instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int make_raw_rw_request(void)
{
int aligned_sector_t;
int max_sector;
int max_size;
int tracksize;
int ssize;
if (WARN(max_buffer_sectors == 0, "VFS: Block I/O scheduled on unopened device\n"))
return 0;
set_fdc((long)current_req->rq_disk->private_data);
raw_cmd = &default_raw_cmd;
raw_cmd->flags = FD_RAW_SPIN | FD_RAW_NEED_DISK | FD_RAW_NEED_SEEK;
raw_cmd->cmd_count = NR_RW;
if (rq_data_dir(current_req) == READ) {
raw_cmd->flags |= FD_RAW_READ;
COMMAND = FM_MODE(_floppy, FD_READ);
} else if (rq_data_dir(current_req) == WRITE) {
raw_cmd->flags |= FD_RAW_WRITE;
COMMAND = FM_MODE(_floppy, FD_WRITE);
} else {
DPRINT("%s: unknown command\n", __func__);
return 0;
}
max_sector = _floppy->sect * _floppy->head;
TRACK = (int)blk_rq_pos(current_req) / max_sector;
fsector_t = (int)blk_rq_pos(current_req) % max_sector;
if (_floppy->track && TRACK >= _floppy->track) {
if (blk_rq_cur_sectors(current_req) & 1) {
current_count_sectors = 1;
return 1;
} else
return 0;
}
HEAD = fsector_t / _floppy->sect;
if (((_floppy->stretch & (FD_SWAPSIDES | FD_SECTBASEMASK)) ||
test_bit(FD_NEED_TWADDLE_BIT, &DRS->flags)) &&
fsector_t < _floppy->sect)
max_sector = _floppy->sect;
/* 2M disks have phantom sectors on the first track */
if ((_floppy->rate & FD_2M) && (!TRACK) && (!HEAD)) {
max_sector = 2 * _floppy->sect / 3;
if (fsector_t >= max_sector) {
current_count_sectors =
min_t(int, _floppy->sect - fsector_t,
blk_rq_sectors(current_req));
return 1;
}
SIZECODE = 2;
} else
SIZECODE = FD_SIZECODE(_floppy);
raw_cmd->rate = _floppy->rate & 0x43;
if ((_floppy->rate & FD_2M) && (TRACK || HEAD) && raw_cmd->rate == 2)
raw_cmd->rate = 1;
if (SIZECODE)
SIZECODE2 = 0xff;
else
SIZECODE2 = 0x80;
raw_cmd->track = TRACK << STRETCH(_floppy);
DR_SELECT = UNIT(current_drive) + PH_HEAD(_floppy, HEAD);
GAP = _floppy->gap;
ssize = DIV_ROUND_UP(1 << SIZECODE, 4);
SECT_PER_TRACK = _floppy->sect << 2 >> SIZECODE;
SECTOR = ((fsector_t % _floppy->sect) << 2 >> SIZECODE) +
FD_SECTBASE(_floppy);
/* tracksize describes the size which can be filled up with sectors
* of size ssize.
*/
tracksize = _floppy->sect - _floppy->sect % ssize;
if (tracksize < _floppy->sect) {
SECT_PER_TRACK++;
if (tracksize <= fsector_t % _floppy->sect)
SECTOR--;
/* if we are beyond tracksize, fill up using smaller sectors */
while (tracksize <= fsector_t % _floppy->sect) {
while (tracksize + ssize > _floppy->sect) {
SIZECODE--;
ssize >>= 1;
}
SECTOR++;
SECT_PER_TRACK++;
tracksize += ssize;
}
max_sector = HEAD * _floppy->sect + tracksize;
} else if (!TRACK && !HEAD && !(_floppy->rate & FD_2M) && probing) {
max_sector = _floppy->sect;
} else if (!HEAD && CT(COMMAND) == FD_WRITE) {
/* for virtual DMA bug workaround */
max_sector = _floppy->sect;
}
in_sector_offset = (fsector_t % _floppy->sect) % ssize;
aligned_sector_t = fsector_t - in_sector_offset;
max_size = blk_rq_sectors(current_req);
if ((raw_cmd->track == buffer_track) &&
(current_drive == buffer_drive) &&
(fsector_t >= buffer_min) && (fsector_t < buffer_max)) {
/* data already in track buffer */
if (CT(COMMAND) == FD_READ) {
copy_buffer(1, max_sector, buffer_max);
return 1;
}
} else if (in_sector_offset || blk_rq_sectors(current_req) < ssize) {
if (CT(COMMAND) == FD_WRITE) {
unsigned int sectors;
sectors = fsector_t + blk_rq_sectors(current_req);
if (sectors > ssize && sectors < ssize + ssize)
max_size = ssize + ssize;
else
max_size = ssize;
}
raw_cmd->flags &= ~FD_RAW_WRITE;
raw_cmd->flags |= FD_RAW_READ;
COMMAND = FM_MODE(_floppy, FD_READ);
} else if ((unsigned long)current_req->buffer < MAX_DMA_ADDRESS) {
unsigned long dma_limit;
int direct, indirect;
indirect =
transfer_size(ssize, max_sector,
max_buffer_sectors * 2) - fsector_t;
/*
* Do NOT use minimum() here---MAX_DMA_ADDRESS is 64 bits wide
* on a 64 bit machine!
*/
max_size = buffer_chain_size();
dma_limit = (MAX_DMA_ADDRESS -
((unsigned long)current_req->buffer)) >> 9;
if ((unsigned long)max_size > dma_limit)
max_size = dma_limit;
/* 64 kb boundaries */
if (CROSS_64KB(current_req->buffer, max_size << 9))
max_size = (K_64 -
((unsigned long)current_req->buffer) %
K_64) >> 9;
direct = transfer_size(ssize, max_sector, max_size) - fsector_t;
/*
* We try to read tracks, but if we get too many errors, we
* go back to reading just one sector at a time.
*
* This means we should be able to read a sector even if there
* are other bad sectors on this track.
*/
if (!direct ||
(indirect * 2 > direct * 3 &&
*errors < DP->max_errors.read_track &&
((!probing ||
(DP->read_track & (1 << DRS->probed_format)))))) {
max_size = blk_rq_sectors(current_req);
} else {
raw_cmd->kernel_data = current_req->buffer;
raw_cmd->length = current_count_sectors << 9;
if (raw_cmd->length == 0) {
DPRINT("%s: zero dma transfer attempted\n", __func__);
DPRINT("indirect=%d direct=%d fsector_t=%d\n",
indirect, direct, fsector_t);
return 0;
}
virtualdmabug_workaround();
return 2;
}
}
if (CT(COMMAND) == FD_READ)
max_size = max_sector; /* unbounded */
/* claim buffer track if needed */
if (buffer_track != raw_cmd->track || /* bad track */
buffer_drive != current_drive || /* bad drive */
fsector_t > buffer_max ||
fsector_t < buffer_min ||
((CT(COMMAND) == FD_READ ||
(!in_sector_offset && blk_rq_sectors(current_req) >= ssize)) &&
max_sector > 2 * max_buffer_sectors + buffer_min &&
max_size + fsector_t > 2 * max_buffer_sectors + buffer_min)) {
/* not enough space */
buffer_track = -1;
buffer_drive = current_drive;
buffer_max = buffer_min = aligned_sector_t;
}
raw_cmd->kernel_data = floppy_track_buffer +
((aligned_sector_t - buffer_min) << 9);
if (CT(COMMAND) == FD_WRITE) {
/* copy write buffer to track buffer.
* if we get here, we know that the write
* is either aligned or the data already in the buffer
* (buffer will be overwritten) */
if (in_sector_offset && buffer_track == -1)
DPRINT("internal error offset !=0 on write\n");
buffer_track = raw_cmd->track;
buffer_drive = current_drive;
copy_buffer(ssize, max_sector,
2 * max_buffer_sectors + buffer_min);
} else
transfer_size(ssize, max_sector,
2 * max_buffer_sectors + buffer_min -
aligned_sector_t);
/* round up current_count_sectors to get dma xfer size */
raw_cmd->length = in_sector_offset + current_count_sectors;
raw_cmd->length = ((raw_cmd->length - 1) | (ssize - 1)) + 1;
raw_cmd->length <<= 9;
if ((raw_cmd->length < current_count_sectors << 9) ||
(raw_cmd->kernel_data != current_req->buffer &&
CT(COMMAND) == FD_WRITE &&
(aligned_sector_t + (raw_cmd->length >> 9) > buffer_max ||
aligned_sector_t < buffer_min)) ||
raw_cmd->length % (128 << SIZECODE) ||
raw_cmd->length <= 0 || current_count_sectors <= 0) {
DPRINT("fractionary current count b=%lx s=%lx\n",
raw_cmd->length, current_count_sectors);
if (raw_cmd->kernel_data != current_req->buffer)
pr_info("addr=%d, length=%ld\n",
(int)((raw_cmd->kernel_data -
floppy_track_buffer) >> 9),
current_count_sectors);
pr_info("st=%d ast=%d mse=%d msi=%d\n",
fsector_t, aligned_sector_t, max_sector, max_size);
pr_info("ssize=%x SIZECODE=%d\n", ssize, SIZECODE);
pr_info("command=%x SECTOR=%d HEAD=%d, TRACK=%d\n",
COMMAND, SECTOR, HEAD, TRACK);
pr_info("buffer drive=%d\n", buffer_drive);
pr_info("buffer track=%d\n", buffer_track);
pr_info("buffer_min=%d\n", buffer_min);
pr_info("buffer_max=%d\n", buffer_max);
return 0;
}
if (raw_cmd->kernel_data != current_req->buffer) {
if (raw_cmd->kernel_data < floppy_track_buffer ||
current_count_sectors < 0 ||
raw_cmd->length < 0 ||
raw_cmd->kernel_data + raw_cmd->length >
floppy_track_buffer + (max_buffer_sectors << 10)) {
DPRINT("buffer overrun in schedule dma\n");
pr_info("fsector_t=%d buffer_min=%d current_count=%ld\n",
fsector_t, buffer_min, raw_cmd->length >> 9);
pr_info("current_count_sectors=%ld\n",
current_count_sectors);
if (CT(COMMAND) == FD_READ)
pr_info("read\n");
if (CT(COMMAND) == FD_WRITE)
pr_info("write\n");
return 0;
}
} else if (raw_cmd->length > blk_rq_bytes(current_req) ||
current_count_sectors > blk_rq_sectors(current_req)) {
DPRINT("buffer overrun in direct transfer\n");
return 0;
} else if (raw_cmd->length < current_count_sectors << 9) {
DPRINT("more sectors than bytes\n");
pr_info("bytes=%ld\n", raw_cmd->length >> 9);
pr_info("sectors=%ld\n", current_count_sectors);
}
if (raw_cmd->length == 0) {
DPRINT("zero dma transfer attempted from make_raw_request\n");
return 0;
}
virtualdmabug_workaround();
return 2;
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 39,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int perf_ftrace_function_unregister(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct ftrace_ops *ops = &event->ftrace_ops;
int ret = unregister_ftrace_function(ops);
ftrace_free_filter(ops);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf/ftrace: Fix paranoid level for enabling function tracer
The current default perf paranoid level is "1" which has
"perf_paranoid_kernel()" return false, and giving any operations that
use it, access to normal users. Unfortunately, this includes function
tracing and normal users should not be allowed to enable function
tracing by default.
