instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static double php_apache_sapi_get_request_time(TSRMLS_D)
{
php_struct *ctx = SG(server_context);
return ((double) apr_time_as_msec(ctx->r->request_time)) / 1000.0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,379 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init vhost_scsi_init(void)
{
int ret = -ENOMEM;
/*
* Use our own dedicated workqueue for submitting I/O into
* target core to avoid contention within system_wq.
*/
vhost_scsi_workqueue = alloc_workqueue("vhost_scsi", 0, 0);
if (!vhost_scsi_workqueue)
goto out;
ret = vhost_scsi_register();
if (ret < 0)
goto out_destroy_workqueue;
ret = vhost_scsi_register_configfs();
if (ret < 0)
goto out_vhost_scsi_deregister;
return 0;
out_vhost_scsi_deregister:
vhost_scsi_deregister();
out_destroy_workqueue:
destroy_workqueue(vhost_scsi_workqueue);
out:
return ret;
};
Commit Message: vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::updateNativeHandleInMeta(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<NativeHandle>& nativeHandle, OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer, portIndex);
if (header == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
if (portIndex != kPortIndexInput && portIndex != kPortIndexOutput) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *bufferMeta = (BufferMeta *)(header->pAppPrivate);
sp<ABuffer> data = bufferMeta->getBuffer(
header, portIndex == kPortIndexInput /* backup */, false /* limit */);
bufferMeta->setNativeHandle(nativeHandle);
if (mMetadataType[portIndex] == kMetadataBufferTypeNativeHandleSource
&& data->capacity() >= sizeof(VideoNativeHandleMetadata)) {
VideoNativeHandleMetadata &metadata = *(VideoNativeHandleMetadata *)(data->data());
metadata.eType = mMetadataType[portIndex];
metadata.pHandle =
nativeHandle == NULL ? NULL : const_cast<native_handle*>(nativeHandle->handle());
} else {
CLOG_ERROR(updateNativeHandleInMeta, BAD_VALUE, "%s:%u, %#x bad type (%d) or size (%zu)",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer, mMetadataType[portIndex], data->capacity());
return BAD_VALUE;
}
CLOG_BUFFER(updateNativeHandleInMeta, "%s:%u, %#x := %p",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer,
nativeHandle == NULL ? NULL : nativeHandle->handle());
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 174,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: extensions::WindowController* ExtensionTabUtil::GetWindowControllerOfTab(
const WebContents* web_contents) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 116,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
{
const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
size_t nmatch;
TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
CERT *c = s->cert;
unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
/* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
conf = c->client_sigalgs;
conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
} else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
} else
conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
pref = conf;
preflen = conflen;
allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
} else {
allow = conf;
allowlen = conflen;
pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
}
nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
if (nmatch) {
salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
if (salgs == NULL)
return 0;
nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
} else {
salgs = NULL;
}
c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 69,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static enum d_walk_ret umount_check(void *_data, struct dentry *dentry)
{
/* it has busy descendents; complain about those instead */
if (!list_empty(&dentry->d_subdirs))
return D_WALK_CONTINUE;
/* root with refcount 1 is fine */
if (dentry == _data && dentry->d_lockref.count == 1)
return D_WALK_CONTINUE;
printk(KERN_ERR "BUG: Dentry %p{i=%lx,n=%pd} "
" still in use (%d) [unmount of %s %s]\n",
dentry,
dentry->d_inode ?
dentry->d_inode->i_ino : 0UL,
dentry,
dentry->d_lockref.count,
dentry->d_sb->s_type->name,
dentry->d_sb->s_id);
WARN_ON(1);
return D_WALK_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,379 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int napi_gro_complete(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct packet_type *ptype;
__be16 type = skb->protocol;
struct list_head *head = &ptype_base[ntohs(type) & PTYPE_HASH_MASK];
int err = -ENOENT;
if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->count == 1) {
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = 0;
goto out;
}
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptype, head, list) {
if (ptype->type != type || ptype->dev || !ptype->gro_complete)
continue;
err = ptype->gro_complete(skb);
break;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (err) {
WARN_ON(&ptype->list == head);
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
out:
return netif_receive_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API RFlag *r_flag_free(RFlag *f) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < R_FLAG_SPACES_MAX; i++) {
free (f->spaces[i]);
}
r_skiplist_free (f->by_off);
ht_free (f->ht_name);
r_list_free (f->flags);
r_list_free (f->spacestack);
r_num_free (f->num);
free (f);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in wasm disassembler
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 60,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int netmasklen(struct in_addr addr)
{
int masklen;
for (masklen = 0; masklen < 32; masklen++) {
if (ntohl(addr.s_addr) >= (0xffffffff << masklen))
break;
}
return 32 - masklen;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::SetterRaisesExceptionLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_setterRaisesExceptionLongAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::SetterRaisesExceptionLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_fpu *fpu)
{
struct fxregs_state *fxsave =
&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.state.fxsave;
memcpy(fpu->fpr, fxsave->st_space, 128);
fpu->fcw = fxsave->cwd;
fpu->fsw = fxsave->swd;
fpu->ftwx = fxsave->twd;
fpu->last_opcode = fxsave->fop;
fpu->last_ip = fxsave->rip;
fpu->last_dp = fxsave->rdp;
memcpy(fpu->xmm, fxsave->xmm_space, sizeof fxsave->xmm_space);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,708 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsTagTypeSignature DecideTextType(cmsFloat64Number ICCVersion, const void *Data)
{
if (ICCVersion >= 4.0)
return cmsSigMultiLocalizedUnicodeType;
return cmsSigTextType;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(Data);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool X86_insn_reg_intel2(unsigned int id, x86_reg *reg1, enum cs_ac_type *access1, x86_reg *reg2, enum cs_ac_type *access2)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARR_SIZE(insn_regs_intel2); i++) {
if (insn_regs_intel2[i].insn == id) {
*reg1 = insn_regs_intel2[i].reg1;
*reg2 = insn_regs_intel2[i].reg2;
if (access1)
*access1 = insn_regs_intel2[i].access1;
if (access2)
*access2 = insn_regs_intel2[i].access2;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: x86: fast path checking for X86_insn_reg_intel()
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 94,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init sched_init_smp(void)
{
cpumask_var_t non_isolated_cpus;
alloc_cpumask_var(&non_isolated_cpus, GFP_KERNEL);
alloc_cpumask_var(&fallback_doms, GFP_KERNEL);
sched_init_numa();
/*
* There's no userspace yet to cause hotplug operations; hence all the
* cpu masks are stable and all blatant races in the below code cannot
* happen.
*/
mutex_lock(&sched_domains_mutex);
init_sched_domains(cpu_active_mask);
cpumask_andnot(non_isolated_cpus, cpu_possible_mask, cpu_isolated_map);
if (cpumask_empty(non_isolated_cpus))
cpumask_set_cpu(smp_processor_id(), non_isolated_cpus);
mutex_unlock(&sched_domains_mutex);
hotcpu_notifier(sched_domains_numa_masks_update, CPU_PRI_SCHED_ACTIVE);
hotcpu_notifier(cpuset_cpu_active, CPU_PRI_CPUSET_ACTIVE);
hotcpu_notifier(cpuset_cpu_inactive, CPU_PRI_CPUSET_INACTIVE);
init_hrtick();
/* Move init over to a non-isolated CPU */
if (set_cpus_allowed_ptr(current, non_isolated_cpus) < 0)
BUG();
sched_init_granularity();
free_cpumask_var(non_isolated_cpus);
init_sched_rt_class();
init_sched_dl_class();
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 58,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NativeBrowserFrame* NativeBrowserFrame::CreateNativeBrowserFrame(
BrowserFrame* browser_frame,
BrowserView* browser_view) {
if (views::Widget::IsPureViews())
return new BrowserFrameViews(browser_frame, browser_view);
return new BrowserFrameGtk(browser_frame, browser_view);
}
Commit Message: Fixed brekage when PureViews are enable but Desktop is not
TBR=ben@chromium.org
BUG=none
TEST=chrome starts with --use-pure-views with touchui
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7210037
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91197 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,315 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
char buf_space[11]; /* Request this many bytes in initial read.
* We can detect SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 Client Hellos
* ('type == 3') correctly only when the following
* is in a single record, which is not guaranteed by
* the protocol specification:
* Byte Content
* 0 type \
* 1/2 version > record header
* 3/4 length /
* 5 msg_type \
* 6-8 length > Client Hello message
* 9/10 client_version /
*/
char *buf= &(buf_space[0]);
unsigned char *p,*d,*d_len,*dd;
unsigned int i;
unsigned int csl,sil,cl;
int n=0,j;
int type=0;
int v[2];
if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
{
/* read the initial header */
v[0]=v[1]=0;
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) goto err;
n=ssl23_read_bytes(s, sizeof buf_space);
if (n != sizeof buf_space) return(n); /* n == -1 || n == 0 */
p=s->packet;
memcpy(buf,p,n);
if ((p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO))
{
/*
* SSLv2 header
*/
if ((p[3] == 0x00) && (p[4] == 0x02))
{
v[0]=p[3]; v[1]=p[4];
/* SSLv2 */
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
type=1;
}
else if (p[3] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
{
v[0]=p[3]; v[1]=p[4];
/* SSLv3/TLSv1 */
if (p[4] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
{
if (p[4] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
{
s->version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (p[4] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
{
s->version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
/* type=2; */ /* done later to survive restarts */
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
{
s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
/* type=2; */ /* done later to survive restarts */
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
{
s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
/* type=2; */
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
{
type=1;
}
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
{
s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
/* type=2; */
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
type=1;
}
}
else if ((p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) &&
(p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
(p[5] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
((p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 5 /* silly record length? */)
|| (p[9] >= p[1])))
{
/*
* SSLv3 or tls1 header
*/
v[0]=p[1]; /* major version (= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) */
/* We must look at client_version inside the Client Hello message
* to get the correct minor version.
