instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void iucv_sock_unlink(struct iucv_sock_list *l, struct sock *sk)
{
write_lock_bh(&l->lock);
sk_del_node_init(sk);
write_unlock_bh(&l->lock);
}
Commit Message: iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Cc: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,629 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void qdisc_pkt_len_init(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct skb_shared_info *shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len = skb->len;
/* To get more precise estimation of bytes sent on wire,
* we add to pkt_len the headers size of all segments
*/
if (shinfo->gso_size) {
unsigned int hdr_len;
u16 gso_segs = shinfo->gso_segs;
/* mac layer + network layer */
hdr_len = skb_transport_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb);
/* + transport layer */
if (likely(shinfo->gso_type & (SKB_GSO_TCPV4 | SKB_GSO_TCPV6)))
hdr_len += tcp_hdrlen(skb);
else
hdr_len += sizeof(struct udphdr);
if (shinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_DODGY)
gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len - hdr_len,
shinfo->gso_size);
qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len += (gso_segs - 1) * hdr_len;
}
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,928 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GrabDeferredLock() {
if (root_window_ && defer_compositor_lock_) {
compositor_lock_ = root_window_->compositor()->GetCompositorLock();
defer_compositor_lock_ = false;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,840 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void deactivate_super(struct super_block *s)
{
if (!atomic_add_unless(&s->s_active, -1, 1)) {
down_write(&s->s_umount);
deactivate_locked_super(s);
}
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 46,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: infinite_recursive_call_check(Node* node, ScanEnv* env, int head)
{
int ret;
int r = 0;
switch (NODE_TYPE(node)) {
case NODE_LIST:
{
Node *x;
OnigLen min;
x = node;
do {
ret = infinite_recursive_call_check(NODE_CAR(x), env, head);
if (ret < 0 || (ret & RECURSION_INFINITE) != 0) return ret;
r |= ret;
if (head != 0) {
min = tree_min_len(NODE_CAR(x), env);
if (min != 0) head = 0;
}
} while (IS_NOT_NULL(x = NODE_CDR(x)));
}
break;
case NODE_ALT:
{
int must;
must = RECURSION_MUST;
do {
ret = infinite_recursive_call_check(NODE_CAR(node), env, head);
if (ret < 0 || (ret & RECURSION_INFINITE) != 0) return ret;
r |= (ret & RECURSION_EXIST);
must &= ret;
} while (IS_NOT_NULL(node = NODE_CDR(node)));
r |= must;
}
break;
case NODE_QUANT:
r = infinite_recursive_call_check(NODE_BODY(node), env, head);
if (r < 0) return r;
if ((r & RECURSION_MUST) != 0) {
if (QUANT_(node)->lower == 0)
r &= ~RECURSION_MUST;
}
break;
case NODE_ANCHOR:
if (! ANCHOR_HAS_BODY(ANCHOR_(node)))
break;
/* fall */
case NODE_CALL:
r = infinite_recursive_call_check(NODE_BODY(node), env, head);
break;
case NODE_BAG:
{
BagNode* en = BAG_(node);
if (en->type == BAG_MEMORY) {
if (NODE_IS_MARK2(node))
return 0;
else if (NODE_IS_MARK1(node))
return (head == 0 ? RECURSION_EXIST | RECURSION_MUST
: RECURSION_EXIST | RECURSION_MUST | RECURSION_INFINITE);
else {
NODE_STATUS_ADD(node, MARK2);
r = infinite_recursive_call_check(NODE_BODY(node), env, head);
NODE_STATUS_REMOVE(node, MARK2);
}
}
else if (en->type == BAG_IF_ELSE) {
int eret;
ret = infinite_recursive_call_check(NODE_BODY(node), env, head);
if (ret < 0 || (ret & RECURSION_INFINITE) != 0) return ret;
r |= ret;
if (IS_NOT_NULL(en->te.Then)) {
OnigLen min;
if (head != 0) {
min = tree_min_len(NODE_BODY(node), env);
}
else min = 0;
ret = infinite_recursive_call_check(en->te.Then, env, min != 0 ? 0:head);
if (ret < 0 || (ret & RECURSION_INFINITE) != 0) return ret;
r |= ret;
}
if (IS_NOT_NULL(en->te.Else)) {
eret = infinite_recursive_call_check(en->te.Else, env, head);
if (eret < 0 || (eret & RECURSION_INFINITE) != 0) return eret;
r |= (eret & RECURSION_EXIST);
if ((eret & RECURSION_MUST) == 0)
r &= ~RECURSION_MUST;
}
}
else {
r = infinite_recursive_call_check(NODE_BODY(node), env, head);
}
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __hwahc_op_wusbhc_start(struct wusbhc *wusbhc)
{
int result;
struct hwahc *hwahc = container_of(wusbhc, struct hwahc, wusbhc);
struct device *dev = &hwahc->wa.usb_iface->dev;
result = __wa_set_feature(&hwahc->wa, WA_ENABLE);
if (result < 0) {
dev_err(dev, "error commanding HC to start: %d\n", result);
goto error_stop;
}
result = __wa_wait_status(&hwahc->wa, WA_ENABLE, WA_ENABLE);
if (result < 0) {
dev_err(dev, "error waiting for HC to start: %d\n", result);
goto error_stop;
}
result = wa_nep_arm(&hwahc->wa, GFP_KERNEL);
if (result < 0) {
dev_err(dev, "cannot listen to notifications: %d\n", result);
goto error_stop;
}
/*
* If WUSB_QUIRK_ALEREON_HWA_DISABLE_XFER_NOTIFICATIONS is set,
* disable transfer notifications.
*/
if (hwahc->wa.quirks &
WUSB_QUIRK_ALEREON_HWA_DISABLE_XFER_NOTIFICATIONS) {
struct usb_host_interface *cur_altsetting =
hwahc->wa.usb_iface->cur_altsetting;
result = usb_control_msg(hwahc->wa.usb_dev,
usb_sndctrlpipe(hwahc->wa.usb_dev, 0),
WA_REQ_ALEREON_DISABLE_XFER_NOTIFICATIONS,
USB_DIR_OUT | USB_TYPE_VENDOR |
USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
WA_REQ_ALEREON_FEATURE_SET,
cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber,
NULL, 0,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
/*
* If we successfully sent the control message, start DTI here
* because no transfer notifications will be received which is
* where DTI is normally started.
*/
if (result == 0)
result = wa_dti_start(&hwahc->wa);
else
result = 0; /* OK. Continue normally. */
if (result < 0) {
dev_err(dev, "cannot start DTI: %d\n", result);
goto error_dti_start;
}
}
return result;
error_dti_start:
wa_nep_disarm(&hwahc->wa);
error_stop:
__wa_clear_feature(&hwahc->wa, WA_ENABLE);
return result;
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 75,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 FormatBookmarkURLForDisplay(const GURL& url) {
return url_formatter::FormatUrl(
url, url_formatter::kFormatUrlOmitAll &
~url_formatter::kFormatUrlOmitUsernamePassword,
net::UnescapeRule::SPACES, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Prevent interpretating userinfo as url scheme when editing bookmarks
Chrome's Edit Bookmark dialog formats urls for display such that a
url of http://javascript:scripttext@host.com is later converted to a
javascript url scheme, allowing persistence of a script injection
attack within the user's bookmarks.
This fix prevents such misinterpretations by always showing the
scheme when a userinfo component is present within the url.
BUG=639126
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2368593002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#422467}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 1 | 172,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ReflectReflectedNameAttributeTestAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V0CustomElementProcessingStack::CallbackDeliveryScope delivery_scope;
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "reflectReflectedNameAttributeTestAttribute");
TestInterfaceImplementation* cpp_value = V8TestInterface::ToImplWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value);
if (!cpp_value) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("The provided value is not of type 'TestInterface'.");
return;
}
impl->setAttribute(html_names::kReflectedNameAttributeAttr, cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,087 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: single_encode(float8 x, char *str)
{
int ndig = DBL_DIG + extra_float_digits;
if (ndig < 1)
ndig = 1;
sprintf(str, "%.*g", ndig, x);
return TRUE;
} /* single_encode() */
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 39,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
u32 exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl;
if (!cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(&vmx->vcpu))
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
if (vmx->vpid == 0)
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID;
if (!enable_ept) {
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT;
enable_unrestricted_guest = 0;
/* Enable INVPCID for non-ept guests may cause performance regression. */
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
}
if (!enable_unrestricted_guest)
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
if (!ple_gap)
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING;
if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu))
exec_control &= ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE;
/* SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS is enabled when L1 executes VMPTRLD
(handle_vmptrld).
We can NOT enable shadow_vmcs here because we don't have yet
a current VMCS12
*/
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS;
if (!enable_pml)
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML;
return exec_control;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: decode_NXAST_RAW_WRITE_METADATA(const struct nx_action_write_metadata *nawm,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
struct ofpact_metadata *om;
if (!is_all_zeros(nawm->zeros, sizeof nawm->zeros)) {
return OFPERR_NXBRC_MUST_BE_ZERO;
}
om = ofpact_put_WRITE_METADATA(out);
om->metadata = nawm->metadata;
om->mask = nawm->mask;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void convert_32s8u_C1R(const OPJ_INT32* pSrc, OPJ_BYTE* pDst,
OPJ_SIZE_T length)
{
OPJ_SIZE_T i;
for (i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
pDst[i] = (OPJ_BYTE)pSrc[i];
}
}
Commit Message: pgxtoimage(): fix write stack buffer overflow (#997)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 61,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void add_workflow_buttons(GtkBox *box, GHashTable *workflows, GCallback func)
{
gtk_container_foreach(GTK_CONTAINER(box), &remove_child_widget, NULL);
GList *possible_workflows = list_possible_events_glist(g_dump_dir_name, "workflow");
GHashTable *workflow_table = load_workflow_config_data_from_list(
possible_workflows,
WORKFLOWS_DIR);
g_list_free_full(possible_workflows, free);
g_object_set_data_full(G_OBJECT(box), "workflows", workflow_table, (GDestroyNotify)g_hash_table_destroy);
GList *wf_list = g_hash_table_get_values(workflow_table);
wf_list = g_list_sort(wf_list, (GCompareFunc)wf_priority_compare);
for (GList *wf_iter = wf_list; wf_iter; wf_iter = g_list_next(wf_iter))
{
workflow_t *w = (workflow_t *)wf_iter->data;
char *btn_label = xasprintf("<b>%s</b>\n%s", wf_get_screen_name(w), wf_get_description(w));
GtkWidget *button = gtk_button_new_with_label(btn_label);
GList *children = gtk_container_get_children(GTK_CONTAINER(button));
GtkWidget *label = (GtkWidget *)children->data;
gtk_label_set_use_markup(GTK_LABEL(label), true);
gtk_widget_set_halign(label, GTK_ALIGN_START);
gtk_widget_set_margin_top(label, 10);
#if ((GTK_MAJOR_VERSION == 3 && GTK_MINOR_VERSION < 11) || (GTK_MAJOR_VERSION == 3 && GTK_MINOR_VERSION == 11 && GTK_MICRO_VERSION < 2))
gtk_widget_set_margin_left(label, 40);
#else
gtk_widget_set_margin_start(label, 40);
#endif
gtk_widget_set_margin_bottom(label, 10);
g_list_free(children);
free(btn_label);
g_signal_connect(button, "clicked", func, w);
gtk_box_pack_start(box, button, true, false, 2);
}
g_list_free(wf_list);
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,789 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetWorkerProcessTitle(
const GURL& url, content::ResourceContext* context) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
ProfileIOData* io_data = ProfileIOData::FromResourceContext(context);
const Extension* extension =
io_data->GetExtensionInfoMap()->extensions().GetByID(url.host());
return extension ? extension->name() : std::string();
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,763 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GC_API int GC_CALL GC_posix_memalign(void **memptr, size_t align, size_t lb)
{
/* Check alignment properly. */
if (((align - 1) & align) != 0 || align < sizeof(void *)) {
# ifdef MSWINCE
return ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
# else
return EINVAL;
# endif
}
if ((*memptr = GC_memalign(align, lb)) == NULL) {
# ifdef MSWINCE
return ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY;
# else
return ENOMEM;
# endif
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix allocation size overflows due to rounding.
