instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ikev1_n_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep, uint32_t phase, uint32_t doi0 _U_,
uint32_t proto0 _U_, int depth)
{
const struct ikev1_pl_n *p;
struct ikev1_pl_n n;
const u_char *cp;
const u_char *ep2;
uint32_t doi;
uint32_t proto;
static const char *notify_error_str[] = {
NULL, "INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE",
"DOI-NOT-SUPPORTED", "SITUATION-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"INVALID-COOKIE", "INVALID-MAJOR-VERSION",
"INVALID-MINOR-VERSION", "INVALID-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"INVALID-FLAGS", "INVALID-MESSAGE-ID",
"INVALID-PROTOCOL-ID", "INVALID-SPI",
"INVALID-TRANSFORM-ID", "ATTRIBUTES-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"NO-PROPOSAL-CHOSEN", "BAD-PROPOSAL-SYNTAX",
"PAYLOAD-MALFORMED", "INVALID-KEY-INFORMATION",
"INVALID-ID-INFORMATION", "INVALID-CERT-ENCODING",
"INVALID-CERTIFICATE", "CERT-TYPE-UNSUPPORTED",
"INVALID-CERT-AUTHORITY", "INVALID-HASH-INFORMATION",
"AUTHENTICATION-FAILED", "INVALID-SIGNATURE",
"ADDRESS-NOTIFICATION", "NOTIFY-SA-LIFETIME",
"CERTIFICATE-UNAVAILABLE", "UNSUPPORTED-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"UNEQUAL-PAYLOAD-LENGTHS",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_error_str[] = {
"RESERVED",
};
static const char *notify_status_str[] = {
"CONNECTED",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_status_str[] = {
"RESPONDER-LIFETIME", "REPLAY-STATUS",
"INITIAL-CONTACT",
};
/* NOTE: these macro must be called with x in proper range */
/* 0 - 8191 */
#define NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((x), notify_error_str)
/* 8192 - 16383 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 8192), ipsec_notify_error_str)
/* 16384 - 24575 */
#define NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 16384), notify_status_str)
/* 24576 - 32767 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 24576), ipsec_notify_status_str)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
p = (const struct ikev1_pl_n *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&n, ext, sizeof(n));
doi = ntohl(n.doi);
proto = n.prot_id;
if (doi != 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=%d", doi));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%d", proto));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=ipsec"));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%s", PROTOIDSTR(proto)));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 32768)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
ep2 = (const u_char *)p + item_len;
if (cp < ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," orig=("));
switch (ntohs(n.type)) {
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_RESPONDER_LIFETIME:
{
const struct attrmap *map = oakley_t_map;
size_t nmap = sizeof(oakley_t_map)/sizeof(oakley_t_map[0]);
while (cp < ep && cp < ep2) {
cp = ikev1_attrmap_print(ndo, cp,
(ep < ep2) ? ep : ep2, map, nmap);
}
break;
}
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_REPLAY_STATUS:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"replay detection %sabled",
EXTRACT_32BITS(cp) ? "en" : "dis"));
break;
case ISAKMP_NTYPE_NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN:
if (ikev1_sub_print(ndo, ISAKMP_NPTYPE_SA,
(const struct isakmp_gen *)cp, ep, phase, doi, proto,
depth) == NULL)
return NULL;
break;
default:
/* NULL is dummy */
isakmp_print(ndo, cp,
item_len - sizeof(*p) - n.spi_size,
NULL);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
}
return (const u_char *)ext + item_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12990/Fix printing of ISAKMPv1 Notification payload data.
The closest thing to a specification for the contents of the payload
data is draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04, and nothing in there says that it
is ever a complete ISAKMP message, so don't dissect types we don't have
specific code for as a complete ISAKMP message.
While we're at it, fix a comment, and clean up printing of V1 Nonce,
V2 Authentication payloads, and v2 Notice payloads.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 1 | 167,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rb_event_data_length(struct ring_buffer_event *event)
{
unsigned length;
if (event->type_len)
length = event->type_len * RB_ALIGNMENT;
else
length = event->array[0];
return length + RB_EVNT_HDR_SIZE;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,529 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(io_destroy, aio_context_t, ctx)
{
struct kioctx *ioctx = lookup_ioctx(ctx);
if (likely(NULL != ioctx)) {
struct ctx_rq_wait wait;
int ret;
init_completion(&wait.comp);
atomic_set(&wait.count, 1);
/* Pass requests_done to kill_ioctx() where it can be set
* in a thread-safe way. If we try to set it here then we have
* a race condition if two io_destroy() called simultaneously.
*/
ret = kill_ioctx(current->mm, ioctx, &wait);
percpu_ref_put(&ioctx->users);
/* Wait until all IO for the context are done. Otherwise kernel
* keep using user-space buffers even if user thinks the context
* is destroyed.
*/
if (!ret)
wait_for_completion(&wait.comp);
return ret;
}
pr_debug("EINVAL: invalid context id\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: aio: mark AIO pseudo-fs noexec
This ensures that do_mmap() won't implicitly make AIO memory mappings
executable if the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag is set. Such
behavior is problematic because the security_mmap_file LSM hook doesn't
catch this case, potentially permitting an attacker to bypass a W^X
policy enforced by SELinux.
I have tested the patch on my machine.
To test the behavior, compile and run this:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/personality.h>
#include <linux/aio_abi.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
int main(void) {
personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC);
aio_context_t ctx = 0;
if (syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx))
err(1, "io_setup");
char cmd[1000];
sprintf(cmd, "cat /proc/%d/maps | grep -F '/[aio]'",
(int)getpid());
system(cmd);
return 0;
}
In the output, "rw-s" is good, "rwxs" is bad.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 72,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v4l2_std_id parse_audio_std_option(void)
{
if (strcasecmp(audio_std, "A2") == 0)
return V4L2_STD_A2;
if (strcasecmp(audio_std, "A2/A") == 0)
return V4L2_STD_A2_A;
if (strcasecmp(audio_std, "A2/B") == 0)
return V4L2_STD_A2_B;
if (strcasecmp(audio_std, "NICAM") == 0)
return V4L2_STD_NICAM;
if (strcasecmp(audio_std, "NICAM/A") == 0)
return V4L2_STD_NICAM_A;
if (strcasecmp(audio_std, "NICAM/B") == 0)
return V4L2_STD_NICAM_B;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] xc2028: avoid use after free
If struct xc2028_config is passed without a firmware name,
the following trouble may happen:
[11009.907205] xc2028 5-0061: type set to XCeive xc2028/xc3028 tuner
[11009.907491] ==================================================================
[11009.907750] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in strcmp+0x96/0xb0 at addr ffff8803bd78ab40
[11009.907992] Read of size 1 by task modprobe/28992
[11009.907994] =============================================================================
[11009.907997] BUG kmalloc-16 (Tainted: G W ): kasan: bad access detected
[11009.907999] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[11009.908008] INFO: Allocated in xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd] age=0 cpu=3 pid=28992
[11009.908012] ___slab_alloc+0x581/0x5b0
[11009.908014] __slab_alloc+0x51/0x90
[11009.908017] __kmalloc+0x27b/0x350
[11009.908022] xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd]
[11009.908026] usb_hcd_submit_urb+0x1e8/0x1c60
[11009.908029] usb_submit_urb+0xb0e/0x1200
[11009.908032] usb_serial_generic_write_start+0xb6/0x4c0
[11009.908035] usb_serial_generic_write+0x92/0xc0
[11009.908039] usb_console_write+0x38a/0x560
[11009.908045] call_console_drivers.constprop.14+0x1ee/0x2c0
[11009.908051] console_unlock+0x40d/0x900
[11009.908056] vprintk_emit+0x4b4/0x830
[11009.908061] vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30
[11009.908064] printk+0x99/0xb5
[11009.908067] kasan_report_error+0x10a/0x550
[11009.908070] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50
[11009.908074] INFO: Freed in xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] age=1 cpu=3 pid=28992
[11009.908077] __slab_free+0x2ec/0x460
[11009.908080] kfree+0x266/0x280
[11009.908083] xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908086] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908090] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908094] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908098] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908101] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908105] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908108] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300
[11009.908111] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad
[11009.908114] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0
[11009.908117] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130
[11009.908120] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76
[11009.908123] INFO: Slab 0xffffea000ef5e280 objects=25 used=25 fp=0x (null) flags=0x2ffff8000004080
[11009.908126] INFO: Object 0xffff8803bd78ab40 @offset=2880 fp=0x0000000000000001
[11009.908130] Bytes b4 ffff8803bd78ab30: 01 00 00 00 2a 07 00 00 9d 28 00 00 01 00 00 00 ....*....(......
[11009.908133] Object ffff8803bd78ab40: 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 b0 1d c3 6a 00 88 ff ff ...........j....
[11009.908137] CPU: 3 PID: 28992 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B W 4.5.0-rc1+ #43
[11009.908140] Hardware name: /NUC5i7RYB, BIOS RYBDWi35.86A.0350.2015.0812.1722 08/12/2015
[11009.908142] ffff8803bd78a000 ffff8802c273f1b8 ffffffff81932007 ffff8803c6407a80
[11009.908148] ffff8802c273f1e8 ffffffff81556759 ffff8803c6407a80 ffffea000ef5e280
[11009.908153] ffff8803bd78ab40 dffffc0000000000 ffff8802c273f210 ffffffff8155ccb4
[11009.908158] Call Trace:
[11009.908162] [<ffffffff81932007>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x64
[11009.908165] [<ffffffff81556759>] print_trailer+0xf9/0x150
[11009.908168] [<ffffffff8155ccb4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[11009.908171] [<ffffffff8155f260>] kasan_report_error+0x230/0x550
[11009.908175] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290
[11009.908179] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908182] [<ffffffff8155f5c3>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50
[11009.908185] [<ffffffff8155ea00>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x50/0xa0
[11009.908189] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] ? strcmp+0x96/0xb0
[11009.908192] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] strcmp+0x96/0xb0
[11009.908196] [<ffffffffa13ba4ac>] xc2028_set_config+0x15c/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908200] [<ffffffffa13bac90>] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908203] [<ffffffff8155ea78>] ? memset+0x28/0x30
[11009.908206] [<ffffffffa13ba980>] ? xc2028_set_config+0x630/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908211] [<ffffffffa157a59a>] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908215] [<ffffffffa157aa2a>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x37c/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908219] [<ffffffffa157a3a1>] ? hauppauge_hvr930c_init+0x487/0x487 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908222] [<ffffffffa01795ac>] ? lgdt330x_attach+0x1cc/0x370 [lgdt330x]
[11009.908226] [<ffffffffa01793e0>] ? i2c_read_demod_bytes.isra.2+0x210/0x210 [lgdt330x]
[11009.908230] [<ffffffff812e87d0>] ? ref_module.part.15+0x10/0x10
[11009.908233] [<ffffffff812e56e0>] ? module_assert_mutex_or_preempt+0x80/0x80
[11009.908238] [<ffffffffa157af92>] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908242] [<ffffffffa157a6ae>] ? em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x30d/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908245] [<ffffffff8195222d>] ? string+0x14d/0x1f0
[11009.908249] [<ffffffff8195381f>] ? symbol_string+0xff/0x1a0
[11009.908253] [<ffffffff81953720>] ? uuid_string+0x6f0/0x6f0
[11009.908257] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0
[11009.908260] [<ffffffff8104b02f>] ? print_context_stack+0x7f/0xf0
[11009.908264] [<ffffffff812e9846>] ? __module_address+0xb6/0x360
[11009.908268] [<ffffffff8137fdc9>] ? is_ftrace_trampoline+0x99/0xe0
[11009.908271] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0
[11009.908275] [<ffffffff81240a70>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
[11009.908278] [<ffffffff8104a24b>] ? dump_trace+0x11b/0x300
[11009.908282] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908285] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290
[11009.908289] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590
[11009.908292] [<ffffffff812404dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[11009.908296] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908299] [<ffffffff822dcbb0>] ? mutex_trylock+0x400/0x400
[11009.908302] [<ffffffff810021a1>] ? do_one_initcall+0x131/0x300
[11009.908306] [<ffffffff81296dc7>] ? call_rcu_sched+0x17/0x20
[11009.908309] [<ffffffff8159e708>] ? put_object+0x48/0x70
[11009.908314] [<ffffffffa1579f11>] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908317] [<ffffffffa13e81f9>] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908320] [<ffffffffa0150000>] ? 0xffffffffa0150000
[11009.908324] [<ffffffffa0150010>] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908327] [<ffffffff810021b1>] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300
[11009.908330] [<ffffffff81002070>] ? try_to_run_init_process+0x40/0x40
[11009.908333] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590
[11009.908337] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908340] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908343] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908346] [<ffffffff8155ea37>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x87/0xa0
[11009.908350] [<ffffffff8144da7b>] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad
[11009.908353] [<ffffffff812f2626>] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0
[11009.908356] [<ffffffff812e9c90>] ? symbol_put_addr+0x50/0x50
[11009.908361] [<ffffffffa1580037>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x5989/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908366] [<ffffffff812ebfc0>] ? module_frob_arch_sections+0x20/0x20
[11009.908369] [<ffffffff815bc940>] ? open_exec+0x50/0x50
[11009.908374] [<ffffffff811671bb>] ? ns_capable+0x5b/0xd0
[11009.908377] [<ffffffff812f5e58>] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130
[11009.908379] [<ffffffff812f5d50>] ? SyS_init_module+0x1f0/0x1f0
[11009.908383] [<ffffffff81004044>] ? lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x12/0x14
[11009.908394] [<ffffffff822e6936>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76
[11009.908396] Memory state around the buggy address:
[11009.908398] ffff8803bd78aa00: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908401] ffff8803bd78aa80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908403] >ffff8803bd78ab00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908405] ^
[11009.908407] ffff8803bd78ab80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908409] ffff8803bd78ac00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908411] ==================================================================
In order to avoid it, let's set the cached value of the firmware
name to NULL after freeing it. While here, return an error if
the memory allocation fails.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string result() const { return result_; }
Commit Message: Disable OutOfProcessPPAPITest.VarDeprecated on Mac due to timeouts.
