instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE6(mmap_pgoff, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, len,
unsigned long, prot, unsigned long, flags,
unsigned long, fd, unsigned long, pgoff)
{
return ksys_mmap_pgoff(addr, len, prot, flags, fd, pgoff);
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void P2PQuicStreamImpl::OnFinRead() {
DCHECK(delegate_);
quic::QuicStream::OnFinRead();
delegate_->OnRemoteFinish();
}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Rect ShellWindowFrameView::GetBoundsForClientView() const {
if (frame_->IsFullscreen())
return bounds();
return gfx::Rect(0, kCaptionHeight, width(),
std::max(0, height() - kCaptionHeight));
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 1 | 170,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char *ipx_device_name(struct ipx_interface *intrfc)
{
return intrfc->if_internal ? "Internal" :
intrfc->if_dev ? intrfc->if_dev->name : "Unknown";
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,424 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SProcXvPutVideo(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xvPutVideoReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvPutVideoReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->port);
swapl(&stuff->drawable);
swapl(&stuff->gc);
swaps(&stuff->vid_x);
swaps(&stuff->vid_y);
swaps(&stuff->vid_w);
swaps(&stuff->vid_h);
swaps(&stuff->drw_x);
swaps(&stuff->drw_y);
swaps(&stuff->drw_w);
swaps(&stuff->drw_h);
return XvProcVector[xv_PutVideo] (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int name_from_dns_search(struct address buf[static MAXADDRS], char canon[static 256], const char *name, int family)
{
char search[256];
struct resolvconf conf;
size_t l, dots;
char *p, *z;
if (__get_resolv_conf(&conf, search, sizeof search) < 0) return -1;
/* Count dots, suppress search when >=ndots or name ends in
* a dot, which is an explicit request for global scope. */
for (dots=l=0; name[l]; l++) if (name[l]=='.') dots++;
if (dots >= conf.ndots || name[l-1]=='.') *search = 0;
/* This can never happen; the caller already checked length. */
if (l >= 256) return EAI_NONAME;
/* Name with search domain appended is setup in canon[]. This both
* provides the desired default canonical name (if the requested
* name is not a CNAME record) and serves as a buffer for passing
* the full requested name to name_from_dns. */
memcpy(canon, name, l);
canon[l] = '.';
for (p=search; *p; p=z) {
for (; isspace(*p); p++);
for (z=p; *z && !isspace(*z); z++);
if (z==p) break;
if (z-p < 256 - l - 1) {
memcpy(canon+l+1, p, z-p);
canon[z-p+1+l] = 0;
int cnt = name_from_dns(buf, canon, canon, family, &conf);
if (cnt) return cnt;
}
}
canon[l] = 0;
return name_from_dns(buf, canon, name, family, &conf);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: V8Console::CommandLineAPIScope::CommandLineAPIScope(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Object> commandLineAPI, v8::Local<v8::Object> global)
: m_context(context)
, m_commandLineAPI(commandLineAPI)
, m_global(global)
, m_installedMethods(v8::Set::New(context->GetIsolate()))
, m_cleanup(false)
{
v8::Local<v8::Array> names;
if (!m_commandLineAPI->GetOwnPropertyNames(context).ToLocal(&names))
return;
v8::Local<v8::External> externalThis = v8::External::New(context->GetIsolate(), this);
for (size_t i = 0; i < names->Length(); ++i) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> name;
if (!names->Get(context, i).ToLocal(&name) || !name->IsName())
continue;
if (m_global->Has(context, name).FromMaybe(true))
continue;
if (!m_installedMethods->Add(context, name).ToLocal(&m_installedMethods))
continue;
if (!m_global->SetAccessor(context, v8::Local<v8::Name>::Cast(name), CommandLineAPIScope::accessorGetterCallback,
CommandLineAPIScope::accessorSetterCallback, externalThis,
v8::DEFAULT, v8::DontEnum).FromMaybe(false)) {
bool removed = m_installedMethods->Delete(context, name).FromMaybe(false);
DCHECK(removed);
continue;
}
}
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int do_execve(const char *filename,
const char __user *const __user *__argv,
const char __user *const __user *__envp)
{
struct user_arg_ptr argv = { .ptr.native = __argv };
struct user_arg_ptr envp = { .ptr.native = __envp };
return do_execve_common(filename, argv, envp);
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 30,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FileAPIMessageFilter::~FileAPIMessageFilter() {}
Commit Message: File permission fix: now we selectively grant read permission for Sandboxed files
We also need to check the read permission and call GrantReadFile() for
sandboxed files for CreateSnapshotFile().
BUG=162114
TEST=manual
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11280231
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@170181 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 119,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeDownloadDelegate::EnqueueDownloadManagerRequest(
jobject chrome_download_delegate,
bool overwrite,
jobject download_info) {
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
return Java_ChromeDownloadDelegate_enqueueDownloadManagerRequestFromNative(
env, chrome_download_delegate, overwrite, download_info);
}
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 126,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int iriap_data_indication(void *instance, void *sap,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct iriap_cb *self;
__u8 *frame;
__u8 opcode;
IRDA_DEBUG(3, "%s()\n", __func__);
self = (struct iriap_cb *) instance;
IRDA_ASSERT(skb != NULL, return 0;);
IRDA_ASSERT(self != NULL, goto out;);
IRDA_ASSERT(self->magic == IAS_MAGIC, goto out;);
frame = skb->data;
if (self->mode == IAS_SERVER) {
/* Call server */
IRDA_DEBUG(4, "%s(), Calling server!\n", __func__);
iriap_do_r_connect_event(self, IAP_RECV_F_LST, skb);
goto out;
}
opcode = frame[0];
if (~opcode & IAP_LST) {
IRDA_WARNING("%s:, IrIAS multiframe commands or "
"results is not implemented yet!\n",
__func__);
goto out;
}
/* Check for ack frames since they don't contain any data */
if (opcode & IAP_ACK) {
IRDA_DEBUG(0, "%s() Got ack frame!\n", __func__);
goto out;
}
opcode &= ~IAP_LST; /* Mask away LST bit */
switch (opcode) {
case GET_INFO_BASE:
IRDA_DEBUG(0, "IrLMP GetInfoBaseDetails not implemented!\n");
break;
case GET_VALUE_BY_CLASS:
iriap_do_call_event(self, IAP_RECV_F_LST, NULL);
switch (frame[1]) {
case IAS_SUCCESS:
iriap_getvaluebyclass_confirm(self, skb);
break;
case IAS_CLASS_UNKNOWN:
IRDA_DEBUG(1, "%s(), No such class!\n", __func__);
/* Finished, close connection! */
iriap_disconnect_request(self);
/*
* Warning, the client might close us, so remember
* no to use self anymore after calling confirm
*/
if (self->confirm)
self->confirm(IAS_CLASS_UNKNOWN, 0, NULL,
self->priv);
break;
case IAS_ATTRIB_UNKNOWN:
IRDA_DEBUG(1, "%s(), No such attribute!\n", __func__);
/* Finished, close connection! */
iriap_disconnect_request(self);
/*
* Warning, the client might close us, so remember
* no to use self anymore after calling confirm
*/
if (self->confirm)
self->confirm(IAS_ATTRIB_UNKNOWN, 0, NULL,
self->priv);
break;
}
break;
default:
IRDA_DEBUG(0, "%s(), Unknown op-code: %02x\n", __func__,
opcode);
break;
}
out:
/* Cleanup - sub-calls will have done skb_get() as needed. */
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: irda: validate peer name and attribute lengths
Length fields provided by a peer for names and attributes may be longer
than the destination array sizes. Validate lengths to prevent stack
buffer overflows.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 35,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rose_kill_by_device(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct sock *s;
struct hlist_node *node;
spin_lock_bh(&rose_list_lock);
sk_for_each(s, node, &rose_list) {
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(s);
if (rose->device == dev) {
rose_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH, ROSE_OUT_OF_ORDER, 0);
rose->neighbour->use--;
rose->device = NULL;
}
}
spin_unlock_bh(&rose_list_lock);
}
Commit Message: rose: Add length checks to CALL_REQUEST parsing
Define some constant offsets for CALL_REQUEST based on the description
at <http://www.techfest.com/networking/wan/x25plp.htm> and the
definition of ROSE as using 10-digit (5-byte) addresses. Use them
consistently. Validate all implicit and explicit facilities lengths.
Validate the address length byte rather than either trusting or
assuming its value.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,207 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ClipboardMessageFilter::OnReadImageReply(
const SkBitmap& bitmap, IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
base::SharedMemoryHandle image_handle = base::SharedMemory::NULLHandle();
uint32 image_size = 0;
if (!bitmap.isNull()) {
std::vector<unsigned char> png_data;
if (gfx::PNGCodec::FastEncodeBGRASkBitmap(bitmap, false, &png_data)) {
base::SharedMemory buffer;
if (buffer.CreateAndMapAnonymous(png_data.size())) {
memcpy(buffer.memory(), vector_as_array(&png_data), png_data.size());
if (buffer.GiveToProcess(PeerHandle(), &image_handle)) {
image_size = png_data.size();
}
}
}
}
ClipboardHostMsg_ReadImage::WriteReplyParams(reply_msg, image_handle,
image_size);
Send(reply_msg);
}
Commit Message: Refactor ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap sanitization in ClipboardMsgFilter.
BUG=352395
R=tony@chromium.org
TBR=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/200523004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@257164 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 122,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ext4_update_bh_state(struct buffer_head *bh, unsigned long flags)
{
unsigned long old_state;
unsigned long new_state;
flags &= EXT4_MAP_FLAGS;
/* Dummy buffer_head? Set non-atomically. */
if (!bh->b_page) {
bh->b_state = (bh->b_state & ~EXT4_MAP_FLAGS) | flags;
return;
}
/*
* Someone else may be modifying b_state. Be careful! This is ugly but
* once we get rid of using bh as a container for mapping information
* to pass to / from get_block functions, this can go away.
*/
do {
old_state = READ_ONCE(bh->b_state);
new_state = (old_state & ~EXT4_MAP_FLAGS) | flags;
} while (unlikely(
cmpxchg(&bh->b_state, old_state, new_state) != old_state));
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix data exposure after a crash
Huang has reported that in his powerfail testing he is seeing stale
block contents in some of recently allocated blocks although he mounts
ext4 in data=ordered mode. After some investigation I have found out
that indeed when delayed allocation is used, we don't add inode to
transaction's list of inodes needing flushing before commit. Originally
we were doing that but commit f3b59291a69d removed the logic with a
flawed argument that it is not needed.
The problem is that although for delayed allocated blocks we write their
contents immediately after allocating them, there is no guarantee that
the IO scheduler or device doesn't reorder things and thus transaction
allocating blocks and attaching them to inode can reach stable storage
before actual block contents. Actually whenever we attach freshly
allocated blocks to inode using a written extent, we should add inode to
transaction's ordered inode list to make sure we properly wait for block
contents to be written before committing the transaction. So that is
what we do in this patch. This also handles other cases where stale data
exposure was possible - like filling hole via mmap in
data=ordered,nodelalloc mode.
The only exception to the above rule are extending direct IO writes where
blkdev_direct_IO() waits for IO to complete before increasing i_size and
thus stale data exposure is not possible. For now we don't complicate
the code with optimizing this special case since the overhead is pretty
low. In case this is observed to be a performance problem we can always
handle it using a special flag to ext4_map_blocks().