The proper level is defined at "-1" (full perf access), which
"perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw()" will only give access to. Use that
check instead for enabling function tracing.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.4+
CVE: CVE-2013-2930
Fixes: ced39002f5ea ("ftrace, perf: Add support to use function tracepoint in perf")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 30,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int page_mkclean_one(struct page *page, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, void *arg)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
pte_t *pte;
spinlock_t *ptl;
int ret = 0;
int *cleaned = arg;
pte = page_check_address(page, mm, address, &ptl, 1);
if (!pte)
goto out;
if (pte_dirty(*pte) || pte_write(*pte)) {
pte_t entry;
flush_cache_page(vma, address, pte_pfn(*pte));
entry = ptep_clear_flush(vma, address, pte);
entry = pte_wrprotect(entry);
entry = pte_mkclean(entry);
set_pte_at(mm, address, pte, entry);
ret = 1;
}
pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
if (ret) {
mmu_notifier_invalidate_page(mm, address);
(*cleaned)++;
}
out:
return SWAP_AGAIN;
}
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 38,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gst_asf_demux_change_state (GstElement * element, GstStateChange transition)
{
GstASFDemux *demux = GST_ASF_DEMUX (element);
GstStateChangeReturn ret = GST_STATE_CHANGE_SUCCESS;
switch (transition) {
case GST_STATE_CHANGE_NULL_TO_READY:{
gst_segment_init (&demux->segment, GST_FORMAT_TIME);
demux->need_newsegment = TRUE;
demux->segment_running = FALSE;
demux->keyunit_sync = FALSE;
demux->accurate = FALSE;
demux->adapter = gst_adapter_new ();
demux->metadata = gst_caps_new_empty ();
demux->global_metadata = gst_structure_new_empty ("metadata");
demux->data_size = 0;
demux->data_offset = 0;
demux->index_offset = 0;
demux->base_offset = 0;
demux->flowcombiner = gst_flow_combiner_new ();
break;
}
default:
break;
}
ret = GST_ELEMENT_CLASS (parent_class)->change_state (element, transition);
if (ret == GST_STATE_CHANGE_FAILURE)
return ret;
switch (transition) {
case GST_STATE_CHANGE_PAUSED_TO_READY:
gst_asf_demux_reset (demux, FALSE);
break;
case GST_STATE_CHANGE_READY_TO_NULL:
gst_asf_demux_reset (demux, FALSE);
gst_flow_combiner_free (demux->flowcombiner);
demux->flowcombiner = NULL;
break;
default:
break;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,529 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::setURL(const KURL& url)
{
const KURL& newURL = url.isEmpty() ? blankURL() : url;
if (newURL == m_url)
return;
m_url = newURL;
m_accessEntryFromURL = nullptr;
updateBaseURL();
contextFeatures().urlDidChange(this);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: views::View* TabStrip::GetTooltipHandlerForPoint(const gfx::Point& point) {
if (!HitTestPoint(point))
return nullptr;
if (!touch_layout_) {
views::View* v = View::GetTooltipHandlerForPoint(point);
if (v && v != this && strcmp(v->GetClassName(), Tab::kViewClassName))
return v;
views::View* tab = FindTabHitByPoint(point);
if (tab)
return tab;
} else {
if (new_tab_button_->GetVisible()) {
views::View* view =
ConvertPointToViewAndGetTooltipHandler(this, new_tab_button_, point);
if (view)
return view;
}
Tab* tab = FindTabForEvent(point);
if (tab)
return ConvertPointToViewAndGetTooltipHandler(this, tab, point);
}
return this;
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceFetcher::requestPreload(Resource::Type type, FetchRequest& request, const String& charset)
{
if (type == Resource::MainResource)
return;
String encoding;
if (type == Resource::Script || type == Resource::CSSStyleSheet)
encoding = charset.isEmpty() ? m_document->charset().string() : charset;
request.setCharset(encoding);
request.setForPreload(true);
ResourcePtr<Resource> resource = requestResource(type, request);
if (!resource || (m_preloads && m_preloads->contains(resource.get())))
return;
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_STEP_INTO0("net", "Resource", resource.get(), "Preload");
resource->increasePreloadCount();
if (!m_preloads)
m_preloads = adoptPtr(new ListHashSet<Resource*>);
m_preloads->add(resource.get());
#if PRELOAD_DEBUG
printf("PRELOADING %s\n", resource->url().string().latin1().data());
#endif
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 121,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct lh_entry* lh_table_lookup_entry(struct lh_table *t, const void *k)
{
unsigned long h = t->hash_fn(k);
unsigned long n = h % t->size;
int count = 0;
t->lookups++;
while( count < t->size ) {
if(t->table[n].k == LH_EMPTY) return NULL;
if(t->table[n].k != LH_FREED &&
t->equal_fn(t->table[n].k, k)) return &t->table[n];
if ((int)++n == t->size) n = 0;
count++;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Patch to address the following issues:
* CVE-2013-6371: hash collision denial of service
* CVE-2013-6370: buffer overflow if size_t is larger than int
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 40,966 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ext4_file_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from)
{
struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp);
struct mutex *aio_mutex = NULL;
struct blk_plug plug;
int o_direct = file->f_flags & O_DIRECT;
int overwrite = 0;
size_t length = iov_iter_count(from);
ssize_t ret;
loff_t pos = iocb->ki_pos;
/*
* Unaligned direct AIO must be serialized; see comment above
* In the case of O_APPEND, assume that we must always serialize
*/
if (o_direct &&
ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS) &&
!is_sync_kiocb(iocb) &&
(file->f_flags & O_APPEND ||
ext4_unaligned_aio(inode, from, pos))) {
aio_mutex = ext4_aio_mutex(inode);
mutex_lock(aio_mutex);
ext4_unwritten_wait(inode);
}
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
iocb->ki_pos = pos = i_size_read(inode);
/*
* If we have encountered a bitmap-format file, the size limit
* is smaller than s_maxbytes, which is for extent-mapped files.
*/
if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))) {
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
if ((pos > sbi->s_bitmap_maxbytes) ||
(pos == sbi->s_bitmap_maxbytes && length > 0)) {
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
ret = -EFBIG;
goto errout;
}
if (pos + length > sbi->s_bitmap_maxbytes)
iov_iter_truncate(from, sbi->s_bitmap_maxbytes - pos);
}
if (o_direct) {
blk_start_plug(&plug);
iocb->private = &overwrite;
/* check whether we do a DIO overwrite or not */
if (ext4_should_dioread_nolock(inode) && !aio_mutex &&
!file->f_mapping->nrpages && pos + length <= i_size_read(inode)) {
struct ext4_map_blocks map;
unsigned int blkbits = inode->i_blkbits;
int err, len;
map.m_lblk = pos >> blkbits;
map.m_len = (EXT4_BLOCK_ALIGN(pos + length, blkbits) >> blkbits)
- map.m_lblk;
len = map.m_len;
err = ext4_map_blocks(NULL, inode, &map, 0);
/*
* 'err==len' means that all of blocks has
* been preallocated no matter they are
* initialized or not. For excluding
* unwritten extents, we need to check
* m_flags. There are two conditions that
* indicate for initialized extents. 1) If we
* hit extent cache, EXT4_MAP_MAPPED flag is
* returned; 2) If we do a real lookup,
* non-flags are returned. So we should check
* these two conditions.
*/
if (err == len && (map.m_flags & EXT4_MAP_MAPPED))
overwrite = 1;
}
}
ret = __generic_file_write_iter(iocb, from);
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
if (ret > 0) {
ssize_t err;
err = generic_write_sync(file, iocb->ki_pos - ret, ret);
if (err < 0)
ret = err;
}
if (o_direct)
blk_finish_plug(&plug);
errout:
if (aio_mutex)
mutex_unlock(aio_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,298 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
int len = 0, l;
int c;
int count = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG
nbParseNameComplex++;
#endif
/*
* Handler for more complex cases
*/
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
if ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLD10) == 0) {
/*
* Use the new checks of production [4] [4a] amd [5] of the
* Update 5 of XML-1.0
*/
if ((c == ' ') || (c == '>') || (c == '/') || /* accelerators */
(!(((c >= 'a') && (c <= 'z')) ||
((c >= 'A') && (c <= 'Z')) ||
(c == '_') || (c == ':') ||
((c >= 0xC0) && (c <= 0xD6)) ||
((c >= 0xD8) && (c <= 0xF6)) ||
((c >= 0xF8) && (c <= 0x2FF)) ||
((c >= 0x370) && (c <= 0x37D)) ||
((c >= 0x37F) && (c <= 0x1FFF)) ||
((c >= 0x200C) && (c <= 0x200D)) ||
((c >= 0x2070) && (c <= 0x218F)) ||
((c >= 0x2C00) && (c <= 0x2FEF)) ||
((c >= 0x3001) && (c <= 0xD7FF)) ||
((c >= 0xF900) && (c <= 0xFDCF)) ||
((c >= 0xFDF0) && (c <= 0xFFFD)) ||
((c >= 0x10000) && (c <= 0xEFFFF))))) {
return(NULL);
}
len += l;
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
while ((c != ' ') && (c != '>') && (c != '/') && /* accelerators */
(((c >= 'a') && (c <= 'z')) ||
((c >= 'A') && (c <= 'Z')) ||
((c >= '0') && (c <= '9')) || /* !start */
(c == '_') || (c == ':') ||
(c == '-') || (c == '.') || (c == 0xB7) || /* !start */
((c >= 0xC0) && (c <= 0xD6)) ||
((c >= 0xD8) && (c <= 0xF6)) ||
((c >= 0xF8) && (c <= 0x2FF)) ||
((c >= 0x300) && (c <= 0x36F)) || /* !start */
((c >= 0x370) && (c <= 0x37D)) ||
((c >= 0x37F) && (c <= 0x1FFF)) ||
((c >= 0x200C) && (c <= 0x200D)) ||
((c >= 0x203F) && (c <= 0x2040)) || /* !start */
((c >= 0x2070) && (c <= 0x218F)) ||
((c >= 0x2C00) && (c <= 0x2FEF)) ||
((c >= 0x3001) && (c <= 0xD7FF)) ||
((c >= 0xF900) && (c <= 0xFDCF)) ||
((c >= 0xFDF0) && (c <= 0xFFFD)) ||
((c >= 0x10000) && (c <= 0xEFFFF))
)) {
if (count++ > XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE) {
count = 0;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
}
len += l;
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
} else {
if ((c == ' ') || (c == '>') || (c == '/') || /* accelerators */
(!IS_LETTER(c) && (c != '_') &&
(c != ':'))) {
return(NULL);
}
len += l;
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
while ((c != ' ') && (c != '>') && (c != '/') && /* test bigname.xml */
((IS_LETTER(c)) || (IS_DIGIT(c)) ||
(c == '.') || (c == '-') ||
(c == '_') || (c == ':') ||
(IS_COMBINING(c)) ||
(IS_EXTENDER(c)))) {
if (count++ > XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE) {
count = 0;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
}
len += l;
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
if (c == 0) {
count = 0;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
}
}
if ((len > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "Name");
return(NULL);
}
if (ctxt->input->cur > ctxt->input->base && (*ctxt->input->cur == '\n') && (ctxt->input->cur[-1] == '\r')) {
if (ctxt->input->base > ctxt->input->cur - (len + 1)) {
return(NULL);
}
return(xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, ctxt->input->cur - (len + 1), len));
}
if (ctxt->input->base > ctxt->input->cur - len) {
return(NULL);
}
return(xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, ctxt->input->cur - len, len));
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 163,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void event_function_call(struct perf_event *event, event_f func, void *data)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
struct task_struct *task = READ_ONCE(ctx->task); /* verified in event_function */
struct event_function_struct efs = {
.event = event,
.func = func,
.data = data,
};
if (!event->parent) {
/*
* If this is a !child event, we must hold ctx::mutex to
* stabilize the the event->ctx relation. See
* perf_event_ctx_lock().
