instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: add_master(ClientPtr client, xXIAddMasterInfo * c, int flags[MAXDEVICES])
{
DeviceIntPtr ptr, keybd, XTestptr, XTestkeybd;
char *name;
int rc;
name = calloc(c->name_len + 1, sizeof(char));
if (name == NULL) {
rc = BadAlloc;
goto unwind;
}
strncpy(name, (char *) &c[1], c->name_len);
rc = AllocDevicePair(client, name, &ptr, &keybd,
CorePointerProc, CoreKeyboardProc, TRUE);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
if (!c->send_core)
ptr->coreEvents = keybd->coreEvents = FALSE;
/* Allocate virtual slave devices for xtest events */
rc = AllocXTestDevice(client, name, &XTestptr, &XTestkeybd, ptr, keybd);
if (rc != Success) {
DeleteInputDeviceRequest(ptr);
DeleteInputDeviceRequest(keybd);
goto unwind;
}
ActivateDevice(ptr, FALSE);
ActivateDevice(keybd, FALSE);
flags[ptr->id] |= XIMasterAdded;
flags[keybd->id] |= XIMasterAdded;
ActivateDevice(XTestptr, FALSE);
ActivateDevice(XTestkeybd, FALSE);
flags[XTestptr->id] |= XISlaveAdded;
flags[XTestkeybd->id] |= XISlaveAdded;
if (c->enable) {
EnableDevice(ptr, FALSE);
EnableDevice(keybd, FALSE);
flags[ptr->id] |= XIDeviceEnabled;
flags[keybd->id] |= XIDeviceEnabled;
EnableDevice(XTestptr, FALSE);
EnableDevice(XTestkeybd, FALSE);
flags[XTestptr->id] |= XIDeviceEnabled;
flags[XTestkeybd->id] |= XIDeviceEnabled;
}
/* Attach the XTest virtual devices to the newly
created master device */
AttachDevice(NULL, XTestptr, ptr);
AttachDevice(NULL, XTestkeybd, keybd);
flags[XTestptr->id] |= XISlaveAttached;
flags[XTestkeybd->id] |= XISlaveAttached;
for (int i = 0; i < currentMaxClients; i++)
XIBarrierNewMasterDevice(clients[i], ptr->id);
unwind:
free(name);
return rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int _yr_emit_split(
RE_EMIT_CONTEXT* emit_context,
uint8_t opcode,
int16_t argument,
uint8_t** instruction_addr,
int16_t** argument_addr,
size_t* code_size)
{
assert(opcode == RE_OPCODE_SPLIT_A || opcode == RE_OPCODE_SPLIT_B);
if (emit_context->next_split_id == RE_MAX_SPLIT_ID)
return ERROR_REGULAR_EXPRESSION_TOO_COMPLEX;
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
emit_context->arena,
&opcode,
sizeof(uint8_t),
(void**) instruction_addr));
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
emit_context->arena,
&emit_context->next_split_id,
sizeof(RE_SPLIT_ID_TYPE),
NULL));
emit_context->next_split_id++;
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
emit_context->arena,
&argument,
sizeof(int16_t),
(void**) argument_addr));
*code_size = sizeof(uint8_t) + sizeof(RE_SPLIT_ID_TYPE) + sizeof(int16_t);
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer overrun (issue #678). Add assert for detecting this kind of issues earlier.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 64,554 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void flush_fp_to_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
if (tsk->thread.regs) {
/*
* We need to disable preemption here because if we didn't,
* another process could get scheduled after the regs->msr
* test but before we have finished saving the FP registers
* to the thread_struct. That process could take over the
* FPU, and then when we get scheduled again we would store
* bogus values for the remaining FP registers.
*/
preempt_disable();
if (tsk->thread.regs->msr & MSR_FP) {
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
* This should only ever be called for current or
* for a stopped child process. Since we save away
* the FP register state on context switch on SMP,
* there is something wrong if a stopped child appears
* to still have its FP state in the CPU registers.
*/
BUG_ON(tsk != current);
#endif
giveup_fpu_maybe_transactional(tsk);
}
preempt_enable();
}
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ipip_gro_complete(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhoff)
{
skb->encapsulation = 1;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type |= SKB_GSO_IPIP;
return inet_gro_complete(skb, nhoff);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: person_queue_command(person_t* person, int command, bool is_immediate)
{
struct command* commands;
bool is_aok = true;
switch (command) {
case COMMAND_MOVE_NORTHEAST:
is_aok &= person_queue_command(person, COMMAND_MOVE_NORTH, true);
is_aok &= person_queue_command(person, COMMAND_MOVE_EAST, is_immediate);
return is_aok;
case COMMAND_MOVE_SOUTHEAST:
is_aok &= person_queue_command(person, COMMAND_MOVE_SOUTH, true);
is_aok &= person_queue_command(person, COMMAND_MOVE_EAST, is_immediate);
return is_aok;
case COMMAND_MOVE_SOUTHWEST:
is_aok &= person_queue_command(person, COMMAND_MOVE_SOUTH, true);
is_aok &= person_queue_command(person, COMMAND_MOVE_WEST, is_immediate);
return is_aok;
case COMMAND_MOVE_NORTHWEST:
is_aok &= person_queue_command(person, COMMAND_MOVE_NORTH, true);
is_aok &= person_queue_command(person, COMMAND_MOVE_WEST, is_immediate);
return is_aok;
default:
++person->num_commands;
if (person->num_commands > person->max_commands) {
if (!(commands = realloc(person->commands, person->num_commands * 2 * sizeof(struct command))))
return false;
person->max_commands = person->num_commands * 2;
person->commands = commands;
}
person->commands[person->num_commands - 1].type = command;
person->commands[person->num_commands - 1].is_immediate = is_immediate;
person->commands[person->num_commands - 1].script = NULL;
return true;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 75,102 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int compute_selinux_con_for_new_file(pid_t pid, int dir_fd, security_context_t *newcon)
{
security_context_t srccon;
security_context_t dstcon;
const int r = is_selinux_enabled();
if (r == 0)
{
*newcon = NULL;
return 1;
}
else if (r == -1)
{
perror_msg("Couldn't get state of SELinux");
return -1;
}
else if (r != 1)
error_msg_and_die("Unexpected SELinux return value: %d", r);
if (getpidcon_raw(pid, &srccon) < 0)
{
perror_msg("getpidcon_raw(%d)", pid);
return -1;
}
if (fgetfilecon_raw(dir_fd, &dstcon) < 0)
{
perror_msg("getfilecon_raw(%s)", user_pwd);
return -1;
}
if (security_compute_create_raw(srccon, dstcon, string_to_security_class("file"), newcon) < 0)
{
perror_msg("security_compute_create_raw(%s, %s, 'file')", srccon, dstcon);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ccpp: save abrt core files only to new files
Prior this commit abrt-hook-ccpp saved a core file generated by a
process running a program whose name starts with "abrt" in
DUMP_LOCATION/$(basename program)-coredump. If the file was a symlink,
the hook followed and wrote core file to the symlink's target.
Addresses CVE-2015-5287
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 42,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *AcquireImageCanvas(const Image *images,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const Image
*p,
*q;
size_t
columns,
number_channels,
rows;
q=images;
columns=images->columns;
rows=images->rows;
number_channels=0;
for (p=images; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
{
size_t
channels;
channels=3;
if (p->matte != MagickFalse)
channels+=1;
if (p->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
channels+=1;
if (channels > number_channels)
{
number_channels=channels;
q=p;
}
if (p->columns > columns)
columns=p->columns;
if (p->rows > rows)
rows=p->rows;
}
return(CloneImage(q,columns,rows,MagickTrue,exception));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 88,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: early_platform_match(struct early_platform_driver *epdrv, int id)
{
struct platform_device *pd;
list_for_each_entry(pd, &early_platform_device_list, dev.devres_head)
if (platform_match(&pd->dev, &epdrv->pdrv->driver))
if (pd->id == id)
return pd;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: driver core: platform: fix race condition with driver_override
The driver_override implementation is susceptible to race condition when
different threads are reading vs storing a different driver override.
Add locking to avoid race condition.
Fixes: 3d713e0e382e ("driver core: platform: add device binding path 'driver_override'")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <salidoa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 63,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *ldb_dn_alloc_linearized(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct ldb_dn *dn)
{
return talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, ldb_dn_get_linearized(dn));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 2,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool on_tty(void) {
/* We check both stdout and stderr, so that situations where pipes on the shell are used are reliably
* recognized, regardless if only the output or the errors are piped to some place. Since on_tty() is generally
* used to default to a safer, non-interactive, non-color mode of operation it's probably good to be defensive
* here, and check for both. Note that we don't check for STDIN_FILENO, because it should fine to use fancy
* terminal functionality when outputting stuff, even if the input is piped to us. */
if (cached_on_tty < 0)
cached_on_tty =
isatty(STDOUT_FILENO) > 0 &&
isatty(STDERR_FILENO) > 0;
return cached_on_tty;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255 | 0 | 92,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dvd_read_bca(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi, dvd_struct *s,
struct packet_command *cgc)
{
int ret, size = 4 + 188;
u_char *buf;
const struct cdrom_device_ops *cdo = cdi->ops;
buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
init_cdrom_command(cgc, buf, size, CGC_DATA_READ);
cgc->cmd[0] = GPCMD_READ_DVD_STRUCTURE;
cgc->cmd[7] = s->type;
cgc->cmd[9] = cgc->buflen & 0xff;
ret = cdo->generic_packet(cdi, cgc);
if (ret)
goto out;
s->bca.len = buf[0] << 8 | buf[1];
if (s->bca.len < 12 || s->bca.len > 188) {
cd_dbg(CD_WARNING, "Received invalid BCA length (%d)\n",
s->bca.len);
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
memcpy(s->bca.value, &buf[4], s->bca.len);
ret = 0;
out:
kfree(buf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 76,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: getconfig(
int argc,
char ** argv
)
{
char line[MAXLINE];
#ifdef DEBUG
atexit(free_all_config_trees);
#endif
#ifndef SYS_WINNT
config_file = CONFIG_FILE;
#else
temp = CONFIG_FILE;
if (!ExpandEnvironmentStrings((LPCTSTR)temp, (LPTSTR)config_file_storage, (DWORD)sizeof(config_file_storage))) {
msyslog(LOG_ERR, "ExpandEnvironmentStrings CONFIG_FILE failed: %m\n");
exit(1);
}
config_file = config_file_storage;
temp = ALT_CONFIG_FILE;
if (!ExpandEnvironmentStrings((LPCTSTR)temp, (LPTSTR)alt_config_file_storage, (DWORD)sizeof(alt_config_file_storage))) {
msyslog(LOG_ERR, "ExpandEnvironmentStrings ALT_CONFIG_FILE failed: %m\n");
exit(1);
}
alt_config_file = alt_config_file_storage;
#endif /* SYS_WINNT */
/*
* install a non default variable with this daemon version
*/
snprintf(line, sizeof(line), "daemon_version=\"%s\"", Version);
set_sys_var(line, strlen(line)+1, RO);
/*
* Set up for the first time step to install a variable showing
* which syscall is being used to step.
*/
set_tod_using = &ntpd_set_tod_using;
/*
* On Windows, the variable has already been set, on the rest,
* initialize it to "UNKNOWN".
*/
#ifndef SYS_WINNT
strncpy(line, "settimeofday=\"UNKNOWN\"", sizeof(line));
set_sys_var(line, strlen(line) + 1, RO);
#endif
getCmdOpts(argc, argv);
init_syntax_tree(&cfgt);
curr_include_level = 0;
if (
(fp[curr_include_level] = F_OPEN(FindConfig(config_file), "r")) == NULL
#ifdef HAVE_NETINFO
/* If there is no config_file, try NetInfo. */
&& check_netinfo && !(config_netinfo = get_netinfo_config())
#endif /* HAVE_NETINFO */
) {
msyslog(LOG_INFO, "getconfig: Couldn't open <%s>", FindConfig(config_file));
#ifndef SYS_WINNT
io_open_sockets();
return;
#else
/* Under WinNT try alternate_config_file name, first NTP.CONF, then NTP.INI */
if ((fp[curr_include_level] = F_OPEN(FindConfig(alt_config_file), "r")) == NULL) {
/*
* Broadcast clients can sometimes run without
* a configuration file.
*/
msyslog(LOG_INFO, "getconfig: Couldn't open <%s>", FindConfig(alt_config_file));
io_open_sockets();
return;
}
cfgt.source.value.s = estrdup(alt_config_file);
#endif /* SYS_WINNT */
} else
cfgt.source.value.s = estrdup(config_file);
/*** BULK OF THE PARSER ***/
#ifdef DEBUG
yydebug = !!(debug >= 5);
#endif
ip_file = fp[curr_include_level];
yyparse();
DPRINTF(1, ("Finished Parsing!!\n"));
cfgt.source.attr = CONF_SOURCE_FILE;
cfgt.timestamp = time(NULL);
save_and_apply_config_tree();
while (curr_include_level != -1)
FCLOSE(fp[curr_include_level--]);
#ifdef HAVE_NETINFO
if (config_netinfo)
free_netinfo_config(config_netinfo);
#endif /* HAVE_NETINFO */
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ut64 MACH0_(get_baddr)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
int i;
if (bin->hdr.filetype != MH_EXECUTE && bin->hdr.filetype != MH_DYLINKER)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < bin->nsegs; ++i)
if (bin->segs[i].fileoff == 0 && bin->segs[i].filesize != 0)
return bin->segs[i].vmaddr;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 168,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sp<ABuffer> decodeBase64(const AString &s) {
size_t n = s.size();
if ((n % 4) != 0) {
return NULL;
}
size_t padding = 0;
if (n >= 1 && s.c_str()[n - 1] == '=') {
padding = 1;
if (n >= 2 && s.c_str()[n - 2] == '=') {
padding = 2;
if (n >= 3 && s.c_str()[n - 3] == '=') {
padding = 3;
}
}
}
size_t outLen = (n / 4) * 3 - padding;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(outLen);
uint8_t *out = buffer->data();
if (out == NULL || buffer->size() < outLen) {
return NULL;
}
size_t j = 0;
uint32_t accum = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
char c = s.c_str()[i];
unsigned value;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') {
value = c - 'A';
} else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') {
value = 26 + c - 'a';
} else if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
value = 52 + c - '0';
} else if (c == '+') {
value = 62;
} else if (c == '/') {
value = 63;
} else if (c != '=') {
return NULL;
} else {
if (i < n - padding) {
return NULL;
}
value = 0;
}
accum = (accum << 6) | value;
if (((i + 1) % 4) == 0) {
out[j++] = (accum >> 16);
if (j < outLen) { out[j++] = (accum >> 8) & 0xff; }
if (j < outLen) { out[j++] = accum & 0xff; }
accum = 0;
}
}
return buffer;
}
Commit Message: stagefright: avoid buffer overflow in base64 decoder
Bug: 62673128
Change-Id: Id5f04b772aaca3184879bd5bca453ad9e82c7f94
(cherry picked from commit 5e96386ab7a5391185f6b3ed9ea06f3e23ed253b)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,996 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct ipv6_txoptions *ipv6_update_options(struct sock *sk,
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt)
{
if (inet_sk(sk)->is_icsk) {
if (opt &&
!((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_LISTEN | TCPF_CLOSE)) &&
inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr != LOOPBACK4_IPV6) {
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen;
icsk->icsk_sync_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
}
}
opt = xchg(&inet6_sk(sk)->opt, opt);
sk_dst_reset(sk);
return opt;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 167,337 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BaseSettingChange::Contains(const BaseSettingChange* other) const {
return this == other;
}
Commit Message: [protector] Refactoring of --no-protector code.