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f3b59291a69d0b734be1fc8be489fef2dd846d3d
Reported-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Tested-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 67,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void gdImageFillToBorder (gdImagePtr im, int x, int y, int border, int color)
{
int lastBorder;
/* Seek left */
int leftLimit = -1, rightLimit;
int i, restoreAlphaBlending = 0;
if (border < 0) {
/* Refuse to fill to a non-solid border */
return;
}
restoreAlphaBlending = im->alphaBlendingFlag;
im->alphaBlendingFlag = 0;
if (x >= im->sx) {
x = im->sx - 1;
} else if (x < 0) {
x = 0;
}
if (y >= im->sy) {
y = im->sy - 1;
} else if (y < 0) {
y = 0;
}
for (i = x; i >= 0; i--) {
if (gdImageGetPixel(im, i, y) == border) {
break;
}
gdImageSetPixel(im, i, y, color);
leftLimit = i;
}
if (leftLimit == -1) {
im->alphaBlendingFlag = restoreAlphaBlending;
return;
}
/* Seek right */
rightLimit = x;
for (i = (x + 1); i < im->sx; i++) {
if (gdImageGetPixel(im, i, y) == border) {
break;
}
gdImageSetPixel(im, i, y, color);
rightLimit = i;
}
/* Look at lines above and below and start paints */
/* Above */
if (y > 0) {
lastBorder = 1;
for (i = leftLimit; i <= rightLimit; i++) {
int c = gdImageGetPixel(im, i, y - 1);
if (lastBorder) {
if ((c != border) && (c != color)) {
gdImageFillToBorder(im, i, y - 1, border, color);
lastBorder = 0;
}
} else if ((c == border) || (c == color)) {
lastBorder = 1;
}
}
}
/* Below */
if (y < ((im->sy) - 1)) {
lastBorder = 1;
for (i = leftLimit; i <= rightLimit; i++) {
int c = gdImageGetPixel(im, i, y + 1);
if (lastBorder) {
if ((c != border) && (c != color)) {
gdImageFillToBorder(im, i, y + 1, border, color);
lastBorder = 0;
}
} else if ((c == border) || (c == color)) {
lastBorder = 1;
}
}
}
im->alphaBlendingFlag = restoreAlphaBlending;
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 51,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jslCharPosFree(JslCharPos *pos) {
jsvStringIteratorFree(&pos->it);
}
Commit Message: Fix strncat/cpy bounding issues (fix #1425)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,518 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcCopyGC(ClientPtr client)
{
GC *dstGC;
GC *pGC;
int result;
REQUEST(xCopyGCReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xCopyGCReq);
result = dixLookupGC(&pGC, stuff->srcGC, client, DixGetAttrAccess);
if (result != Success)
return result;
result = dixLookupGC(&dstGC, stuff->dstGC, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
if (result != Success)
return result;
if ((dstGC->pScreen != pGC->pScreen) || (dstGC->depth != pGC->depth))
return BadMatch;
if (stuff->mask & ~GCAllBits) {
client->errorValue = stuff->mask;
return BadValue;
}
return CopyGC(pGC, dstGC, stuff->mask);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 14,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void readonlyDOMTimeStampMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::readonlyDOMTimeStampMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ip_cmsg_recv_opts(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (IPCB(skb)->opt.optlen == 0)
return;
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, IP_RECVOPTS, IPCB(skb)->opt.optlen,
ip_hdr(skb) + 1);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_report_one(struct crypto_alg *alg,
struct crypto_user_alg *ualg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
memcpy(&ualg->cru_name, &alg->cra_name, sizeof(ualg->cru_name));
memcpy(&ualg->cru_driver_name, &alg->cra_driver_name,
sizeof(ualg->cru_driver_name));
memcpy(&ualg->cru_module_name, module_name(alg->cra_module),
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
ualg->cru_flags = alg->cra_flags;
ualg->cru_refcnt = atomic_read(&alg->cra_refcnt);
if (nla_put_u32(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_PRIORITY_VAL, alg->cra_priority))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_LARVAL) {
struct crypto_report_larval rl;
snprintf(rl.type, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", "larval");
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_LARVAL,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_larval), &rl))
goto nla_put_failure;
goto out;
}
if (alg->cra_type && alg->cra_type->report) {
if (alg->cra_type->report(skb, alg))
goto nla_put_failure;
goto out;
}
switch (alg->cra_flags & (CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK | CRYPTO_ALG_LARVAL)) {
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER:
if (crypto_report_cipher(skb, alg))
goto nla_put_failure;
break;
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_COMPRESS:
if (crypto_report_comp(skb, alg))
goto nla_put_failure;
break;
}
out:
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 1 | 166,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit crypto_user_exit(void)
{
netlink_kernel_release(crypto_nlsk);
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TaskManagerView::~TaskManagerView() {
RemoveAllChildViews(true);
}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 106,577 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RendererSchedulerImpl::EnsureUrgentPolicyUpdatePostedOnMainThread(
const base::Location& from_here) {
any_thread_lock_.AssertAcquired();
if (!policy_may_need_update_.IsSet()) {
policy_may_need_update_.SetWhileLocked(true);
control_task_queue_->PostTask(from_here, update_policy_closure_);
}
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 143,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AirPDcapGetStaAddress(
const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *frame)
{
switch(AIRPDCAP_DS_BITS(frame->fc[1])) { /* Bit 1 = FromDS, bit 0 = ToDS */
case 0:
if (memcmp(frame->addr2, frame->addr3, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN) == 0)
return frame->addr1;
else
return frame->addr2;
case 1:
return frame->addr2;
case 2:
return frame->addr1;
case 3:
if (memcmp(frame->addr1, frame->addr2, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN) < 0)
return frame->addr1;
else
return frame->addr2;
default:
return NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Sanity check eapol_len in AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey
Bug: 12175
Change-Id: Iaf977ba48f8668bf8095800a115ff9a3472dd893
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15326
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
Tested-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 51,903 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::RunModalAlertDialog(const blink::WebString& message) {
RunJavaScriptDialog(JAVASCRIPT_DIALOG_TYPE_ALERT, message.Utf16(),
base::string16(), nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::LoadHTMLString(const WebData& data,
const WebURL& base_url,
const WebURL& unreachable_url,
bool replace) {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
CommitDataNavigation(data, WebString::FromUTF8("text/html"),
WebString::FromUTF8("UTF-8"), base_url, unreachable_url,
replace, WebFrameLoadType::kStandard, WebHistoryItem(),
false, nullptr, nullptr, WebNavigationTimings());
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 145,743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GpuProcessHost::Init() {
init_start_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("gpu", "LaunchGpuProcess", TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD);
if (ServiceManagerConnection::GetForProcess()) {
ServiceManagerConnection::GetForProcess()->AddConnectionFilter(
std::make_unique<ConnectionFilterImpl>(process_->GetData().id));
}
process_->GetHost()->CreateChannelMojo();
mode_ = GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->GetGpuMode();
DCHECK_NE(mode_, gpu::GpuMode::DISABLED);
if (in_process_) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DCHECK(GetGpuMainThreadFactory());
gpu::GpuPreferences gpu_preferences = GetGpuPreferencesFromCommandLine();
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->UpdateGpuPreferences(&gpu_preferences);
in_process_gpu_thread_.reset(GetGpuMainThreadFactory()(
InProcessChildThreadParams(
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get(),
process_->GetInProcessMojoInvitation(),
process_->child_connection()->service_token()),
gpu_preferences));
base::Thread::Options options;
#if defined(OS_WIN) || defined(OS_MACOSX)
options.message_loop_type = base::MessageLoop::TYPE_UI;
#endif
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
options.priority = base::ThreadPriority::DISPLAY;
#endif
in_process_gpu_thread_->StartWithOptions(options);
OnProcessLaunched(); // Fake a callback that the process is ready.
} else if (!LaunchGpuProcess()) {
return false;
}
process_->child_channel()
->GetAssociatedInterfaceSupport()
->GetRemoteAssociatedInterface(&gpu_main_ptr_);
viz::mojom::GpuHostPtr host_proxy;
gpu_host_binding_.Bind(mojo::MakeRequest(&host_proxy));
discardable_memory::mojom::DiscardableSharedMemoryManagerPtr
discardable_manager_ptr;
auto discardable_request = mojo::MakeRequest(&discardable_manager_ptr);
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&BindDiscardableMemoryRequestOnUI,
std::move(discardable_request)));
DCHECK(GetFontRenderParamsOnIO().initialized);
gpu_main_ptr_->CreateGpuService(
mojo::MakeRequest(&gpu_service_ptr_), std::move(host_proxy),
std::move(discardable_manager_ptr), activity_flags_.CloneHandle(),
GetFontRenderParamsOnIO().params.subpixel_rendering);
#if defined(USE_OZONE)
InitOzone();
#endif // defined(USE_OZONE)
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix GPU process fallback logic.
1. In GpuProcessHost::OnProcessCrashed() record the process crash first.
This means the GPU mode fallback will happen before a new GPU process
is started.
2. Don't call FallBackToNextGpuMode() if GPU process initialization
fails for an unsandboxed GPU process. The unsandboxed GPU is only
used for collect information and it's failure doesn't indicate a need
to change GPU modes.
Bug: 869419
Change-Id: I8bd0a03268f0ea8809f3df8458d4e6a92db9391f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1157164
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#579625}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,484 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: list_to_parameters_foreach (GAppInfo *application,
GList *uris,
GList **ret)
{
ApplicationLaunchParameters *parameters;
uris = g_list_reverse (uris);
parameters = application_launch_parameters_new
(application, uris);
*ret = g_list_prepend (*ret, parameters);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void VoidMethodSequenceSequenceDOMStringArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "voidMethodSequenceSequenceDOMStringArg");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
Vector<Vector<String>> string_sequence_sequence_arg;
string_sequence_sequence_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLSequence<IDLSequence<IDLString>>>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->voidMethodSequenceSequenceDOMStringArg(string_sequence_sequence_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static TriState StateUnorderedList(LocalFrame& frame, Event*) {
return SelectionListState(frame.Selection(), ulTag);
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,660 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Luv32fromXYZ(LogLuvState* sp, uint8* op, tmsize_t n)
{
uint32* luv = (uint32*) sp->tbuf;
float* xyz = (float*) op;
while (n-- > 0) {
*luv++ = LogLuv32fromXYZ(xyz, sp->encode_meth);
xyz += 3;
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u_int dccp_csum_coverage(const struct dccp_hdr* dh, u_int len)
{
u_int cov;
if (DCCPH_CSCOV(dh) == 0)
return len;
cov = (dh->dccph_doff + DCCPH_CSCOV(dh) - 1) * sizeof(uint32_t);
return (cov > len)? len : cov;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16229/DCCP: Fix printing "Timestamp" and "Timestamp Echo" options
Add some comments.
Moreover:
Put a function definition name at the beginning of the line.
(This change was ported from commit 6df4852 in the master branch.)
Ryan Ackroyd had independently identified this buffer over-read later by
means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture file for the test.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 93,164 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void Q(u32 *block, u8 *Kr, u32 *Km)
{
u32 I;
block[2] ^= F1(block[3], Kr[0], Km[0]);
block[1] ^= F2(block[2], Kr[1], Km[1]);
block[0] ^= F3(block[1], Kr[2], Km[2]);
block[3] ^= F1(block[0], Kr[3], Km[3]);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool pdptrs_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u64 pdpte[ARRAY_SIZE(vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->pdptrs)];
bool changed = true;
int offset;
gfn_t gfn;
int r;
if (is_long_mode(vcpu) || !is_pae(vcpu))
return false;
if (!test_bit(VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR,
(unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_avail))
return true;
gfn = (kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) & ~31u) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
offset = (kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) & ~31u) & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
r = kvm_read_nested_guest_page(vcpu, gfn, pdpte, offset, sizeof(pdpte),
PFERR_USER_MASK | PFERR_WRITE_MASK);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
changed = memcmp(pdpte, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->pdptrs, sizeof(pdpte)) != 0;
out:
return changed;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool unconditional(const struct ipt_entry *e)
{
static const struct ipt_ip uncond;
return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
memcmp(&e->ip, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks
The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.
In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.
However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.
IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.
If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.
Fixes: 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: syzbot+e783f671527912cd9403@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 85,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ctdb_tcp_node_connect(struct event_context *ev, struct timed_event *te,
struct timeval t, void *private_data)
{
struct ctdb_node *node = talloc_get_type(private_data,
struct ctdb_node);
struct ctdb_tcp_node *tnode = talloc_get_type(node->private_data,
struct ctdb_tcp_node);
struct ctdb_context *ctdb = node->ctdb;
ctdb_sock_addr sock_in;
int sockin_size;
int sockout_size;
ctdb_sock_addr sock_out;
ctdb_tcp_stop_connection(node);
ZERO_STRUCT(sock_out);
#ifdef HAVE_SOCK_SIN_LEN
sock_out.ip.sin_len = sizeof(sock_out);
#endif
if (ctdb_tcp_get_address(ctdb, node->address.address, &sock_out) != 0) {
return;
}
switch (sock_out.sa.sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
sock_out.ip.sin_port = htons(node->address.port);
break;
case AF_INET6:
sock_out.ip6.sin6_port = htons(node->address.port);
break;
default:
DEBUG(DEBUG_ERR, (__location__ " unknown family %u\n",
sock_out.sa.sa_family));
return;
}
tnode->fd = socket(sock_out.sa.sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
if (tnode->fd == -1) {
DEBUG(DEBUG_ERR, (__location__ "Failed to create socket\n"));
return;
}
set_nonblocking(tnode->fd);
set_close_on_exec(tnode->fd);
DEBUG(DEBUG_DEBUG, (__location__ " Created TCP SOCKET FD:%d\n", tnode->fd));
/* Bind our side of the socketpair to the same address we use to listen
* on incoming CTDB traffic.
* We must specify this address to make sure that the address we expose to
* the remote side is actually routable in case CTDB traffic will run on
* a dedicated non-routeable network.
*/
ZERO_STRUCT(sock_in);
if (ctdb_tcp_get_address(ctdb, ctdb->address.address, &sock_in) != 0) {
DEBUG(DEBUG_ERR, (__location__ " Failed to find our address. Failing bind.\n"));
close(tnode->fd);
return;
}
/* AIX libs check to see if the socket address and length
arguments are consistent with each other on calls like
connect(). Can not get by with just sizeof(sock_in),
need sizeof(sock_in.ip).
*/
switch (sock_in.sa.sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
sockin_size = sizeof(sock_in.ip);
sockout_size = sizeof(sock_out.ip);
break;
case AF_INET6:
sockin_size = sizeof(sock_in.ip6);
sockout_size = sizeof(sock_out.ip6);
break;
default:
DEBUG(DEBUG_ERR, (__location__ " unknown family %u\n",
sock_in.sa.sa_family));
close(tnode->fd);
return;
}
#ifdef HAVE_SOCK_SIN_LEN
sock_in.ip.sin_len = sockin_size;
sock_out.ip.sin_len = sockout_size;
#endif
if (bind(tnode->fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sock_in, sockin_size) == -1) {
DEBUG(DEBUG_ERR, (__location__ "Failed to bind socket %s(%d)\n",
strerror(errno), errno));
close(tnode->fd);
return;
}
if (connect(tnode->fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sock_out, sockout_size) != 0 &&
errno != EINPROGRESS) {
ctdb_tcp_stop_connection(node);
tnode->connect_te = event_add_timed(ctdb->ev, tnode,
timeval_current_ofs(1, 0),
ctdb_tcp_node_connect, node);
return;
}
/* non-blocking connect - wait for write event */
tnode->connect_fde = event_add_fd(node->ctdb->ev, tnode, tnode->fd,
EVENT_FD_WRITE|EVENT_FD_READ,
ctdb_node_connect_write, node);
/* don't give it long to connect - retry in one second. This ensures
that we find a node is up quickly (tcp normally backs off a syn reply
delay by quite a lot) */
tnode->connect_te = event_add_timed(ctdb->ev, tnode, timeval_current_ofs(1, 0),
ctdb_tcp_node_connect, node);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,810 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t khugepaged_defrag_store(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t count)
{
return single_flag_store(kobj, attr, buf, count,
TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_DEFRAG_KHUGEPAGED_FLAG);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE and vm_flags cleanups
The huge_memory.c THP page fault was allowed to run if vm_ops was null
(which would succeed for /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE, as the f_op->mmap wouldn't
setup a special vma->vm_ops and it would fallback to regular anonymous
memory) but other THP logics weren't fully activated for vmas with vm_file
not NULL (/dev/zero has a not NULL vma->vm_file).