*/
lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->mutex);
}
if (!task) {
cpu_function_call(event->cpu, event_function, &efs);
return;
}
if (task == TASK_TOMBSTONE)
return;
again:
if (!task_function_call(task, event_function, &efs))
return;
raw_spin_lock_irq(&ctx->lock);
/*
* Reload the task pointer, it might have been changed by
* a concurrent perf_event_context_sched_out().
*/
task = ctx->task;
if (task == TASK_TOMBSTONE) {
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
return;
}
if (ctx->is_active) {
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
goto again;
}
func(event, NULL, ctx, data);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 68,316 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd)
{
struct fd exe;
struct dentry *dentry;
int err;
exe = fdget(fd);
if (!exe.file)
return -EBADF;
dentry = exe.file->f_path.dentry;
/*
* Because the original mm->exe_file points to executable file, make
* sure that this one is executable as well, to avoid breaking an
* overall picture.
*/
err = -EACCES;
if (!S_ISREG(dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ||
exe.file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)
goto exit;
err = inode_permission(dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC);
if (err)
goto exit;
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
/*
* Forbid mm->exe_file change if old file still mapped.
*/
err = -EBUSY;
if (mm->exe_file) {
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next)
if (vma->vm_file &&
path_equal(&vma->vm_file->f_path,
&mm->exe_file->f_path))
goto exit_unlock;
}
/*
* The symlink can be changed only once, just to disallow arbitrary
* transitions malicious software might bring in. This means one
* could make a snapshot over all processes running and monitor
* /proc/pid/exe changes to notice unusual activity if needed.
*/
err = -EPERM;
if (test_and_set_bit(MMF_EXE_FILE_CHANGED, &mm->flags))
goto exit_unlock;
err = 0;
set_mm_exe_file(mm, exe.file); /* this grabs a reference to exe.file */
exit_unlock:
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
exit:
fdput(exe);
return err;
}
Commit Message: kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-16 | 0 | 21,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit hid_exit(void)
{
usb_deregister(&hid_driver);
usbhid_quirks_exit();
}
Commit Message: HID: usbhid: fix out-of-bounds bug
The hid descriptor identifies the length and type of subordinate
descriptors for a device. If the received hid descriptor is smaller than
the size of the struct hid_descriptor, it is possible to cause
out-of-bounds.
In addition, if bNumDescriptors of the hid descriptor have an incorrect
value, this can also cause out-of-bounds while approaching hdesc->desc[n].
So check the size of hid descriptor and bNumDescriptors.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006c5f8edf by task kworker/1:2/1261
CPU: 1 PID: 1261 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted
4.14.0-rc1-42251-gebb2c2437d80 #169
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x22f/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1004
hid_add_device+0x16b/0xb30 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2944
usbhid_probe+0xc28/0x1100 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1369
usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_set_configuration+0x104e/0x1870 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1932
generic_probe+0x73/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:174
usb_probe_device+0xaf/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_new_device+0x7b8/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2457
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
process_one_work+0xc7f/0x1db0 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
kthread+0x3a1/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaejoong Kim <climbbb.kim@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 59,800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t SampleIterator::findChunkRange(uint32_t sampleIndex) {
CHECK(sampleIndex >= mFirstChunkSampleIndex);
while (sampleIndex >= mStopChunkSampleIndex) {
if (mSampleToChunkIndex == mTable->mNumSampleToChunkOffsets) {
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mFirstChunkSampleIndex = mStopChunkSampleIndex;
const SampleTable::SampleToChunkEntry *entry =
&mTable->mSampleToChunkEntries[mSampleToChunkIndex];
mFirstChunk = entry->startChunk;
mSamplesPerChunk = entry->samplesPerChunk;
mChunkDesc = entry->chunkDesc;
if (mSampleToChunkIndex + 1 < mTable->mNumSampleToChunkOffsets) {
mStopChunk = entry[1].startChunk;
mStopChunkSampleIndex =
mFirstChunkSampleIndex
+ (mStopChunk - mFirstChunk) * mSamplesPerChunk;
} else {
mStopChunk = 0xffffffff;
mStopChunkSampleIndex = 0xffffffff;
}
++mSampleToChunkIndex;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceFetcher::StorePerformanceTimingInitiatorInformation(
Resource* resource) {
const AtomicString& fetch_initiator = resource->Options().initiator_info.name;
if (fetch_initiator == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::internal)
return;
bool is_main_resource = resource->GetType() == Resource::kMainResource;
double start_time = resource->GetResourceRequest().NavigationStartTime()
? resource->GetResourceRequest().NavigationStartTime()
: MonotonicallyIncreasingTime();
if (is_main_resource) {
DCHECK(!navigation_timing_info_);
navigation_timing_info_ = ResourceTimingInfo::Create(
fetch_initiator, start_time, is_main_resource);
}
RefPtr<ResourceTimingInfo> info =
ResourceTimingInfo::Create(fetch_initiator, start_time, is_main_resource);
if (resource->IsCacheValidator()) {
const AtomicString& timing_allow_origin =
resource->GetResponse().HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Timing_Allow_Origin);
if (!timing_allow_origin.IsEmpty())
info->SetOriginalTimingAllowOrigin(timing_allow_origin);
}
if (!is_main_resource ||
Context().UpdateTimingInfoForIFrameNavigation(info.get())) {
resource_timing_info_map_.insert(resource, std::move(info));
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Editor::Command::IsTextInsertion() const {
return command_ && command_->is_text_insertion;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __sched yield(void)
{
set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
sys_sched_yield();
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit crct10dif_intel_mod_fini(void)
{
crypto_unregister_shash(&alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sha384_ssse3_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
struct sha512_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
sctx->state[0] = SHA384_H0;
sctx->state[1] = SHA384_H1;
sctx->state[2] = SHA384_H2;
sctx->state[3] = SHA384_H3;
sctx->state[4] = SHA384_H4;
sctx->state[5] = SHA384_H5;
sctx->state[6] = SHA384_H6;
sctx->state[7] = SHA384_H7;
sctx->count[0] = sctx->count[1] = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,051 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Page* Document::page() const
{
return m_frame ? m_frame->page() : 0;
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataFileSystem::CreateFile(const FilePath& file_path,
bool is_exclusive,
const FileOperationCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI) ||
BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
RunTaskOnUIThread(base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::CreateFileOnUIThread,
ui_weak_ptr_,
file_path,
is_exclusive,
CreateRelayCallback(callback)));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 116,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: evdns_base_search_add(struct evdns_base *base, const char *domain) {
EVDNS_LOCK(base);
search_postfix_add(base, domain);
EVDNS_UNLOCK(base);
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HRESULT CGaiaCredentialBase::GetCheckboxValue(DWORD field_id,
BOOL* pbChecked,
wchar_t** ppszLabel) {
return E_NOTIMPL;
}
Commit Message: [GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled.
Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always
fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled.
Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or
googlemail.com domain.
Bug: 944049
Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903
Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 130,690 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long llc_ui_wait_for_conn(struct sock *sk, long timeout)
{
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
while (1) {
prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (sk_wait_event(sk, &timeout, sk->sk_state != TCP_SYN_SENT))
break;
if (signal_pending(current) || !timeout)
break;
}
finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
return timeout;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in llc
The stack object “info” has a total size of 12 bytes. Its last byte
is padding which is not initialized and leaked via “put_cmsg”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 53,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void die(const char * str, struct pt_regs * regs, long err)
{
static int die_counter;
oops_enter();
spin_lock_irq(&die_lock);
console_verbose();
bust_spinlocks(1);
printk("%s: %04lx [#%d]\n", str, err & 0xffff, ++die_counter);
print_modules();
show_regs(regs);
printk("Process: %s (pid: %d, stack limit = %p)\n", current->comm,
task_pid_nr(current), task_stack_page(current) + 1);
if (!user_mode(regs) || in_interrupt())
dump_mem("Stack: ", regs->regs[15], THREAD_SIZE +
(unsigned long)task_stack_page(current));
notify_die(DIE_OOPS, str, regs, err, 255, SIGSEGV);
bust_spinlocks(0);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
oops_exit();
if (kexec_should_crash(current))
crash_kexec(regs);
if (in_interrupt())
panic("Fatal exception in interrupt");
if (panic_on_oops)
panic("Fatal exception");
do_exit(SIGSEGV);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __free_session(struct nfsd4_session *ses)
{
free_session_slots(ses);
kfree(ses);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,393 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::WorkerDestroyed() {
DCHECK_NE(WORKER_TERMINATED, state_);
DCHECK(worker_host_);
state_ = WORKER_TERMINATED;
for (auto* inspector : protocol::InspectorHandler::ForAgentHost(this))
inspector->TargetCrashed();
for (DevToolsSession* session : sessions())
session->SetRenderer(nullptr, nullptr);
worker_host_ = nullptr;
agent_ptr_.reset();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void m_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct proc_maps_private *priv = m->private;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = v;
if (!IS_ERR(vma))
vma_stop(priv, vma);
if (priv->task)
put_task_struct(priv->task);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DataReductionProxyConfig::GetNetworkPropertiesManager() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return *network_properties_manager_;
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void parse_id3(AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext *pb,
AVDictionary **metadata, int64_t *dts,
ID3v2ExtraMetaAPIC **apic, ID3v2ExtraMeta **extra_meta)
{
static const char id3_priv_owner_ts[] = "com.apple.streaming.transportStreamTimestamp";
ID3v2ExtraMeta *meta;
ff_id3v2_read_dict(pb, metadata, ID3v2_DEFAULT_MAGIC, extra_meta);
for (meta = *extra_meta; meta; meta = meta->next) {
if (!strcmp(meta->tag, "PRIV")) {
ID3v2ExtraMetaPRIV *priv = meta->data;
if (priv->datasize == 8 && !strcmp(priv->owner, id3_priv_owner_ts)) {
/* 33-bit MPEG timestamp */
int64_t ts = AV_RB64(priv->data);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "HLS ID3 audio timestamp %"PRId64"\n", ts);
if ((ts & ~((1ULL << 33) - 1)) == 0)
*dts = ts;
else
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid HLS ID3 audio timestamp %"PRId64"\n", ts);
}
} else if (!strcmp(meta->tag, "APIC") && apic)
*apic = meta->data;
}
}
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <lingjiujianke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 61,811 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned long gfn_to_hva_many(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
gfn_t *nr_pages)
{
return __gfn_to_hva_many(slot, gfn, nr_pages, true);
}
Commit Message: KVM: perform an invalid memslot step for gpa base change
PPC must flush all translations before the new memory slot
is visible.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OffscreenCanvas::DiscardResourceProvider() {
CanvasResourceHost::DiscardResourceProvider();
needs_matrix_clip_restore_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SpeechSynthesisLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetSpeechSynthesisLibrary() {
return speech_synthesis_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 170,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DevToolsDockSide DevToolsWindow::GetDockSideFromPrefs(Profile* profile) {
std::string dock_side =
profile->GetPrefs()->GetString(prefs::kDevToolsDockSide);
const char kOldPrefBottom[] = "bottom";
const char kOldPrefRight[] = "right";
if ((dock_side == kOldPrefBottom) || (dock_side == kOldPrefRight)) {
if (!profile->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kDevToolsOpenDocked))
return DEVTOOLS_DOCK_SIDE_UNDOCKED;
return (dock_side == kOldPrefBottom) ?