*) On DSE change, new provider is not pushed to Sync.
*) Simplified code in BrowserInit.
BUG=None
TEST=protector.py
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10065016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132398 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 103,765 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionDevToolsInfoBarDelegate::ExtensionDevToolsInfoBarDelegate(
const base::Closure& dismissed_callback,
const std::string& client_name)
: ConfirmInfoBarDelegate(),
client_name_(base::UTF8ToUTF16(client_name)),
dismissed_callback_(dismissed_callback) {}
Commit Message: Allow to specify elide behavior for confrim infobar message
Used in "<extension name> is debugging this browser" infobar.
Bug: 823194
Change-Id: Iff6627097c020cccca8f7cc3e21a803a41fd8f2c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1048064
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557245}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 154,189 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ipxitf_rcv(struct ipx_interface *intrfc, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ipxhdr *ipx = ipx_hdr(skb);
int rc = 0;
ipxitf_hold(intrfc);
/* See if we should update our network number */
if (!intrfc->if_netnum) /* net number of intrfc not known yet */
ipxitf_discover_netnum(intrfc, skb);
IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->last_hop.index = -1;
if (ipx->ipx_type == IPX_TYPE_PPROP) {
rc = ipxitf_pprop(intrfc, skb);
if (rc)
goto out_free_skb;
}
/* local processing follows */
if (!IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_dest_net)
IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_dest_net = intrfc->if_netnum;
if (!IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_source_net)
IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_source_net = intrfc->if_netnum;
/* it doesn't make sense to route a pprop packet, there's no meaning
* in the ipx_dest_net for such packets */
if (ipx->ipx_type != IPX_TYPE_PPROP &&
intrfc->if_netnum != IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_dest_net) {
/* We only route point-to-point packets. */
if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_HOST) {
skb = skb_unshare(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb)
rc = ipxrtr_route_skb(skb);
goto out_intrfc;
}
goto out_free_skb;
}
/* see if we should keep it */
if (!memcmp(ipx_broadcast_node, ipx->ipx_dest.node, IPX_NODE_LEN) ||
!memcmp(intrfc->if_node, ipx->ipx_dest.node, IPX_NODE_LEN)) {
rc = ipxitf_demux_socket(intrfc, skb, 0);
goto out_intrfc;
}
/* we couldn't pawn it off so unload it */
out_free_skb:
kfree_skb(skb);
out_intrfc:
ipxitf_put(intrfc);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,463 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DictionaryValue* AutofillSpecificsToValue(
const sync_pb::AutofillSpecifics& proto) {
DictionaryValue* value = new DictionaryValue();
SET_STR(name);
SET_STR(value);
SET_INT64_REP(usage_timestamp);
SET(profile, AutofillProfileSpecificsToValue);
return value;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,214 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBox::imageChanged(WrappedImagePtr image, const IntRect*)
{
if (!parent())
return;
AllowRepaintScope scoper(frameView());
if ((style()->borderImage().image() && style()->borderImage().image()->data() == image) ||
(style()->maskBoxImage().image() && style()->maskBoxImage().image()->data() == image)) {
repaint();
return;
}
ShapeValue* shapeOutsideValue = style()->shapeOutside();
if (!frameView()->isInPerformLayout() && isFloating() && shapeOutsideValue && shapeOutsideValue->image() && shapeOutsideValue->image()->data() == image) {
ShapeOutsideInfo::ensureInfo(*this).markShapeAsDirty();
markShapeOutsideDependentsForLayout();
}
bool didFullRepaint = repaintLayerRectsForImage(image, style()->backgroundLayers(), true);
if (!didFullRepaint)
repaintLayerRectsForImage(image, style()->maskLayers(), false);
if (hasLayer() && layer()->hasCompositedMask() && layersUseImage(image, style()->maskLayers()))
layer()->contentChanged(MaskImageChanged);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,536 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int netlink_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
int len, val, err;
if (level != SOL_NETLINK)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (len < 0)
return -EINVAL;
switch (optname) {
case NETLINK_PKTINFO:
if (len < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(int);
val = nlk->flags & NETLINK_RECV_PKTINFO ? 1 : 0;
if (put_user(len, optlen) ||
put_user(val, optval))
return -EFAULT;
err = 0;
break;
case NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR:
if (len < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(int);
val = nlk->flags & NETLINK_BROADCAST_SEND_ERROR ? 1 : 0;
if (put_user(len, optlen) ||
put_user(val, optval))
return -EFAULT;
err = 0;
break;
case NETLINK_NO_ENOBUFS:
if (len < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(int);
val = nlk->flags & NETLINK_RECV_NO_ENOBUFS ? 1 : 0;
if (put_user(len, optlen) ||
put_user(val, optval))
return -EFAULT;
err = 0;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 19,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int get_compat_sigevent(struct sigevent *event,
const struct compat_sigevent __user *u_event)
{
memset(event, 0, sizeof(*event));
return (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, u_event, sizeof(*u_event)) ||
__get_user(event->sigev_value.sival_int,
&u_event->sigev_value.sival_int) ||
__get_user(event->sigev_signo, &u_event->sigev_signo) ||
__get_user(event->sigev_notify, &u_event->sigev_notify) ||
__get_user(event->sigev_notify_thread_id,
&u_event->sigev_notify_thread_id))
? -EFAULT : 0;
}
Commit Message: compat: fix 4-byte infoleak via uninitialized struct field
Commit 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to
native counterparts") removed the memset() in compat_get_timex(). Since
then, the compat adjtimex syscall can invoke do_adjtimex() with an
uninitialized ->tai.
If do_adjtimex() doesn't write to ->tai (e.g. because the arguments are
invalid), compat_put_timex() then copies the uninitialized ->tai field
to userspace.
Fix it by adding the memset() back.
Fixes: 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to native counterparts")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 82,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cdf_unpack_dir(cdf_directory_t *d, char *buf)
{
size_t len = 0;
CDF_UNPACKA(d->d_name);
CDF_UNPACK(d->d_namelen);
CDF_UNPACK(d->d_type);
CDF_UNPACK(d->d_color);
CDF_UNPACK(d->d_left_child);
CDF_UNPACK(d->d_right_child);
CDF_UNPACK(d->d_storage);
CDF_UNPACKA(d->d_storage_uuid);
CDF_UNPACK(d->d_flags);
CDF_UNPACK(d->d_created);
CDF_UNPACK(d->d_modified);
CDF_UNPACK(d->d_stream_first_sector);
CDF_UNPACK(d->d_size);
CDF_UNPACK(d->d_unused0);
}
Commit Message: Fix bounds checks again.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void br_ip6_multicast_leave_group(struct net_bridge *br,
struct net_bridge_port *port,
const struct in6_addr *group)
{
struct br_ip br_group;
if (ipv6_is_local_multicast(group))
return;
ipv6_addr_copy(&br_group.u.ip6, group);
br_group.proto = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
br_multicast_leave_group(br, port, &br_group);
}
Commit Message: bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <ihands@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::EstablishRequest::EstablishRequest()
: event(false, false),
gpu_process_handle(base::kNullProcessHandle) {
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 170,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CGaiaCredentialBase::UIProcessInfo::UIProcessInfo() {}
Commit Message: [GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled.
Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always
fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled.
Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or
googlemail.com domain.
Bug: 944049
Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903
Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 130,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mpeg4_decode_profile_level(MpegEncContext *s, GetBitContext *gb, int *profile, int *level)
{
*profile = get_bits(gb, 4);
*level = get_bits(gb, 4);
if (*profile == 0 && *level == 8) {
*level = 0;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check for bitstream end in read_quant_matrix_ext()
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: asff-crash-0e53d0dc491dfdd507530b66562812fbd4c36678
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 74,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void voidMethodUnsignedLongLongArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "voidMethodUnsignedLongLongArg", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(unsigned long long, unsignedLongLongArg, toUInt64(info[0], exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->voidMethodUnsignedLongLongArg(unsignedLongLongArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,909 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void iucv_callback_connack(struct iucv_path *path, u8 ipuser[16])
{
struct sock *sk = path->private;
sk->sk_state = IUCV_CONNECTED;
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
}
Commit Message: iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Cc: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(xml)
{
le_xml_parser = zend_register_list_destructors_ex(xml_parser_dtor, NULL, "xml", module_number);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_NONE", XML_ERROR_NONE, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY", XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_SYNTAX", XML_ERROR_SYNTAX, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS", XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN", XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN", XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR", XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_TAG_MISMATCH", XML_ERROR_TAG_MISMATCH, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ATTRIBUTE", XML_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ATTRIBUTE, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_JUNK_AFTER_DOC_ELEMENT", XML_ERROR_JUNK_AFTER_DOC_ELEMENT, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_PARAM_ENTITY_REF", XML_ERROR_PARAM_ENTITY_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_UNDEFINED_ENTITY", XML_ERROR_UNDEFINED_ENTITY, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_RECURSIVE_ENTITY_REF", XML_ERROR_RECURSIVE_ENTITY_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY", XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_BAD_CHAR_REF", XML_ERROR_BAD_CHAR_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_BINARY_ENTITY_REF", XML_ERROR_BINARY_ENTITY_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_ATTRIBUTE_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_REF", XML_ERROR_ATTRIBUTE_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_MISPLACED_XML_PI", XML_ERROR_MISPLACED_XML_PI, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ENCODING", XML_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ENCODING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_INCORRECT_ENCODING", XML_ERROR_INCORRECT_ENCODING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_CDATA_SECTION", XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_CDATA_SECTION, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING", XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_OPTION_CASE_FOLDING", PHP_XML_OPTION_CASE_FOLDING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_OPTION_TARGET_ENCODING", PHP_XML_OPTION_TARGET_ENCODING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_OPTION_SKIP_TAGSTART", PHP_XML_OPTION_SKIP_TAGSTART, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_OPTION_SKIP_WHITE", PHP_XML_OPTION_SKIP_WHITE, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
/* this object should not be pre-initialised at compile time,
as the order of members may vary */
php_xml_mem_hdlrs.malloc_fcn = php_xml_malloc_wrapper;
php_xml_mem_hdlrs.realloc_fcn = php_xml_realloc_wrapper;
php_xml_mem_hdlrs.free_fcn = php_xml_free_wrapper;
#ifdef LIBXML_EXPAT_COMPAT
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("XML_SAX_IMPL", "libxml", CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#else
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("XML_SAX_IMPL", "expat", CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,233 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ps_sd *ps_sd_lookup(ps_mm *data, const char *key, int rw)
{
php_uint32 hv, slot;
ps_sd *ret, *prev;
hv = ps_sd_hash(key, strlen(key));
slot = hv & data->hash_max;
for (prev = NULL, ret = data->hash[slot]; ret; prev = ret, ret = ret->next) {
if (ret->hv == hv && !strcmp(ret->key, key)) {
break;
}
}
if (ret && rw && ret != data->hash[slot]) {
/* Move the entry to the top of the linked list */
if (prev) {
prev->next = ret->next;
}
ret->next = data->hash[slot];
data->hash[slot] = ret;
}
ps_mm_debug(("lookup(%s): ret=%p,hv=%u,slot=%d\n", key, ret, hv, slot));
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,235 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssize_t intel_event_sysfs_show(char *page, u64 config)
{
u64 event = (config & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EVENT);
return x86_event_sysfs_show(page, config, event);
}
Commit Message: perf/x86: Fix offcore_rsp valid mask for SNB/IVB
The valid mask for both offcore_response_0 and
offcore_response_1 was wrong for SNB/SNB-EP,
IVB/IVB-EP. It was possible to write to
reserved bit and cause a GP fault crashing
the kernel.
This patch fixes the problem by correctly marking the
reserved bits in the valid mask for all the processors
mentioned above.
A distinction between desktop and server parts is introduced
because bits 24-30 are only available on the server parts.