BUG=121107
TBR=polina@chromium.org,ddorwin@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9950017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@129857 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 107,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PanoramiXRenderCreateConicalGradient (ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xRenderCreateConicalGradientReq);
PanoramiXRes *newPict;
int result = Success, j;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderCreateConicalGradientReq);
if(!(newPict = (PanoramiXRes *) malloc(sizeof(PanoramiXRes))))
return BadAlloc;
newPict->type = XRT_PICTURE;
newPict->info[0].id = stuff->pid;
newPict->u.pict.root = FALSE;
for(j = 1; j < PanoramiXNumScreens; j++)
newPict->info[j].id = FakeClientID(client->index);
FOR_NSCREENS_BACKWARD(j) {
stuff->pid = newPict->info[j].id;
result = (*PanoramiXSaveRenderVector[X_RenderCreateConicalGradient]) (client);
if(result != Success) break;
}
if (result == Success)
AddResource(newPict->info[0].id, XRT_PICTURE, newPict);
else
free(newPict);
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_attr_shortform_to_leaf(
struct xfs_da_args *args,
struct xfs_buf **leaf_bp)
{
xfs_inode_t *dp;
xfs_attr_shortform_t *sf;
xfs_attr_sf_entry_t *sfe;
xfs_da_args_t nargs;
char *tmpbuffer;
int error, i, size;
xfs_dablk_t blkno;
struct xfs_buf *bp;
xfs_ifork_t *ifp;
trace_xfs_attr_sf_to_leaf(args);
dp = args->dp;
ifp = dp->i_afp;
sf = (xfs_attr_shortform_t *)ifp->if_u1.if_data;
size = be16_to_cpu(sf->hdr.totsize);
tmpbuffer = kmem_alloc(size, KM_SLEEP);
ASSERT(tmpbuffer != NULL);
memcpy(tmpbuffer, ifp->if_u1.if_data, size);
sf = (xfs_attr_shortform_t *)tmpbuffer;
xfs_idata_realloc(dp, -size, XFS_ATTR_FORK);
xfs_bmap_local_to_extents_empty(dp, XFS_ATTR_FORK);
bp = NULL;
error = xfs_da_grow_inode(args, &blkno);
if (error) {
/*
* If we hit an IO error middle of the transaction inside
* grow_inode(), we may have inconsistent data. Bail out.
*/
if (error == -EIO)
goto out;
xfs_idata_realloc(dp, size, XFS_ATTR_FORK); /* try to put */
memcpy(ifp->if_u1.if_data, tmpbuffer, size); /* it back */
goto out;
}
ASSERT(blkno == 0);
error = xfs_attr3_leaf_create(args, blkno, &bp);
if (error) {
error = xfs_da_shrink_inode(args, 0, bp);
bp = NULL;
if (error)
goto out;
xfs_idata_realloc(dp, size, XFS_ATTR_FORK); /* try to put */
memcpy(ifp->if_u1.if_data, tmpbuffer, size); /* it back */
goto out;
}
memset((char *)&nargs, 0, sizeof(nargs));
nargs.dp = dp;
nargs.geo = args->geo;
nargs.firstblock = args->firstblock;
nargs.dfops = args->dfops;
nargs.total = args->total;
nargs.whichfork = XFS_ATTR_FORK;
nargs.trans = args->trans;
nargs.op_flags = XFS_DA_OP_OKNOENT;
sfe = &sf->list[0];
for (i = 0; i < sf->hdr.count; i++) {
nargs.name = sfe->nameval;
nargs.namelen = sfe->namelen;
nargs.value = &sfe->nameval[nargs.namelen];
nargs.valuelen = sfe->valuelen;
nargs.hashval = xfs_da_hashname(sfe->nameval,
sfe->namelen);
nargs.flags = XFS_ATTR_NSP_ONDISK_TO_ARGS(sfe->flags);
error = xfs_attr3_leaf_lookup_int(bp, &nargs); /* set a->index */
ASSERT(error == -ENOATTR);
error = xfs_attr3_leaf_add(bp, &nargs);
ASSERT(error != -ENOSPC);
if (error)
goto out;
sfe = XFS_ATTR_SF_NEXTENTRY(sfe);
}
error = 0;
*leaf_bp = bp;
out:
kmem_free(tmpbuffer);
return error;
}
Commit Message: xfs: don't call xfs_da_shrink_inode with NULL bp
xfs_attr3_leaf_create may have errored out before instantiating a buffer,
for example if the blkno is out of range. In that case there is no work
to do to remove it, and in fact xfs_da_shrink_inode will lead to an oops
if we try.
This also seems to fix a flaw where the original error from
xfs_attr3_leaf_create gets overwritten in the cleanup case, and it
removes a pointless assignment to bp which isn't used after this.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199969
Reported-by: Xu, Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Xu, Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 169,164 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string AwContents::GetLocale() {
return g_locale;
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,588 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int http_wait_for_request_body(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit)
{
struct session *sess = s->sess;
struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
struct http_msg *msg = &s->txn->req;
/* We have to parse the HTTP request body to find any required data.
* "balance url_param check_post" should have been the only way to get
* into this. We were brought here after HTTP header analysis, so all
* related structures are ready.
*/
if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE) {
/* This is the first call */
if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)
goto missing_data;
if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_100_SENT) {
/* If we have HTTP/1.1 and Expect: 100-continue, then we must
* send an HTTP/1.1 100 Continue intermediate response.
*/
if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_VER_11) {
struct hdr_ctx ctx;
ctx.idx = 0;
/* Expect is allowed in 1.1, look for it */
if (http_find_header2("Expect", 6, req->buf->p, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx) &&
unlikely(ctx.vlen == 12 && strncasecmp(ctx.line+ctx.val, "100-continue", 12) == 0)) {
co_inject(&s->res, http_100_chunk.str, http_100_chunk.len);
http_remove_header2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx);
}
}
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_100_SENT;
}
/* we have msg->sov which points to the first byte of message body.
* req->buf->p still points to the beginning of the message. We
* must save the body in msg->next because it survives buffer
* re-alignments.
*/
msg->next = msg->sov;
if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE;
else
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_DATA;
}
if (!(msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)) {
/* We're in content-length mode, we just have to wait for enough data. */
if (http_body_bytes(msg) < msg->body_len)
goto missing_data;
/* OK we have everything we need now */
goto http_end;
}
/* OK here we're parsing a chunked-encoded message */
if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE) {
/* read the chunk size and assign it to ->chunk_len, then
* set ->sov and ->next to point to the body and switch to DATA or
* TRAILERS state.
*/
unsigned int chunk;
int ret = h1_parse_chunk_size(req->buf, msg->next, req->buf->i, &chunk);
if (!ret)
goto missing_data;
else if (ret < 0) {
msg->err_pos = req->buf->i + ret;
if (msg->err_pos < 0)
msg->err_pos += req->buf->size;
stream_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
goto return_bad_req;
}
msg->chunk_len = chunk;
msg->body_len += chunk;
msg->sol = ret;
msg->next += ret;
msg->msg_state = msg->chunk_len ? HTTP_MSG_DATA : HTTP_MSG_TRAILERS;
}
/* Now we're in HTTP_MSG_DATA or HTTP_MSG_TRAILERS state.
* We have the first data byte is in msg->sov + msg->sol. We're waiting
* for at least a whole chunk or the whole content length bytes after
* msg->sov + msg->sol.
*/
if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_TRAILERS)
goto http_end;
if (http_body_bytes(msg) >= msg->body_len) /* we have enough bytes now */
goto http_end;
missing_data:
/* we get here if we need to wait for more data. If the buffer is full,
* we have the maximum we can expect.
*/
if (buffer_full(req->buf, global.tune.maxrewrite))
goto http_end;
if ((req->flags & CF_READ_TIMEOUT) || tick_is_expired(req->analyse_exp, now_ms)) {
txn->status = 408;
http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
s->flags |= SF_ERR_CLITO;
if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
s->flags |= SF_FINST_D;
goto return_err_msg;
}
/* we get here if we need to wait for more data */
if (!(req->flags & (CF_SHUTR | CF_READ_ERROR))) {
/* Not enough data. We'll re-use the http-request
* timeout here. Ideally, we should set the timeout
* relative to the accept() date. We just set the
* request timeout once at the beginning of the
* request.
*/
channel_dont_connect(req);
if (!tick_isset(req->analyse_exp))
req->analyse_exp = tick_add_ifset(now_ms, s->be->timeout.httpreq);
return 0;
}
http_end:
/* The situation will not evolve, so let's give up on the analysis. */
s->logs.tv_request = now; /* update the request timer to reflect full request */
req->analysers &= ~an_bit;
req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
return 1;
return_bad_req: /* let's centralize all bad requests */
txn->req.err_state = txn->req.msg_state;
txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
txn->status = 400;
http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
return_err_msg:
req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.failed_req, 1);
if (sess->listener->counters)
HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->failed_req, 1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void utee_param_to_param(struct tee_ta_param *p, struct utee_params *up)
{
size_t n;
uint32_t types = up->types;
p->types = types;
for (n = 0; n < TEE_NUM_PARAMS; n++) {
uintptr_t a = up->vals[n * 2];
size_t b = up->vals[n * 2 + 1];
switch (TEE_PARAM_TYPE_GET(types, n)) {
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT:
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT:
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_INOUT:
p->u[n].mem.mobj = &mobj_virt;
p->u[n].mem.offs = a;
p->u[n].mem.size = b;
break;
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_VALUE_INPUT:
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_VALUE_INOUT:
p->u[n].val.a = a;
p->u[n].val.b = b;
break;
default:
memset(&p->u[n], 0, sizeof(p->u[n]));
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: core: svc: always check ta parameters
Always check TA parameters from a user TA. This prevents a user TA from
passing invalid pointers to a pseudo TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0007: "Buffer checks missing when calling pseudo
TAs".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 169,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GeolocationServiceContext* WebContentsImpl::GetGeolocationServiceContext() {
return geolocation_service_context_.get();
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int to_ib_qp_access_flags(int mlx5_flags)
{
int ib_flags = 0;
if (mlx5_flags & MLX5_QP_BIT_RRE)
ib_flags |= IB_ACCESS_REMOTE_READ;
if (mlx5_flags & MLX5_QP_BIT_RWE)
ib_flags |= IB_ACCESS_REMOTE_WRITE;
if (mlx5_flags & MLX5_QP_BIT_RAE)
ib_flags |= IB_ACCESS_REMOTE_ATOMIC;
return ib_flags;
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,207 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLElement::adjustDirectionalityIfNeededAfterChildAttributeChanged(Element* child)
{
ASSERT(selfOrAncestorHasDirAutoAttribute());
Node* strongDirectionalityTextNode;
TextDirection textDirection = directionality(&strongDirectionalityTextNode);
setHasDirAutoFlagRecursively(child, false);
if (renderer() && renderer()->style() && renderer()->style()->direction() != textDirection) {
Element* elementToAdjust = this;
for (; elementToAdjust; elementToAdjust = elementToAdjust->parentElement()) {
if (elementAffectsDirectionality(elementToAdjust)) {
elementToAdjust->setNeedsStyleRecalc();
return;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::UnguessableToken RenderFrameHostImpl::GetDevToolsFrameToken() {
return frame_tree_node_->devtools_frame_token();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int AutofillPopupBaseView::GetCornerRadius() {
return ChromeLayoutProvider::Get()->GetCornerRadiusMetric(
views::EMPHASIS_MEDIUM);
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sshcomp *comp;
int r, mode;
debug("%s: called", __func__);
/* This was set in net child, but is not visible in user child */
ssh->state->after_authentication = 1;
ssh->state->rekeying = 0;
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
if (ssh->state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
continue;
comp = &ssh->state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
if (comp && comp->enabled &&
(r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::RegisterMojoInterfaces() {
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(&InstalledAppProviderImplDefault::Create));
#endif // !defined(OS_ANDROID)
PermissionControllerImpl* permission_controller =
PermissionControllerImpl::FromBrowserContext(
GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext());
if (delegate_) {
auto* geolocation_context = delegate_->GetGeolocationContext();
if (geolocation_context) {
geolocation_service_.reset(new GeolocationServiceImpl(
geolocation_context, permission_controller, this));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&GeolocationServiceImpl::Bind,
base::Unretained(geolocation_service_.get())));
}
}
registry_->AddInterface<device::mojom::WakeLock>(base::Bind(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindWakeLockRequest, base::Unretained(this)));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebNfc)) {
registry_->AddInterface<device::mojom::NFC>(base::Bind(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindNFCRequest, base::Unretained(this)));
}
#endif
if (!permission_service_context_)
permission_service_context_.reset(new PermissionServiceContext(this));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&PermissionServiceContext::CreateService,
base::Unretained(permission_service_context_.get())));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindPresentationServiceRequest,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&MediaSessionServiceImpl::Create, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(
base::IgnoreResult(&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateWebBluetoothService),
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateWebUsbService, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface<media::mojom::InterfaceFactory>(
base::Bind(&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindMediaInterfaceFactoryRequest,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateWebSocket, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateDedicatedWorkerHostFactory,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(&SharedWorkerConnectorImpl::Create,
process_->GetID(), routing_id_));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(&device::GamepadMonitor::Create));
registry_->AddInterface<device::mojom::VRService>(base::Bind(
&WebvrServiceProvider::BindWebvrService, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateAudioInputStreamFactory,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateAudioOutputStreamFactory,
base::Unretained(this)));
if (BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance()) {
MediaStreamManager* media_stream_manager =
BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance()->media_stream_manager();
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&MediaDevicesDispatcherHost::Create, GetProcess()->GetID(),