* malloc.c (GC_generic_malloc): Check if the allocation size is
rounded to a smaller value.
* mallocx.c (GC_generic_malloc_ignore_off_page): Likewise.
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 94,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct dir *squashfs_opendir_4(unsigned int block_start, unsigned int offset,
struct inode **i)
{
struct squashfs_dir_header dirh;
char buffer[sizeof(struct squashfs_dir_entry) + SQUASHFS_NAME_LEN + 1]
__attribute__((aligned));
struct squashfs_dir_entry *dire = (struct squashfs_dir_entry *) buffer;
long long start;
long long bytes;
int dir_count, size;
struct dir_ent *new_dir;
struct dir *dir;
TRACE("squashfs_opendir: inode start block %d, offset %d\n",
block_start, offset);
*i = s_ops.read_inode(block_start, offset);
dir = malloc(sizeof(struct dir));
if(dir == NULL)
EXIT_UNSQUASH("squashfs_opendir: malloc failed!\n");
dir->dir_count = 0;
dir->cur_entry = 0;
dir->mode = (*i)->mode;
dir->uid = (*i)->uid;
dir->guid = (*i)->gid;
dir->mtime = (*i)->time;
dir->xattr = (*i)->xattr;
dir->dirs = NULL;
if ((*i)->data == 3)
/*
* if the directory is empty, skip the unnecessary
* lookup_entry, this fixes the corner case with
* completely empty filesystems where lookup_entry correctly
* returning -1 is incorrectly treated as an error
*/
return dir;
start = sBlk.s.directory_table_start + (*i)->start;
bytes = lookup_entry(directory_table_hash, start);
if(bytes == -1)
EXIT_UNSQUASH("squashfs_opendir: directory block %lld not "
"found!\n", start);
bytes += (*i)->offset;
size = (*i)->data + bytes - 3;
while(bytes < size) {
SQUASHFS_SWAP_DIR_HEADER(directory_table + bytes, &dirh);
dir_count = dirh.count + 1;
TRACE("squashfs_opendir: Read directory header @ byte position "
"%d, %d directory entries\n", bytes, dir_count);
bytes += sizeof(dirh);
/* dir_count should never be larger than SQUASHFS_DIR_COUNT */
if(dir_count > SQUASHFS_DIR_COUNT) {
ERROR("File system corrupted: too many entries in directory\n");
goto corrupted;
}
while(dir_count--) {
SQUASHFS_SWAP_DIR_ENTRY(directory_table + bytes, dire);
bytes += sizeof(*dire);
/* size should never be SQUASHFS_NAME_LEN or larger */
if(dire->size >= SQUASHFS_NAME_LEN) {
ERROR("File system corrupted: filename too long\n");
goto corrupted;
}
memcpy(dire->name, directory_table + bytes,
dire->size + 1);
dire->name[dire->size + 1] = '\0';
TRACE("squashfs_opendir: directory entry %s, inode "
"%d:%d, type %d\n", dire->name,
dirh.start_block, dire->offset, dire->type);
if((dir->dir_count % DIR_ENT_SIZE) == 0) {
new_dir = realloc(dir->dirs, (dir->dir_count +
DIR_ENT_SIZE) * sizeof(struct dir_ent));
if(new_dir == NULL)
EXIT_UNSQUASH("squashfs_opendir: "
"realloc failed!\n");
dir->dirs = new_dir;
}
strcpy(dir->dirs[dir->dir_count].name, dire->name);
dir->dirs[dir->dir_count].start_block =
dirh.start_block;
dir->dirs[dir->dir_count].offset = dire->offset;
dir->dirs[dir->dir_count].type = dire->type;
dir->dir_count ++;
bytes += dire->size + 1;
}
}
return dir;
corrupted:
free(dir->dirs);
free(dir);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: unsquashfs-4: Add more sanity checks + fix CVE-2015-4645/6
Add more filesystem table sanity checks to Unsquashfs-4 and
also properly fix CVE-2015-4645 and CVE-2015-4646.
The CVEs were raised due to Unsquashfs having variable
oveflow and stack overflow in a number of vulnerable
functions.
The suggested patch only "fixed" one such function and fixed
it badly, and so it was buggy and introduced extra bugs!
The suggested patch was not only buggy, but, it used the
essentially wrong approach too. It was "fixing" the
symptom but not the cause. The symptom is wrong values
causing overflow, the cause is filesystem corruption.
This corruption should be detected and the filesystem
rejected *before* trying to allocate memory.
This patch applies the following fixes:
1. The filesystem super-block tables are checked, and the values
must match across the filesystem.
This will trap corrupted filesystems created by Mksquashfs.
2. The maximum (theorectical) size the filesystem tables could grow
to, were analysed, and some variables were increased from int to
long long.
This analysis has been added as comments.
3. Stack allocation was removed, and a shared buffer (which is
checked and increased as necessary) is used to read the
table indexes.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 74,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vma_dup_policy(struct vm_area_struct *src, struct vm_area_struct *dst)
{
struct mempolicy *pol = mpol_dup(vma_policy(src));
if (IS_ERR(pol))
return PTR_ERR(pol);
dst->vm_policy = pol;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy.c: fix error handling in set_mempolicy and mbind.
In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the
bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak
sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 67,210 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char16_t *strncpy16(char16_t *dst, const char16_t *src, size_t n)
{
char16_t *q = dst;
const char16_t *p = src;
char ch;
while (n) {
n--;
*q++ = ch = *p++;
if ( !ch )
break;
}
*q = 0;
return dst;
}
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 158,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::ExecuteMediaPlayerActionAtLocation(
const gfx::Point& location,
const blink::WebMediaPlayerAction& action) {
gfx::PointF point_in_view = GetView()->TransformRootPointToViewCoordSpace(
gfx::PointF(location.x(), location.y()));
Send(new FrameMsg_MediaPlayerActionAt(routing_id_, point_in_view, action));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __get_data_block(struct inode *inode, sector_t iblock,
struct buffer_head *bh, int create, int flag,
pgoff_t *next_pgofs)
{
struct f2fs_map_blocks map;
int err;
map.m_lblk = iblock;
map.m_len = bh->b_size >> inode->i_blkbits;
map.m_next_pgofs = next_pgofs;
err = f2fs_map_blocks(inode, &map, create, flag);
if (!err) {
map_bh(bh, inode->i_sb, map.m_pblk);
bh->b_state = (bh->b_state & ~F2FS_MAP_FLAGS) | map.m_flags;
bh->b_size = map.m_len << inode->i_blkbits;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a dead loop in f2fs_fiemap()
A dead loop can be triggered in f2fs_fiemap() using the test case
as below:
...
fd = open();
fallocate(fd, 0, 0, 4294967296);
ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FIEMAP, fiemap_buf);
...
It's caused by an overflow in __get_data_block():
...
bh->b_size = map.m_len << inode->i_blkbits;
...
map.m_len is an unsigned int, and bh->b_size is a size_t which is 64 bits
on 64 bits archtecture, type conversion from an unsigned int to a size_t
will result in an overflow.
In the above-mentioned case, bh->b_size will be zero, and f2fs_fiemap()
will call get_data_block() at block 0 again an again.
Fix this by adding a force conversion before left shift.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 169,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: encode_DEC_MPLS_TTL(const struct ofpact_null *null OVS_UNUSED,
enum ofp_version ofp_version, struct ofpbuf *out)
{
put_OFPAT_DEC_MPLS_TTL(out, ofp_version);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void write_date(bytearray_t * bplist, double val)
{
uint8_t buff[9];
buff[0] = BPLIST_DATE | 3;
*(uint64_t*)(buff+1) = float_bswap64(*(uint64_t*)&val);
byte_array_append(bplist, buff, sizeof(buff));
}
Commit Message: bplist: Fix data range check for string/data/dict/array nodes
Passing a size of 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF to parse_string_node() might result
in a memcpy with a size of -1, leading to undefined behavior.
This commit makes sure that the actual node data (which depends on the size)
is in the range start_of_object..start_of_object+size.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 68,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason)
{
u32 exit_intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
/*
* At this point, the exit interruption info in exit_intr_info
* is only valid for EXCEPTION_NMI exits. For EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT
* we need to query the in-kernel LAPIC.
*/
WARN_ON(exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT);
if ((exit_intr_info &
(INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)) ==
(INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)) {
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_error_code =
vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);
}
nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, exit_reason, exit_intr_info,
vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION));
return 1;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 63,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderLayerCompositor::updateRootLayerPosition()
{
if (m_rootContentLayer) {
const IntRect& documentRect = m_renderView->documentRect();
m_rootContentLayer->setSize(documentRect.size());
m_rootContentLayer->setPosition(documentRect.location());
#if USE(RUBBER_BANDING)
if (m_layerForOverhangShadow)
OverscrollTheme::theme()->updateOverhangShadowLayer(m_layerForOverhangShadow.get(), m_rootContentLayer.get());
#endif
}
if (m_containerLayer) {
FrameView* frameView = m_renderView->frameView();
m_containerLayer->setSize(frameView->unscaledVisibleContentSize());
}
}
Commit Message: Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 113,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_io_s_popen(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value klass)
{
mrb_value cmd, io;
mrb_value mode = mrb_str_new_cstr(mrb, "r");
mrb_value opt = mrb_hash_new(mrb);
struct mrb_io *fptr;
const char *pname;
int pid = 0, flags;
STARTUPINFO si;
PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES saAttr;
HANDLE ifd[2];
HANDLE ofd[2];
int doexec;
int opt_in, opt_out, opt_err;
ifd[0] = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
ifd[1] = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
ofd[0] = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
ofd[1] = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "S|SH", &cmd, &mode, &opt);
io = mrb_obj_value(mrb_data_object_alloc(mrb, mrb_class_ptr(klass), NULL, &mrb_io_type));
pname = mrb_string_value_cstr(mrb, &cmd);
flags = mrb_io_modestr_to_flags(mrb, mrb_string_value_cstr(mrb, &mode));
doexec = (strcmp("-", pname) != 0);
opt_in = option_to_fd(mrb, opt, "in");
opt_out = option_to_fd(mrb, opt, "out");
opt_err = option_to_fd(mrb, opt, "err");
saAttr.nLength = sizeof(SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES);
saAttr.bInheritHandle = TRUE;
saAttr.lpSecurityDescriptor = NULL;
if (flags & FMODE_READABLE) {
if (!CreatePipe(&ofd[0], &ofd[1], &saAttr, 0)
|| !SetHandleInformation(ofd[0], HANDLE_FLAG_INHERIT, 0)) {
mrb_sys_fail(mrb, "pipe");
}
}
if (flags & FMODE_WRITABLE) {
if (!CreatePipe(&ifd[0], &ifd[1], &saAttr, 0)
|| !SetHandleInformation(ifd[1], HANDLE_FLAG_INHERIT, 0)) {
mrb_sys_fail(mrb, "pipe");
}
}
if (doexec) {
ZeroMemory(&pi, sizeof(pi));
ZeroMemory(&si, sizeof(si));
si.cb = sizeof(si);
si.dwFlags |= STARTF_USESHOWWINDOW;
si.wShowWindow = SW_HIDE;
si.dwFlags |= STARTF_USESTDHANDLES;
if (flags & FMODE_READABLE) {
si.hStdOutput = ofd[1];
si.hStdError = ofd[1];
}
if (flags & FMODE_WRITABLE) {
si.hStdInput = ifd[0];
}
if (!CreateProcess(
NULL, (char*)pname, NULL, NULL,
TRUE, CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi)) {
CloseHandle(ifd[0]);
CloseHandle(ifd[1]);
CloseHandle(ofd[0]);
CloseHandle(ofd[1]);
mrb_raisef(mrb, E_IO_ERROR, "command not found: %S", cmd);
}
CloseHandle(pi.hThread);
CloseHandle(ifd[0]);
CloseHandle(ofd[1]);
pid = pi.dwProcessId;
}
mrb_iv_set(mrb, io, mrb_intern_cstr(mrb, "@buf"), mrb_str_new_cstr(mrb, ""));
fptr = mrb_io_alloc(mrb);
fptr->fd = _open_osfhandle((intptr_t)ofd[0], 0);
fptr->fd2 = _open_osfhandle((intptr_t)ifd[1], 0);
fptr->pid = pid;
fptr->readable = ((flags & FMODE_READABLE) != 0);
fptr->writable = ((flags & FMODE_WRITABLE) != 0);
fptr->sync = 0;
DATA_TYPE(io) = &mrb_io_type;
DATA_PTR(io) = fptr;
return io;
}
Commit Message: Fix `use after free in File#initilialize_copy`; fix #4001
The bug and the fix were reported by https://hackerone.com/pnoltof
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 83,153 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(stream_socket_recvfrom)
{
php_stream *stream;
zval *zstream, *zremote = NULL;
char *remote_addr = NULL;
int remote_addr_len;
long to_read = 0;
char *read_buf;
long flags = 0;
int recvd;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rl|lz", &zstream, &to_read, &flags, &zremote) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
php_stream_from_zval(stream, &zstream);
if (zremote) {
zval_dtor(zremote);
ZVAL_NULL(zremote);
}
if (to_read <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Length parameter must be greater than 0");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
read_buf = safe_emalloc(1, to_read, 1);
recvd = php_stream_xport_recvfrom(stream, read_buf, to_read, flags, NULL, NULL,
zremote ? &remote_addr : NULL,
zremote ? &remote_addr_len : NULL
TSRMLS_CC);
if (recvd >= 0) {
if (zremote) {
ZVAL_STRINGL(zremote, remote_addr, remote_addr_len, 0);
}
read_buf[recvd] = '\0';
RETURN_STRINGL(read_buf, recvd, 0);
}
efree(read_buf);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppLauncherHandler::HandleLaunchApp(const base::ListValue* args) {
std::string extension_id;
CHECK(args->GetString(0, &extension_id));
double source = -1.0;
CHECK(args->GetDouble(1, &source));
std::string url;
if (args->GetSize() > 2)
CHECK(args->GetString(2, &url));
extension_misc::AppLaunchBucket launch_bucket =
static_cast<extension_misc::AppLaunchBucket>(
static_cast<int>(source));
CHECK(launch_bucket >= 0 &&
launch_bucket < extension_misc::APP_LAUNCH_BUCKET_BOUNDARY);
const Extension* extension =
extension_service_->GetExtensionById(extension_id, false);
if (!extension) {
PromptToEnableApp(extension_id);
return;
}
Profile* profile = extension_service_->profile();
WindowOpenDisposition disposition = args->GetSize() > 3 ?