So this removes the vm_file checks so that /dev/zero also can safely use
THP (the other albeit safer approach to fix this bug would have been to
prevent the THP initial page fault to run if vm_file was set).
After removing the vm_file checks, this also makes huge_memory.c stricter
in khugepaged for the DEBUG_VM=y case. It doesn't replace the vm_file
check with a is_pfn_mapping check (but it keeps checking for VM_PFNMAP
under VM_BUG_ON) because for a is_cow_mapping() mapping VM_PFNMAP should
only be allowed to exist before the first page fault, and in turn when
vma->anon_vma is null (so preventing khugepaged registration). So I tend
to think the previous comment saying if vm_file was set, VM_PFNMAP might
have been set and we could still be registered in khugepaged (despite
anon_vma was not NULL to be registered in khugepaged) was too paranoid.
The is_linear_pfn_mapping check is also I think superfluous (as described
by comment) but under DEBUG_VM it is safe to stay.
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33682
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Caspar Zhang <bugs@casparzhang.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.38.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> composite() { return m_composite; }
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void put_fb_info(struct fb_info *fb_info)
{
if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&fb_info->count))
return;
if (fb_info->fbops->fb_destroy)
fb_info->fbops->fb_destroy(fb_info);
}
Commit Message: vm: convert fb_mmap to vm_iomap_memory() helper
This is my example conversion of a few existing mmap users. The
fb_mmap() case is a good example because it is a bit more complicated
than some: fb_mmap() mmaps one of two different memory areas depending
on the page offset of the mmap (but happily there is never any mixing of
the two, so the helper function still works).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 31,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Automation::AcceptPromptAppModalDialog(const std::string& prompt_text,
Error** error) {
*error = CheckAlertsSupported();
if (*error)
return;
std::string error_msg;
if (!SendAcceptPromptAppModalDialogJSONRequest(
automation(), prompt_text, &error_msg)) {
*error = new Error(kUnknownError, error_msg);
}
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AutofillManager::GetCachedFormAndField(const FormData& form,
const FormFieldData& field,
FormStructure** form_structure,
AutofillField** autofill_field) {
if (!FindCachedForm(form, form_structure) &&
!FormStructure(form).ShouldBeParsed()) {
return false;
}
if (!UpdateCachedForm(form, *form_structure, form_structure))
return false;
if (!(*form_structure)->autofill_count())
return false;
*autofill_field = nullptr;
for (const auto& current : **form_structure) {
if (current->SameFieldAs(field)) {
*autofill_field = current.get();
break;
}
}
return *autofill_field != nullptr;
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | 0 | 154,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: file_completion_cb (const char *buf, linenoiseCompletions *lc)
{
DIR *dirp;
struct dirent *dp;
char *basec, *basen, *dirc, *dirn;
int baselen, dirlen;
char *fullpath;
struct stat filestat;
basec = strdup(buf);
dirc = strdup(buf);
dirn = dirname(dirc);
dirlen = strlen(dirn);
basen = basename(basec);
baselen = strlen(basen);
dirp = opendir(dirn);
if (dirp) {
while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
if (strncmp(basen, dp->d_name, baselen) == 0) {
/* add 2 extra bytes for possible / in middle & at end */
fullpath = (char *) malloc(strlen(dp->d_name) + dirlen + 3);
strcpy(fullpath, dirn);
if (fullpath[dirlen-1] != '/')
strcat(fullpath, "/");
strcat(fullpath, dp->d_name);
if (stat(fullpath, &filestat) == 0) {
if (S_ISDIR(filestat.st_mode)) {
strcat(fullpath, "/");
}
linenoiseAddCompletion(lc,fullpath);
}
free(fullpath);
}
}
closedir(dirp);
}
free(basec);
free(dirc);
}
Commit Message: Do not use "/bin/sh" to run external commands.
Picocom no longer uses /bin/sh to run external commands for
file-transfer operations. Parsing the command line and spliting it into
arguments is now performed internally by picocom, using quoting rules
very similar to those of the Unix shell. Hopefully, this makes it
impossible to inject shell-commands when supplying filenames or
extra arguments to the send- and receive-file commands.
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 73,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: isis_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *p, u_int length)
{
const struct isis_common_header *isis_header;
const struct isis_iih_lan_header *header_iih_lan;
const struct isis_iih_ptp_header *header_iih_ptp;
const struct isis_lsp_header *header_lsp;
const struct isis_csnp_header *header_csnp;
const struct isis_psnp_header *header_psnp;
const struct isis_tlv_lsp *tlv_lsp;
const struct isis_tlv_ptp_adj *tlv_ptp_adj;
const struct isis_tlv_is_reach *tlv_is_reach;
const struct isis_tlv_es_reach *tlv_es_reach;
uint8_t pdu_type, max_area, id_length, tlv_type, tlv_len, tmp, alen, lan_alen, prefix_len;
uint8_t ext_is_len, ext_ip_len, mt_len;
const uint8_t *optr, *pptr, *tptr;
u_short packet_len,pdu_len, key_id;
u_int i,vendor_id;
int sigcheck;
packet_len=length;
optr = p; /* initialize the _o_riginal pointer to the packet start -
need it for parsing the checksum TLV and authentication
TLV verification */
isis_header = (const struct isis_common_header *)p;
ND_TCHECK(*isis_header);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
pptr = p+(ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE);
header_iih_lan = (const struct isis_iih_lan_header *)pptr;
header_iih_ptp = (const struct isis_iih_ptp_header *)pptr;
header_lsp = (const struct isis_lsp_header *)pptr;
header_csnp = (const struct isis_csnp_header *)pptr;
header_psnp = (const struct isis_psnp_header *)pptr;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IS-IS"));
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (isis_header->version != ISIS_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "version %d packet not supported", isis_header->version));
return (0);
}
if ((isis_header->id_length != SYSTEM_ID_LEN) && (isis_header->id_length != 0)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "system ID length of %d is not supported",
isis_header->id_length));
return (0);
}
if (isis_header->pdu_version != ISIS_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "version %d packet not supported", isis_header->pdu_version));
return (0);
}
if (length < isis_header->fixed_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "fixed header length %u > packet length %u", isis_header->fixed_len, length));
return (0);
}
if (isis_header->fixed_len < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "fixed header length %u < minimum header size %u", isis_header->fixed_len, (u_int)ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE));
return (0);
}
max_area = isis_header->max_area;
switch(max_area) {
case 0:
max_area = 3; /* silly shit */
break;
case 255:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "bad packet -- 255 areas"));
return (0);
default:
break;
}
id_length = isis_header->id_length;
switch(id_length) {
case 0:
id_length = 6; /* silly shit again */
break;
case 1: /* 1-8 are valid sys-ID lenghts */
case 2:
case 3:
case 4:
case 5:
case 6:
case 7:
case 8:
break;
case 255:
id_length = 0; /* entirely useless */
break;
default:
break;
}
/* toss any non 6-byte sys-ID len PDUs */
if (id_length != 6 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "bad packet -- illegal sys-ID length (%u)", id_length));
return (0);
}
pdu_type=isis_header->pdu_type;
/* in non-verbose mode print the basic PDU Type plus PDU specific brief information*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s",
ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ",
tok2str(isis_pdu_values, "unknown PDU-Type %u", pdu_type)));
} else {
/* ok they seem to want to know everything - lets fully decode it */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%slength %u", ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ", length));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t%s, hlen: %u, v: %u, pdu-v: %u, sys-id-len: %u (%u), max-area: %u (%u)",
tok2str(isis_pdu_values,
"unknown, type %u",
pdu_type),
isis_header->fixed_len,
isis_header->version,
isis_header->pdu_version,
id_length,
isis_header->id_length,
max_area,
isis_header->max_area));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, optr, "\n\t", 8)) /* provide the _o_riginal pointer */
return (0); /* for optionally debugging the common header */
}
}
switch (pdu_type) {
case ISIS_PDU_L1_LAN_IIH:
case ISIS_PDU_L2_LAN_IIH:
if (isis_header->fixed_len != (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bogus fixed header length %u should be %lu",
isis_header->fixed_len, (unsigned long)(ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE)));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*header_iih_lan);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", src-id %s",
isis_print_id(header_iih_lan->source_id, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", lan-id %s, prio %u",
isis_print_id(header_iih_lan->lan_id,NODE_ID_LEN),
header_iih_lan->priority));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
pdu_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(header_iih_lan->pdu_len);
if (packet_len>pdu_len) {
packet_len=pdu_len; /* do TLV decoding as long as it makes sense */
length=pdu_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t source-id: %s, holding time: %us, Flags: [%s]",
isis_print_id(header_iih_lan->source_id,SYSTEM_ID_LEN),
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_iih_lan->holding_time),
tok2str(isis_iih_circuit_type_values,
"unknown circuit type 0x%02x",
header_iih_lan->circuit_type)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t lan-id: %s, Priority: %u, PDU length: %u",
isis_print_id(header_iih_lan->lan_id, NODE_ID_LEN),
(header_iih_lan->priority) & ISIS_LAN_PRIORITY_MASK,
pdu_len));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE))
return (0);
}
packet_len -= (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE);
pptr = p + (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE);
break;
case ISIS_PDU_PTP_IIH:
if (isis_header->fixed_len != (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bogus fixed header length %u should be %lu",
isis_header->fixed_len, (unsigned long)(ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE)));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*header_iih_ptp);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", src-id %s", isis_print_id(header_iih_ptp->source_id, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
pdu_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(header_iih_ptp->pdu_len);
if (packet_len>pdu_len) {
packet_len=pdu_len; /* do TLV decoding as long as it makes sense */
length=pdu_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t source-id: %s, holding time: %us, Flags: [%s]",
isis_print_id(header_iih_ptp->source_id,SYSTEM_ID_LEN),
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_iih_ptp->holding_time),
tok2str(isis_iih_circuit_type_values,
"unknown circuit type 0x%02x",
header_iih_ptp->circuit_type)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t circuit-id: 0x%02x, PDU length: %u",
header_iih_ptp->circuit_id,
pdu_len));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE))
return (0);
}
packet_len -= (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE);
pptr = p + (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE);
break;
case ISIS_PDU_L1_LSP:
case ISIS_PDU_L2_LSP:
if (isis_header->fixed_len != (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bogus fixed header length %u should be %lu",
isis_header->fixed_len, (unsigned long)ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*header_lsp);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", lsp-id %s, seq 0x%08x, lifetime %5us",
isis_print_id(header_lsp->lsp_id, LSP_ID_LEN),
EXTRACT_32BITS(header_lsp->sequence_number),
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_lsp->remaining_lifetime)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
pdu_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(header_lsp->pdu_len);
if (packet_len>pdu_len) {
packet_len=pdu_len; /* do TLV decoding as long as it makes sense */
length=pdu_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t lsp-id: %s, seq: 0x%08x, lifetime: %5us\n\t chksum: 0x%04x",
isis_print_id(header_lsp->lsp_id, LSP_ID_LEN),
EXTRACT_32BITS(header_lsp->sequence_number),
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_lsp->remaining_lifetime),
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_lsp->checksum)));
osi_print_cksum(ndo, (const uint8_t *)header_lsp->lsp_id,
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_lsp->checksum),
12, length-12);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", PDU length: %u, Flags: [ %s",
pdu_len,
ISIS_MASK_LSP_OL_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "Overload bit set, " : ""));
if (ISIS_MASK_LSP_ATT_BITS(header_lsp->typeblock)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ISIS_MASK_LSP_ATT_DEFAULT_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "default " : ""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ISIS_MASK_LSP_ATT_DELAY_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "delay " : ""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ISIS_MASK_LSP_ATT_EXPENSE_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "expense " : ""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ISIS_MASK_LSP_ATT_ERROR_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "error " : ""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ATT bit set, "));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ISIS_MASK_LSP_PARTITION_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "P bit set, " : ""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ]", tok2str(isis_lsp_istype_values, "Unknown(0x%x)",
ISIS_MASK_LSP_ISTYPE_BITS(header_lsp->typeblock))));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE))
return (0);
}
packet_len -= (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE);
pptr = p + (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE);
break;
case ISIS_PDU_L1_CSNP:
case ISIS_PDU_L2_CSNP:
if (isis_header->fixed_len != (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bogus fixed header length %u should be %lu",
isis_header->fixed_len, (unsigned long)(ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE)));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*header_csnp);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", src-id %s", isis_print_id(header_csnp->source_id, NODE_ID_LEN)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
pdu_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(header_csnp->pdu_len);
if (packet_len>pdu_len) {
packet_len=pdu_len; /* do TLV decoding as long as it makes sense */
length=pdu_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t source-id: %s, PDU length: %u",
isis_print_id(header_csnp->source_id, NODE_ID_LEN),
pdu_len));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t start lsp-id: %s",
isis_print_id(header_csnp->start_lsp_id, LSP_ID_LEN)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t end lsp-id: %s",
isis_print_id(header_csnp->end_lsp_id, LSP_ID_LEN)));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE))
return (0);
}
packet_len -= (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE);
pptr = p + (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE);
break;
case ISIS_PDU_L1_PSNP:
case ISIS_PDU_L2_PSNP:
if (isis_header->fixed_len != (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "- bogus fixed header length %u should be %lu",
isis_header->fixed_len, (unsigned long)(ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE)));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*header_psnp);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", src-id %s", isis_print_id(header_psnp->source_id, NODE_ID_LEN)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
pdu_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(header_psnp->pdu_len);
if (packet_len>pdu_len) {
packet_len=pdu_len; /* do TLV decoding as long as it makes sense */
length=pdu_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t source-id: %s, PDU length: %u",
isis_print_id(header_psnp->source_id, NODE_ID_LEN),
pdu_len));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE))
return (0);
}
packet_len -= (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE);
pptr = p + (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE);
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
(void)print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", length);
return (0);
}
/*
* Now print the TLV's.