* However if we have only a pathologically small fragment of the
* Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
* to read more records to find out.
* No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
* so we simply reject such connections to avoid
* protocol version downgrade attacks. */
if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
/* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
* which will use the highest version 3 we support.
* If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
* this....
*/
if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
v[1]=0xff;
else
v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
if (v[1] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
{
if (v[1] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
{
s->version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
type=3;
}
else if (v[1] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
{
s->version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
type=3;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
{
s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
type=3;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
{
s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
type=3;
}
}
else
{
/* client requests SSL 3.0 */
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
{
s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
type=3;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
{
/* we won't be able to use TLS of course,
* but this will send an appropriate alert */
s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
type=3;
}
}
}
else if ((strncmp("GET ", (char *)p,4) == 0) ||
(strncmp("POST ",(char *)p,5) == 0) ||
(strncmp("HEAD ",(char *)p,5) == 0) ||
(strncmp("PUT ", (char *)p,4) == 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
goto err;
}
else if (strncmp("CONNECT",(char *)p,7) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
goto err;
}
}
/* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
goto err;
}
#endif
if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B)
{
/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 in an SSLv2 header
* (other cases skip this state) */
type=2;
p=s->packet;
v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
v[1] = p[4];
/* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
* header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
* record. It's format is:
* Byte Content
* 0-1 msg_length
* 2 msg_type
* 3-4 version
* 5-6 cipher_spec_length
* 7-8 session_id_length
* 9-10 challenge_length
* ... ...
*/
n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
if (n > (1024*4))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
if (n < 9)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
/* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have
* j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid
* packet bytes. */
if (j <= 0) return(j);
ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-HELLO */
p=s->packet;
p+=5;
n2s(p,csl);
n2s(p,sil);
n2s(p,cl);
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if ((csl+sil+cl+11) != s->packet_length) /* We can't have TLS extensions in SSL 2.0 format
* Client Hello, can we? Error condition should be
* '>' otherweise */
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/* record header: msg_type ... */
*(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
/* ... and length (actual value will be written later) */
d_len = d;
d += 3;
/* client_version */
*(d++) = SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR; /* == v[0] */
*(d++) = v[1];
/* lets populate the random area */
/* get the challenge_length */
i=(cl > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)?SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE:cl;
memset(d,0,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
memcpy(&(d[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-i]),&(p[csl+sil]),i);
d+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* no session-id reuse */
*(d++)=0;
/* ciphers */
j=0;
dd=d;
d+=2;
for (i=0; i<csl; i+=3)
{
if (p[i] != 0) continue;
*(d++)=p[i+1];
*(d++)=p[i+2];
j+=2;
}
s2n(j,dd);
/* COMPRESSION */
*(d++)=1;
*(d++)=0;
#if 0
/* copy any remaining data with may be extensions */
p = p+csl+sil+cl;
while (p < s->packet+s->packet_length)
{
*(d++)=*(p++);
}
#endif
i = (d-(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data) - 4;
l2n3((long)i, d_len);
/* get the data reused from the init_buf */
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
s->s3->tmp.message_type=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
s->s3->tmp.message_size=i;
}
/* imaginary new state (for program structure): */
/* s->state = SSL23_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C */
if (type == 1)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
goto err;
#else
/* we are talking sslv2 */
/* we need to clean up the SSLv3/TLSv1 setup and put in the
* sslv2 stuff. */
if (s->s2 == NULL)
{
if (!ssl2_new(s))
goto err;
}
else
ssl2_clear(s);
if (s->s3 != NULL) ssl3_free(s);
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,
SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
{
goto err;
}
s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 && s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)
s->s2->ssl2_rollback=0;
else
/* reject SSL 2.0 session if client supports SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0
* (SSL 3.0 draft/RFC 2246, App. E.2) */
s->s2->ssl2_rollback=1;
/* setup the n bytes we have read so we get them from
* the sslv2 buffer */
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
s->packet_length=n;
s->packet= &(s->s2->rbuf[0]);
memcpy(s->packet,buf,n);
s->s2->rbuf_left=n;
s->s2->rbuf_offs=0;
s->method=SSLv2_server_method();
s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
#endif
}
if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
{
/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */
s->method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
if (s->method == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;
if (type == 3)
{
/* put the 'n' bytes we have read into the input buffer
* for SSLv3 */
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
s->packet_length=n;
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
goto err;
s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
memcpy(s->packet,buf,n);
s->s3->rbuf.left=n;
s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
}
else
{
s->packet_length=0;
s->s3->rbuf.left=0;
s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
}
#if 0 /* ssl3_get_client_hello does this */
s->client_version=(v[0]<<8)|v[1];
#endif
s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
}
if ((type < 1) || (type > 3))
{
/* bad, very bad */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
goto err;
}
s->init_num=0;
if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf);
return(SSL_accept(s));
err:
if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf);
return(-1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 1 | 165,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SoftVPXEncoder::SoftVPXEncoder(const char *name,
const OMX_CALLBACKTYPE *callbacks,
OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_COMPONENTTYPE **component)
: SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent(
name, "video_encoder.vp8", OMX_VIDEO_CodingVP8,
kProfileLevels, NELEM(kProfileLevels),
176 /* width */, 144 /* height */,
callbacks, appData, component),
mCodecContext(NULL),
mCodecConfiguration(NULL),
mCodecInterface(NULL),
mBitrateUpdated(false),
mBitrateControlMode(VPX_VBR), // variable bitrate
mDCTPartitions(0),
mErrorResilience(OMX_FALSE),
mLevel(OMX_VIDEO_VP8Level_Version0),
mKeyFrameInterval(0),
mMinQuantizer(0),
mMaxQuantizer(0),
mTemporalLayers(0),
mTemporalPatternType(OMX_VIDEO_VPXTemporalLayerPatternNone),
mTemporalPatternLength(0),
mTemporalPatternIdx(0),
mLastTimestamp(0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFLL),
mConversionBuffer(NULL),
mKeyFrameRequested(false) {
memset(mTemporalLayerBitrateRatio, 0, sizeof(mTemporalLayerBitrateRatio));
mTemporalLayerBitrateRatio[0] = 100;
const size_t kMinOutputBufferSize = 1024 * 1024; // arbitrary
initPorts(
kNumBuffers, kNumBuffers, kMinOutputBufferSize,
MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_VP8, 2 /* minCompressionRatio */);
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in VP8 encoder.
Bug: 27569635
Change-Id: I469573f40e21dc9f4c200749d4f220e3a2d31761
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __unregister_pernet_operations(struct pernet_operations *ops)
{
struct net *net;
LIST_HEAD(net_exit_list);
list_del(&ops->list);
for_each_net(net)
list_add_tail(&net->exit_list, &net_exit_list);
ops_exit_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
ops_free_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
}
Commit Message: net: Fix double free and memory corruption in get_net_ns_by_id()
(I can trivially verify that that idr_remove in cleanup_net happens
after the network namespace count has dropped to zero --EWB)
Function get_net_ns_by_id() does not check for net::count
after it has found a peer in netns_ids idr.
It may dereference a peer, after its count has already been
finaly decremented. This leads to double free and memory
corruption:
put_net(peer) rtnl_lock()
atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0] ...
__put_net(peer) get_net_ns_by_id(net, id)
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
queue_work() peer = idr_find(&net->netns_ids, id)
| get_net(peer) [count=1]
| ...
| (use after final put)
v ...
cleanup_net() ...
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..) ...
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
... ...
... put_net(peer)
... atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0]
... spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
... spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... queue_work()
... rtnl_unlock()
rtnl_lock() ...
for_each_net(tmp) { ...
id = __peernet2id(tmp, peer) ...
spin_lock_irq(&tmp->nsid_lock) ...
idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id) ...
... ...
net_drop_ns() ...
net_free(peer) ...
} ...
|
v
cleanup_net()
...
(Second free of peer)
Also, put_net() on the right cpu may reorder with left's cpu
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..), and then cleanup_list
will be corrupted.
Since cleanup_net() is executed in worker thread, while
put_net(peer) can happen everywhere, there should be
enough time for concurrent get_net_ns_by_id() to pick
the peer up, and the race does not seem to be unlikely.
The patch fixes the problem in standard way.
(Also, there is possible problem in peernet2id_alloc(), which requires
check for net::count under nsid_lock and maybe_get_net(peer), but
in current stable kernel it's used under rtnl_lock() and it has to be
safe. Openswitch begun to use peernet2id_alloc(), and possibly it should
be fixed too. While this is not in stable kernel yet, so I'll send
a separate message to netdev@ later).
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Fixes: 0c7aecd4bde4 "netns: add rtnl cmd to add and get peer netns ids"
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 86,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int register_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
{
struct key_type *p;
int ret;
memset(&ktype->lock_class, 0, sizeof(ktype->lock_class));
ret = -EEXIST;
down_write(&key_types_sem);
/* disallow key types with the same name */
list_for_each_entry(p, &key_types_list, link) {
if (strcmp(p->name, ktype->name) == 0)
goto out;
}
/* store the type */
list_add(&ktype->link, &key_types_list);
pr_notice("Key type %s registered\n", ktype->name);
ret = 0;
out:
up_write(&key_types_sem);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: potential uninitialized variable
If __key_link_begin() failed then "edit" would be uninitialized. I've
added a check to fix that.
This allows a random user to crash the kernel, though it's quite
difficult to achieve. There are three ways it can be done as the user
would have to cause an error to occur in __key_link():
(1) Cause the kernel to run out of memory. In practice, this is difficult
to achieve without ENOMEM cropping up elsewhere and aborting the
attempt.
(2) Revoke the destination keyring between the keyring ID being looked up
and it being tested for revocation. In practice, this is difficult to
time correctly because the KEYCTL_REJECT function can only be used
from the request-key upcall process. Further, users can only make use
of what's in /sbin/request-key.conf, though this does including a
rejection debugging test - which means that the destination keyring
has to be the caller's session keyring in practice.