This version of the patch is just a rebase to perf/urgent tree
and should apply to older kernels as well.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: jolsa@redhat.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 31,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceFetcher::scheduleDocumentResourcesGC()
{
if (!m_garbageCollectDocumentResourcesTimer.isActive())
m_garbageCollectDocumentResourcesTimer.startOneShot(0, FROM_HERE);
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 121,276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CustomElementRegistry* LocalDOMWindow::MaybeCustomElements() const {
return custom_elements_;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::Reload() {
reloading_ = true;
web_contents_->GetController().Reload(content::ReloadType::NORMAL, false);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 138,341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct sem_array *sem_obtain_lock(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int id)
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp;
struct sem_array *sma;
rcu_read_lock();
ipcp = ipc_obtain_object(&sem_ids(ns), id);
if (IS_ERR(ipcp)) {
sma = ERR_CAST(ipcp);
goto err;
}
spin_lock(&ipcp->lock);
/* ipc_rmid() may have already freed the ID while sem_lock
* was spinning: verify that the structure is still valid
*/
if (!ipcp->deleted)
return container_of(ipcp, struct sem_array, sem_perm);
spin_unlock(&ipcp->lock);
sma = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
err:
rcu_read_unlock();
return sma;
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 165,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cmd_login(char *tag, char *user)
{
char userbuf[MAX_MAILBOX_BUFFER];
char replybuf[MAX_MAILBOX_BUFFER];
unsigned userlen;
const char *canon_user = userbuf;
const void *val;
int c;
struct buf passwdbuf;
char *passwd;
const char *reply = NULL;
int r;
int failedloginpause;
if (imapd_userid) {
eatline(imapd_in, ' ');
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s BAD Already logged in\r\n", tag);
return;
}
r = imapd_canon_user(imapd_saslconn, NULL, user, 0,
SASL_CU_AUTHID | SASL_CU_AUTHZID, NULL,
userbuf, sizeof(userbuf), &userlen);
if (r) {
eatline(imapd_in, ' ');
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "badlogin: %s plaintext %s invalid user",
imapd_clienthost, beautify_string(user));
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO %s\r\n", tag,
error_message(IMAP_INVALID_USER));
return;
}
/* possibly disallow login */
if (imapd_tls_required ||
(!imapd_starttls_done && (extprops_ssf < 2) &&
!config_getswitch(IMAPOPT_ALLOWPLAINTEXT) &&
!is_userid_anonymous(canon_user))) {
eatline(imapd_in, ' ');
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO Login only available under a layer\r\n",
tag);
return;
}
memset(&passwdbuf,0,sizeof(struct buf));
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &passwdbuf);
if(c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') {
buf_free(&passwdbuf);
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Unexpected extra arguments to LOGIN\r\n",
tag);
eatline(imapd_in, c);
return;
}
passwd = passwdbuf.s;
if (is_userid_anonymous(canon_user)) {
if (config_getswitch(IMAPOPT_ALLOWANONYMOUSLOGIN)) {
passwd = beautify_string(passwd);
if (strlen(passwd) > 500) passwd[500] = '\0';
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "login: %s anonymous %s",
imapd_clienthost, passwd);
reply = "Anonymous access granted";
imapd_userid = xstrdup("anonymous");
}
else {
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "badlogin: %s anonymous login refused",
imapd_clienthost);
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO %s\r\n", tag,
error_message(IMAP_ANONYMOUS_NOT_PERMITTED));
buf_free(&passwdbuf);
return;
}
}
else if ( nosaslpasswdcheck ) {
snprintf(replybuf, sizeof(replybuf),
"User logged in SESSIONID=<%s>", session_id());
reply = replybuf;
imapd_userid = xstrdup(canon_user);
imapd_authstate = auth_newstate(canon_user);
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "login: %s %s%s nopassword%s %s", imapd_clienthost,
imapd_userid, imapd_magicplus ? imapd_magicplus : "",
imapd_starttls_done ? "+TLS" : "", reply);
}
else if ((r = sasl_checkpass(imapd_saslconn,
canon_user,
strlen(canon_user),
passwd,
strlen(passwd))) != SASL_OK) {
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "badlogin: %s plaintext %s %s",
imapd_clienthost, canon_user, sasl_errdetail(imapd_saslconn));
failedloginpause = config_getint(IMAPOPT_FAILEDLOGINPAUSE);
if (failedloginpause != 0) {
sleep(failedloginpause);
}
/* Don't allow user probing */
if (r == SASL_NOUSER) r = SASL_BADAUTH;
if ((reply = sasl_errstring(r, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO Login failed: %s\r\n", tag, reply);
} else {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO Login failed: %d\r\n", tag, r);
}
snmp_increment_args(AUTHENTICATION_NO, 1,
VARIABLE_AUTH, 0 /* hash_simple("LOGIN") */,
VARIABLE_LISTEND);
buf_free(&passwdbuf);
return;
}
else {
r = sasl_getprop(imapd_saslconn, SASL_USERNAME, &val);
if(r != SASL_OK) {
if ((reply = sasl_errstring(r, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO Login failed: %s\r\n",
tag, reply);
} else {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO Login failed: %d\r\n", tag, r);
}
snmp_increment_args(AUTHENTICATION_NO, 1,
VARIABLE_AUTH, 0 /* hash_simple("LOGIN") */,
VARIABLE_LISTEND);
buf_free(&passwdbuf);
return;
}
snprintf(replybuf, sizeof(replybuf),
"User logged in SESSIONID=<%s>", session_id());
reply = replybuf;
imapd_userid = xstrdup((const char *) val);
snmp_increment_args(AUTHENTICATION_YES, 1,
VARIABLE_AUTH, 0 /*hash_simple("LOGIN") */,
VARIABLE_LISTEND);
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "login: %s %s%s plaintext%s %s", imapd_clienthost,
imapd_userid, imapd_magicplus ? imapd_magicplus : "",
imapd_starttls_done ? "+TLS" : "",
reply ? reply : "");
/* Apply penalty only if not under layer */
if (!imapd_starttls_done) {
int plaintextloginpause = config_getint(IMAPOPT_PLAINTEXTLOGINPAUSE);
if (plaintextloginpause) {
sleep(plaintextloginpause);
}
/* Fetch plaintext login nag message */
plaintextloginalert = config_getstring(IMAPOPT_PLAINTEXTLOGINALERT);
}
}
buf_free(&passwdbuf);
if (checklimits(tag)) return;
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK [CAPABILITY ", tag);
capa_response(CAPA_PREAUTH|CAPA_POSTAUTH);
prot_printf(imapd_out, "] %s\r\n", reply);
authentication_success();
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,153 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void voidMethodCompareHowArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("voidMethodCompareHowArg", "TestObjectPython", ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(Range::CompareHow, compareHowArg, static_cast<Range::CompareHow>(info[0]->Int32Value()));
imp->voidMethodCompareHowArg(compareHowArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _pixman_image_get_scanline_generic_float (pixman_iter_t * iter,
const uint32_t *mask)
{
pixman_iter_get_scanline_t fetch_32 = iter->data;
uint32_t *buffer = iter->buffer;
fetch_32 (iter, NULL);
pixman_expand_to_float ((argb_t *)buffer, buffer, PIXMAN_a8r8g8b8, iter->width);
return iter->buffer;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 15,426 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_push(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
struct segmented_address addr;
register_address_increment(ctxt, &ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP], -ctxt->op_bytes);
addr.ea = register_address(ctxt, ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP]);
addr.seg = VCPU_SREG_SS;
/* Disable writeback. */
ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
return segmented_write(ctxt, addr, &ctxt->src.val, ctxt->op_bytes);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sctp_packet *sctp_ootb_pkt_new(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
struct sctp_packet *packet;
struct sctp_transport *transport;
__u16 sport;
__u16 dport;
__u32 vtag;
/* Get the source and destination port from the inbound packet. */
sport = ntohs(chunk->sctp_hdr->dest);
dport = ntohs(chunk->sctp_hdr->source);
/* The V-tag is going to be the same as the inbound packet if no
* association exists, otherwise, use the peer's vtag.
*/
if (asoc) {
/* Special case the INIT-ACK as there is no peer's vtag
* yet.
*/
switch(chunk->chunk_hdr->type) {
case SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK:
{
sctp_initack_chunk_t *initack;
initack = (sctp_initack_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr;
vtag = ntohl(initack->init_hdr.init_tag);
break;
}
default:
vtag = asoc->peer.i.init_tag;
break;
}
} else {
/* Special case the INIT and stale COOKIE_ECHO as there is no
* vtag yet.
*/
switch(chunk->chunk_hdr->type) {
case SCTP_CID_INIT:
{
sctp_init_chunk_t *init;
init = (sctp_init_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr;
vtag = ntohl(init->init_hdr.init_tag);
break;
}
default:
vtag = ntohl(chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag);
break;
}
}
/* Make a transport for the bucket, Eliza... */
transport = sctp_transport_new(net, sctp_source(chunk), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!transport)
goto nomem;
/* Cache a route for the transport with the chunk's destination as
* the source address.
*/
sctp_transport_route(transport, (union sctp_addr *)&chunk->dest,
sctp_sk(net->sctp.ctl_sock));
packet = sctp_packet_init(&transport->packet, transport, sport, dport);
packet = sctp_packet_config(packet, vtag, 0);
return packet;
nomem:
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 31,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ftp_do_pasv (int csock, ip_address *addr, int *port)
{
uerr_t err;
/* We need to determine the address family and need to call
getpeername, so while we're at it, store the address to ADDR.
ftp_pasv and ftp_lpsv can simply override it. */
if (!socket_ip_address (csock, addr, ENDPOINT_PEER))
abort ();
/* If our control connection is over IPv6, then we first try EPSV and then
* LPSV if the former is not supported. If the control connection is over
* IPv4, we simply issue the good old PASV request. */
switch (addr->family)
{
case AF_INET:
if (!opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> PASV ... ");
err = ftp_pasv (csock, addr, port);
break;
case AF_INET6:
if (!opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> EPSV ... ");
err = ftp_epsv (csock, addr, port);
/* If EPSV is not supported try LPSV */
if (err == FTPNOPASV)
{
if (!opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> LPSV ... ");
err = ftp_lpsv (csock, addr, port);
}
break;
default:
abort ();
}
return err;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Response TargetHandler::SetDiscoverTargets(bool discover) {
if (discover_ == discover)
return Response::OK();
discover_ = discover;
if (discover_) {
DevToolsAgentHost::AddObserver(this);
} else {
DevToolsAgentHost::RemoveObserver(this);
reported_hosts_.clear();
}
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int setkey(struct crypto_tfm *parent, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
struct priv *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(parent);
struct crypto_cipher *child = ctx->tweak;
u32 *flags = &parent->crt_flags;
int err;
/* key consists of keys of equal size concatenated, therefore
* the length must be even */
if (keylen % 2) {
/* tell the user why there was an error */
*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
return -EINVAL;
}
/* we need two cipher instances: one to compute the initial 'tweak'
* by encrypting the IV (usually the 'plain' iv) and the other
* one to encrypt and decrypt the data */
/* tweak cipher, uses Key2 i.e. the second half of *key */
crypto_cipher_clear_flags(child, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
crypto_cipher_set_flags(child, crypto_tfm_get_flags(parent) &
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
err = crypto_cipher_setkey(child, key + keylen/2, keylen/2);
if (err)
return err;
crypto_tfm_set_flags(parent, crypto_cipher_get_flags(child) &
CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
child = ctx->child;
/* data cipher, uses Key1 i.e. the first half of *key */
crypto_cipher_clear_flags(child, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
crypto_cipher_set_flags(child, crypto_tfm_get_flags(parent) &
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
err = crypto_cipher_setkey(child, key, keylen/2);
if (err)
return err;
crypto_tfm_set_flags(parent, crypto_cipher_get_flags(child) &
CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: htmlCtxtReadFile(htmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const char *filename,
const char *encoding, int options)
{
xmlParserInputPtr stream;
if (filename == NULL)
return (NULL);
if (ctxt == NULL)
return (NULL);
xmlInitParser();
htmlCtxtReset(ctxt);
stream = xmlLoadExternalEntity(filename, NULL, ctxt);
if (stream == NULL) {
return (NULL);
}
inputPush(ctxt, stream);
return (htmlDoRead(ctxt, NULL, encoding, options, 1));
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 150,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t FLACExtractor::init()
{
mFileMetadata = new MetaData;
mTrackMetadata = new MetaData;
mParser = new FLACParser(mDataSource, mFileMetadata, mTrackMetadata);
return mParser->initCheck();
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 162,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sd_source_prepare (GSource *source,
gint *timeout)
{
*timeout = -1;
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 14,596 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API bool r_anal_bb_set_offset(RAnalBlock *bb, int i, ut16 v) {
if (i > 0 && v > 0) {
if (i >= bb->op_pos_size) {
int new_pos_size = i * 2;
ut16 *tmp_op_pos = realloc (bb->op_pos, new_pos_size * sizeof (*bb->op_pos));
if (!tmp_op_pos) {
return false;
}
bb->op_pos_size = new_pos_size;
bb->op_pos = tmp_op_pos;
}
bb->op_pos[i - 1] = v;
return true;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix #10293 - Use-after-free in r_anal_bb_free()
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 82,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssize_t libevt_record_values_read(
libevt_record_values_t *record_values,
libbfio_handle_t *file_io_handle,
libevt_io_handle_t *io_handle,
off64_t *file_offset,
uint8_t strict_mode,
libcerror_error_t **error )
{
uint8_t record_size_data[ 4 ];
uint8_t *record_data = NULL;
static char *function = "libevt_record_values_read";
size_t read_size = 0;
size_t record_data_offset = 0;
ssize_t read_count = 0;
ssize_t total_read_count = 0;
uint32_t record_data_size = 0;
if( record_values == NULL )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_ARGUMENTS,
LIBCERROR_ARGUMENT_ERROR_INVALID_VALUE,
"%s: invalid record values.",
function );
return( -1 );
}
if( io_handle == NULL )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_ARGUMENTS,
LIBCERROR_ARGUMENT_ERROR_INVALID_VALUE,
"%s: invalid IO handle.",
function );
return( -1 );
}