*/
while (packet_len > 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, 2);
if (packet_len < 2)
goto trunc;
tlv_type = *pptr++;
tlv_len = *pptr++;
tmp =tlv_len; /* copy temporary len & pointer to packet data */
tptr = pptr;
packet_len -= 2;
/* first lets see if we know the TLVs name*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV #%u, length: %u",
tok2str(isis_tlv_values,
"unknown",
tlv_type),
tlv_type,
tlv_len));
if (tlv_len == 0) /* something is invalid */
continue;
if (packet_len < tlv_len)
goto trunc;
/* now check if we have a decoder otherwise do a hexdump at the end*/
switch (tlv_type) {
case ISIS_TLV_AREA_ADDR:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
alen = *tptr++;
while (tmp && alen < tmp) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Area address (length: %u): %s",
alen,
isonsap_string(ndo, tptr, alen)));
tptr += alen;
tmp -= alen + 1;
if (tmp==0) /* if this is the last area address do not attemt a boundary check */
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
alen = *tptr++;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_ISNEIGH:
while (tmp >= ETHER_ADDR_LEN) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ETHER_ADDR_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t SNPA: %s", isis_print_id(tptr, ETHER_ADDR_LEN)));
tmp -= ETHER_ADDR_LEN;
tptr += ETHER_ADDR_LEN;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_ISNEIGH_VARLEN:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, 1) || tmp < 3) /* min. TLV length */
goto trunctlv;
lan_alen = *tptr++; /* LAN address length */
if (lan_alen == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t LAN address length 0 bytes (invalid)"));
break;
}
tmp --;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t LAN address length %u bytes ", lan_alen));
while (tmp >= lan_alen) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, lan_alen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tIS Neighbor: %s", isis_print_id(tptr, lan_alen)));
tmp -= lan_alen;
tptr +=lan_alen;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_PADDING:
break;
case ISIS_TLV_MT_IS_REACH:
mt_len = isis_print_mtid(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ");
if (mt_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=mt_len;
tmp-=mt_len;
while (tmp >= 2+NODE_ID_LEN+3+1) {
ext_is_len = isis_print_ext_is_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlv_type);
if (ext_is_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tmp-=ext_is_len;
tptr+=ext_is_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IS_ALIAS_ID:
while (tmp >= NODE_ID_LEN+1) { /* is it worth attempting a decode ? */
ext_is_len = isis_print_ext_is_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlv_type);
if (ext_is_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tmp-=ext_is_len;
tptr+=ext_is_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_EXT_IS_REACH:
while (tmp >= NODE_ID_LEN+3+1) { /* is it worth attempting a decode ? */
ext_is_len = isis_print_ext_is_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlv_type);
if (ext_is_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tmp-=ext_is_len;
tptr+=ext_is_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IS_REACH:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,1); /* check if there is one byte left to read out the virtual flag */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s",
tok2str(isis_is_reach_virtual_values,
"bogus virtual flag 0x%02x",
*tptr++)));
tlv_is_reach = (const struct isis_tlv_is_reach *)tptr;
while (tmp >= sizeof(struct isis_tlv_is_reach)) {
ND_TCHECK(*tlv_is_reach);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IS Neighbor: %s",
isis_print_id(tlv_is_reach->neighbor_nodeid, NODE_ID_LEN)));
isis_print_metric_block(ndo, &tlv_is_reach->isis_metric_block);
tmp -= sizeof(struct isis_tlv_is_reach);
tlv_is_reach++;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_ESNEIGH:
tlv_es_reach = (const struct isis_tlv_es_reach *)tptr;
while (tmp >= sizeof(struct isis_tlv_es_reach)) {
ND_TCHECK(*tlv_es_reach);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t ES Neighbor: %s",
isis_print_id(tlv_es_reach->neighbor_sysid, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
isis_print_metric_block(ndo, &tlv_es_reach->isis_metric_block);
tmp -= sizeof(struct isis_tlv_es_reach);
tlv_es_reach++;
}
break;
/* those two TLVs share the same format */
case ISIS_TLV_INT_IP_REACH:
case ISIS_TLV_EXT_IP_REACH:
if (!isis_print_tlv_ip_reach(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", tlv_len))
return (1);
break;
case ISIS_TLV_EXTD_IP_REACH:
while (tmp>0) {
ext_ip_len = isis_print_extd_ip_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", AF_INET);
if (ext_ip_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=ext_ip_len;
tmp-=ext_ip_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_MT_IP_REACH:
mt_len = isis_print_mtid(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ");
if (mt_len == 0) { /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
}
tptr+=mt_len;
tmp-=mt_len;
while (tmp>0) {
ext_ip_len = isis_print_extd_ip_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", AF_INET);
if (ext_ip_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=ext_ip_len;
tmp-=ext_ip_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IP6_REACH:
while (tmp>0) {
ext_ip_len = isis_print_extd_ip_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", AF_INET6);
if (ext_ip_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=ext_ip_len;
tmp-=ext_ip_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_MT_IP6_REACH:
mt_len = isis_print_mtid(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ");
if (mt_len == 0) { /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
}
tptr+=mt_len;
tmp-=mt_len;
while (tmp>0) {
ext_ip_len = isis_print_extd_ip_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", AF_INET6);
if (ext_ip_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=ext_ip_len;
tmp-=ext_ip_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IP6ADDR:
while (tmp>=sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv6 interface address: %s",
ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tptr += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
tmp -= sizeof(struct in6_addr);
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_AUTH:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s: ",
tok2str(isis_subtlv_auth_values,
"unknown Authentication type 0x%02x",
*tptr)));
switch (*tptr) {
case ISIS_SUBTLV_AUTH_SIMPLE:
if (fn_printzp(ndo, tptr + 1, tlv_len - 1, ndo->ndo_snapend))
goto trunctlv;
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_AUTH_MD5:
for(i=1;i<tlv_len;i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr + i), 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(tptr + i)));
}
if (tlv_len != ISIS_SUBTLV_AUTH_MD5_LEN+1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", (invalid subTLV) "));
sigcheck = signature_verify(ndo, optr, length, tptr + 1,
isis_clear_checksum_lifetime,
header_lsp);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%s)", tok2str(signature_check_values, "Unknown", sigcheck)));
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_AUTH_GENERIC:
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr + 1), 2);
key_id = EXTRACT_16BITS((tptr+1));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u, password: ", key_id));
for(i=1 + sizeof(uint16_t);i<tlv_len;i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr + i), 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(tptr + i)));
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_AUTH_PRIVATE:
default:
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr + 1, "\n\t\t ", tlv_len - 1))
return(0);
break;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_PTP_ADJ:
tlv_ptp_adj = (const struct isis_tlv_ptp_adj *)tptr;
if(tmp>=1) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Adjacency State: %s (%u)",
tok2str(isis_ptp_adjancey_values, "unknown", *tptr),
*tptr));
tmp--;
}
if(tmp>sizeof(tlv_ptp_adj->extd_local_circuit_id)) {
ND_TCHECK(tlv_ptp_adj->extd_local_circuit_id);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Extended Local circuit-ID: 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptp_adj->extd_local_circuit_id)));
tmp-=sizeof(tlv_ptp_adj->extd_local_circuit_id);
}
if(tmp>=SYSTEM_ID_LEN) {
ND_TCHECK2(tlv_ptp_adj->neighbor_sysid, SYSTEM_ID_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Neighbor System-ID: %s",
isis_print_id(tlv_ptp_adj->neighbor_sysid, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
tmp-=SYSTEM_ID_LEN;
}
if(tmp>=sizeof(tlv_ptp_adj->neighbor_extd_local_circuit_id)) {
ND_TCHECK(tlv_ptp_adj->neighbor_extd_local_circuit_id);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Neighbor Extended Local circuit-ID: 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptp_adj->neighbor_extd_local_circuit_id)));
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_PROTOCOLS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t NLPID(s): "));
while (tmp>0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (0x%02x)",
tok2str(nlpid_values,
"unknown",
*tptr),
*tptr));
if (tmp>1) /* further NPLIDs ? - put comma */
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", "));
tptr++;
tmp--;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_MT_PORT_CAP:
{
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t RES: %d, MTID(s): %d",
(EXTRACT_16BITS (tptr) >> 12),
(EXTRACT_16BITS (tptr) & 0x0fff)));
tmp = tmp-2;
tptr = tptr+2;
if (tmp)
isis_print_mt_port_cap_subtlv(ndo, tptr, tmp);
break;
}
case ISIS_TLV_MT_CAPABILITY:
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t O: %d, RES: %d, MTID(s): %d",
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) >> 15) & 0x01,
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) >> 12) & 0x07,
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) & 0x0fff));
tmp = tmp-2;
tptr = tptr+2;
if (tmp)
isis_print_mt_capability_subtlv(ndo, tptr, tmp);
break;
case ISIS_TLV_TE_ROUTER_ID:
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Traffic Engineering Router ID: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, pptr)));
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IPADDR:
while (tmp>=sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 interface address: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tptr += sizeof(struct in_addr);
tmp -= sizeof(struct in_addr);
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_HOSTNAME:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Hostname: "));
if (fn_printzp(ndo, tptr, tmp, ndo->ndo_snapend))
goto trunctlv;
break;
case ISIS_TLV_SHARED_RISK_GROUP:
if (tmp < NODE_ID_LEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, NODE_ID_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IS Neighbor: %s", isis_print_id(tptr, NODE_ID_LEN)));
tptr+=(NODE_ID_LEN);
tmp-=(NODE_ID_LEN);
if (tmp < 1)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags: [%s]", ISIS_MASK_TLV_SHARED_RISK_GROUP(*tptr++) ? "numbered" : "unnumbered"));
tmp--;
if (tmp < sizeof(struct in_addr))
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 interface address: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tptr+=sizeof(struct in_addr);
tmp-=sizeof(struct in_addr);
if (tmp < sizeof(struct in_addr))
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 neighbor address: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tptr+=sizeof(struct in_addr);
tmp-=sizeof(struct in_addr);
while (tmp>=4) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Link-ID: 0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr+=4;
tmp-=4;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_LSP:
tlv_lsp = (const struct isis_tlv_lsp *)tptr;
while(tmp>=sizeof(struct isis_tlv_lsp)) {
ND_TCHECK((tlv_lsp->lsp_id)[LSP_ID_LEN-1]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t lsp-id: %s",
isis_print_id(tlv_lsp->lsp_id, LSP_ID_LEN)));
ND_TCHECK2(tlv_lsp->sequence_number, 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", seq: 0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_lsp->sequence_number)));
ND_TCHECK2(tlv_lsp->remaining_lifetime, 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", lifetime: %5ds", EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv_lsp->remaining_lifetime)));
ND_TCHECK2(tlv_lsp->checksum, 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", chksum: 0x%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv_lsp->checksum)));
tmp-=sizeof(struct isis_tlv_lsp);
tlv_lsp++;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_CHECKSUM:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_CHECKSUM_MINLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_CHECKSUM_MINLEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t checksum: 0x%04x ", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
/* do not attempt to verify the checksum if it is zero
* most likely a HMAC-MD5 TLV is also present and
* to avoid conflicts the checksum TLV is zeroed.