(3) Have just enough key quota available to create a key, a new session
keyring for the upcall and a link in the session keyring, but not then
sufficient quota to create a link in the nominated destination keyring
so that it fails with EDQUOT.
The bug can be triggered using option (3) above using something like the
following:
echo 80 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes
keyctl request2 user debug:fred negate @t
The above sets the quota to something much lower (80) to make the bug
easier to trigger, but this is dependent on the system. Note also that
the name of the keyring created contains a random number that may be
between 1 and 10 characters in size, so may throw the test off by
changing the amount of quota used.
Assuming the failure occurs, something like the following will be seen:
kfree_debugcheck: out of range ptr 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68h
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at ../mm/slab.c:2821!
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811600f9>] kfree_debugcheck+0x20/0x25
RSP: 0018:ffff8804014a7de8 EFLAGS: 00010092
RAX: 0000000000000034 RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000040001 RSI: 00000000000000f6 RDI: 0000000000000300
RBP: ffff8804014a7df0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8804014a7e68 R11: 0000000000000054 R12: 0000000000000202
R13: ffffffff81318a66 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
...
Call Trace:
kfree+0xde/0x1bc
assoc_array_cancel_edit+0x1f/0x36
__key_link_end+0x55/0x63
key_reject_and_link+0x124/0x155
keyctl_reject_key+0xb6/0xe0
keyctl_negate_key+0x10/0x12
SyS_keyctl+0x9f/0xe7
do_syscall_64+0x63/0x13a
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
Fixes: f70e2e06196a ('KEYS: Do preallocation for __key_link()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLenum GetBindTargetForSamplerType(GLenum type) {
switch (type) {
case GL_SAMPLER_2D:
case GL_SAMPLER_2D_SHADOW:
case GL_INT_SAMPLER_2D:
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_SAMPLER_2D:
return GL_TEXTURE_2D;
case GL_SAMPLER_CUBE:
case GL_SAMPLER_CUBE_SHADOW:
case GL_INT_SAMPLER_CUBE:
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_SAMPLER_CUBE:
return GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP;
case GL_SAMPLER_EXTERNAL_OES:
return GL_TEXTURE_EXTERNAL_OES;
case GL_SAMPLER_2D_RECT_ARB:
return GL_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB;
case GL_SAMPLER_3D:
case GL_INT_SAMPLER_3D:
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_SAMPLER_3D:
return GL_TEXTURE_3D;
case GL_SAMPLER_2D_ARRAY:
case GL_SAMPLER_2D_ARRAY_SHADOW:
case GL_INT_SAMPLER_2D_ARRAY:
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_SAMPLER_2D_ARRAY:
return GL_TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY;
default:
NOTREACHED();
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int verify_auth_trunc(struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC];
struct xfrm_algo_auth *algp;
if (!rt)
return 0;
algp = nla_data(rt);
if (nla_len(rt) < xfrm_alg_auth_len(algp))
return -EINVAL;
algp->alg_name[sizeof(algp->alg_name) - 1] = '\0';
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipsec: Fix aborted xfrm policy dump crash
An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.
The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.
This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.
Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void deprecatedVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
imp->deprecatedVoidMethod();
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct page *alloc_hugepage_vma(int defrag,
struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long haddr, int nd,
gfp_t extra_gfp)
{
return alloc_pages_vma(alloc_hugepage_gfpmask(defrag, extra_gfp),
HPAGE_PMD_ORDER, vma, haddr, nd);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE and vm_flags cleanups
The huge_memory.c THP page fault was allowed to run if vm_ops was null
(which would succeed for /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE, as the f_op->mmap wouldn't
setup a special vma->vm_ops and it would fallback to regular anonymous
memory) but other THP logics weren't fully activated for vmas with vm_file
not NULL (/dev/zero has a not NULL vma->vm_file).
So this removes the vm_file checks so that /dev/zero also can safely use
THP (the other albeit safer approach to fix this bug would have been to
prevent the THP initial page fault to run if vm_file was set).
After removing the vm_file checks, this also makes huge_memory.c stricter
in khugepaged for the DEBUG_VM=y case. It doesn't replace the vm_file
check with a is_pfn_mapping check (but it keeps checking for VM_PFNMAP
under VM_BUG_ON) because for a is_cow_mapping() mapping VM_PFNMAP should
only be allowed to exist before the first page fault, and in turn when
vma->anon_vma is null (so preventing khugepaged registration). So I tend
to think the previous comment saying if vm_file was set, VM_PFNMAP might
have been set and we could still be registered in khugepaged (despite
anon_vma was not NULL to be registered in khugepaged) was too paranoid.
The is_linear_pfn_mapping check is also I think superfluous (as described
by comment) but under DEBUG_VM it is safe to stay.
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33682
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Caspar Zhang <bugs@casparzhang.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.38.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FS_PureServerSetReferencedPaks( const char *pakSums, const char *pakNames ) {
int i, c, d = 0;
Cmd_TokenizeString( pakSums );
c = Cmd_Argc();
if ( c > MAX_SEARCH_PATHS ) {
c = MAX_SEARCH_PATHS;
}
for ( i = 0 ; i < c ; i++ ) {
fs_serverReferencedPaks[i] = atoi( Cmd_Argv( i ) );
}
for (i = 0 ; i < ARRAY_LEN(fs_serverReferencedPakNames); i++)
{
if(fs_serverReferencedPakNames[i])
Z_Free(fs_serverReferencedPakNames[i]);
fs_serverReferencedPakNames[i] = NULL;
}
if ( pakNames && *pakNames ) {
Cmd_TokenizeString( pakNames );
d = Cmd_Argc();
if(d > c)
d = c;
for ( i = 0 ; i < d ; i++ ) {
fs_serverReferencedPakNames[i] = CopyString( Cmd_Argv( i ) );
}
}
if(d < c)
c = d;
fs_numServerReferencedPaks = c;
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 96,047 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: raptor_libxml_xmlStructuredError_handler_parsing(void *user_data,
xmlErrorPtr err)
{
raptor_sax2* sax2 = NULL;
/* user_data may point to a raptor_sax2* */
if(user_data) {
sax2 = (raptor_sax2*)user_data;
if(sax2->magic != RAPTOR_LIBXML_MAGIC)
sax2 = NULL;
}
/* err->ctxt->userData may point to a raptor_sax2* */
if(err && err->ctxt) {
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt = (xmlParserCtxtPtr)err->ctxt;
if(ctxt->userData) {
sax2 = (raptor_sax2*)ctxt->userData;
if(sax2->magic != RAPTOR_LIBXML_MAGIC)
sax2 = NULL;
}
}
if(sax2)
raptor_libxml_xmlStructuredError_handler_common(sax2->world, sax2->locator,
err);
else
raptor_libxml_xmlStructuredError_handler_common(NULL, NULL, err);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 21,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLScriptRunner::requestPendingScript(PendingScript& pendingScript, Element* script) const
{
ASSERT(!pendingScript.element());
pendingScript.setElement(script);
ScriptResource* resource = toScriptLoaderIfPossible(script)->resource().get();
if (!resource) {
notImplemented(); // Dispatch error event.