GetRoutingID(), base::Unretained(media_stream_manager)),
base::CreateSingleThreadTaskRunnerWithTraits({BrowserThread::IO}));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&MediaStreamDispatcherHost::Create,
GetProcess()->GetID(), GetRoutingID(),
base::Unretained(media_stream_manager)),
base::CreateSingleThreadTaskRunnerWithTraits({BrowserThread::IO}));
}
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MEDIA_REMOTING)
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(&RemoterFactoryImpl::Bind,
GetProcess()->GetID(), GetRoutingID()));
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MEDIA_REMOTING)
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&KeyboardLockServiceImpl::CreateMojoService, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(&ImageCaptureImpl::Create));
sensor_provider_proxy_.reset(
new SensorProviderProxyImpl(permission_controller, this));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&SensorProviderProxyImpl::Bind,
base::Unretained(sensor_provider_proxy_.get())));
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindSerialServiceRequest, base::Unretained(this)));
#endif // !defined(OS_ANDROID)
media::VideoDecodePerfHistory::SaveCallback save_stats_cb;
if (GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowserContext()->GetVideoDecodePerfHistory()) {
save_stats_cb = GetSiteInstance()
->GetBrowserContext()
->GetVideoDecodePerfHistory()
->GetSaveCallback();
}
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&media::MediaMetricsProvider::Create, frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame(),
base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostDelegate::GetUkmSourceIdForLastCommittedSource,
base::Unretained(delegate_)),
base::BindRepeating(
[](RenderFrameHostImpl* frame) {
return ::media::learning::FeatureValue(
frame->GetLastCommittedOrigin().host());
},
base::Unretained(this)),
std::move(save_stats_cb)));
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
cc::switches::kEnableGpuBenchmarking)) {
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&InputInjectorImpl::Create, weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&QuotaDispatcherHost::CreateForFrame, GetProcess(), routing_id_));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(SpeechRecognitionDispatcherHost::Create,
GetProcess()->GetID(), routing_id_),
base::CreateSingleThreadTaskRunnerWithTraits({BrowserThread::IO}));
file_system_manager_.reset(new FileSystemManagerImpl(
GetProcess()->GetID(), routing_id_,
GetProcess()->GetStoragePartition()->GetFileSystemContext(),
ChromeBlobStorageContext::GetFor(GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext())));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&FileSystemManagerImpl::BindRequest,
base::Unretained(file_system_manager_.get())),
base::CreateSingleThreadTaskRunnerWithTraits({BrowserThread::IO}));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&BackgroundFetchServiceImpl::CreateForFrame, GetProcess(), routing_id_));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(&ContactsManagerImpl::Create,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&FileChooserImpl::Create, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(&WakeLockServiceImpl::Create,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&PictureInPictureServiceImpl::Create, base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UserCloudPolicyManagerFactoryChromeOS::CreateForProfile(
Profile* profile,
bool force_immediate_load,
scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner> background_task_runner) {
return GetInstance()->CreateManagerForProfile(
profile, force_immediate_load, background_task_runner);
}
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 110,405 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Document* Document::CreateForTest() {
return new Document(DocumentInit::Create());
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 143,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::NotifyRendererResponsive() {
delegate_->RendererResponsive(this);
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderMenuList::addChild(RenderObject* newChild, RenderObject* beforeChild)
{
createInnerBlock();
m_innerBlock->addChild(newChild, beforeChild);
ASSERT(m_innerBlock == firstChild());
}
Commit Message: PopupMenuClient::multiple() should be const
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=76771
Patch by Benjamin Poulain <bpoulain@apple.com> on 2012-01-21
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
* platform/PopupMenuClient.h:
(WebCore::PopupMenuClient::multiple):
* rendering/RenderMenuList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMenuList::multiple):
* rendering/RenderMenuList.h:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@105570 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int http_write(URLContext *h, const uint8_t *buf, int size)
{
char temp[11] = ""; /* 32-bit hex + CRLF + nul */
int ret;
char crlf[] = "\r\n";
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
if (!s->chunked_post) {
/* non-chunked data is sent without any special encoding */
return ffurl_write(s->hd, buf, size);
}
/* silently ignore zero-size data since chunk encoding that would
* signal EOF */
if (size > 0) {
/* upload data using chunked encoding */
snprintf(temp, sizeof(temp), "%x\r\n", size);
if ((ret = ffurl_write(s->hd, temp, strlen(temp))) < 0 ||
(ret = ffurl_write(s->hd, buf, size)) < 0 ||
(ret = ffurl_write(s->hd, crlf, sizeof(crlf) - 1)) < 0)
return ret;
}
return size;
}
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 70,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: test_bson_visit_unsupported_type_bad_key (void)
{
/* key is invalid utf-8 char, '\x80' */
const char data[] = "\x0c\x00\x00\x00\x33\x80\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00";
bson_t b;
bson_iter_t iter;
unsupported_type_test_data_t context = {0};
bson_visitor_t visitor = {0};
visitor.visit_unsupported_type = visit_unsupported_type;
BSON_ASSERT (bson_init_static (&b, (const uint8_t *) data, sizeof data - 1));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_iter_init (&iter, &b));
BSON_ASSERT (!bson_iter_visit_all (&iter, &visitor, (void *) &context));
BSON_ASSERT (!bson_iter_next (&iter));
/* unsupported type error wasn't reported, because the bson is corrupt */
BSON_ASSERT (!context.visited);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 77,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PaintLayerScrollableArea::SetVerticalScrollbarVisualRect(
const LayoutRect& rect) {
vertical_scrollbar_visual_rect_ = rect;
if (Scrollbar* scrollbar = VerticalScrollbar())
scrollbar->SetVisualRect(rect);
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap)
{
int rc;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,290 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: free_ssl_lib (void)
{
crypto_uninit_lib ();
prng_uninit();
}
Commit Message: Use constant time memcmp when comparing HMACs in openvpn_decrypt.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 32,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFlowThread* flowThread() const { return m_flowThread; }
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,358 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool encode_extended_dn_request(void *mem_ctx, void *in, DATA_BLOB *out)
{
struct ldb_extended_dn_control *ledc = talloc_get_type(in, struct ldb_extended_dn_control);
struct asn1_data *data;
if (!in) {
*out = data_blob(NULL, 0);
return true;
}
data = asn1_init(mem_ctx);
if (!data) return false;
if (!asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_write_Integer(data, ledc->type)) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_pop_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
*out = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, data->data, data->length);
if (out->data == NULL) {
return false;
}
talloc_free(data);
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DataReductionProxyConfig::EnableGetNetworkIdAsynchronously() {
get_network_id_asynchronously_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long jpc_dec_lookahead(jas_stream_t *in)
{
uint_fast16_t x;
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &x)) {
return -1;
}
if (jas_stream_ungetc(in, x & 0xff) == EOF ||
jas_stream_ungetc(in, x >> 8) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
if (x >= JPC_MS_INMIN && x <= JPC_MS_INMAX) {
return x;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed numerous integer overflow problems in the code for packet iterators
in the JPC decoder.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 86,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_get_algo_key_size)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(algorithms_dir);
RETURN_LONG(mcrypt_module_get_algo_key_size(module, dir));
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 167,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Document* HTMLLinkElement::import() const {
if (LinkImport* link = GetLinkImport())
return link->ImportedDocument();
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Avoid crash when setting rel=stylesheet on <link> in shadow root.
Link elements in shadow roots without rel=stylesheet are currently not
added as stylesheet candidates upon insertion. This causes a crash if
rel=stylesheet is set (and then loaded) later.
R=futhark@chromium.org
Bug: 886753
Change-Id: Ia0de2c1edf43407950f973982ee1c262a909d220
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1242463
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <andruud@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#593907}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 143,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct file *aio_private_file(struct kioctx *ctx, loff_t nr_pages)
{
struct qstr this = QSTR_INIT("[aio]", 5);
struct file *file;
struct path path;
struct inode *inode = alloc_anon_inode(aio_mnt->mnt_sb);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
return ERR_CAST(inode);
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &aio_ctx_aops;
inode->i_mapping->private_data = ctx;
inode->i_size = PAGE_SIZE * nr_pages;
path.dentry = d_alloc_pseudo(aio_mnt->mnt_sb, &this);
if (!path.dentry) {
iput(inode);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
path.mnt = mntget(aio_mnt);
d_instantiate(path.dentry, inode);
file = alloc_file(&path, FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE, &aio_ring_fops);
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
path_put(&path);
return file;
}
file->f_flags = O_RDWR;
file->private_data = ctx;
return file;
}
Commit Message: aio: fix kernel memory disclosure in io_getevents() introduced in v3.10
A kernel memory disclosure was introduced in aio_read_events_ring() in v3.10
by commit a31ad380bed817aa25f8830ad23e1a0480fef797. The changes made to
aio_read_events_ring() failed to correctly limit the index into
ctx->ring_pages[], allowing an attacked to cause the subsequent kmap() of
an arbitrary page with a copy_to_user() to copy the contents into userspace.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2014-0206. Thanks to Mateusz and
Petr for disclosing this issue.
This patch applies to v3.12+. A separate backport is needed for 3.10/3.11.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kmo@daterainc.com>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: | 0 | 39,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport void UnregisterCAPTIONImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("CAPTION");
}
Commit Message: Fix a small memory leak
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 71,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void VideoCaptureManager::OnDeviceLaunched(VideoCaptureController* controller) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
std::ostringstream string_stream;
string_stream << "Launching device has succeeded. device_id = "
<< controller->device_id();
EmitLogMessage(string_stream.str(), 1);
DCHECK(!device_start_request_queue_.empty());
DCHECK_EQ(controller, device_start_request_queue_.begin()->controller());
DCHECK(controller);
if (controller->stream_type() == MEDIA_GUM_DESKTOP_VIDEO_CAPTURE) {
const media::VideoCaptureSessionId session_id =
device_start_request_queue_.front().session_id();
DCHECK(session_id != kFakeSessionId);
MaybePostDesktopCaptureWindowId(session_id);
}
auto it = photo_request_queue_.begin();
while (it != photo_request_queue_.end()) {
auto request = it++;
VideoCaptureController* maybe_entry =
LookupControllerBySessionId(request->first);
if (maybe_entry && maybe_entry->IsDeviceAlive()) {
request->second.Run();
photo_request_queue_.erase(request);
}
}
device_start_request_queue_.pop_front();
ProcessDeviceStartRequestQueue();
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t read_null(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 66,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetWindowRestoreOverrides(aura::Window* window,
const gfx::Rect& bounds_override,
ui::WindowShowState window_state_override) {
if (bounds_override.IsEmpty()) {
window->ClearProperty(kRestoreWindowStateTypeOverrideKey);
window->ClearProperty(kRestoreBoundsOverrideKey);
return;
}
window->SetProperty(kRestoreWindowStateTypeOverrideKey,
ToWindowStateType(window_state_override));
window->SetProperty(kRestoreBoundsOverrideKey,
new gfx::Rect(bounds_override));
}
Commit Message: Fix the crash after clamshell -> tablet transition in overview mode.
This CL just reverted some changes that were made in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1658955. In
that CL, we changed the clamshell <-> tablet transition when clamshell
split view mode is enabled, however, we should keep the old behavior
unchanged if the feature is not enabled, i.e., overview should be ended
if it's active before the transition. Otherwise, it will cause a nullptr
dereference crash since |split_view_drag_indicators_| is not created in
clamshell overview and will be used in tablet overview.
Bug: 982507
Change-Id: I238fe9472648a446cff4ab992150658c228714dd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1705474
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima (Slow - on/off site) <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679306}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_arm_vcpu_arch_set_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
{
int ret;
switch (attr->group) {
case KVM_ARM_VCPU_PMU_V3_CTRL:
ret = kvm_arm_pmu_v3_set_attr(vcpu, attr);
break;
case KVM_ARM_VCPU_TIMER_CTRL:
ret = kvm_arm_timer_set_attr(vcpu, attr);
break;
default:
ret = -ENXIO;
break;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: Tighten guest core register access from userspace
We currently allow userspace to access the core register file
in about any possible way, including straddling multiple
registers and doing unaligned accesses.