* see rfc3358 for details
*/
osi_print_cksum(ndo, optr, EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr), tptr-optr,
length);
break;
case ISIS_TLV_POI:
if (tlv_len >= SYSTEM_ID_LEN + 1) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, SYSTEM_ID_LEN + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Purge Originator System-ID: %s",
isis_print_id(tptr + 1, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
}
if (tlv_len == 2 * SYSTEM_ID_LEN + 1) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 2 * SYSTEM_ID_LEN + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Received from System-ID: %s",
isis_print_id(tptr + SYSTEM_ID_LEN + 1, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_MT_SUPPORTED:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_MT_SUPPORTED_MINLEN)
break;
while (tmp>1) {
/* length can only be a multiple of 2, otherwise there is
something broken -> so decode down until length is 1 */
if (tmp!=1) {
mt_len = isis_print_mtid(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ");
if (mt_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=mt_len;
tmp-=mt_len;
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t invalid MT-ID"));
break;
}
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING:
/* first attempt to decode the flags */
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_FLAGLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_FLAGLEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(isis_restart_flag_values, "none", *tptr)));
tptr+=ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_FLAGLEN;
tmp-=ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_FLAGLEN;
/* is there anything other than the flags field? */
if (tmp == 0)
break;
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_HOLDTIMELEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_HOLDTIMELEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Remaining holding time %us", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
tptr+=ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_HOLDTIMELEN;
tmp-=ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_HOLDTIMELEN;
/* is there an additional sysid field present ?*/
if (tmp == SYSTEM_ID_LEN) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, SYSTEM_ID_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", for %s", isis_print_id(tptr,SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IDRP_INFO:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_IDRP_INFO_MINLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_IDRP_INFO_MINLEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Inter-Domain Information Type: %s",
tok2str(isis_subtlv_idrp_values,
"Unknown (0x%02x)",
*tptr)));
switch (*tptr++) {
case ISIS_SUBTLV_IDRP_ASN:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 2); /* fetch AS number */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AS Number: %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_IDRP_LOCAL:
case ISIS_SUBTLV_IDRP_RES:
default:
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlv_len - 1))
return(0);
break;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_LSP_BUFFERSIZE:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_LSP_BUFFERSIZE_MINLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_LSP_BUFFERSIZE_MINLEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t LSP Buffersize: %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
break;
case ISIS_TLV_PART_DIS:
while (tmp >= SYSTEM_ID_LEN) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, SYSTEM_ID_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", isis_print_id(tptr, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
tptr+=SYSTEM_ID_LEN;
tmp-=SYSTEM_ID_LEN;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_PREFIX_NEIGH:
if (tmp < sizeof(struct isis_metric_block))
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct isis_metric_block));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Metric Block"));
isis_print_metric_block(ndo, (const struct isis_metric_block *)tptr);
tptr+=sizeof(struct isis_metric_block);
tmp-=sizeof(struct isis_metric_block);
while(tmp>0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
prefix_len=*tptr++; /* read out prefix length in semioctets*/
if (prefix_len < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tAddress: prefix length %u < 2", prefix_len));
break;
}
tmp--;
if (tmp < prefix_len/2)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, prefix_len / 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tAddress: %s/%u",
isonsap_string(ndo, tptr, prefix_len / 2), prefix_len * 4));
tptr+=prefix_len/2;
tmp-=prefix_len/2;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IIH_SEQNR:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_IIH_SEQNR_MINLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_IIH_SEQNR_MINLEN); /* check if four bytes are on the wire */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Sequence number: %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
case ISIS_TLV_VENDOR_PRIVATE:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_VENDOR_PRIVATE_MINLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_VENDOR_PRIVATE_MINLEN); /* check if enough byte for a full oui */
vendor_id = EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Vendor: %s (%u)",
tok2str(oui_values, "Unknown", vendor_id),
vendor_id));
tptr+=3;
tmp-=3;
if (tmp > 0) /* hexdump the rest */
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t\t", tmp))
return(0);
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined TLVs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case ISIS_TLV_DECNET_PHASE4:
case ISIS_TLV_LUCENT_PRIVATE:
case ISIS_TLV_IPAUTH:
case ISIS_TLV_NORTEL_PRIVATE1:
case ISIS_TLV_NORTEL_PRIVATE2:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t\t", tlv_len))
return(0);
}
break;
}
/* do we want to see an additionally hexdump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag> 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", tlv_len))
return(0);
}
pptr += tlv_len;
packet_len -= tlv_len;
}
if (packet_len != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %u straggler bytes", packet_len));
}
return (1);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (1);
trunctlv:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return(1);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12999/IS-IS: Add a missing length check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: wb_consume(struct archive_write *a, size_t size)
{
struct iso9660 *iso9660 = (struct iso9660 *)a->format_data;
if (size > iso9660->wbuff_remaining ||
iso9660->wbuff_remaining == 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Internal Programing error: iso9660:wb_consume()"
" size=%jd, wbuff_remaining=%jd",
(intmax_t)size, (intmax_t)iso9660->wbuff_remaining);
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
iso9660->wbuff_remaining -= size;
if (iso9660->wbuff_remaining < LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE)
return (wb_write_out(a));
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 50,888 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::ValidateTexSubImage2D(
error::Error* error,
const char* function_name,
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
const void * data) {
(*error) = error::kNoError;
if (!validators_->texture_target.IsValid(target)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR_INVALID_ENUM(function_name, target, "target");
return false;
}
if (width < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "width < 0");
return false;
}
if (height < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "height < 0");
return false;
}
TextureRef* texture_ref = texture_manager()->GetTextureInfoForTarget(
&state_, target);
if (!texture_ref) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
function_name, "unknown texture for target");
return false;
}
Texture* texture = texture_ref->texture();
GLenum current_type = 0;
GLenum internal_format = 0;
if (!texture->GetLevelType(target, level, ¤t_type, &internal_format)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name, "level does not exist.");
return false;
}
if (!texture_manager()->ValidateTextureParameters(state_.GetErrorState(),
function_name, format, type, internal_format, level)) {
return false;
}
if (type != current_type) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
function_name, "type does not match type of texture.");
return false;
}
if (async_pixel_transfer_manager_->AsyncTransferIsInProgress(texture_ref)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
function_name, "async upload pending for texture");
return false;
}
if (!texture->ValidForTexture(
target, level, xoffset, yoffset, width, height, type)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "bad dimensions.");
return false;
}
if ((GLES2Util::GetChannelsForFormat(format) &
(GLES2Util::kDepth | GLES2Util::kStencil)) != 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
function_name, "can not supply data for depth or stencil textures");
return false;
}
if (data == NULL) {
(*error) = error::kOutOfBounds;
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,051 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void EqualizerSetBandLevel(EffectContext *pContext, int band, short Gain){
int gainRounded;
if(Gain > 0){
gainRounded = (int)((Gain+50)/100);
}else{
gainRounded = (int)((Gain-50)/100);
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bandGaindB[band] = gainRounded;
pContext->pBundledContext->CurPreset = PRESET_CUSTOM;
EqualizerLimitBandLevels(pContext);
}
Commit Message: fix possible overflow in effect wrappers.
Add checks on parameter size field in effect command handlers
to avoid overflow leading to invalid comparison with min allowed
size for command and reply buffers.
Bug: 26347509.
Change-Id: I20e6a9b6de8e5172b957caa1ac9410b9752efa4d
(cherry picked from commit ad1bd92a49d78df6bc6e75bee68c517c1326f3cf)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 161,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rfcomm_sock_kill(struct sock *sk)
{
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) || sk->sk_socket)
return;
BT_DBG("sk %p state %d refcnt %d", sk, sk->sk_state, atomic_read(&sk->sk_refcnt));
/* Kill poor orphan */
bt_sock_unlink(&rfcomm_sk_list, sk);
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD);
sock_put(sk);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix missing msg_namelen update in rfcomm_sock_recvmsg()
If RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP is set in the flags, rfcomm_sock_recvmsg() returns
early with 0 without updating the possibly set msg_namelen member. This,
in turn, leads to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix this by updating msg_namelen in this case. For all other cases it
will be handled in bt_sock_stream_recvmsg().
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ppp_scompress(unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd,
struct ppp_option_data32 __user *odata32)
{
struct ppp_option_data __user *odata;
__u32 data;
void __user *datap;
odata = compat_alloc_user_space(sizeof(*odata));
if (get_user(data, &odata32->ptr))
return -EFAULT;
datap = compat_ptr(data);
if (put_user(datap, &odata->ptr))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_in_user(&odata->length, &odata32->length,
sizeof(__u32) + sizeof(int)))
return -EFAULT;
return sys_ioctl(fd, PPPIOCSCOMPRESS, (unsigned long) odata);
}
Commit Message: fs/compat_ioctl.c: VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE missing error check
The compat ioctl for VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE was missing an error check
while converting ioctl arguments. This could lead to leaking kernel
stack contents into userspace.
Patch extracted from existing fix in grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 32,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const MediaTrackConstraintSet& ImageCapture::GetMediaTrackConstraints() const {
return current_constraints_;
}
Commit Message: Convert MediaTrackConstraints to a ScriptValue
IDLDictionaries such as MediaTrackConstraints should not be stored on
the heap which would happen when binding one as a parameter to a
callback. This change converts the object to a ScriptValue ahead of
time. This is fine because the value will be passed to a
ScriptPromiseResolver that will converted it to a V8 value if it
isn't already.
Bug: 759457
Change-Id: I3009a0f7711cc264aeaae07a36c18a6db8c915c8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/701358
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507177}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 151,087 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(curl_close)
{
zval *zid;
php_curl *ch;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "r", &zid) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ((ch = (php_curl*)zend_fetch_resource(Z_RES_P(zid), le_curl_name, le_curl)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (ch->in_callback) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Attempt to close cURL handle from a callback");
return;
}
if (Z_REFCOUNT_P(zid) <= 2) {
zend_list_close(Z_RES_P(zid));
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72674 - check both curl_escape and curl_unescape
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 50,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string16 ExtensionGlobalError::MenuItemLabel() {
NOTREACHED();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
{
unsigned char *p,*plen;
int i,mac_size,clear=0;
int prefix_len=0;
int eivlen;
long align=0;
SSL3_RECORD *wr;
SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
SSL_SESSION *sess;
/* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
* out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
if (wb->left != 0)
return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
{
i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
if (i <= 0)
return(i);
/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
}
if (wb->buf == NULL)
if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
return -1;
if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
return 0;
wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
sess=s->session;
if ( (sess == NULL) ||
(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
(EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
{
#if 1
clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
#else
clear=1;
#endif
mac_size=0;
}
else
{
mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
if (mac_size < 0)
goto err;
}
#if 0 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
if (type==SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && s->compress==NULL &&
!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && /*!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) &&*/
EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)
do {
unsigned char aad[13];
EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param = {NULL,aad,sizeof(aad),0};
int packlen;
memcpy(aad,s->s3->write_sequence,8);
aad[8]=type;
aad[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
aad[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
aad[11]=(unsigned char)(len>>8);
aad[12]=(unsigned char)len;
packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
if (packlen==0 || packlen > wb->len) break;
mb_param.out = wb->buf;
mb_param.inp = buf;
mb_param.len = len;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave)
{
int j=6;
while (j>=0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--])==0) ;
}
wb->offset=0;
wb->left = packlen;
/* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
s->s3->wpend_type=type;
s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
/* we now just need to write the buffer */
return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
} while (0);
#endif
/* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
{
/* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
* (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
{
/* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
* this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
* (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
* together with the actual payload) */
prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
if (prefix_len <= 0)
goto err;
if (prefix_len >
(SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
{
/* insufficient space */
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
}
if (create_empty_fragment)
{
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
/* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
* which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
* if we want to align the real payload, then we can
* just pretent we simply have two headers. */
align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
#endif
p = wb->buf + align;
wb->offset = align;
}
else if (prefix_len)
{
p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
}
else
{
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
#endif
p = wb->buf + align;
wb->offset = align;
}
/* write the header */
*(p++)=type&0xff;
wr->type=type;
*(p++)=(s->version>>8);
/* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
* bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
*/
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
&& !s->renegotiate
&& TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
*(p++) = 0x1;
else
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
/* field where we are to write out packet length */
plen=p;
p+=2;
/* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
{
int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
{
eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
if (eivlen <= 1)
eivlen = 0;
}
/* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
else
eivlen = 0;
}
else
eivlen = 0;
/* lets setup the record stuff. */
wr->data=p + eivlen;
wr->length=(int)len;
wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
/* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
* wr->data */
/* first we compress */
if (s->compress != NULL)
{
if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
else
{
memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
wr->input=wr->data;
}
/* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
* from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
* wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0)
{
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
goto err;
wr->length+=mac_size;
}
wr->input=p;
wr->data=p;
if (eivlen)
{
/* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
goto err; */
wr->length += eivlen;
}
if(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1)<1) goto err;
if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0)
{
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,p + wr->length,1) < 0)
goto err;
wr->length+=mac_size;
}
/* record length after mac and block padding */
s2n(wr->length,plen);
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* we should now have
* wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
* wr->length long */
wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
if (create_empty_fragment)
{
/* we are in a recursive call;
* just return the length, don't write out anything here
*/
return wr->length;
}
/* now let's set up wb */
wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
/* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
s->s3->wpend_type=type;
s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
/* we now just need to write the buffer */
return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
err:
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in dtls1_get_record whilst in the listen state where you get two
separate reads performed - one for the header and one for the body of the
handshake record.
CVE-2014-3571
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 94,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int copy_fs(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct fs_struct *fs = current->fs;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_FS) {
/* tsk->fs is already what we want */
spin_lock(&fs->lock);
if (fs->in_exec) {
spin_unlock(&fs->lock);
return -EAGAIN;
}
fs->users++;
spin_unlock(&fs->lock);
return 0;
}
tsk->fs = copy_fs_struct(fs);
if (!tsk->fs)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HostCache::Entry::GetStaleness(base::TimeTicks now,
int network_changes,
EntryStaleness* out) const {
DCHECK(out);
out->expired_by = now - expires_;
out->network_changes = network_changes - network_changes_;
out->stale_hits = stale_hits_;
}
Commit Message: Add PersistenceDelegate to HostCache
PersistenceDelegate is a new interface for persisting the contents of
the HostCache. This commit includes the interface itself, the logic in
HostCache for interacting with it, and a mock implementation of the
interface for testing. It does not include support for immediate data
removal since that won't be needed for the currently planned use case.
BUG=605149
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2943143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#481015}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: select_opt_exact(OnigEncoding enc, OptStr* now, OptStr* alt)
{
int vn, va;
vn = now->len;
va = alt->len;
if (va == 0) {
return ;
}
else if (vn == 0) {
copy_opt_exact(now, alt);
return ;
}
else if (vn <= 2 && va <= 2) {
/* ByteValTable[x] is big value --> low price */
va = map_position_value(enc, now->s[0]);
vn = map_position_value(enc, alt->s[0]);
if (now->len > 1) vn += 5;
if (alt->len > 1) va += 5;
}
if (now->case_fold == 0) vn *= 2;
if (alt->case_fold == 0) va *= 2;
if (now->good_case_fold != 0) vn *= 4;
if (alt->good_case_fold != 0) va *= 4;
if (comp_distance_value(&now->mmd, &alt->mmd, vn, va) > 0)
copy_opt_exact(now, alt);
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const base::FilePath& OfflinePageModelImpl::GetArchiveDirectory(
const std::string& name_space) const {
if (policy_controller_->IsRemovedOnCacheReset(name_space))
return archive_manager_->GetTemporaryArchivesDir();
return archive_manager_->GetPersistentArchivesDir();
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 155,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AP_DECLARE(void) ap_send_interim_response(request_rec *r, int send_headers)
{
hdr_ptr x;
char *status_line = NULL;
request_rec *rr;
if (r->proto_num < HTTP_VERSION(1,1)) {
/* don't send interim response to HTTP/1.0 Client */
return;
}
if (!ap_is_HTTP_INFO(r->status)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(00575)
"Status is %d - not sending interim response", r->status);
return;
}
if ((r->status == HTTP_CONTINUE) && !r->expecting_100) {
/*
* Don't send 100-Continue when there was no Expect: 100-continue
* in the request headers. For origin servers this is a SHOULD NOT
* for proxies it is a MUST NOT according to RFC 2616 8.2.3
*/
return;
}
/* if we send an interim response, we're no longer in a state of
* expecting one. Also, this could feasibly be in a subrequest,
* so we need to propagate the fact that we responded.