webui::GetDispositionFromClick(args, 3) : CURRENT_TAB;
if (extension_id != extension_misc::kWebStoreAppId) {
CHECK_NE(launch_bucket, extension_misc::APP_LAUNCH_BUCKET_INVALID);
CoreAppLauncherHandler::RecordAppLaunchType(launch_bucket,
extension->GetType());
} else {
CoreAppLauncherHandler::RecordWebStoreLaunch();
}
if (disposition == NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB || disposition == NEW_BACKGROUND_TAB ||
disposition == NEW_WINDOW) {
AppLaunchParams params(profile, extension,
disposition == NEW_WINDOW ?
extensions::LAUNCH_CONTAINER_WINDOW :
extensions::LAUNCH_CONTAINER_TAB,
disposition);
params.override_url = GURL(url);
OpenApplication(params);
} else {
Browser* browser = chrome::FindBrowserWithWebContents(
web_ui()->GetWebContents());
WebContents* old_contents = NULL;
if (browser)
old_contents = browser->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents();
AppLaunchParams params(profile, extension,
old_contents ? CURRENT_TAB : NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB);
params.override_url = GURL(url);
WebContents* new_contents = OpenApplication(params);
if (new_contents != old_contents && browser &&
browser->tab_strip_model()->count() > 1) {
chrome::CloseWebContents(browser, old_contents, true);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Sp_split_regexp(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
const char *text;
int limit, len, k;
const char *p, *a, *b, *c, *e;
Resub m;
text = checkstring(J, 0);
re = js_toregexp(J, 1);
limit = js_isdefined(J, 2) ? js_tointeger(J, 2) : 1 << 30;
js_newarray(J);
len = 0;
e = text + strlen(text);
/* splitting the empty string */
if (e == text) {
if (js_regexec(re->prog, text, &m, 0)) {
if (len == limit) return;
js_pushliteral(J, "");
js_setindex(J, -2, 0);
}
return;
}
p = a = text;
while (a < e) {
if (js_regexec(re->prog, a, &m, a > text ? REG_NOTBOL : 0))
break; /* no match */
b = m.sub[0].sp;
c = m.sub[0].ep;
/* empty string at end of last match */
if (b == p) {
++a;
continue;
}
if (len == limit) return;
js_pushlstring(J, p, b - p);
js_setindex(J, -2, len++);
for (k = 1; k < m.nsub; ++k) {
if (len == limit) return;
js_pushlstring(J, m.sub[k].sp, m.sub[k].ep - m.sub[k].sp);
js_setindex(J, -2, len++);
}
a = p = c;
}
if (len == limit) return;
js_pushstring(J, p);
js_setindex(J, -2, len);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 1 | 169,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::ShouldAllowSession(
DevToolsSession* session) {
DevToolsManager* manager = DevToolsManager::GetInstance();
if (manager->delegate() && frame_host_) {
if (!manager->delegate()->AllowInspectingRenderFrameHost(frame_host_))
return false;
}
const bool is_webui =
frame_host_ && (frame_host_->web_ui() || frame_host_->pending_web_ui());
if (!session->client()->MayAttachToRenderer(frame_host_, is_webui))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,690 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void clear_page_huge_active(struct page *page)
{
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageHeadHuge(page), page);
ClearPagePrivate(&page[1]);
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sco_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int len, err = 0;
struct bt_voice voice;
u32 opt;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case BT_DEFER_SETUP:
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND && sk->sk_state != BT_LISTEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (get_user(opt, (u32 __user *) optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (opt)
set_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags);
else
clear_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags);
break;
case BT_VOICE:
if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN && sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND &&
sk->sk_state != BT_CONNECT2) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
voice.setting = sco_pi(sk)->setting;
len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(voice), optlen);
if (copy_from_user((char *)&voice, optval, len)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
/* Explicitly check for these values */
if (voice.setting != BT_VOICE_TRANSPARENT &&
voice.setting != BT_VOICE_CVSD_16BIT) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
sco_pi(sk)->setting = voice.setting;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Validate socket address length in sco_sock_bind().
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 57,367 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BTM_PINCodeReply (BD_ADDR bd_addr, UINT8 res, UINT8 pin_len, UINT8 *p_pin, UINT32 trusted_mask[])
{
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec;
BTM_TRACE_API ("BTM_PINCodeReply(): PairState: %s PairFlags: 0x%02x PinLen:%d Result:%d",
btm_pair_state_descr(btm_cb.pairing_state), btm_cb.pairing_flags, pin_len, res);
/* If timeout already expired or has been canceled, ignore the reply */
if (btm_cb.pairing_state != BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_LOCAL_PIN)
{
BTM_TRACE_WARNING ("BTM_PINCodeReply() - Wrong State: %d", btm_cb.pairing_state);
return;
}
if (memcmp (bd_addr, btm_cb.pairing_bda, BD_ADDR_LEN) != 0)
{
BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("BTM_PINCodeReply() - Wrong BD Addr");
return;
}
if ((p_dev_rec = btm_find_dev (bd_addr)) == NULL)
{
BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("BTM_PINCodeReply() - no dev CB");
return;
}
if ( (pin_len > PIN_CODE_LEN) || (pin_len == 0) || (p_pin == NULL) )
res = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
if (res != BTM_SUCCESS)
{
/* if peer started dd OR we started dd and pre-fetch pin was not used send negative reply */
if ((btm_cb.pairing_flags & BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_PEER_STARTED_DD) ||
((btm_cb.pairing_flags & BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_WE_STARTED_DD) &&
(btm_cb.pairing_flags & BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_DISC_WHEN_DONE)) )
{
/* use BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_AUTH_COMPLETE to report authentication failed event */
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_AUTH_COMPLETE);
btm_cb.acl_disc_reason = HCI_ERR_HOST_REJECT_SECURITY;
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_neg_reply (bd_addr);
}
else
{
p_dev_rec->security_required = BTM_SEC_NONE;
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_IDLE);
}
return;
}
if (trusted_mask)
BTM_SEC_COPY_TRUSTED_DEVICE(trusted_mask, p_dev_rec->trusted_mask);
p_dev_rec->sec_flags |= BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_AUTHED;
if ( (btm_cb.pairing_flags & BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_WE_STARTED_DD)
&& (p_dev_rec->hci_handle == BTM_SEC_INVALID_HANDLE)
&& (btm_cb.security_mode_changed == FALSE) )
{
/* This is start of the dedicated bonding if local device is 2.0 */
btm_cb.pin_code_len = pin_len;
memcpy (btm_cb.pin_code, p_pin, pin_len);
btm_cb.security_mode_changed = TRUE;
#ifdef APPL_AUTH_WRITE_EXCEPTION
if(!(APPL_AUTH_WRITE_EXCEPTION)(p_dev_rec->bd_addr))
#endif
btsnd_hcic_write_auth_enable (TRUE);
btm_cb.acl_disc_reason = 0xff ;
/* if we rejected incoming connection request, we have to wait HCI_Connection_Complete event */
/* before originating */
if (btm_cb.pairing_flags & BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_REJECTED_CONNECT)
{
BTM_TRACE_WARNING ("BTM_PINCodeReply(): waiting HCI_Connection_Complete after rejected incoming connection");
/* we change state little bit early so btm_sec_connected() will originate connection */
/* when existing ACL link is down completely */
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_PIN_REQ);
}
/* if we already accepted incoming connection from pairing device */
else if (p_dev_rec->sm4 & BTM_SM4_CONN_PEND)
{
BTM_TRACE_WARNING ("BTM_PINCodeReply(): link is connecting so wait pin code request from peer");
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_PIN_REQ);
}
else if (btm_sec_dd_create_conn(p_dev_rec) != BTM_CMD_STARTED)
{
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_IDLE);
p_dev_rec->sec_flags &= ~BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_AUTHED;
if (btm_cb.api.p_auth_complete_callback)
(*btm_cb.api.p_auth_complete_callback) (p_dev_rec->bd_addr, p_dev_rec->dev_class,
p_dev_rec->sec_bd_name, HCI_ERR_AUTH_FAILURE);
}
return;
}
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_AUTH_COMPLETE);
btm_cb.acl_disc_reason = HCI_SUCCESS;
#ifdef PORCHE_PAIRING_CONFLICT
BTM_TRACE_EVENT("BTM_PINCodeReply(): Saving pin_len: %d btm_cb.pin_code_len: %d", pin_len, btm_cb.pin_code_len);
/* if this was not pre-fetched, save the PIN */
if (btm_cb.pin_code_len == 0)
memcpy (btm_cb.pin_code, p_pin, pin_len);
btm_cb.pin_code_len_saved = pin_len;
#endif
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_req_reply (bd_addr, pin_len, p_pin);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 173,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: find_client_in_id_table(struct list_head *tbl, clientid_t *clid, bool sessions)
{
struct nfs4_client *clp;
unsigned int idhashval = clientid_hashval(clid->cl_id);
list_for_each_entry(clp, &tbl[idhashval], cl_idhash) {
if (same_clid(&clp->cl_clientid, clid)) {
if ((bool)clp->cl_minorversion != sessions)
return NULL;
renew_client_locked(clp);
return clp;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_NPP_Destroy(rpc_connection_t *connection)
{
D(bug("handle_NPP_Destroy\n"));
int error;
PluginInstance *plugin;
error = rpc_method_get_args(connection,
RPC_TYPE_NPW_PLUGIN_INSTANCE, &plugin,
RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR) {
npw_perror("NPP_Destroy() get args", error);
return error;
}
NPSavedData *save_area = NULL;
NPError ret = NPERR_NO_ERROR;
/* Take a ref for the rpc_method_send_reply; otherwise the
* rpc_connection_unref in g_NPP_Destroy_Now may cause a slight
* nuisance. */
rpc_connection_ref(connection);
if (!rpc_method_in_invoke(connection)) {
/* The plugin is not on the stack; it's safe to call this. */
D(bug("NPP_Destroy is fine.\n"));
ret = g_NPP_Destroy_Now(plugin, &save_area);
} else {
/* It is not safe to call NPP_Destroy right now. Delay it until we
* return to the event loop.
