instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: suspend_lo_store(struct mddev *mddev, const char *buf, size_t len)
{
unsigned long long old, new;
int err;
err = kstrtoull(buf, 10, &new);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (new != (sector_t)new)
return -EINVAL;
err = mddev_lock(mddev);
if (err)
return err;
err = -EINVAL;
if (mddev->pers == NULL ||
mddev->pers->quiesce == NULL)
goto unlock;
old = mddev->suspend_lo;
mddev->suspend_lo = new;
if (new >= old)
/* Shrinking suspended region */
mddev->pers->quiesce(mddev, 2);
else {
/* Expanding suspended region - need to wait */
mddev->pers->quiesce(mddev, 1);
mddev->pers->quiesce(mddev, 0);
}
err = 0;
unlock:
mddev_unlock(mddev);
return err ?: len;
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cqspi_set_protocol(struct spi_nor *nor, const int read)
{
struct cqspi_flash_pdata *f_pdata = nor->priv;
f_pdata->inst_width = CQSPI_INST_TYPE_SINGLE;
f_pdata->addr_width = CQSPI_INST_TYPE_SINGLE;
f_pdata->data_width = CQSPI_INST_TYPE_SINGLE;
if (read) {
switch (nor->flash_read) {
case SPI_NOR_NORMAL:
case SPI_NOR_FAST:
f_pdata->data_width = CQSPI_INST_TYPE_SINGLE;
break;
case SPI_NOR_DUAL:
f_pdata->data_width = CQSPI_INST_TYPE_DUAL;
break;
case SPI_NOR_QUAD:
f_pdata->data_width = CQSPI_INST_TYPE_QUAD;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
cqspi_configure(nor);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mtd: spi-nor: Off by one in cqspi_setup_flash()
There are CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT elements in the ->f_pdata array so the >
should be >=.
Fixes: 140623410536 ('mtd: spi-nor: Add driver for Cadence Quad SPI Flash Controller')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Cyrille Pitchen <cyrille.pitchen@atmel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 93,683 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int json_equal(json_t *json1, json_t *json2)
{
if(!json1 || !json2)
return 0;
if(json_typeof(json1) != json_typeof(json2))
return 0;
/* this covers true, false and null as they are singletons */
if(json1 == json2)
return 1;
if(json_is_object(json1))
return json_object_equal(json1, json2);
if(json_is_array(json1))
return json_array_equal(json1, json2);
if(json_is_string(json1))
return json_string_equal(json1, json2);
if(json_is_integer(json1))
return json_integer_equal(json1, json2);
if(json_is_real(json1))
return json_real_equal(json1, json2);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 40,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RadioButtonGroupScope* HTMLInputElement::GetRadioButtonGroupScope() const {
if (type() != InputTypeNames::radio)
return nullptr;
if (HTMLFormElement* form_element = Form())
return &form_element->GetRadioButtonGroupScope();
if (isConnected())
return &GetTreeScope().GetRadioButtonGroupScope();
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 AttestationPermissionRequestSheetModel::GetStepDescription()
const {
return l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_WEBAUTHN_REQUEST_ATTESTATION_PERMISSION_DESC,
GetRelyingPartyIdString(dialog_model()));
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bmpw_convert_row_4(const iw_byte *srcrow, iw_byte *dstrow, int width)
{
int i;
for(i=0;i<width;i++) {
if(i%2==0)
dstrow[i/2] = srcrow[i]<<4;
else
dstrow[i/2] |= srcrow[i];
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 64,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
{
return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
}
Commit Message: EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().
Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <ware@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 55,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebFrameScheduler* FrameFetchContext::GetFrameScheduler() {
if (IsDetached())
return nullptr;
return GetFrame()->FrameScheduler();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigatorImpl::CancelNavigation(FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node,
bool inform_renderer) {
if (frame_tree_node->navigation_request() &&
frame_tree_node->navigation_request()->navigation_handle()) {
frame_tree_node->navigation_request()
->navigation_handle()
->set_net_error_code(net::ERR_ABORTED);
}
frame_tree_node->ResetNavigationRequest(false, inform_renderer);
if (frame_tree_node->IsMainFrame())
navigation_data_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Don't preserve NavigationEntry for failed navigations with invalid URLs.
The formatting logic may rewrite such URLs into an unsafe state. This
is a first step before preventing navigations to invalid URLs entirely.
Bug: 850824
Change-Id: I71743bfb4b610d55ce901ee8902125f934a2bb23
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1252942
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597304}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline unsigned short ReadProfileShort(const EndianType endian,
unsigned char *buffer)
{
unsigned short
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned short) ((buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[0]);
return((unsigned short) (value & 0xffff));
}
value=(unsigned short) ((((unsigned char *) buffer)[0] << 8) |
((unsigned char *) buffer)[1]);
return((unsigned short) (value & 0xffff));
}
Commit Message: Fixed SEGV reported in https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/130
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 73,541 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vrend_object_bind_blend(struct vrend_context *ctx,
uint32_t handle)
{
struct pipe_blend_state *state;
if (handle == 0) {
memset(&ctx->sub->blend_state, 0, sizeof(ctx->sub->blend_state));
vrend_blend_enable(ctx, false);
return;
}
state = vrend_object_lookup(ctx->sub->object_hash, handle, VIRGL_OBJECT_BLEND);
if (!state) {
report_context_error(ctx, VIRGL_ERROR_CTX_ILLEGAL_HANDLE, handle);
return;
}
ctx->sub->blend_state = *state;
vrend_hw_emit_blend(ctx, &ctx->sub->blend_state);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 8,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sp<MetaData> DRMSource::getFormat() {
return mOriginalMediaSource->getFormat();
}
Commit Message: Fix security vulnerability in libstagefright
bug: 28175045
Change-Id: Icee6c7eb5b761da4aa3e412fb71825508d74d38f
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::FilePath DestinationFile(Browser* browser, const base::FilePath& file) {
return GetDownloadDirectory(browser).Append(file.BaseName());
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 151,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoTraceEndCHROMIUM() {
if (gpu_tracer_->CurrentName().empty()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glTraceEndCHROMIUM", "no trace begin found");
return;
}
TRACE_EVENT_COPY_ASYNC_END0("gpu", gpu_tracer_->CurrentName().c_str(), this);
gpu_tracer_->End(kTraceCHROMIUM);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int IPCThreadState::setupPolling(int* fd)
{
if (mProcess->mDriverFD <= 0) {
return -EBADF;
}
mOut.writeInt32(BC_ENTER_LOOPER);
*fd = mProcess->mDriverFD;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #27252896: Security Vulnerability -- weak binder
Sending transaction to freed BBinder through weak handle
can cause use of a (mostly) freed object. We need to try to
safely promote to a strong reference first.
Change-Id: Ic9c6940fa824980472e94ed2dfeca52a6b0fd342
(cherry picked from commit c11146106f94e07016e8e26e4f8628f9a0c73199)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnZoomLevelChanged(const base::Closure& callback,
const HostZoomMap::ZoomLevelChange& host) {
callback.Run();
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u16 SQLITE_NOINLINE computeNumericType(Mem *pMem){
assert( (pMem->flags & (MEM_Int|MEM_Real))==0 );
assert( (pMem->flags & (MEM_Str|MEM_Blob))!=0 );
if( sqlite3AtoF(pMem->z, &pMem->u.r, pMem->n, pMem->enc)==0 ){
return 0;
}
if( sqlite3Atoi64(pMem->z, &pMem->u.i, pMem->n, pMem->enc)==SQLITE_OK ){
return MEM_Int;
}
return MEM_Real;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_da_grow_inode(
struct xfs_da_args *args,
xfs_dablk_t *new_blkno)
{
xfs_fileoff_t bno;
int count;
int error;
trace_xfs_da_grow_inode(args);
if (args->whichfork == XFS_DATA_FORK) {
bno = args->dp->i_mount->m_dirleafblk;
count = args->dp->i_mount->m_dirblkfsbs;
} else {
bno = 0;
count = 1;
}
error = xfs_da_grow_inode_int(args, &bno, count);
if (!error)
*new_blkno = (xfs_dablk_t)bno;
return error;
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix directory hash ordering bug
Commit f5ea1100 ("xfs: add CRCs to dir2/da node blocks") introduced
in 3.10 incorrectly converted the btree hash index array pointer in
xfs_da3_fixhashpath(). It resulted in the the current hash always
being compared against the first entry in the btree rather than the
current block index into the btree block's hash entry array. As a
result, it was comparing the wrong hashes, and so could misorder the
entries in the btree.
For most cases, this doesn't cause any problems as it requires hash
collisions to expose the ordering problem. However, when there are
hash collisions within a directory there is a very good probability
that the entries will be ordered incorrectly and that actually
matters when duplicate hashes are placed into or removed from the
btree block hash entry array.
This bug results in an on-disk directory corruption and that results
in directory verifier functions throwing corruption warnings into
the logs. While no data or directory entries are lost, access to
them may be compromised, and attempts to remove entries from a
directory that has suffered from this corruption may result in a
filesystem shutdown. xfs_repair will fix the directory hash
ordering without data loss occuring.
[dchinner: wrote useful a commit message]
cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::ProcessMouseWheelEvent(
const blink::WebMouseWheelEvent& event,
const ui::LatencyInfo& latency) {
host_->ForwardWheelEventWithLatencyInfo(event, latency);
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,290 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void JPEGImageDecoder::jpegComplete()
{
if (m_frameBufferCache.isEmpty())
return;
ImageFrame& buffer = m_frameBufferCache[0];
buffer.setHasAlpha(false);
buffer.setStatus(ImageFrame::FrameComplete);
}
Commit Message: Progressive JPEG outputScanlines() calls should handle failure
outputScanlines() can fail and delete |this|, so any attempt to access
members thereafter should be avoided. Copy the decoder pointer member,
and use that copy to detect and handle the failure case.
BUG=232763
R=pkasting@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/14844003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150545 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,076 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint16_t ReadLE16(const uint8_t *data, size_t data_size,
uint32_t read_offset) {
if (read_offset + 1 > data_size)
return 0;
uint16_t val;
val = data[read_offset];
val |= data[read_offset + 1] << 8;
return val;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (vorbis|opus)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: I1ccdd16a00741da072527a6d13e87fd7c7fe8c54
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,605 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int is_dx_internal_node(struct inode *dir, ext4_lblk_t block,
struct ext4_dir_entry *de)
{
struct super_block *sb = dir->i_sb;
if (!is_dx(dir))
return 0;
if (block == 0)
return 1;
if (de->inode == 0 &&
ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, sb->s_blocksize) ==
sb->s_blocksize)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FrameFetchContext::IsSVGImageChromeClient() const {
if (IsDetached())
return frozen_state_->is_svg_image_chrome_client;
return GetFrame()->GetChromeClient().IsSVGImageChromeClient();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual bool MyIpAddress(std::string* ip_address) {
my_ip_address_count++;
*ip_address = my_ip_address_result;
return !my_ip_address_result.empty();
}
Commit Message: Test for error in handling getters changing element kind.