DEVTOOLS_DOCK_SIDE_BOTTOM : DEVTOOLS_DOCK_SIDE_RIGHT;
}
if (dock_side == kPrefUndocked)
return DEVTOOLS_DOCK_SIDE_UNDOCKED;
if (dock_side == kPrefRight)
return DEVTOOLS_DOCK_SIDE_RIGHT;
return DEVTOOLS_DOCK_SIDE_BOTTOM;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int32_t DpbAllocWrapper(void *userData,
unsigned int sizeInMbs, unsigned int numBuffers) {
SoftAVCEncoder *encoder = static_cast<SoftAVCEncoder *>(userData);
CHECK(encoder != NULL);
return encoder->allocOutputBuffers(sizeInMbs, numBuffers);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 163,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HttpProxyClientSocket::WasNpnNegotiated() const {
if (transport_.get() && transport_->socket()) {
return transport_->socket()->WasNpnNegotiated();
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: upnp_event_notify_connect(struct upnp_event_notify * obj)
{
unsigned int i;
const char * p;
unsigned short port;
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
socklen_t addrlen;
#else
struct sockaddr_in addr;
socklen_t addrlen;
#endif
if(!obj)
return;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
i = 0;
if(obj->sub == NULL) {
obj->state = EError;
return;
}
p = obj->sub->callback;
p += 7; /* http:// */
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
if(*p == '[') { /* ip v6 */
obj->addrstr[i++] = '[';
p++;
obj->ipv6 = 1;
while(*p != ']' && i < (sizeof(obj->addrstr)-1))
obj->addrstr[i++] = *(p++);
if(*p == ']')
p++;
if(i < (sizeof(obj->addrstr)-1))
obj->addrstr[i++] = ']';
} else {
#endif
while(*p != '/' && *p != ':' && i < (sizeof(obj->addrstr)-1))
obj->addrstr[i++] = *(p++);
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
}
#endif
obj->addrstr[i] = '\0';
if(*p == ':') {
obj->portstr[0] = *p;
i = 1;
p++;
port = (unsigned short)atoi(p);
while(*p != '/') {
if(i<7) obj->portstr[i++] = *p;
p++;
}
obj->portstr[i] = 0;
} else {
port = 80;
obj->portstr[0] = '\0';
}
obj->path = p;
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
if(obj->ipv6) {
char addrstr_tmp[48];
struct sockaddr_in6 * sa = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&addr;
sa->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
i = (int)strlen(obj->addrstr);
if(i > 2) {
i -= 2;
memcpy(addrstr_tmp, obj->addrstr + 1, i);
addrstr_tmp[i] = '\0';
inet_pton(AF_INET6, addrstr_tmp, &(sa->sin6_addr));
}
sa->sin6_port = htons(port);
addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
} else {
struct sockaddr_in * sa = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr;
sa->sin_family = AF_INET;
inet_pton(AF_INET, obj->addrstr, &(sa->sin_addr));
sa->sin_port = htons(port);
addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
}
#else
addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
inet_aton(obj->addrstr, &addr.sin_addr);
addr.sin_port = htons(port);
addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
#endif
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s: '%s' %hu '%s'", "upnp_event_notify_connect",
obj->addrstr, port, obj->path);
obj->state = EConnecting;
if(connect(obj->s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen) < 0) {
if(errno != EINPROGRESS && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: connect(%d, %s, %u): %m",
"upnp_event_notify_connect", obj->s,
obj->addrstr, addrlen);
obj->state = EError;
}
}
}
Commit Message: upnp_event_prepare(): check the return value of snprintf()
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 89,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_attr_group(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap,
const struct nfs_server *server, uint32_t *gid, int may_sleep)
{
uint32_t len;
__be32 *p;
int ret = 0;
*gid = -2;
if (unlikely(bitmap[1] & (FATTR4_WORD1_OWNER_GROUP - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[1] & FATTR4_WORD1_OWNER_GROUP)) {
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
len = be32_to_cpup(p);
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, len);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
if (!may_sleep) {
/* do nothing */
} else if (len < XDR_MAX_NETOBJ) {
if (nfs_map_group_to_gid(server, (char *)p, len, gid) == 0)
ret = NFS_ATTR_FATTR_GROUP;
else
dprintk("%s: nfs_map_group_to_gid failed!\n",
__func__);
} else
dprintk("%s: name too long (%u)!\n",
__func__, len);
bitmap[1] &= ~FATTR4_WORD1_OWNER_GROUP;
}
dprintk("%s: gid=%d\n", __func__, (int)*gid);
return ret;
out_overflow:
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int check_compression(struct compressor *comp)
{
int res, bytes = 0;
char buffer[SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE] __attribute__ ((aligned));
if(!comp->supported) {
ERROR("Filesystem uses %s compression, this is "
"unsupported by this version\n", comp->name);
ERROR("Decompressors available:\n");
display_compressors("", "");
return 0;
}
/*
* Read compression options from disk if present, and pass to
* the compressor to ensure we know how to decompress a filesystem
* compressed with these compression options.
*
* Note, even if there is no compression options we still call the
* compressor because some compression options may be mandatory
* for some compressors.
*/
if(SQUASHFS_COMP_OPTS(sBlk.s.flags)) {
bytes = read_block(fd, sizeof(sBlk.s), NULL, 0, buffer);
if(bytes == 0) {
ERROR("Failed to read compressor options\n");
return 0;
}
}
res = compressor_check_options(comp, sBlk.s.block_size, buffer, bytes);
return res != -1;
}
Commit Message: unsquashfs-4: Add more sanity checks + fix CVE-2015-4645/6
Add more filesystem table sanity checks to Unsquashfs-4 and
also properly fix CVE-2015-4645 and CVE-2015-4646.
The CVEs were raised due to Unsquashfs having variable
oveflow and stack overflow in a number of vulnerable
functions.
The suggested patch only "fixed" one such function and fixed
it badly, and so it was buggy and introduced extra bugs!
The suggested patch was not only buggy, but, it used the
essentially wrong approach too. It was "fixing" the
symptom but not the cause. The symptom is wrong values
causing overflow, the cause is filesystem corruption.
This corruption should be detected and the filesystem
rejected *before* trying to allocate memory.
This patch applies the following fixes:
1. The filesystem super-block tables are checked, and the values
must match across the filesystem.
This will trap corrupted filesystems created by Mksquashfs.
2. The maximum (theorectical) size the filesystem tables could grow
to, were analysed, and some variables were increased from int to
long long.
This analysis has been added as comments.
3. Stack allocation was removed, and a shared buffer (which is
checked and increased as necessary) is used to read the
table indexes.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 74,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mktree(struct tree_content *t, int v, struct strbuf *b)
{
size_t maxlen = 0;
unsigned int i;
if (!v)
qsort(t->entries,t->entry_count,sizeof(t->entries[0]),tecmp0);
else
qsort(t->entries,t->entry_count,sizeof(t->entries[0]),tecmp1);
for (i = 0; i < t->entry_count; i++) {
if (t->entries[i]->versions[v].mode)
maxlen += t->entries[i]->name->str_len + 34;
}
strbuf_reset(b);
strbuf_grow(b, maxlen);
for (i = 0; i < t->entry_count; i++) {
struct tree_entry *e = t->entries[i];
if (!e->versions[v].mode)
continue;
strbuf_addf(b, "%o %s%c",
(unsigned int)(e->versions[v].mode & ~NO_DELTA),
e->name->str_dat, '\0');
strbuf_add(b, e->versions[v].sha1, 20);
}
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,087 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Address LargeObjectArena::allocateLargeObjectPage(size_t allocationSize,
size_t gcInfoIndex) {
ASSERT(!(allocationSize & allocationMask));
Address result = lazySweep(allocationSize, gcInfoIndex);
if (result)
return result;
getThreadState()->completeSweep();
getThreadState()->scheduleGCIfNeeded();
return doAllocateLargeObjectPage(allocationSize, gcInfoIndex);
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 147,538 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int json_object_equal(json_t *object1, json_t *object2)
{
const char *key;
json_t *value1, *value2;
if(json_object_size(object1) != json_object_size(object2))
return 0;
json_object_foreach(object1, key, value1) {
value2 = json_object_get(object2, key);
if(!json_equal(value1, value2))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 40,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: varbit_out(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
VarBit *s = PG_GETARG_VARBIT_P(0);
char *result,
*r;
bits8 *sp;
bits8 x;
int i,
k,
len;
len = VARBITLEN(s);
result = (char *) palloc(len + 1);
sp = VARBITS(s);
r = result;
for (i = 0; i <= len - BITS_PER_BYTE; i += BITS_PER_BYTE, sp++)
{
/* print full bytes */
x = *sp;
for (k = 0; k < BITS_PER_BYTE; k++)
{
*r++ = IS_HIGHBIT_SET(x) ? '1' : '0';
x <<= 1;
}
}
if (i < len)
{
/* print the last partial byte */
x = *sp;
for (k = i; k < len; k++)
{
*r++ = IS_HIGHBIT_SET(x) ? '1' : '0';
x <<= 1;
}
}
*r = '\0';
PG_RETURN_CSTRING(result);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 39,104 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PaymentRequestState::CanMakePayment(bool legacy_mode,
StatusCallback callback) {
if (!get_all_instruments_finished_) {
DCHECK(!can_make_payment_callback_);
can_make_payment_callback_ = std::move(callback);
can_make_payment_legacy_mode_ = legacy_mode;
return;
}
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&PaymentRequestState::CheckCanMakePayment,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), legacy_mode,
std::move(callback)));
}
Commit Message: [Payment Handler] Don't wait for response from closed payment app.
Before this patch, tapping the back button on top of the payment handler
window on desktop would not affect the |response_helper_|, which would
continue waiting for a response from the payment app. The service worker
of the closed payment app could timeout after 5 minutes and invoke the
|response_helper_|. Depending on what else the user did afterwards, in
the best case scenario, the payment sheet would display a "Transaction
failed" error message. In the worst case scenario, the
|response_helper_| would be used after free.
This patch clears the |response_helper_| in the PaymentRequestState and
in the ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument after the payment app is closed.
After this patch, the cancelled payment app does not show "Transaction
failed" and does not use memory after it was freed.
Bug: 956597
Change-Id: I64134b911a4f8c154cb56d537a8243a68a806394
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1588682
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654995}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 151,135 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameHostImpl::CheckOrDispatchBeforeUnloadForSubtree(
bool subframes_only,
bool send_ipc,
bool is_reload) {
bool found_beforeunload = false;
for (FrameTreeNode* node :
frame_tree_node_->frame_tree()->SubtreeNodes(frame_tree_node_)) {
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh = node->current_frame_host();
if (subframes_only && rfh->GetSiteInstance() == GetSiteInstance())
continue;
if (!rfh->IsRenderFrameLive())
continue;
bool should_run_beforeunload =
rfh->GetSuddenTerminationDisablerState(blink::kBeforeUnloadHandler);
if (rfh == this)
should_run_beforeunload = true;
if (!should_run_beforeunload)
continue;
found_beforeunload = true;
if (!send_ipc)
return true;
while (!rfh->is_local_root() && rfh != this)
rfh = rfh->GetParent();
if (base::ContainsKey(beforeunload_pending_replies_, rfh))
continue;
bool has_same_site_ancestor = false;
for (auto* added_rfh : beforeunload_pending_replies_) {
if (rfh->IsDescendantOf(added_rfh) &&
rfh->GetSiteInstance() == added_rfh->GetSiteInstance()) {
has_same_site_ancestor = true;
break;
}
}
if (has_same_site_ancestor)
continue;
beforeunload_pending_replies_.insert(rfh);
rfh->Send(new FrameMsg_BeforeUnload(rfh->GetRoutingID(), is_reload));
}
return found_beforeunload;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sys_swapcontext(struct ucontext __user *old_ctx,
struct ucontext __user *new_ctx,
long ctx_size, long r6, long r7, long r8, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned char tmp;
sigset_t set;
unsigned long new_msr = 0;
int ctx_has_vsx_region = 0;
if (new_ctx &&
get_user(new_msr, &new_ctx->uc_mcontext.gp_regs[PT_MSR]))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* Check that the context is not smaller than the original
* size (with VMX but without VSX)
*/
if (ctx_size < UCONTEXTSIZEWITHOUTVSX)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* If the new context state sets the MSR VSX bits but
* it doesn't provide VSX state.