if( file_offset == NULL )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_ARGUMENTS,
LIBCERROR_ARGUMENT_ERROR_INVALID_VALUE,
"%s: invalid file offset.",
function );
return( -1 );
}
record_values->offset = *file_offset;
read_count = libbfio_handle_read_buffer(
file_io_handle,
record_size_data,
sizeof( uint32_t ),
error );
if( read_count != (ssize_t) sizeof( uint32_t ) )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_IO,
LIBCERROR_IO_ERROR_READ_FAILED,
"%s: unable to read record size data.",
function );
goto on_error;
}
*file_offset += read_count;
total_read_count = read_count;
byte_stream_copy_to_uint32_little_endian(
record_size_data,
record_data_size );
if( record_data_size < 4 )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_RUNTIME,
LIBCERROR_RUNTIME_ERROR_VALUE_OUT_OF_BOUNDS,
"%s: record data size value out of bounds.",
function );
goto on_error;
}
#if SIZEOF_SIZE_T <= 4
if( (size_t) record_data_size > (size_t) SSIZE_MAX )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_RUNTIME,
LIBCERROR_RUNTIME_ERROR_VALUE_EXCEEDS_MAXIMUM,
"%s: invalid record data size value exceeds maximum.",
function );
goto on_error;
}
#endif
/* Allocating record data as 4 bytes and then using realloc here
* corrupts the memory
*/
record_data = (uint8_t *) memory_allocate(
sizeof( uint8_t ) * record_data_size );
if( record_data == NULL )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_MEMORY,
LIBCERROR_MEMORY_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT,
"%s: unable to create record data.",
function );
goto on_error;
}
byte_stream_copy_from_uint32_little_endian(
record_data,
record_data_size );
record_data_offset = 4;
read_size = record_data_size - record_data_offset;
if( ( (size64_t) *file_offset + read_size ) > io_handle->file_size )
{
read_size = (size_t) ( io_handle->file_size - *file_offset );
}
read_count = libbfio_handle_read_buffer(
file_io_handle,
&( record_data[ record_data_offset ] ),
read_size,
error );
if( read_count != (ssize_t) read_size )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_IO,
LIBCERROR_IO_ERROR_READ_FAILED,
"%s: unable to read record data.",
function );
goto on_error;
}
*file_offset += read_count;
record_data_offset += read_count;
total_read_count += read_count;
if( record_data_offset < (size_t) record_data_size )
{
if( libbfio_handle_seek_offset(
file_io_handle,
(off64_t) sizeof( evt_file_header_t ),
SEEK_SET,
error ) == -1 )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_IO,
LIBCERROR_IO_ERROR_SEEK_FAILED,
"%s: unable to seek file header offset: %" PRIzd ".",
function,
sizeof( evt_file_header_t ) );
goto on_error;
}
*file_offset = (off64_t) sizeof( evt_file_header_t );
read_size = (size_t) record_data_size - record_data_offset;
read_count = libbfio_handle_read_buffer(
file_io_handle,
&( record_data[ record_data_offset ] ),
read_size,
error );
if( read_count != (ssize_t) read_size )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_IO,
LIBCERROR_IO_ERROR_READ_FAILED,
"%s: unable to read record data.",
function );
goto on_error;
}
*file_offset += read_count;
total_read_count += read_count;
}
#if defined( HAVE_DEBUG_OUTPUT )
if( libcnotify_verbose != 0 )
{
libcnotify_printf(
"%s: record data:\n",
function );
libcnotify_print_data(
record_data,
(size_t) record_data_size,
LIBCNOTIFY_PRINT_DATA_FLAG_GROUP_DATA );
}
#endif
if( memory_compare(
&( record_data[ 4 ] ),
evt_file_signature,
4 ) == 0 )
{
record_values->type = LIBEVT_RECORD_TYPE_EVENT;
}
else if( memory_compare(
&( record_data[ 4 ] ),
evt_end_of_file_record_signature1,
4 ) == 0 )
{
record_values->type = LIBEVT_RECORD_TYPE_END_OF_FILE;
}
else
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_RUNTIME,
LIBCERROR_RUNTIME_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VALUE,
"%s: unsupported record values signature.",
function );
goto on_error;
}
if( record_values->type == LIBEVT_RECORD_TYPE_EVENT )
{
if( libevt_record_values_read_event(
record_values,
record_data,
(size_t) record_data_size,
strict_mode,
error ) != 1 )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_IO,
LIBCERROR_IO_ERROR_READ_FAILED,
"%s: unable to read event record values.",
function );
goto on_error;
}
}
else if( record_values->type == LIBEVT_RECORD_TYPE_END_OF_FILE )
{
if( libevt_record_values_read_end_of_file(
record_values,
record_data,
(size_t) record_data_size,
error ) != 1 )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_IO,
LIBCERROR_IO_ERROR_READ_FAILED,
"%s: unable to read end of file record values.",
function );
goto on_error;
}
}
memory_free(
record_data );
return( total_read_count );
on_error:
if( record_data != NULL )
{
memory_free(
record_data );
}
return( -1 );
}
Commit Message: Applied updates and addition boundary checks for corrupted data
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 83,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual status_t requestBuffer(int bufferIdx, sp<GraphicBuffer>* buf) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IGraphicBufferProducer::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32(bufferIdx);
status_t result =remote()->transact(REQUEST_BUFFER, data, &reply);
if (result != NO_ERROR) {
return result;
}
bool nonNull = reply.readInt32();
if (nonNull) {
*buf = new GraphicBuffer();
result = reply.read(**buf);
if(result != NO_ERROR) {
(*buf).clear();
return result;
}
}
result = reply.readInt32();
return result;
}
Commit Message: BQ: fix some uninitialized variables
Bug 27555981
Bug 27556038
Change-Id: I436b6fec589677d7e36c0e980f6e59808415dc0e
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 160,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int irda_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct irda_sock *self = irda_sk(sk);
struct irda_device_list list;
struct irda_device_info *discoveries;
struct irda_ias_set * ias_opt; /* IAS get/query params */
struct ias_object * ias_obj; /* Object in IAS */
struct ias_attrib * ias_attr; /* Attribute in IAS object */
int daddr = DEV_ADDR_ANY; /* Dest address for IAS queries */
int val = 0;
int len = 0;
int err = 0;
int offset, total;
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "%s(%p)\n", __func__, self);
if (level != SOL_IRLMP)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if(len < 0)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case IRLMP_ENUMDEVICES:
/* Offset to first device entry */
offset = sizeof(struct irda_device_list) -
sizeof(struct irda_device_info);
if (len < offset) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Ask lmp for the current discovery log */
discoveries = irlmp_get_discoveries(&list.len, self->mask.word,
self->nslots);
/* Check if the we got some results */
if (discoveries == NULL) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto out; /* Didn't find any devices */
}
/* Write total list length back to client */
if (copy_to_user(optval, &list, offset))
err = -EFAULT;
/* Copy the list itself - watch for overflow */
if (list.len > 2048) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto bed;
}
total = offset + (list.len * sizeof(struct irda_device_info));
if (total > len)
total = len;
if (copy_to_user(optval+offset, discoveries, total - offset))
err = -EFAULT;
/* Write total number of bytes used back to client */
if (put_user(total, optlen))
err = -EFAULT;
bed:
/* Free up our buffer */
kfree(discoveries);
break;
case IRLMP_MAX_SDU_SIZE:
val = self->max_data_size;
len = sizeof(int);
if (put_user(len, optlen)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
if (copy_to_user(optval, &val, len)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
break;
case IRLMP_IAS_GET:
/* The user want an object from our local IAS database.
* We just need to query the IAS and return the value
* that we found */
/* Check that the user has allocated the right space for us */
if (len != sizeof(struct irda_ias_set)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ias_opt = kmalloc(sizeof(struct irda_ias_set), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ias_opt == NULL) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
/* Copy query to the driver. */
if (copy_from_user(ias_opt, optval, len)) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
/* Find the object we target.
* If the user gives us an empty string, we use the object
* associated with this socket. This will workaround
* duplicated class name - Jean II */
if(ias_opt->irda_class_name[0] == '\0')
ias_obj = self->ias_obj;
else
ias_obj = irias_find_object(ias_opt->irda_class_name);
if(ias_obj == (struct ias_object *) NULL) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Find the attribute (in the object) we target */
ias_attr = irias_find_attrib(ias_obj,
ias_opt->irda_attrib_name);
if(ias_attr == (struct ias_attrib *) NULL) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Translate from internal to user structure */
err = irda_extract_ias_value(ias_opt, ias_attr->value);
if(err) {
kfree(ias_opt);
goto out;
}
/* Copy reply to the user */
if (copy_to_user(optval, ias_opt,
sizeof(struct irda_ias_set))) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
/* Note : don't need to put optlen, we checked it */
kfree(ias_opt);
break;
case IRLMP_IAS_QUERY:
/* The user want an object from a remote IAS database.
* We need to use IAP to query the remote database and
* then wait for the answer to come back. */
/* Check that the user has allocated the right space for us */
if (len != sizeof(struct irda_ias_set)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ias_opt = kmalloc(sizeof(struct irda_ias_set), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ias_opt == NULL) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
/* Copy query to the driver. */
if (copy_from_user(ias_opt, optval, len)) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
/* At this point, there are two cases...
* 1) the socket is connected - that's the easy case, we
* just query the device we are connected to...
* 2) the socket is not connected - the user doesn't want
* to connect and/or may not have a valid service name
* (so can't create a fake connection). In this case,
* we assume that the user pass us a valid destination
* address in the requesting structure...
*/
if(self->daddr != DEV_ADDR_ANY) {
/* We are connected - reuse known daddr */
daddr = self->daddr;
} else {
/* We are not connected, we must specify a valid
* destination address */
daddr = ias_opt->daddr;
if((!daddr) || (daddr == DEV_ADDR_ANY)) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
/* Check that we can proceed with IAP */
if (self->iriap) {
IRDA_WARNING("%s: busy with a previous query\n",
__func__);
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
self->iriap = iriap_open(LSAP_ANY, IAS_CLIENT, self,
irda_getvalue_confirm);
if (self->iriap == NULL) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
/* Treat unexpected wakeup as disconnect */
self->errno = -EHOSTUNREACH;
/* Query remote LM-IAS */
iriap_getvaluebyclass_request(self->iriap,
self->saddr, daddr,
ias_opt->irda_class_name,
ias_opt->irda_attrib_name);
/* Wait for answer, if not yet finished (or failed) */
if (wait_event_interruptible(self->query_wait,
(self->iriap == NULL))) {
/* pending request uses copy of ias_opt-content
* we can free it regardless! */
kfree(ias_opt);
/* Treat signals as disconnect */
err = -EHOSTUNREACH;
goto out;
}
/* Check what happened */
if (self->errno)
{
kfree(ias_opt);
/* Requested object/attribute doesn't exist */
if((self->errno == IAS_CLASS_UNKNOWN) ||
(self->errno == IAS_ATTRIB_UNKNOWN))
err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
else
err = -EHOSTUNREACH;
goto out;
}
/* Translate from internal to user structure */
err = irda_extract_ias_value(ias_opt, self->ias_result);
if (self->ias_result)
irias_delete_value(self->ias_result);
if (err) {
kfree(ias_opt);
goto out;
}
/* Copy reply to the user */
if (copy_to_user(optval, ias_opt,
sizeof(struct irda_ias_set))) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
/* Note : don't need to put optlen, we checked it */
kfree(ias_opt);
break;
case IRLMP_WAITDEVICE:
/* This function is just another way of seeing life ;-)
* IRLMP_ENUMDEVICES assumes that you have a static network,
* and that you just want to pick one of the devices present.
* On the other hand, in here we assume that no device is
* present and that at some point in the future a device will
* come into range. When this device arrive, we just wake
* up the caller, so that he has time to connect to it before
* the device goes away...
* Note : once the node has been discovered for more than a
* few second, it won't trigger this function, unless it
* goes away and come back changes its hint bits (so we
* might call it IRLMP_WAITNEWDEVICE).
*/
/* Check that the user is passing us an int */
if (len != sizeof(int)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Get timeout in ms (max time we block the caller) */
if (get_user(val, (int __user *)optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
/* Tell IrLMP we want to be notified */
irlmp_update_client(self->ckey, self->mask.word,
irda_selective_discovery_indication,
NULL, (void *) self);
/* Do some discovery (and also return cached results) */
irlmp_discovery_request(self->nslots);
/* Wait until a node is discovered */
if (!self->cachedaddr) {
IRDA_DEBUG(1, "%s(), nothing discovered yet, going to sleep...\n", __func__);
/* Set watchdog timer to expire in <val> ms. */
self->errno = 0;
setup_timer(&self->watchdog, irda_discovery_timeout,
(unsigned long)self);
mod_timer(&self->watchdog,
jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(val));
/* Wait for IR-LMP to call us back */
err = __wait_event_interruptible(self->query_wait,
(self->cachedaddr != 0 || self->errno == -ETIME));
/* If watchdog is still activated, kill it! */
del_timer(&(self->watchdog));
IRDA_DEBUG(1, "%s(), ...waking up !\n", __func__);
if (err != 0)
goto out;
}
else
IRDA_DEBUG(1, "%s(), found immediately !\n",
__func__);
/* Tell IrLMP that we have been notified */
irlmp_update_client(self->ckey, self->mask.word,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
/* Check if the we got some results */
if (!self->cachedaddr) {
err = -EAGAIN; /* Didn't find any devices */
goto out;
}
daddr = self->cachedaddr;
/* Cleanup */
self->cachedaddr = 0;
/* We return the daddr of the device that trigger the
* wakeup. As irlmp pass us only the new devices, we
* are sure that it's not an old device.
* If the user want more details, he should query
* the whole discovery log and pick one device...
*/
if (put_user(daddr, (int __user *)optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline size_t snd_compr_get_avail(struct snd_compr_stream *stream)
{
struct snd_compr_avail avail;
return snd_compr_calc_avail(stream, &avail);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress: fix an integer overflow check
I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now,
it's still buggy.
The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer(). We multiply
".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we
save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we
allocate a smaller than expected size.