return false;
}
pendingScript.setScriptResource(resource);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection(ExecState* exec)
{
JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor* jsConstructor = static_cast<JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor*>(exec->callee());
ScriptExecutionContext* context = jsConstructor->scriptExecutionContext();
if (!context)
return throwVMError(exec, createReferenceError(exec, "DeprecatedPeerConnection constructor associated document is unavailable"));
if (exec->argumentCount() < 2)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
String serverConfiguration = ustringToString(exec->argument(0).toString(exec)->value(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(JSValue());
RefPtr<SignalingCallback> signalingCallback = createFunctionOnlyCallback<JSSignalingCallback>(exec, static_cast<JSDOMGlobalObject*>(exec->lexicalGlobalObject()), exec->argument(1));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(JSValue());
RefPtr<DeprecatedPeerConnection> peerConnection = DeprecatedPeerConnection::create(context, serverConfiguration, signalingCallback.release());
return JSValue::encode(CREATE_DOM_WRAPPER(exec, jsConstructor->globalObject(), DeprecatedPeerConnection, peerConnection.get()));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void rpc_wake_up(struct rpc_wait_queue *queue)
{
struct rpc_task *task, *next;
struct list_head *head;
spin_lock_bh(&queue->lock);
head = &queue->tasks[queue->maxpriority];
for (;;) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(task, next, head, u.tk_wait.list)
rpc_wake_up_task_queue_locked(queue, task);
if (head == &queue->tasks[0])
break;
head--;
}
spin_unlock_bh(&queue->lock);
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 34,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Blob::Blob(const KURL& srcURL, const String& type, long long size)
: m_type(type)
, m_size(size)
{
ScriptWrappable::init(this);
m_internalURL = BlobURL::createInternalURL();
ThreadableBlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(0, m_internalURL, srcURL);
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 1 | 170,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void on_srv_l2cap_psm_connect_l(tBTA_JV_L2CAP_OPEN *p_open, l2cap_socket *sock)
{
l2cap_socket *accept_rs;
uint32_t new_listen_id;
accept_rs = btsock_l2cap_alloc_l(sock->name, (const bt_bdaddr_t*)p_open->rem_bda, FALSE, 0);
accept_rs->connected = TRUE;
accept_rs->security = sock->security;
accept_rs->fixed_chan = sock->fixed_chan;
accept_rs->channel = sock->channel;
accept_rs->handle = sock->handle;
sock->handle = -1; /* We should no longer associate this handle with the server socket */
/* Swap IDs to hand over the GAP connection to the accepted socket, and start a new server on
the newly create socket ID. */
new_listen_id = accept_rs->id;
accept_rs->id = sock->id;
sock->id = new_listen_id;
if (accept_rs) {
btsock_thread_add_fd(pth, sock->our_fd, BTSOCK_L2CAP, SOCK_THREAD_FD_EXCEPTION, sock->id);
btsock_thread_add_fd(pth, accept_rs->our_fd, BTSOCK_L2CAP, SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD,
accept_rs->id);
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("sending connect signal & app fd: %d to app server to accept() the"
" connection", accept_rs->app_fd);
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("server fd:%d, scn:%d", sock->our_fd, sock->channel);
send_app_connect_signal(sock->our_fd, &accept_rs->addr, sock->channel, 0,
accept_rs->app_fd, p_open->tx_mtu);
accept_rs->app_fd = -1; // The fd is closed after sent to app in send_app_connect_signal()
if(btSock_start_l2cap_server_l(sock) != BT_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
btsock_l2cap_free_l(sock);
}
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API zend_class_entry *zend_lookup_class(zend_string *name) /* {{{ */
{
return zend_lookup_class_ex(name, NULL, 1);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Use format string
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 57,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::DidCommitSameDocumentNavigation(
std::unique_ptr<FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params>
validated_params) {
ScopedActiveURL scoped_active_url(
validated_params->url,
frame_tree_node()->frame_tree()->root()->current_origin());
ScopedCommitStateResetter commit_state_resetter(this);
if (is_waiting_for_swapout_ack_)
return;
TRACE_EVENT2("navigation",
"RenderFrameHostImpl::DidCommitSameDocumentNavigation",
"frame_tree_node", frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id(), "url",
validated_params->url.possibly_invalid_spec());
if (!DidCommitNavigationInternal(validated_params.get(),
true /* is_same_document_navigation*/))
return;
commit_state_resetter.disable();
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,096 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::UpdateStyleAndLayoutTree() {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
if (Lifecycle().LifecyclePostponed())
return;
HTMLFrameOwnerElement::PluginDisposeSuspendScope suspend_plugin_dispose;
ScriptForbiddenScope forbid_script;
if (HTMLFrameOwnerElement* owner = LocalOwner()) {
owner->GetDocument().UpdateStyleAndLayoutTree();
}
if (!View() || !IsActive())
return;
if (View()->ShouldThrottleRendering())
return;
GetSlotAssignmentEngine().RecalcSlotAssignments();
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
NestingLevelIncrementer slot_assignment_recalc_forbidden_scope(
slot_assignment_recalc_forbidden_recursion_depth_);
#endif
if (!NeedsLayoutTreeUpdate()) {
if (Lifecycle().GetState() < DocumentLifecycle::kStyleClean) {
Lifecycle().AdvanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::kInStyleRecalc);
Lifecycle().AdvanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::kStyleClean);
}
return;
}
if (InStyleRecalc())
return;
CHECK(Lifecycle().StateAllowsTreeMutations());
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN1("blink,devtools.timeline", "UpdateLayoutTree", "beginData",
inspector_recalculate_styles_event::Data(GetFrame()));
unsigned start_element_count = GetStyleEngine().StyleForElementCount();
probe::RecalculateStyle recalculate_style_scope(this);
DocumentAnimations::UpdateAnimationTimingIfNeeded(*this);
EvaluateMediaQueryListIfNeeded();
UpdateUseShadowTreesIfNeeded();
UpdateDistributionForLegacyDistributedNodes();
UpdateActiveStyle();
UpdateStyleInvalidationIfNeeded();
UpdateStyle();
NotifyLayoutTreeOfSubtreeChanges();
if (HoverElement() && !HoverElement()->GetLayoutObject() && GetFrame()) {
GetFrame()->GetEventHandler().MayUpdateHoverWhenContentUnderMouseChanged(
MouseEventManager::UpdateHoverReason::kLayoutOrStyleChanged);
}
if (focused_element_ && !focused_element_->IsFocusable())
ClearFocusedElementSoon();
GetLayoutView()->ClearHitTestCache();
DCHECK(!DocumentAnimations::NeedsAnimationTimingUpdate(*this));
unsigned element_count =
GetStyleEngine().StyleForElementCount() - start_element_count;
TRACE_EVENT_END1("blink,devtools.timeline", "UpdateLayoutTree",
"elementCount", element_count);
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
AssertLayoutTreeUpdated(*this);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 152,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int seek_firmware(struct dvb_frontend *fe, unsigned int type,
v4l2_std_id *id)
{
struct xc2028_data *priv = fe->tuner_priv;
int i, best_i = -1, best_nr_matches = 0;
unsigned int type_mask = 0;
tuner_dbg("%s called, want type=", __func__);
if (debug) {
dump_firm_type(type);
printk("(%x), id %016llx.\n", type, (unsigned long long)*id);
}
if (!priv->firm) {
tuner_err("Error! firmware not loaded\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (((type & ~SCODE) == 0) && (*id == 0))
*id = V4L2_STD_PAL;
if (type & BASE)
type_mask = BASE_TYPES;
else if (type & SCODE) {
type &= SCODE_TYPES;
type_mask = SCODE_TYPES & ~HAS_IF;
} else if (type & DTV_TYPES)
type_mask = DTV_TYPES;
else if (type & STD_SPECIFIC_TYPES)
type_mask = STD_SPECIFIC_TYPES;
type &= type_mask;
if (!(type & SCODE))
type_mask = ~0;
/* Seek for exact match */
for (i = 0; i < priv->firm_size; i++) {
if ((type == (priv->firm[i].type & type_mask)) &&
(*id == priv->firm[i].id))
goto found;
}
/* Seek for generic video standard match */
for (i = 0; i < priv->firm_size; i++) {
v4l2_std_id match_mask;
int nr_matches;
if (type != (priv->firm[i].type & type_mask))
continue;
match_mask = *id & priv->firm[i].id;
if (!match_mask)
continue;
if ((*id & match_mask) == *id)
goto found; /* Supports all the requested standards */
nr_matches = hweight64(match_mask);
if (nr_matches > best_nr_matches) {
best_nr_matches = nr_matches;
best_i = i;
}
}
if (best_nr_matches > 0) {
tuner_dbg("Selecting best matching firmware (%d bits) for "
"type=", best_nr_matches);
dump_firm_type(type);
printk("(%x), id %016llx:\n", type, (unsigned long long)*id);
i = best_i;
goto found;
}
/*FIXME: Would make sense to seek for type "hint" match ? */
i = -ENOENT;
goto ret;
found:
*id = priv->firm[i].id;
ret:
tuner_dbg("%s firmware for type=", (i < 0) ? "Can't find" : "Found");
if (debug) {
dump_firm_type(type);
printk("(%x), id %016llx.\n", type, (unsigned long long)*id);
}
return i;
}
Commit Message: [media] xc2028: avoid use after free
If struct xc2028_config is passed without a firmware name,
the following trouble may happen:
[11009.907205] xc2028 5-0061: type set to XCeive xc2028/xc3028 tuner
[11009.907491] ==================================================================
[11009.907750] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in strcmp+0x96/0xb0 at addr ffff8803bd78ab40
[11009.907992] Read of size 1 by task modprobe/28992
[11009.907994] =============================================================================
[11009.907997] BUG kmalloc-16 (Tainted: G W ): kasan: bad access detected
[11009.907999] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[11009.908008] INFO: Allocated in xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd] age=0 cpu=3 pid=28992
[11009.908012] ___slab_alloc+0x581/0x5b0
[11009.908014] __slab_alloc+0x51/0x90
[11009.908017] __kmalloc+0x27b/0x350
[11009.908022] xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd]
[11009.908026] usb_hcd_submit_urb+0x1e8/0x1c60
[11009.908029] usb_submit_urb+0xb0e/0x1200
[11009.908032] usb_serial_generic_write_start+0xb6/0x4c0
[11009.908035] usb_serial_generic_write+0x92/0xc0
[11009.908039] usb_console_write+0x38a/0x560
[11009.908045] call_console_drivers.constprop.14+0x1ee/0x2c0
[11009.908051] console_unlock+0x40d/0x900
[11009.908056] vprintk_emit+0x4b4/0x830
[11009.908061] vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30
[11009.908064] printk+0x99/0xb5
[11009.908067] kasan_report_error+0x10a/0x550
[11009.908070] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50
[11009.908074] INFO: Freed in xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] age=1 cpu=3 pid=28992
[11009.908077] __slab_free+0x2ec/0x460
[11009.908080] kfree+0x266/0x280
[11009.908083] xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908086] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908090] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908094] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908098] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908101] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908105] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908108] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300
[11009.908111] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad
[11009.908114] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0
[11009.908117] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130
[11009.908120] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76
[11009.908123] INFO: Slab 0xffffea000ef5e280 objects=25 used=25 fp=0x (null) flags=0x2ffff8000004080
[11009.908126] INFO: Object 0xffff8803bd78ab40 @offset=2880 fp=0x0000000000000001
[11009.908130] Bytes b4 ffff8803bd78ab30: 01 00 00 00 2a 07 00 00 9d 28 00 00 01 00 00 00 ....*....(......
[11009.908133] Object ffff8803bd78ab40: 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 b0 1d c3 6a 00 88 ff ff ...........j....