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Merged-In: I99def991ebcb7c26ba7ca4b4b31ef1cdeaea7721
Change-Id: I99def991ebcb7c26ba7ca4b4b31ef1cdeaea7721
(cherry picked from commit 59b9b11a462fe3aad313b8538fb98468f22d9095)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 164,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8Proxy::clearForNavigation()
{
resetIsolatedWorlds();
windowShell()->clearForNavigation();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void t2p_read_tiff_init(T2P* t2p, TIFF* input){
tdir_t directorycount=0;
tdir_t i=0;
uint16 pagen=0;
uint16 paged=0;
uint16 xuint16=0;
directorycount=TIFFNumberOfDirectories(input);
t2p->tiff_pages = (T2P_PAGE*) _TIFFmalloc(TIFFSafeMultiply(tmsize_t,directorycount,sizeof(T2P_PAGE)));
if(t2p->tiff_pages==NULL){
TIFFError(
TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate " TIFF_SIZE_FORMAT " bytes of memory for tiff_pages array, %s",
(TIFF_SIZE_T) directorycount * sizeof(T2P_PAGE),
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return;
}
_TIFFmemset( t2p->tiff_pages, 0x00, directorycount * sizeof(T2P_PAGE));
t2p->tiff_tiles = (T2P_TILES*) _TIFFmalloc(TIFFSafeMultiply(tmsize_t,directorycount,sizeof(T2P_TILES)));
if(t2p->tiff_tiles==NULL){
TIFFError(
TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate " TIFF_SIZE_FORMAT " bytes of memory for tiff_tiles array, %s",
(TIFF_SIZE_T) directorycount * sizeof(T2P_TILES),
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return;
}
_TIFFmemset( t2p->tiff_tiles, 0x00, directorycount * sizeof(T2P_TILES));
for(i=0;i<directorycount;i++){
uint32 subfiletype = 0;
if(!TIFFSetDirectory(input, i)){
TIFFError(
TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't set directory %u of input file %s",
i,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return;
}
if(TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER, &pagen, &paged)){
if((pagen>paged) && (paged != 0)){
t2p->tiff_pages[t2p->tiff_pagecount].page_number =
paged;
} else {
t2p->tiff_pages[t2p->tiff_pagecount].page_number =
pagen;
}
goto ispage2;
}
if(TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_SUBFILETYPE, &subfiletype)){
if ( ((subfiletype & FILETYPE_PAGE) != 0)
|| (subfiletype == 0)){
goto ispage;
} else {
goto isnotpage;
}
}
if(TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_OSUBFILETYPE, &subfiletype)){
if ((subfiletype == OFILETYPE_IMAGE)
|| (subfiletype == OFILETYPE_PAGE)
|| (subfiletype == 0) ){
goto ispage;
} else {
goto isnotpage;
}
}
ispage:
t2p->tiff_pages[t2p->tiff_pagecount].page_number=t2p->tiff_pagecount;
ispage2:
t2p->tiff_pages[t2p->tiff_pagecount].page_directory=i;
if(TIFFIsTiled(input)){
t2p->tiff_pages[t2p->tiff_pagecount].page_tilecount =
TIFFNumberOfTiles(input);
}
t2p->tiff_pagecount++;
isnotpage:
(void)0;
}
qsort((void*) t2p->tiff_pages, t2p->tiff_pagecount,
sizeof(T2P_PAGE), t2p_cmp_t2p_page);
for(i=0;i<t2p->tiff_pagecount;i++){
t2p->pdf_xrefcount += 5;
TIFFSetDirectory(input, t2p->tiff_pages[i].page_directory );
if((TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, &xuint16)
&& (xuint16==PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE))
|| TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_INDEXED, &xuint16)) {
t2p->tiff_pages[i].page_extra++;
t2p->pdf_xrefcount++;
}
#ifdef ZIP_SUPPORT
if (TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, &xuint16)) {
if( (xuint16== COMPRESSION_DEFLATE ||
xuint16== COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE) &&
((t2p->tiff_pages[i].page_tilecount != 0)
|| TIFFNumberOfStrips(input)==1) &&
(t2p->pdf_nopassthrough==0) ){
if(t2p->pdf_minorversion<2){t2p->pdf_minorversion=2;}
}
}
#endif
if (TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_TRANSFERFUNCTION,
&(t2p->tiff_transferfunction[0]),
&(t2p->tiff_transferfunction[1]),
&(t2p->tiff_transferfunction[2]))) {
if((t2p->tiff_transferfunction[1] != (float*) NULL) &&
(t2p->tiff_transferfunction[2] != (float*) NULL) &&
(t2p->tiff_transferfunction[1] !=
t2p->tiff_transferfunction[0])) {
t2p->tiff_transferfunctioncount = 3;
t2p->tiff_pages[i].page_extra += 4;
t2p->pdf_xrefcount += 4;
} else {
t2p->tiff_transferfunctioncount = 1;
t2p->tiff_pages[i].page_extra += 2;
t2p->pdf_xrefcount += 2;
}
if(t2p->pdf_minorversion < 2)
t2p->pdf_minorversion = 2;
} else {
t2p->tiff_transferfunctioncount=0;
}
if( TIFFGetField(
input,
TIFFTAG_ICCPROFILE,
&(t2p->tiff_iccprofilelength),
&(t2p->tiff_iccprofile)) != 0){
t2p->tiff_pages[i].page_extra++;
t2p->pdf_xrefcount++;
if(t2p->pdf_minorversion<3){t2p->pdf_minorversion=3;}
}
t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tilecount=
t2p->tiff_pages[i].page_tilecount;
if( (TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG, &xuint16) != 0)
&& (xuint16 == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE ) ){
if( !TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL, &xuint16) )
{
TIFFError(
TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Missing SamplesPerPixel, %s",
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return;
}
if( (t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tilecount % xuint16) != 0 )
{
TIFFError(
TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Invalid tile count, %s",
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return;
}
t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tilecount/= xuint16;
}
if( t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tilecount > 0){
t2p->pdf_xrefcount +=
(t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tilecount -1)*2;
TIFFGetField(input,
TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH,
&( t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tilewidth) );
TIFFGetField(input,
TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH,
&( t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tilelength) );
t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tiles =
(T2P_TILE*) _TIFFmalloc(TIFFSafeMultiply(tmsize_t,t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tilecount,
sizeof(T2P_TILE)) );
if( t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tiles == NULL){
TIFFError(
TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate " TIFF_SIZE_FORMAT " bytes of memory for t2p_read_tiff_init, %s",
(TIFF_SIZE_T) t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tilecount * sizeof(T2P_TILE),
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return;
}
}
}
return;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 48,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Notification::dispatchShowEvent()
{
dispatchEvent(Event::create(EventTypeNames::show));
}
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
CWE ID: | 0 | 119,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_refptr<Extension> Extension::Create(const FilePath& path,
Location location,
const DictionaryValue& value,
int flags,
std::string* error) {
scoped_refptr<Extension> extension = new Extension(path, location);
if (!extension->InitFromValue(value, flags, error))
return NULL;
return extension;
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,713 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ProfilingProcessHost::RequestProcessReport(std::string trigger_name) {
DCHECK(content::BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(content::BrowserThread::UI));
if (!connector_) {
DLOG(ERROR)
<< "Requesting process dump when profiling process hasn't started.";
return;
}
bool result = content::TracingController::GetInstance()->StartTracing(
GetBackgroundTracingConfig(), base::Closure());
if (!result)
return;
auto finish_sink_callback = base::Bind(
[](std::string trigger_name,
std::unique_ptr<const base::DictionaryValue> metadata,
base::RefCountedString* in) {
std::string result;
result.swap(in->data());
content::BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(
content::BrowserThread::UI)
->PostTask(FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&UploadTraceToCrashServer,
std::move(result),
std::move(trigger_name)));
},
std::move(trigger_name));
scoped_refptr<content::TracingController::TraceDataEndpoint> sink =
content::TracingController::CreateStringEndpoint(
std::move(finish_sink_callback));
base::OnceClosure stop_tracing_closure = base::BindOnce(
base::IgnoreResult<bool (content::TracingController::*)( // NOLINT
const scoped_refptr<content::TracingController::TraceDataEndpoint>&)>(
&content::TracingController::StopTracing),
base::Unretained(content::TracingController::GetInstance()), sink);
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE, std::move(stop_tracing_closure),
base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(10));
}
Commit Message: [Reland #1] Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
The original CL added a javatest and its dependencies to the apk_under_test.
This causes the dependencies to be stripped from the instrumentation_apk, which
causes issue. This CL updates the build configuration so that the javatest and
its dependencies are only added to the instrumentation_apk.
This is a reland of e0b4355f0651adb1ebc2c513dc4410471af712f5
Original change's description:
> Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
>
> This CL has three components:
> 1) The bulk of the logic in OOP HP was refactored into ProfilingTestDriver.
> 2) Adds a java instrumentation test, along with a JNI shim that forwards into
> ProfilingTestDriver.
> 3) Creates a new apk: chrome_public_apk_for_test that contains the same
> content as chrome_public_apk, as well as native files needed for (2).
> chrome_public_apk_test now targets chrome_public_apk_for_test instead of
> chrome_public_apk.
>
> Other ideas, discarded:
> * Originally, I attempted to make the browser_tests target runnable on
> Android. The primary problem is that native test harness cannot fork
> or spawn processes. This is difficult to solve.
>
> More details on each of the components:
> (1) ProfilingTestDriver
> * The TracingController test was migrated to use ProfilingTestDriver, but the
> write-to-file test was left as-is. The latter behavior will likely be phased
> out, but I'll clean that up in a future CL.
> * gtest isn't supported for Android instrumentation tests. ProfilingTestDriver
> has a single function RunTest that returns a 'bool' indicating success. On
> failure, the class uses LOG(ERROR) to print the nature of the error. This will
> cause the error to be printed out on browser_test error. On instrumentation
> test failure, the error will be forwarded to logcat, which is available on all
> infra bot test runs.
> (2) Instrumentation test
> * For now, I only added a single test for the "browser" mode. Furthermore, I'm
> only testing the start with command-line path.
> (3) New apk
> * libchromefortest is a new shared library that contains all content from
> libchrome, but also contains native sources for the JNI shim.
> * chrome_public_apk_for_test is a new apk that contains all content from
> chrome_public_apk, but uses a single shared library libchromefortest rather
> than libchrome. This also contains java sources for the JNI shim.
> * There is no way to just add a second shared library to chrome_public_apk
> that just contains the native sources from the JNI shim without causing ODR
> issues.
> * chrome_public_test_apk now has apk_under_test = chrome_public_apk_for_test.
> * There is no way to add native JNI sources as a shared library to
> chrome_public_test_apk without causing ODR issues.
>
> Finally, this CL drastically increases the timeout to wait for native
> initialization. The previous timeout was 2 *
> CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL, which flakily failed for this test.
> This suggests that this step/timeout is generally flaky. I increased the timeout
> to 20 * CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL.