*
* NOTE: This means that the browser never sees the real return
* value of NPP_Destroy; the NPSavedData will be discarded, and any
* error code will be ignored. */
D(bug("NPP_Destroy raced; delaying it to get a clean stack.\n"));
delayed_destroys_add(plugin);
}
error = rpc_method_send_reply(connection,
RPC_TYPE_INT32, ret,
RPC_TYPE_NP_SAVED_DATA, save_area,
RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (save_area) {
if (save_area->buf)
NPN_MemFree(save_area->buf);
NPN_MemFree(save_area);
}
rpc_connection_unref(connection);
return error;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sg_add_sfp(Sg_device * sdp)
{
Sg_fd *sfp;
unsigned long iflags;
int bufflen;
sfp = kzalloc(sizeof(*sfp), GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!sfp)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
init_waitqueue_head(&sfp->read_wait);
rwlock_init(&sfp->rq_list_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sfp->rq_list);
kref_init(&sfp->f_ref);
mutex_init(&sfp->f_mutex);
sfp->timeout = SG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT;
sfp->timeout_user = SG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_USER;
sfp->force_packid = SG_DEF_FORCE_PACK_ID;
sfp->cmd_q = SG_DEF_COMMAND_Q;
sfp->keep_orphan = SG_DEF_KEEP_ORPHAN;
sfp->parentdp = sdp;
write_lock_irqsave(&sdp->sfd_lock, iflags);
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)) {
write_unlock_irqrestore(&sdp->sfd_lock, iflags);
return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
}
list_add_tail(&sfp->sfd_siblings, &sdp->sfds);
write_unlock_irqrestore(&sdp->sfd_lock, iflags);
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sdp,
"sg_add_sfp: sfp=0x%p\n", sfp));
if (unlikely(sg_big_buff != def_reserved_size))
sg_big_buff = def_reserved_size;
bufflen = min_t(int, sg_big_buff,
max_sectors_bytes(sdp->device->request_queue));
sg_build_reserve(sfp, bufflen);
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sdp,
"sg_add_sfp: bufflen=%d, k_use_sg=%d\n",
sfp->reserve.bufflen,
sfp->reserve.k_use_sg));
kref_get(&sdp->d_ref);
__module_get(THIS_MODULE);
return sfp;
}
Commit Message: scsi: sg: fixup infoleak when using SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE
When calling SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE ioctl only a half-filled table is
returned; the remaining part will then contain stale kernel memory
information. This patch zeroes out the entire table to avoid this
issue.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 60,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: write_file(cupsd_client_t *con, /* I - Client connection */
http_status_t code, /* I - HTTP status */
char *filename, /* I - Filename */
char *type, /* I - File type */
struct stat *filestats) /* O - File information */
{
con->file = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "write_file: code=%d, filename=\"%s\" (%d), type=\"%s\", filestats=%p.", code, filename, con->file, type ? type : "(null)", filestats);
if (con->file < 0)
return (0);
fcntl(con->file, F_SETFD, fcntl(con->file, F_GETFD) | FD_CLOEXEC);
con->pipe_pid = 0;
con->sent_header = 1;
httpClearFields(con->http);
httpSetLength(con->http, (size_t)filestats->st_size);
httpSetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_LAST_MODIFIED,
httpGetDateString(filestats->st_mtime));
if (!cupsdSendHeader(con, code, type, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
return (0);
cupsdAddSelect(httpGetFd(con->http), NULL, (cupsd_selfunc_t)cupsdWriteClient, con);
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG, "Sending file.");
return (1);
}
Commit Message: Don't treat "localhost.localdomain" as an allowed replacement for localhost, since it isn't.
CWE ID: CWE-290 | 0 | 86,112 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: KURL DocumentLoader::urlForHistory() const
{
if (m_substituteData.isValid())
return unreachableURL();
return m_originalRequestCopy.url();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void prepare_show_merge(struct rev_info *revs)
{
struct commit_list *bases;
struct commit *head, *other;
unsigned char sha1[20];
const char **prune = NULL;
int i, prune_num = 1; /* counting terminating NULL */
if (get_sha1("HEAD", sha1))
die("--merge without HEAD?");
head = lookup_commit_or_die(sha1, "HEAD");
if (get_sha1("MERGE_HEAD", sha1))
die("--merge without MERGE_HEAD?");
other = lookup_commit_or_die(sha1, "MERGE_HEAD");
add_pending_object(revs, &head->object, "HEAD");
add_pending_object(revs, &other->object, "MERGE_HEAD");
bases = get_merge_bases(head, other);
add_rev_cmdline_list(revs, bases, REV_CMD_MERGE_BASE, UNINTERESTING | BOTTOM);
add_pending_commit_list(revs, bases, UNINTERESTING | BOTTOM);
free_commit_list(bases);
head->object.flags |= SYMMETRIC_LEFT;
if (!active_nr)
read_cache();
for (i = 0; i < active_nr; i++) {
const struct cache_entry *ce = active_cache[i];
if (!ce_stage(ce))
continue;
if (ce_path_match(ce, &revs->prune_data, NULL)) {
prune_num++;
REALLOC_ARRAY(prune, prune_num);
prune[prune_num-2] = ce->name;
prune[prune_num-1] = NULL;
}
while ((i+1 < active_nr) &&
ce_same_name(ce, active_cache[i+1]))
i++;
}
free_pathspec(&revs->prune_data);
parse_pathspec(&revs->prune_data, PATHSPEC_ALL_MAGIC & ~PATHSPEC_LITERAL,
PATHSPEC_PREFER_FULL | PATHSPEC_LITERAL_PATH, "", prune);
revs->limited = 1;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int git_index_reuc_find(size_t *at_pos, git_index *index, const char *path)
{
return git_vector_bsearch2(at_pos, &index->reuc, index->reuc_search, path);
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 83,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MakeScreenPrivate(ScreenPtr pScreen)
{
SetupScreen(pScreen);
if (pPriv)
return pPriv;
pPriv = New(ScreenSaverScreenPrivateRec);
if (!pPriv)
return 0;
pPriv->events = 0;
pPriv->attr = 0;
pPriv->hasWindow = FALSE;
pPriv->installedMap = None;
SetScreenPrivate(pScreen, pPriv);
pScreen->screensaver.ExternalScreenSaver = ScreenSaverHandle;
return pPriv;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SystemKeyEventListener::AddCapsLockObserver(CapsLockObserver* observer) {
caps_lock_observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PasswordAutofillManager::DidAcceptSuggestion(const base::string16& value,
int identifier,
int position) {
autofill_client_->ExecuteCommand(identifier);
if (identifier == autofill::POPUP_ITEM_ID_GENERATE_PASSWORD_ENTRY) {
password_manager_driver_->UserSelectedManualGenerationOption();
} else if (identifier !=
autofill::POPUP_ITEM_ID_HTTP_NOT_SECURE_WARNING_MESSAGE &&
identifier != autofill::POPUP_ITEM_ID_ALL_SAVED_PASSWORDS_ENTRY) {
bool success =
FillSuggestion(form_data_key_, GetUsernameFromSuggestion(value));
DCHECK(success);
}
if (identifier == autofill::POPUP_ITEM_ID_ALL_SAVED_PASSWORDS_ENTRY) {
DCHECK_NE(show_all_saved_passwords_shown_context_,
metrics_util::SHOW_ALL_SAVED_PASSWORDS_CONTEXT_NONE);
metrics_util::LogContextOfShowAllSavedPasswordsAccepted(
show_all_saved_passwords_shown_context_);
if (password_client_) {
using UserAction =
password_manager::PasswordManagerMetricsRecorder::PageLevelUserAction;
switch (show_all_saved_passwords_shown_context_) {
case metrics_util::SHOW_ALL_SAVED_PASSWORDS_CONTEXT_PASSWORD:
password_client_->GetMetricsRecorder().RecordPageLevelUserAction(
UserAction::kShowAllPasswordsWhileSomeAreSuggested);
break;
case metrics_util::SHOW_ALL_SAVED_PASSWORDS_CONTEXT_MANUAL_FALLBACK:
password_client_->GetMetricsRecorder().RecordPageLevelUserAction(
UserAction::kShowAllPasswordsWhileNoneAreSuggested);
break;
case metrics_util::SHOW_ALL_SAVED_PASSWORDS_CONTEXT_CONTEXT_MENU:
case metrics_util::SHOW_ALL_SAVED_PASSWORDS_CONTEXT_NONE:
case metrics_util::SHOW_ALL_SAVED_PASSWORDS_CONTEXT_COUNT:
NOTREACHED();
}
}
}
autofill_client_->HideAutofillPopup();
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <nikhil.sahni@samsung.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ldm_validate_partition_table(struct parsed_partitions *state)
{
Sector sect;
u8 *data;
struct partition *p;
int i;
bool result = false;
BUG_ON(!state);
data = read_part_sector(state, 0, §);
if (!data) {
ldm_crit ("Disk read failed.");
return false;
}
if (*(__le16*) (data + 0x01FE) != cpu_to_le16 (MSDOS_LABEL_MAGIC))
goto out;
p = (struct partition*)(data + 0x01BE);
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++, p++)
if (SYS_IND (p) == LDM_PARTITION) {
result = true;
break;
}
if (result)
ldm_debug ("Found W2K dynamic disk partition type.");
out:
put_dev_sector (sect);
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fix for buffer overflow in ldm_frag_add not sufficient
As Ben Hutchings discovered [1], the patch for CVE-2011-1017 (buffer
overflow in ldm_frag_add) is not sufficient. The original patch in
commit c340b1d64000 ("fs/partitions/ldm.c: fix oops caused by corrupted
partition table") does not consider that, for subsequent fragments,
previously allocated memory is used.
[1] http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/5/6/407
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContentSecurityPolicy::copyStateFrom(const ContentSecurityPolicy* other) {
ASSERT(m_policies.isEmpty());
for (const auto& policy : other->m_policies)
addAndReportPolicyFromHeaderValue(policy->header(), policy->headerType(),
policy->headerSource());
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 136,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int yr_arena_create(
size_t initial_size,
int flags,
YR_ARENA** arena)
{
YR_ARENA* new_arena;
YR_ARENA_PAGE* new_page;
*arena = NULL;
new_arena = (YR_ARENA*) yr_malloc(sizeof(YR_ARENA));
if (new_arena == NULL)
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
new_page = _yr_arena_new_page(initial_size);
if (new_page == NULL)
{
yr_free(new_arena);
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
}
new_arena->page_list_head = new_page;
new_arena->current_page = new_page;
new_arena->flags = flags | ARENA_FLAGS_COALESCED;
*arena = new_arena;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #658
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 66,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void handle_flags(struct smi_info *smi_info)
{
retry:
if (smi_info->msg_flags & WDT_PRE_TIMEOUT_INT) {
/* Watchdog pre-timeout */
smi_inc_stat(smi_info, watchdog_pretimeouts);
start_clear_flags(smi_info);
smi_info->msg_flags &= ~WDT_PRE_TIMEOUT_INT;
ipmi_smi_watchdog_pretimeout(smi_info->intf);
} else if (smi_info->msg_flags & RECEIVE_MSG_AVAIL) {
/* Messages available. */
smi_info->curr_msg = alloc_msg_handle_irq(smi_info);
if (!smi_info->curr_msg)
return;
start_getting_msg_queue(smi_info);
} else if (smi_info->msg_flags & EVENT_MSG_BUFFER_FULL) {
/* Events available. */
smi_info->curr_msg = alloc_msg_handle_irq(smi_info);
if (!smi_info->curr_msg)
return;
start_getting_events(smi_info);
} else if (smi_info->msg_flags & OEM_DATA_AVAIL &&
smi_info->oem_data_avail_handler) {
if (smi_info->oem_data_avail_handler(smi_info))
goto retry;
} else
smi_info->si_state = SI_NORMAL;
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 90,221 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GetDownloads(Browser* browser,
std::vector<DownloadItem*>* downloads) const {
DCHECK(downloads);
DownloadManager* manager = DownloadManagerForBrowser(browser);
manager->GetAllDownloads(downloads);
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 151,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string16 GetFindBarMatchCountTextForBrowser(Browser* browser) {
FindBarTesting* find_bar =
browser->GetFindBarController()->find_bar()->GetFindBarTesting();
return find_bar->GetMatchCountText();
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct ctl_node *first_usable_entry(struct rb_node *node)
{
struct ctl_node *ctl_node;
for (;node; node = rb_next(node)) {
ctl_node = rb_entry(node, struct ctl_node, node);
if (use_table(ctl_node->header))
return ctl_node;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir
Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.