[11009.908137] CPU: 3 PID: 28992 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B W 4.5.0-rc1+ #43
[11009.908140] Hardware name: /NUC5i7RYB, BIOS RYBDWi35.86A.0350.2015.0812.1722 08/12/2015
[11009.908142] ffff8803bd78a000 ffff8802c273f1b8 ffffffff81932007 ffff8803c6407a80
[11009.908148] ffff8802c273f1e8 ffffffff81556759 ffff8803c6407a80 ffffea000ef5e280
[11009.908153] ffff8803bd78ab40 dffffc0000000000 ffff8802c273f210 ffffffff8155ccb4
[11009.908158] Call Trace:
[11009.908162] [<ffffffff81932007>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x64
[11009.908165] [<ffffffff81556759>] print_trailer+0xf9/0x150
[11009.908168] [<ffffffff8155ccb4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[11009.908171] [<ffffffff8155f260>] kasan_report_error+0x230/0x550
[11009.908175] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290
[11009.908179] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908182] [<ffffffff8155f5c3>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50
[11009.908185] [<ffffffff8155ea00>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x50/0xa0
[11009.908189] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] ? strcmp+0x96/0xb0
[11009.908192] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] strcmp+0x96/0xb0
[11009.908196] [<ffffffffa13ba4ac>] xc2028_set_config+0x15c/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908200] [<ffffffffa13bac90>] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908203] [<ffffffff8155ea78>] ? memset+0x28/0x30
[11009.908206] [<ffffffffa13ba980>] ? xc2028_set_config+0x630/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908211] [<ffffffffa157a59a>] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908215] [<ffffffffa157aa2a>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x37c/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908219] [<ffffffffa157a3a1>] ? hauppauge_hvr930c_init+0x487/0x487 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908222] [<ffffffffa01795ac>] ? lgdt330x_attach+0x1cc/0x370 [lgdt330x]
[11009.908226] [<ffffffffa01793e0>] ? i2c_read_demod_bytes.isra.2+0x210/0x210 [lgdt330x]
[11009.908230] [<ffffffff812e87d0>] ? ref_module.part.15+0x10/0x10
[11009.908233] [<ffffffff812e56e0>] ? module_assert_mutex_or_preempt+0x80/0x80
[11009.908238] [<ffffffffa157af92>] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908242] [<ffffffffa157a6ae>] ? em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x30d/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908245] [<ffffffff8195222d>] ? string+0x14d/0x1f0
[11009.908249] [<ffffffff8195381f>] ? symbol_string+0xff/0x1a0
[11009.908253] [<ffffffff81953720>] ? uuid_string+0x6f0/0x6f0
[11009.908257] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0
[11009.908260] [<ffffffff8104b02f>] ? print_context_stack+0x7f/0xf0
[11009.908264] [<ffffffff812e9846>] ? __module_address+0xb6/0x360
[11009.908268] [<ffffffff8137fdc9>] ? is_ftrace_trampoline+0x99/0xe0
[11009.908271] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0
[11009.908275] [<ffffffff81240a70>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
[11009.908278] [<ffffffff8104a24b>] ? dump_trace+0x11b/0x300
[11009.908282] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908285] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290
[11009.908289] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590
[11009.908292] [<ffffffff812404dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[11009.908296] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908299] [<ffffffff822dcbb0>] ? mutex_trylock+0x400/0x400
[11009.908302] [<ffffffff810021a1>] ? do_one_initcall+0x131/0x300
[11009.908306] [<ffffffff81296dc7>] ? call_rcu_sched+0x17/0x20
[11009.908309] [<ffffffff8159e708>] ? put_object+0x48/0x70
[11009.908314] [<ffffffffa1579f11>] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908317] [<ffffffffa13e81f9>] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908320] [<ffffffffa0150000>] ? 0xffffffffa0150000
[11009.908324] [<ffffffffa0150010>] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908327] [<ffffffff810021b1>] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300
[11009.908330] [<ffffffff81002070>] ? try_to_run_init_process+0x40/0x40
[11009.908333] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590
[11009.908337] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908340] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908343] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908346] [<ffffffff8155ea37>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x87/0xa0
[11009.908350] [<ffffffff8144da7b>] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad
[11009.908353] [<ffffffff812f2626>] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0
[11009.908356] [<ffffffff812e9c90>] ? symbol_put_addr+0x50/0x50
[11009.908361] [<ffffffffa1580037>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x5989/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908366] [<ffffffff812ebfc0>] ? module_frob_arch_sections+0x20/0x20
[11009.908369] [<ffffffff815bc940>] ? open_exec+0x50/0x50
[11009.908374] [<ffffffff811671bb>] ? ns_capable+0x5b/0xd0
[11009.908377] [<ffffffff812f5e58>] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130
[11009.908379] [<ffffffff812f5d50>] ? SyS_init_module+0x1f0/0x1f0
[11009.908383] [<ffffffff81004044>] ? lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x12/0x14
[11009.908394] [<ffffffff822e6936>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76
[11009.908396] Memory state around the buggy address:
[11009.908398] ffff8803bd78aa00: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908401] ffff8803bd78aa80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908403] >ffff8803bd78ab00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908405] ^
[11009.908407] ffff8803bd78ab80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908409] ffff8803bd78ac00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908411] ==================================================================
In order to avoid it, let's set the cached value of the firmware
name to NULL after freeing it. While here, return an error if
the memory allocation fails.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,546 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t f2fs_direct_IO(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
{
struct address_space *mapping = iocb->ki_filp->f_mapping;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
size_t count = iov_iter_count(iter);
loff_t offset = iocb->ki_pos;
int rw = iov_iter_rw(iter);
int err;
err = check_direct_IO(inode, iter, offset);
if (err)
return err;
if (__force_buffered_io(inode, rw))
return 0;
trace_f2fs_direct_IO_enter(inode, offset, count, rw);
down_read(&F2FS_I(inode)->dio_rwsem[rw]);
err = blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, iter, get_data_block_dio);
up_read(&F2FS_I(inode)->dio_rwsem[rw]);
if (rw == WRITE) {
if (err > 0)
set_inode_flag(inode, FI_UPDATE_WRITE);
else if (err < 0)
f2fs_write_failed(mapping, offset + count);
}
trace_f2fs_direct_IO_exit(inode, offset, count, rw, err);
return err;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a dead loop in f2fs_fiemap()
A dead loop can be triggered in f2fs_fiemap() using the test case
as below:
...
fd = open();
fallocate(fd, 0, 0, 4294967296);
ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FIEMAP, fiemap_buf);
...
It's caused by an overflow in __get_data_block():
...
bh->b_size = map.m_len << inode->i_blkbits;
...
map.m_len is an unsigned int, and bh->b_size is a size_t which is 64 bits
on 64 bits archtecture, type conversion from an unsigned int to a size_t
will result in an overflow.
In the above-mentioned case, bh->b_size will be zero, and f2fs_fiemap()
will call get_data_block() at block 0 again an again.
Fix this by adding a force conversion before left shift.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 85,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init michael_mic_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_shash(&alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,298 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::GetTrafficAnnotation() {
return net::DefineNetworkTrafficAnnotation("resource_dispatcher_host",
R"(
semantics {
sender: "Resource Dispatcher Host"
description:
"Navigation-initiated request or renderer process initiated "
"request, which includes all resources for normal page loads, "
"chrome URLs, resources for installed extensions, as well as "
"downloads."
trigger:
"Navigating to a URL or downloading a file. A webpage, "
"ServiceWorker, chrome:// page, or extension may also initiate "
"requests in the background."
data: "Anything the initiator wants to send."
destination: OTHER
}
policy {
cookies_allowed: YES
cookies_store: "user or per-app cookie store"
setting: "These requests cannot be disabled."
policy_exception_justification:
"Not implemented. Without these requests, Chrome will be unable to "
"load any webpage."
})");
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 152,013 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void wrap_all_labels(GtkWidget *widget)
{
label_wrapper(widget, NULL);
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncManager::UpdateEnabledTypes() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
data_->UpdateEnabledTypes();
}
Commit Message: sync: remove Chrome OS specific logic to deal with flimflam shutdown / sync race.
No longer necessary as the ProfileSyncService now aborts sync network traffic on shutdown.