>
> Bug: 753218
> Change-Id: Ic224b7314fff57f1770a4048aa5753f54e040b55
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/770148
> Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Brett Wilson <brettw@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517541}
Bug: 753218
TBR: brettw@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ic6aafb34c2467253f75cc85da48200d19f3bc9af
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/777697
Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517850}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 150,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int V8Debugger::getGroupId(v8::Local<v8::Context> context)
{
v8::Local<v8::Value> data = context->GetEmbedderData(static_cast<int>(v8::Context::kDebugIdIndex));
if (data.IsEmpty() || !data->IsString())
return 0;
String16 dataString = toProtocolString(data.As<v8::String>());
if (dataString.isEmpty())
return 0;
size_t commaPos = dataString.find(",");
if (commaPos == String16::kNotFound)
return 0;
return dataString.substring(0, commaPos).toInteger();
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void update_defense_level(void)
{
struct sysinfo i;
static int old_secure_tcp = 0;
int availmem;
int nomem;
int to_change = -1;
/* we only count free and buffered memory (in pages) */
si_meminfo(&i);
availmem = i.freeram + i.bufferram;
/* however in linux 2.5 the i.bufferram is total page cache size,
we need adjust it */
/* si_swapinfo(&i); */
/* availmem = availmem - (i.totalswap - i.freeswap); */
nomem = (availmem < sysctl_ip_vs_amemthresh);
local_bh_disable();
/* drop_entry */
spin_lock(&__ip_vs_dropentry_lock);
switch (sysctl_ip_vs_drop_entry) {
case 0:
atomic_set(&ip_vs_dropentry, 0);
break;
case 1:
if (nomem) {
atomic_set(&ip_vs_dropentry, 1);
sysctl_ip_vs_drop_entry = 2;
} else {
atomic_set(&ip_vs_dropentry, 0);
}
break;
case 2:
if (nomem) {
atomic_set(&ip_vs_dropentry, 1);
} else {
atomic_set(&ip_vs_dropentry, 0);
sysctl_ip_vs_drop_entry = 1;
};
break;
case 3:
atomic_set(&ip_vs_dropentry, 1);
break;
}
spin_unlock(&__ip_vs_dropentry_lock);
/* drop_packet */
spin_lock(&__ip_vs_droppacket_lock);
switch (sysctl_ip_vs_drop_packet) {
case 0:
ip_vs_drop_rate = 0;
break;
case 1:
if (nomem) {
ip_vs_drop_rate = ip_vs_drop_counter
= sysctl_ip_vs_amemthresh /
(sysctl_ip_vs_amemthresh-availmem);
sysctl_ip_vs_drop_packet = 2;
} else {
ip_vs_drop_rate = 0;
}
break;
case 2:
if (nomem) {
ip_vs_drop_rate = ip_vs_drop_counter
= sysctl_ip_vs_amemthresh /
(sysctl_ip_vs_amemthresh-availmem);
} else {
ip_vs_drop_rate = 0;
sysctl_ip_vs_drop_packet = 1;
}
break;
case 3:
ip_vs_drop_rate = sysctl_ip_vs_am_droprate;
break;
}
spin_unlock(&__ip_vs_droppacket_lock);
/* secure_tcp */
write_lock(&__ip_vs_securetcp_lock);
switch (sysctl_ip_vs_secure_tcp) {
case 0:
if (old_secure_tcp >= 2)
to_change = 0;
break;
case 1:
if (nomem) {
if (old_secure_tcp < 2)
to_change = 1;
sysctl_ip_vs_secure_tcp = 2;
} else {
if (old_secure_tcp >= 2)
to_change = 0;
}
break;
case 2:
if (nomem) {
if (old_secure_tcp < 2)
to_change = 1;
} else {
if (old_secure_tcp >= 2)
to_change = 0;
sysctl_ip_vs_secure_tcp = 1;
}
break;
case 3:
if (old_secure_tcp < 2)
to_change = 1;
break;
}
old_secure_tcp = sysctl_ip_vs_secure_tcp;
if (to_change >= 0)
ip_vs_protocol_timeout_change(sysctl_ip_vs_secure_tcp>1);
write_unlock(&__ip_vs_securetcp_lock);
local_bh_enable();
}
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned ucvector_push_back(ucvector* p, unsigned char c)
{
if(!ucvector_resize(p, p->size + 1)) return 0;
p->data[p->size - 1] = c;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CIFSSMBPosixLock(const int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
const __u16 smb_file_id, const int get_flag, const __u64 len,
struct file_lock *pLockData, const __u16 lock_type,
const bool waitFlag)
{
struct smb_com_transaction2_sfi_req *pSMB = NULL;
struct smb_com_transaction2_sfi_rsp *pSMBr = NULL;
struct cifs_posix_lock *parm_data;
int rc = 0;
int timeout = 0;
int bytes_returned = 0;
int resp_buf_type = 0;
__u16 params, param_offset, offset, byte_count, count;
struct kvec iov[1];
cFYI(1, "Posix Lock");
if (pLockData == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
rc = small_smb_init(SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2, 15, tcon, (void **) &pSMB);
if (rc)
return rc;
pSMBr = (struct smb_com_transaction2_sfi_rsp *)pSMB;
params = 6;
pSMB->MaxSetupCount = 0;
pSMB->Reserved = 0;
pSMB->Flags = 0;
pSMB->Reserved2 = 0;
param_offset = offsetof(struct smb_com_transaction2_sfi_req, Fid) - 4;
offset = param_offset + params;
count = sizeof(struct cifs_posix_lock);
pSMB->MaxParameterCount = cpu_to_le16(2);
pSMB->MaxDataCount = cpu_to_le16(1000); /* BB find max SMB from sess */
pSMB->SetupCount = 1;
pSMB->Reserved3 = 0;
if (get_flag)
pSMB->SubCommand = cpu_to_le16(TRANS2_QUERY_FILE_INFORMATION);
else
pSMB->SubCommand = cpu_to_le16(TRANS2_SET_FILE_INFORMATION);
byte_count = 3 /* pad */ + params + count;
pSMB->DataCount = cpu_to_le16(count);
pSMB->ParameterCount = cpu_to_le16(params);
pSMB->TotalDataCount = pSMB->DataCount;
pSMB->TotalParameterCount = pSMB->ParameterCount;
pSMB->ParameterOffset = cpu_to_le16(param_offset);
parm_data = (struct cifs_posix_lock *)
(((char *) &pSMB->hdr.Protocol) + offset);
parm_data->lock_type = cpu_to_le16(lock_type);
if (waitFlag) {
timeout = CIFS_BLOCKING_OP; /* blocking operation, no timeout */
parm_data->lock_flags = cpu_to_le16(1);
pSMB->Timeout = cpu_to_le32(-1);
} else
pSMB->Timeout = 0;
parm_data->pid = cpu_to_le32(current->tgid);
parm_data->start = cpu_to_le64(pLockData->fl_start);
parm_data->length = cpu_to_le64(len); /* normalize negative numbers */
pSMB->DataOffset = cpu_to_le16(offset);
pSMB->Fid = smb_file_id;
pSMB->InformationLevel = cpu_to_le16(SMB_SET_POSIX_LOCK);
pSMB->Reserved4 = 0;
inc_rfc1001_len(pSMB, byte_count);
pSMB->ByteCount = cpu_to_le16(byte_count);
if (waitFlag) {
rc = SendReceiveBlockingLock(xid, tcon, (struct smb_hdr *) pSMB,
(struct smb_hdr *) pSMBr, &bytes_returned);
} else {
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)pSMB;
iov[0].iov_len = be32_to_cpu(pSMB->hdr.smb_buf_length) + 4;
rc = SendReceive2(xid, tcon->ses, iov, 1 /* num iovecs */,
&resp_buf_type, timeout);
pSMB = NULL; /* request buf already freed by SendReceive2. Do
not try to free it twice below on exit */
pSMBr = (struct smb_com_transaction2_sfi_rsp *)iov[0].iov_base;
}
if (rc) {
cFYI(1, "Send error in Posix Lock = %d", rc);
} else if (get_flag) {
/* lock structure can be returned on get */
__u16 data_offset;
__u16 data_count;
rc = validate_t2((struct smb_t2_rsp *)pSMBr);
if (rc || get_bcc(&pSMBr->hdr) < sizeof(*parm_data)) {
rc = -EIO; /* bad smb */
goto plk_err_exit;
}
data_offset = le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->t2.DataOffset);
data_count = le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->t2.DataCount);
if (data_count < sizeof(struct cifs_posix_lock)) {
rc = -EIO;
goto plk_err_exit;
}
parm_data = (struct cifs_posix_lock *)
((char *)&pSMBr->hdr.Protocol + data_offset);
if (parm_data->lock_type == __constant_cpu_to_le16(CIFS_UNLCK))
pLockData->fl_type = F_UNLCK;
else {
if (parm_data->lock_type ==
__constant_cpu_to_le16(CIFS_RDLCK))
pLockData->fl_type = F_RDLCK;
else if (parm_data->lock_type ==
__constant_cpu_to_le16(CIFS_WRLCK))
pLockData->fl_type = F_WRLCK;
pLockData->fl_start = le64_to_cpu(parm_data->start);
pLockData->fl_end = pLockData->fl_start +
le64_to_cpu(parm_data->length) - 1;
pLockData->fl_pid = le32_to_cpu(parm_data->pid);
}
}
plk_err_exit:
if (pSMB)
cifs_small_buf_release(pSMB);
if (resp_buf_type == CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER)
cifs_small_buf_release(iov[0].iov_base);
else if (resp_buf_type == CIFS_LARGE_BUFFER)
cifs_buf_release(iov[0].iov_base);
/* Note: On -EAGAIN error only caller can retry on handle based calls
since file handle passed in no longer valid */
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix possible memory corruption in CIFSFindNext
The name_len variable in CIFSFindNext is a signed int that gets set to
the resume_name_len in the cifs_search_info. The resume_name_len however
is unsigned and for some infolevels is populated directly from a 32 bit
value sent by the server.
If the server sends a very large value for this, then that value could
look negative when converted to a signed int. That would make that
value pass the PATH_MAX check later in CIFSFindNext. The name_len would
then be used as a length value for a memcpy. It would then be treated
as unsigned again, and the memcpy scribbles over a ton of memory.
Fix this by making the name_len an unsigned value in CIFSFindNext.
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Darren Lavender <dcl@hppine99.gbr.hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int net_cmd(struct priv_net *pn, int command, void *arg, int alen)
{
uint32_t rc;
int len;
int cmd;
if (net_send(pn->pn_s, command, arg, alen) == -1)
{
return -1;
}
len = sizeof(rc);
cmd = net_get_nopacket(pn, &rc, &len);
if (cmd == -1)
{
return -1;
}
assert(cmd == NET_RC);
assert(len == sizeof(rc));
return ntohl(rc);
}
Commit Message: OSdep: Fixed segmentation fault that happens with a malicious server sending a negative length (Closes #16 on GitHub).
git-svn-id: http://svn.aircrack-ng.org/trunk@2419 28c6078b-6c39-48e3-add9-af49d547ecab
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void UnrestrictedDoubleOrStringAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "unrestrictedDoubleOrStringAttribute");
UnrestrictedDoubleOrString cpp_value;
V8UnrestrictedDoubleOrString::ToImpl(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, cpp_value, UnionTypeConversionMode::kNotNullable, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setUnrestrictedDoubleOrStringAttribute(cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,280 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(forward_static_call_array)
{
zval *params, *retval_ptr = NULL;
zend_fcall_info fci;
zend_fcall_info_cache fci_cache;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "fa/", &fci, &fci_cache, ¶ms) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
zend_fcall_info_args(&fci, params TSRMLS_CC);
fci.retval_ptr_ptr = &retval_ptr;
if (EG(called_scope) &&
instanceof_function(EG(called_scope), fci_cache.calling_scope TSRMLS_CC)) {
fci_cache.called_scope = EG(called_scope);
}
if (zend_call_function(&fci, &fci_cache TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS && fci.retval_ptr_ptr && *fci.retval_ptr_ptr) {
COPY_PZVAL_TO_ZVAL(*return_value, *fci.retval_ptr_ptr);
}
zend_fcall_info_args_clear(&fci, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
{
struct idpair *idmap;
bool ret = false;
int i;
idmap = kcalloc(ID_MAP_SIZE, sizeof(struct idpair), GFP_KERNEL);
/* If we failed to allocate the idmap, just say it's not safe */
if (!idmap)
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
if (!regsafe(&old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], idmap))
goto out_free;
}
if (!stacksafe(old, cur, idmap))
goto out_free;
ret = true;
out_free:
kfree(idmap);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 59,174 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QQuickWebViewExperimental::evaluateJavaScript(const QString& script, const QJSValue& value)
{
JSCallbackClosure* closure = new JSCallbackClosure;
closure->receiver = this;
closure->value = value;
d_ptr->webPageProxy.get()->runJavaScriptInMainFrame(script, ScriptValueCallback::create(closure, javaScriptCallback));
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ResourceRequestBlockedReason CanRequestInternal(
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reporting_policy) {
KURL input_url(kParsedURLString, "http://example.com/");
ResourceRequest resource_request(input_url);
resource_request.SetFetchCredentialsMode(
WebURLRequest::kFetchCredentialsModeOmit);
ResourceLoaderOptions options;
return fetch_context->CanRequest(
Resource::kImage, resource_request, input_url, options,
reporting_policy, FetchParameters::kUseDefaultOriginRestrictionForType,
ResourceRequest::RedirectStatus::kNoRedirect);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,784 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void snd_seq_autoload_exit(void)
{
atomic_inc(&snd_seq_in_init);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Cancel pending autoload work at unbinding device
ALSA sequencer core has a mechanism to load the enumerated devices
automatically, and it's performed in an off-load work. This seems
causing some race when a sequencer is removed while the pending
autoload work is running. As syzkaller spotted, it may lead to some
use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_rawmidi_dev_seq_free+0x69/0x70
sound/core/rawmidi.c:1617
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88006c611d90 by task kworker/2:1/567
CPU: 2 PID: 567 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 4.13.0+ #29
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events autoload_drivers
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline]
dump_stack+0x192/0x22c lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x230/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_store8_noabort+0x1c/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:435
snd_rawmidi_dev_seq_free+0x69/0x70 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1617
snd_seq_dev_release+0x4f/0x70 sound/core/seq_device.c:192
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:648 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:677 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:70 [inline]
kobject_put+0x145/0x240 lib/kobject.c:694
put_device+0x25/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:1799
klist_devices_put+0x36/0x40 drivers/base/bus.c:827
klist_next+0x264/0x4a0 lib/klist.c:403
next_device drivers/base/bus.c:270 [inline]
bus_for_each_dev+0x17e/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:312
autoload_drivers+0x3b/0x50 sound/core/seq_device.c:117
process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1570 kernel/workqueue.c:2097
worker_thread+0x1e4/0x1350 kernel/workqueue.c:2231
kthread+0x324/0x3f0 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:425
The fix is simply to assure canceling the autoload work at removing
the device.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int add_overflow(int a, int b)
{
return (INT_MAX - a) < b;
}
Commit Message: unsquashfs-4: Add more sanity checks + fix CVE-2015-4645/6
Add more filesystem table sanity checks to Unsquashfs-4 and
also properly fix CVE-2015-4645 and CVE-2015-4646.