This is not the expected use of the ABI, and nobody is actually
using it that way. Let's tighten it by explicitly checking
the size and alignment for each field of the register file.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 2f4a07c5f9fe ("arm64: KVM: guest one-reg interface")
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[maz: rewrote Dave's initial patch to be more easily backported]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 76,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType IsBoundsCleared(const Image *image1,
const Image *image2,RectangleInfo *bounds,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
register const Quantum
*p,
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
y;
if (bounds->x < 0)
return(MagickFalse);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) bounds->height; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image1,bounds->x,bounds->y+y,bounds->width,1,exception);
q=GetVirtualPixels(image2,bounds->x,bounds->y+y,bounds->width,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) bounds->width; x++)
{
if ((GetPixelAlpha(image1,p) >= (Quantum) (QuantumRange/2)) &&
(GetPixelAlpha(image2,q) < (Quantum) (QuantumRange/2)))
break;
p+=GetPixelChannels(image1);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image2);
}
if (x < (ssize_t) bounds->width)
break;
}
return(y < (ssize_t) bounds->height ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1629
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 96,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct async *alloc_async(unsigned int numisoframes)
{
struct async *as;
as = kzalloc(sizeof(struct async), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!as)
return NULL;
as->urb = usb_alloc_urb(numisoframes, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!as->urb) {
kfree(as);
return NULL;
}
return as;
}
Commit Message: USB: usbfs: fix potential infoleak in devio
The stack object “ci” has a total size of 8 bytes. Its last 3 bytes
are padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked to userland
via “copy_to_user”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 53,185 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebContentsAddedObserver::~WebContentsAddedObserver() {
WebContentsImpl::FriendWrapper::RemoveCreatedCallbackForTesting(
web_contents_created_callback_);
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,235 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void WriteImageData(Image *image, const size_t pixelFormat,
const size_t compression, const MagickBooleanType clusterFit,
const MagickBooleanType weightByAlpha, ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
if (pixelFormat == DDPF_FOURCC)
WriteFourCC(image,compression,clusterFit,weightByAlpha,exception);
else
WriteUncompressed(image,exception);
}
Commit Message: Added check to prevent image being 0x0 (reported in #489).
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 65,131 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void truncate_pack(struct sha1file_checkpoint *checkpoint)
{
if (sha1file_truncate(pack_file, checkpoint))
die_errno("cannot truncate pack to skip duplicate");
pack_size = checkpoint->offset;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,148 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void put_pi_state(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state)
{
if (!pi_state)
return;
if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&pi_state->refcount))
return;
/*
* If pi_state->owner is NULL, the owner is most probably dying
* and has cleaned up the pi_state already
*/
if (pi_state->owner) {
struct task_struct *owner;
raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
owner = pi_state->owner;
if (owner) {
raw_spin_lock(&owner->pi_lock);
list_del_init(&pi_state->list);
raw_spin_unlock(&owner->pi_lock);
}
rt_mutex_proxy_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex, owner);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
}
if (current->pi_state_cache) {
kfree(pi_state);
} else {
/*
* pi_state->list is already empty.
* clear pi_state->owner.
* refcount is at 0 - put it back to 1.
*/
pi_state->owner = NULL;
atomic_set(&pi_state->refcount, 1);
current->pi_state_cache = pi_state;
}
}
Commit Message: futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
signed integer overflow:
0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.
Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 84,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int f2fs_write_node_pages(struct address_space *mapping,
struct writeback_control *wbc)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_M_SB(mapping);
struct blk_plug plug;
long diff;
/* balancing f2fs's metadata in background */
f2fs_balance_fs_bg(sbi);
/* collect a number of dirty node pages and write together */
if (get_pages(sbi, F2FS_DIRTY_NODES) < nr_pages_to_skip(sbi, NODE))
goto skip_write;
trace_f2fs_writepages(mapping->host, wbc, NODE);
diff = nr_pages_to_write(sbi, NODE, wbc);
wbc->sync_mode = WB_SYNC_NONE;
blk_start_plug(&plug);
sync_node_pages(sbi, wbc);
blk_finish_plug(&plug);
wbc->nr_to_write = max((long)0, wbc->nr_to_write - diff);
return 0;
skip_write:
wbc->pages_skipped += get_pages(sbi, F2FS_DIRTY_NODES);
trace_f2fs_writepages(mapping->host, wbc, NODE);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CSSStyleSheetResource* CSSStyleSheetResource::CreateForTest(
const KURL& url,
const WTF::TextEncoding& encoding) {
ResourceRequest request(url);
request.SetFetchCredentialsMode(network::mojom::FetchCredentialsMode::kOmit);
ResourceLoaderOptions options;
TextResourceDecoderOptions decoder_options(
TextResourceDecoderOptions::kCSSContent, encoding);
return new CSSStyleSheetResource(request, options, decoder_options);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 154,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int inode_has_encryption_context(struct inode *inode)
{
if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context)
return 0;
return (inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, NULL, 0L) > 0);
}
Commit Message: fscrypto: add authorization check for setting encryption policy
On an ext4 or f2fs filesystem with file encryption supported, a user
could set an encryption policy on any empty directory(*) to which they
had readonly access. This is obviously problematic, since such a
directory might be owned by another user and the new encryption policy
would prevent that other user from creating files in their own directory
(for example).
Fix this by requiring inode_owner_or_capable() permission to set an
encryption policy. This means that either the caller must own the file,
or the caller must have the capability CAP_FOWNER.
(*) Or also on any regular file, for f2fs v4.6 and later and ext4
v4.8-rc1 and later; a separate bug fix is coming for that.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.1+; check fs/{ext4,f2fs}
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 70,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sock *unix_next_socket(struct seq_file *seq,
struct sock *sk,
loff_t *pos)
{
unsigned long bucket;
while (sk > (struct sock *)SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
sk = sk_next(sk);
if (!sk)
goto next_bucket;
if (sock_net(sk) == seq_file_net(seq))
return sk;
}
do {
sk = unix_from_bucket(seq, pos);
if (sk)
return sk;
next_bucket:
bucket = get_bucket(*pos) + 1;
*pos = set_bucket_offset(bucket, 1);
} while (bucket < ARRAY_SIZE(unix_socket_table));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 19,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: futex_wake(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags, int nr_wake, u32 bitset)
{
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
struct futex_q *this, *next;
union futex_key key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
int ret;
DEFINE_WAKE_Q(wake_q);
if (!bitset)
return -EINVAL;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key, VERIFY_READ);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
hb = hash_futex(&key);
/* Make sure we really have tasks to wakeup */
if (!hb_waiters_pending(hb))
goto out_put_key;
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, &hb->chain, list) {
if (match_futex (&this->key, &key)) {
if (this->pi_state || this->rt_waiter) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/* Check if one of the bits is set in both bitsets */
if (!(this->bitset & bitset))
continue;
mark_wake_futex(&wake_q, this);
if (++ret >= nr_wake)
break;
}
}
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
wake_up_q(&wake_q);
out_put_key:
put_futex_key(&key);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
signed integer overflow:
0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.
Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 84,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jas_image_t *jpg_decode(jas_stream_t *in, char *optstr)
{
struct jpeg_decompress_struct cinfo;
struct jpeg_error_mgr jerr;
FILE *input_file;
jpg_dest_t dest_mgr_buf;
jpg_dest_t *dest_mgr = &dest_mgr_buf;
JDIMENSION num_scanlines;
jas_image_t *image;
int ret;
jpg_dec_importopts_t opts;
size_t size;
if (jpg_dec_parseopts(optstr, &opts)) {
goto error;
}
memset(&cinfo, 0, sizeof(struct jpeg_decompress_struct));
memset(dest_mgr, 0, sizeof(jpg_dest_t));
dest_mgr->data = 0;
image = 0;
input_file = 0;
if (!(input_file = tmpfile())) {
jas_eprintf("cannot make temporary file\n");
goto error;
}
if (jpg_copystreamtofile(input_file, in)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot copy stream\n");
goto error;
}
rewind(input_file);
/* Allocate and initialize a JPEG decompression object. */
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_std_error(%p)\n", &jerr));
cinfo.err = jpeg_std_error(&jerr);
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_create_decompress(%p)\n", &cinfo));
jpeg_create_decompress(&cinfo);
/* Specify the data source for decompression. */
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_stdio_src(%p, %p)\n", &cinfo, input_file));
jpeg_stdio_src(&cinfo, input_file);
/* Read the file header to obtain the image information. */
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_read_header(%p, TRUE)\n", &cinfo));
ret = jpeg_read_header(&cinfo, TRUE);
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_read_header return value %d\n", ret));
if (ret != JPEG_HEADER_OK) {
jas_eprintf("jpeg_read_header did not return JPEG_HEADER_OK\n");
}
JAS_DBGLOG(10, (
"header: image_width %d; image_height %d; num_components %d\n",
cinfo.image_width, cinfo.image_height, cinfo.num_components)
);
/* Start the decompressor. */
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_start_decompress(%p)\n", &cinfo));
ret = jpeg_start_decompress(&cinfo);
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_start_decompress return value %d\n", ret));
JAS_DBGLOG(10, (
"header: output_width %d; output_height %d; output_components %d\n",
cinfo.output_width, cinfo.output_height, cinfo.output_components)
);
if (opts.max_size) {
if (!jas_safe_size_mul(cinfo.output_width, cinfo.output_height,
&size) ||
!jas_safe_size_mul(size, cinfo.output_components, &size)) {
goto error;
}
if (size > opts.max_size) {
jas_eprintf("image is too large\n");
goto error;
}
}
/* Create an image object to hold the decoded data. */
if (!(image = jpg_mkimage(&cinfo))) {
jas_eprintf("jpg_mkimage failed\n");
goto error;
}
/* Initialize the data sink object. */
dest_mgr->image = image;
if (!(dest_mgr->data = jas_matrix_create(1, cinfo.output_width))) {
jas_eprintf("jas_matrix_create failed\n");
goto error;
}
dest_mgr->start_output = jpg_start_output;
dest_mgr->put_pixel_rows = jpg_put_pixel_rows;
dest_mgr->finish_output = jpg_finish_output;
dest_mgr->buffer = (*cinfo.mem->alloc_sarray)
((j_common_ptr) &cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE,
cinfo.output_width * cinfo.output_components, (JDIMENSION) 1);
dest_mgr->buffer_height = 1;
dest_mgr->error = 0;
/* Process the compressed data. */
(*dest_mgr->start_output)(&cinfo, dest_mgr);
while (cinfo.output_scanline < cinfo.output_height) {
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_read_scanlines(%p, %p, %lu)\n", &cinfo,
dest_mgr->buffer, JAS_CAST(unsigned long, dest_mgr->buffer_height)));
num_scanlines = jpeg_read_scanlines(&cinfo, dest_mgr->buffer,
dest_mgr->buffer_height);
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_read_scanlines return value %lu\n",
JAS_CAST(unsigned long, num_scanlines)));
(*dest_mgr->put_pixel_rows)(&cinfo, dest_mgr, num_scanlines);
}
(*dest_mgr->finish_output)(&cinfo, dest_mgr);
/* Complete the decompression process. */
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_finish_decompress(%p)\n", &cinfo));
jpeg_finish_decompress(&cinfo);
/* Destroy the JPEG decompression object. */
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_destroy_decompress(%p)\n", &cinfo));
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&cinfo);
jas_matrix_destroy(dest_mgr->data);
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("fclose(%p)\n", input_file));
fclose(input_file);
input_file = 0;
if (dest_mgr->error) {
jas_eprintf("error during decoding\n");
goto error;
}
return image;
error:
if (dest_mgr->data) {
jas_matrix_destroy(dest_mgr->data);
}
if (image) {
jas_image_destroy(image);
}
if (input_file) {
fclose(input_file);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 168,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> conditionalAttr3AttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.conditionalAttr3._get");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
return v8::Integer::New(imp->conditionalAttr3());
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,536 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_ccm_init_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
{
struct aead_instance *inst = aead_alg_instance(tfm);
struct ccm_instance_ctx *ictx = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
struct crypto_ccm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
struct crypto_ahash *mac;
struct crypto_skcipher *ctr;
unsigned long align;
int err;
mac = crypto_spawn_ahash(&ictx->mac);
if (IS_ERR(mac))
return PTR_ERR(mac);
ctr = crypto_spawn_skcipher(&ictx->ctr);
err = PTR_ERR(ctr);
if (IS_ERR(ctr))
goto err_free_mac;
ctx->mac = mac;
ctx->ctr = ctr;
align = crypto_aead_alignmask(tfm);
align &= ~(crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() - 1);
crypto_aead_set_reqsize(
tfm,
align + sizeof(struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx) +
crypto_skcipher_reqsize(ctr));
return 0;
err_free_mac:
crypto_free_ahash(mac);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: ccm - move cbcmac input off the stack
Commit f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
refactored the CCM driver to allow separate implementations of the
underlying MAC to be provided by a platform. However, in doing so, it
moved some data from the linear region to the stack, which violates the
SG constraints when the stack is virtually mapped.
So move idata/odata back to the request ctx struct, of which we can
reasonably expect that it has been allocated using kmalloc() et al.