BUG=chromium-os:20841
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120912 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107,857 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: find_or_create_lock_stateid(struct nfs4_lockowner *lo, struct nfs4_file *fi,
struct inode *inode, struct nfs4_ol_stateid *ost,
bool *new)
{
struct nfs4_stid *ns = NULL;
struct nfs4_ol_stateid *lst;
struct nfs4_openowner *oo = openowner(ost->st_stateowner);
struct nfs4_client *clp = oo->oo_owner.so_client;
spin_lock(&clp->cl_lock);
lst = find_lock_stateid(lo, fi);
if (lst == NULL) {
spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
ns = nfs4_alloc_stid(clp, stateid_slab, nfs4_free_lock_stateid);
if (ns == NULL)
return NULL;
spin_lock(&clp->cl_lock);
lst = find_lock_stateid(lo, fi);
if (likely(!lst)) {
lst = openlockstateid(ns);
init_lock_stateid(lst, lo, fi, inode, ost);
ns = NULL;
*new = true;
}
}
spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
if (ns)
nfs4_put_stid(ns);
return lst;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tcp_mark_head_lost(struct sock *sk, int packets, int mark_head)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
int cnt, oldcnt;
int err;
unsigned int mss;
WARN_ON(packets > tp->packets_out);
if (tp->lost_skb_hint) {
skb = tp->lost_skb_hint;
cnt = tp->lost_cnt_hint;
/* Head already handled? */
if (mark_head && skb != tcp_write_queue_head(sk))
return;
} else {
skb = tcp_write_queue_head(sk);
cnt = 0;
}
tcp_for_write_queue_from(skb, sk) {
if (skb == tcp_send_head(sk))
break;
/* TODO: do this better */
/* this is not the most efficient way to do this... */
tp->lost_skb_hint = skb;
tp->lost_cnt_hint = cnt;
if (after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq, tp->high_seq))
break;
oldcnt = cnt;
if (tcp_is_fack(tp) || tcp_is_reno(tp) ||
(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED))
cnt += tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
if (cnt > packets) {
if ((tcp_is_sack(tp) && !tcp_is_fack(tp)) ||
(oldcnt >= packets))
break;
mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
err = tcp_fragment(sk, skb, (packets - oldcnt) * mss, mss);
if (err < 0)
break;
cnt = packets;
}
tcp_skb_mark_lost(tp, skb);
if (mark_head)
break;
}
tcp_verify_left_out(tp);
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 41,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool isValidNameNonASCII(const LChar* characters, unsigned length)
{
if (!isValidNameStart(characters[0]))
return false;
for (unsigned i = 1; i < length; ++i) {
if (!isValidNamePart(characters[i]))
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,772 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void performInternal(WebPagePrivate* webPagePrivate)
{
webPagePrivate->m_webPage->popupListClosed(webPagePrivate->m_cachedPopupListSelecteds.size(), webPagePrivate->m_cachedPopupListSelecteds.data());
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int crypto_probing_notify(unsigned long val, void *v)
{
int ok;
ok = blocking_notifier_call_chain(&crypto_chain, val, v);
if (ok == NOTIFY_DONE) {
request_module("cryptomgr");
ok = blocking_notifier_call_chain(&crypto_chain, val, v);
}
return ok;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::ReflectUnsignedLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_reflectUnsignedLongAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::ReflectUnsignedLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,096 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void inc_cpu_load(struct rq *rq, unsigned long load)
{
update_load_add(&rq->load, load);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::UnscheduleUseShadowTreeUpdate(SVGUseElement& element) {
use_elements_needing_update_.erase(&element);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameSelection::SetSelectionAndEndTyping(
const SelectionInDOMTree& selection) {
SetSelection(selection, SetSelectionOptions::Builder()
.SetShouldCloseTyping(true)
.SetShouldClearTypingStyle(true)
.Build());
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void virtio_queue_set_host_notifier_fd_handler(VirtQueue *vq, bool assign,
bool set_handler)
{
AioContext *ctx = qemu_get_aio_context();
if (assign && set_handler) {
if (vq->use_aio) {
aio_set_event_notifier(ctx, &vq->host_notifier, true,
virtio_queue_host_notifier_read);
} else {
event_notifier_set_handler(&vq->host_notifier, true,
virtio_queue_host_notifier_read);
}
} else {
if (vq->use_aio) {
aio_set_event_notifier(ctx, &vq->host_notifier, true, NULL);
} else {
event_notifier_set_handler(&vq->host_notifier, true, NULL);
}
}
if (!assign) {
/* Test and clear notifier before after disabling event,
* in case poll callback didn't have time to run. */
virtio_queue_host_notifier_read(&vq->host_notifier);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,235 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IRCView::cancelRememberLine() //slot
{
m_rememberLineDirtyBit = false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API RList *r_bin_dwarf_parse_aranges(RBin *a, int mode) {
ut8 *buf;
int ret;
size_t len;
RBinSection *section = getsection (a, "debug_aranges");
RBinFile *binfile = a ? a->cur: NULL;
if (binfile && section) {
len = section->size;
if (len < 1 || len > ST32_MAX) {
return NULL;
}
buf = calloc (1, len);
ret = r_buf_read_at (binfile->buf, section->paddr, buf, len);
if (!ret) {
free (buf);
return NULL;
}
if (mode == R_CORE_BIN_PRINT) {
r_bin_dwarf_parse_aranges_raw (buf, len, stdout);
} else {
r_bin_dwarf_parse_aranges_raw (buf, len, DBGFD);
}
free (buf);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8813 - segfault in dwarf parser
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 59,708 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::RenderViewTerminated(RenderViewHost* rvh,
base::TerminationStatus status,
int error_code) {
if (rvh != GetRenderViewHost()) {
return;
}
if (IsFullscreenForCurrentTab(GetRenderViewHost()->GetWidget()))
ExitFullscreenMode(false);
CancelActiveAndPendingDialogs();
if (delegate_)
delegate_->HideValidationMessage(this);
SetIsLoading(false, true, nullptr);
NotifyDisconnected();
SetIsCrashed(status, error_code);
ResetLoadProgressState();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver,
observers_,
RenderProcessGone(GetCrashedStatus()));
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u64 snmp_get_cpu_field64(void __percpu *mib, int cpu, int offt,
size_t syncp_offset)
{
void *bhptr;
struct u64_stats_sync *syncp;
u64 v;
unsigned int start;
bhptr = per_cpu_ptr(mib, cpu);
syncp = (struct u64_stats_sync *)(bhptr + syncp_offset);
do {
start = u64_stats_fetch_begin_irq(syncp);
v = *(((u64 *)bhptr) + offt);
} while (u64_stats_fetch_retry_irq(syncp, start));
return v;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 41,554 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidDisplayContentWithCertificateErrors() {
Send(new FrameHostMsg_DidDisplayContentWithCertificateErrors(routing_id_));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ewk_frame_redirect_cancelled(Evas_Object* ewkFrame)
{
evas_object_smart_callback_call(ewkFrame, "redirect,cancelled", 0);
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107,687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceFetcher::willSendRequest(unsigned long identifier, ResourceRequest& request, const ResourceResponse& redirectResponse, const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiatorInfo)
{
context().dispatchWillSendRequest(m_documentLoader, identifier, request, redirectResponse, initiatorInfo);
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 121,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FilePath Extension::MaybeNormalizePath(const FilePath& path) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
std::wstring path_str = path.value();
if (path_str.size() >= 2 && path_str[0] >= L'a' && path_str[0] <= L'z' &&
path_str[1] == ':')
path_str[0] += ('A' - 'a');
return FilePath(path_str);
#else
return path;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,770 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IDNConversionResult UnsafeIDNToUnicodeWithAdjustments(
base::StringPiece host,
base::OffsetAdjuster::Adjustments* adjustments) {
return IDNToUnicodeWithAdjustmentsImpl(host, adjustments, false);
}
Commit Message: Restrict Latin Small Letter Thorn (U+00FE) to Icelandic domains
This character (þ) can be confused with both b and p when used in a domain
name. IDN spoof checker doesn't have a good way of flagging a character as
confusable with multiple characters, so it can't catch spoofs containing
this character. As a practical fix, this CL restricts this character to
domains under Iceland's ccTLD (.is). With this change, a domain name containing
"þ" with a non-.is TLD will be displayed in punycode in the UI.
This change affects less than 10 real world domains with limited popularity.
Bug: 798892, 843352, 904327, 1017707
Change-Id: Ib07190dcde406bf62ce4413688a4fb4859a51030
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1879992
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christopher Thompson <cthomp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#709309}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string RenderThreadImpl::GetLocale() {
const base::CommandLine& parsed_command_line =
*base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
const std::string& lang =
parsed_command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kLang);
DCHECK(!lang.empty());
return lang;
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool fixed_bits_valid(u64 val, u64 fixed0, u64 fixed1)
{
return ((val & fixed1) | fixed0) == val;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,018 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_StartDemoLoop( void ) {
Cbuf_AddText( "d1\n" );
Key_SetCatcher( 0 );
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DateTimeChooser* ChromeClientImpl::OpenDateTimeChooser(
DateTimeChooserClient* picker_client,
const DateTimeChooserParameters& parameters) {
if (picker_client->OwnerElement()
.GetDocument()
.GetSettings()
->GetPagePopupsSuppressed())
return nullptr;
NotifyPopupOpeningObservers();
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::InputMultipleFieldsUIEnabled())
return DateTimeChooserImpl::Create(this, picker_client, parameters);
return ExternalDateTimeChooser::Create(this, web_view_->Client(),
picker_client, parameters);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool __stratum_send(struct pool *pool, char *s, ssize_t len)
{
SOCKETTYPE sock = pool->sock;
ssize_t ssent = 0;
if (opt_protocol)
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "SEND: %s", s);
strcat(s, "\n");
len++;
while (len > 0 ) {
struct timeval timeout = {0, 0};
ssize_t sent;
fd_set wd;
FD_ZERO(&wd);
FD_SET(sock, &wd);
if (select(sock + 1, NULL, &wd, NULL, &timeout) < 1) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Write select failed on pool %d sock", pool->pool_no);
return false;
}
sent = send(pool->sock, s + ssent, len, 0);
if (sent < 0) {
if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to curl_easy_send in stratum_send");
return false;
}
sent = 0;
}
ssent += sent;
len -= sent;
}
pool->cgminer_pool_stats.times_sent++;
pool->cgminer_pool_stats.bytes_sent += ssent;
total_bytes_xfer += ssent;
pool->cgminer_pool_stats.net_bytes_sent += ssent;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Bugfix: initiate_stratum: Ensure extranonce2 size is not negative (which could lead to exploits later as too little memory gets allocated)
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick@dejavusecurity.com> for finding this!