*/
if ((ctx_size < sizeof(struct ucontext)) &&
(new_msr & MSR_VSX))
return -EINVAL;
/* Does the context have enough room to store VSX data? */
if (ctx_size >= sizeof(struct ucontext))
ctx_has_vsx_region = 1;
if (old_ctx != NULL) {
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, old_ctx, ctx_size)
|| setup_sigcontext(&old_ctx->uc_mcontext, regs, 0, NULL, 0,
ctx_has_vsx_region)
|| __copy_to_user(&old_ctx->uc_sigmask,
¤t->blocked, sizeof(sigset_t)))
return -EFAULT;
}
if (new_ctx == NULL)
return 0;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, new_ctx, ctx_size)
|| __get_user(tmp, (u8 __user *) new_ctx)
|| __get_user(tmp, (u8 __user *) new_ctx + ctx_size - 1))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* If we get a fault copying the context into the kernel's
* image of the user's registers, we can't just return -EFAULT
* because the user's registers will be corrupted. For instance
* the NIP value may have been updated but not some of the
* other registers. Given that we have done the access_ok
* and successfully read the first and last bytes of the region
* above, this should only happen in an out-of-memory situation
* or if another thread unmaps the region containing the context.
* We kill the task with a SIGSEGV in this situation.
*/
if (__copy_from_user(&set, &new_ctx->uc_sigmask, sizeof(set)))
do_exit(SIGSEGV);
set_current_blocked(&set);
if (restore_sigcontext(regs, NULL, 0, &new_ctx->uc_mcontext))
do_exit(SIGSEGV);
/* This returns like rt_sigreturn */
set_thread_flag(TIF_RESTOREALL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Block signal return setting invalid MSR state
Currently we allow both the MSR T and S bits to be set by userspace on
a signal return. Unfortunately this is a reserved configuration and
will cause a TM Bad Thing exception if attempted (via rfid).
This patch checks for this case in both the 32 and 64 bit signals
code. If both T and S are set, we mark the context as invalid.
Found using a syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 56,497 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebRunnerBrowserContext::CreateRequestContextForStoragePartition(
const base::FilePath& partition_path,
bool in_memory,
content::ProtocolHandlerMap* protocol_handlers,
content::URLRequestInterceptorScopedVector request_interceptors) {
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <kmarshall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <fdegans@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 131,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void destroy_sched_domains(struct sched_domain *sd, int cpu)
{
for (; sd; sd = sd->parent)
destroy_sched_domain(sd, cpu);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool LoadFlashBroker(const FilePath& plugin_path, CommandLine* cmd_line) {
FilePath rundll;
if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_SYSTEM, &rundll))
return false;
rundll = rundll.AppendASCII("rundll32.exe");
wchar_t short_path[MAX_PATH];
if (0 == ::GetShortPathNameW(plugin_path.value().c_str(),
short_path, arraysize(short_path)))
return false;
std::wstring cmd_final =
base::StringPrintf(L"%ls \"%ls\",BrokerMain browser=chrome",
rundll.value().c_str(),
short_path);
base::ProcessHandle process;
base::LaunchOptions options;
options.start_hidden = true;
if (!base::LaunchProcess(cmd_final, options, &process))
return false;
cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("flash-broker",
base::Int64ToString(::GetProcessId(process)));
HANDLE job = ::CreateJobObjectW(NULL, NULL);
if (base::SetJobObjectAsKillOnJobClose(job)) {
::AssignProcessToJobObject(job, process);
} else {
::CloseHandle(job);
return false;
}
::CloseHandle(process);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,675 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int VirtualizerIsConfigurationSupported(audio_channel_mask_t channelMask,
audio_devices_t deviceType) {
uint32_t channelCount = audio_channel_count_from_out_mask(channelMask);
if ((channelCount == 0) || (channelCount > 2)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
return VirtualizerIsDeviceSupported(deviceType);
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,413 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: juniper_chdlc_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_CHDLC;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
/* this DLT contains nothing but raw c-hdlc frames */
chdlc_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12993/Juniper: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,497 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLuint StubGLCreateProgram(void) {
return glCreateProgram();
}
Commit Message: Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 99,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Box *stbl_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_SampleTableBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STBL);
tmp->MaxSamplePerChunk = 10;
tmp->groupID = 1;
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,435 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void isa_register_soundhw(const char *name, const char *descr,
int (*init_isa)(ISABus *bus))
{
assert(soundhw_count < ARRAY_SIZE(soundhw) - 1);
soundhw[soundhw_count].name = name;
soundhw[soundhw_count].descr = descr;
soundhw[soundhw_count].isa = 1;
soundhw[soundhw_count].init.init_isa = init_isa;
soundhw_count++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: aura::Window* CreateWindow(aura::client::WindowType type,
const gfx::Rect bounds) {
InitParams params(type);
params.bounds = bounds;
return CreateWindowInWatchedContainer(params);
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xml_acl_enabled(xmlNode *xml)
{
if(xml && xml->doc && xml->doc->_private){
xml_private_t *p = xml->doc->_private;
return is_set(p->flags, xpf_acl_enabled);
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Effect_getDescriptor(effect_handle_t self,
effect_descriptor_t *pDescriptor)
{
EffectContext * pContext = (EffectContext *) self;
const effect_descriptor_t *desc;
if (pContext == NULL || pDescriptor == NULL) {
ALOGV("Effect_getDescriptor() invalid param");
return -EINVAL;
}
switch(pContext->EffectType) {
case LVM_BASS_BOOST:
desc = &android::gBassBoostDescriptor;
break;
case LVM_VIRTUALIZER:
desc = &android::gVirtualizerDescriptor;
break;
case LVM_EQUALIZER:
desc = &android::gEqualizerDescriptor;
break;
case LVM_VOLUME:
desc = &android::gVolumeDescriptor;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
*pDescriptor = *desc;
return 0;
} /* end Effect_getDescriptor */
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,387 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gray_move_to( const FT_Vector* to,
PWorker worker )
{
TPos x, y;
/* record current cell, if any */
gray_record_cell( RAS_VAR );
/* start to a new position */
x = UPSCALE( to->x );
y = UPSCALE( to->y );
gray_start_cell( RAS_VAR_ TRUNC( x ), TRUNC( y ) );
worker->x = x;
worker->y = y;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 10,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext2_check_descriptors(struct super_block *sb)
{
int i;
struct ext2_sb_info *sbi = EXT2_SB(sb);
ext2_debug ("Checking group descriptors");
for (i = 0; i < sbi->s_groups_count; i++) {
struct ext2_group_desc *gdp = ext2_get_group_desc(sb, i, NULL);
ext2_fsblk_t first_block = ext2_group_first_block_no(sb, i);
ext2_fsblk_t last_block;
if (i == sbi->s_groups_count - 1)
last_block = le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_blocks_count) - 1;
else
last_block = first_block +
(EXT2_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) - 1);
if (le32_to_cpu(gdp->bg_block_bitmap) < first_block ||
le32_to_cpu(gdp->bg_block_bitmap) > last_block)
{
ext2_error (sb, "ext2_check_descriptors",
"Block bitmap for group %d"
" not in group (block %lu)!",
i, (unsigned long) le32_to_cpu(gdp->bg_block_bitmap));
return 0;
}
if (le32_to_cpu(gdp->bg_inode_bitmap) < first_block ||
le32_to_cpu(gdp->bg_inode_bitmap) > last_block)
{
ext2_error (sb, "ext2_check_descriptors",
"Inode bitmap for group %d"
" not in group (block %lu)!",
i, (unsigned long) le32_to_cpu(gdp->bg_inode_bitmap));
return 0;
}
if (le32_to_cpu(gdp->bg_inode_table) < first_block ||
le32_to_cpu(gdp->bg_inode_table) + sbi->s_itb_per_group - 1 >
last_block)
{
ext2_error (sb, "ext2_check_descriptors",
"Inode table for group %d"
" not in group (block %lu)!",
i, (unsigned long) le32_to_cpu(gdp->bg_inode_table));
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 94,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static sk_sp<SkImage> premulSkImageToUnPremul(SkImage* input) {
SkImageInfo info = SkImageInfo::Make(input->width(), input->height(),
kN32_SkColorType, kUnpremul_SkAlphaType);
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels = copySkImageData(input, info);
if (!dstPixels)
return nullptr;
return newSkImageFromRaster(
info, std::move(dstPixels),
static_cast<size_t>(input->width()) * info.bytesPerPixel());
}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 172,504 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::EncodeTask(
std::unique_ptr<JobRecord> job_record) {
DCHECK(encoder_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (job_record->exif_shm &&
!job_record->exif_shm->MapAt(job_record->exif_offset,
job_record->exif_shm->size())) {
VPLOGF(1) << "could not map exif bitstream_buffer";
NotifyError(job_record->task_id, PLATFORM_FAILURE);
return;
}
gfx::Size coded_size = job_record->input_frame->coded_size();
if (latest_input_buffer_coded_size_ != coded_size ||
latest_quality_ != job_record->quality) {
std::unique_ptr<EncodedInstanceDmaBuf> encoded_device(
new EncodedInstanceDmaBuf(this));
VLOGF(1) << "Open Device for quality " << job_record->quality
<< ", width: " << coded_size.width()
<< ", height: " << coded_size.height();
if (!encoded_device->Initialize()) {
VLOGF(1) << "Failed to initialize device";
NotifyError(job_record->task_id, PLATFORM_FAILURE);
return;
}
if (!encoded_device->SetUpJpegParameters(job_record->quality, coded_size)) {
VLOGF(1) << "SetUpJpegParameters failed";
NotifyError(job_record->task_id, PLATFORM_FAILURE);
return;
}
if (!encoded_device->CreateBuffers(
coded_size, job_record->input_frame->layout(),
job_record->output_frame->layout().planes()[0].size)) {
VLOGF(1) << "Create buffers failed.";
NotifyError(job_record->task_id, PLATFORM_FAILURE);
return;
}
latest_input_buffer_coded_size_ = coded_size;
latest_quality_ = job_record->quality;
encoded_instances_dma_buf_.push(std::move(encoded_device));
}
encoded_instances_dma_buf_.back()->input_job_queue_.push(
std::move(job_record));
ServiceDeviceTask();
}
Commit Message: media: remove base::SharedMemoryHandle usage in v4l2 encoder
This replaces a use of the legacy UnalignedSharedMemory ctor
taking a SharedMemoryHandle with the current ctor taking a
PlatformSharedMemoryRegion.