Reported-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Fixes: f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,661 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int task_clock_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
{
if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE)
return -ENOENT;
if (event->attr.config != PERF_COUNT_SW_TASK_CLOCK)
return -ENOENT;
/*
* no branch sampling for software events
*/
if (has_branch_stack(event))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
perf_swevent_init_hrtimer(event);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 31,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThread::Init() {
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("RenderThread::Init", 0, "");
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
WebKit::WebView::setUseExternalPopupMenus(true);
#endif
lazy_tls.Pointer()->Set(this);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (RenderProcessImpl::InProcessPlugins())
CoInitialize(0);
#endif
suspend_webkit_shared_timer_ = true;
notify_webkit_of_modal_loop_ = true;
plugin_refresh_allowed_ = true;
widget_count_ = 0;
hidden_widget_count_ = 0;
idle_notification_delay_in_s_ = kInitialIdleHandlerDelayS;
task_factory_.reset(new ScopedRunnableMethodFactory<RenderThread>(this));
appcache_dispatcher_.reset(new AppCacheDispatcher(this));
indexed_db_dispatcher_.reset(new IndexedDBDispatcher());
db_message_filter_ = new DBMessageFilter();
AddFilter(db_message_filter_.get());
vc_manager_ = new VideoCaptureImplManager();
AddFilter(vc_manager_->video_capture_message_filter());
audio_input_message_filter_ = new AudioInputMessageFilter();
AddFilter(audio_input_message_filter_.get());
audio_message_filter_ = new AudioMessageFilter();
AddFilter(audio_message_filter_.get());
content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->RenderThreadStarted();
TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("RenderThread::Init", 0, "");
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,326 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_islice_data_cavlc(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice,
UWORD16 u2_first_mb_in_slice)
{
UWORD8 uc_more_data_flag;
UWORD8 u1_num_mbs, u1_mb_idx;
dec_mb_info_t *ps_cur_mb_info;
deblk_mb_t *ps_cur_deblk_mb;
dec_bit_stream_t * const ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD16 i2_pic_wdin_mbs = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
WORD16 i2_cur_mb_addr;
UWORD8 u1_mbaff;
UWORD8 u1_num_mbs_next, u1_end_of_row, u1_tfr_n_mb;
WORD32 ret = OK;
ps_dec->u1_qp = ps_slice->u1_slice_qp;
ih264d_update_qp(ps_dec, 0);
u1_mbaff = ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
/* initializations */
u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
u1_num_mbs = u1_mb_idx;
uc_more_data_flag = 1;
i2_cur_mb_addr = u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff;
do
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_type;
ps_dec->pv_prev_mb_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
if(i2_cur_mb_addr > ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr)
{
ret = ERROR_MB_ADDRESS_T;
break;
}
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u4_num_pmbair = (u1_num_mbs >> u1_mbaff);
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = 0;
/***************************************************************/
/* Get the required information for decoding of MB */
/* mb_x, mb_y , neighbour availablity, */
/***************************************************************/
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, 0);
/***************************************************************/
/* Set the deblocking parameters for this MB */
/***************************************************************/
ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + u1_num_mbs;
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0)
ih264d_set_deblocking_parameters(ps_cur_deblk_mb, ps_slice,
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity,
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag);
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type = ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type | D_INTRA_MB;
/**************************************************************/
/* Macroblock Layer Begins, Decode the u1_mb_type */
/**************************************************************/
{
UWORD32 u4_bitstream_offset = *pu4_bitstrm_ofst;
UWORD32 u4_word, u4_ldz, u4_temp;
/***************************************************************/
/* Find leading zeros in next 32 bits */
/***************************************************************/
NEXTBITS_32(u4_word, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
u4_ldz = CLZ(u4_word);
/* Flush the ps_bitstrm */
u4_bitstream_offset += (u4_ldz + 1);
/* Read the suffix from the ps_bitstrm */
u4_word = 0;
if(u4_ldz)
GETBITS(u4_word, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf,
u4_ldz);
*pu4_bitstrm_ofst = u4_bitstream_offset;
u4_temp = ((1 << u4_ldz) + u4_word - 1);
if(u4_temp > 25)
return ERROR_MB_TYPE;
u1_mb_type = u4_temp;
}
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type = u1_mb_type;
COPYTHECONTEXT("u1_mb_type", u1_mb_type);
/**************************************************************/
/* Parse Macroblock data */
/**************************************************************/
if(25 == u1_mb_type)
{
/* I_PCM_MB */
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = I_PCM_MB;
ret = ih264d_parse_ipcm_mb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, u1_num_mbs);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = 0;
}
else
{
ret = ih264d_parse_imb_cavlc(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, u1_num_mbs, u1_mb_type);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = ps_dec->u1_qp;
}
if(u1_mbaff)
{
ih264d_update_mbaff_left_nnz(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info);
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Get next Macroblock address */
/**************************************************************/
i2_cur_mb_addr++;
uc_more_data_flag = MORE_RBSP_DATA(ps_bitstrm);
/* Store the colocated information */
{
mv_pred_t *ps_mv_nmb_start = ps_dec->ps_mv_cur + (u1_num_mbs << 4);
mv_pred_t s_mvPred =
{
{ 0, 0, 0, 0 },
{ -1, -1 }, 0, 0};
ih264d_rep_mv_colz(ps_dec, &s_mvPred, ps_mv_nmb_start, 0,
(UWORD8)(ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag << 1), 4,
4);
}
/*if num _cores is set to 3,compute bs will be done in another thread*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores < 3)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0)
ps_dec->pf_compute_bs(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info,
(UWORD16)(u1_num_mbs >> u1_mbaff));
}
u1_num_mbs++;
/****************************************************************/
/* Check for End Of Row */
/****************************************************************/
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next) && (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_tfr_n_mb = (u1_num_mbs == ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp) || u1_end_of_row
|| (!uc_more_data_flag);
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = (!uc_more_data_flag);
/*H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Pic: %d Mb_X=%d Mb_Y=%d",
ps_slice->i4_poc >> ps_slice->u1_field_pic_flag,
ps_dec->u2_mbx,ps_dec->u2_mby + (1 - ps_cur_mb_info->u1_topmb));
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("u1_tfr_n_mb || (!uc_more_data_flag): %d", u1_tfr_n_mb || (!uc_more_data_flag));*/
if(u1_tfr_n_mb || (!uc_more_data_flag))
{
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb,
u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
if(u1_tfr_n_mb)
u1_num_mbs = 0;
u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
}
}
while(uc_more_data_flag);
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice = i2_cur_mb_addr
- (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Return error when there are more mmco params than allocated size
Bug: 25818142
Change-Id: I5c1b23985eeca5192b42703c627ca3d060e4e13d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 161,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnAccessibilityEvents(
const std::vector<AccessibilityHostMsg_EventParams>& params,
int reset_token, int ack_token) {
if (accessibility_reset_token_ != reset_token) {
Send(new AccessibilityMsg_Events_ACK(routing_id_, ack_token));
return;
}
accessibility_reset_token_ = 0;
RenderWidgetHostViewBase* view = GetViewForAccessibility();
if (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame() && view)
view->SetMainFrameAXTreeID(GetAXTreeID());
AccessibilityMode accessibility_mode = delegate_->GetAccessibilityMode();
if (!accessibility_mode.is_mode_off() && view && is_active()) {
if (accessibility_mode.has_mode(AccessibilityMode::kNativeAPIs))
GetOrCreateBrowserAccessibilityManager();
std::vector<AXEventNotificationDetails> details;
details.reserve(params.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < params.size(); ++i) {
const AccessibilityHostMsg_EventParams& param = params[i];
AXEventNotificationDetails detail;
detail.event_type = param.event_type;
detail.id = param.id;
detail.ax_tree_id = GetAXTreeID();
detail.event_from = param.event_from;
if (param.update.has_tree_data) {
detail.update.has_tree_data = true;
ax_content_tree_data_ = param.update.tree_data;
AXContentTreeDataToAXTreeData(&detail.update.tree_data);
}
detail.update.root_id = param.update.root_id;
detail.update.node_id_to_clear = param.update.node_id_to_clear;
detail.update.nodes.resize(param.update.nodes.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < param.update.nodes.size(); ++i) {
AXContentNodeDataToAXNodeData(param.update.nodes[i],
&detail.update.nodes[i]);
}
details.push_back(detail);
}
if (accessibility_mode.has_mode(AccessibilityMode::kNativeAPIs)) {
if (browser_accessibility_manager_)
browser_accessibility_manager_->OnAccessibilityEvents(details);
}
delegate_->AccessibilityEventReceived(details);
if (!accessibility_testing_callback_.is_null()) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < details.size(); i++) {
const AXEventNotificationDetails& detail = details[i];
if (static_cast<int>(detail.event_type) < 0)
continue;
if (!ax_tree_for_testing_) {
if (browser_accessibility_manager_) {
ax_tree_for_testing_.reset(new ui::AXTree(
browser_accessibility_manager_->SnapshotAXTreeForTesting()));
} else {
ax_tree_for_testing_.reset(new ui::AXTree());
CHECK(ax_tree_for_testing_->Unserialize(detail.update))
<< ax_tree_for_testing_->error();
}
} else {
CHECK(ax_tree_for_testing_->Unserialize(detail.update))
<< ax_tree_for_testing_->error();
}
accessibility_testing_callback_.Run(this, detail.event_type, detail.id);
}
}
}
Send(new AccessibilityMsg_Events_ACK(routing_id_, ack_token));
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,828 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GDataFileError GDataFileSystem::RemoveEntryFromGData(
const FilePath& file_path, std::string* resource_id) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
resource_id->clear();
GDataEntry* entry = directory_service_->FindEntryByPathSync(file_path);
if (!entry)
return GDATA_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND;
if (!entry->parent())
return GDATA_FILE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
if (entry->AsGDataFile())
*resource_id = entry->AsGDataFile()->resource_id();
GDataDirectory* parent_dir = entry->parent();
parent_dir->RemoveEntry(entry);
OnDirectoryChanged(parent_dir->GetFilePath());
return GDATA_FILE_OK;
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string EscapeCacheFileName(const std::string& filename) {
std::string escaped;
for (size_t i = 0; i < filename.size(); ++i) {
char c = filename[i];
if (c == '%' || c == '.' || c == '/') {
base::StringAppendF(&escaped, "%%%02X", c);
} else {
escaped.push_back(c);
}
}
return escaped;
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 105,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ~MakeRequestFail() {
base::RunLoop run_loop;
base::PostTaskWithTraitsAndReply(
FROM_HERE, {BrowserThread::IO},
base::BindOnce(UndoMakeRequestFailOnIO, host_), run_loop.QuitClosure());
run_loop.Run();
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ft_black_init( black_PRaster raster )
{
#ifdef FT_RASTER_OPTION_ANTI_ALIASING
FT_UInt n;
/* set default 5-levels gray palette */
for ( n = 0; n < 5; n++ )
raster->grays[n] = n * 255 / 4;
raster->gray_width = RASTER_GRAY_LINES / 2;
#else
FT_UNUSED( raster );
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,051 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned HTMLFormElement::length() const {
unsigned len = 0;
for (const auto& element : ListedElements()) {
if (element->IsEnumeratable())
++len;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 152,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ShutdownSDK() {
FPDF_DestroyLibrary();
TearDownV8();
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,430 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: restore_time(struct cpio *cpio, struct archive_entry *entry,
const char *name, int fd)
{
#ifndef HAVE_UTIMES
static int warned = 0;
(void)cpio; /* UNUSED */
(void)entry; /* UNUSED */
(void)name; /* UNUSED */
if (!warned)
lafe_warnc(0, "Can't restore access times on this platform");
warned = 1;
return (fd);
#else
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
struct __timeval times[2];
#else
struct timeval times[2];
#endif
if (!cpio->option_atime_restore)
return (fd);
times[1].tv_sec = archive_entry_mtime(entry);
times[1].tv_usec = archive_entry_mtime_nsec(entry) / 1000;
times[0].tv_sec = archive_entry_atime(entry);
times[0].tv_usec = archive_entry_atime_nsec(entry) / 1000;
#if defined(HAVE_FUTIMES) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
if (fd >= 0 && futimes(fd, times) == 0)
return (fd);
#endif
/*
* Some platform cannot restore access times if the file descriptor
* is still opened.
*/
if (fd >= 0) {
close(fd);
fd = -1;
}
#ifdef HAVE_LUTIMES
if (lutimes(name, times) != 0)
#else
if ((AE_IFLNK != archive_entry_filetype(entry))
&& utimes(name, times) != 0)
#endif
lafe_warnc(errno, "Can't update time for %s", name);
#endif
return (fd);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 43,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorNetworkAgent::Restore() {
if (state_->booleanProperty(NetworkAgentState::kNetworkAgentEnabled, false)) {
Enable(state_->integerProperty(NetworkAgentState::kTotalBufferSize,
g_maximum_total_buffer_size),
state_->integerProperty(NetworkAgentState::kResourceBufferSize,
g_maximum_resource_buffer_size));
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,519 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UrlFetcherDownloader::CreateDownloadDir() {
base::CreateNewTempDirectory(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("chrome_url_fetcher_"),
&download_dir_);
}
Commit Message: Fix error handling in the request sender and url fetcher downloader.
That means handling the network errors by primarily looking at net_error.