The CVEs were raised due to Unsquashfs having variable
oveflow and stack overflow in a number of vulnerable
functions.
The suggested patch only "fixed" one such function and fixed
it badly, and so it was buggy and introduced extra bugs!
The suggested patch was not only buggy, but, it used the
essentially wrong approach too. It was "fixing" the
symptom but not the cause. The symptom is wrong values
causing overflow, the cause is filesystem corruption.
This corruption should be detected and the filesystem
rejected *before* trying to allocate memory.
This patch applies the following fixes:
1. The filesystem super-block tables are checked, and the values
must match across the filesystem.
This will trap corrupted filesystems created by Mksquashfs.
2. The maximum (theorectical) size the filesystem tables could grow
to, were analysed, and some variables were increased from int to
long long.
This analysis has been added as comments.
3. Stack allocation was removed, and a shared buffer (which is
checked and increased as necessary) is used to read the
table indexes.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 74,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport void SetBlobExempt(Image *image,const MagickBooleanType exempt)
{
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
image->blob->exempt=exempt;
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 88,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void DetectRunTx(ThreadVars *tv,
DetectEngineCtx *de_ctx,
DetectEngineThreadCtx *det_ctx,
Packet *p,
Flow *f,
DetectRunScratchpad *scratch)
{
const uint8_t flow_flags = scratch->flow_flags;
const SigGroupHead * const sgh = scratch->sgh;
void * const alstate = f->alstate;
const uint8_t ipproto = f->proto;
const AppProto alproto = f->alproto;
const uint64_t total_txs = AppLayerParserGetTxCnt(f, alstate);
uint64_t tx_id = AppLayerParserGetTransactionInspectId(f->alparser, flow_flags);
const int tx_end_state = AppLayerParserGetStateProgressCompletionStatus(alproto, flow_flags);
for ( ; tx_id < total_txs; tx_id++) {
DetectTransaction tx = GetTx(ipproto, alproto,
alstate, tx_id, tx_end_state, flow_flags);
if (tx.tx_ptr == NULL) {
SCLogDebug("%p/%"PRIu64" no transaction to inspect",
tx.tx_ptr, tx_id);
continue;
}
uint32_t array_idx = 0;
uint32_t total_rules = det_ctx->match_array_cnt;
total_rules += (tx.de_state ? tx.de_state->cnt : 0);
/* run prefilter engines and merge results into a candidates array */
if (sgh->tx_engines) {
PACKET_PROFILING_DETECT_START(p, PROF_DETECT_PF_TX);
DetectRunPrefilterTx(det_ctx, sgh, p, ipproto, flow_flags, alproto,
alstate, &tx);
PACKET_PROFILING_DETECT_END(p, PROF_DETECT_PF_TX);
SCLogDebug("%p/%"PRIu64" rules added from prefilter: %u candidates",
tx.tx_ptr, tx_id, det_ctx->pmq.rule_id_array_cnt);
total_rules += det_ctx->pmq.rule_id_array_cnt;
if (!(RuleMatchCandidateTxArrayHasSpace(det_ctx, total_rules))) {
RuleMatchCandidateTxArrayExpand(det_ctx, total_rules);
}
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < det_ctx->pmq.rule_id_array_cnt; i++) {
const Signature *s = de_ctx->sig_array[det_ctx->pmq.rule_id_array[i]];
const SigIntId id = s->num;
det_ctx->tx_candidates[array_idx].s = s;
det_ctx->tx_candidates[array_idx].id = id;
det_ctx->tx_candidates[array_idx].flags = NULL;
det_ctx->tx_candidates[array_idx].stream_reset = 0;
array_idx++;
}
} else {
if (!(RuleMatchCandidateTxArrayHasSpace(det_ctx, total_rules))) {
RuleMatchCandidateTxArrayExpand(det_ctx, total_rules);
}
}
/* merge 'state' rules from the regular prefilter */
uint32_t x = array_idx;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < det_ctx->match_array_cnt; i++) {
const Signature *s = det_ctx->match_array[i];
if (s->flags & SIG_FLAG_STATE_MATCH) {
const SigIntId id = s->num;
det_ctx->tx_candidates[array_idx].s = s;
det_ctx->tx_candidates[array_idx].id = id;
det_ctx->tx_candidates[array_idx].flags = NULL;
det_ctx->tx_candidates[array_idx].stream_reset = 0;
array_idx++;
SCLogDebug("%p/%"PRIu64" rule %u (%u) added from 'match' list",
tx.tx_ptr, tx_id, s->id, id);
}
}
SCLogDebug("%p/%"PRIu64" rules added from 'match' list: %u",
tx.tx_ptr, tx_id, array_idx - x); (void)x;
/* merge stored state into results */
if (tx.de_state != NULL) {
const uint32_t old = array_idx;
/* if tx.de_state->flags has 'new file' set and sig below has
* 'file inspected' flag, reset the file part of the state */
const bool have_new_file = (tx.de_state->flags & DETECT_ENGINE_STATE_FLAG_FILE_NEW);
if (have_new_file) {
SCLogDebug("%p/%"PRIu64" destate: need to consider new file",
tx.tx_ptr, tx_id);
tx.de_state->flags &= ~DETECT_ENGINE_STATE_FLAG_FILE_NEW;
}
SigIntId state_cnt = 0;
DeStateStore *tx_store = tx.de_state->head;
for (; tx_store != NULL; tx_store = tx_store->next) {
SCLogDebug("tx_store %p", tx_store);
SigIntId store_cnt = 0;
for (store_cnt = 0;
store_cnt < DE_STATE_CHUNK_SIZE && state_cnt < tx.de_state->cnt;
store_cnt++, state_cnt++)
{
DeStateStoreItem *item = &tx_store->store[store_cnt];
SCLogDebug("rule id %u, inspect_flags %u", item->sid, item->flags);
if (have_new_file && (item->flags & DE_STATE_FLAG_FILE_INSPECT)) {
/* remove part of the state. File inspect engine will now
* be able to run again */
item->flags &= ~(DE_STATE_FLAG_SIG_CANT_MATCH|DE_STATE_FLAG_FULL_INSPECT|DE_STATE_FLAG_FILE_INSPECT);
SCLogDebug("rule id %u, post file reset inspect_flags %u", item->sid, item->flags);
}
det_ctx->tx_candidates[array_idx].s = de_ctx->sig_array[item->sid];
det_ctx->tx_candidates[array_idx].id = item->sid;
det_ctx->tx_candidates[array_idx].flags = &item->flags;
det_ctx->tx_candidates[array_idx].stream_reset = 0;
array_idx++;
}
}
if (old && old != array_idx) {
qsort(det_ctx->tx_candidates, array_idx, sizeof(RuleMatchCandidateTx),
DetectRunTxSortHelper);
SCLogDebug("%p/%"PRIu64" rules added from 'continue' list: %u",
tx.tx_ptr, tx_id, array_idx - old);
}
}
det_ctx->tx_id = tx_id;
det_ctx->tx_id_set = 1;
det_ctx->p = p;
/* run rules: inspect the match candidates */
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < array_idx; i++) {
RuleMatchCandidateTx *can = &det_ctx->tx_candidates[i];
const Signature *s = det_ctx->tx_candidates[i].s;
uint32_t *inspect_flags = det_ctx->tx_candidates[i].flags;
/* deduplicate: rules_array is sorted, but not deduplicated:
* both mpm and stored state could give us the same sid.
* As they are back to back in that case we can check for it
* here. We select the stored state one. */
if ((i + 1) < array_idx) {
if (det_ctx->tx_candidates[i].s == det_ctx->tx_candidates[i+1].s) {
if (det_ctx->tx_candidates[i].flags != NULL) {
i++;
SCLogDebug("%p/%"PRIu64" inspecting SKIP NEXT: sid %u (%u), flags %08x",
tx.tx_ptr, tx_id, s->id, s->num, inspect_flags ? *inspect_flags : 0);
} else if (det_ctx->tx_candidates[i+1].flags != NULL) {
SCLogDebug("%p/%"PRIu64" inspecting SKIP CURRENT: sid %u (%u), flags %08x",
tx.tx_ptr, tx_id, s->id, s->num, inspect_flags ? *inspect_flags : 0);
continue;
} else {
i++;
SCLogDebug("%p/%"PRIu64" inspecting SKIP NEXT: sid %u (%u), flags %08x",
tx.tx_ptr, tx_id, s->id, s->num, inspect_flags ? *inspect_flags : 0);
}
}
}
SCLogDebug("%p/%"PRIu64" inspecting: sid %u (%u), flags %08x",
tx.tx_ptr, tx_id, s->id, s->num, inspect_flags ? *inspect_flags : 0);
if (inspect_flags) {
if (*inspect_flags & (DE_STATE_FLAG_FULL_INSPECT|DE_STATE_FLAG_SIG_CANT_MATCH)) {
SCLogDebug("%p/%"PRIu64" inspecting: sid %u (%u), flags %08x ALREADY COMPLETE",
tx.tx_ptr, tx_id, s->id, s->num, *inspect_flags);
continue;
}
}
if (inspect_flags) {
/* continue previous inspection */
SCLogDebug("%p/%"PRIu64" Continueing sid %u", tx.tx_ptr, tx_id, s->id);
} else {
/* start new inspection */
SCLogDebug("%p/%"PRIu64" Start sid %u", tx.tx_ptr, tx_id, s->id);
}
/* call individual rule inspection */
RULE_PROFILING_START(p);
const int r = DetectRunTxInspectRule(tv, de_ctx, det_ctx, p, f, flow_flags,
alstate, &tx, s, inspect_flags, can, scratch);
if (r == 1) {
/* match */
DetectRunPostMatch(tv, det_ctx, p, s);
uint8_t alert_flags = (PACKET_ALERT_FLAG_STATE_MATCH|PACKET_ALERT_FLAG_TX);
if (s->action & ACTION_DROP)
alert_flags |= PACKET_ALERT_FLAG_DROP_FLOW;
SCLogDebug("%p/%"PRIu64" sig %u (%u) matched", tx.tx_ptr, tx_id, s->id, s->num);
if (!(s->flags & SIG_FLAG_NOALERT)) {
PacketAlertAppend(det_ctx, s, p, tx_id, alert_flags);
} else {
DetectSignatureApplyActions(p, s, alert_flags);
}
}
DetectVarProcessList(det_ctx, p->flow, p);
RULE_PROFILING_END(det_ctx, s, r, p);
}
det_ctx->tx_id = 0;
det_ctx->tx_id_set = 0;
det_ctx->p = NULL;
/* see if we have any updated state to store in the tx */
uint64_t new_detect_flags = 0;
/* this side of the tx is done */
if (tx.tx_progress >= tx.tx_end_state) {
new_detect_flags |= APP_LAYER_TX_INSPECTED_FLAG;
SCLogDebug("%p/%"PRIu64" tx is done for direction %s. Flag %016"PRIx64,
tx.tx_ptr, tx_id,
flow_flags & STREAM_TOSERVER ? "toserver" : "toclient",
new_detect_flags);
}
if (tx.prefilter_flags != tx.prefilter_flags_orig) {
new_detect_flags |= tx.prefilter_flags;
SCLogDebug("%p/%"PRIu64" updated prefilter flags %016"PRIx64" "
"(was: %016"PRIx64") for direction %s. Flag %016"PRIx64,
tx.tx_ptr, tx_id, tx.prefilter_flags, tx.prefilter_flags_orig,
flow_flags & STREAM_TOSERVER ? "toserver" : "toclient",
new_detect_flags);
}
if (new_detect_flags != 0 &&
(new_detect_flags | tx.detect_flags) != tx.detect_flags)
{
new_detect_flags |= tx.detect_flags;
SCLogDebug("%p/%"PRIu64" Storing new flags %016"PRIx64" (was %016"PRIx64")",
tx.tx_ptr, tx_id, new_detect_flags, tx.detect_flags);
AppLayerParserSetTxDetectFlags(ipproto, alproto, tx.tx_ptr,
flow_flags, new_detect_flags);
}
}
}
Commit Message: stream: still inspect packets dropped by stream
The detect engine would bypass packets that are set as dropped. This
seems sane, as these packets are going to be dropped anyway.