The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:
[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265] [<ffffffff817cdaaf>] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817] [<ffffffff817d33fb>] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346] [<ffffffff817cf055>] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256] [<ffffffff817cf0d3>] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972] [<ffffffff810d1fd0>] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804] [<ffffffff8130de64>] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227] [<ffffffff8130de17>] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648] [<ffffffff8130decd>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654] [<ffffffff8130deff>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657] [<ffffffff810f57f5>] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344] [<ffffffff810d7704>] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447] [<ffffffff817d0761>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844] [<ffffffff81167684>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336] [<ffffffff8116789d>] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186] [<ffffffff81167acb>] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899] [<ffffffff810fce3d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234] [<ffffffff8115a9f5>] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049] [<ffffffff81167ae5>] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571] [<ffffffff8115aa2c>] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207] [<ffffffff810bc83f>] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736] [<ffffffff810bc7c0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461] [<ffffffff810bce9b>] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697] [<ffffffff810bcd70>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426] [<ffffffff810c3f7e>] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991] [<ffffffff817d4baf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041] [<ffffffff810c3e80>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230
One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex. The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.
See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13
Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Yang Shukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 48,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline MagickBooleanType IsPoint(const char *point)
{
char
*p;
double
value;
value=StringToDouble(point,&p);
return((value == 0.0) && (p == point) ? MagickFalse : MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,013 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: make_echo_reply(const struct ofp_header *rq)
{
struct ofpbuf rq_buf = ofpbuf_const_initializer(rq, ntohs(rq->length));
ofpraw_pull_assert(&rq_buf);
struct ofpbuf *reply = ofpraw_alloc_reply(OFPRAW_OFPT_ECHO_REPLY,
rq, rq_buf.size);
ofpbuf_put(reply, rq_buf.data, rq_buf.size);
return reply;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsWindow::OnLoadCompleted() {
WebContents* inspected_web_contents = GetInspectedWebContents();
if (inspected_web_contents) {
SessionTabHelper* session_tab_helper =
SessionTabHelper::FromWebContents(inspected_web_contents);
if (session_tab_helper) {
base::FundamentalValue tabId(session_tab_helper->session_id().id());
bindings_->CallClientFunction("DevToolsAPI.setInspectedTabId",
&tabId, NULL, NULL);
}
}
if (life_stage_ == kClosing)
return;
if (life_stage_ != kLoadCompleted) {
life_stage_ = life_stage_ == kIsDockedSet ? kLoadCompleted : kOnLoadFired;
}
if (life_stage_ == kLoadCompleted)
LoadCompleted();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 138,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void tracing_reset_online_cpus(struct trace_buffer *buf)
{
struct ring_buffer *buffer = buf->buffer;
int cpu;
if (!buffer)
return;
ring_buffer_record_disable(buffer);
/* Make sure all commits have finished */
synchronize_rcu();
buf->time_start = buffer_ftrace_now(buf, buf->cpu);
for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
ring_buffer_reset_cpu(buffer, cpu);
ring_buffer_record_enable(buffer);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int asf_read_language_list(AVFormatContext *s, const GUIDParseTable *g)
{
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
int i, ret;
uint64_t size = avio_rl64(pb);
uint16_t nb_langs = avio_rl16(pb);
if (nb_langs < ASF_MAX_STREAMS) {
for (i = 0; i < nb_langs; i++) {
size_t len;
len = avio_r8(pb);
if (!len)
len = 6;
if ((ret = get_asf_string(pb, len, asf->asf_sd[i].langs,
sizeof(asf->asf_sd[i].langs))) < 0) {
return ret;
}
}
}
align_position(pb, asf->offset, size);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec_o: Check size_bmp more fully
Fixes: integer overflow and out of array access
Fixes: asfo-crash-46080c4341572a7137a162331af77f6ded45cbd7
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 74,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLES2Implementation::SingleThreadChecker::~SingleThreadChecker() {
--gles2_implementation_->use_count_;
CHECK_EQ(0, gles2_implementation_->use_count_);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,168 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int netlink_broadcast_deliver(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf &&
!test_bit(0, &nlk->state)) {
skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk);
__netlink_sendskb(sk, skb);
return atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) > (sk->sk_rcvbuf >> 1);
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 19,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ExecuteMoveBackward(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
frame.Selection().Modify(SelectionModifyAlteration::kMove,
SelectionModifyDirection::kBackward,
TextGranularity::kCharacter, SetSelectionBy::kUser);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CCLayerTreeHostTestShortlived2() { }
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long Cluster::GetEntryCount() const
{
return m_entries_count;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PeekNamedPipeAsync(HANDLE pipe, DWORD count, LPHANDLE events)
{
return AsyncPipeOp(peek, pipe, NULL, 0, count, events);
}
Commit Message: Fix potential double-free() in Interactive Service (CVE-2018-9336)
Malformed input data on the service pipe towards the OpenVPN interactive
service (normally used by the OpenVPN GUI to request openvpn instances
from the service) can result in a double free() in the error handling code.
This usually only leads to a process crash (DoS by an unprivileged local
account) but since it could possibly lead to memory corruption if
happening while multiple other threads are active at the same time,
CVE-2018-9336 has been assigned to acknowledge this risk.
Fix by ensuring that sud->directory is set to NULL in GetStartUpData()
for all error cases (thus not being free()ed in FreeStartupData()).
Rewrite control flow to use explicit error label for error exit.
Discovered and reported by Jacob Baines <jbaines@tenable.com>.
CVE: 2018-9336
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Acked-by: Selva Nair <selva.nair@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20180414072617.25075-1-gert@greenie.muc.de>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&q=20180414072617.25075-1-gert@greenie.muc.de
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 83,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: setnonblocking(int fd)
{
int flags;
if (-1 == (flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0))) {
flags = 0;
}
return fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK);
}
Commit Message: Fix #1734
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 60,324 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameHostImpl::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message &msg) {
if (!render_frame_created_)
return false;
ScopedActiveURL scoped_active_url(this);
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(RenderFrameHostImpl, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RenderProcessGone, OnRenderProcessGone)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
if (handled)
return true;
if (delegate_->OnMessageReceived(this, msg))
return true;
RenderFrameProxyHost* proxy =
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->GetProxyToParent();
if (proxy && proxy->cross_process_frame_connector() &&
proxy->cross_process_frame_connector()->OnMessageReceived(msg))
return true;
handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(RenderFrameHostImpl, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole,
OnDidAddMessageToConsole)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_Detach, OnDetach)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_FrameFocused, OnFrameFocused)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError,
OnDidFailProvisionalLoadWithError)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidFailLoadWithError,
OnDidFailLoadWithError)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_UpdateState, OnUpdateState)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_OpenURL, OnOpenURL)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DocumentOnLoadCompleted,
OnDocumentOnLoadCompleted)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_BeforeUnload_ACK, OnBeforeUnloadACK)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SwapOut_ACK, OnSwapOutACK)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ContextMenu, OnContextMenu)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_JavaScriptExecuteResponse,
OnJavaScriptExecuteResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_VisualStateResponse,
OnVisualStateResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(FrameHostMsg_RunJavaScriptDialog,
OnRunJavaScriptDialog)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(FrameHostMsg_RunBeforeUnloadConfirm,
OnRunBeforeUnloadConfirm)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidAccessInitialDocument,
OnDidAccessInitialDocument)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeOpener, OnDidChangeOpener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidAddContentSecurityPolicies,
OnDidAddContentSecurityPolicies)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeFramePolicy,
OnDidChangeFramePolicy)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeFrameOwnerProperties,
OnDidChangeFrameOwnerProperties)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_UpdateTitle, OnUpdateTitle)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidBlockFramebust, OnDidBlockFramebust)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_AbortNavigation, OnAbortNavigation)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DispatchLoad, OnDispatchLoad)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ForwardResourceTimingToParent,
OnForwardResourceTimingToParent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_TextSurroundingSelectionResponse,
OnTextSurroundingSelectionResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_EventBundle, OnAccessibilityEvents)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_LocationChanges,
OnAccessibilityLocationChanges)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_FindInPageResult,
OnAccessibilityFindInPageResult)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_ChildFrameHitTestResult,
OnAccessibilityChildFrameHitTestResult)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_SnapshotResponse,
OnAccessibilitySnapshotResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_EnterFullscreen, OnEnterFullscreen)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ExitFullscreen, OnExitFullscreen)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SuddenTerminationDisablerChanged,
OnSuddenTerminationDisablerChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidStopLoading, OnDidStopLoading)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeLoadProgress,
OnDidChangeLoadProgress)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SerializeAsMHTMLResponse,
OnSerializeAsMHTMLResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SelectionChanged, OnSelectionChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_FocusedNodeChanged, OnFocusedNodeChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_UpdateUserActivationState,
OnUpdateUserActivationState)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation,
OnSetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ScrollRectToVisibleInParentFrame,
OnScrollRectToVisibleInParentFrame)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_BubbleLogicalScrollInParentFrame,
OnBubbleLogicalScrollInParentFrame)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_FrameDidCallFocus, OnFrameDidCallFocus)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RenderFallbackContentInParentProcess,
OnRenderFallbackContentInParentProcess)
#if BUILDFLAG(USE_EXTERNAL_POPUP_MENU)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ShowPopup, OnShowPopup)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_HidePopup, OnHidePopup)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RequestOverlayRoutingToken,
OnRequestOverlayRoutingToken)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ShowCreatedWindow, OnShowCreatedWindow)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int proc_tid_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer)
{
return do_io_accounting(task, buffer, 0);
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,903 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: client_skip_proxy(struct archive_read_filter *self, int64_t request)
{
if (request < 0)
__archive_errx(1, "Negative skip requested.");
if (request == 0)
return 0;
if (self->archive->client.skipper != NULL) {
/* Seek requests over 1GiB are broken down into
* multiple seeks. This avoids overflows when the
* requests get passed through 32-bit arguments. */
int64_t skip_limit = (int64_t)1 << 30;
int64_t total = 0;
for (;;) {
int64_t get, ask = request;
if (ask > skip_limit)
ask = skip_limit;
get = (self->archive->client.skipper)
(&self->archive->archive, self->data, ask);
if (get == 0)
return (total);
request -= get;
total += get;
}
} else if (self->archive->client.seeker != NULL
&& request > 64 * 1024) {
/* If the client provided a seeker but not a skipper,
* we can use the seeker to skip forward.
*
* Note: This isn't always a good idea. The client
* skipper is allowed to skip by less than requested
* if it needs to maintain block alignment. The
* seeker is not allowed to play such games, so using
* the seeker here may be a performance loss compared
* to just reading and discarding. That's why we
* only do this for skips of over 64k.