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabContentsWrapper* DefaultTabHandler::CreateTabContentsForURL(
const GURL& url,
const GURL& referrer,
Profile* profile,
PageTransition::Type transition,
bool defer_load,
SiteInstance* instance) const {
return delegate_->AsBrowser()->CreateTabContentsForURL(url,
referrer,
profile,
transition,
defer_load,
instance);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hci_sock_cmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
__u32 mask = hci_pi(sk)->cmsg_mask;
if (mask & HCI_CMSG_DIR) {
int incoming = bt_cb(skb)->incoming;
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_HCI, HCI_CMSG_DIR, sizeof(incoming),
&incoming);
}
if (mask & HCI_CMSG_TSTAMP) {
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
struct compat_timeval ctv;
#endif
struct timeval tv;
void *data;
int len;
skb_get_timestamp(skb, &tv);
data = &tv;
len = sizeof(tv);
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (!COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME &&
(msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)) {
ctv.tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
ctv.tv_usec = tv.tv_usec;
data = &ctv;
len = sizeof(ctv);
}
#endif
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_HCI, HCI_CMSG_TSTAMP, len, data);
}
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: HCI - Fix info leak in getsockopt(HCI_FILTER)
The HCI code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
hci_ufilter before copying it to userland -- that for leaking two
bytes kernel stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the
structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::RenderProcessGone(SiteInstanceImpl* site_instance) {
DCHECK_EQ(site_instance_.get(), site_instance);
if (GetNavigationHandle())
GetNavigationHandle()->set_net_error_code(net::ERR_ABORTED);
ResetNavigationRequests();
ResetLoadingState();
set_nav_entry_id(0);
OnAudibleStateChanged(false);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void event_uart_has_bytes(eager_reader_t *reader, UNUSED_ATTR void *context) {
if (stream_has_interpretation) {
callbacks->data_ready(current_data_type);
} else {
uint8_t type_byte;
if (eager_reader_read(reader, &type_byte, 1, true) == 0) {
LOG_ERROR("%s could not read HCI message type", __func__);
return;
}
if (stream_corrupted_during_le_scan_workaround(type_byte))
return;
if (type_byte < DATA_TYPE_ACL || type_byte > DATA_TYPE_EVENT) {
LOG_ERROR("%s Unknown HCI message type. Dropping this byte 0x%x, min %x, max %x", __func__, type_byte, DATA_TYPE_ACL, DATA_TYPE_EVENT);
return;
}
stream_has_interpretation = true;
current_data_type = type_byte;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __sys_connect(int fd, struct sockaddr __user *uservaddr, int addrlen)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
int err, fput_needed;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (!sock)
goto out;
err = move_addr_to_kernel(uservaddr, addrlen, &address);
if (err < 0)
goto out_put;
err =
security_socket_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&address, addrlen);
if (err)
goto out_put;
err = sock->ops->connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&address, addrlen,
sock->file->f_flags);
out_put:
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 82,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExclusiveAccessContext* TestBrowserWindow::GetExclusiveAccessContext() {
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::GoToOffset(int offset) {
if (!CanGoToOffset(offset))
return;
GoToIndex(GetIndexForOffset(offset));
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLSelectElement::accessKeySetSelectedIndex(int index)
{
if (!focused())
accessKeyAction(false);
const Vector<HTMLElement*>& items = listItems();
int listIndex = optionToListIndex(index);
if (listIndex >= 0) {
HTMLElement* element = items[listIndex];
if (element->hasTagName(optionTag)) {
if (toHTMLOptionElement(element)->selected())
toHTMLOptionElement(element)->setSelectedState(false);
else
selectOption(index, DispatchChangeEvent | UserDriven);
}
}
if (usesMenuList())
dispatchChangeEventForMenuList();
else
listBoxOnChange();
scrollToSelection();
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 114,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int avpriv_dv_produce_packet(DVDemuxContext *c, AVPacket *pkt,
uint8_t* buf, int buf_size)
{
int size, i;
uint8_t *ppcm[4] = {0};
if (buf_size < DV_PROFILE_BYTES ||
!(c->sys = avpriv_dv_frame_profile(c->sys, buf, buf_size)) ||
buf_size < c->sys->frame_size) {
return -1; /* Broken frame, or not enough data */
}
/* Queueing audio packet */
/* FIXME: in case of no audio/bad audio we have to do something */
size = dv_extract_audio_info(c, buf);
for (i = 0; i < c->ach; i++) {
c->audio_pkt[i].size = size;
c->audio_pkt[i].pts = c->abytes * 30000*8 / c->ast[i]->codec->bit_rate;
ppcm[i] = c->audio_buf[i];
}
dv_extract_audio(buf, ppcm, c->sys);
/* We work with 720p frames split in half, thus even frames have
* channels 0,1 and odd 2,3. */
if (buf[1] & 0x0C) {
c->audio_pkt[2].size = c->audio_pkt[3].size = 0;
} else {
c->audio_pkt[0].size = c->audio_pkt[1].size = 0;
c->abytes += size;
}
} else {
c->abytes += size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 165,244 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CatalogueInitFPE (FontPathElementPtr fpe)
{
CataloguePtr cat;
cat = (CataloguePtr) xalloc(sizeof *cat);
if (cat == NULL)
return AllocError;
fpe->private = (pointer) cat;
cat->fpeCount = 0;
cat->fpeAlloc = 0;
cat->fpeList = NULL;
cat->mtime = 0;
return CatalogueRescan (fpe);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,248 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PassOwnPtr<MockLayerTreeHostImpl> create(TestHooks* testHooks, const CCSettings& settings)
{
return adoptPtr(new MockLayerTreeHostImpl(testHooks, settings));
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *special_mapping_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
return ((struct vm_special_mapping *)vma->vm_private_data)->name;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jiffies_to_compat_timeval(unsigned long jiffies, struct compat_timeval *value)
{
/*
* Convert jiffies to nanoseconds and separate with
* one divide.
*/
u64 nsec = (u64)jiffies * TICK_NSEC;
long rem;
value->tv_sec = div_long_long_rem(nsec, NSEC_PER_SEC, &rem);
value->tv_usec = rem / NSEC_PER_USEC;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 165,748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderViewTest::RendererBlinkPlatformImplNoSandbox::Get() const {
return blink_platform_impl_.get();
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,068 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void xhci_ep_kick_timer(void *opaque)
{
XHCIEPContext *epctx = opaque;
xhci_kick_epctx(epctx, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 5,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::VoidMethodByteStringArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodByteStringArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodByteStringArgMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XMPFileHandler * TIFF_MetaHandlerCTor ( XMPFiles * parent )
{
return new TIFF_MetaHandler ( parent );
} // TIFF_MetaHandlerCTor
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 9,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int btrfs_setsize(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
{
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
loff_t oldsize = i_size_read(inode);
loff_t newsize = attr->ia_size;
int mask = attr->ia_valid;
int ret;
/*
* The regular truncate() case without ATTR_CTIME and ATTR_MTIME is a
* special case where we need to update the times despite not having
* these flags set. For all other operations the VFS set these flags
* explicitly if it wants a timestamp update.
*/
if (newsize != oldsize) {
inode_inc_iversion(inode);
if (!(mask & (ATTR_CTIME | ATTR_MTIME)))
inode->i_ctime = inode->i_mtime =
current_fs_time(inode->i_sb);
}
if (newsize > oldsize) {
truncate_pagecache(inode, newsize);
/*
* Don't do an expanding truncate while snapshoting is ongoing.
* This is to ensure the snapshot captures a fully consistent
* state of this file - if the snapshot captures this expanding
* truncation, it must capture all writes that happened before
* this truncation.
*/
wait_for_snapshot_creation(root);
ret = btrfs_cont_expand(inode, oldsize, newsize);
if (ret) {
btrfs_end_write_no_snapshoting(root);
return ret;
}
trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 1);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
btrfs_end_write_no_snapshoting(root);
return PTR_ERR(trans);
}
i_size_write(inode, newsize);
btrfs_ordered_update_i_size(inode, i_size_read(inode), NULL);
ret = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, inode);
btrfs_end_write_no_snapshoting(root);
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
} else {
/*
* We're truncating a file that used to have good data down to
* zero. Make sure it gets into the ordered flush list so that
* any new writes get down to disk quickly.
*/
if (newsize == 0)
set_bit(BTRFS_INODE_ORDERED_DATA_CLOSE,
&BTRFS_I(inode)->runtime_flags);
/*
* 1 for the orphan item we're going to add
* 1 for the orphan item deletion.
*/
trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 2);
if (IS_ERR(trans))
return PTR_ERR(trans);
/*
* We need to do this in case we fail at _any_ point during the
* actual truncate. Once we do the truncate_setsize we could
* invalidate pages which forces any outstanding ordered io to
* be instantly completed which will give us extents that need
* to be truncated. If we fail to get an orphan inode down we
* could have left over extents that were never meant to live,
* so we need to garuntee from this point on that everything
* will be consistent.
*/
ret = btrfs_orphan_add(trans, inode);
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* we don't support swapfiles, so vmtruncate shouldn't fail */
truncate_setsize(inode, newsize);
/* Disable nonlocked read DIO to avoid the end less truncate */
btrfs_inode_block_unlocked_dio(inode);
inode_dio_wait(inode);
btrfs_inode_resume_unlocked_dio(inode);
ret = btrfs_truncate(inode);
if (ret && inode->i_nlink) {
int err;
/*
* failed to truncate, disk_i_size is only adjusted down
* as we remove extents, so it should represent the true
* size of the inode, so reset the in memory size and
* delete our orphan entry.
*/
trans = btrfs_join_transaction(root);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
btrfs_orphan_del(NULL, inode);
return ret;
}
i_size_write(inode, BTRFS_I(inode)->disk_i_size);
err = btrfs_orphan_del(trans, inode);
if (err)
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, err);
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 41,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gdImageScaleNearestNeighbour(gdImagePtr im, const unsigned int width, const unsigned int height)
{
const unsigned long new_width = MAX(1, width);
const unsigned long new_height = MAX(1, height);
const float dx = (float)im->sx / (float)new_width;
const float dy = (float)im->sy / (float)new_height;
const gdFixed f_dx = gd_ftofx(dx);
const gdFixed f_dy = gd_ftofx(dy);
gdImagePtr dst_img;
unsigned long dst_offset_x;
unsigned long dst_offset_y = 0;
unsigned int i;
dst_img = gdImageCreateTrueColor(new_width, new_height);
if (dst_img == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
for (i=0; i<new_height; i++) {
unsigned int j;
dst_offset_x = 0;
if (im->trueColor) {
for (j=0; j<new_width; j++) {
const gdFixed f_i = gd_itofx(i);
const gdFixed f_j = gd_itofx(j);
const gdFixed f_a = gd_mulfx(f_i, f_dy);
const gdFixed f_b = gd_mulfx(f_j, f_dx);
const long m = gd_fxtoi(f_a);
const long n = gd_fxtoi(f_b);
dst_img->tpixels[dst_offset_y][dst_offset_x++] = im->tpixels[m][n];
}
} else {
for (j=0; j<new_width; j++) {
const gdFixed f_i = gd_itofx(i);
const gdFixed f_j = gd_itofx(j);
const gdFixed f_a = gd_mulfx(f_i, f_dy);
const gdFixed f_b = gd_mulfx(f_j, f_dx);
const long m = gd_fxtoi(f_a);
const long n = gd_fxtoi(f_b);
dst_img->tpixels[dst_offset_y][dst_offset_x++] = colorIndex2RGBA(im->pixels[m][n]);
}
}
dst_offset_y++;
}
return dst_img;
}
Commit Message: gdImageScaleTwoPass memory leak fix
Fixing memory leak in gdImageScaleTwoPass, as reported by @cmb69 and
confirmed by @vapier. This bug actually bit me in production and I'm
very thankful that it was reported with an easy fix.