However, it lead to the following corner case: stream events that
triggered the drop could not be matched on the rules. The packet
with the event wouldn't make it to the detect engine due to the bypass.
This patch changes the logic to not bypass DROP packets anymore.
Packets that are dropped by the stream engine will set the no payload
inspection flag, so avoid needless cost.
CWE ID: CWE-693 | 0 | 84,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didStartProvisionalLoad(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
WebDataSource* ds = frame->provisionalDataSource();
if (!ds)
return;
DocumentState* document_state = DocumentState::FromDataSource(ds);
CHECK((ds->request().url() != GURL(kSwappedOutURL)) ||
is_swapped_out_ ||
render_view_->is_swapped_out()) <<
"Heard swappedout:// when not swapped out.";
if (document_state->request_time().is_null()) {
double event_time = ds->triggeringEventTime();
if (event_time != 0.0)
document_state->set_request_time(Time::FromDoubleT(event_time));
}
document_state->set_start_load_time(Time::Now());
bool is_top_most = !frame->parent();
if (is_top_most) {
render_view_->set_navigation_gesture(
WebUserGestureIndicator::isProcessingUserGesture() ?
NavigationGestureUser : NavigationGestureAuto);
} else if (ds->replacesCurrentHistoryItem()) {
document_state->navigation_state()->set_transition_type(
PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_SUBFRAME);
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, render_view_->observers(),
DidStartProvisionalLoad(frame));
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderFrameObserver, observers_, DidStartProvisionalLoad());
int parent_routing_id = frame->parent() ?
FromWebFrame(frame->parent())->GetRoutingID() : -1;
Send(new FrameHostMsg_DidStartProvisionalLoadForFrame(
routing_id_, parent_routing_id, ds->request().url()));
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __latent_entropy int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm,
struct mm_struct *oldmm)
{
struct vm_area_struct *mpnt, *tmp, *prev, **pprev;
struct rb_node **rb_link, *rb_parent;
int retval;
unsigned long charge;
LIST_HEAD(uf);
uprobe_start_dup_mmap();
if (down_write_killable(&oldmm->mmap_sem)) {
retval = -EINTR;
goto fail_uprobe_end;
}
flush_cache_dup_mm(oldmm);
uprobe_dup_mmap(oldmm, mm);
/*
* Not linked in yet - no deadlock potential:
*/
down_write_nested(&mm->mmap_sem, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
/* No ordering required: file already has been exposed. */
RCU_INIT_POINTER(mm->exe_file, get_mm_exe_file(oldmm));
mm->total_vm = oldmm->total_vm;
mm->data_vm = oldmm->data_vm;
mm->exec_vm = oldmm->exec_vm;
mm->stack_vm = oldmm->stack_vm;
rb_link = &mm->mm_rb.rb_node;
rb_parent = NULL;
pprev = &mm->mmap;
retval = ksm_fork(mm, oldmm);
if (retval)
goto out;
retval = khugepaged_fork(mm, oldmm);
if (retval)
goto out;
prev = NULL;
for (mpnt = oldmm->mmap; mpnt; mpnt = mpnt->vm_next) {
struct file *file;
if (mpnt->vm_flags & VM_DONTCOPY) {
vm_stat_account(mm, mpnt->vm_flags, -vma_pages(mpnt));
continue;
}
charge = 0;
if (mpnt->vm_flags & VM_ACCOUNT) {
unsigned long len = vma_pages(mpnt);
if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm(oldmm, len)) /* sic */
goto fail_nomem;
charge = len;
}
tmp = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tmp)
goto fail_nomem;
*tmp = *mpnt;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tmp->anon_vma_chain);
retval = vma_dup_policy(mpnt, tmp);
if (retval)
goto fail_nomem_policy;
tmp->vm_mm = mm;
retval = dup_userfaultfd(tmp, &uf);
if (retval)
goto fail_nomem_anon_vma_fork;
if (anon_vma_fork(tmp, mpnt))
goto fail_nomem_anon_vma_fork;
tmp->vm_flags &= ~(VM_LOCKED | VM_LOCKONFAULT);
tmp->vm_next = tmp->vm_prev = NULL;
file = tmp->vm_file;
if (file) {
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
get_file(file);
if (tmp->vm_flags & VM_DENYWRITE)
atomic_dec(&inode->i_writecount);
i_mmap_lock_write(mapping);
if (tmp->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)
atomic_inc(&mapping->i_mmap_writable);
flush_dcache_mmap_lock(mapping);
/* insert tmp into the share list, just after mpnt */
vma_interval_tree_insert_after(tmp, mpnt,
&mapping->i_mmap);
flush_dcache_mmap_unlock(mapping);
i_mmap_unlock_write(mapping);
}
/*
* Clear hugetlb-related page reserves for children. This only
* affects MAP_PRIVATE mappings. Faults generated by the child
* are not guaranteed to succeed, even if read-only
*/
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(tmp))
reset_vma_resv_huge_pages(tmp);
/*
* Link in the new vma and copy the page table entries.
*/
*pprev = tmp;
pprev = &tmp->vm_next;
tmp->vm_prev = prev;
prev = tmp;
__vma_link_rb(mm, tmp, rb_link, rb_parent);
rb_link = &tmp->vm_rb.rb_right;
rb_parent = &tmp->vm_rb;
mm->map_count++;
retval = copy_page_range(mm, oldmm, mpnt);
if (tmp->vm_ops && tmp->vm_ops->open)
tmp->vm_ops->open(tmp);
if (retval)
goto out;
}
/* a new mm has just been created */
arch_dup_mmap(oldmm, mm);
retval = 0;
out:
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
flush_tlb_mm(oldmm);
up_write(&oldmm->mmap_sem);
dup_userfaultfd_complete(&uf);
fail_uprobe_end:
uprobe_end_dup_mmap();
return retval;
fail_nomem_anon_vma_fork:
mpol_put(vma_policy(tmp));
fail_nomem_policy:
kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, tmp);
fail_nomem:
retval = -ENOMEM;
vm_unacct_memory(charge);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: fork: fix incorrect fput of ->exe_file causing use-after-free
Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().
However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
a reference is taken on the mm_struct's ->exe_file. Since the
->exe_file of the new mm_struct was already set to the old ->exe_file by
the memcpy() in dup_mm(), it was possible for the mmput() in the error
path of dup_mm() to drop a reference to ->exe_file which was never
taken.
This caused the struct file to later be freed prematurely.
Fix it by updating mm_init() to NULL out the ->exe_file, in the same
place it clears other things like the list of mmaps.
This bug was found by syzkaller. It can be reproduced using the
following C program:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *mmap_thread(void *_arg)
{
for (;;) {
mmap(NULL, 0x1000000, PROT_READ,
MAP_POPULATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
}
}
static void *fork_thread(void *_arg)
{
usleep(rand() % 10000);
fork();
}
int main(void)
{
fork();
fork();
fork();
for (;;) {
if (fork() == 0) {
pthread_t t;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, mmap_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t, NULL, fork_thread, NULL);
usleep(rand() % 10000);
syscall(__NR_exit_group, 0);
}
wait(NULL);
}
}
No special kernel config options are needed. It usually causes a NULL
pointer dereference in __remove_shared_vm_struct() during exit, or in
dup_mmap() (which is usually inlined into copy_process()) during fork.
Both are due to a vm_area_struct's ->vm_file being used after it's
already been freed.
Google Bug Id: 64772007
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823211408.31198-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v4.7+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static apr_array_header_t *parse_errorlog_string(apr_pool_t *p,
const char *s,
const char **err,
int is_main_fmt)
{
apr_array_header_t *a = apr_array_make(p, 30,
sizeof(ap_errorlog_format_item));
char *res;
int seen_msg_fmt = 0;
while (s && *s) {
ap_errorlog_format_item *item =
(ap_errorlog_format_item *)apr_array_push(a);
memset(item, 0, sizeof(*item));
res = parse_errorlog_item(p, item, &s);
if (res) {
*err = res;
return NULL;
}
if (item->flags & AP_ERRORLOG_FLAG_MESSAGE) {
if (!is_main_fmt) {
*err = "%M cannot be used in once-per-request or "
"once-per-connection formats";
return NULL;
}
seen_msg_fmt = 1;
}
if (is_main_fmt && item->flags & AP_ERRORLOG_FLAG_REQUIRED) {
*err = "The '+' flag cannot be used in the main error log format";
return NULL;
}
if (!is_main_fmt && item->min_loglevel) {
*err = "The loglevel cannot be used as a condition in "
"once-per-request or once-per-connection formats";
return NULL;
}
if (item->min_loglevel > APLOG_TRACE8) {
*err = "The specified loglevel modifier is out of range";
return NULL;
}
}
if (is_main_fmt && !seen_msg_fmt) {
*err = "main ErrorLogFormat must contain message format string '%M'";
return NULL;
}
return a;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Locale& Document::GetCachedLocale(const AtomicString& locale) {
AtomicString locale_key = locale;
if (locale.IsEmpty() ||
!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::LangAttributeAwareFormControlUIEnabled())
return Locale::DefaultLocale();
LocaleIdentifierToLocaleMap::AddResult result =
locale_cache_.insert(locale_key, nullptr);
if (result.is_new_entry)
result.stored_value->value = Locale::Create(locale_key);
return *(result.stored_value->value);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nfs_destroy_writepagecache(void)
{
mempool_destroy(nfs_commit_mempool);
kmem_cache_destroy(nfs_cdata_cachep);
mempool_destroy(nfs_wdata_mempool);
kmem_cache_destroy(nfs_wdata_cachep);
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSObjectRef makeEventSender(JSContextRef context)
{
return JSObjectMake(context, getClass(context), 0);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void tcp_rcv_rtt_measure(struct tcp_sock *tp)
{
if (tp->rcv_rtt_est.time == 0)
goto new_measure;
if (before(tp->rcv_nxt, tp->rcv_rtt_est.seq))
return;
tcp_rcv_rtt_update(tp, tcp_time_stamp - tp->rcv_rtt_est.time, 1);
new_measure:
tp->rcv_rtt_est.seq = tp->rcv_nxt + tp->rcv_wnd;
tp->rcv_rtt_est.time = tcp_time_stamp;
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 51,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ovs_instruction_name_from_type(enum ovs_instruction_type type)
{
return type < ARRAY_SIZE(inst_info) ? inst_info[type].name : NULL;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 77,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sgpd_del_entry(u32 grouping_type, void *entry)
{
switch (grouping_type) {
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_SYNC:
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_ROLL:
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_PROL:
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_RAP:
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_SEIG:
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_TELE:
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_SAP:
gf_free(entry);
return;
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_OINF:
gf_isom_oinf_del_entry(entry);
return;
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_LINF:
gf_isom_linf_del_entry(entry);
return;
default:
{
GF_DefaultSampleGroupDescriptionEntry *ptr = (GF_DefaultSampleGroupDescriptionEntry *)entry;
if (ptr->data) gf_free(ptr->data);
gf_free(ptr);
}
}
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,405 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: checkBackBuffer(Buffer *buf)
{
Buffer *fbuf = buf->linkBuffer[LB_N_FRAME];
if (fbuf) {
if (fbuf->frameQ)
return TRUE; /* Currentbuf has stacked frames */
/* when no frames stacked and next is frame source, try next's
* nextBuffer */
if (RenderFrame && fbuf == buf->nextBuffer) {
if (fbuf->nextBuffer != NULL)
return TRUE;
else
return FALSE;
}
}
if (buf->nextBuffer)
return TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 84,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: stop(struct file *file, int code, const char *what)
/* Return control when a PNG file cannot be read. This outputs an 'ERR'
* summary line too.