*/
int64_t before = self->position;
int64_t after = (self->archive->client.seeker)
(&self->archive->archive, self->data, request, SEEK_CUR);
if (after != before + request)
return ARCHIVE_FATAL;
return after - before;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a potential crash issue discovered by Alexander Cherepanov:
It seems bsdtar automatically handles stacked compression. This is a
nice feature but it could be problematic when it's completely
unlimited. Most clearly it's illustrated with quines:
$ curl -sRO http://www.maximumcompression.com/selfgz.gz
$ (ulimit -v 10000000 && bsdtar -tvf selfgz.gz)
bsdtar: Error opening archive: Can't allocate data for gzip decompression
Without ulimit, bsdtar will eat all available memory. This could also
be a problem for other applications using libarchive.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 50,040 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ResourceFetcher::clientDefersImage(const KURL& url) const
{
return frame() && !frame()->loader().client()->allowImage(m_imagesEnabled, url);
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 121,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void userfaultfd_ctx_put(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx)
{
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&ctx->refcount)) {
VM_BUG_ON(spin_is_locked(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh.lock));
VM_BUG_ON(waitqueue_active(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh));
VM_BUG_ON(spin_is_locked(&ctx->fault_wqh.lock));
VM_BUG_ON(waitqueue_active(&ctx->fault_wqh));
VM_BUG_ON(spin_is_locked(&ctx->event_wqh.lock));
VM_BUG_ON(waitqueue_active(&ctx->event_wqh));
VM_BUG_ON(spin_is_locked(&ctx->fd_wqh.lock));
VM_BUG_ON(waitqueue_active(&ctx->fd_wqh));
mmdrop(ctx->mm);
kmem_cache_free(userfaultfd_ctx_cachep, ctx);
}
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QQuickWebViewExperimental::schemeDelegates_Clear(QDeclarativeListProperty<QQuickUrlSchemeDelegate>* property)
{
const QObjectList children = property->object->children();
for (int index = 0; index < children.count(); index++) {
QObject* child = children.at(index);
child->setParent(0);
delete child;
}
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 101,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PPB_URLLoader_Impl::RegisterCallback(PP_CompletionCallback callback) {
DCHECK(callback.func);
DCHECK(!pending_callback_.get() || pending_callback_->completed());
PP_Resource resource_id = GetReferenceNoAddRef();
CHECK(resource_id);
pending_callback_ = new TrackedCompletionCallback(
instance()->module()->GetCallbackTracker(), resource_id, callback);
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,020 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct import_t* MACH0_(get_imports)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
struct import_t *imports;
int i, j, idx, stridx;
const char *symstr;
if (!bin->symtab || !bin->symstr || !bin->sects || !bin->indirectsyms)
return NULL;
if (bin->dysymtab.nundefsym < 1 || bin->dysymtab.nundefsym > 0xfffff) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(imports = malloc ((bin->dysymtab.nundefsym + 1) * sizeof (struct import_t)))) {
return NULL;
}
for (i = j = 0; i < bin->dysymtab.nundefsym; i++) {
idx = bin->dysymtab.iundefsym + i;
if (idx < 0 || idx >= bin->nsymtab) {
bprintf ("WARNING: Imports index out of bounds. Ignoring relocs\n");
free (imports);
return NULL;
}
stridx = bin->symtab[idx].n_strx;
if (stridx >= 0 && stridx < bin->symstrlen) {
symstr = (char *)bin->symstr + stridx;
} else {
symstr = "";
}
if (!*symstr) {
continue;
}
{
int i = 0;
int len = 0;
char *symstr_dup = NULL;
len = bin->symstrlen - stridx;
imports[j].name[0] = 0;
if (len > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if ((unsigned char)symstr[i] == 0xff || !symstr[i]) {
len = i;
break;
}
}
symstr_dup = r_str_ndup (symstr, len);
if (symstr_dup) {
r_str_ncpy (imports[j].name, symstr_dup, R_BIN_MACH0_STRING_LENGTH);
r_str_filter (imports[j].name, - 1);
imports[j].name[R_BIN_MACH0_STRING_LENGTH - 2] = 0;
free (symstr_dup);
}
}
}
imports[j].ord = i;
imports[j++].last = 0;
}
imports[j].last = 1;
if (!bin->imports_by_ord_size) {
if (j > 0) {
bin->imports_by_ord_size = j;
bin->imports_by_ord = (RBinImport**)calloc (j, sizeof (RBinImport*));
} else {
bin->imports_by_ord_size = 0;
bin->imports_by_ord = NULL;
}
}
return imports;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9970 - heap oobread in mach0 parser (#10026)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 169,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvmppc_handle_store(struct kvm_run *run, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u64 val, unsigned int bytes, int is_default_endian)
{
void *data = run->mmio.data;
int idx, ret;
bool host_swabbed;
/* Pity C doesn't have a logical XOR operator */
if (kvmppc_need_byteswap(vcpu)) {
host_swabbed = is_default_endian;
} else {
host_swabbed = !is_default_endian;
}
if (bytes > sizeof(run->mmio.data)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: bad MMIO length: %d\n", __func__,
run->mmio.len);
}
run->mmio.phys_addr = vcpu->arch.paddr_accessed;
run->mmio.len = bytes;
run->mmio.is_write = 1;
vcpu->mmio_needed = 1;
vcpu->mmio_is_write = 1;
if ((vcpu->arch.mmio_sp64_extend) && (bytes == 4))
val = dp_to_sp(val);
/* Store the value at the lowest bytes in 'data'. */
if (!host_swabbed) {
switch (bytes) {
case 8: *(u64 *)data = val; break;
case 4: *(u32 *)data = val; break;
case 2: *(u16 *)data = val; break;
case 1: *(u8 *)data = val; break;
}
} else {
switch (bytes) {
case 8: *(u64 *)data = swab64(val); break;
case 4: *(u32 *)data = swab32(val); break;
case 2: *(u16 *)data = swab16(val); break;
case 1: *(u8 *)data = val; break;
}
}
idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
ret = kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, run->mmio.phys_addr,
bytes, &run->mmio.data);
srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
if (!ret) {
vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
return EMULATE_DONE;
}
return EMULATE_DO_MMIO;
}
Commit Message: KVM: PPC: Fix oops when checking KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM
The following program causes a kernel oops:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
main()
{
int fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR);
ioctl(fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM);
}
This happens because when using the global KVM fd with
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension() gets
called with a NULL kvm argument, which gets dereferenced
in is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(). Spotted while reading the code.
Let's use the hv_enabled fallback variable, like everywhere
else in this function.
Fixes: 23528bb21ee2 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 60,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntRect ChromeClientImpl::rootViewToScreen(const IntRect& rect) const
{
IntRect screenRect(rect);
if (m_webView->client()) {
WebRect windowRect = m_webView->client()->windowRect();
screenRect.move(windowRect.x, windowRect.y);
}
return screenRect;
}
Commit Message: Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,640 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RendererSchedulerImpl::ResumeTimersForAndroidWebView() {
main_thread_only().pause_timers_for_webview = false;
UpdatePolicy();
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 143,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_timer_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
{
void __user *uaddr = (void __user *)(long)reg->addr;
u64 val;
int ret;
ret = copy_from_user(&val, uaddr, KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id));
if (ret != 0)
return -EFAULT;
return kvm_arm_timer_set_reg(vcpu, reg->id, val);
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: Tighten guest core register access from userspace
We currently allow userspace to access the core register file
in about any possible way, including straddling multiple
registers and doing unaligned accesses.
This is not the expected use of the ABI, and nobody is actually
using it that way. Let's tighten it by explicitly checking
the size and alignment for each field of the register file.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 2f4a07c5f9fe ("arm64: KVM: guest one-reg interface")
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[maz: rewrote Dave's initial patch to be more easily backported]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 76,529 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int arcmsr_iop_message_xfer(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb,
struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
{
char *buffer;
unsigned short use_sg;
int retvalue = 0, transfer_len = 0;
unsigned long flags;
struct CMD_MESSAGE_FIELD *pcmdmessagefld;
uint32_t controlcode = (uint32_t)cmd->cmnd[5] << 24 |
(uint32_t)cmd->cmnd[6] << 16 |
(uint32_t)cmd->cmnd[7] << 8 |
(uint32_t)cmd->cmnd[8];
struct scatterlist *sg;
use_sg = scsi_sg_count(cmd);
sg = scsi_sglist(cmd);
buffer = kmap_atomic(sg_page(sg)) + sg->offset;
if (use_sg > 1) {
retvalue = ARCMSR_MESSAGE_FAIL;
goto message_out;
}
transfer_len += sg->length;
if (transfer_len > sizeof(struct CMD_MESSAGE_FIELD)) {
retvalue = ARCMSR_MESSAGE_FAIL;
pr_info("%s: ARCMSR_MESSAGE_FAIL!\n", __func__);
goto message_out;
}
pcmdmessagefld = (struct CMD_MESSAGE_FIELD *)buffer;
switch (controlcode) {
case ARCMSR_MESSAGE_READ_RQBUFFER: {
unsigned char *ver_addr;
uint8_t *ptmpQbuffer;
uint32_t allxfer_len = 0;
ver_addr = kmalloc(ARCMSR_API_DATA_BUFLEN, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!ver_addr) {
retvalue = ARCMSR_MESSAGE_FAIL;
pr_info("%s: memory not enough!\n", __func__);
goto message_out;
}
ptmpQbuffer = ver_addr;
spin_lock_irqsave(&acb->rqbuffer_lock, flags);
if (acb->rqbuf_getIndex != acb->rqbuf_putIndex) {
unsigned int tail = acb->rqbuf_getIndex;
unsigned int head = acb->rqbuf_putIndex;
unsigned int cnt_to_end = CIRC_CNT_TO_END(head, tail, ARCMSR_MAX_QBUFFER);
allxfer_len = CIRC_CNT(head, tail, ARCMSR_MAX_QBUFFER);
if (allxfer_len > ARCMSR_API_DATA_BUFLEN)
allxfer_len = ARCMSR_API_DATA_BUFLEN;
if (allxfer_len <= cnt_to_end)
memcpy(ptmpQbuffer, acb->rqbuffer + tail, allxfer_len);
else {
memcpy(ptmpQbuffer, acb->rqbuffer + tail, cnt_to_end);
memcpy(ptmpQbuffer + cnt_to_end, acb->rqbuffer, allxfer_len - cnt_to_end);
}
acb->rqbuf_getIndex = (acb->rqbuf_getIndex + allxfer_len) % ARCMSR_MAX_QBUFFER;
}
memcpy(pcmdmessagefld->messagedatabuffer, ver_addr,
allxfer_len);
if (acb->acb_flags & ACB_F_IOPDATA_OVERFLOW) {
struct QBUFFER __iomem *prbuffer;
acb->acb_flags &= ~ACB_F_IOPDATA_OVERFLOW;
prbuffer = arcmsr_get_iop_rqbuffer(acb);
if (arcmsr_Read_iop_rqbuffer_data(acb, prbuffer) == 0)
acb->acb_flags |= ACB_F_IOPDATA_OVERFLOW;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&acb->rqbuffer_lock, flags);
kfree(ver_addr);
pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.Length = allxfer_len;
if (acb->fw_flag == FW_DEADLOCK)
pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.ReturnCode =
ARCMSR_MESSAGE_RETURNCODE_BUS_HANG_ON;
else
pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.ReturnCode =
ARCMSR_MESSAGE_RETURNCODE_OK;
break;
}
case ARCMSR_MESSAGE_WRITE_WQBUFFER: {
unsigned char *ver_addr;
int32_t user_len, cnt2end;
uint8_t *pQbuffer, *ptmpuserbuffer;
ver_addr = kmalloc(ARCMSR_API_DATA_BUFLEN, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!ver_addr) {
retvalue = ARCMSR_MESSAGE_FAIL;
goto message_out;
}
ptmpuserbuffer = ver_addr;
user_len = pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.Length;
memcpy(ptmpuserbuffer,
pcmdmessagefld->messagedatabuffer, user_len);
spin_lock_irqsave(&acb->wqbuffer_lock, flags);
if (acb->wqbuf_putIndex != acb->wqbuf_getIndex) {
struct SENSE_DATA *sensebuffer =
(struct SENSE_DATA *)cmd->sense_buffer;