Bug: 1028369
Change-Id: I8181bced25f8b56144ea336a03883d0dceea5108
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1935428
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sorin Jianu <sorin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#719199}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lookup_header_set(struct ctl_table_root *root)
{
struct ctl_table_set *set = &root->default_set;
if (root->lookup)
set = root->lookup(root);
return set;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir
Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.
The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:
[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265] [<ffffffff817cdaaf>] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817] [<ffffffff817d33fb>] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346] [<ffffffff817cf055>] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256] [<ffffffff817cf0d3>] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972] [<ffffffff810d1fd0>] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804] [<ffffffff8130de64>] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227] [<ffffffff8130de17>] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648] [<ffffffff8130decd>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654] [<ffffffff8130deff>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657] [<ffffffff810f57f5>] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344] [<ffffffff810d7704>] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447] [<ffffffff817d0761>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844] [<ffffffff81167684>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336] [<ffffffff8116789d>] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186] [<ffffffff81167acb>] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899] [<ffffffff810fce3d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234] [<ffffffff8115a9f5>] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049] [<ffffffff81167ae5>] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571] [<ffffffff8115aa2c>] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207] [<ffffffff810bc83f>] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736] [<ffffffff810bc7c0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461] [<ffffffff810bce9b>] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697] [<ffffffff810bcd70>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426] [<ffffffff810c3f7e>] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991] [<ffffffff817d4baf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041] [<ffffffff810c3e80>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230
One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex. The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.
See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13
Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Yang Shukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 48,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::enqueueHashchangeEvent(const String& oldURL, const String& newURL)
{
enqueueWindowEvent(HashChangeEvent::create(oldURL, newURL));
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,713 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _free_event(struct perf_event *event)
{
irq_work_sync(&event->pending);
unaccount_event(event);
if (event->rb) {
/*
* Can happen when we close an event with re-directed output.
*
* Since we have a 0 refcount, perf_mmap_close() will skip
* over us; possibly making our ring_buffer_put() the last.
*/
mutex_lock(&event->mmap_mutex);
ring_buffer_attach(event, NULL);
mutex_unlock(&event->mmap_mutex);
}
if (is_cgroup_event(event))
perf_detach_cgroup(event);
__free_event(event);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 50,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ewk_frame_load_provisional(Evas_Object* ewkFrame)
{
evas_object_smart_callback_call(ewkFrame, "load,provisional", 0);
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void DetectFlow(ThreadVars *tv,
DetectEngineCtx *de_ctx, DetectEngineThreadCtx *det_ctx,
Packet *p)
{
if (p->flags & PKT_NOPACKET_INSPECTION) {
/* hack: if we are in pass the entire flow mode, we need to still
* update the inspect_id forward. So test for the condition here,
* and call the update code if necessary. */
const int pass = ((p->flow->flags & FLOW_NOPACKET_INSPECTION));
const AppProto alproto = FlowGetAppProtocol(p->flow);
if (pass && AppLayerParserProtocolSupportsTxs(p->proto, alproto)) {
uint8_t flags;
if (p->flowflags & FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER) {
flags = STREAM_TOSERVER;
} else {
flags = STREAM_TOCLIENT;
}
flags = FlowGetDisruptionFlags(p->flow, flags);
DeStateUpdateInspectTransactionId(p->flow, flags, true);
}
SCLogDebug("p->pcap %"PRIu64": no detection on packet, "
"PKT_NOPACKET_INSPECTION is set", p->pcap_cnt);
return;
}
/* see if the packet matches one or more of the sigs */
(void)DetectRun(tv, de_ctx, det_ctx, p);
}
Commit Message: stream: fix false negative on bad RST
If a bad RST was received the stream inspection would not happen
for that packet, but it would still move the 'raw progress' tracker
forward. Following good packets would then fail to detect anything
before the 'raw progress' position.
Bug #2770
Reported-by: Alexey Vishnyakov
CWE ID: CWE-347 | 0 | 87,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void zrle_write_u8(VncState *vs, uint8_t value)
{
vnc_write_u8(vs, value);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 17,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BrowserCommandController::UpdateCommandEnabled(int id, bool state) {
if (is_locked_fullscreen_)
return false;
return command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(id, state);
}
Commit Message: mac: Do not let synthetic events toggle "Allow JavaScript From AppleEvents"
Bug: 891697
Change-Id: I49eb77963515637df739c9d2ce83530d4e21cf15
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1308771
Reviewed-by: Elly Fong-Jones <ellyjones@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604268}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 153,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationURLLoaderImpl::FollowRedirect(
const base::Optional<std::vector<std::string>>&
to_be_removed_request_headers,
const base::Optional<net::HttpRequestHeaders>& modified_request_headers) {
base::PostTaskWithTraits(
FROM_HERE, {BrowserThread::IO},
base::BindOnce(&URLLoaderRequestController::FollowRedirect,
base::Unretained(request_controller_.get()),
modified_request_headers));
}
Commit Message: Abort navigations on 304 responses.
A recent change (https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1161479)
accidentally resulted in treating 304 responses as downloads. This CL
treats them as ERR_ABORTED instead. This doesn't exactly match old
behavior, which passed them on to the renderer, which then aborted them.
The new code results in correctly restoring the original URL in the
omnibox, and has a shiny new test to prevent future regressions.
Bug: 882270
Change-Id: Ic73dcce9e9596d43327b13acde03b4ed9bd0c82e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1252684
Commit-Queue: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595641}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pf_probe(struct pf_unit *pf)
{
if (pf->drive == -1) {
for (pf->drive = 0; pf->drive <= 1; pf->drive++)
if (!pf_reset(pf)) {
if (pf->lun != -1)
return pf_identify(pf);
else
for (pf->lun = 0; pf->lun < 8; pf->lun++)
if (!pf_identify(pf))
return 0;
}
} else {
if (pf_reset(pf))
return -1;
if (pf->lun != -1)
return pf_identify(pf);
for (pf->lun = 0; pf->lun < 8; pf->lun++)
if (!pf_identify(pf))
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: paride/pf: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
pf: pf version 1.04, major 47, cluster 64, nice 0
pf: No ATAPI disk detected
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9887 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pf_init+0x7af/0x1000 [pf]
Code: 46 77 d2 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 03 25 a6 d2 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 e6 24 a6 d2 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 79 34
RSP: 0018:ffff8881abcbf998 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc1e4a8a8 RCX: ffffffffaec50788
RDX: 0000000000039b10 RSI: ffffc9000153c000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee44e59 R09: ffffed103ee44e59
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee44e58 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc1e4b028 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000020
FS: 00007f1b78a91700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6d72b207f8 CR3: 00000001d5790004 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1e50000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f1b78a90c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f1b78a90c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1b78a916bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pf(+) paride gpio_tps65218 tps65218 i2c_cht_wc ati_remote dc395x act_meta_skbtcindex act_ife ife ecdh_generic rc_xbox_dvd sky81452_regulator v4l2_fwnode leds_blinkm snd_usb_hiface comedi(C) aes_ti slhc cfi_cmdset_0020 mtd cfi_util sx8654 mdio_gpio of_mdio fixed_phy mdio_bitbang libphy alcor_pci matrix_keymap hid_uclogic usbhid scsi_transport_fc videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_dma_sg snd_soc_pcm179x_spi snd_soc_pcm179x_codec i2c_demux_pinctrl mdev snd_indigodj isl6405 mii enc28j60 cmac adt7316_i2c(C) adt7316(C) fmc_trivial fmc nf_reject_ipv4 authenc rc_dtt200u rtc_ds1672 dvb_usb_dibusb_mc dvb_usb_dibusb_mc_common dib3000mc dibx000_common dvb_usb_dibusb_common dvb_usb dvb_core videobuf2_common videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops regulator_haptic adf7242 mac802154 ieee802154 s5h1409 da9034_ts snd_intel8x0m wmi cx24120 usbcore sdhci_cadence sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core joydev i2c_algo_bit scsi_transport_iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs ves1820 lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrp
c
ip_vs snd_soc_adau7002 snd_cs4281 snd_rawmidi gameport snd_opl3_lib snd_seq_device snd_hwdep snd_ac97_codec ad7418 hid_primax hid snd_soc_cs4265 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer ac97_bus snd_compress snd soundcore ti_adc108s102 eeprom_93cx6 i2c_algo_pca mlxreg_hotplug st_pressure st_sensors industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio v4l2_common videodev media snd_soc_adau_utils rc_pinnacle_grey rc_core pps_gpio leds_lm3692x nandcore ledtrig_pattern iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ide_pci_generic aes_x86_64 piix crypto_simd input_leds psmouse cryp
td
glue_helper ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt agpgart ata_generic i2c_piix4 pata_acpi parport_pc parport rtc_cmos floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: paride]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 7a818cf5f210d79e ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pf_init_units, pf->disk will be
NULL, however in pf_detect and pf_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 6ce59025f118 ("paride/pf: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 88,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vrrp_script_child_thread(thread_t * thread)
{
int wait_status;
pid_t pid;
vrrp_script_t *vscript = THREAD_ARG(thread);
int sig_num;
unsigned timeout = 0;
char *script_exit_type = NULL;
bool script_success;
char *reason = NULL;
int reason_code;
if (thread->type == THREAD_CHILD_TIMEOUT) {
pid = THREAD_CHILD_PID(thread);
if (vscript->state == SCRIPT_STATE_RUNNING) {
vscript->state = SCRIPT_STATE_REQUESTING_TERMINATION;
sig_num = SIGTERM;
timeout = 2;
} else if (vscript->state == SCRIPT_STATE_REQUESTING_TERMINATION) {
vscript->state = SCRIPT_STATE_FORCING_TERMINATION;
sig_num = SIGKILL;
timeout = 2;
} else if (vscript->state == SCRIPT_STATE_FORCING_TERMINATION) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Child (PID %d) failed to terminate after kill", pid);
sig_num = SIGKILL;
timeout = 10; /* Give it longer to terminate */
}
/* Kill it off. */
if (timeout) {
/* If kill returns an error, we can't kill the process since either the process has terminated,
* or we don't have permission. If we can't kill it, there is no point trying again. */
if (kill(-pid, sig_num)) {
if (errno == ESRCH) {
/* The process does not exist; presumably it
* has just terminated. We should get
* notification of it's termination, so allow
* that to handle it. */
timeout = 1;
} else {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "kill -%d of process %s(%d) with new state %d failed with errno %d", sig_num, vscript->script.args[0], pid, vscript->state, errno);
timeout = 1000;
}
}
} else if (vscript->state != SCRIPT_STATE_IDLE) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Child thread pid %d timeout with unknown script state %d", pid, vscript->state);
timeout = 10; /* We need some timeout */
}
if (timeout)
thread_add_child(thread->master, vrrp_script_child_thread, vscript, pid, timeout * TIMER_HZ);
return 0;
}
wait_status = THREAD_CHILD_STATUS(thread);
if (WIFEXITED(wait_status)) {
int status = WEXITSTATUS(wait_status);
/* Report if status has changed */
if (status != vscript->last_status)
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Script `%s` now returning %d", vscript->sname, status);
if (status == 0) {
/* success */
script_exit_type = "succeeded";
script_success = true;
} else {
/* failure */
script_exit_type = "failed";
script_success = false;
reason = "exited with status";
reason_code = status;
}
vscript->last_status = status;
}
else if (WIFSIGNALED(wait_status)) {
if (vscript->state == SCRIPT_STATE_REQUESTING_TERMINATION && WTERMSIG(wait_status) == SIGTERM) {
/* The script terminated due to a SIGTERM, and we sent it a SIGTERM to
* terminate the process. Now make sure any children it created have
* died too. */
pid = THREAD_CHILD_PID(thread);
kill(-pid, SIGKILL);
}
/* We treat forced termination as a failure */
if ((vscript->state == SCRIPT_STATE_REQUESTING_TERMINATION && WTERMSIG(wait_status) == SIGTERM) ||
(vscript->state == SCRIPT_STATE_FORCING_TERMINATION && (WTERMSIG(wait_status) == SIGKILL || WTERMSIG(wait_status) == SIGTERM)))
script_exit_type = "timed_out";
else {
script_exit_type = "failed";
reason = "due to signal";
reason_code = WTERMSIG(wait_status);
}
script_success = false;
}
if (script_exit_type) {
if (script_success) {
if (vscript->result < vscript->rise - 1) {
vscript->result++;
} else if (vscript->result != vscript->rise + vscript->fall - 1) {
if (vscript->result < vscript->rise) { /* i.e. == vscript->rise - 1 */
log_message(LOG_INFO, "VRRP_Script(%s) %s", vscript->sname, script_exit_type);
update_script_priorities(vscript, true);
}
vscript->result = vscript->rise + vscript->fall - 1;
}
} else {
if (vscript->result > vscript->rise) {
vscript->result--;
} else {
if (vscript->result == vscript->rise ||
vscript->init_state == SCRIPT_INIT_STATE_INIT) {
if (reason)
log_message(LOG_INFO, "VRRP_Script(%s) %s (%s %d)", vscript->sname, script_exit_type, reason, reason_code);
else
log_message(LOG_INFO, "VRRP_Script(%s) %s", vscript->sname, script_exit_type);
update_script_priorities(vscript, false);
}
vscript->result = 0;
}
}
}
vscript->state = SCRIPT_STATE_IDLE;
vscript->init_state = SCRIPT_INIT_STATE_DONE;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,087 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStripGtk::Init() {
model_->AddObserver(this);
tabstrip_.Own(gtk_fixed_new());
ViewIDUtil::SetID(tabstrip_.get(), VIEW_ID_TAB_STRIP);
gtk_widget_set_size_request(tabstrip_.get(), 0,
TabGtk::GetMinimumUnselectedSize().height());
gtk_widget_set_app_paintable(tabstrip_.get(), TRUE);
gtk_drag_dest_set(tabstrip_.get(), GTK_DEST_DEFAULT_ALL,
NULL, 0,
static_cast<GdkDragAction>(
GDK_ACTION_COPY | GDK_ACTION_MOVE | GDK_ACTION_LINK));
static const int targets[] = { ui::TEXT_URI_LIST,
ui::NETSCAPE_URL,
ui::TEXT_PLAIN,
-1 };
ui::SetDestTargetList(tabstrip_.get(), targets);
g_signal_connect(tabstrip_.get(), "map",
G_CALLBACK(OnMapThunk), this);
g_signal_connect(tabstrip_.get(), "expose-event",
G_CALLBACK(OnExposeThunk), this);
g_signal_connect(tabstrip_.get(), "size-allocate",
G_CALLBACK(OnSizeAllocateThunk), this);
g_signal_connect(tabstrip_.get(), "drag-motion",
G_CALLBACK(OnDragMotionThunk), this);
g_signal_connect(tabstrip_.get(), "drag-drop",
G_CALLBACK(OnDragDropThunk), this);
g_signal_connect(tabstrip_.get(), "drag-leave",
G_CALLBACK(OnDragLeaveThunk), this);
g_signal_connect(tabstrip_.get(), "drag-data-received",
G_CALLBACK(OnDragDataReceivedThunk), this);
newtab_button_.reset(MakeNewTabButton());
newtab_surface_bounds_.SetRect(0, 0, newtab_button_->SurfaceWidth(),
newtab_button_->SurfaceHeight());
gtk_widget_show_all(tabstrip_.get());
bounds_ = GetInitialWidgetBounds(tabstrip_.get());
if (drop_indicator_width == 0) {
GdkPixbuf* drop_image = GetDropArrowImage(true)->ToGdkPixbuf();
drop_indicator_width = gdk_pixbuf_get_width(drop_image);
drop_indicator_height = gdk_pixbuf_get_height(drop_image);
}
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_BROWSER_THEME_CHANGED,
content::Source<ThemeService>(theme_service_));
theme_service_->InitThemesFor(this);
ViewIDUtil::SetDelegateForWidget(widget(), this);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: QUrl OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::getNavigationEntryUrl(int index) const {
return proxy_->getNavigationEntryUrl(index);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sctp_assoc_rm_peer(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_transport *peer)
{
struct list_head *pos;
struct sctp_transport *transport;
pr_debug("%s: association:%p addr:%pISpc\n",
__func__, asoc, &peer->ipaddr.sa);
/* If we are to remove the current retran_path, update it
* to the next peer before removing this peer from the list.