*/
{
log_error(file, code, what);
/* The chunk being read is typically identified by file->chunk or, if this is
* NULL, by file->type. This may be wrong if libpng reads ahead, but this
* only happens with IDAT where libpng reads the header then jumps around
* finding errors in the previous chunks. We know that is happening because
* we are at the start of the IDAT (i.e. no IDAT data has yet been written.)
*
* SUMMARY FORMAT (stop):
*
* IDAT ERR status code read-errno write-errno message file
*
* 'uncompressed' will be 0 if there was a problem in the IHDR. The errno
* values are emit_string(strerror(errno)).
*/
if (file->global->quiet < 2) /* need two quiets to stop this. */
{
png_uint_32 type;
if (file->chunk != NULL)
type = current_type(file, code); /* Gropes in struct chunk and IDAT */
else
type = file->type;
if (type)
type_name(type, stdout);
else /* magic: an IDAT header, produces bogons for too many IDATs */
fputs("HEAD", stdout); /* not a registered chunk! */
printf(" ERR %.2x %s ", file->status_code, strcode(code));
/* This only works one strerror at a time, because of the way strerror is
* implemented.
*/
emit_string(strerror(file->read_errno), stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
emit_string(strerror(file->write_errno), stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
emit_string(what, stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
fputs(file->file_name, stdout);
putc('\n', stdout);
}
file->status_code |= FILE_ERROR;
longjmp(file->jmpbuf, code);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _tls_tl_close_sockinfo (struct _tls_stream *sockinfo)
{
if (sockinfo->socket > 0) {
if (sockinfo->ssl_conn != NULL) {
SSL_shutdown (sockinfo->ssl_conn);
SSL_shutdown (sockinfo->ssl_conn);
SSL_free (sockinfo->ssl_conn);
}
if (sockinfo->ssl_ctx != NULL)
SSL_CTX_free (sockinfo->ssl_ctx);
closesocket (sockinfo->socket);
}
if (sockinfo->buf != NULL)
osip_free (sockinfo->buf);
if (sockinfo->sendbuf != NULL)
osip_free (sockinfo->sendbuf);
#ifdef MULTITASKING_ENABLED
if (sockinfo->readStream != NULL) {
CFReadStreamClose (sockinfo->readStream);
CFRelease (sockinfo->readStream);
}
if (sockinfo->writeStream != NULL) {
CFWriteStreamClose (sockinfo->writeStream);
CFRelease (sockinfo->writeStream);
}
#endif
memset (sockinfo, 0, sizeof (*sockinfo));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 17,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void red_client_remove_channel(RedChannelClient *rcc)
{
pthread_mutex_lock(&rcc->client->lock);
ring_remove(&rcc->client_link);
rcc->client->channels_num--;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&rcc->client->lock);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Browser::CanBookmarkAllTabs() const {
BookmarkModel* model = profile()->GetBookmarkModel();
return (model && model->IsLoaded()) &&
tab_count() > 1 &&
profile()->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kEditBookmarksEnabled);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_set_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int dr, unsigned long val)
{
int res;
res = __kvm_set_dr(vcpu, dr, val);
if (res > 0)
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
else if (res < 0)
kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
return res;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::UpdateOverridingUserAgent() {
NotifyPreferencesChanged();
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,906 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ecryptfs_encrypt_and_encode_filename(
char **encoded_name,
size_t *encoded_name_size,
struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat,
const char *name, size_t name_size)
{
size_t encoded_name_no_prefix_size;
int rc = 0;
(*encoded_name) = NULL;
(*encoded_name_size) = 0;
if ((crypt_stat && (crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES))
|| (mount_crypt_stat && (mount_crypt_stat->flags
& ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES))) {
struct ecryptfs_filename *filename;
filename = kzalloc(sizeof(*filename), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!filename) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Out of memory whilst attempting "
"to kzalloc [%zd] bytes\n", __func__,
sizeof(*filename));
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
filename->filename = (char *)name;
filename->filename_size = name_size;
rc = ecryptfs_encrypt_filename(filename, crypt_stat,
mount_crypt_stat);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Error attempting to encrypt "
"filename; rc = [%d]\n", __func__, rc);
kfree(filename);
goto out;
}
ecryptfs_encode_for_filename(
NULL, &encoded_name_no_prefix_size,
filename->encrypted_filename,
filename->encrypted_filename_size);
if ((crypt_stat && (crypt_stat->flags
& ECRYPTFS_ENCFN_USE_MOUNT_FNEK))
|| (mount_crypt_stat
&& (mount_crypt_stat->flags
& ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCFN_USE_MOUNT_FNEK)))
(*encoded_name_size) =
(ECRYPTFS_FNEK_ENCRYPTED_FILENAME_PREFIX_SIZE
+ encoded_name_no_prefix_size);
else
(*encoded_name_size) =
(ECRYPTFS_FEK_ENCRYPTED_FILENAME_PREFIX_SIZE
+ encoded_name_no_prefix_size);
(*encoded_name) = kmalloc((*encoded_name_size) + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!(*encoded_name)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Out of memory whilst attempting "
"to kzalloc [%zd] bytes\n", __func__,
(*encoded_name_size));
rc = -ENOMEM;
kfree(filename->encrypted_filename);
kfree(filename);
goto out;
}
if ((crypt_stat && (crypt_stat->flags
& ECRYPTFS_ENCFN_USE_MOUNT_FNEK))
|| (mount_crypt_stat
&& (mount_crypt_stat->flags
& ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCFN_USE_MOUNT_FNEK))) {
memcpy((*encoded_name),
ECRYPTFS_FNEK_ENCRYPTED_FILENAME_PREFIX,
ECRYPTFS_FNEK_ENCRYPTED_FILENAME_PREFIX_SIZE);
ecryptfs_encode_for_filename(
((*encoded_name)
+ ECRYPTFS_FNEK_ENCRYPTED_FILENAME_PREFIX_SIZE),
&encoded_name_no_prefix_size,
filename->encrypted_filename,
filename->encrypted_filename_size);
(*encoded_name_size) =
(ECRYPTFS_FNEK_ENCRYPTED_FILENAME_PREFIX_SIZE
+ encoded_name_no_prefix_size);
(*encoded_name)[(*encoded_name_size)] = '\0';
} else {
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Error attempting to encode "
"encrypted filename; rc = [%d]\n", __func__,
rc);
kfree((*encoded_name));
(*encoded_name) = NULL;
(*encoded_name_size) = 0;
}
kfree(filename->encrypted_filename);
kfree(filename);
} else {
rc = ecryptfs_copy_filename(encoded_name,
encoded_name_size,
name, name_size);
}
out:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine
Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the
end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This
fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when
the current bit offset is 2.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.29+: 51ca58d eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functions
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 45,416 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OxideQQuickWebView::hoverEnterEvent(QHoverEvent* event) {
Q_D(OxideQQuickWebView);
QQuickItem::hoverEnterEvent(event);
d->contents_view_->handleHoverEnterEvent(event);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PerformPaste() {
const base::string16 expected_title = base::UTF8ToUTF16("TEXT_CHANGED");
content::TitleWatcher title_watcher(shell()->web_contents(),
expected_title);
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh =
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(interstitial_->GetMainFrame());
rfh->GetRenderWidgetHost()->delegate()->Paste();
EXPECT_EQ(expected_title, title_watcher.WaitAndGetTitle());
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void call_snmp_init_once(void) {
static int have_init = 0;
if (have_init == 0)
init_snmp(PACKAGE_NAME);
have_init = 1;
} /* void call_snmp_init_once */
Commit Message: snmp plugin: Fix double free of request PDU
snmp_sess_synch_response() always frees request PDU, in both case of request
error and success. If error condition occurs inside of `while (status == 0)`
loop, double free of `req` happens.
Issue: #2291
Signed-off-by: Florian Forster <octo@collectd.org>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 59,657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct loaded_vmcs *nested_get_current_vmcs02(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
struct vmcs02_list *item;
list_for_each_entry(item, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, list)
if (item->vmptr == vmx->nested.current_vmptr) {
list_move(&item->list, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool);
return &item->vmcs02;
}
if (vmx->nested.vmcs02_num >= max(VMCS02_POOL_SIZE, 1)) {
/* Recycle the least recently used VMCS. */
item = list_last_entry(&vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool,
struct vmcs02_list, list);
item->vmptr = vmx->nested.current_vmptr;
list_move(&item->list, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool);
return &item->vmcs02;
}
/* Create a new VMCS */
item = kmalloc(sizeof(struct vmcs02_list), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!item)
return NULL;
item->vmcs02.vmcs = alloc_vmcs();
if (!item->vmcs02.vmcs) {
kfree(item);
return NULL;
}
loaded_vmcs_init(&item->vmcs02);
item->vmptr = vmx->nested.current_vmptr;
list_add(&(item->list), &(vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool));
vmx->nested.vmcs02_num++;
return &item->vmcs02;
}
Commit Message: kvm:vmx: more complete state update on APICv on/off
The function to update APICv on/off state (in particular, to deactivate
it when enabling Hyper-V SynIC) is incomplete: it doesn't adjust
APICv-related fields among secondary processor-based VM-execution
controls. As a result, Windows 2012 guests get stuck when SynIC-based
auto-EOI interrupt intersected with e.g. an IPI in the guest.
In addition, the MSR intercept bitmap isn't updated every time "virtualize
x2APIC mode" is toggled. This path can only be triggered by a malicious
guest, because Windows didn't use x2APIC but rather their own synthetic
APIC access MSRs; however a guest running in a SynIC-enabled VM could
switch to x2APIC and thus obtain direct access to host APIC MSRs
(CVE-2016-4440).
The patch fixes those omissions.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Reported-by: Yang Zhang <yang.zhang.wz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 53,316 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool mock_deleting() const { return mock_deleting_; }
Commit Message: Remove unused histograms from the background loader offliner.