arcmsr_write_ioctldata2iop(acb);
/* has error report sensedata */
sensebuffer->ErrorCode = SCSI_SENSE_CURRENT_ERRORS;
sensebuffer->SenseKey = ILLEGAL_REQUEST;
sensebuffer->AdditionalSenseLength = 0x0A;
sensebuffer->AdditionalSenseCode = 0x20;
sensebuffer->Valid = 1;
retvalue = ARCMSR_MESSAGE_FAIL;
} else {
pQbuffer = &acb->wqbuffer[acb->wqbuf_putIndex];
cnt2end = ARCMSR_MAX_QBUFFER - acb->wqbuf_putIndex;
if (user_len > cnt2end) {
memcpy(pQbuffer, ptmpuserbuffer, cnt2end);
ptmpuserbuffer += cnt2end;
user_len -= cnt2end;
acb->wqbuf_putIndex = 0;
pQbuffer = acb->wqbuffer;
}
memcpy(pQbuffer, ptmpuserbuffer, user_len);
acb->wqbuf_putIndex += user_len;
acb->wqbuf_putIndex %= ARCMSR_MAX_QBUFFER;
if (acb->acb_flags & ACB_F_MESSAGE_WQBUFFER_CLEARED) {
acb->acb_flags &=
~ACB_F_MESSAGE_WQBUFFER_CLEARED;
arcmsr_write_ioctldata2iop(acb);
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&acb->wqbuffer_lock, flags);
kfree(ver_addr);
if (acb->fw_flag == FW_DEADLOCK)
pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.ReturnCode =
ARCMSR_MESSAGE_RETURNCODE_BUS_HANG_ON;
else
pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.ReturnCode =
ARCMSR_MESSAGE_RETURNCODE_OK;
break;
}
case ARCMSR_MESSAGE_CLEAR_RQBUFFER: {
uint8_t *pQbuffer = acb->rqbuffer;
arcmsr_clear_iop2drv_rqueue_buffer(acb);
spin_lock_irqsave(&acb->rqbuffer_lock, flags);
acb->acb_flags |= ACB_F_MESSAGE_RQBUFFER_CLEARED;
acb->rqbuf_getIndex = 0;
acb->rqbuf_putIndex = 0;
memset(pQbuffer, 0, ARCMSR_MAX_QBUFFER);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&acb->rqbuffer_lock, flags);
if (acb->fw_flag == FW_DEADLOCK)
pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.ReturnCode =
ARCMSR_MESSAGE_RETURNCODE_BUS_HANG_ON;
else
pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.ReturnCode =
ARCMSR_MESSAGE_RETURNCODE_OK;
break;
}
case ARCMSR_MESSAGE_CLEAR_WQBUFFER: {
uint8_t *pQbuffer = acb->wqbuffer;
spin_lock_irqsave(&acb->wqbuffer_lock, flags);
acb->acb_flags |= (ACB_F_MESSAGE_WQBUFFER_CLEARED |
ACB_F_MESSAGE_WQBUFFER_READED);
acb->wqbuf_getIndex = 0;
acb->wqbuf_putIndex = 0;
memset(pQbuffer, 0, ARCMSR_MAX_QBUFFER);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&acb->wqbuffer_lock, flags);
if (acb->fw_flag == FW_DEADLOCK)
pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.ReturnCode =
ARCMSR_MESSAGE_RETURNCODE_BUS_HANG_ON;
else
pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.ReturnCode =
ARCMSR_MESSAGE_RETURNCODE_OK;
break;
}
case ARCMSR_MESSAGE_CLEAR_ALLQBUFFER: {
uint8_t *pQbuffer;
arcmsr_clear_iop2drv_rqueue_buffer(acb);
spin_lock_irqsave(&acb->rqbuffer_lock, flags);
acb->acb_flags |= ACB_F_MESSAGE_RQBUFFER_CLEARED;
acb->rqbuf_getIndex = 0;
acb->rqbuf_putIndex = 0;
pQbuffer = acb->rqbuffer;
memset(pQbuffer, 0, sizeof(struct QBUFFER));
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&acb->rqbuffer_lock, flags);
spin_lock_irqsave(&acb->wqbuffer_lock, flags);
acb->acb_flags |= (ACB_F_MESSAGE_WQBUFFER_CLEARED |
ACB_F_MESSAGE_WQBUFFER_READED);
acb->wqbuf_getIndex = 0;
acb->wqbuf_putIndex = 0;
pQbuffer = acb->wqbuffer;
memset(pQbuffer, 0, sizeof(struct QBUFFER));
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&acb->wqbuffer_lock, flags);
if (acb->fw_flag == FW_DEADLOCK)
pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.ReturnCode =
ARCMSR_MESSAGE_RETURNCODE_BUS_HANG_ON;
else
pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.ReturnCode =
ARCMSR_MESSAGE_RETURNCODE_OK;
break;
}
case ARCMSR_MESSAGE_RETURN_CODE_3F: {
if (acb->fw_flag == FW_DEADLOCK)
pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.ReturnCode =
ARCMSR_MESSAGE_RETURNCODE_BUS_HANG_ON;
else
pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.ReturnCode =
ARCMSR_MESSAGE_RETURNCODE_3F;
break;
}
case ARCMSR_MESSAGE_SAY_HELLO: {
int8_t *hello_string = "Hello! I am ARCMSR";
if (acb->fw_flag == FW_DEADLOCK)
pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.ReturnCode =
ARCMSR_MESSAGE_RETURNCODE_BUS_HANG_ON;
else
pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.ReturnCode =
ARCMSR_MESSAGE_RETURNCODE_OK;
memcpy(pcmdmessagefld->messagedatabuffer,
hello_string, (int16_t)strlen(hello_string));
break;
}
case ARCMSR_MESSAGE_SAY_GOODBYE: {
if (acb->fw_flag == FW_DEADLOCK)
pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.ReturnCode =
ARCMSR_MESSAGE_RETURNCODE_BUS_HANG_ON;
else
pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.ReturnCode =
ARCMSR_MESSAGE_RETURNCODE_OK;
arcmsr_iop_parking(acb);
break;
}
case ARCMSR_MESSAGE_FLUSH_ADAPTER_CACHE: {
if (acb->fw_flag == FW_DEADLOCK)
pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.ReturnCode =
ARCMSR_MESSAGE_RETURNCODE_BUS_HANG_ON;
else
pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.ReturnCode =
ARCMSR_MESSAGE_RETURNCODE_OK;
arcmsr_flush_adapter_cache(acb);
break;
}
default:
retvalue = ARCMSR_MESSAGE_FAIL;
pr_info("%s: unknown controlcode!\n", __func__);
}
message_out:
if (use_sg) {
struct scatterlist *sg = scsi_sglist(cmd);
kunmap_atomic(buffer - sg->offset);
}
return retvalue;
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 166,928 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void jpg_finish_output(j_decompress_ptr cinfo, jpg_dest_t *dinfo)
{
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpg_finish_output(%p, %p)\n", cinfo, dinfo));
/* Avoid compiler warnings about unused parameters. */
cinfo = 0;
dinfo = 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void DestroyXMLTreeChild(XMLTreeInfo *xml_info)
{
XMLTreeInfo
*child,
*node;
child=xml_info->child;
while(child != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
{
node=child;
child=node->child;
node->child=(XMLTreeInfo *) NULL;
(void) DestroyXMLTree(node);
}
}
Commit Message: Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 71,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __udp4_lib_mcast_deliver(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct udphdr *uh,
__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
struct udp_table *udptable,
int proto)
{
struct sock *sk, *stack[256 / sizeof(struct sock *)];
struct hlist_nulls_node *node;
unsigned short hnum = ntohs(uh->dest);
struct udp_hslot *hslot = udp_hashslot(udptable, net, hnum);
int dif = skb->dev->ifindex;
unsigned int count = 0, offset = offsetof(typeof(*sk), sk_nulls_node);
unsigned int hash2 = 0, hash2_any = 0, use_hash2 = (hslot->count > 10);
bool inner_flushed = false;
if (use_hash2) {
hash2_any = udp4_portaddr_hash(net, htonl(INADDR_ANY), hnum) &
udp_table.mask;
hash2 = udp4_portaddr_hash(net, daddr, hnum) & udp_table.mask;
start_lookup:
hslot = &udp_table.hash2[hash2];
offset = offsetof(typeof(*sk), __sk_common.skc_portaddr_node);
}
spin_lock(&hslot->lock);
sk_nulls_for_each_entry_offset(sk, node, &hslot->head, offset) {
if (__udp_is_mcast_sock(net, sk,
uh->dest, daddr,
uh->source, saddr,
dif, hnum)) {
if (unlikely(count == ARRAY_SIZE(stack))) {
flush_stack(stack, count, skb, ~0);
inner_flushed = true;
count = 0;
}
stack[count++] = sk;
sock_hold(sk);
}
}
spin_unlock(&hslot->lock);
/* Also lookup *:port if we are using hash2 and haven't done so yet. */
if (use_hash2 && hash2 != hash2_any) {
hash2 = hash2_any;
goto start_lookup;
}
/*
* do the slow work with no lock held
*/
if (count) {
flush_stack(stack, count, skb, count - 1);
} else {
if (!inner_flushed)
UDP_INC_STATS_BH(net, UDP_MIB_IGNOREDMULTI,
proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE);
consume_skb(skb);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums
We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums :
1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty.
This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll()
2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other
processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP.
This patch is an attempt to make things better.
We might in the future add extra support for rt applications
wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile
environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing
packets in socket receive queue.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 42,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OfflinePageModelTaskified::PostClearLegacyTemporaryPagesTask() {
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&OfflinePageModelTaskified::ClearLegacyTemporaryPages,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
kInitializingTaskDelay);
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 155,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::StaticSaveSameObjectAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_staticSaveSameObjectAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::StaticSaveSameObjectAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_description(struct NntpData *nntp_data, char *wildmat, char *msg)
{
char buf[STRING];
char *cmd = NULL;
/* get newsgroup description, if possible */
struct NntpServer *nserv = nntp_data->nserv;
if (!wildmat)
wildmat = nntp_data->group;
if (nserv->hasLIST_NEWSGROUPS)
cmd = "LIST NEWSGROUPS";
else if (nserv->hasXGTITLE)
cmd = "XGTITLE";
else
return 0;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s %s\r\n", cmd, wildmat);
int rc = nntp_fetch_lines(nntp_data, buf, sizeof(buf), msg, fetch_description, nserv);
if (rc > 0)
{
mutt_error("%s: %s", cmd, buf);
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Add alloc fail check in nntp_fetch_headers
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 79,492 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::RenderProcessGone(SiteInstanceImpl* instance) {
GetRenderFrameProxyHost(instance)->set_render_frame_proxy_created(false);
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static journal_t *ext3_get_journal(struct super_block *sb,
unsigned int journal_inum)
{
struct inode *journal_inode;
journal_t *journal;
/* First, test for the existence of a valid inode on disk. Bad
* things happen if we iget() an unused inode, as the subsequent
* iput() will try to delete it. */
journal_inode = ext3_iget(sb, journal_inum);
if (IS_ERR(journal_inode)) {
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: no journal found");
return NULL;
}
if (!journal_inode->i_nlink) {
make_bad_inode(journal_inode);
iput(journal_inode);
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: journal inode is deleted");
return NULL;
}
jbd_debug(2, "Journal inode found at %p: %Ld bytes\n",
journal_inode, journal_inode->i_size);
if (!S_ISREG(journal_inode->i_mode)) {
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: invalid journal inode");
iput(journal_inode);
return NULL;
}
journal = journal_init_inode(journal_inode);
if (!journal) {
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: could not load journal inode");
iput(journal_inode);
return NULL;
}
journal->j_private = sb;
ext3_init_journal_params(sb, journal);
return journal;
}
Commit Message: ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 32,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: StateBase(v8::Handle<v8::Value> composite, StateBase* next)
: m_composite(composite)
, m_next(next)
{
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Editor::RevealSelectionScope::RevealSelectionScope(Editor* editor)
: m_editor(editor) {
++m_editor->m_preventRevealSelection;
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID: | 0 | 129,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_end (const char *p)
{
if (!p)
return false;
while (c_isspace (*p))
++p;
if (!*p
|| (p[0] == 'G' && p[1] == 'M' && p[2] == 'T')
|| ((p[0] == '+' || p[0] == '-') && c_isdigit (p[1])))
return true;
else
return false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void disk_block_events(struct gendisk *disk)
{
struct disk_events *ev = disk->ev;
unsigned long flags;
bool cancel;
if (!ev)
return;
/*
* Outer mutex ensures that the first blocker completes canceling
* the event work before further blockers are allowed to finish.