*/
if (asoc->peer.retran_path == peer)
sctp_assoc_update_retran_path(asoc);
/* Remove this peer from the list. */
list_del_rcu(&peer->transports);
/* Get the first transport of asoc. */
pos = asoc->peer.transport_addr_list.next;
transport = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_transport, transports);
/* Update any entries that match the peer to be deleted. */
if (asoc->peer.primary_path == peer)
sctp_assoc_set_primary(asoc, transport);
if (asoc->peer.active_path == peer)
asoc->peer.active_path = transport;
if (asoc->peer.retran_path == peer)
asoc->peer.retran_path = transport;
if (asoc->peer.last_data_from == peer)
asoc->peer.last_data_from = transport;
/* If we remove the transport an INIT was last sent to, set it to
* NULL. Combined with the update of the retran path above, this
* will cause the next INIT to be sent to the next available
* transport, maintaining the cycle.
*/
if (asoc->init_last_sent_to == peer)
asoc->init_last_sent_to = NULL;
/* If we remove the transport an SHUTDOWN was last sent to, set it
* to NULL. Combined with the update of the retran path above, this
* will cause the next SHUTDOWN to be sent to the next available
* transport, maintaining the cycle.
*/
if (asoc->shutdown_last_sent_to == peer)
asoc->shutdown_last_sent_to = NULL;
/* If we remove the transport an ASCONF was last sent to, set it to
* NULL.
*/
if (asoc->addip_last_asconf &&
asoc->addip_last_asconf->transport == peer)
asoc->addip_last_asconf->transport = NULL;
/* If we have something on the transmitted list, we have to
* save it off. The best place is the active path.
*/
if (!list_empty(&peer->transmitted)) {
struct sctp_transport *active = asoc->peer.active_path;
struct sctp_chunk *ch;
/* Reset the transport of each chunk on this list */
list_for_each_entry(ch, &peer->transmitted,
transmitted_list) {
ch->transport = NULL;
ch->rtt_in_progress = 0;
}
list_splice_tail_init(&peer->transmitted,
&active->transmitted);
/* Start a T3 timer here in case it wasn't running so
* that these migrated packets have a chance to get
* retransmitted.
*/
if (!timer_pending(&active->T3_rtx_timer))
if (!mod_timer(&active->T3_rtx_timer,
jiffies + active->rto))
sctp_transport_hold(active);
}
asoc->peer.transport_count--;
sctp_transport_free(peer);
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions
Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with
SCTP authentication enabled:
Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1
task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000
PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c
LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38
pc : [<c024bb80>] lr : [<c00f32dc>] psr: 40000013
sp : c6f538e8 ip : 00000000 fp : c6f53924
r10: c6f50d80 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00010000
r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7be4000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c6f56254
r3 : c00c8170 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000008 r0 : c6f1e660
Flags: nZcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 0005397f Table: 06f28000 DAC: 00000015
Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0)
Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000)
[...]
Backtrace:
[<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8)
[<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844)
[<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28)
[<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220)
[<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4)
[<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160)
[<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74)
[<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888)
While we already had various kind of bugs in that area
ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if
we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache
auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different
kind.
Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is
needed can be found in RFC4895:
SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against
blind attackers. These values are not changed during the
lifetime of an SCTP association.
Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a
method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by
the original peer that started the association and not by a
malicious attacker.
To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between
peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to
authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO
parameters that are being negotiated among peers:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random
number and the peer's random number *after* the association
has been established. The local and peer's random number along
with the shared key are then part of the secret used for
calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk.
Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking
SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY
and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling
sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other,
thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
<--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -----------
-------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -------->
...
Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags,
the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1:
In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling
of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for
the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of
RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random
Number and the peer's Random Number after the association
has been established.
In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B:
B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an
association at about the same time but the peer endpoint
started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's
INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not
being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint.
The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED
state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from
the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may
running and send a COOKIE ACK.
In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the
same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in
Action B of section 5.2.4.
Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b()
case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the
side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over
peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created
association to update the existing one.
Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on
the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated.
However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous
asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so
that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early
return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to
authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK).
That in fact causes the server side when responding with ...
<------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK -----------------
... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in
sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is
being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the
endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses
asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key
and dereferences it in ...
crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len)
... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack()
called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1
and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking
sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over
the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize
its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks
in that case are not sent by the temporary association which
are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via
SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the
*updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated
association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state),
since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init()
was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually
throw away each time.
The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable
value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(),
so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1,
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate
the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic.
Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 36,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: foreach_nfs_shareopt(const char *shareopts,
nfs_shareopt_callback_t callback, void *cookie)
{
char *shareopts_dup, *opt, *cur, *value;
int was_nul, rc;
if (shareopts == NULL)
return (SA_OK);
shareopts_dup = strdup(shareopts);
if (shareopts_dup == NULL)
return (SA_NO_MEMORY);
opt = shareopts_dup;
was_nul = 0;
while (1) {
cur = opt;
while (*cur != ',' && *cur != '\0')
cur++;
if (*cur == '\0')
was_nul = 1;
*cur = '\0';
if (cur > opt) {
value = strchr(opt, '=');
if (value != NULL) {
*value = '\0';
value++;
}
rc = callback(opt, value, cookie);
if (rc != SA_OK) {
free(shareopts_dup);
return (rc);
}
}
opt = cur + 1;
if (was_nul)
break;
}
free(shareopts_dup);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Move nfs.c:foreach_nfs_shareopt() to libshare.c:foreach_shareopt()
so that it can be (re)used in other parts of libshare.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 170,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void caif_ctrl_cb(struct cflayer *layr,
enum caif_ctrlcmd flow,
int phyid)
{
struct caifsock *cf_sk = container_of(layr, struct caifsock, layer);
switch (flow) {
case CAIF_CTRLCMD_FLOW_ON_IND:
/* OK from modem to start sending again */
set_tx_flow_on(cf_sk);
cf_sk->sk.sk_state_change(&cf_sk->sk);
break;
case CAIF_CTRLCMD_FLOW_OFF_IND:
/* Modem asks us to shut up */
set_tx_flow_off(cf_sk);
cf_sk->sk.sk_state_change(&cf_sk->sk);
break;
case CAIF_CTRLCMD_INIT_RSP:
/* We're now connected */
caif_client_register_refcnt(&cf_sk->layer,
cfsk_hold, cfsk_put);
cf_sk->sk.sk_state = CAIF_CONNECTED;
set_tx_flow_on(cf_sk);
cf_sk->sk.sk_shutdown = 0;
cf_sk->sk.sk_state_change(&cf_sk->sk);
break;
case CAIF_CTRLCMD_DEINIT_RSP:
/* We're now disconnected */
cf_sk->sk.sk_state = CAIF_DISCONNECTED;
cf_sk->sk.sk_state_change(&cf_sk->sk);
break;
case CAIF_CTRLCMD_INIT_FAIL_RSP:
/* Connect request failed */
cf_sk->sk.sk_err = ECONNREFUSED;
cf_sk->sk.sk_state = CAIF_DISCONNECTED;
cf_sk->sk.sk_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK;
/*
* Socket "standards" seems to require POLLOUT to
* be set at connect failure.