Bug: 849207
Change-Id: Iea24ebdcd941cf2fa97e19cf2aeac1a18f9773d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1697602
Commit-Queue: Matthew Cary (CET) <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#681740}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Resource::SetResponse(const ResourceResponse& response) {
response_ = response;
if (!GetResourceRequest().Url().ProtocolIsInHTTPFamily() ||
!GetResponse().Url().ProtocolIsInHTTPFamily()) {
cache_handler_.Clear();
return;
}
if (GetResponse().WasFetchedViaServiceWorker()) {
cache_handler_ = ServiceWorkerResponseCachedMetadataHandler::Create(
this, fetcher_security_origin_.get());
} else {
cache_handler_ = CachedMetadataHandlerImpl::Create(this);
}
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 149,766 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *Type_MPEcurve_Read(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, cmsUInt32Number* nItems, cmsUInt32Number SizeOfTag)
{
cmsStage* mpe = NULL;
cmsUInt16Number InputChans, OutputChans;
cmsUInt32Number i, BaseOffset;
cmsToneCurve** GammaTables;
*nItems = 0;
BaseOffset = io ->Tell(io) - sizeof(_cmsTagBase);
if (!_cmsReadUInt16Number(io, &InputChans)) return NULL;
if (!_cmsReadUInt16Number(io, &OutputChans)) return NULL;
if (InputChans != OutputChans) return NULL;
GammaTables = (cmsToneCurve**) _cmsCalloc(self ->ContextID, InputChans, sizeof(cmsToneCurve*));
if (GammaTables == NULL) return NULL;
if (ReadPositionTable(self, io, InputChans, BaseOffset, GammaTables, ReadMPECurve)) {
mpe = cmsStageAllocToneCurves(self ->ContextID, InputChans, GammaTables);
}
else {
mpe = NULL;
}
for (i=0; i < InputChans; i++) {
if (GammaTables[i]) cmsFreeToneCurve(GammaTables[i]);
}
_cmsFree(self ->ContextID, GammaTables);
*nItems = (mpe != NULL) ? 1 : 0;
return mpe;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(SizeOfTag);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 71,020 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::enableWebGLImageChromium(bool enable)
{
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::setWebGLImageChromiumEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove SpeechSynthesis runtime flag (status=stable)
BUG=402536
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/482273005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180763 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-94 | 0 | 116,112 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const base::TimeTicks& RenderProcessHostImpl::GetInitTimeForNavigationMetrics()
const {
return init_time_;
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fuse_notify(struct fuse_conn *fc, enum fuse_notify_code code,
unsigned int size, struct fuse_copy_state *cs)
{
/* Don't try to move pages (yet) */
cs->move_pages = 0;
switch (code) {
case FUSE_NOTIFY_POLL:
return fuse_notify_poll(fc, size, cs);
case FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_INODE:
return fuse_notify_inval_inode(fc, size, cs);
case FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY:
return fuse_notify_inval_entry(fc, size, cs);
case FUSE_NOTIFY_STORE:
return fuse_notify_store(fc, size, cs);
case FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE:
return fuse_notify_retrieve(fc, size, cs);
case FUSE_NOTIFY_DELETE:
return fuse_notify_delete(fc, size, cs);
default:
fuse_copy_finish(cs);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DictionaryValue* ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
const WebContents* contents,
TabStripModel* tab_strip,
int tab_index,
const Extension* extension) {
bool has_permission = extension && extension->HasAPIPermissionForTab(
GetTabId(contents), APIPermission::kTab);
return CreateTabValue(contents, tab_strip, tab_index,
has_permission ? INCLUDE_PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_FIELDS :
OMIT_PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_FIELDS);
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 171,454 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHPAPI zend_string *php_addslashes(zend_string *str, int should_free)
{
/* maximum string length, worst case situation */
char *source, *target;
char *end;
size_t offset;
zend_string *new_str;
if (!str) {
return ZSTR_EMPTY_ALLOC();
}
source = ZSTR_VAL(str);
end = source + ZSTR_LEN(str);
while (source < end) {
switch (*source) {
case '\0':
case '\'':
case '\"':
case '\\':
goto do_escape;
default:
source++;
break;
}
}
if (!should_free) {
return zend_string_copy(str);
}
return str;
do_escape:
offset = source - (char *)ZSTR_VAL(str);
new_str = zend_string_alloc(offset + (2 * (ZSTR_LEN(str) - offset)), 0);
memcpy(ZSTR_VAL(new_str), ZSTR_VAL(str), offset);
target = ZSTR_VAL(new_str) + offset;
while (source < end) {
switch (*source) {
case '\0':
*target++ = '\\';
*target++ = '0';
break;
case '\'':
case '\"':
case '\\':
*target++ = '\\';
/* break is missing *intentionally* */
default:
*target++ = *source;
break;
}
source++;
}
*target = 0;
if (should_free) {
zend_string_release(str);
}
if (ZSTR_LEN(new_str) - (target - ZSTR_VAL(new_str)) > 16) {
new_str = zend_string_truncate(new_str, target - ZSTR_VAL(new_str), 0);
} else {
ZSTR_LEN(new_str) = target - ZSTR_VAL(new_str);
}
return new_str;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 14,670 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void headers32(RBinFile *bf) {
#define p bf->rbin->cb_printf
const ut8 *buf = r_buf_get_at (bf->buf, 0, NULL);
p ("0x00000000 ELF MAGIC 0x%08x\n", r_read_le32 (buf));
p ("0x00000004 Type 0x%04x\n", r_read_le16 (buf + 4));
p ("0x00000006 Machine 0x%04x\n", r_read_le16 (buf + 6));
p ("0x00000008 Version 0x%08x\n", r_read_le32 (buf + 8));
p ("0x0000000c Entrypoint 0x%08x\n", r_read_le32 (buf + 12));
p ("0x00000010 PhOff 0x%08x\n", r_read_le32 (buf + 16));
p ("0x00000014 ShOff 0x%08x\n", r_read_le32 (buf + 20));
}
Commit Message: Fix #9904 - crash in r2_hoobr_r_read_le32 (over 9000 entrypoints) and read_le oobread (#9923)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplObjectStorage, setInfo)
{
spl_SplObjectStorageElement *element;
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern = (spl_SplObjectStorage*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
zval *inf;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "z", &inf) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(&intern->storage, (void**)&element, &intern->pos) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&element->inf);
element->inf = inf;
Z_ADDREF_P(inf);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplObjectStorage::next()
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: point_distance(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
Point *pt1 = PG_GETARG_POINT_P(0);
Point *pt2 = PG_GETARG_POINT_P(1);
PG_RETURN_FLOAT8(HYPOT(pt1->x - pt2->x, pt1->y - pt2->y));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_replace_finish(struct net *net, struct ebt_replace *repl,
struct ebt_table_info *newinfo)
{
int ret, i;
struct ebt_counter *counterstmp = NULL;
/* used to be able to unlock earlier */
struct ebt_table_info *table;
struct ebt_table *t;
/* the user wants counters back
the check on the size is done later, when we have the lock */
if (repl->num_counters) {
unsigned long size = repl->num_counters * sizeof(*counterstmp);
counterstmp = vmalloc(size);
if (!counterstmp)
return -ENOMEM;
}
newinfo->chainstack = NULL;
ret = ebt_verify_pointers(repl, newinfo);
if (ret != 0)
goto free_counterstmp;
ret = translate_table(net, repl->name, newinfo);
if (ret != 0)
goto free_counterstmp;
t = find_table_lock(net, repl->name, &ret, &ebt_mutex);
if (!t) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto free_iterate;
}
/* the table doesn't like it */
if (t->check && (ret = t->check(newinfo, repl->valid_hooks)))
goto free_unlock;
if (repl->num_counters && repl->num_counters != t->private->nentries) {
BUGPRINT("Wrong nr. of counters requested\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto free_unlock;
}
/* we have the mutex lock, so no danger in reading this pointer */
table = t->private;
/* make sure the table can only be rmmod'ed if it contains no rules */
if (!table->nentries && newinfo->nentries && !try_module_get(t->me)) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto free_unlock;
} else if (table->nentries && !newinfo->nentries)
module_put(t->me);
/* we need an atomic snapshot of the counters */
write_lock_bh(&t->lock);
if (repl->num_counters)
get_counters(t->private->counters, counterstmp,
t->private->nentries);
t->private = newinfo;
write_unlock_bh(&t->lock);
mutex_unlock(&ebt_mutex);
/* so, a user can change the chains while having messed up her counter
allocation. Only reason why this is done is because this way the lock
is held only once, while this doesn't bring the kernel into a
dangerous state. */
if (repl->num_counters &&
copy_to_user(repl->counters, counterstmp,
repl->num_counters * sizeof(struct ebt_counter))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
}
else
ret = 0;
/* decrease module count and free resources */
EBT_ENTRY_ITERATE(table->entries, table->entries_size,
ebt_cleanup_entry, net, NULL);
vfree(table->entries);
if (table->chainstack) {
for_each_possible_cpu(i)
vfree(table->chainstack[i]);
vfree(table->chainstack);
}
vfree(table);
vfree(counterstmp);
return ret;
free_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&ebt_mutex);
free_iterate:
EBT_ENTRY_ITERATE(newinfo->entries, newinfo->entries_size,
ebt_cleanup_entry, net, NULL);
free_counterstmp:
vfree(counterstmp);
/* can be initialized in translate_table() */
if (newinfo->chainstack) {
for_each_possible_cpu(i)
vfree(newinfo->chainstack[i]);
vfree(newinfo->chainstack);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: bridge: netfilter: fix information leak
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool kvm_hv_msr_partition_wide(u32 msr)
{
bool r = false;
switch (msr) {
case HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID:
case HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL:
case HV_X64_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC:
case HV_X64_MSR_TIME_REF_COUNT:
r = true;
break;
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 35,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jswrap_graphics_getWidthOrHeight(JsVar *parent, bool height) {
JsGraphics gfx; if (!graphicsGetFromVar(&gfx, parent)) return 0;
if (gfx.data.flags & JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_SWAP_XY)
height=!height;
return height ? gfx.data.height : gfx.data.width;
}
Commit Message: Add height check for Graphics.createArrayBuffer(...vertical_byte:true) (fix #1421)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpeg2000_decode_packet(Jpeg2000DecoderContext *s,
Jpeg2000CodingStyle *codsty,
Jpeg2000ResLevel *rlevel, int precno,
int layno, uint8_t *expn, int numgbits)
{
int bandno, cblkno, ret, nb_code_blocks;
if (!(ret = get_bits(s, 1))) {
jpeg2000_flush(s);
return 0;
} else if (ret < 0)
return ret;
for (bandno = 0; bandno < rlevel->nbands; bandno++) {
Jpeg2000Band *band = rlevel->band + bandno;
Jpeg2000Prec *prec = band->prec + precno;
if (band->coord[0][0] == band->coord[0][1] ||
band->coord[1][0] == band->coord[1][1])
continue;
nb_code_blocks = prec->nb_codeblocks_height *
prec->nb_codeblocks_width;
for (cblkno = 0; cblkno < nb_code_blocks; cblkno++) {
Jpeg2000Cblk *cblk = prec->cblk + cblkno;
int incl, newpasses, llen;
if (cblk->npasses)
incl = get_bits(s, 1);
else
incl = tag_tree_decode(s, prec->cblkincl + cblkno, layno + 1) == layno;
if (!incl)
continue;
else if (incl < 0)
return incl;
if (!cblk->npasses) {
int v = expn[bandno] + numgbits - 1 -
tag_tree_decode(s, prec->zerobits + cblkno, 100);