Fixes: b35cc8225845 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 58,075 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintODTiming(GF_Terminal *term, GF_ObjectManager *odm, u32 indent)
{
GF_MediaInfo odi;
u32 ind = indent;
u32 i, count;
if (!odm) return;
if (gf_term_get_object_info(term, odm, &odi) != GF_OK) return;
if (!odi.od) {
fprintf(stderr, "Service not attached\n");
return;
}
while (ind) {
fprintf(stderr, " ");
ind--;
}
if (! odi.generated_scene) {
fprintf(stderr, "- OD %d: ", odi.od->objectDescriptorID);
switch (odi.status) {
case 1:
fprintf(stderr, "Playing - ");
break;
case 2:
fprintf(stderr, "Paused - ");
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Stopped - ");
break;
}
if (odi.buffer>=0) fprintf(stderr, "Buffer: %d ms - ", odi.buffer);
else fprintf(stderr, "Not buffering - ");
fprintf(stderr, "Clock drift: %d ms", odi.clock_drift);
fprintf(stderr, " - time: ");
PrintTime((u32) (odi.current_time*1000));
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "+ Service %s:\n", odi.service_url);
}
count = gf_term_get_object_count(term, odm);
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
GF_ObjectManager *an_odm = gf_term_get_object(term, odm, i);
PrintODTiming(term, an_odm, indent+1);
}
return;
}
Commit Message: add some boundary checks on gf_text_get_utf8_line (#1188)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 92,807 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt)
{
struct l2cap_chan_list *l;
struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
struct sock *sk;
if (!conn)
return 0;
l = &conn->chan_list;
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
read_lock(&l->lock);
for (sk = l->head; sk; sk = l2cap_pi(sk)->next_c) {
bh_lock_sock(sk);
if (l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state & L2CAP_CONF_CONNECT_PEND) {
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
continue;
}
if (!status && (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECTED ||
sk->sk_state == BT_CONFIG)) {
l2cap_check_encryption(sk, encrypt);
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
continue;
}
if (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECT) {
if (!status) {
struct l2cap_conn_req req;
req.scid = cpu_to_le16(l2cap_pi(sk)->scid);
req.psm = l2cap_pi(sk)->psm;
l2cap_pi(sk)->ident = l2cap_get_ident(conn);
l2cap_send_cmd(conn, l2cap_pi(sk)->ident,
L2CAP_CONN_REQ, sizeof(req), &req);
} else {
l2cap_sock_clear_timer(sk);
l2cap_sock_set_timer(sk, HZ / 10);
}
} else if (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECT2) {
struct l2cap_conn_rsp rsp;
__u16 result;
if (!status) {
sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG;
result = L2CAP_CR_SUCCESS;
} else {
sk->sk_state = BT_DISCONN;
l2cap_sock_set_timer(sk, HZ / 10);
result = L2CAP_CR_SEC_BLOCK;
}
rsp.scid = cpu_to_le16(l2cap_pi(sk)->dcid);
rsp.dcid = cpu_to_le16(l2cap_pi(sk)->scid);
rsp.result = cpu_to_le16(result);
rsp.status = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CS_NO_INFO);
l2cap_send_cmd(conn, l2cap_pi(sk)->ident,
L2CAP_CONN_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
}
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
}
read_unlock(&l->lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <gustavo@las.ic.unicamp.br>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 58,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rb_advance_reader(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
{
struct ring_buffer_event *event;
struct buffer_page *reader;
unsigned length;
reader = rb_get_reader_page(cpu_buffer);
/* This function should not be called when buffer is empty */
if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, !reader))
return;
event = rb_reader_event(cpu_buffer);
if (event->type_len <= RINGBUF_TYPE_DATA_TYPE_LEN_MAX)
cpu_buffer->read++;
rb_update_read_stamp(cpu_buffer, event);
length = rb_event_length(event);
cpu_buffer->reader_page->read += length;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,515 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void anon_vma_free(struct anon_vma *anon_vma)
{
VM_BUG_ON(atomic_read(&anon_vma->refcount));
/*
* Synchronize against page_lock_anon_vma_read() such that
* we can safely hold the lock without the anon_vma getting
* freed.
*
* Relies on the full mb implied by the atomic_dec_and_test() from
* put_anon_vma() against the acquire barrier implied by
* down_read_trylock() from page_lock_anon_vma_read(). This orders:
*
* page_lock_anon_vma_read() VS put_anon_vma()
* down_read_trylock() atomic_dec_and_test()
* LOCK MB
* atomic_read() rwsem_is_locked()
*
* LOCK should suffice since the actual taking of the lock must
* happen _before_ what follows.
*/
if (rwsem_is_locked(&anon_vma->root->rwsem)) {
anon_vma_lock_write(anon_vma);
anon_vma_unlock_write(anon_vma);
}
kmem_cache_free(anon_vma_cachep, anon_vma);
}
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 38,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GURL GetURLForLayoutTest(const std::string& test_name,
base::FilePath* current_working_directory,
bool* enable_pixel_dumping,
std::string* expected_pixel_hash) {
std::string path_or_url = test_name;
std::string pixel_switch;
std::string pixel_hash;
std::string::size_type separator_position = path_or_url.find('\'');
if (separator_position != std::string::npos) {
pixel_switch = path_or_url.substr(separator_position + 1);
path_or_url.erase(separator_position);
}
separator_position = pixel_switch.find('\'');
if (separator_position != std::string::npos) {
pixel_hash = pixel_switch.substr(separator_position + 1);
pixel_switch.erase(separator_position);
}
if (enable_pixel_dumping) {
*enable_pixel_dumping =
(pixel_switch == "--pixel-test" || pixel_switch == "-p");
}
if (expected_pixel_hash)
*expected_pixel_hash = pixel_hash;
GURL test_url;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (content::GetTestUrlForAndroid(path_or_url, &test_url))
return test_url;
#endif
test_url = GURL(path_or_url);
if (!(test_url.is_valid() && test_url.has_scheme())) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowIO allow_io;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
base::FilePath::StringType wide_path_or_url =
base::SysNativeMBToWide(path_or_url);
base::FilePath local_file(wide_path_or_url);
#else
base::FilePath local_file(path_or_url);
#endif
if (!base::PathExists(local_file)) {
local_file = content::GetWebKitRootDirFilePath()
.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("LayoutTests"))
.Append(local_file);
}
test_url = net::FilePathToFileURL(base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(local_file));
}
base::FilePath local_path;
if (current_working_directory) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowIO allow_io;
if (net::FileURLToFilePath(test_url, &local_path))
*current_working_directory = local_path.DirName();
else
base::GetCurrentDirectory(current_working_directory);
}
return test_url;
}
Commit Message: Content Shell: Move shell_layout_tests_android into layout_tests/.
BUG=420994
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/661743002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299892}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 110,823 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static HB_Error Load_PairPos( HB_GPOS_SubTable* st,
HB_Stream stream )
{
HB_Error error;
HB_PairPos* pp = &st->pair;
HB_UShort format1, format2;
HB_UInt cur_offset, new_offset, base_offset;
base_offset = FILE_Pos();
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 8L ) )
return error;
pp->PosFormat = GET_UShort();
new_offset = GET_UShort() + base_offset;
format1 = pp->ValueFormat1 = GET_UShort();
format2 = pp->ValueFormat2 = GET_UShort();
FORGET_Frame();
cur_offset = FILE_Pos();
if ( FILE_Seek( new_offset ) ||
( error = _HB_OPEN_Load_Coverage( &pp->Coverage, stream ) ) != HB_Err_Ok )
return error;
(void)FILE_Seek( cur_offset );
switch ( pp->PosFormat )
{
case 1:
error = Load_PairPos1( &pp->ppf.ppf1, format1, format2, stream );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
break;
case 2:
error = Load_PairPos2( &pp->ppf.ppf2, format1, format2, stream );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
break;
default:
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_SubTable_Format);
}
return HB_Err_Ok;
Fail:
_HB_OPEN_Free_Coverage( &pp->Coverage );
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fs_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, int length)
{
int fs_op;
unsigned long i;
if (length <= (int)sizeof(struct rx_header))
return;
if (ndo->ndo_snapend - bp + 1 <= (int)(sizeof(struct rx_header) + sizeof(int32_t))) {
goto trunc;
}
/*
* Print out the afs call we're invoking. The table used here was
* gleaned from fsint/afsint.xg
*/
fs_op = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp + sizeof(struct rx_header));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fs call %s", tok2str(fs_req, "op#%d", fs_op)));
/*
* Print out arguments to some of the AFS calls. This stuff is
* all from afsint.xg
*/
bp += sizeof(struct rx_header) + 4;
/*
* Sigh. This is gross. Ritchie forgive me.
*/
switch (fs_op) {
case 130: /* Fetch data */
FIDOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " offset"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " length"));
UINTOUT();
break;
case 131: /* Fetch ACL */
case 132: /* Fetch Status */
case 143: /* Old set lock */
case 144: /* Old extend lock */
case 145: /* Old release lock */
case 156: /* Set lock */
case 157: /* Extend lock */
case 158: /* Release lock */
FIDOUT();
break;
case 135: /* Store status */
FIDOUT();
STOREATTROUT();
break;
case 133: /* Store data */
FIDOUT();
STOREATTROUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " offset"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " length"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " flen"));
UINTOUT();
break;
case 134: /* Store ACL */
{
char a[AFSOPAQUEMAX+1];
FIDOUT();
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
i = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], i);
i = min(AFSOPAQUEMAX, i);
strncpy(a, (const char *) bp, i);
a[i] = '\0';
acl_print(ndo, (u_char *) a, sizeof(a), (u_char *) a + i);
break;
}
case 137: /* Create file */
case 141: /* MakeDir */
FIDOUT();
STROUT(AFSNAMEMAX);
STOREATTROUT();
break;
case 136: /* Remove file */
case 142: /* Remove directory */
FIDOUT();
STROUT(AFSNAMEMAX);
break;
case 138: /* Rename file */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " old"));
FIDOUT();
STROUT(AFSNAMEMAX);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " new"));
FIDOUT();
STROUT(AFSNAMEMAX);
break;
case 139: /* Symlink */
FIDOUT();
STROUT(AFSNAMEMAX);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " link to"));
STROUT(AFSNAMEMAX);
break;
case 140: /* Link */
FIDOUT();
STROUT(AFSNAMEMAX);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " link to"));
FIDOUT();
break;
case 148: /* Get volume info */
STROUT(AFSNAMEMAX);
break;
case 149: /* Get volume stats */
case 150: /* Set volume stats */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " volid"));
UINTOUT();
break;
case 154: /* New get volume info */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " volname"));
STROUT(AFSNAMEMAX);
break;
case 155: /* Bulk stat */
case 65536: /* Inline bulk stat */
{
unsigned long j;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
j = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
FIDOUT();
if (i != j - 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ","));
}
if (j == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " <none!>"));
}
case 65537: /* Fetch data 64 */
FIDOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " offset"));
UINT64OUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " length"));
UINT64OUT();
break;
case 65538: /* Store data 64 */
FIDOUT();
STOREATTROUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " offset"));
UINT64OUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " length"));
UINT64OUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " flen"));
UINT64OUT();
break;
case 65541: /* CallBack rx conn address */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " addr"));
UINTOUT();
default:
;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|fs]"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13049/Rx: add a missing bounds check for Ubik
One of the case blocks in ubik_print() didn't check bounds before
fetching 32 bits of packet data and could overread past the captured
packet data by that amount.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Henri Salo from Nixu
Corporation.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestingAutomationProvider::SetTimezone(DictionaryValue* args,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
std::string timezone_id;
if (!args->GetString("timezone", &timezone_id)) {
AutomationJSONReply(this, reply_message).SendError(
"Invalid or missing args.");
return;
}
icu::TimeZone* timezone =
icu::TimeZone::createTimeZone(icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8(timezone_id));
chromeos::system::TimezoneSettings::GetInstance()->SetTimezone(*timezone);
delete timezone;
AutomationJSONReply(this, reply_message).SendSuccess(NULL);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,233 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_open_release(void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_opendata *data = calldata;
struct nfs4_state *state = NULL;
/* If this request hasn't been cancelled, do nothing */
if (data->cancelled == 0)
goto out_free;
/* In case of error, no cleanup! */
if (data->rpc_status != 0 || !data->rpc_done)
goto out_free;
/* In case we need an open_confirm, no cleanup! */
if (data->o_res.rflags & NFS4_OPEN_RESULT_CONFIRM)
goto out_free;
state = nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state(data);
if (!IS_ERR(state))
nfs4_close_state(state, data->o_arg.fmode);
out_free:
nfs4_opendata_put(data);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int http_process_request(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit)
{
struct session *sess = s->sess;
struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
struct http_msg *msg = &txn->req;
struct connection *cli_conn = objt_conn(strm_sess(s)->origin);
if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)) {
/* we need more data */
channel_dont_connect(req);
return 0;
}
DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%d analysers=%02x\n",
now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
s,
req,
req->rex, req->wex,
req->flags,
req->buf->i,
req->analysers);
/*
* Right now, we know that we have processed the entire headers
* and that unwanted requests have been filtered out. We can do
* whatever we want with the remaining request. Also, now we
* may have separate values for ->fe, ->be.
*/
/*
* If HTTP PROXY is set we simply get remote server address parsing
* incoming request. Note that this requires that a connection is
* allocated on the server side.
*/
if ((s->be->options & PR_O_HTTP_PROXY) && !(s->flags & SF_ADDR_SET)) {
struct connection *conn;
char *path;
/* Note that for now we don't reuse existing proxy connections */
if (unlikely((conn = cs_conn(si_alloc_cs(&s->si[1], NULL))) == NULL)) {
txn->req.err_state = txn->req.msg_state;
txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
txn->status = 500;
req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
s->flags |= SF_ERR_RESOURCE;
if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
return 0;
}
path = http_get_path(txn);
if (url2sa(req->buf->p + msg->sl.rq.u,
path ? path - (req->buf->p + msg->sl.rq.u) : msg->sl.rq.u_l,
&conn->addr.to, NULL) == -1)
goto return_bad_req;
/* if the path was found, we have to remove everything between
* req->buf->p + msg->sl.rq.u and path (excluded). If it was not
* found, we need to replace from req->buf->p + msg->sl.rq.u for
* u_l characters by a single "/".