Fixes #173.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 56,349 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeClientImpl::SetCursor(const Cursor& cursor,
LocalFrame* local_frame) {
last_set_mouse_cursor_for_testing_ = cursor;
SetCursor(WebCursorInfo(cursor), local_frame);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t OMXCodec::pause() {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
mPaused = true;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: OMXCodec: check IMemory::pointer() before using allocation
Bug: 29421811
Change-Id: I0a73ba12bae4122f1d89fc92e5ea4f6a96cd1ed1
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,185 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderWidgetHostImpl::CopyFromBackingStoreToCGContext(
const CGRect& dest_rect, CGContextRef target) {
BackingStore* backing_store = GetBackingStore(false);
if (!backing_store)
return false;
(static_cast<BackingStoreMac*>(backing_store))->
CopyFromBackingStoreToCGContext(dest_rect, target);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int reset_mac(pegasus_t *pegasus)
{
__u8 data = 0x8;
int i;
set_register(pegasus, EthCtrl1, data);
for (i = 0; i < REG_TIMEOUT; i++) {
get_registers(pegasus, EthCtrl1, 1, &data);
if (~data & 0x08) {
if (loopback)
break;
if (mii_mode && (pegasus->features & HAS_HOME_PNA))
set_register(pegasus, Gpio1, 0x34);
else
set_register(pegasus, Gpio1, 0x26);
set_register(pegasus, Gpio0, pegasus->features);
set_register(pegasus, Gpio0, DEFAULT_GPIO_SET);
break;
}
}
if (i == REG_TIMEOUT)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
if (usb_dev_id[pegasus->dev_index].vendor == VENDOR_LINKSYS ||
usb_dev_id[pegasus->dev_index].vendor == VENDOR_DLINK) {
set_register(pegasus, Gpio0, 0x24);
set_register(pegasus, Gpio0, 0x26);
}
if (usb_dev_id[pegasus->dev_index].vendor == VENDOR_ELCON) {
__u16 auxmode;
read_mii_word(pegasus, 3, 0x1b, &auxmode);
auxmode |= 4;
write_mii_word(pegasus, 3, 0x1b, &auxmode);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: pegasus: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
References: https://bugs.debian.org/852556
Reported-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <lisandro@debian.org>
Tested-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <lisandro@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_image_filter_grayscale(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS)
{
PHP_GD_SINGLE_RES
if (gdImageGrayScale(im_src) == 1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidChangeLoadProgress(double load_progress) {
Send(new FrameHostMsg_DidChangeLoadProgress(routing_id_, load_progress));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void set_custom_visible_security_state(
std::unique_ptr<VisibleSecurityState> visible_security_state) {
custom_visible_security_state_ = std::move(visible_security_state);
}
Commit Message: Remove unused histograms from the background loader offliner.
Bug: 975512
Change-Id: I87b0a91bed60e3a9e8a1fd9ae9b18cac27a0859f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1683361
Reviewed-by: Cathy Li <chili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Holte <holte@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Williamson <petewil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#675332}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 139,171 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dvb_usbv2_adapter_frontend_init(struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap)
{
int ret, i, count_registered = 0;
struct dvb_usb_device *d = adap_to_d(adap);
dev_dbg(&d->udev->dev, "%s: adap=%d\n", __func__, adap->id);
memset(adap->fe, 0, sizeof(adap->fe));
adap->active_fe = -1;
if (d->props->frontend_attach) {
ret = d->props->frontend_attach(adap);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_dbg(&d->udev->dev,
"%s: frontend_attach() failed=%d\n",
__func__, ret);
goto err_dvb_frontend_detach;
}
} else {
dev_dbg(&d->udev->dev, "%s: frontend_attach() do not exists\n",
__func__);
ret = 0;
goto err;
}
for (i = 0; i < MAX_NO_OF_FE_PER_ADAP && adap->fe[i]; i++) {
adap->fe[i]->id = i;
/* re-assign sleep and wakeup functions */
adap->fe_init[i] = adap->fe[i]->ops.init;
adap->fe[i]->ops.init = dvb_usb_fe_init;
adap->fe_sleep[i] = adap->fe[i]->ops.sleep;
adap->fe[i]->ops.sleep = dvb_usb_fe_sleep;
ret = dvb_register_frontend(&adap->dvb_adap, adap->fe[i]);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_err(&d->udev->dev,
"%s: frontend%d registration failed\n",
KBUILD_MODNAME, i);
goto err_dvb_unregister_frontend;
}
count_registered++;
}
if (d->props->tuner_attach) {
ret = d->props->tuner_attach(adap);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_dbg(&d->udev->dev, "%s: tuner_attach() failed=%d\n",
__func__, ret);
goto err_dvb_unregister_frontend;
}
}
ret = dvb_create_media_graph(&adap->dvb_adap, true);
if (ret < 0)
goto err_dvb_unregister_frontend;
ret = dvb_usbv2_media_device_register(adap);
return ret;
err_dvb_unregister_frontend:
for (i = count_registered - 1; i >= 0; i--)
dvb_unregister_frontend(adap->fe[i]);
err_dvb_frontend_detach:
for (i = MAX_NO_OF_FE_PER_ADAP - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
if (adap->fe[i]) {
dvb_frontend_detach(adap->fe[i]);
adap->fe[i] = NULL;
}
}
err:
dev_dbg(&d->udev->dev, "%s: failed=%d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: [media] dvb-usb-v2: avoid use-after-free
I ran into a stack frame size warning because of the on-stack copy of
the USB device structure:
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c: In function 'dvb_usbv2_disconnect':
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c:1029:1: error: the frame size of 1104 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]
Copying a device structure like this is wrong for a number of other reasons
too aside from the possible stack overflow. One of them is that the
dev_info() call will print the name of the device later, but AFAICT
we have only copied a pointer to the name earlier and the actual name
has been freed by the time it gets printed.
This removes the on-stack copy of the device and instead copies the
device name using kstrdup(). I'm ignoring the possible failure here
as both printk() and kfree() are able to deal with NULL pointers.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,684 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int splashCeil(SplashCoord x) {
return (int)ceil(x);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct dentry *dget_parent(struct dentry *dentry)
{
int gotref;
struct dentry *ret;
/*
* Do optimistic parent lookup without any
* locking.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
ret = ACCESS_ONCE(dentry->d_parent);
gotref = lockref_get_not_zero(&ret->d_lockref);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (likely(gotref)) {
if (likely(ret == ACCESS_ONCE(dentry->d_parent)))
return ret;
dput(ret);
}
repeat:
/*
* Don't need rcu_dereference because we re-check it was correct under
* the lock.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
ret = dentry->d_parent;
spin_lock(&ret->d_lock);
if (unlikely(ret != dentry->d_parent)) {
spin_unlock(&ret->d_lock);
rcu_read_unlock();
goto repeat;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
BUG_ON(!ret->d_lockref.count);
ret->d_lockref.count++;
spin_unlock(&ret->d_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int falsecompareproc(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, ref *space, ref *testspace)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,078 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionService::UninstallExtensionHelper(
ExtensionService* extensions_service,
const std::string& extension_id) {
const Extension* extension =
extensions_service->GetInstalledExtension(extension_id);
if (!extension) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Attempted uninstallation of non-existent extension with "
<< "id: " << extension_id;
return false;
}
std::string error;
if (!extensions_service->UninstallExtension(extension_id, false, &error)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Cannot uninstall extension with id " << extension_id
<< ": " << error;
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 98,655 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool InputHandler::removeComposedText()
{
if (compositionActive()) {
if (!deleteText(m_composingTextStart, m_composingTextEnd)) {
return false;
}
removeAttributedTextMarker();
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileAPIMessageFilter::DidCancel(int request_id,
base::PlatformFileError result) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
if (result == base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK)
Send(new FileSystemMsg_DidSucceed(request_id));
else
Send(new FileSystemMsg_DidFail(request_id, result));
}
Commit Message: File permission fix: now we selectively grant read permission for Sandboxed files
We also need to check the read permission and call GrantReadFile() for
sandboxed files for CreateSnapshotFile().
BUG=162114
TEST=manual
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11280231
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@170181 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 119,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void netif_device_attach(struct net_device *dev)
{
if (!test_and_set_bit(__LINK_STATE_PRESENT, &dev->state) &&
netif_running(dev)) {
netif_tx_wake_all_queues(dev);
__netdev_watchdog_up(dev);
}
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int TraceCubicBezier(FT_Vector *p,FT_Vector *q,FT_Vector *to,
DrawInfo *draw_info)
{
AffineMatrix
affine;
char
path[MaxTextExtent];
affine=draw_info->affine;
(void) FormatLocaleString(path,MaxTextExtent,"C%g,%g %g,%g %g,%g",affine.tx+
p->x/64.0,affine.ty-p->y/64.0,affine.tx+q->x/64.0,affine.ty-q->y/64.0,
affine.tx+to->x/64.0,affine.ty-to->y/64.0);
(void) ConcatenateString(&draw_info->primitive,path);
return(0);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1588
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 88,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct ip_vs_service *ip_vs_info_array(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t pos)
{
struct ip_vs_iter *iter = seq->private;
int idx;
struct ip_vs_service *svc;
/* look in hash by protocol */
for (idx = 0; idx < IP_VS_SVC_TAB_SIZE; idx++) {
list_for_each_entry(svc, &ip_vs_svc_table[idx], s_list) {
if (pos-- == 0){
iter->table = ip_vs_svc_table;
iter->bucket = idx;
return svc;
}
}
}
/* keep looking in fwmark */
for (idx = 0; idx < IP_VS_SVC_TAB_SIZE; idx++) {
list_for_each_entry(svc, &ip_vs_svc_fwm_table[idx], f_list) {
if (pos-- == 0) {
iter->table = ip_vs_svc_fwm_table;
iter->bucket = idx;
return svc;
}
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ShellWindowViews::CanResize() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 103,162 |
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