if (v < 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"nonzerobits %d invalid\n", v);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
cblk->nonzerobits = v;
}
if ((newpasses = getnpasses(s)) < 0)
return newpasses;
if ((llen = getlblockinc(s)) < 0)
return llen;
cblk->lblock += llen;
if ((ret = get_bits(s, av_log2(newpasses) + cblk->lblock)) < 0)
return ret;
if (ret > sizeof(cblk->data)) {
avpriv_request_sample(s->avctx,
"Block with lengthinc greater than %zu",
sizeof(cblk->data));
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
cblk->lengthinc = ret;
cblk->npasses += newpasses;
}
}
jpeg2000_flush(s);
if (codsty->csty & JPEG2000_CSTY_EPH) {
if (bytestream2_peek_be16(&s->g) == JPEG2000_EPH)
bytestream2_skip(&s->g, 2);
else
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "EPH marker not found.\n");
}
for (bandno = 0; bandno < rlevel->nbands; bandno++) {
Jpeg2000Band *band = rlevel->band + bandno;
Jpeg2000Prec *prec = band->prec + precno;
nb_code_blocks = prec->nb_codeblocks_height * prec->nb_codeblocks_width;
for (cblkno = 0; cblkno < nb_code_blocks; cblkno++) {
Jpeg2000Cblk *cblk = prec->cblk + cblkno;
if ( bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) < cblk->lengthinc
|| sizeof(cblk->data) < cblk->length + cblk->lengthinc + 2
)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
bytestream2_get_bufferu(&s->g, cblk->data + cblk->length, cblk->lengthinc);
cblk->length += cblk->lengthinc;
cblk->lengthinc = 0;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: jpeg2000: check log2_cblk dimensions
Fixes out of array access
Fixes Ticket2895
Found-by: Piotr Bandurski <ami_stuff@o2.pl>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xfrm_flush_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct km_event c;
struct xfrm_usersa_flush *p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
struct xfrm_audit audit_info;
int err;
audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info.sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid);
err = xfrm_state_flush(net, p->proto, &audit_info);
if (err) {
if (err == -ESRCH) /* empty table */
return 0;
return err;
}
c.data.proto = p->proto;
c.event = nlh->nlmsg_type;
c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
c.pid = nlh->nlmsg_pid;
c.net = net;
km_state_notify(NULL, &c);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int IsEqualGUID ( const GUID& guid1, const GUID& guid2 )
{
return (memcmp ( &guid1, &guid2, sizeof(GUID) ) == 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 15,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HeadlessWebContentsImpl::RenderFrameDeleted(
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
if (headless_tab_socket_)
headless_tab_socket_->RenderFrameDeleted(render_frame_host);
browser_context_->RemoveDevToolsFrameToken(
render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
render_frame_host->GetRoutingID(),
render_frame_host->GetFrameTreeNodeId());
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 126,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: V9fsPDU *pdu_alloc(V9fsState *s)
{
V9fsPDU *pdu = NULL;
if (!QLIST_EMPTY(&s->free_list)) {
pdu = QLIST_FIRST(&s->free_list);
QLIST_REMOVE(pdu, next);
QLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&s->active_list, pdu, next);
}
return pdu;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 1,467 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t local_preadv(FsContext *ctx, V9fsFidOpenState *fs,
const struct iovec *iov,
int iovcnt, off_t offset)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PREADV
return preadv(fs->fd, iov, iovcnt, offset);
#else
int err = lseek(fs->fd, offset, SEEK_SET);
if (err == -1) {
return err;
} else {
return readv(fs->fd, iov, iovcnt);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 17,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: read_SubStreamsInfo(struct archive_read *a, struct _7z_substream_info *ss,
struct _7z_folder *f, size_t numFolders)
{
const unsigned char *p;
uint64_t *usizes;
size_t unpack_streams;
int type;
unsigned i;
uint32_t numDigests;
memset(ss, 0, sizeof(*ss));
for (i = 0; i < numFolders; i++)
f[i].numUnpackStreams = 1;
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
return (-1);
type = *p;
if (type == kNumUnPackStream) {
unpack_streams = 0;
for (i = 0; i < numFolders; i++) {
if (parse_7zip_uint64(a, &(f[i].numUnpackStreams)) < 0)
return (-1);
if (UMAX_ENTRY < f[i].numUnpackStreams)
return (-1);
unpack_streams += (size_t)f[i].numUnpackStreams;
}
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
return (-1);
type = *p;
} else
unpack_streams = numFolders;
ss->unpack_streams = unpack_streams;
if (unpack_streams) {
ss->unpackSizes = calloc(unpack_streams,
sizeof(*ss->unpackSizes));
ss->digestsDefined = calloc(unpack_streams,
sizeof(*ss->digestsDefined));
ss->digests = calloc(unpack_streams,
sizeof(*ss->digests));
if (ss->unpackSizes == NULL || ss->digestsDefined == NULL ||
ss->digests == NULL)
return (-1);
}
usizes = ss->unpackSizes;
for (i = 0; i < numFolders; i++) {
unsigned pack;
uint64_t sum;
if (f[i].numUnpackStreams == 0)
continue;
sum = 0;
if (type == kSize) {
for (pack = 1; pack < f[i].numUnpackStreams; pack++) {
if (parse_7zip_uint64(a, usizes) < 0)
return (-1);
sum += *usizes++;
}
}
*usizes++ = folder_uncompressed_size(&f[i]) - sum;
}
if (type == kSize) {
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
return (-1);
type = *p;
}
for (i = 0; i < unpack_streams; i++) {
ss->digestsDefined[i] = 0;
ss->digests[i] = 0;
}
numDigests = 0;
for (i = 0; i < numFolders; i++) {
if (f[i].numUnpackStreams != 1 || !f[i].digest_defined)
numDigests += (uint32_t)f[i].numUnpackStreams;
}
if (type == kCRC) {
struct _7z_digests tmpDigests;
unsigned char *digestsDefined = ss->digestsDefined;
uint32_t * digests = ss->digests;
int di = 0;
memset(&tmpDigests, 0, sizeof(tmpDigests));
if (read_Digests(a, &(tmpDigests), numDigests) < 0) {
free_Digest(&tmpDigests);
return (-1);
}
for (i = 0; i < numFolders; i++) {
if (f[i].numUnpackStreams == 1 && f[i].digest_defined) {
*digestsDefined++ = 1;
*digests++ = f[i].digest;
} else {
unsigned j;
for (j = 0; j < f[i].numUnpackStreams;
j++, di++) {
*digestsDefined++ =
tmpDigests.defineds[di];
*digests++ =
tmpDigests.digests[di];
}
}
}
free_Digest(&tmpDigests);
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
return (-1);
type = *p;
}
/*
* Must be kEnd.
*/
if (type != kEnd)
return (-1);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Issue #718: Fix TALOS-CAN-152
If a 7-Zip archive declares a rediculously large number of substreams,
it can overflow an internal counter, leading a subsequent memory
allocation to be too small for the substream data.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco
for reporting this issue.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 167,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GfxAxialShading::GfxAxialShading(double x0A, double y0A,
double x1A, double y1A,
double t0A, double t1A,
Function **funcsA, int nFuncsA,
GBool extend0A, GBool extend1A):
GfxShading(2)
{
int i;
x0 = x0A;
y0 = y0A;
x1 = x1A;
y1 = y1A;
t0 = t0A;
t1 = t1A;
nFuncs = nFuncsA;
for (i = 0; i < nFuncs; ++i) {
funcs[i] = funcsA[i];
}
extend0 = extend0A;
extend1 = extend1A;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceLoader::DidChangePriority(ResourceLoadPriority load_priority,
int intra_priority_value) {
if (loader_) {
loader_->DidChangePriority(
static_cast<WebURLRequest::Priority>(load_priority),
intra_priority_value);
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcScreenSaverSelectInput(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xScreenSaverSelectInputReq);
DrawablePtr pDraw;
int rc;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xScreenSaverSelectInputReq);
rc = dixLookupDrawable(&pDraw, stuff->drawable, client, 0,
DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
rc = XaceHook(XACE_SCREENSAVER_ACCESS, client, pDraw->pScreen,
DixSetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
if (!setEventMask(pDraw->pScreen, client, stuff->eventMask))
return BadAlloc;
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,406 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __sched yield_to(struct task_struct *p, bool preempt)
{
struct task_struct *curr = current;
struct rq *rq, *p_rq;
unsigned long flags;
int yielded = 0;
local_irq_save(flags);
rq = this_rq();
again:
p_rq = task_rq(p);
/*
* If we're the only runnable task on the rq and target rq also
* has only one task, there's absolutely no point in yielding.
*/
if (rq->nr_running == 1 && p_rq->nr_running == 1) {
yielded = -ESRCH;
goto out_irq;
}
double_rq_lock(rq, p_rq);
if (task_rq(p) != p_rq) {
double_rq_unlock(rq, p_rq);
goto again;
}
if (!curr->sched_class->yield_to_task)
goto out_unlock;
if (curr->sched_class != p->sched_class)
goto out_unlock;
if (task_running(p_rq, p) || p->state)
goto out_unlock;
yielded = curr->sched_class->yield_to_task(rq, p, preempt);
if (yielded) {
schedstat_inc(rq, yld_count);
/*
* Make p's CPU reschedule; pick_next_entity takes care of
* fairness.
*/
if (preempt && rq != p_rq)
resched_curr(p_rq);
}
out_unlock:
double_rq_unlock(rq, p_rq);
out_irq:
local_irq_restore(flags);
if (yielded > 0)
schedule();
return yielded;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XML_GetParsingStatus(XML_Parser parser, XML_ParsingStatus *status)
{
if (parser == NULL)
return;
assert(status != NULL);
*status = parser->m_parsingStatus;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 92,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Local<v8::Object> Create(
v8::Isolate* isolate,
base::WeakPtr<MimeHandlerViewContainer> container) {
ScriptableObject* scriptable_object =
new ScriptableObject(isolate, container);
return gin::CreateHandle(isolate, scriptable_object)
.ToV8()
.As<v8::Object>();
}
Commit Message: Skip Service workers in requests for mime handler plugins
BUG=808838
TEST=./browser_tests --gtest_filter=*/ServiceWorkerTest.MimeHandlerView*
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: I82e75c200091babbab648a04232db47e2938d914
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914150
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Istiaque Ahmed <lazyboy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#537386}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int etm_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
{
int ret = 0;
if (event->attr.type != etm_pmu.type) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
ret = etm_addr_filters_alloc(event);
if (ret)
goto out;
event->destroy = etm_event_destroy;
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: coresight: fix kernel panic caused by invalid CPU
Commit d52c9750f150 ("coresight: reset "enable_sink" flag when need be")
caused a kernel panic because of the using of an invalid value: after
'for_each_cpu(cpu, mask)', value of local variable 'cpu' become invalid,
causes following 'cpu_to_node' access invalid memory area.
This patch brings the deleted 'cpu = cpumask_first(mask)' back.
Panic log:
$ perf record -e cs_etm// ls
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffe801804af4f10
pgd = ffff8017ce031600
[fffe801804af4f10] *pgd=0000000000000000, *pud=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 33 PID: 1619 Comm: perf Not tainted 4.7.1+ #16
Hardware name: Huawei Taishan 2280 /CH05TEVBA, BIOS 1.10 11/24/2016
task: ffff8017cb0c8400 ti: ffff8017cb154000 task.ti: ffff8017cb154000
PC is at tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x60/0xd4
LR is at tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x44/0xd4
pc : [<ffff000008633df8>] lr : [<ffff000008633ddc>] pstate: 60000145
sp : ffff8017cb157b40
x29: ffff8017cb157b40 x28: 0000000000000000
...skip...