*/
if (path) {
char *cur_ptr = req->buf->p;
char *cur_end = cur_ptr + txn->req.sl.rq.l;
int delta;
delta = buffer_replace2(req->buf, req->buf->p + msg->sl.rq.u, path, NULL, 0);
http_msg_move_end(&txn->req, delta);
cur_end += delta;
if (http_parse_reqline(&txn->req, HTTP_MSG_RQMETH, cur_ptr, cur_end + 1, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
goto return_bad_req;
}
else {
char *cur_ptr = req->buf->p;
char *cur_end = cur_ptr + txn->req.sl.rq.l;
int delta;
delta = buffer_replace2(req->buf, req->buf->p + msg->sl.rq.u,
req->buf->p + msg->sl.rq.u + msg->sl.rq.u_l, "/", 1);
http_msg_move_end(&txn->req, delta);
cur_end += delta;
if (http_parse_reqline(&txn->req, HTTP_MSG_RQMETH, cur_ptr, cur_end + 1, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
goto return_bad_req;
}
}
/*
* 7: Now we can work with the cookies.
* Note that doing so might move headers in the request, but
* the fields will stay coherent and the URI will not move.
* This should only be performed in the backend.
*/
if (s->be->cookie_name || sess->fe->capture_name)
manage_client_side_cookies(s, req);
/* add unique-id if "header-unique-id" is specified */
if (!LIST_ISEMPTY(&sess->fe->format_unique_id) && !s->unique_id) {
if ((s->unique_id = pool_alloc(pool_head_uniqueid)) == NULL)
goto return_bad_req;
s->unique_id[0] = '\0';
build_logline(s, s->unique_id, UNIQUEID_LEN, &sess->fe->format_unique_id);
}
if (sess->fe->header_unique_id && s->unique_id) {
chunk_printf(&trash, "%s: %s", sess->fe->header_unique_id, s->unique_id);
if (trash.len < 0)
goto return_bad_req;
if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, trash.str, trash.len) < 0))
goto return_bad_req;
}
/*
* 9: add X-Forwarded-For if either the frontend or the backend
* asks for it.
*/
if ((sess->fe->options | s->be->options) & PR_O_FWDFOR) {
struct hdr_ctx ctx = { .idx = 0 };
if (!((sess->fe->options | s->be->options) & PR_O_FF_ALWAYS) &&
http_find_header2(s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len ? s->be->fwdfor_hdr_name : sess->fe->fwdfor_hdr_name,
s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len ? s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len : sess->fe->fwdfor_hdr_len,
req->buf->p, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) {
/* The header is set to be added only if none is present
* and we found it, so don't do anything.
*/
}
else if (cli_conn && cli_conn->addr.from.ss_family == AF_INET) {
/* Add an X-Forwarded-For header unless the source IP is
* in the 'except' network range.
*/
if ((!sess->fe->except_mask.s_addr ||
(((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.from)->sin_addr.s_addr & sess->fe->except_mask.s_addr)
!= sess->fe->except_net.s_addr) &&
(!s->be->except_mask.s_addr ||
(((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.from)->sin_addr.s_addr & s->be->except_mask.s_addr)
!= s->be->except_net.s_addr)) {
int len;
unsigned char *pn;
pn = (unsigned char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.from)->sin_addr;
/* Note: we rely on the backend to get the header name to be used for
* x-forwarded-for, because the header is really meant for the backends.
* However, if the backend did not specify any option, we have to rely
* on the frontend's header name.
*/
if (s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len) {
len = s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len;
memcpy(trash.str, s->be->fwdfor_hdr_name, len);
} else {
len = sess->fe->fwdfor_hdr_len;
memcpy(trash.str, sess->fe->fwdfor_hdr_name, len);
}
len += snprintf(trash.str + len, trash.size - len, ": %d.%d.%d.%d", pn[0], pn[1], pn[2], pn[3]);
if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, trash.str, len) < 0))
goto return_bad_req;
}
}
else if (cli_conn && cli_conn->addr.from.ss_family == AF_INET6) {
/* FIXME: for the sake of completeness, we should also support
* 'except' here, although it is mostly useless in this case.
*/
int len;
char pn[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
inet_ntop(AF_INET6,
(const void *)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)(&cli_conn->addr.from))->sin6_addr,
pn, sizeof(pn));
/* Note: we rely on the backend to get the header name to be used for
* x-forwarded-for, because the header is really meant for the backends.
* However, if the backend did not specify any option, we have to rely
* on the frontend's header name.
*/
if (s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len) {
len = s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len;
memcpy(trash.str, s->be->fwdfor_hdr_name, len);
} else {
len = sess->fe->fwdfor_hdr_len;
memcpy(trash.str, sess->fe->fwdfor_hdr_name, len);
}
len += snprintf(trash.str + len, trash.size - len, ": %s", pn);
if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, trash.str, len) < 0))
goto return_bad_req;
}
}
/*
* 10: add X-Original-To if either the frontend or the backend
* asks for it.
*/
if ((sess->fe->options | s->be->options) & PR_O_ORGTO) {
/* FIXME: don't know if IPv6 can handle that case too. */
if (cli_conn && cli_conn->addr.from.ss_family == AF_INET) {
/* Add an X-Original-To header unless the destination IP is
* in the 'except' network range.
*/
conn_get_to_addr(cli_conn);
if (cli_conn->addr.to.ss_family == AF_INET &&
((!sess->fe->except_mask_to.s_addr ||
(((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.to)->sin_addr.s_addr & sess->fe->except_mask_to.s_addr)
!= sess->fe->except_to.s_addr) &&
(!s->be->except_mask_to.s_addr ||
(((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.to)->sin_addr.s_addr & s->be->except_mask_to.s_addr)
!= s->be->except_to.s_addr))) {
int len;
unsigned char *pn;
pn = (unsigned char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.to)->sin_addr;
/* Note: we rely on the backend to get the header name to be used for
* x-original-to, because the header is really meant for the backends.
* However, if the backend did not specify any option, we have to rely
* on the frontend's header name.
*/
if (s->be->orgto_hdr_len) {
len = s->be->orgto_hdr_len;
memcpy(trash.str, s->be->orgto_hdr_name, len);
} else {
len = sess->fe->orgto_hdr_len;
memcpy(trash.str, sess->fe->orgto_hdr_name, len);
}
len += snprintf(trash.str + len, trash.size - len, ": %d.%d.%d.%d", pn[0], pn[1], pn[2], pn[3]);
if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, trash.str, len) < 0))
goto return_bad_req;
}
}
}
/* 11: add "Connection: close" or "Connection: keep-alive" if needed and not yet set.
* If an "Upgrade" token is found, the header is left untouched in order not to have
* to deal with some servers bugs : some of them fail an Upgrade if anything but
* "Upgrade" is present in the Connection header.
*/
if (!(txn->flags & TX_HDR_CONN_UPG) &&
(((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_TUN) ||
((sess->fe->options & PR_O_HTTP_MODE) == PR_O_HTTP_PCL ||
(s->be->options & PR_O_HTTP_MODE) == PR_O_HTTP_PCL))) {
unsigned int want_flags = 0;
if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_VER_11) {
if (((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) >= TX_CON_WANT_SCL ||
((sess->fe->options & PR_O_HTTP_MODE) == PR_O_HTTP_PCL ||
(s->be->options & PR_O_HTTP_MODE) == PR_O_HTTP_PCL)) &&
!((sess->fe->options2|s->be->options2) & PR_O2_FAKE_KA))
want_flags |= TX_CON_CLO_SET;
} else {
if (((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_KAL &&
((sess->fe->options & PR_O_HTTP_MODE) != PR_O_HTTP_PCL &&
(s->be->options & PR_O_HTTP_MODE) != PR_O_HTTP_PCL)) ||
((sess->fe->options2|s->be->options2) & PR_O2_FAKE_KA))
want_flags |= TX_CON_KAL_SET;
}
if (want_flags != (txn->flags & (TX_CON_CLO_SET|TX_CON_KAL_SET)))
http_change_connection_header(txn, msg, want_flags);
}
/* If we have no server assigned yet and we're balancing on url_param
* with a POST request, we may be interested in checking the body for
* that parameter. This will be done in another analyser.
*/
if (!(s->flags & (SF_ASSIGNED|SF_DIRECT)) &&
s->txn->meth == HTTP_METH_POST && s->be->url_param_name != NULL &&
(msg->flags & (HTTP_MSGF_CNT_LEN|HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK))) {
channel_dont_connect(req);
req->analysers |= AN_REQ_HTTP_BODY;
}
req->analysers &= ~AN_REQ_FLT_XFER_DATA;
req->analysers |= AN_REQ_HTTP_XFER_BODY;
#ifdef TCP_QUICKACK
/* We expect some data from the client. Unless we know for sure
* we already have a full request, we have to re-enable quick-ack
* in case we previously disabled it, otherwise we might cause
* the client to delay further data.
*/
if ((sess->listener->options & LI_O_NOQUICKACK) &&
cli_conn && conn_ctrl_ready(cli_conn) &&
((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK) ||
(msg->body_len > req->buf->i - txn->req.eoh - 2)))
setsockopt(cli_conn->handle.fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_QUICKACK, &one, sizeof(one));
#endif
/*************************************************************
* OK, that's finished for the headers. We have done what we *
* could. Let's switch to the DATA state. *
************************************************************/
req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
req->analysers &= ~an_bit;
s->logs.tv_request = now;
/* OK let's go on with the BODY now */
return 1;
return_bad_req: /* let's centralize all bad requests */
if (unlikely(msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR) || msg->err_pos >= 0) {
/* we detected a parsing error. We want to archive this request
* in the dedicated proxy area for later troubleshooting.
*/
http_capture_bad_message(sess->fe, &sess->fe->invalid_req, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
}
txn->req.err_state = txn->req.msg_state;
txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
txn->status = 400;
req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.failed_req, 1);
if (sess->listener->counters)
HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->failed_req, 1);
if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::progressEventTimerFired(TimerBase*) {
if (m_networkState != kNetworkLoading)
return;
double time = WTF::currentTime();
double timedelta = time - m_previousProgressTime;
if (webMediaPlayer() && webMediaPlayer()->didLoadingProgress()) {
scheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::progress);
m_previousProgressTime = time;
m_sentStalledEvent = false;
if (layoutObject())
layoutObject()->updateFromElement();
} else if (timedelta > 3.0 && !m_sentStalledEvent) {
scheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::stalled);
m_sentStalledEvent = true;
setShouldDelayLoadEvent(false);
}
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 128,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_search(const struct Pattern *search, int allpats)
{
int rc = 0;
const struct Pattern *pat = NULL;
for (pat = search; pat; pat = pat->next)
{
switch (pat->op)
{
case MUTT_BODY:
case MUTT_HEADER:
case MUTT_WHOLE_MSG:
if (pat->stringmatch)
rc++;
break;
case MUTT_SERVERSEARCH:
rc++;
break;
default:
if (pat->child && do_search(pat->child, 1))
rc++;
}
if (!allpats)
break;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 79,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_refptr<net::IOBuffer> CreateBufferForTransfer(
const T& input,
UsbEndpointDirection direction,
size_t size) {
if (size >= kMaxTransferLength)
return NULL;
scoped_refptr<net::IOBuffer> buffer =
new net::IOBuffer(std::max(static_cast<size_t>(1), size));
if (direction == device::USB_DIRECTION_INBOUND) {
return buffer;
} else if (direction == device::USB_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND) {
if (input.data.get() && size <= input.data->size()) {
memcpy(buffer->data(), input.data->data(), size);
return buffer;
}
}
NOTREACHED();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,379 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err cslg_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_CompositionToDecodeBox *ptr = (GF_CompositionToDecodeBox *)s;
ptr->compositionToDTSShift = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 32);
ptr->leastDecodeToDisplayDelta = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 32);
ptr->greatestDecodeToDisplayDelta = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 32);
ptr->compositionStartTime = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 32);
ptr->compositionEndTime = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 32);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,026 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::GetAddress() const {
BluetoothDeviceClient::Properties* properties =
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothDeviceClient()->
GetProperties(object_path_);
DCHECK(properties);
return properties->address.value();
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,546 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t FLACParser::init()
{
mDecoder = FLAC__stream_decoder_new();
if (mDecoder == NULL) {
ALOGE("new failed");
return NO_INIT;
}
FLAC__stream_decoder_set_md5_checking(mDecoder, false);
FLAC__stream_decoder_set_metadata_ignore_all(mDecoder);
FLAC__stream_decoder_set_metadata_respond(
mDecoder, FLAC__METADATA_TYPE_STREAMINFO);
FLAC__stream_decoder_set_metadata_respond(
mDecoder, FLAC__METADATA_TYPE_PICTURE);
FLAC__stream_decoder_set_metadata_respond(
mDecoder, FLAC__METADATA_TYPE_VORBIS_COMMENT);
FLAC__StreamDecoderInitStatus initStatus;
initStatus = FLAC__stream_decoder_init_stream(
mDecoder,
read_callback, seek_callback, tell_callback,
length_callback, eof_callback, write_callback,
metadata_callback, error_callback, (void *) this);
if (initStatus != FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_INIT_STATUS_OK) {
ALOGE("init_stream failed %d", initStatus);
return NO_INIT;
}
if (!FLAC__stream_decoder_process_until_end_of_metadata(mDecoder)) {
ALOGE("end_of_metadata failed");
return NO_INIT;
}
if (mStreamInfoValid) {
if (getChannels() == 0 || getChannels() > 8) {
ALOGE("unsupported channel count %u", getChannels());
return NO_INIT;
}
switch (getBitsPerSample()) {
case 8:
case 16:
case 24:
break;
default:
ALOGE("unsupported bits per sample %u", getBitsPerSample());
return NO_INIT;
}
switch (getSampleRate()) {
case 8000:
case 11025:
case 12000:
case 16000:
case 22050:
case 24000:
case 32000:
case 44100:
case 48000:
case 88200:
case 96000:
break;
default:
ALOGE("unsupported sample rate %u", getSampleRate());
return NO_INIT;
}
static const struct {
unsigned mChannels;
unsigned mBitsPerSample;
void (*mCopy)(short *dst, const int *const *src, unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels);
} table[] = {
{ 1, 8, copyMono8 },
{ 2, 8, copyStereo8 },
{ 8, 8, copyMultiCh8 },
{ 1, 16, copyMono16 },
{ 2, 16, copyStereo16 },
{ 8, 16, copyMultiCh16 },
{ 1, 24, copyMono24 },
{ 2, 24, copyStereo24 },
{ 8, 24, copyMultiCh24 },
};
for (unsigned i = 0; i < sizeof(table)/sizeof(table[0]); ++i) {
if (table[i].mChannels >= getChannels() &&
table[i].mBitsPerSample == getBitsPerSample()) {
mCopy = table[i].mCopy;
break;
}
}
if (mTrackMetadata != 0) {
mTrackMetadata->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_RAW);
mTrackMetadata->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, getChannels());
mTrackMetadata->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, getSampleRate());
mTrackMetadata->setInt32(kKeyPcmEncoding, kAudioEncodingPcm16bit);
mTrackMetadata->setInt64(kKeyDuration,
(getTotalSamples() * 1000000LL) / getSampleRate());
}
} else {
ALOGE("missing STREAMINFO");
return NO_INIT;
}
if (mFileMetadata != 0) {
mFileMetadata->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_FLAC);
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static NTSTATUS check_base_file_access(struct connection_struct *conn,
struct smb_filename *smb_fname,
uint32_t access_mask)
{
NTSTATUS status;
status = smbd_calculate_access_mask(conn, smb_fname,
false,
access_mask,
&access_mask);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(10, ("smbd_calculate_access_mask "
"on file %s returned %s\n",
smb_fname_str_dbg(smb_fname),
nt_errstr(status)));
return status;
}
if (access_mask & (FILE_WRITE_DATA|FILE_APPEND_DATA)) {
uint32_t dosattrs;
if (!CAN_WRITE(conn)) {
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
dosattrs = dos_mode(conn, smb_fname);
if (IS_DOS_READONLY(dosattrs)) {
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
}
return smbd_check_access_rights(conn,
smb_fname,
false,
access_mask);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 5,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintPreviewDialogDelegate::GetDialogSize(gfx::Size* size) const {
DCHECK(size);
const gfx::Size kMinDialogSize(800, 480);
const int kBorder = 25;
*size = kMinDialogSize;
web_modal::WebContentsModalDialogHost* host = nullptr;
content::WebContents* outermost_web_contents =
guest_view::GuestViewBase::GetTopLevelWebContents(initiator_);
Browser* browser = chrome::FindBrowserWithWebContents(outermost_web_contents);
if (browser)
host = browser->window()->GetWebContentsModalDialogHost();
if (host)
size->SetToMax(host->GetMaximumDialogSize());
else
size->SetToMax(outermost_web_contents->GetContainerBounds().size());
size->Enlarge(-2 * kBorder, -kBorder);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
const gfx::Size kMaxDialogSize(1000, 660);
size->SetToMin(kMaxDialogSize);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 126,765 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jslGetTokenLength() {
return lex->tokenl;
}
Commit Message: Fix strncat/cpy bounding issues (fix #1425)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnExtendSelectionAndDelete(int before, int after) {
if (!GetRenderWidget()->ShouldHandleImeEvent())
return;
DCHECK(!WebUserGestureIndicator::isProcessingUserGesture());
ImeEventGuard guard(GetRenderWidget());
blink::WebScopedUserGesture gesture_indicator;
frame_->extendSelectionAndDelete(before, after);
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gst_asf_demux_setup_pad (GstASFDemux * demux, GstPad * src_pad,
GstCaps * caps, guint16 id, gboolean is_video, GstBuffer * streamheader,
GstTagList * tags)
{
AsfStream *stream;
gst_pad_use_fixed_caps (src_pad);
gst_pad_set_caps (src_pad, caps);
gst_pad_set_event_function (src_pad,
GST_DEBUG_FUNCPTR (gst_asf_demux_handle_src_event));
gst_pad_set_query_function (src_pad,
GST_DEBUG_FUNCPTR (gst_asf_demux_handle_src_query));
stream = &demux->stream[demux->num_streams];
stream->caps = caps;
stream->pad = src_pad;
stream->id = id;
stream->fps_known = !is_video; /* bit hacky for audio */
stream->is_video = is_video;
stream->pending_tags = tags;
stream->discont = TRUE;
stream->first_buffer = TRUE;
stream->streamheader = streamheader;
if (stream->streamheader) {
stream->streamheader = gst_buffer_make_writable (streamheader);
GST_BUFFER_FLAG_SET (stream->streamheader, GST_BUFFER_FLAG_HEADER);
}
if (is_video) {
GstStructure *st;
gint par_x, par_y;
st = gst_caps_get_structure (caps, 0);
if (gst_structure_get_fraction (st, "pixel-aspect-ratio", &par_x, &par_y) &&
par_x > 0 && par_y > 0) {
GST_DEBUG ("PAR %d/%d", par_x, par_y);
stream->par_x = par_x;
stream->par_y = par_y;
}
}
stream->payloads = g_array_new (FALSE, FALSE, sizeof (AsfPayload));
/* TODO: create this array during reverse play? */
stream->payloads_rev = g_array_new (FALSE, FALSE, sizeof (AsfPayload));
GST_INFO ("Created pad %s for stream %u with caps %" GST_PTR_FORMAT,
GST_PAD_NAME (src_pad), demux->num_streams, caps);
++demux->num_streams;
stream->active = FALSE;
return stream;
}
Commit Message: asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void *alloc_smp_resp(int size)
{
return kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: fix memory leak in sas_smp_get_phy_events()
We've got a memory leak with the following producer:
while true;
do cat /sys/class/sas_phy/phy-1:0:12/invalid_dword_count >/dev/null;
done
The buffer req is allocated and not freed after we return. Fix it.
Fixes: 2908d778ab3e ("[SCSI] aic94xx: new driver")
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: chenqilin <chenqilin2@huawei.com>
CC: chenxiang <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 83,922 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_num_732(unsigned char *p, uint32_t value)
{
archive_be32enc(p, value);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 50,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int skb_splice_bits(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk, unsigned int offset,
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned int tlen,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct partial_page partial[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
struct page *pages[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
struct splice_pipe_desc spd = {
.pages = pages,
.partial = partial,
.nr_pages_max = MAX_SKB_FRAGS,
.flags = flags,
.ops = &nosteal_pipe_buf_ops,
.spd_release = sock_spd_release,
};
int ret = 0;
__skb_splice_bits(skb, pipe, &offset, &tlen, &spd, sk);
if (spd.nr_pages)
ret = splice_to_pipe(pipe, &spd);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 67,712 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int in_sched_functions(unsigned long addr)
{
return in_lock_functions(addr) ||
(addr >= (unsigned long)__sched_text_start
&& addr < (unsigned long)__sched_text_end);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,454 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int specific_minor(int minor)
{
int r;
if (minor >= (1 << MINORBITS))
return -EINVAL;
idr_preload(GFP_KERNEL);
spin_lock(&_minor_lock);
r = idr_alloc(&_minor_idr, MINOR_ALLOCED, minor, minor + 1, GFP_NOWAIT);
spin_unlock(&_minor_lock);
idr_preload_end();
if (r < 0)
return r == -ENOSPC ? -EBUSY : r;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorNetworkAgent::WillSendRequest(
ExecutionContext* execution_context,
unsigned long identifier,
DocumentLoader* loader,
ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info) {
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::internal)
return;
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::document &&
loader->GetSubstituteData().IsValid())
return;
protocol::DictionaryValue* headers =
state_->getObject(NetworkAgentState::kExtraRequestHeaders);
if (headers) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < headers->size(); ++i) {
auto header = headers->at(i);
String value;
if (header.second->asString(&value))
request.SetHTTPHeaderField(AtomicString(header.first),
AtomicString(value));
}
}
request.SetReportRawHeaders(true);
if (state_->booleanProperty(NetworkAgentState::kCacheDisabled, false)) {
if (LoadsFromCacheOnly(request) &&
request.GetRequestContext() != WebURLRequest::kRequestContextInternal) {
request.SetCachePolicy(WebCachePolicy::kBypassCacheLoadOnlyFromCache);
} else {
request.SetCachePolicy(WebCachePolicy::kBypassingCache);
}
request.SetShouldResetAppCache(true);
}
if (state_->booleanProperty(NetworkAgentState::kBypassServiceWorker, false))
request.SetServiceWorkerMode(WebURLRequest::ServiceWorkerMode::kNone);
WillSendRequestInternal(execution_context, identifier, loader, request,
redirect_response, initiator_info);
if (!host_id_.IsEmpty()) {
request.AddHTTPHeaderField(
HTTPNames::X_DevTools_Emulate_Network_Conditions_Client_Id,
AtomicString(host_id_));
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 172,467 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PlatformSensorProviderLinux::GetAllSensorDevices() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 148,987 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int in6_dump_addrs(struct inet6_dev *idev, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlink_callback *cb, enum addr_type_t type,
int s_ip_idx, int *p_ip_idx)
{
struct ifmcaddr6 *ifmca;
struct ifacaddr6 *ifaca;
int err = 1;
int ip_idx = *p_ip_idx;
read_lock_bh(&idev->lock);
switch (type) {
case UNICAST_ADDR: {
struct inet6_ifaddr *ifa;
/* unicast address incl. temp addr */
list_for_each_entry(ifa, &idev->addr_list, if_list) {
if (++ip_idx < s_ip_idx)
continue;
err = inet6_fill_ifaddr(skb, ifa,
NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
RTM_NEWADDR,
NLM_F_MULTI);
if (err < 0)
break;
nl_dump_check_consistent(cb, nlmsg_hdr(skb));
}
break;
}
case MULTICAST_ADDR:
/* multicast address */
for (ifmca = idev->mc_list; ifmca;
ifmca = ifmca->next, ip_idx++) {
if (ip_idx < s_ip_idx)
continue;
err = inet6_fill_ifmcaddr(skb, ifmca,
NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
RTM_GETMULTICAST,
NLM_F_MULTI);
if (err < 0)
break;
}
break;
case ANYCAST_ADDR:
/* anycast address */
for (ifaca = idev->ac_list; ifaca;
ifaca = ifaca->aca_next, ip_idx++) {
if (ip_idx < s_ip_idx)
continue;
err = inet6_fill_ifacaddr(skb, ifaca,
NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
RTM_GETANYCAST,
NLM_F_MULTI);
if (err < 0)
break;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
read_unlock_bh(&idev->lock);
*p_ip_idx = ip_idx;
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RTCPeerConnectionHandler::CreateOrUpdateTransceiver(
RtpTransceiverState transceiver_state) {
DCHECK_EQ(configuration_.sdp_semantics, webrtc::SdpSemantics::kUnifiedPlan);
DCHECK(transceiver_state.is_initialized());
DCHECK(transceiver_state.sender_state());
DCHECK(transceiver_state.receiver_state());
auto webrtc_transceiver = transceiver_state.webrtc_transceiver();
auto webrtc_sender = transceiver_state.sender_state()->webrtc_sender();
auto webrtc_receiver = transceiver_state.receiver_state()->webrtc_receiver();
std::unique_ptr<RTCRtpTransceiver> transceiver;
auto it = FindTransceiver(RTCRtpTransceiver::GetId(webrtc_transceiver.get()));
if (it == rtp_transceivers_.end()) {
transceiver = std::make_unique<RTCRtpTransceiver>(
native_peer_connection_, track_adapter_map_,
std::move(transceiver_state));
rtp_transceivers_.push_back(transceiver->ShallowCopy());
DCHECK(FindSender(RTCRtpSender::getId(webrtc_sender.get())) ==
rtp_senders_.end());
rtp_senders_.push_back(
std::make_unique<RTCRtpSender>(*transceiver->content_sender()));
DCHECK(FindReceiver(RTCRtpReceiver::getId(webrtc_receiver.get())) ==
rtp_receivers_.end());
rtp_receivers_.push_back(
std::make_unique<RTCRtpReceiver>(*transceiver->content_receiver()));
} else {
transceiver = (*it)->ShallowCopy();
transceiver->set_state(std::move(transceiver_state));
DCHECK(FindSender(RTCRtpSender::getId(webrtc_sender.get())) !=
rtp_senders_.end());
DCHECK(FindReceiver(RTCRtpReceiver::getId(webrtc_receiver.get())) !=
rtp_receivers_.end());
}
return transceiver;
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void lsi_mem_write(LSIState *s, dma_addr_t addr,
const void *buf, dma_addr_t len)
{
if (s->dmode & LSI_DMODE_DIOM) {
address_space_write(&s->pci_io_as, addr, MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED,
buf, len);
} else {
pci_dma_write(PCI_DEVICE(s), addr, buf, len);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 3,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
Buffer b;
char *p, *userstyle;
u_int len;
int fail = 0;
buffer_init(&b);
buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
p = buffer_ptr(&b);
len = buffer_len(&b);
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len < session_id2_len) ||
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
} else {
p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len != session_id2_len) ||
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
free(p);
}
if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
fail++;
p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
userstyle, p);
fail++;
}
free(userstyle);
free(p);
buffer_skip_string(&b);
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
fail++;
} else {
p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
fail++;
free(p);
if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
fail++;
buffer_skip_string(&b);
}
buffer_skip_string(&b);
if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
fail++;
buffer_free(&b);
return (fail == 0);
}
Commit Message: set sshpam_ctxt to NULL after free
Avoids use-after-free in monitor when privsep child is compromised.
Reported by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 42,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BaseSettingChange::CanBeMerged() const {
return !GetNewSettingURL().is_empty();
}
Commit Message: [protector] Refactoring of --no-protector code.
*) On DSE change, new provider is not pushed to Sync.
*) Simplified code in BrowserInit.