Bug: 975512
Change-Id: I87b0a91bed60e3a9e8a1fd9ae9b18cac27a0859f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1683361
Reviewed-by: Cathy Li <chili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Holte <holte@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Williamson <petewil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#675332}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 139,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void npidentifier_cache_invalidate(void)
{
#if defined(HAVE_G_HASH_TABLE_REMOVE_ALL) && !defined(BUILD_GENERIC)
if (g_npidentifier_cache)
g_hash_table_remove_all(g_npidentifier_cache);
#else
npidentifier_cache_destroy();
npidentifier_cache_create();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,160 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs_lookup_req(char *fname)
{
uint32_t data[1024];
uint32_t *p;
int len;
int fnamelen;
fnamelen = strlen (fname);
p = &(data[0]);
p = rpc_add_credentials(p);
memcpy (p, dirfh, NFS_FHSIZE);
p += (NFS_FHSIZE / 4);
*p++ = htonl(fnamelen);
if (fnamelen & 3)
*(p + fnamelen / 4) = 0;
memcpy (p, fname, fnamelen);
p += (fnamelen + 3) / 4;
len = p - &(data[0]);
rpc_req(PROG_NFS, NFS_LOOKUP, data, len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,365 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool NuMediaExtractor::getCachedDuration(
int64_t *durationUs, bool *eos) const {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
int64_t bitrate;
if (mIsWidevineExtractor) {
sp<WVMExtractor> wvmExtractor =
static_cast<WVMExtractor *>(mImpl.get());
status_t finalStatus;
*durationUs = wvmExtractor->getCachedDurationUs(&finalStatus);
*eos = (finalStatus != OK);
return true;
} else if ((mDataSource->flags() & DataSource::kIsCachingDataSource)
&& getTotalBitrate(&bitrate)) {
sp<NuCachedSource2> cachedSource =
static_cast<NuCachedSource2 *>(mDataSource.get());
status_t finalStatus;
size_t cachedDataRemaining =
cachedSource->approxDataRemaining(&finalStatus);
*durationUs = cachedDataRemaining * 8000000ll / bitrate;
*eos = (finalStatus != OK);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow and divide-by-zero
Bug: 35763994
Test: ran CTS with and without fix
Change-Id: If835e97ce578d4fa567e33e349e48fb7b2559e0e
(cherry picked from commit 8538a603ef992e75f29336499cb783f3ec19f18c)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 162,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Handle<Object> GetImpl(Isolate* isolate, FixedArrayBase* elements,
uint32_t entry) {
UNREACHABLE();
return Handle<Object>();
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 163,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~TestInterstitialPage() { }
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLint GLES2Util::GetColorEncodingFromInternalFormat(uint32_t internalformat) {
switch (internalformat) {
case GL_SRGB_EXT:
case GL_SRGB_ALPHA_EXT:
case GL_SRGB8:
case GL_SRGB8_ALPHA8:
return GL_SRGB;
default:
return GL_LINEAR;
}
}
Commit Message: Validate glClearBuffer*v function |buffer| param on the client side
Otherwise we could read out-of-bounds even if an invalid |buffer| is passed
in and in theory we should not read the buffer at all.
BUG=908749
TEST=gl_tests in ASAN build
R=piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I94b69b56ce3358ff9bfc0e21f0618aec4371d1ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1354571
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#612023}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 153,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PanoramiXFixesSetPictureClipRegion(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXFixesSetPictureClipRegionReq);
int result = Success, j;
PanoramiXRes *pict;
RegionPtr reg = NULL;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXFixesSetPictureClipRegionReq);
if ((result = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &pict, stuff->picture,
XRT_PICTURE, client,
DixWriteAccess))) {
client->errorValue = stuff->picture;
return result;
}
if (pict->u.pict.root)
VERIFY_REGION_OR_NONE(reg, stuff->region, client, DixReadAccess);
FOR_NSCREENS_BACKWARD(j) {
ScreenPtr screen = screenInfo.screens[j];
stuff->picture = pict->info[j].id;
if (reg)
RegionTranslate(reg, -screen->x, -screen->y);
result =
(*PanoramiXSaveXFixesVector[X_XFixesSetPictureClipRegion]) (client);
if (reg)
RegionTranslate(reg, screen->x, screen->y);
if (result != Success)
break;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void strawberryAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::strawberryAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,986 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::HandleMouseDown() {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->HandleMouseDown();
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,684 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init init_dns_resolver(void)
{
struct cred *cred;
struct key *keyring;
int ret;
/* create an override credential set with a special thread keyring in
* which DNS requests are cached
*
* this is used to prevent malicious redirections from being installed
* with add_key().
*/
cred = prepare_kernel_cred(NULL);
if (!cred)
return -ENOMEM;
keyring = keyring_alloc(".dns_resolver",
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred,
(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto failed_put_cred;
}
ret = register_key_type(&key_type_dns_resolver);
if (ret < 0)
goto failed_put_key;
/* instruct request_key() to use this special keyring as a cache for
* the results it looks up */
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR, &keyring->flags);
cred->thread_keyring = keyring;
cred->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING;
dns_resolver_cache = cred;
kdebug("DNS resolver keyring: %d\n", key_serial(keyring));
return 0;
failed_put_key:
key_put(keyring);
failed_put_cred:
put_cred(cred);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LoginDisplayHostWebUI::OnPreferencesChanged() {
if (is_showing_login_)
login_display_->OnPreferencesChanged();
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __might_sleep(const char *file, int line, int preempt_offset)
{
/*
* Blocking primitives will set (and therefore destroy) current->state,
* since we will exit with TASK_RUNNING make sure we enter with it,
* otherwise we will destroy state.
*/
WARN_ONCE(current->state != TASK_RUNNING && current->task_state_change,
"do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; "
"state=%lx set at [<%p>] %pS\n",
current->state,
(void *)current->task_state_change,
(void *)current->task_state_change);
___might_sleep(file, line, preempt_offset);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void VideoCaptureManager::QueueStartDevice(
media::VideoCaptureSessionId session_id,
VideoCaptureController* controller,
const media::VideoCaptureParams& params) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
device_start_request_queue_.push_back(
CaptureDeviceStartRequest(controller, session_id, params));
if (device_start_request_queue_.size() == 1)
ProcessDeviceStartRequestQueue();
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::BrowserURLHandlerCreated(
BrowserURLHandler* handler) {
handler->AddHandlerPair(&ExtensionWebUI::HandleChromeURLOverride,
BrowserURLHandler::null_handler());
handler->AddHandlerPair(BrowserURLHandler::null_handler(),
&ExtensionWebUI::HandleChromeURLOverrideReverse);
handler->AddHandlerPair(&WillHandleBrowserAboutURL,
BrowserURLHandler::null_handler());
handler->AddHandlerPair(&HandleWebUI, &HandleWebUIReverse);
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,727 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int len, r, ms_remain;
fd_set *setp;
char buf[8192];
struct timeval timeout, start, *timeoutp = NULL;
DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_in + 1,
NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
if (setp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/*
* Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have
* been sent.
*/
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
for (;;) {
/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
if (r != 0)
break;
if (!compat20 && (
*typep == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS
|| *typep == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE
|| *typep == SSH_CMSG_EOF
|| *typep == SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION))
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
break;
/* If we got a packet, return it. */
if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
break;
/*
* Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the
* buffer, and try again.
*/
memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_in + 1,
NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
FD_SET(state->connection_in, setp);
if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms;
timeoutp = &timeout;
}
/* Wait for some data to arrive. */
for (;;) {
if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
}
if ((r = select(state->connection_in + 1, setp,
NULL, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
break;
if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR)
break;
if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
continue;
ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
if (ms_remain <= 0) {
r = 0;
break;
}
}
if (r == 0)
return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
/* Read data from the socket. */
len = read(state->connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (len == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
goto out;
}
if (len < 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/* Append it to the buffer. */
if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
out:
free(setp);
return r;
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 72,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnBubbleLogicalScrollInParentFrame(
blink::WebScrollDirection direction,
blink::WebScrollGranularity granularity) {
if (!is_active())
return;
RenderFrameProxyHost* proxy =
frame_tree_node()->render_manager()->GetProxyToParent();
if (!proxy) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(GetProcess(),
bad_message::RFH_NO_PROXY_TO_PARENT);
return;
}
proxy->BubbleLogicalScroll(direction, granularity);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX::~OMX() {
delete mMaster;
mMaster = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void enforcedRangeUnsignedLongLongAttrAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "enforcedRangeUnsignedLongLongAttr", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(unsigned long long, cppValue, toUInt64(jsValue, EnforceRange, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setEnforcedRangeUnsignedLongLongAttr(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,694 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cliPrintContextError(void) {
if (context == NULL) return;
fprintf(stderr,"Error: %s\n",context->errstr);
}
Commit Message: Security: fix redis-cli buffer overflow.
Thanks to Fakhri Zulkifli for reporting it.
The fix switched to dynamic allocation, copying the final prompt in the
static buffer only at the end.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 81,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static CPLXMLNode* FLTGetFirstChildNode(CPLXMLNode* psXMLNode)
{
if( psXMLNode == NULL )
return NULL;
psXMLNode = psXMLNode->psChild;
while( psXMLNode != NULL )
{
if( psXMLNode->eType == CXT_Element )
return psXMLNode;
psXMLNode = psXMLNode->psNext;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 68,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_syscall_enter(void *ignore, struct pt_regs *regs, long id)
{
struct syscall_metadata *sys_data;
struct syscall_trace_enter *rec;
struct hlist_head *head;
int syscall_nr;
int rctx;
int size;
syscall_nr = trace_get_syscall_nr(current, regs);
if (syscall_nr < 0)
return;
if (!test_bit(syscall_nr, enabled_perf_enter_syscalls))
return;
sys_data = syscall_nr_to_meta(syscall_nr);
if (!sys_data)
return;
head = this_cpu_ptr(sys_data->enter_event->perf_events);
if (hlist_empty(head))
return;
/* get the size after alignment with the u32 buffer size field */
size = sizeof(unsigned long) * sys_data->nb_args + sizeof(*rec);
size = ALIGN(size + sizeof(u32), sizeof(u64));
size -= sizeof(u32);
rec = (struct syscall_trace_enter *)perf_trace_buf_prepare(size,
sys_data->enter_event->event.type, regs, &rctx);
if (!rec)
return;
rec->nr = syscall_nr;
syscall_get_arguments(current, regs, 0, sys_data->nb_args,
(unsigned long *)&rec->args);
perf_trace_buf_submit(rec, size, rctx, 0, 1, regs, head, NULL);
}
Commit Message: tracing/syscalls: Ignore numbers outside NR_syscalls' range
ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie
outside the range of NR_syscalls. If any of these are called while
syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will
occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers.
# trace-cmd record -e raw_syscalls:* true && trace-cmd report
...
true-653 [000] 384.675777: sys_enter: NR 192 (0, 1000, 3, 4000022, ffffffff, 0)
true-653 [000] 384.675812: sys_exit: NR 192 = 1995915264
true-653 [000] 384.675971: sys_enter: NR 983045 (76f74480, 76f74000, 76f74b28, 76f74480, 76f76f74, 1)
true-653 [000] 384.675988: sys_exit: NR 983045 = 0
...
# trace-cmd record -e syscalls:* true
[ 17.289329] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address aaaaaace
[ 17.289590] pgd = 9e71c000
[ 17.289696] [aaaaaace] *pgd=00000000
[ 17.289985] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[ 17.290169] Modules linked in:
[ 17.290391] CPU: 0 PID: 704 Comm: true Not tainted 3.18.0-rc2+ #21
[ 17.290585] task: 9f4dab00 ti: 9e710000 task.ti: 9e710000
[ 17.290747] PC is at ftrace_syscall_enter+0x48/0x1f8
[ 17.290866] LR is at syscall_trace_enter+0x124/0x184
Fix this by ignoring out-of-NR_syscalls-bounds syscall numbers.
Commit cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
added the check for less than zero, but it should have also checked
for greater than NR_syscalls.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/1414620418-29472-1-git-send-email-rabin@rab.in
Fixes: cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.33+
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 166,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __unregister_ftrace_function(struct ftrace_ops *ops)
{
int ret;
if (ftrace_disabled)
return -ENODEV;
if (WARN_ON(!(ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_ENABLED)))
return -EBUSY;
if (FTRACE_WARN_ON(ops == &global_ops))
return -EINVAL;
if (ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_GLOBAL) {
ret = remove_ftrace_list_ops(&ftrace_global_list,
&global_ops, ops);
if (!ret)
ops->flags &= ~FTRACE_OPS_FL_ENABLED;
} else if (ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_CONTROL) {
ret = remove_ftrace_list_ops(&ftrace_control_list,
&control_ops, ops);
if (!ret) {
/*
* The ftrace_ops is now removed from the list,
* so there'll be no new users. We must ensure
* all current users are done before we free
* the control data.