*/
mutex_lock(&ev->block_mutex);
spin_lock_irqsave(&ev->lock, flags);
cancel = !ev->block++;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ev->lock, flags);
if (cancel)
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&disk->ev->dwork);
mutex_unlock(&ev->block_mutex);
}
Commit Message: block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pl022_update(PL022State *s)
{
s->sr = 0;
if (s->tx_fifo_len == 0)
s->sr |= PL022_SR_TFE;
if (s->tx_fifo_len != 8)
s->sr |= PL022_SR_TNF;
if (s->rx_fifo_len != 0)
s->sr |= PL022_SR_RNE;
if (s->rx_fifo_len == 8)
s->sr |= PL022_SR_RFF;
if (s->tx_fifo_len)
s->sr |= PL022_SR_BSY;
s->is = 0;
if (s->rx_fifo_len >= 4)
s->is |= PL022_INT_RX;
if (s->tx_fifo_len <= 4)
s->is |= PL022_INT_TX;
qemu_set_irq(s->irq, (s->is & s->im) != 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderWidgetHost* RenderWidgetHostViewAura::GetRenderWidgetHost() const {
return host_;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,832 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseCatalogPI(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *catalog) {
xmlChar *URL = NULL;
const xmlChar *tmp, *base;
xmlChar marker;
tmp = catalog;
while (IS_BLANK_CH(*tmp)) tmp++;
if (xmlStrncmp(tmp, BAD_CAST"catalog", 7))
goto error;
tmp += 7;
while (IS_BLANK_CH(*tmp)) tmp++;
if (*tmp != '=') {
return;
}
tmp++;
while (IS_BLANK_CH(*tmp)) tmp++;
marker = *tmp;
if ((marker != '\'') && (marker != '"'))
goto error;
tmp++;
base = tmp;
while ((*tmp != 0) && (*tmp != marker)) tmp++;
if (*tmp == 0)
goto error;
URL = xmlStrndup(base, tmp - base);
tmp++;
while (IS_BLANK_CH(*tmp)) tmp++;
if (*tmp != 0)
goto error;
if (URL != NULL) {
ctxt->catalogs = xmlCatalogAddLocal(ctxt->catalogs, URL);
xmlFree(URL);
}
return;
error:
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_CATALOG_PI,
"Catalog PI syntax error: %s\n",
catalog, NULL);
if (URL != NULL)
xmlFree(URL);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 59,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::OnCanDrawStateChangedForTree() {
client_->OnCanDrawStateChanged(CanDraw());
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rtnl_fill_ifinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
int type, u32 pid, u32 seq, u32 change,
unsigned int flags, u32 ext_filter_mask)
{
struct ifinfomsg *ifm;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct nlattr *af_spec;
struct rtnl_af_ops *af_ops;
struct net_device *upper_dev = netdev_master_upper_dev_get(dev);
ASSERT_RTNL();
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, pid, seq, type, sizeof(*ifm), flags);
if (nlh == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
ifm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
ifm->ifi_family = AF_UNSPEC;
ifm->__ifi_pad = 0;
ifm->ifi_type = dev->type;
ifm->ifi_index = dev->ifindex;
ifm->ifi_flags = dev_get_flags(dev);
ifm->ifi_change = change;
if (nla_put_string(skb, IFLA_IFNAME, dev->name) ||
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_TXQLEN, dev->tx_queue_len) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_OPERSTATE,
netif_running(dev) ? dev->operstate : IF_OPER_DOWN) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_LINKMODE, dev->link_mode) ||
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_MTU, dev->mtu) ||
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_GROUP, dev->group) ||
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_PROMISCUITY, dev->promiscuity) ||
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_NUM_TX_QUEUES, dev->num_tx_queues) ||
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_GSO_MAX_SEGS, dev->gso_max_segs) ||
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_GSO_MAX_SIZE, dev->gso_max_size) ||
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_NUM_RX_QUEUES, dev->num_rx_queues) ||
#endif
(dev->ifindex != dev_get_iflink(dev) &&
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_LINK, dev_get_iflink(dev))) ||
(upper_dev &&
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_MASTER, upper_dev->ifindex)) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_CARRIER, netif_carrier_ok(dev)) ||
(dev->qdisc &&
nla_put_string(skb, IFLA_QDISC, dev->qdisc->ops->id)) ||
(dev->ifalias &&
nla_put_string(skb, IFLA_IFALIAS, dev->ifalias)) ||
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_CARRIER_CHANGES,
atomic_read(&dev->carrier_changes)) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_PROTO_DOWN, dev->proto_down))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (rtnl_fill_link_ifmap(skb, dev))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (dev->addr_len) {
if (nla_put(skb, IFLA_ADDRESS, dev->addr_len, dev->dev_addr) ||
nla_put(skb, IFLA_BROADCAST, dev->addr_len, dev->broadcast))
goto nla_put_failure;
}
if (rtnl_phys_port_id_fill(skb, dev))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (rtnl_phys_port_name_fill(skb, dev))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (rtnl_phys_switch_id_fill(skb, dev))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (rtnl_fill_stats(skb, dev))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (dev->dev.parent && (ext_filter_mask & RTEXT_FILTER_VF) &&
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_NUM_VF, dev_num_vf(dev->dev.parent)))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_get_vf_config && dev->dev.parent &&
ext_filter_mask & RTEXT_FILTER_VF) {
int i;
struct nlattr *vfinfo;
int num_vfs = dev_num_vf(dev->dev.parent);
vfinfo = nla_nest_start(skb, IFLA_VFINFO_LIST);
if (!vfinfo)
goto nla_put_failure;
for (i = 0; i < num_vfs; i++) {
if (rtnl_fill_vfinfo(skb, dev, i, vfinfo))
goto nla_put_failure;
}
nla_nest_end(skb, vfinfo);
}
if (rtnl_port_fill(skb, dev, ext_filter_mask))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (dev->rtnl_link_ops || rtnl_have_link_slave_info(dev)) {
if (rtnl_link_fill(skb, dev) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
}
if (dev->rtnl_link_ops &&
dev->rtnl_link_ops->get_link_net) {
struct net *link_net = dev->rtnl_link_ops->get_link_net(dev);
if (!net_eq(dev_net(dev), link_net)) {
int id = peernet2id_alloc(dev_net(dev), link_net);
if (nla_put_s32(skb, IFLA_LINK_NETNSID, id))
goto nla_put_failure;
}
}
if (!(af_spec = nla_nest_start(skb, IFLA_AF_SPEC)))
goto nla_put_failure;
list_for_each_entry(af_ops, &rtnl_af_ops, list) {
if (af_ops->fill_link_af) {
struct nlattr *af;
int err;
if (!(af = nla_nest_start(skb, af_ops->family)))
goto nla_put_failure;
err = af_ops->fill_link_af(skb, dev, ext_filter_mask);
/*
* Caller may return ENODATA to indicate that there
* was no data to be dumped. This is not an error, it
* means we should trim the attribute header and
* continue.
*/
if (err == -ENODATA)
nla_nest_cancel(skb, af);
else if (err < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, af);
}
}
nla_nest_end(skb, af_spec);
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 53,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayoutBlockFlow::styleDidChange(StyleDifference diff, const ComputedStyle* oldStyle)
{
LayoutBlock::styleDidChange(diff, oldStyle);
bool canPropagateFloatIntoSibling = !isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned() && !avoidsFloats();
if (diff.needsFullLayout() && s_canPropagateFloatIntoSibling && !canPropagateFloatIntoSibling && hasOverhangingFloats()) {
LayoutBlockFlow* parentBlockFlow = this;
const FloatingObjectSet& floatingObjectSet = m_floatingObjects->set();
FloatingObjectSetIterator end = floatingObjectSet.end();
for (LayoutObject* curr = parent(); curr && !curr->isLayoutView(); curr = curr->parent()) {
if (curr->isLayoutBlockFlow()) {
LayoutBlockFlow* currBlock = toLayoutBlockFlow(curr);
if (currBlock->hasOverhangingFloats()) {
for (FloatingObjectSetIterator it = floatingObjectSet.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
LayoutBox* layoutBox = (*it)->layoutObject();
if (currBlock->hasOverhangingFloat(layoutBox)) {
parentBlockFlow = currBlock;
break;
}
}
}
}
}
parentBlockFlow->markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout();
parentBlockFlow->markSiblingsWithFloatsForLayout();
}
if (diff.needsFullLayout() || !oldStyle)
createOrDestroyMultiColumnFlowThreadIfNeeded(oldStyle);
if (oldStyle) {
if (LayoutMultiColumnFlowThread* flowThread = multiColumnFlowThread()) {
if (!style()->columnRuleEquivalent(oldStyle)) {
flowThread->columnRuleStyleDidChange();
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 123,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UnprivilegedProcessDelegate::KillProcess(DWORD exit_code) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
channel_.reset();
if (worker_process_.IsValid()) {
TerminateProcess(worker_process_, exit_code);
}
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_free_closedata(void *data)
{
struct nfs4_closedata *calldata = data;
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp = calldata->state->owner;
struct super_block *sb = calldata->state->inode->i_sb;
if (calldata->roc)
pnfs_roc_release(calldata->state->inode);
nfs4_put_open_state(calldata->state);
nfs_free_seqid(calldata->arg.seqid);
nfs4_put_state_owner(sp);
nfs_sb_deactive(sb);
kfree(calldata);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_ctl_elem_user_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
struct snd_ctl_elem_value *ucontrol)
{
int change;
struct user_element *ue = kcontrol->private_data;
change = memcmp(&ucontrol->value, ue->elem_data, ue->elem_data_size) != 0;
if (change)
memcpy(ue->elem_data, &ucontrol->value, ue->elem_data_size);
return change;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 166,298 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::Stop() {
if (!isContextLost()) {
ForceLostContext(kSyntheticLostContext, kManual);
}
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::AccessibilityScrollToMakeVisible(
int acc_obj_id, gfx::Rect subfocus) {
Send(new AccessibilityMsg_ScrollToMakeVisible(
GetRoutingID(), acc_obj_id, subfocus));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int airspy_s_ctrl(struct v4l2_ctrl *ctrl)
{
struct airspy *s = container_of(ctrl->handler, struct airspy, hdl);
int ret;
switch (ctrl->id) {
case V4L2_CID_RF_TUNER_LNA_GAIN_AUTO:
case V4L2_CID_RF_TUNER_LNA_GAIN:
ret = airspy_set_lna_gain(s);
break;
case V4L2_CID_RF_TUNER_MIXER_GAIN_AUTO:
case V4L2_CID_RF_TUNER_MIXER_GAIN:
ret = airspy_set_mixer_gain(s);
break;
case V4L2_CID_RF_TUNER_IF_GAIN:
ret = airspy_set_if_gain(s);
break;
default:
dev_dbg(s->dev, "unknown ctrl: id=%d name=%s\n",
ctrl->id, ctrl->name);
ret = -EINVAL;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: media: fix airspy usb probe error path
Fix a memory leak on probe error of the airspy usb device driver.
The problem is triggered when more than 64 usb devices register with
v4l2 of type VFL_TYPE_SDR or VFL_TYPE_SUBDEV.
The memory leak is caused by the probe function of the airspy driver
mishandeling errors and not freeing the corresponding control structures
when an error occours registering the device to v4l2 core.
A badusb device can emulate 64 of these devices, and then through
continual emulated connect/disconnect of the 65th device, cause the
kernel to run out of RAM and crash the kernel, thus causing a local DOS
vulnerability.
Fixes CVE-2016-5400
Signed-off-by: James Patrick-Evans <james@jmp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 51,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType TraceCircle(MVGInfo *mvg_info,const PointInfo start,
const PointInfo end)
{
double
alpha,
beta,
radius;
PointInfo
offset,
degrees;
alpha=end.x-start.x;
beta=end.y-start.y;
radius=hypot((double) alpha,(double) beta);
offset.x=(double) radius;
offset.y=(double) radius;
degrees.x=0.0;
degrees.y=360.0;
return(TraceEllipse(mvg_info,start,offset,degrees));
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: | 0 | 87,289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBox::panScroll(const IntPoint& sourcePoint)
{
LocalFrame* frame = this->frame();
if (!frame)
return;
IntPoint lastKnownMousePosition = frame->eventHandler().lastKnownMousePosition();
static IntPoint previousMousePosition;
if (lastKnownMousePosition.x() < 0 || lastKnownMousePosition.y() < 0)
lastKnownMousePosition = previousMousePosition;
else
previousMousePosition = lastKnownMousePosition;
IntSize delta = lastKnownMousePosition - sourcePoint;
if (abs(delta.width()) <= ScrollView::noPanScrollRadius) // at the center we let the space for the icon
delta.setWidth(0);
if (abs(delta.height()) <= ScrollView::noPanScrollRadius)
delta.setHeight(0);
scrollByRecursively(adjustedScrollDelta(delta), ScrollOffsetClamped);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,575 |
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