*/
set_tx_flow_on(cf_sk);
cf_sk->sk.sk_state_change(&cf_sk->sk);
break;
case CAIF_CTRLCMD_REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_IND:
/* Modem has closed this connection, or device is down. */
cf_sk->sk.sk_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK;
cf_sk->sk.sk_err = ECONNRESET;
set_rx_flow_on(cf_sk);
cf_sk->sk.sk_error_report(&cf_sk->sk);
break;
default:
pr_debug("Unexpected flow command %d\n", flow);
}
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ih264d_cavlc_parse_chroma_dc(dec_mb_info_t *ps_cur_mb_info,
WORD16 *pi2_coeff_block,
dec_bit_stream_t *ps_bitstrm,
UWORD32 u4_scale_u,
UWORD32 u4_scale_v,
WORD32 i4_mb_inter_inc)
{
UWORD32 u4_total_coeff, u4_trailing_ones, u4_total_coeff_tone, u4_code;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 u4_bitstream_offset = ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
const UWORD8 *pu1_cav_chromdc = (const UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_cav_chromdc_vld;
UNUSED(i4_mb_inter_inc);
/******************************************************************/
/* Chroma DC Block for U component */
/******************************************************************/
NEXTBITS(u4_code, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf, 8);
u4_code = pu1_cav_chromdc[u4_code];
FLUSHBITS(u4_bitstream_offset, ((u4_code & 0x7) + 1));
ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst = u4_bitstream_offset;
u4_total_coeff = (u4_code >> 5);
if(u4_total_coeff)
{
WORD32 i_z0, i_z1, i_z2, i_z3;
tu_sblk4x4_coeff_data_t *ps_tu_4x4;
dec_struct_t *ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)ps_bitstrm->pv_codec_handle;
WORD16 ai2_dc_coef[4];
UWORD8 pu1_inv_scan[4] =
{ 0, 1, 2, 3 };
WORD16 *pi2_coeff_data =
(WORD16 *)ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
ps_tu_4x4 = (tu_sblk4x4_coeff_data_t *)ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
u4_trailing_ones = ((u4_code >> 3) & 0x3);
u4_total_coeff_tone = (u4_total_coeff << 16) | u4_trailing_ones;
ih264d_rest_of_residual_cav_chroma_dc_block(u4_total_coeff_tone,
ps_bitstrm);
ai2_dc_coef[0] = 0;
ai2_dc_coef[1] = 0;
ai2_dc_coef[2] = 0;
ai2_dc_coef[3] = 0;
ih264d_unpack_coeff4x4_dc_4x4blk(ps_tu_4x4,
ai2_dc_coef,
pu1_inv_scan);
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Inverse 2x2 transform and scaling of chroma DC */
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
i_z0 = (ai2_dc_coef[0] + ai2_dc_coef[2]);
i_z1 = (ai2_dc_coef[0] - ai2_dc_coef[2]);
i_z2 = (ai2_dc_coef[1] - ai2_dc_coef[3]);
i_z3 = (ai2_dc_coef[1] + ai2_dc_coef[3]);
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Scaling and storing the values back */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
*pi2_coeff_data++ = ((i_z0 + i_z3) * u4_scale_u) >> 5;
*pi2_coeff_data++ = ((i_z0 - i_z3) * u4_scale_u) >> 5;
*pi2_coeff_data++ = ((i_z1 + i_z2) * u4_scale_u) >> 5;
*pi2_coeff_data++ = ((i_z1 - i_z2) * u4_scale_u) >> 5;
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = (void *)pi2_coeff_data;
SET_BIT(ps_cur_mb_info->u1_yuv_dc_block_flag,1);
}
/******************************************************************/
/* Chroma DC Block for V component */
/******************************************************************/
pi2_coeff_block += 64;
u4_bitstream_offset = ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
NEXTBITS(u4_code, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf, 8);
u4_code = pu1_cav_chromdc[u4_code];
FLUSHBITS(u4_bitstream_offset, ((u4_code & 0x7) + 1));
ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst = u4_bitstream_offset;
u4_total_coeff = (u4_code >> 5);
if(u4_total_coeff)
{
WORD32 i_z0, i_z1, i_z2, i_z3;
tu_sblk4x4_coeff_data_t *ps_tu_4x4;
dec_struct_t *ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)ps_bitstrm->pv_codec_handle;
WORD16 ai2_dc_coef[4];
UWORD8 pu1_inv_scan[4] =
{ 0, 1, 2, 3 };
WORD16 *pi2_coeff_data =
(WORD16 *)ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
ps_tu_4x4 = (tu_sblk4x4_coeff_data_t *)ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
u4_trailing_ones = ((u4_code >> 3) & 0x3);
u4_total_coeff_tone = (u4_total_coeff << 16) | u4_trailing_ones;
ih264d_rest_of_residual_cav_chroma_dc_block(u4_total_coeff_tone,
ps_bitstrm);
ai2_dc_coef[0] = 0;
ai2_dc_coef[1] = 0;
ai2_dc_coef[2] = 0;
ai2_dc_coef[3] = 0;
ih264d_unpack_coeff4x4_dc_4x4blk(ps_tu_4x4,
ai2_dc_coef,
pu1_inv_scan);
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Inverse 2x2 transform and scaling of chroma DC */
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
i_z0 = (ai2_dc_coef[0] + ai2_dc_coef[2]);
i_z1 = (ai2_dc_coef[0] - ai2_dc_coef[2]);
i_z2 = (ai2_dc_coef[1] - ai2_dc_coef[3]);
i_z3 = (ai2_dc_coef[1] + ai2_dc_coef[3]);
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Scaling and storing the values back */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
*pi2_coeff_data++ = ((i_z0 + i_z3) * u4_scale_v) >> 5;
*pi2_coeff_data++ = ((i_z0 - i_z3) * u4_scale_v) >> 5;
*pi2_coeff_data++ = ((i_z1 + i_z2) * u4_scale_v) >> 5;
*pi2_coeff_data++ = ((i_z1 - i_z2) * u4_scale_v) >> 5;
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = (void *)pi2_coeff_data;
SET_BIT(ps_cur_mb_info->u1_yuv_dc_block_flag,2);
}
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Fix stack underflow in CAVLC 4x4 parse functions
Bug: 26399350
Change-Id: Id768751672a7b093ab6e53d4fc0b3188d470920e
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 161,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool low_pfn(unsigned long pfn)
{
return pfn < max_low_pfn;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,942 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int machine_constraints_current(struct regulator_dev *rdev,
struct regulation_constraints *constraints)
{
const struct regulator_ops *ops = rdev->desc->ops;
int ret;
if (!constraints->min_uA && !constraints->max_uA)
return 0;
if (constraints->min_uA > constraints->max_uA) {
rdev_err(rdev, "Invalid current constraints\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!ops->set_current_limit || !ops->get_current_limit) {
rdev_warn(rdev, "Operation of current configuration missing\n");
return 0;
}
/* Set regulator current in constraints range */
ret = ops->set_current_limit(rdev, constraints->min_uA,
constraints->max_uA);
if (ret < 0) {
rdev_err(rdev, "Failed to set current constraint, %d\n", ret);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 74,467 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sched_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct inode *inode = m->private;
struct task_struct *p;
p = get_proc_task(inode);
if (!p)
return -ESRCH;
proc_sched_show_task(p, m);
put_task_struct(p);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: efx_ethtool_get_rxnfc(struct net_device *net_dev,
struct ethtool_rxnfc *info, u32 *rules __always_unused)
{
struct efx_nic *efx = netdev_priv(net_dev);
switch (info->cmd) {
case ETHTOOL_GRXRINGS:
info->data = efx->n_rx_channels;
return 0;
case ETHTOOL_GRXFH: {
unsigned min_revision = 0;
info->data = 0;
switch (info->flow_type) {
case TCP_V4_FLOW:
info->data |= RXH_L4_B_0_1 | RXH_L4_B_2_3;
/* fall through */
case UDP_V4_FLOW:
case SCTP_V4_FLOW:
case AH_ESP_V4_FLOW:
case IPV4_FLOW:
info->data |= RXH_IP_SRC | RXH_IP_DST;
min_revision = EFX_REV_FALCON_B0;
break;
case TCP_V6_FLOW:
info->data |= RXH_L4_B_0_1 | RXH_L4_B_2_3;
/* fall through */
case UDP_V6_FLOW:
case SCTP_V6_FLOW:
case AH_ESP_V6_FLOW:
case IPV6_FLOW:
info->data |= RXH_IP_SRC | RXH_IP_DST;
min_revision = EFX_REV_SIENA_A0;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (efx_nic_rev(efx) < min_revision)
info->data = 0;
return 0;
}
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,454 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> V8ValueConverterImpl::ToV8ValueImpl(
v8::Isolate* isolate,
v8::Local<v8::Object> creation_context,
const base::Value* value) const {
CHECK(value);
switch (value->GetType()) {
case base::Value::TYPE_NULL:
return v8::Null(isolate);
case base::Value::TYPE_BOOLEAN: {
bool val = false;
CHECK(value->GetAsBoolean(&val));
return v8::Boolean::New(isolate, val);
}
case base::Value::TYPE_INTEGER: {
int val = 0;
CHECK(value->GetAsInteger(&val));
return v8::Integer::New(isolate, val);
}
case base::Value::TYPE_DOUBLE: {
double val = 0.0;
CHECK(value->GetAsDouble(&val));
return v8::Number::New(isolate, val);
}
case base::Value::TYPE_STRING: {
std::string val;
CHECK(value->GetAsString(&val));
return v8::String::NewFromUtf8(
isolate, val.c_str(), v8::String::kNormalString, val.length());
}
case base::Value::TYPE_LIST:
return ToV8Array(isolate,
creation_context,
static_cast<const base::ListValue*>(value));
case base::Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY:
return ToV8Object(isolate,
creation_context,
static_cast<const base::DictionaryValue*>(value));
case base::Value::TYPE_BINARY:
return ToArrayBuffer(isolate,
creation_context,
static_cast<const base::BinaryValue*>(value));
default:
LOG(ERROR) << "Unexpected value type: " << value->GetType();
return v8::Null(isolate);
}
}
Commit Message: V8ValueConverter::ToV8Value should not trigger setters
BUG=606390
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1918793003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390045}
CWE ID: | 0 | 156,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebGLRenderingContext::uniform1ivCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebGLRenderingContext.uniform1iv()");
return uniformHelperi(args, kUniform1v);
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint64_t cirrus_linear_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
unsigned size)
{
CirrusVGAState *s = opaque;
uint32_t ret;
addr &= s->cirrus_addr_mask;
if (((s->vga.sr[0x17] & 0x44) == 0x44) &&
((addr & s->linear_mmio_mask) == s->linear_mmio_mask)) {
/* memory-mapped I/O */
ret = cirrus_mmio_blt_read(s, addr & 0xff);
} else if (0) {
/* XXX handle bitblt */
ret = 0xff;
} else {
/* video memory */
if ((s->vga.gr[0x0B] & 0x14) == 0x14) {
addr <<= 4;
} else if (s->vga.gr[0x0B] & 0x02) {
addr <<= 3;
}
addr &= s->cirrus_addr_mask;
ret = *(s->vga.vram_ptr + addr);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void activityLoggingAccessForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, imp->activityLoggingAccessForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,083 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t pdu_marshal(V9fsPDU *pdu, size_t offset, const char *fmt, ...)
{
ssize_t ret;
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
ret = pdu->s->transport->pdu_vmarshal(pdu, offset, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 1,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ieee80211_if_setup(struct net_device *dev)
{
ether_setup(dev);
dev->netdev_ops = &ieee80211_dataif_ops;
dev->destructor = free_netdev;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 165,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cmd_stdin(void *data, const char *input) {
RCore *core = (RCore *)data;
if (input[0] == '?') {
r_cons_printf ("Usage: '-' '.-' '. -' do the same\n");
return false;
}
return r_core_run_script (core, "-");
}
Commit Message: Fix #7727 - undefined pointers and out of band string access fixes
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 64,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 30,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ovl_set_dir_cache(struct dentry *dentry, struct ovl_dir_cache *cache)
{
struct ovl_entry *oe = dentry->d_fsdata;
oe->cache = cache;
}
Commit Message: fs: limit filesystem stacking depth
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 74,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int simple_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int error;
if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) {
error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
if (error < 0)
return 0;
if (error == 0)
acl = NULL;
}
inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: clear S_ISGID when setting posix ACLs
This change was missed the tmpfs modification in In CVE-2016-7097
commit 073931017b49 ("posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting
file permissions")
It can test by xfstest generic/375, which failed to clear
setgid bit in the following test case on tmpfs:
touch $testfile
chown 100:100 $testfile
chmod 2755 $testfile
_runas -u 100 -g 101 -- setfacl -m u::rwx,g::rwx,o::rwx $testfile
Signed-off-by: Gu Zheng <guzheng1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: | 1 | 168,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void seqiv_complete(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err)
{
struct skcipher_givcrypt_request *req = base->data;
seqiv_complete2(req, err);
skcipher_givcrypt_complete(req, err);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,893 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameObserverNatives::RenderFrameObserverNatives(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context), weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
RouteFunction(
"OnDocumentElementCreated",
base::Bind(&RenderFrameObserverNatives::OnDocumentElementCreated,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 172,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_handle_bKGD(png_structrp png_ptr, png_inforp info_ptr, png_uint_32 length)
{
unsigned int truelen;
png_byte buf[6];
png_color_16 background;
png_debug(1, "in png_handle_bKGD");
if ((png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IHDR) == 0)
png_chunk_error(png_ptr, "missing IHDR");
else if ((png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IDAT) != 0 ||
(png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE &&
(png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_PLTE) == 0))
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "out of place");
return;
}
else if (info_ptr != NULL && (info_ptr->valid & PNG_INFO_bKGD) != 0)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "duplicate");
return;
}
if (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
truelen = 1;
else if ((png_ptr->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) != 0)
truelen = 6;
else
truelen = 2;
if (length != truelen)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "invalid");
return;
}
png_crc_read(png_ptr, buf, truelen);
if (png_crc_finish(png_ptr, 0) != 0)
return;
/* We convert the index value into RGB components so that we can allow
* arbitrary RGB values for background when we have transparency, and
* so it is easy to determine the RGB values of the background color
* from the info_ptr struct.
*/
if (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
background.index = buf[0];
if (info_ptr != NULL && info_ptr->num_palette != 0)
{
if (buf[0] >= info_ptr->num_palette)
{
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "invalid index");
return;
}
background.red = (png_uint_16)png_ptr->palette[buf[0]].red;
background.green = (png_uint_16)png_ptr->palette[buf[0]].green;
background.blue = (png_uint_16)png_ptr->palette[buf[0]].blue;
}
else
background.red = background.green = background.blue = 0;
background.gray = 0;
}
else if ((png_ptr->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) == 0) /* GRAY */
{
if (png_ptr->bit_depth <= 8)
{
if (buf[0] != 0 || buf[1] >= (unsigned int)(1 << png_ptr->bit_depth))
{
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "invalid gray level");
return;
}
}
background.index = 0;
background.red =
background.green =
background.blue =
background.gray = png_get_uint_16(buf);
}
else
{
if (png_ptr->bit_depth <= 8)
{
if (buf[0] != 0 || buf[2] != 0 || buf[4] != 0)
{
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "invalid color");
return;
}
}
background.index = 0;
background.red = png_get_uint_16(buf);
background.green = png_get_uint_16(buf + 2);
background.blue = png_get_uint_16(buf + 4);
background.gray = 0;
}
png_set_bKGD(png_ptr, info_ptr, &background);
}
Commit Message: [libpng16] Fix the calculation of row_factor in png_check_chunk_length
(Bug report by Thuan Pham, SourceForge issue #278)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 79,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserViewRenderer::DidDestroyCompositor(
content::SynchronousCompositor* compositor) {
TRACE_EVENT0("android_webview", "BrowserViewRenderer::DidDestroyCompositor");
DCHECK(compositor_);
compositor_->SetIsActive(false);
compositor_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_acquire_dquot(struct dquot *dquot)
{
int ret, err;
handle_t *handle;
handle = ext4_journal_start(dquot_to_inode(dquot),
EXT4_QUOTA_INIT_BLOCKS(dquot->dq_sb));
if (IS_ERR(handle))
return PTR_ERR(handle);
ret = dquot_acquire(dquot);
err = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (!ret)
ret = err;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,443 |
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