*/
for (rr = r; rr != NULL; rr = rr->main) {
rr->expecting_100 = 0;
}
status_line = apr_pstrcat(r->pool, AP_SERVER_PROTOCOL, " ", r->status_line, CRLF, NULL);
ap_xlate_proto_to_ascii(status_line, strlen(status_line));
x.f = r->connection->output_filters;
x.bb = apr_brigade_create(r->pool, r->connection->bucket_alloc);
ap_fputs(x.f, x.bb, status_line);
if (send_headers) {
apr_table_do(send_header, &x, r->headers_out, NULL);
apr_table_clear(r->headers_out);
}
ap_fputs(x.f, x.bb, CRLF_ASCII);
ap_fflush(x.f, x.bb);
apr_brigade_destroy(x.bb);
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0253 (cve.mitre.org)
core: Fix a crash introduced in with ErrorDocument 400 pointing
to a local URL-path with the INCLUDES filter active, introduced
in 2.4.11. PR 57531. [Yann Ylavic]
Submitted By: ylavic
Committed By: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1664205 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: | 0 | 44,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DECLAREcpFunc(cpSeparate2SeparateByRow)
{
tsize_t scanlinesize = TIFFScanlineSize(in);
tdata_t buf;
uint32 row;
tsample_t s;
(void) imagewidth;
buf = _TIFFmalloc(scanlinesize);
if (!buf)
return 0;
_TIFFmemset(buf, 0, scanlinesize);
for (s = 0; s < spp; s++) {
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row++) {
if (TIFFReadScanline(in, buf, row, s) < 0 && !ignore) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read scanline %lu",
(unsigned long) row);
goto bad;
}
if (TIFFWriteScanline(out, buf, row, s) < 0) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out),
"Error, can't write scanline %lu",
(unsigned long) row);
goto bad;
}
}
}
_TIFFfree(buf);
return 1;
bad:
_TIFFfree(buf);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix out-of-bounds write on tiled images with odd
tile width vs image width. Reported as MSVR 35103
by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 48,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: chunk_type_valid(png_uint_32 c)
/* Bit whacking approach to chunk name validation that is intended to avoid
* branches. The cost is that it uses a lot of 32-bit constants, which might
* be bad on some architectures.
*/
{
png_uint_32 t;
/* Remove bit 5 from all but the reserved byte; this means every
* 8-bit unit must be in the range 65-90 to be valid. So bit 5
* must be zero, bit 6 must be set and bit 7 zero.
*/
c &= ~PNG_U32(32,32,0,32);
t = (c & ~0x1f1f1f1f) ^ 0x40404040;
/* Subtract 65 for each 8 bit quantity, this must not overflow
* and each byte must then be in the range 0-25.
*/
c -= PNG_U32(65,65,65,65);
t |=c ;
/* Subtract 26, handling the overflow which should set the top
* three bits of each byte.
*/
c -= PNG_U32(25,25,25,26);
t |= ~c;
return (t & 0xe0e0e0e0) == 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 1 | 173,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ring_buffer_discard_commit(struct ring_buffer *buffer,
struct ring_buffer_event *event)
{
struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
int cpu;
/* The event is discarded regardless */
rb_event_discard(event);
cpu = smp_processor_id();
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
/*
* This must only be called if the event has not been
* committed yet. Thus we can assume that preemption
* is still disabled.
*/
RB_WARN_ON(buffer, !local_read(&cpu_buffer->committing));
rb_decrement_entry(cpu_buffer, event);
if (rb_try_to_discard(cpu_buffer, event))
goto out;
/*
* The commit is still visible by the reader, so we
* must still update the timestamp.
*/
rb_update_write_stamp(cpu_buffer, event);
out:
rb_end_commit(cpu_buffer);
trace_recursive_unlock(cpu_buffer);
preempt_enable_notrace();
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: do_send_specific(pid_t tgid, pid_t pid, int sig, struct siginfo *info)
{
struct task_struct *p;
int error = -ESRCH;
rcu_read_lock();
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (p && (tgid <= 0 || task_tgid_vnr(p) == tgid)) {
error = check_kill_permission(sig, info, p);
/*
* The null signal is a permissions and process existence
* probe. No signal is actually delivered.
*/
if (!error && sig) {
error = do_send_sig_info(sig, info, p, false);
/*
* If lock_task_sighand() failed we pretend the task
* dies after receiving the signal. The window is tiny,
* and the signal is private anyway.
*/
if (unlikely(error == -ESRCH))
error = 0;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return error;
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DisconnectWindowLinux() {}
Commit Message: Initial implementation of DisconnectWindow on Linux.
BUG=None
TEST=Manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7089016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88889 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,819 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_check_bitstream(struct AVFormatContext *s, const AVPacket *pkt)
{
int ret = 1;
AVStream *st = s->streams[pkt->stream_index];
if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_AAC) {
if (pkt->size > 2 && (AV_RB16(pkt->data) & 0xfff0) == 0xfff0)
ret = ff_stream_add_bitstream_filter(st, "aac_adtstoasc", NULL);
} else if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_VP9) {
ret = ff_stream_add_bitstream_filter(st, "vp9_superframe", NULL);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 79,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t regulator_uA_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct regulator_dev *rdev = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", _regulator_get_current_limit(rdev));
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 74,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int perf_event_set_filter(struct perf_event *event, void __user *arg)
{
char *filter_str;
int ret = -EINVAL;
if ((event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT ||
!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVENT_TRACING)) &&
!has_addr_filter(event))
return -EINVAL;
filter_str = strndup_user(arg, PAGE_SIZE);
if (IS_ERR(filter_str))
return PTR_ERR(filter_str);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVENT_TRACING) &&
event->attr.type == PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT)
ret = ftrace_profile_set_filter(event, event->attr.config,
filter_str);
else if (has_addr_filter(event))
ret = perf_event_set_addr_filter(event, filter_str);
kfree(filter_str);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 68,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AXObjectCacheImpl::handleFocusedUIElementChanged(Node* oldFocusedNode,
Node* newFocusedNode) {
if (!newFocusedNode)
return;
Page* page = newFocusedNode->document().page();
if (!page)
return;
AXObject* focusedObject = this->focusedObject();
if (!focusedObject)
return;
AXObject* oldFocusedObject = get(oldFocusedNode);
postPlatformNotification(oldFocusedObject, AXBlur);
postPlatformNotification(focusedObject, AXFocusedUIElementChanged);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, mapPhar)
{
char *alias = NULL, *error;
int alias_len = 0;
long dataoffset = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|s!l", &alias, &alias_len, &dataoffset) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
phar_request_initialize(TSRMLS_C);
RETVAL_BOOL(phar_open_executed_filename(alias, alias_len, &error TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed Phar::loadPhar(string filename [, string alias])
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,357 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_int32_equal(QEMUFile *f, void *pv, size_t size)
{
int32_t *v = pv;
int32_t v2;
qemu_get_sbe32s(f, &v2);
if (*v == v2) {
return 0;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,705 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int val_hdr(struct arg *arg, char **err_msg)
{
if (arg && arg[1].type == ARGT_SINT && arg[1].data.sint < -MAX_HDR_HISTORY) {
memprintf(err_msg, "header occurrence must be >= %d", -MAX_HDR_HISTORY);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 9,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::CommitPendingWebUI() {
if (should_reuse_web_ui_) {
should_reuse_web_ui_ = false;
} else {
web_ui_ = std::move(pending_web_ui_);
web_ui_type_ = pending_web_ui_type_;
pending_web_ui_type_ = WebUI::kNoWebUI;
}
DCHECK(!pending_web_ui_ && pending_web_ui_type_ == WebUI::kNoWebUI &&
!should_reuse_web_ui_);
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothAdapter::AddObserver(BluetoothAdapter::Observer* observer) {
DCHECK(observer);
observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,164 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int insert_reserved_file_extent(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct inode *inode, u64 file_pos,
u64 disk_bytenr, u64 disk_num_bytes,
u64 num_bytes, u64 ram_bytes,
u8 compression, u8 encryption,
u16 other_encoding, int extent_type)
{
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct btrfs_file_extent_item *fi;
struct btrfs_path *path;
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
struct btrfs_key ins;
int ret;
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path)
return -ENOMEM;
path->leave_spinning = 1;
/*
* we may be replacing one extent in the tree with another.
* The new extent is pinned in the extent map, and we don't want
* to drop it from the cache until it is completely in the btree.
*
* So, tell btrfs_drop_extents to leave this extent in the cache.
* the caller is expected to unpin it and allow it to be merged
* with the others.
*/
ret = btrfs_drop_extents(trans, root, inode, file_pos,
file_pos + num_bytes, 0);
if (ret)
goto out;
ins.objectid = btrfs_ino(inode);
ins.offset = file_pos;
ins.type = BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY;
ret = btrfs_insert_empty_item(trans, root, path, &ins, sizeof(*fi));
if (ret)
goto out;
leaf = path->nodes[0];
fi = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, path->slots[0],
struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
btrfs_set_file_extent_generation(leaf, fi, trans->transid);
btrfs_set_file_extent_type(leaf, fi, extent_type);
btrfs_set_file_extent_disk_bytenr(leaf, fi, disk_bytenr);
btrfs_set_file_extent_disk_num_bytes(leaf, fi, disk_num_bytes);
btrfs_set_file_extent_offset(leaf, fi, 0);
btrfs_set_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi, num_bytes);
btrfs_set_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, fi, ram_bytes);
btrfs_set_file_extent_compression(leaf, fi, compression);
btrfs_set_file_extent_encryption(leaf, fi, encryption);
btrfs_set_file_extent_other_encoding(leaf, fi, other_encoding);
btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty(leaf);
btrfs_release_path(path);
inode_add_bytes(inode, num_bytes);
ins.objectid = disk_bytenr;
ins.offset = disk_num_bytes;
ins.type = BTRFS_EXTENT_ITEM_KEY;
ret = btrfs_alloc_reserved_file_extent(trans, root,
root->root_key.objectid,
btrfs_ino(inode), file_pos, &ins);
out:
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,387 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct kioctx *ioctx_alloc(unsigned nr_events)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct kioctx *ctx;
int err = -ENOMEM;
/*
* We keep track of the number of available ringbuffer slots, to prevent
* overflow (reqs_available), and we also use percpu counters for this.
*
* So since up to half the slots might be on other cpu's percpu counters
* and unavailable, double nr_events so userspace sees what they
* expected: additionally, we move req_batch slots to/from percpu
* counters at a time, so make sure that isn't 0:
*/
nr_events = max(nr_events, num_possible_cpus() * 4);
nr_events *= 2;
/* Prevent overflows */
if ((nr_events > (0x10000000U / sizeof(struct io_event))) ||
(nr_events > (0x10000000U / sizeof(struct kiocb)))) {
pr_debug("ENOMEM: nr_events too high\n");
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
if (!nr_events || (unsigned long)nr_events > (aio_max_nr * 2UL))
return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
ctx = kmem_cache_zalloc(kioctx_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
ctx->max_reqs = nr_events;
if (percpu_ref_init(&ctx->users, free_ioctx_users))
goto err;
if (percpu_ref_init(&ctx->reqs, free_ioctx_reqs))
goto err;
spin_lock_init(&ctx->ctx_lock);
spin_lock_init(&ctx->completion_lock);
mutex_init(&ctx->ring_lock);
init_waitqueue_head(&ctx->wait);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->active_reqs);
ctx->cpu = alloc_percpu(struct kioctx_cpu);
if (!ctx->cpu)
goto err;
if (aio_setup_ring(ctx) < 0)
goto err;
atomic_set(&ctx->reqs_available, ctx->nr_events - 1);
ctx->req_batch = (ctx->nr_events - 1) / (num_possible_cpus() * 4);
if (ctx->req_batch < 1)
ctx->req_batch = 1;
/* limit the number of system wide aios */
spin_lock(&aio_nr_lock);
if (aio_nr + nr_events > (aio_max_nr * 2UL) ||
aio_nr + nr_events < aio_nr) {
spin_unlock(&aio_nr_lock);
err = -EAGAIN;
goto err;
}
aio_nr += ctx->max_reqs;
spin_unlock(&aio_nr_lock);
percpu_ref_get(&ctx->users); /* io_setup() will drop this ref */
err = ioctx_add_table(ctx, mm);
if (err)
goto err_cleanup;
pr_debug("allocated ioctx %p[%ld]: mm=%p mask=0x%x\n",
ctx, ctx->user_id, mm, ctx->nr_events);
return ctx;
err_cleanup:
aio_nr_sub(ctx->max_reqs);
err:
aio_free_ring(ctx);
free_percpu(ctx->cpu);
free_percpu(ctx->reqs.pcpu_count);
free_percpu(ctx->users.pcpu_count);
kmem_cache_free(kioctx_cachep, ctx);
pr_debug("error allocating ioctx %d\n", err);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: aio: prevent double free in ioctx_alloc
ioctx_alloc() calls aio_setup_ring() to allocate a ring. If aio_setup_ring()
fails to do so it would call aio_free_ring() before returning, but
ioctx_alloc() would call aio_free_ring() again causing a double free of
the ring.