*/
synchronize_sched();
control_ops_free(ops);
}
} else
ret = remove_ftrace_ops(&ftrace_ops_list, ops);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ftrace_enabled)
update_ftrace_function();
/*
* Dynamic ops may be freed, we must make sure that all
* callers are done before leaving this function.
*/
if (ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_DYNAMIC)
synchronize_sched();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 30,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gboolean webkit_web_view_popup_menu_handler(GtkWidget* widget)
{
Frame* frame = core(WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW(widget))->focusController()->focusedOrMainFrame();
IntPoint location = getLocationForKeyboardGeneratedContextMenu(frame);
FrameView* view = frame->view();
if (!view)
return FALSE;
location = view->contentsToWindow(location);
location.expandedTo(IntPoint(gContextMenuMargin, gContextMenuMargin));
location.shrunkTo(IntPoint(view->width() - gContextMenuMargin, view->height() - gContextMenuMargin));
IntPoint globalPoint(globalPointForClientPoint(gtk_widget_get_window(widget), location));
PlatformMouseEvent event(location, globalPoint, RightButton, MouseEventPressed, 0, false, false, false, false, gtk_get_current_event_time());
return webkit_web_view_forward_context_menu_event(WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW(widget), event);
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool shouldIgnoreAttributeCase(const Element* e)
{
return e && e->document()->isHTMLDocument() && e->isHTMLElement();
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,405 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RemoveSurface(int surface_id) {
surface_map_.Remove(surface_id);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cifs_setup_session(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses,
struct nls_table *nls_info)
{
int rc = -ENOSYS;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server = ses->server;
ses->flags = 0;
ses->capabilities = server->capabilities;
if (linuxExtEnabled == 0)
ses->capabilities &= (~server->vals->cap_unix);
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Security Mode: 0x%x Capabilities: 0x%x TimeAdjust: %d\n",
server->sec_mode, server->capabilities, server->timeAdj);
if (server->ops->sess_setup)
rc = server->ops->sess_setup(xid, ses, nls_info);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Send error in SessSetup = %d\n", rc);
} else {
mutex_lock(&server->srv_mutex);
if (!server->session_estab) {
server->session_key.response = ses->auth_key.response;
server->session_key.len = ses->auth_key.len;
server->sequence_number = 0x2;
server->session_estab = true;
ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
}
mutex_unlock(&server->srv_mutex);
cifs_dbg(FYI, "CIFS Session Established successfully\n");
spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
ses->status = CifsGood;
ses->need_reconnect = false;
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
}
kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
ses->auth_key.len = 0;
kfree(ses->ntlmssp);
ses->ntlmssp = NULL;
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix off-by-one bug in build_unc_path_to_root
commit 839db3d10a (cifs: fix up handling of prefixpath= option) changed
the code such that the vol->prepath no longer contained a leading
delimiter and then fixed up the places that accessed that field to
account for that change.
One spot in build_unc_path_to_root was missed however. When doing the
pointer addition on pos, that patch failed to account for the fact that
we had already incremented "pos" by one when adding the length of the
prepath. This caused a buffer overrun by one byte.
This patch fixes the problem by correcting the handling of "pos".
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+
Reported-by: Marcus Moeller <marcus.moeller@gmx.ch>
Reported-by: Ken Fallon <ken.fallon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::HideBubble() {
if (save_card_bubble_view_) {
save_card_bubble_view_->Hide();
save_card_bubble_view_ = nullptr;
}
}
Commit Message: [autofill] Avoid duplicate instances of the SaveCardBubble.
autofill::SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::ShowBubble() expects
(via DCHECK) to only be called when the save card bubble is
not already visible. This constraint is violated if the user
clicks multiple times on a submit button.
If the underlying page goes away, the last SaveCardBubbleView
created by the controller will be automatically cleaned up,
but any others are left visible on the screen... holding a
refence to a possibly-deleted controller.
This CL early exits the ShowBubbleFor*** and ReshowBubble logic
if the bubble is already visible.
BUG=708819
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2862933002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#469768}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataFileSystem::UpdateFileByResourceId(
const std::string& resource_id,
const FileOperationCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI) ||
BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
RunTaskOnUIThread(
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::UpdateFileByResourceIdOnUIThread,
ui_weak_ptr_,
resource_id,
CreateRelayCallback(callback)));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::OnWasHidden() {
RenderWidget::OnWasHidden();
if (webview()) {
webview()->settings()->setMinimumTimerInterval(
webkit_glue::kBackgroundTabTimerInterval);
webview()->setVisibilityState(visibilityState(), false);
}
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
std::set<WebPluginDelegateProxy*>::iterator plugin_it;
for (plugin_it = plugin_delegates_.begin();
plugin_it != plugin_delegates_.end(); ++plugin_it) {
(*plugin_it)->SetContainerVisibility(false);
}
#endif // OS_MACOSX
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,971 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AddPrivacyStrings(content::WebUIDataSource* html_source,
Profile* profile) {
LocalizedString localized_strings[] = {
{"privacyPageTitle", IDS_SETTINGS_PRIVACY},
{"linkDoctorPref", IDS_SETTINGS_LINKDOCTOR_PREF},
{"searchSuggestPref", IDS_SETTINGS_SUGGEST_PREF},
{"networkPredictionEnabled",
IDS_SETTINGS_NETWORK_PREDICTION_ENABLED_DESCRIPTION},
{"safeBrowsingEnableProtection",
IDS_SETTINGS_SAFEBROWSING_ENABLEPROTECTION},
{"spellingPref", IDS_SETTINGS_SPELLING_PREF},
{"spellingDescription", IDS_SETTINGS_SPELLING_DESCRIPTION},
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
{"enableLogging", IDS_SETTINGS_ENABLE_LOGGING_DIAGNOSTIC_AND_USAGE_DATA},
#else
{"enableLogging", IDS_SETTINGS_ENABLE_LOGGING},
#endif
{"doNotTrack", IDS_SETTINGS_ENABLE_DO_NOT_TRACK},
{"doNotTrackDialogTitle", IDS_SETTINGS_ENABLE_DO_NOT_TRACK_DIALOG_TITLE},
{"enableContentProtectionAttestation",
IDS_SETTINGS_ENABLE_CONTENT_PROTECTION_ATTESTATION},
{"wakeOnWifi", IDS_SETTINGS_WAKE_ON_WIFI_DESCRIPTION},
{"manageCertificates", IDS_SETTINGS_MANAGE_CERTIFICATES},
{"manageCertificatesDescription",
IDS_SETTINGS_MANAGE_CERTIFICATES_DESCRIPTION},
{"contentSettings", IDS_SETTINGS_CONTENT_SETTINGS},
{"siteSettings", IDS_SETTINGS_SITE_SETTINGS},
{"siteSettingsDescription", IDS_SETTINGS_SITE_SETTINGS_DESCRIPTION},
{"clearData", IDS_SETTINGS_CLEAR_DATA},
{"clearBrowsingData", IDS_SETTINGS_CLEAR_BROWSING_DATA},
{"clearBrowsingDataDescription", IDS_SETTINGS_CLEAR_DATA_DESCRIPTION},
{"titleAndCount", IDS_SETTINGS_TITLE_AND_COUNT},
};
AddLocalizedStringsBulk(html_source, localized_strings,
arraysize(localized_strings));
html_source->AddBoolean(
"importantSitesInCbd",
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kImportantSitesInCbd));
html_source->AddLocalizedString(
"safeBrowsingEnableExtendedReporting",
safe_browsing::ChooseOptInTextResource(
*profile->GetPrefs(),
IDS_SETTINGS_SAFEBROWSING_ENABLE_EXTENDED_REPORTING,
IDS_SETTINGS_SAFEBROWSING_ENABLE_SCOUT_REPORTING));
html_source->AddString(
"improveBrowsingExperience",
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_SETTINGS_IMPROVE_BROWSING_EXPERIENCE,
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
GetHelpUrlWithBoard(chrome::kPrivacyLearnMoreURL)));
#else
base::ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::kPrivacyLearnMoreURL)));
#endif
html_source->AddString(
"doNotTrackDialogMessage",
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_SETTINGS_ENABLE_DO_NOT_TRACK_DIALOG_TEXT,
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
GetHelpUrlWithBoard(chrome::kDoNotTrackLearnMoreURL)));
#else
base::ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::kDoNotTrackLearnMoreURL)));
#endif
html_source->AddString(
"exceptionsLearnMoreURL",
base::ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::kContentSettingsExceptionsLearnMoreURL));
}
Commit Message: [md-settings] Clarify Password Saving and Autofill Toggles
This change clarifies the wording around the password saving and
autofill toggles.
Bug: 822465
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I91b31fe61cd0754239f7908e8c04c7e69b72f670
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/970541
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544661}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 148,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tls1_new(SSL *s)
{
if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
s->method->ssl_clear(s);
return(1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderWidgetHostView* WebContentsImpl::GetCreatedWidget(int process_id,
int route_id) {
auto iter = pending_widget_views_.find(GlobalRoutingID(process_id, route_id));
if (iter == pending_widget_views_.end()) {
DCHECK(false);
return nullptr;
}
RenderWidgetHostView* widget_host_view = iter->second;
pending_widget_views_.erase(GlobalRoutingID(process_id, route_id));
RenderWidgetHost* widget_host = widget_host_view->GetRenderWidgetHost();
if (!widget_host->GetProcess()->IsInitializedAndNotDead()) {
return nullptr;
}
return widget_host_view;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 144,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int URI_FUNC(ComposeQueryEngine)(URI_CHAR * dest,
const URI_TYPE(QueryList) * queryList,
int maxChars, int * charsWritten, int * charsRequired,
UriBool spaceToPlus, UriBool normalizeBreaks) {
UriBool firstItem = URI_TRUE;
int ampersandLen = 0; /* increased to 1 from second item on */
URI_CHAR * write = dest;
/* Subtract terminator */
if (dest == NULL) {
*charsRequired = 0;
} else {
maxChars--;
}
while (queryList != NULL) {
const URI_CHAR * const key = queryList->key;
const URI_CHAR * const value = queryList->value;
const int worstCase = (normalizeBreaks == URI_TRUE ? 6 : 3);
const int keyLen = (key == NULL) ? 0 : (int)URI_STRLEN(key);
const int keyRequiredChars = worstCase * keyLen;
const int valueLen = (value == NULL) ? 0 : (int)URI_STRLEN(value);
const int valueRequiredChars = worstCase * valueLen;
if (dest == NULL) {
if (firstItem == URI_TRUE) {
ampersandLen = 1;
firstItem = URI_FALSE;
}
(*charsRequired) += ampersandLen + keyRequiredChars + ((value == NULL)
? 0
: 1 + valueRequiredChars);
} else {
URI_CHAR * afterKey;
if ((write - dest) + ampersandLen + keyRequiredChars > maxChars) {
return URI_ERROR_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE;
}
/* Copy key */
if (firstItem == URI_TRUE) {
firstItem = URI_FALSE;
} else {
write[0] = _UT('&');
write++;
}
afterKey = URI_FUNC(EscapeEx)(key, key + keyLen,
write, spaceToPlus, normalizeBreaks);
write += (afterKey - write);
if (value != NULL) {
URI_CHAR * afterValue;
if ((write - dest) + 1 + valueRequiredChars > maxChars) {
return URI_ERROR_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE;
}
/* Copy value */
write[0] = _UT('=');
write++;
afterValue = URI_FUNC(EscapeEx)(value, value + valueLen,
write, spaceToPlus, normalizeBreaks);
write += (afterValue - write);
}
}
queryList = queryList->next;
}
if (dest != NULL) {
write[0] = _UT('\0');
if (charsWritten != NULL) {
*charsWritten = (int)(write - dest) + 1; /* .. for terminator */
}
}
return URI_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 168,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidMeaningfulLayout(
blink::WebMeaningfulLayout layout_type) {
SCOPED_UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMER("RenderFrameObservers.DidMeaningfulLayout");
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidMeaningfulLayout(layout_type);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char* Chapters::Display::GetString() const { return m_string; }
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,801 |
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