BUG=None
TEST=protector.py
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10065016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132398 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 103,764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PaintLayerScrollableArea::SetHasVerticalScrollbar(bool has_scrollbar) {
if (FreezeScrollbarsScope::ScrollbarsAreFrozen())
return false;
if (GetLayoutBox()->GetDocument().IsVerticalScrollEnforced()) {
return false;
}
if (has_scrollbar == HasVerticalScrollbar())
return false;
SetScrollbarNeedsPaintInvalidation(kVerticalScrollbar);
scrollbar_manager_.SetHasVerticalScrollbar(has_scrollbar);
UpdateScrollOrigin();
if (HasHorizontalScrollbar())
HorizontalScrollbar()->StyleChanged();
if (HasVerticalScrollbar())
VerticalScrollbar()->StyleChanged();
SetScrollCornerNeedsPaintInvalidation();
if (GetLayoutBox()->GetDocument().HasAnnotatedRegions())
GetLayoutBox()->GetDocument().SetAnnotatedRegionsDirty(true);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType SyncImageProfiles(Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
StringInfo
*profile;
status=MagickTrue;
profile=(StringInfo *) GetImageProfile(image,"8BIM");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
if (Sync8BimProfile(image,profile) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
profile=(StringInfo *) GetImageProfile(image,"EXIF");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
if (SyncExifProfile(image,profile) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/354
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 69,123 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionApiTest::RunExtensionTestIncognito(
const std::string& extension_name) {
return RunExtensionTestImpl(extension_name,
std::string(),
NULL,
kFlagEnableIncognito | kFlagEnableFileAccess);
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 151,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fep_client_set_status_text (FepClient *client,
const char *text,
FepAttribute *attr)
{
FepControlMessage message;
message.command = FEP_CONTROL_SET_STATUS_TEXT;
_fep_control_message_alloc_args (&message, 2);
_fep_control_message_write_string_arg (&message, 0, text, strlen (text) + 1);
_fep_control_message_write_attribute_arg (&message, 1, attr ? attr : &empty_attr);
if (client->filter_running)
client->messages = _fep_append_control_message (client->messages, &message);
else
_fep_write_control_message (client->control, &message);
_fep_control_message_free_args (&message);
}
Commit Message: Don't use abstract Unix domain sockets
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,968 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ip_cmsg_recv_pktinfo(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct in_pktinfo info = *PKTINFO_SKB_CB(skb);
info.ipi_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr;
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, IP_PKTINFO, sizeof(info), &info);
}
Commit Message: ip: fix IP_CHECKSUM handling
The skbs processed by ip_cmsg_recv() are not guaranteed to
be linear e.g. when sending UDP packets over loopback with
MSGMORE.
Using csum_partial() on [potentially] the whole skb len
is dangerous; instead be on the safe side and use skb_checksum().
Thanks to syzkaller team to detect the issue and provide the
reproducer.
v1 -> v2:
- move the variable declaration in a tighter scope
Fixes: ad6f939ab193 ("ip: Add offset parameter to ip_cmsg_recv")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::ExecuteScript(const WebScriptSource& source) {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(ToIsolate(GetFrame()));
GetFrame()->GetScriptController().ExecuteScriptInMainWorld(source);
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 145,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bos_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, int length)
{
int bos_op;
if (length <= (int)sizeof(struct rx_header))
return;
if (ndo->ndo_snapend - bp + 1 <= (int)(sizeof(struct rx_header) + sizeof(int32_t))) {
goto trunc;
}
/*
* Print out the afs call we're invoking. The table used here was
* gleaned from bozo/bosint.xg
*/
bos_op = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp + sizeof(struct rx_header));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " bos call %s", tok2str(bos_req, "op#%d", bos_op)));
/*
* Decode some of the arguments to the BOS calls
*/
bp += sizeof(struct rx_header) + 4;
switch (bos_op) {
case 80: /* Create B node */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " type"));
STROUT(BOSNAMEMAX);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " instance"));
STROUT(BOSNAMEMAX);
break;
case 81: /* Delete B node */
case 83: /* Get status */
case 85: /* Get instance info */
case 87: /* Add super user */
case 88: /* Delete super user */
case 93: /* Set cell name */
case 96: /* Add cell host */
case 97: /* Delete cell host */
case 104: /* Restart */
case 106: /* Uninstall */
case 108: /* Exec */
case 112: /* Getlog */
case 114: /* Get instance strings */
STROUT(BOSNAMEMAX);
break;
case 82: /* Set status */
case 98: /* Set T status */
STROUT(BOSNAMEMAX);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " status"));
INTOUT();
break;
case 86: /* Get instance parm */
STROUT(BOSNAMEMAX);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " num"));
INTOUT();
break;
case 84: /* Enumerate instance */
case 89: /* List super users */
case 90: /* List keys */
case 91: /* Add key */
case 92: /* Delete key */
case 95: /* Get cell host */
INTOUT();
break;
case 105: /* Install */
STROUT(BOSNAMEMAX);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " size"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " flags"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " date"));
INTOUT();
break;
default:
;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|bos]"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13049/Rx: add a missing bounds check for Ubik
One of the case blocks in ubik_print() didn't check bounds before
fetching 32 bits of packet data and could overread past the captured
packet data by that amount.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Henri Salo from Nixu
Corporation.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FrameFetchContext::DefersLoading() const {
return IsDetached() ? false : GetFrame()->GetPage()->Paused();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)
{
unsigned char hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
int ret;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
if (ret != SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
return ret;
return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @u
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 57,410 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __net_init ipgre_init_net(struct net *net)
{
struct ipgre_net *ign = net_generic(net, ipgre_net_id);
int err;
ign->fb_tunnel_dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(struct ip_tunnel), "gre0",
ipgre_tunnel_setup);
if (!ign->fb_tunnel_dev) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_alloc_dev;
}
dev_net_set(ign->fb_tunnel_dev, net);
ipgre_fb_tunnel_init(ign->fb_tunnel_dev);
ign->fb_tunnel_dev->rtnl_link_ops = &ipgre_link_ops;
if ((err = register_netdev(ign->fb_tunnel_dev)))
goto err_reg_dev;
rcu_assign_pointer(ign->tunnels_wc[0],
netdev_priv(ign->fb_tunnel_dev));
return 0;
err_reg_dev:
ipgre_dev_free(ign->fb_tunnel_dev);
err_alloc_dev:
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __unmap_and_move(struct page *page, struct page *newpage,
int force, enum migrate_mode mode)
{
int rc = -EAGAIN;
int page_was_mapped = 0;
struct anon_vma *anon_vma = NULL;
if (!trylock_page(page)) {
if (!force || mode == MIGRATE_ASYNC)
goto out;
/*
* It's not safe for direct compaction to call lock_page.
* For example, during page readahead pages are added locked
* to the LRU. Later, when the IO completes the pages are
* marked uptodate and unlocked. However, the queueing
* could be merging multiple pages for one bio (e.g.
* mpage_readpages). If an allocation happens for the
* second or third page, the process can end up locking
* the same page twice and deadlocking. Rather than
* trying to be clever about what pages can be locked,
* avoid the use of lock_page for direct compaction
* altogether.
*/
if (current->flags & PF_MEMALLOC)
goto out;
lock_page(page);
}
if (PageWriteback(page)) {
/*
* Only in the case of a full synchronous migration is it
* necessary to wait for PageWriteback. In the async case,
* the retry loop is too short and in the sync-light case,
* the overhead of stalling is too much
*/
if (mode != MIGRATE_SYNC) {
rc = -EBUSY;
goto out_unlock;
}
if (!force)
goto out_unlock;
wait_on_page_writeback(page);
}
/*
* By try_to_unmap(), page->mapcount goes down to 0 here. In this case,
* we cannot notice that anon_vma is freed while we migrates a page.
* This get_anon_vma() delays freeing anon_vma pointer until the end
* of migration. File cache pages are no problem because of page_lock()
* File Caches may use write_page() or lock_page() in migration, then,
* just care Anon page here.
*
* Only page_get_anon_vma() understands the subtleties of
* getting a hold on an anon_vma from outside one of its mms.
* But if we cannot get anon_vma, then we won't need it anyway,
* because that implies that the anon page is no longer mapped
* (and cannot be remapped so long as we hold the page lock).
*/
if (PageAnon(page) && !PageKsm(page))
anon_vma = page_get_anon_vma(page);
/*
* Block others from accessing the new page when we get around to
* establishing additional references. We are usually the only one
* holding a reference to newpage at this point. We used to have a BUG
* here if trylock_page(newpage) fails, but would like to allow for
* cases where there might be a race with the previous use of newpage.
* This is much like races on refcount of oldpage: just don't BUG().
*/
if (unlikely(!trylock_page(newpage)))
goto out_unlock;
if (unlikely(isolated_balloon_page(page))) {
/*
* A ballooned page does not need any special attention from
* physical to virtual reverse mapping procedures.
* Skip any attempt to unmap PTEs or to remap swap cache,
* in order to avoid burning cycles at rmap level, and perform
* the page migration right away (proteced by page lock).
*/
rc = balloon_page_migrate(newpage, page, mode);
goto out_unlock_both;
}
/*
* Corner case handling:
* 1. When a new swap-cache page is read into, it is added to the LRU
* and treated as swapcache but it has no rmap yet.
* Calling try_to_unmap() against a page->mapping==NULL page will
* trigger a BUG. So handle it here.
* 2. An orphaned page (see truncate_complete_page) might have
* fs-private metadata. The page can be picked up due to memory
* offlining. Everywhere else except page reclaim, the page is
* invisible to the vm, so the page can not be migrated. So try to
* free the metadata, so the page can be freed.
*/
if (!page->mapping) {
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageAnon(page), page);
if (page_has_private(page)) {
try_to_free_buffers(page);
goto out_unlock_both;
}
} else if (page_mapped(page)) {
/* Establish migration ptes */
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageAnon(page) && !PageKsm(page) && !anon_vma,
page);
try_to_unmap(page,
TTU_MIGRATION|TTU_IGNORE_MLOCK|TTU_IGNORE_ACCESS);
page_was_mapped = 1;
}
if (!page_mapped(page))
rc = move_to_new_page(newpage, page, mode);
if (page_was_mapped)
remove_migration_ptes(page,
rc == MIGRATEPAGE_SUCCESS ? newpage : page);
out_unlock_both:
unlock_page(newpage);
out_unlock:
/* Drop an anon_vma reference if we took one */
if (anon_vma)
put_anon_vma(anon_vma);
unlock_page(page);
out:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: mm: migrate dirty page without clear_page_dirty_for_io etc
clear_page_dirty_for_io() has accumulated writeback and memcg subtleties
since v2.6.16 first introduced page migration; and the set_page_dirty()
which completed its migration of PageDirty, later had to be moderated to
__set_page_dirty_nobuffers(); then PageSwapBacked had to skip that too.
No actual problems seen with this procedure recently, but if you look into
what the clear_page_dirty_for_io(page)+set_page_dirty(newpage) is actually
achieving, it turns out to be nothing more than moving the PageDirty flag,
and its NR_FILE_DIRTY stat from one zone to another.
It would be good to avoid a pile of irrelevant decrementations and
incrementations, and improper event counting, and unnecessary descent of
the radix_tree under tree_lock (to set the PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY which
radix_tree_replace_slot() left in place anyway).
Do the NR_FILE_DIRTY movement, like the other stats movements, while
interrupts still disabled in migrate_page_move_mapping(); and don't even
bother if the zone is the same. Do the PageDirty movement there under
tree_lock too, where old page is frozen and newpage not yet visible:
bearing in mind that as soon as newpage becomes visible in radix_tree, an
un-page-locked set_page_dirty() might interfere (or perhaps that's just
not possible: anything doing so should already hold an additional
reference to the old page, preventing its migration; but play safe).
But we do still need to transfer PageDirty in migrate_page_copy(), for
those who don't go the mapping route through migrate_page_move_mapping().
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 54,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __send_discard(struct clone_info *ci)
{
return __send_changing_extent_only(ci, get_num_discard_bios,
is_split_required_for_discard);
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 AuthenticatorBlePowerOnAutomaticSheetModel::GetStepDescription()
const {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_WEBAUTHN_BLUETOOTH_POWER_ON_AUTO_DESCRIPTION);
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlXPtrNewRangeNodeObject(xmlNodePtr start, xmlXPathObjectPtr end) {
xmlXPathObjectPtr ret;
if (start == NULL)
return(NULL);
if (end == NULL)
return(NULL);
switch (end->type) {
case XPATH_POINT:
case XPATH_RANGE:
break;
case XPATH_NODESET:
/*
* Empty set ...
*/
if (end->nodesetval->nodeNr <= 0)
return(NULL);
break;
default:
/* TODO */
return(NULL);
}
ret = (xmlXPathObjectPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlXPathObject));
if (ret == NULL) {
xmlXPtrErrMemory("allocating range");
return(NULL);
}
memset(ret, 0 , (size_t) sizeof(xmlXPathObject));
ret->type = XPATH_RANGE;
ret->user = start;
ret->index = -1;
switch (end->type) {
case XPATH_POINT:
ret->user2 = end->user;
ret->index2 = end->index;
break;
case XPATH_RANGE:
ret->user2 = end->user2;
ret->index2 = end->index2;
break;
case XPATH_NODESET: {
ret->user2 = end->nodesetval->nodeTab[end->nodesetval->nodeNr - 1];
ret->index2 = -1;
break;
}
default:
STRANGE
return(NULL);
}
xmlXPtrRangeCheckOrder(ret);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix XPointer bug.
BUG=125462
AUTHOR=asd@ut.ee
R=cevans@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10344022
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@135174 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 109,074 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FileError::ErrorCode FileReaderLoader::httpStatusCodeToErrorCode(int httpStatusCode)
{
switch (httpStatusCode) {
case 403:
return FileError::SECURITY_ERR;
case 404:
return FileError::NOT_FOUND_ERR;
default:
return FileError::NOT_READABLE_ERR;
}
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,497 |
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