This is easily reproducible from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 166,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::updateRangesAfterChildrenChanged(ContainerNode* container)
{
for (Range* range : m_ranges)
range->nodeChildrenChanged(container);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::textRemoved(Node* text, unsigned offset, unsigned length)
{
if (!m_ranges.isEmpty()) {
HashSet<Range*>::const_iterator end = m_ranges.end();
for (HashSet<Range*>::const_iterator it = m_ranges.begin(); it != end; ++it)
(*it)->textRemoved(text, offset, length);
}
m_markers->removeMarkers(text, offset, length);
m_markers->shiftMarkers(text, offset + length, 0 - length);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,646 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AXNodeObject::~AXNodeObject() {
ASSERT(!m_node);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_wait_for_completion_rpc_task(struct rpc_task *task)
{
int ret;
ret = rpc_wait_for_completion_task(task);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void uv__chld(uv_signal_t* handle, int signum) {
uv_process_t* process;
uv_loop_t* loop;
int exit_status;
int term_signal;
unsigned int i;
int status;
pid_t pid;
QUEUE pending;
QUEUE* h;
QUEUE* q;
assert(signum == SIGCHLD);
QUEUE_INIT(&pending);
loop = handle->loop;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(loop->process_handles); i++) {
h = loop->process_handles + i;
q = QUEUE_HEAD(h);
while (q != h) {
process = QUEUE_DATA(q, uv_process_t, queue);
q = QUEUE_NEXT(q);
do
pid = waitpid(process->pid, &status, WNOHANG);
while (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR);
if (pid == 0)
continue;
if (pid == -1) {
if (errno != ECHILD)
abort();
continue;
}
process->status = status;
QUEUE_REMOVE(&process->queue);
QUEUE_INSERT_TAIL(&pending, &process->queue);
}
while (!QUEUE_EMPTY(&pending)) {
q = QUEUE_HEAD(&pending);
QUEUE_REMOVE(q);
QUEUE_INIT(q);
process = QUEUE_DATA(q, uv_process_t, queue);
uv__handle_stop(process);
if (process->exit_cb == NULL)
continue;
exit_status = 0;
if (WIFEXITED(process->status))
exit_status = WEXITSTATUS(process->status);
term_signal = 0;
if (WIFSIGNALED(process->status))
term_signal = WTERMSIG(process->status);
process->exit_cb(process, exit_status, term_signal);
}
}
}
Commit Message: unix: call setgoups before calling setuid/setgid
Partial fix for #1093
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,842 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_arm_sys_reg_get_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
{
const struct sys_reg_desc *r;
void __user *uaddr = (void __user *)(unsigned long)reg->addr;
if ((reg->id & KVM_REG_ARM_COPROC_MASK) == KVM_REG_ARM_DEMUX)
return demux_c15_get(reg->id, uaddr);
if (KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id) != sizeof(__u64))
return -ENOENT;
r = index_to_sys_reg_desc(vcpu, reg->id);
if (!r)
return get_invariant_sys_reg(reg->id, uaddr);
if (r->get_user)
return (r->get_user)(vcpu, r, reg, uaddr);
return reg_to_user(uaddr, &vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, r->reg), reg->id);
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 62,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int llc_ui_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int rc = -ENOTCONN;
lock_sock(sk);
if (unlikely(sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED))
goto out;
rc = -EINVAL;
if (how != 2)
goto out;
rc = llc_send_disc(sk);
if (!rc)
rc = llc_ui_wait_for_disc(sk, sk->sk_rcvtimeo);
/* Wake up anyone sleeping in poll */
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
out:
release_sock(sk);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: llc: Fix missing msg_namelen update in llc_ui_recvmsg()
For stream sockets the code misses to update the msg_namelen member
to 0 and therefore makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized
sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack
memory. The msg_namelen update is also missing for datagram sockets
in case the socket is shutting down during receive.
Fix both issues by setting msg_namelen to 0 early. It will be
updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __perf_event_header__init_id(struct perf_event_header *header,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct perf_event *event)
{
u64 sample_type = event->attr.sample_type;
data->type = sample_type;
header->size += event->id_header_size;
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_TID) {
/* namespace issues */
data->tid_entry.pid = perf_event_pid(event, current);
data->tid_entry.tid = perf_event_tid(event, current);
}
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_TIME)
data->time = perf_clock();
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_ID)
data->id = primary_event_id(event);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_STREAM_ID)
data->stream_id = event->id;
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CPU) {
data->cpu_entry.cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
data->cpu_entry.reserved = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: init_standard_palette(png_store *ps, png_structp pp, png_infop pi, int npalette,
int do_tRNS)
{
store_palette_entry *ppal = make_standard_palette(ps, npalette, do_tRNS);
{
int i;
png_color palette[256];
/* Set all entries to detect overread errors. */
for (i=0; i<npalette; ++i)
{
palette[i].red = ppal[i].red;
palette[i].green = ppal[i].green;
palette[i].blue = ppal[i].blue;
}
/* Just in case fill in the rest with detectable values: */
for (; i<256; ++i)
palette[i].red = palette[i].green = palette[i].blue = 42;
png_set_PLTE(pp, pi, palette, npalette);
}
if (do_tRNS)
{
int i, j;
png_byte tRNS[256];
/* Set all the entries, but skip trailing opaque entries */
for (i=j=0; i<npalette; ++i)
if ((tRNS[i] = ppal[i].alpha) < 255)
j = i+1;
/* Fill in the remainder with a detectable value: */
for (; i<256; ++i)
tRNS[i] = 24;
# ifdef PNG_WRITE_tRNS_SUPPORTED
if (j > 0)
png_set_tRNS(pp, pi, tRNS, j, 0/*color*/);
# endif
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,989 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WaitForProcessLauncherThreadToGoIdleObserver::RunOnUIThread() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (automation_)
automation_->Send(reply_message_.release());
Release();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,632 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsBool Write8bitTables(cmsContext ContextID, cmsIOHANDLER* io, cmsUInt32Number n, _cmsStageToneCurvesData* Tables)
{
int j;
cmsUInt32Number i;
cmsUInt8Number val;
for (i=0; i < n; i++) {
if (Tables) {
if ((Tables ->TheCurves[i]->nEntries == 2) &&
(Tables->TheCurves[i]->Table16[0] == 0) &&
(Tables->TheCurves[i]->Table16[1] == 65535)) {
for (j=0; j < 256; j++) {
if (!_cmsWriteUInt8Number(io, (cmsUInt8Number) j)) return FALSE;
}
}
else
if (Tables ->TheCurves[i]->nEntries != 256) {
cmsSignalError(ContextID, cmsERROR_RANGE, "LUT8 needs 256 entries on prelinearization");
return FALSE;
}
else
for (j=0; j < 256; j++) {
val = (cmsUInt8Number) FROM_16_TO_8(Tables->TheCurves[i]->Table16[j]);
if (!_cmsWriteUInt8Number(io, val)) return FALSE;
}
}
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 71,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::haveImportsLoaded() const
{
return !m_import || !m_import->isBlocked();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TextCodecUTF8::RegisterEncodingNames(EncodingNameRegistrar registrar) {
registrar("UTF-8", "UTF-8");
registrar("unicode11utf8", "UTF-8");
registrar("unicode20utf8", "UTF-8");
registrar("utf8", "UTF-8");
registrar("x-unicode20utf8", "UTF-8");
registrar("unicode-1-1-utf-8", "UTF-8");
}
Commit Message: Add bounds CHECK to UTF-8 decoder memory allocation.
Avoid integer overflow when computing a total buffer size from a base
buffer and small partial sequence buffer.
Bug: 901030
Change-Id: Ic82db2c6af770bd748fb1ec881999d0dfaac30f0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1313833
Reviewed-by: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605011}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 143,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OutOfProcessInstance::PrintEnd() {
if (print_settings_.print_pages_called_)
UserMetricsRecordAction("PDF.PrintPage");
print_settings_.Clear();
engine_->PrintEnd();
}
Commit Message: Prevent leaking PDF data cross-origin
BUG=520422
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1311973002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#345267}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 129,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SendSetCookieJSONRequest(
AutomationMessageSender* sender,
const std::string& url,
DictionaryValue* cookie_dict,
std::string* error_msg) {
DictionaryValue dict;
dict.SetString("command", "SetCookie");
dict.SetString("url", url);
dict.Set("cookie", cookie_dict->DeepCopy());
DictionaryValue reply_dict;
return SendAutomationJSONRequest(sender, dict, &reply_dict, error_msg);
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void fixup_objfreelist_debug(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
void **list)
{
#if DEBUG
void *next = *list;
void *objp;
while (next) {
objp = next - obj_offset(cachep);
next = *(void **)next;
poison_obj(cachep, objp, POISON_FREE);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 68,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool roleAllowsOrientation(AccessibilityRole role) {
return role == ScrollBarRole || role == SplitterRole || role == SliderRole;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1(void)
{
return (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & AESNI_CAPABLE ?
&aesni_256_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher : NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 12,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOL update_send_synchronize(rdpContext* context)
{
wStream* s;
rdpRdp* rdp = context->rdp;
BOOL ret;
s = fastpath_update_pdu_init(rdp->fastpath);
if (!s)
return FALSE;
Stream_Zero(s, 2); /* pad2Octets (2 bytes) */
ret = fastpath_send_update_pdu(rdp->fastpath, FASTPATH_UPDATETYPE_SYNCHRONIZE,
s, FALSE);
Stream_Release(s);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BOOL png2pnm (FILE *png_file, FILE *pnm_file, FILE *alpha_file, BOOL raw, BOOL alpha)
{
png_struct *png_ptr = NULL;
png_info *info_ptr = NULL;
png_byte buf[8];
png_byte *png_pixels = NULL;
png_byte **row_pointers = NULL;
png_byte *pix_ptr = NULL;
png_uint_32 row_bytes;
png_uint_32 width;
png_uint_32 height;
int bit_depth;
int channels;
int color_type;
int alpha_present;
int row, col;
int ret;
int i;
long dep_16;
/* read and check signature in PNG file */
ret = fread (buf, 1, 8, png_file);
if (ret != 8)
return FALSE;
ret = png_sig_cmp (buf, 0, 8);
if (ret)
return FALSE;
/* create png and info structures */
png_ptr = png_create_read_struct (PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!png_ptr)
return FALSE; /* out of memory */
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct (png_ptr);
if (!info_ptr)
{
png_destroy_read_struct (&png_ptr, NULL, NULL);
return FALSE; /* out of memory */
}
if (setjmp (png_jmpbuf(png_ptr)))
{
png_destroy_read_struct (&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
return FALSE;
}
/* set up the input control for C streams */
png_init_io (png_ptr, png_file);
png_set_sig_bytes (png_ptr, 8); /* we already read the 8 signature bytes */
/* read the file information */
png_read_info (png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* get size and bit-depth of the PNG-image */
png_get_IHDR (png_ptr, info_ptr,
&width, &height, &bit_depth, &color_type,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
/* set-up the transformations */
/* transform paletted images into full-color rgb */
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
png_set_expand (png_ptr);
/* expand images to bit-depth 8 (only applicable for grayscale images) */
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY && bit_depth < 8)
png_set_expand (png_ptr);
/* transform transparency maps into full alpha-channel */
if (png_get_valid (png_ptr, info_ptr, PNG_INFO_tRNS))
png_set_expand (png_ptr);
#ifdef NJET
/* downgrade 16-bit images to 8 bit */
if (bit_depth == 16)
png_set_strip_16 (png_ptr);
/* transform grayscale images into full-color */
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY ||
color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
png_set_gray_to_rgb (png_ptr);
/* only if file has a file gamma, we do a correction */
if (png_get_gAMA (png_ptr, info_ptr, &file_gamma))
png_set_gamma (png_ptr, (double) 2.2, file_gamma);
#endif
/* all transformations have been registered; now update info_ptr data,
* get rowbytes and channels, and allocate image memory */
png_read_update_info (png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* get the new color-type and bit-depth (after expansion/stripping) */
png_get_IHDR (png_ptr, info_ptr, &width, &height, &bit_depth, &color_type,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
/* check for 16-bit files */
if (bit_depth == 16)
{
raw = FALSE;
#ifdef __TURBOC__
pnm_file->flags &= ~((unsigned) _F_BIN);
#endif
}
/* calculate new number of channels and store alpha-presence */
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
channels = 1;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
channels = 2;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB)
channels = 3;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
channels = 4;
else
channels = 0; /* should never happen */
alpha_present = (channels - 1) % 2;
/* check if alpha is expected to be present in file */
if (alpha && !alpha_present)
{
fprintf (stderr, "PNG2PNM\n");
fprintf (stderr, "Error: PNG-file doesn't contain alpha channel\n");
exit (1);
}
/* row_bytes is the width x number of channels x (bit-depth / 8) */