7a60: ffff000008c64dc8 0000000000000006 0000000000000253 ffffffffffffffff
7a80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff0000080872cc 0000000000000001
[<ffff000008633df8>] tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x60/0xd4
[<ffff000008632b9c>] etm_setup_aux+0x1dc/0x1e8
[<ffff00000816eed4>] rb_alloc_aux+0x2b0/0x338
[<ffff00000816a5e4>] perf_mmap+0x414/0x568
[<ffff0000081ab694>] mmap_region+0x324/0x544
[<ffff0000081abbe8>] do_mmap+0x334/0x3e0
[<ffff000008191150>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0xa4/0xc8
[<ffff0000081a9a30>] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0xb0/0x22c
[<ffff0000080872e4>] sys_mmap+0x18/0x28
[<ffff0000080843f0>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
Code: 912040a5 d0001c00 f873d821 911c6000 (b8656822)
---[ end trace 98933da8f92b0c9a ]---
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Cc: Xia Kaixu <xiakaixu@huawei.com>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d52c9750f150 ("coresight: reset "enable_sink" flag when need be")
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.10
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 83,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkey_export)
{
struct php_x509_request req;
zval ** zpkey, * args = NULL, *out;
char * passphrase = NULL; int passphrase_len = 0;
long key_resource = -1;
EVP_PKEY * key;
BIO * bio_out = NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER * cipher;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "Zz|s!a!", &zpkey, &out, &passphrase, &passphrase_len, &args) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETVAL_FALSE;
key = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(zpkey, 0, passphrase, 0, &key_resource TSRMLS_CC);
if (key == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "cannot get key from parameter 1");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PHP_SSL_REQ_INIT(&req);
if (PHP_SSL_REQ_PARSE(&req, args) == SUCCESS) {
bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (passphrase && req.priv_key_encrypt) {
if (req.priv_key_encrypt_cipher) {
cipher = req.priv_key_encrypt_cipher;
} else {
cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *) EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
}
} else {
cipher = NULL;
}
if (PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bio_out, key, cipher, (unsigned char *)passphrase, passphrase_len, NULL, NULL)) {
/* Success!
* If returning the output as a string, do so now */
char * bio_mem_ptr;
long bio_mem_len;
RETVAL_TRUE;
bio_mem_len = BIO_get_mem_data(bio_out, &bio_mem_ptr);
zval_dtor(out);
ZVAL_STRINGL(out, bio_mem_ptr, bio_mem_len, 1);
}
}
PHP_SSL_REQ_DISPOSE(&req);
if (key_resource == -1 && key) {
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
}
if (bio_out) {
BIO_free(bio_out);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 14,213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ip6_tnl_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
{
int err = 0;
struct ip6_tnl_parm p;
struct ip6_tnl *t = NULL;
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
struct ip6_tnl_net *ip6n = net_generic(net, ip6_tnl_net_id);
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCGETTUNNEL:
if (dev == ip6n->fb_tnl_dev) {
if (copy_from_user(&p, ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_data, sizeof (p))) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
t = ip6_tnl_locate(net, &p, 0);
}
if (t == NULL)
t = netdev_priv(dev);
memcpy(&p, &t->parms, sizeof (p));
if (copy_to_user(ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_data, &p, sizeof (p))) {
err = -EFAULT;
}
break;
case SIOCADDTUNNEL:
case SIOCCHGTUNNEL:
err = -EPERM;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
break;
err = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&p, ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_data, sizeof (p)))
break;
err = -EINVAL;
if (p.proto != IPPROTO_IPV6 && p.proto != IPPROTO_IPIP &&
p.proto != 0)
break;
t = ip6_tnl_locate(net, &p, cmd == SIOCADDTUNNEL);
if (dev != ip6n->fb_tnl_dev && cmd == SIOCCHGTUNNEL) {
if (t != NULL) {
if (t->dev != dev) {
err = -EEXIST;
break;
}
} else
t = netdev_priv(dev);
ip6_tnl_unlink(ip6n, t);
err = ip6_tnl_change(t, &p);
ip6_tnl_link(ip6n, t);
netdev_state_change(dev);
}
if (t) {
err = 0;
if (copy_to_user(ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_data, &t->parms, sizeof (p)))
err = -EFAULT;
} else
err = (cmd == SIOCADDTUNNEL ? -ENOBUFS : -ENOENT);
break;
case SIOCDELTUNNEL:
err = -EPERM;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
break;
if (dev == ip6n->fb_tnl_dev) {
err = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&p, ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_data, sizeof (p)))
break;
err = -ENOENT;
if ((t = ip6_tnl_locate(net, &p, 0)) == NULL)
break;
err = -EPERM;
if (t->dev == ip6n->fb_tnl_dev)
break;
dev = t->dev;
}
err = 0;
unregister_netdevice(dev);
break;
default:
err = -EINVAL;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
{
int rc;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
rc = -ENOMEM;
*nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim;
*classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!*classes)
goto out;
rc = hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
*classes);
if (rc) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
kfree((*classes)[i]);
kfree(*classes);
}
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gss_krb5int_extract_authtime_from_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_oid,
gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
gss_buffer_desc rep;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
rep.value = &ctx->krb_times.authtime;
rep.length = sizeof(ctx->krb_times.authtime);
return generic_gss_add_buffer_set_member(minor_status, &rep, data_set);
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | 0 | 46,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RTCPeerConnectionHandler::Initialize(
const webrtc::PeerConnectionInterface::RTCConfiguration&
server_configuration,
const blink::WebMediaConstraints& options) {
DCHECK(task_runner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
DCHECK(frame_);
CHECK(!initialize_called_);
initialize_called_ = true;
peer_connection_tracker_ =
RenderThreadImpl::current()->peer_connection_tracker()->AsWeakPtr();
configuration_ = server_configuration;
configuration_.set_prerenderer_smoothing(
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableRTCSmoothnessAlgorithm));
configuration_.set_experiment_cpu_load_estimator(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(media::kNewEncodeCpuLoadEstimator));
configuration_.crypto_options = webrtc::CryptoOptions{};
configuration_.crypto_options->srtp.enable_gcm_crypto_suites =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableWebRtcSrtpAesGcm);
configuration_.crypto_options->srtp.enable_encrypted_rtp_header_extensions =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableWebRtcSrtpEncryptedHeaders);
CopyConstraintsIntoRtcConfiguration(options, &configuration_);
peer_connection_observer_ =
new Observer(weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), task_runner_);
native_peer_connection_ = dependency_factory_->CreatePeerConnection(
configuration_, frame_, peer_connection_observer_.get());
if (!native_peer_connection_.get()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initialize native PeerConnection.";
return false;
}
if (peer_connection_tracker_) {
peer_connection_tracker_->RegisterPeerConnection(this, configuration_,
options, frame_);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> withScriptArgumentsAndCallStackCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.withScriptArgumentsAndCallStack");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
RefPtr<ScriptArguments> scriptArguments(createScriptArguments(args, 0));
RefPtr<ScriptCallStack> callStack(createScriptCallStackForInspector());
if (!callStack)
return v8::Undefined();
imp->withScriptArgumentsAndCallStack(scriptArguments, callStack);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_seq_ioctl_set_client_pool(struct snd_seq_client *client,
void *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_client_pool *info = arg;
int rc;
if (client->number != info->client)
return -EINVAL; /* can't change other clients */
if (info->output_pool >= 1 && info->output_pool <= SNDRV_SEQ_MAX_EVENTS &&
(! snd_seq_write_pool_allocated(client) ||
info->output_pool != client->pool->size)) {
if (snd_seq_write_pool_allocated(client)) {
/* remove all existing cells */
snd_seq_pool_mark_closing(client->pool);
snd_seq_queue_client_leave_cells(client->number);
snd_seq_pool_done(client->pool);
}
client->pool->size = info->output_pool;
rc = snd_seq_pool_init(client->pool);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
}
if (client->type == USER_CLIENT && client->data.user.fifo != NULL &&
info->input_pool >= 1 &&
info->input_pool <= SNDRV_SEQ_MAX_CLIENT_EVENTS &&
info->input_pool != client->data.user.fifo_pool_size) {
/* change pool size */
rc = snd_seq_fifo_resize(client->data.user.fifo, info->input_pool);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
client->data.user.fifo_pool_size = info->input_pool;
}
if (info->output_room >= 1 &&
info->output_room <= client->pool->size) {
client->pool->room = info->output_room;
}
return snd_seq_ioctl_get_client_pool(client, arg);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port
There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing. snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
__slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
__slab_free+0x204/0x310
kfree+0x15f/0x180
port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
[<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
[<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
[<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
[<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
.....
We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
letting the caller unref the object after use. Also, there is another
potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
and this is moved inside the lock.
This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <ycqzsy@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 60,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nested_vmx_load_msr_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vmx_msr_entry *e)
{
if (e->index == MSR_FS_BASE ||
e->index == MSR_GS_BASE ||
e->index == MSR_IA32_SMM_MONITOR_CTL || /* SMM is not supported */
nested_vmx_msr_check_common(vcpu, e))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 42,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: netdutils::Status XfrmController::deleteTunnelModeSecurityPolicy(const XfrmSaInfo& record,
const XfrmSocket& sock,
XfrmDirection direction) {
xfrm_userpolicy_id policyid{};
nlattr_xfrm_mark xfrmmark{};
enum {
NLMSG_HDR,
USERPOLICYID,
USERPOLICYID_PAD,
MARK,
MARK_PAD,
};
std::vector<iovec> iov = {
{NULL, 0}, // reserved for the eventual addition of a NLMSG_HDR
{&policyid, 0}, // main xfrm_userpolicy_id struct
{kPadBytes, 0}, // up to NLMSG_ALIGNTO pad bytes of padding
{&xfrmmark, 0}, // adjust size if xfrm mark is present
{kPadBytes, 0}, // up to NLATTR_ALIGNTO pad bytes
};
int len = iov[USERPOLICYID].iov_len = fillUserPolicyId(record, direction, &policyid);
iov[USERPOLICYID_PAD].iov_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(len) - len;
len = iov[MARK].iov_len = fillNlAttrXfrmMark(record, &xfrmmark);
iov[MARK_PAD].iov_len = NLA_ALIGN(len) - len;
return sock.sendMessage(XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY, NETLINK_REQUEST_FLAGS, 0, &iov);
}
Commit Message: Set optlen for UDP-encap check in XfrmController
When setting the socket owner for an encap socket XfrmController will
first attempt to verify that the socket has the UDP-encap socket option
set. When doing so it would pass in an uninitialized optlen parameter
which could cause the call to not modify the option value if the optlen
happened to be too short. So for example if the stack happened to
contain a zero where optlen was located the check would fail and the
socket owner would not be changed.
Fix this by setting optlen to the size of the option value parameter.
Test: run cts -m CtsNetTestCases
BUG: 111650288
Change-Id: I57b6e9dba09c1acda71e3ec2084652e961667bd9
(cherry picked from commit fc42a105147310bd680952d4b71fe32974bd8506)
CWE ID: CWE-909 | 0 | 162,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseRenderingContext2D::clip(Path2D* dom_path,
const String& winding_rule_string) {
ClipInternal(dom_path->GetPath(), winding_rule_string);
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 149,903 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bittoint8(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
VarBit *arg = PG_GETARG_VARBIT_P(0);
uint64 result;
bits8 *r;
/* Check that the bit string is not too long */
if (VARBITLEN(arg) > sizeof(result) * BITS_PER_BYTE)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_NUMERIC_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE),
errmsg("bigint out of range")));
result = 0;
for (r = VARBITS(arg); r < VARBITEND(arg); r++)
{
result <<= BITS_PER_BYTE;
result |= *r;
}
/* Now shift the result to take account of the padding at the end */
result >>= VARBITPAD(arg);
PG_RETURN_INT64(result);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 39,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: print_distance_range(FILE* f, OnigLen a, OnigLen b)
{
if (a == INFINITE_LEN)
fputs("inf", f);
else
fprintf(f, "(%u)", a);
fputs("-", f);
if (b == INFINITE_LEN)
fputs("inf", f);
else
fprintf(f, "(%u)", b);
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,207 |
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