row_bytes = png_get_rowbytes (png_ptr, info_ptr);
if ((png_pixels = (png_byte *) malloc (row_bytes * height * sizeof (png_byte))) == NULL) {
png_destroy_read_struct (&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
return FALSE;
}
if ((row_pointers = (png_byte **) malloc (height * sizeof (png_bytep))) == NULL)
{
png_destroy_read_struct (&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
free (png_pixels);
png_pixels = NULL;
return FALSE;
}
/* set the individual row_pointers to point at the correct offsets */
for (i = 0; i < (height); i++)
row_pointers[i] = png_pixels + i * row_bytes;
/* now we can go ahead and just read the whole image */
png_read_image (png_ptr, row_pointers);
/* read rest of file, and get additional chunks in info_ptr - REQUIRED */
png_read_end (png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* clean up after the read, and free any memory allocated - REQUIRED */
png_destroy_read_struct (&png_ptr, &info_ptr, (png_infopp) NULL);
/* write header of PNM file */
if ((color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY) ||
(color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA))
{
fprintf (pnm_file, "%s\n", (raw) ? "P5" : "P2");
fprintf (pnm_file, "%d %d\n", (int) width, (int) height);
fprintf (pnm_file, "%ld\n", ((1L << (int) bit_depth) - 1L));
}
else if ((color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB) ||
(color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA))
{
fprintf (pnm_file, "%s\n", (raw) ? "P6" : "P3");
fprintf (pnm_file, "%d %d\n", (int) width, (int) height);
fprintf (pnm_file, "%ld\n", ((1L << (int) bit_depth) - 1L));
}
/* write header of PGM file with alpha channel */
if ((alpha) &&
((color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA) ||
(color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)))
{
fprintf (alpha_file, "%s\n", (raw) ? "P5" : "P2");
fprintf (alpha_file, "%d %d\n", (int) width, (int) height);
fprintf (alpha_file, "%ld\n", ((1L << (int) bit_depth) - 1L));
}
/* write data to PNM file */
pix_ptr = png_pixels;
for (row = 0; row < height; row++)
{
for (col = 0; col < width; col++)
{
for (i = 0; i < (channels - alpha_present); i++)
{
if (raw)
fputc ((int) *pix_ptr++ , pnm_file);
else
if (bit_depth == 16){
dep_16 = (long) *pix_ptr++;
fprintf (pnm_file, "%ld ", (dep_16 << 8) + ((long) *pix_ptr++));
}
else
fprintf (pnm_file, "%ld ", (long) *pix_ptr++);
}
if (alpha_present)
{
if (!alpha)
{
pix_ptr++; /* alpha */
if (bit_depth == 16)
pix_ptr++;
}
else /* output alpha-channel as pgm file */
{
if (raw)
fputc ((int) *pix_ptr++ , alpha_file);
else
if (bit_depth == 16){
dep_16 = (long) *pix_ptr++;
fprintf (alpha_file, "%ld ", (dep_16 << 8) + (long) *pix_ptr++);
}
else
fprintf (alpha_file, "%ld ", (long) *pix_ptr++);
}
} /* if alpha_present */
if (!raw)
if (col % 4 == 3)
fprintf (pnm_file, "\n");
} /* end for col */
if (!raw)
if (col % 4 != 0)
fprintf (pnm_file, "\n");
} /* end for row */
if (row_pointers != (unsigned char**) NULL)
free (row_pointers);
if (png_pixels != (unsigned char*) NULL)
free (png_pixels);
return TRUE;
} /* end of source */
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 1 | 173,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::ReloadIfTerminated(
content::RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
std::string extension_id = GetExtensionId(render_view_host);
if (extension_id.empty())
return;
ExtensionRegistry* registry = ExtensionRegistry::Get(browser_context());
if (registry->GetExtensionById(extension_id, ExtensionRegistry::TERMINATED)) {
ExtensionSystem::Get(browser_context())->
extension_service()->ReloadExtension(extension_id);
}
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 125,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserEventRouter::OnBrowserAdded(Browser* browser) {
RegisterForBrowserNotifications(browser);
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 116,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::InitializeNewContext() {
DCHECK(!isContextLost());
DCHECK(GetDrawingBuffer());
marked_canvas_dirty_ = false;
animation_frame_in_progress_ = false;
active_texture_unit_ = 0;
pack_alignment_ = 4;
unpack_alignment_ = 4;
unpack_flip_y_ = false;
unpack_premultiply_alpha_ = false;
unpack_colorspace_conversion_ = GC3D_BROWSER_DEFAULT_WEBGL;
bound_array_buffer_ = nullptr;
current_program_ = nullptr;
framebuffer_binding_ = nullptr;
renderbuffer_binding_ = nullptr;
depth_mask_ = true;
stencil_enabled_ = false;
stencil_mask_ = 0xFFFFFFFF;
stencil_mask_back_ = 0xFFFFFFFF;
stencil_func_ref_ = 0;
stencil_func_ref_back_ = 0;
stencil_func_mask_ = 0xFFFFFFFF;
stencil_func_mask_back_ = 0xFFFFFFFF;
num_gl_errors_to_console_allowed_ = kMaxGLErrorsAllowedToConsole;
clear_color_[0] = clear_color_[1] = clear_color_[2] = clear_color_[3] = 0;
scissor_enabled_ = false;
clear_depth_ = 1;
clear_stencil_ = 0;
color_mask_[0] = color_mask_[1] = color_mask_[2] = color_mask_[3] = true;
GLint num_combined_texture_image_units = 0;
ContextGL()->GetIntegerv(GL_MAX_COMBINED_TEXTURE_IMAGE_UNITS,
&num_combined_texture_image_units);
texture_units_.clear();
texture_units_.resize(num_combined_texture_image_units);
GLint num_vertex_attribs = 0;
ContextGL()->GetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VERTEX_ATTRIBS, &num_vertex_attribs);
max_vertex_attribs_ = num_vertex_attribs;
max_texture_size_ = 0;
ContextGL()->GetIntegerv(GL_MAX_TEXTURE_SIZE, &max_texture_size_);
max_texture_level_ =
WebGLTexture::ComputeLevelCount(max_texture_size_, max_texture_size_, 1);
max_cube_map_texture_size_ = 0;
ContextGL()->GetIntegerv(GL_MAX_CUBE_MAP_TEXTURE_SIZE,
&max_cube_map_texture_size_);
max3d_texture_size_ = 0;
max3d_texture_level_ = 0;
max_array_texture_layers_ = 0;
if (IsWebGL2OrHigher()) {
ContextGL()->GetIntegerv(GL_MAX_3D_TEXTURE_SIZE, &max3d_texture_size_);
max3d_texture_level_ = WebGLTexture::ComputeLevelCount(
max3d_texture_size_, max3d_texture_size_, max3d_texture_size_);
ContextGL()->GetIntegerv(GL_MAX_ARRAY_TEXTURE_LAYERS,
&max_array_texture_layers_);
}
max_cube_map_texture_level_ = WebGLTexture::ComputeLevelCount(
max_cube_map_texture_size_, max_cube_map_texture_size_, 1);
max_renderbuffer_size_ = 0;
ContextGL()->GetIntegerv(GL_MAX_RENDERBUFFER_SIZE, &max_renderbuffer_size_);
max_draw_buffers_ = 0;
max_color_attachments_ = 0;
back_draw_buffer_ = GL_BACK;
read_buffer_of_default_framebuffer_ = GL_BACK;
default_vertex_array_object_ = WebGLVertexArrayObject::Create(
this, WebGLVertexArrayObjectBase::kVaoTypeDefault);
bound_vertex_array_object_ = default_vertex_array_object_;
vertex_attrib_type_.resize(max_vertex_attribs_);
ContextGL()->Viewport(0, 0, drawingBufferWidth(), drawingBufferHeight());
scissor_box_[0] = scissor_box_[1] = 0;
scissor_box_[2] = drawingBufferWidth();
scissor_box_[3] = drawingBufferHeight();
ContextGL()->Scissor(scissor_box_[0], scissor_box_[1], scissor_box_[2],
scissor_box_[3]);
GetDrawingBuffer()->ContextProvider()->SetLostContextCallback(
WTF::BindRepeating(&WebGLRenderingContextBase::ForceLostContext,
WrapWeakPersistent(this),
WebGLRenderingContextBase::kRealLostContext,
WebGLRenderingContextBase::kAuto));
GetDrawingBuffer()->ContextProvider()->SetErrorMessageCallback(
WTF::BindRepeating(&WebGLRenderingContextBase::OnErrorMessage,
WrapWeakPersistent(this)));
if (IsWebGL2OrHigher())
ContextGL()->Enable(GL_PRIMITIVE_RESTART_FIXED_INDEX);
ContextGL()->Flush();
for (int i = 0; i < kWebGLExtensionNameCount; ++i)
extension_enabled_[i] = false;
is_web_gl2_formats_types_added_ = false;
is_web_gl2_tex_image_source_formats_types_added_ = false;
is_web_gl2_internal_formats_copy_tex_image_added_ = false;
is_oes_texture_float_formats_types_added_ = false;
is_oes_texture_half_float_formats_types_added_ = false;
is_web_gl_depth_texture_formats_types_added_ = false;
is_ext_srgb_formats_types_added_ = false;
is_ext_color_buffer_float_formats_added_ = false;
supported_internal_formats_.clear();
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_internal_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2);
supported_tex_image_source_internal_formats_.clear();
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_internal_formats_,
kSupportedFormatsES2);
supported_internal_formats_copy_tex_image_.clear();
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_internal_formats_copy_tex_image_,
kSupportedFormatsES2);
supported_formats_.clear();
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2);
supported_tex_image_source_formats_.clear();
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2);
supported_types_.clear();
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_types_, kSupportedTypesES2);
supported_tex_image_source_types_.clear();
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_types_, kSupportedTypesES2);
GetDrawingBuffer()->RestoreAllState();
ActivateContext(this);
}
Commit Message: Tighten about IntRect use in WebGL with overflow detection
BUG=784183
TEST=test case in the bug in ASAN build
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie25ca328af99de7828e28e6a6e3d775f1bebc43f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811826
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522213}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 146,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct sock *sk_clone_lock(const struct sock *sk, const gfp_t priority)
{
struct sock *newsk;
newsk = sk_prot_alloc(sk->sk_prot, priority, sk->sk_family);
if (newsk != NULL) {
struct sk_filter *filter;
sock_copy(newsk, sk);
/* SANITY */
get_net(sock_net(newsk));
sk_node_init(&newsk->sk_node);
sock_lock_init(newsk);
bh_lock_sock(newsk);
newsk->sk_backlog.head = newsk->sk_backlog.tail = NULL;
newsk->sk_backlog.len = 0;
atomic_set(&newsk->sk_rmem_alloc, 0);
/*
* sk_wmem_alloc set to one (see sk_free() and sock_wfree())
*/
atomic_set(&newsk->sk_wmem_alloc, 1);
atomic_set(&newsk->sk_omem_alloc, 0);
skb_queue_head_init(&newsk->sk_receive_queue);
skb_queue_head_init(&newsk->sk_write_queue);
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_DMA
skb_queue_head_init(&newsk->sk_async_wait_queue);
#endif
spin_lock_init(&newsk->sk_dst_lock);
rwlock_init(&newsk->sk_callback_lock);
lockdep_set_class_and_name(&newsk->sk_callback_lock,
af_callback_keys + newsk->sk_family,
af_family_clock_key_strings[newsk->sk_family]);
newsk->sk_dst_cache = NULL;
newsk->sk_wmem_queued = 0;
newsk->sk_forward_alloc = 0;
newsk->sk_send_head = NULL;
newsk->sk_userlocks = sk->sk_userlocks & ~SOCK_BINDPORT_LOCK;
sock_reset_flag(newsk, SOCK_DONE);
skb_queue_head_init(&newsk->sk_error_queue);
filter = rcu_dereference_protected(newsk->sk_filter, 1);
if (filter != NULL)
sk_filter_charge(newsk, filter);
if (unlikely(xfrm_sk_clone_policy(newsk))) {
/* It is still raw copy of parent, so invalidate
* destructor and make plain sk_free() */
newsk->sk_destruct = NULL;
bh_unlock_sock(newsk);
sk_free(newsk);
newsk = NULL;
goto out;
}
newsk->sk_err = 0;
newsk->sk_priority = 0;
/*
* Before updating sk_refcnt, we must commit prior changes to memory
* (Documentation/RCU/rculist_nulls.txt for details)
*/
smp_wmb();
atomic_set(&newsk->sk_refcnt, 2);
/*
* Increment the counter in the same struct proto as the master
* sock (sk_refcnt_debug_inc uses newsk->sk_prot->socks, that
* is the same as sk->sk_prot->socks, as this field was copied
* with memcpy).
*
* This _changes_ the previous behaviour, where
* tcp_create_openreq_child always was incrementing the
* equivalent to tcp_prot->socks (inet_sock_nr), so this have
* to be taken into account in all callers. -acme
*/
sk_refcnt_debug_inc(newsk);
sk_set_socket(newsk, NULL);
newsk->sk_wq = NULL;
sk_update_clone(sk, newsk);
if (newsk->sk_prot->sockets_allocated)
sk_sockets_allocated_inc(newsk);
if (newsk->sk_flags & SK_FLAGS_TIMESTAMP)
net_enable_timestamp();
}
out:
return newsk;
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ffs_func_revmap_intf(struct ffs_function *func, u8 intf)
{
short *nums = func->interfaces_nums;
unsigned count = func->ffs->interfaces_count;
for (; count; --count, ++nums) {
if (*nums >= 0 && *nums == intf)
return nums - func->interfaces_nums;
}
return -EDOM;
}
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cifs_ci_compare(const struct dentry *parent,
const struct inode *pinode,
const struct dentry *dentry, const struct inode *inode,
unsigned int len, const char *str, const struct qstr *name)
{
struct nls_table *codepage = CIFS_SB(pinode->i_sb)->local_nls;
if ((name->len == len) &&
(nls_strnicmp(codepage, name->name, str, len) == 0))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix dentry refcount leak when opening a FIFO on lookup
commit 5bccda0ebc7c0331b81ac47d39e4b920b198b2cd upstream.
The cifs code will attempt to open files on lookup under certain
circumstances. What happens though if we find that the file we opened
was actually a FIFO or other special file?
Currently, the open filehandle just ends up being leaked leading to
a dentry refcount mismatch and oops on umount. Fix this by having the
code close the filehandle on the server if it turns out not to be a
regular file. While we're at it, change this spaghetti if statement
into a switch too.
Reported-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,476 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnDidChangeFramePolicy(
int32_t frame_routing_id,
blink::WebSandboxFlags flags,
const ParsedFeaturePolicyHeader& container_policy) {
FrameTreeNode* child = FindAndVerifyChild(
frame_routing_id, bad_message::RFH_SANDBOX_FLAGS);
if (!child)
return;
child->SetPendingSandboxFlags(flags);
child->SetPendingContainerPolicy(container_policy);
RenderFrameHost* child_rfh = child->current_frame_host();
if (child_rfh->GetSiteInstance() != GetSiteInstance()) {
child_rfh->Send(new FrameMsg_DidUpdateFramePolicy(child_rfh->GetRoutingID(),
flags, container_policy));
}
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,841 |
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