instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int emulate_clts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
kvm_x86_ops->set_cr0(vcpu, kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, ~X86_CR0_TS));
kvm_x86_ops->fpu_activate(vcpu);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 41,323 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int create_server_socket(const char* name)
{
int s = socket(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if(s < 0)
return -1;
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("covert name to android abstract name:%s", name);
if(socket_local_server_bind(s, name, ANDROID_SOCKET_NAMESPACE_ABSTRACT) >= 0)
{
if(listen(s, 5) == 0)
{
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("listen to local socket:%s, fd:%d", name, s);
return s;
}
else APPL_TRACE_ERROR("listen to local socket:%s, fd:%d failed, errno:%d", name, s, errno);
}
else APPL_TRACE_ERROR("create local socket:%s fd:%d, failed, errno:%d", name, s, errno);
close(s);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,904 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLCanvasElement::CreateLayer() {
DCHECK(!surface_layer_bridge_);
LocalFrame* frame = GetDocument().GetFrame();
WebLayerTreeView* layer_tree_view = nullptr;
if (frame) {
layer_tree_view =
frame->GetPage()->GetChromeClient().GetWebLayerTreeView(frame);
surface_layer_bridge_ = std::make_unique<::blink::SurfaceLayerBridge>(
layer_tree_view, this, base::DoNothing());
surface_layer_bridge_->CreateSolidColorLayer();
}
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,064 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long vma_commit_reservation(struct hstate *h,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)
{
return __vma_reservation_common(h, vma, addr, VMA_COMMIT_RESV);
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void gray_to_rgb(fz_context *ctx, const fz_colorspace *cs, const float *gray, float *rgb)
{
rgb[0] = gray[0];
rgb[1] = gray[0];
rgb[2] = gray[0];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 413 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *urlsection(cmd_parms *cmd, void *mconfig, const char *arg)
{
const char *errmsg;
const char *endp = ap_strrchr_c(arg, '>');
int old_overrides = cmd->override;
char *old_path = cmd->path;
core_dir_config *conf;
ap_regex_t *r = NULL;
const command_rec *thiscmd = cmd->cmd;
ap_conf_vector_t *new_url_conf = ap_create_per_dir_config(cmd->pool);
const char *err = ap_check_cmd_context(cmd, NOT_IN_DIR_LOC_FILE);
if (err != NULL) {
return err;
}
if (endp == NULL) {
return unclosed_directive(cmd);
}
arg = apr_pstrndup(cmd->temp_pool, arg, endp - arg);
if (!arg[0]) {
return missing_container_arg(cmd);
}
cmd->path = ap_getword_conf(cmd->pool, &arg);
cmd->override = OR_ALL|ACCESS_CONF;
if (thiscmd->cmd_data) { /* <LocationMatch> */
r = ap_pregcomp(cmd->pool, cmd->path, AP_REG_EXTENDED);
if (!r) {
return "Regex could not be compiled";
}
}
else if (!strcmp(cmd->path, "~")) {
cmd->path = ap_getword_conf(cmd->pool, &arg);
r = ap_pregcomp(cmd->pool, cmd->path, AP_REG_EXTENDED);
if (!r) {
return "Regex could not be compiled";
}
}
/* initialize our config and fetch it */
conf = ap_set_config_vectors(cmd->server, new_url_conf, cmd->path,
&core_module, cmd->pool);
errmsg = ap_walk_config(cmd->directive->first_child, cmd, new_url_conf);
if (errmsg != NULL)
return errmsg;
conf->d = apr_pstrdup(cmd->pool, cmd->path); /* No mangling, please */
conf->d_is_fnmatch = apr_fnmatch_test(conf->d) != 0;
conf->r = r;
if (r) {
conf->refs = apr_array_make(cmd->pool, 8, sizeof(char *));
ap_regname(r, conf->refs, AP_REG_MATCH, 1);
}
ap_add_per_url_conf(cmd->server, new_url_conf);
if (*arg != '\0') {
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, "Multiple ", thiscmd->name,
"> arguments not (yet) supported.", NULL);
}
cmd->path = old_path;
cmd->override = old_overrides;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,331 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~MockCanceledPluginServiceClient() {}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 116,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int gfs2_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end,
int datasync)
{
struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
int sync_state = inode->i_state & I_DIRTY;
struct gfs2_inode *ip = GFS2_I(inode);
int ret = 0, ret1 = 0;
if (mapping->nrpages) {
ret1 = filemap_fdatawrite_range(mapping, start, end);
if (ret1 == -EIO)
return ret1;
}
if (!gfs2_is_jdata(ip))
sync_state &= ~I_DIRTY_PAGES;
if (datasync)
sync_state &= ~I_DIRTY_SYNC;
if (sync_state) {
ret = sync_inode_metadata(inode, 1);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (gfs2_is_jdata(ip))
filemap_write_and_wait(mapping);
gfs2_ail_flush(ip->i_gl, 1);
}
if (mapping->nrpages)
ret = filemap_fdatawait_range(mapping, start, end);
return ret ? ret : ret1;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,331 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: txid_snapshot_xip(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
FuncCallContext *fctx;
TxidSnapshot *snap;
txid value;
/* on first call initialize snap_state and get copy of snapshot */
if (SRF_IS_FIRSTCALL())
{
TxidSnapshot *arg = (TxidSnapshot *) PG_GETARG_VARLENA_P(0);
fctx = SRF_FIRSTCALL_INIT();
/* make a copy of user snapshot */
snap = MemoryContextAlloc(fctx->multi_call_memory_ctx, VARSIZE(arg));
memcpy(snap, arg, VARSIZE(arg));
fctx->user_fctx = snap;
}
/* return values one-by-one */
fctx = SRF_PERCALL_SETUP();
snap = fctx->user_fctx;
if (fctx->call_cntr < snap->nxip)
{
value = snap->xip[fctx->call_cntr];
SRF_RETURN_NEXT(fctx, Int64GetDatum(value));
}
else
{
SRF_RETURN_DONE(fctx);
}
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 39,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ppp_destroy_channel(struct channel *pch)
{
atomic_dec(&channel_count);
if (!pch->file.dead) {
/* "can't happen" */
pr_err("ppp: destroying undead channel %p !\n", pch);
return;
}
skb_queue_purge(&pch->file.xq);
skb_queue_purge(&pch->file.rq);
kfree(pch);
}
Commit Message: ppp: take reference on channels netns
Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace.
Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their
userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they
can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from
under them.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at
addr ffff880064e217e0
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581
=============================================================================
BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906
[< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440
[< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469
[< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532
[< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574
[< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579
[< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597
[< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325
[< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360
[< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95
[< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150
[< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451
[< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274
[< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723
[< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832
[< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826
[< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631
[< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650
[< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805
[< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814
[< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341
[< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348
[< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448
[< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036
[< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170
[< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303
[< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000
flags=0x5fffc0000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200
CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300
ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054
ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654
[<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661
[< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138
[<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236
[< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293
[<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241
[<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000
[<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478
[<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744
[<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772
[<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901
[<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688
[<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115
[< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750
[<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123
[<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357
[<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550
[<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145
[<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880
[<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307
[< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113
[<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158
[<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712
[<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655
[<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165
[<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692
[< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099
[<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678
[< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807
[<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283
[<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282
[<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344
[<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 52,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __init netlink_add_usersock_entry(void)
{
struct listeners *listeners;
int groups = 32;
listeners = kzalloc(sizeof(*listeners) + NLGRPSZ(groups), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!listeners)
panic("netlink_add_usersock_entry: Cannot allocate listeners\n");
netlink_table_grab();
nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].groups = groups;
rcu_assign_pointer(nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].listeners, listeners);
nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].module = THIS_MODULE;
nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].registered = 1;
nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].flags = NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_SEND;
netlink_table_ungrab();
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,510 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTMLElement* Document::body() const
{
if (!documentElement())
return 0;
for (Node* child = documentElement()->firstChild(); child; child = child->nextSibling()) {
if (child->hasTagName(framesetTag) || child->hasTagName(bodyTag))
return toHTMLElement(child);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int64_t DataReductionProxySettings::GetTotalHttpContentLengthSaved() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats()
->GetHttpOriginalContentLength() -
data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats()
->GetHttpReceivedContentLength();
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ipv6_push_frag_opts(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt, u8 *proto)
{
if (opt->dst1opt)
ipv6_push_exthdr(skb, proto, NEXTHDR_DEST, opt->dst1opt);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 53,684 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SVGElement::SvgAttributeChanged(const QualifiedName& attr_name) {
CSSPropertyID prop_id =
SVGElement::CssPropertyIdForSVGAttributeName(attr_name);
if (prop_id > 0) {
InvalidateInstances();
return;
}
if (attr_name == html_names::kClassAttr) {
ClassAttributeChanged(AtomicString(class_name_->CurrentValue()->Value()));
InvalidateInstances();
return;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 152,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t NuPlayer::GenericSource::setDataSource(const sp<DataSource>& source) {
resetDataSource();
mDataSource = source;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::HasValidNamespaceForAttributes(const QualifiedName& q_name) {
return HasValidNamespaceForElements(q_name);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int thaw_super(struct super_block *sb)
{
int error;
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
if (sb->s_writers.frozen == SB_UNFROZEN) {
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)
goto out;
if (sb->s_op->unfreeze_fs) {
error = sb->s_op->unfreeze_fs(sb);
if (error) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"VFS:Filesystem thaw failed\n");
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
return error;
}
}
out:
sb->s_writers.frozen = SB_UNFROZEN;
smp_wmb();
wake_up(&sb->s_writers.wait_unfrozen);
deactivate_locked_super(sb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 46,212 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::DisableVertexAttribArray(GLuint index) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glDisableVertexAttribArray("
<< index << ")");
vertex_array_object_manager_->SetAttribEnable(index, false);
helper_->DisableVertexAttribArray(index);
CheckGLError();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API void zend_objects_proxy_clone(zend_proxy_object *object, zend_proxy_object **object_clone TSRMLS_DC)
{
*object_clone = emalloc(sizeof(zend_proxy_object));
(*object_clone)->object = object->object;
(*object_clone)->property = object->property;
zval_add_ref(&(*object_clone)->property);
zval_add_ref(&(*object_clone)->object);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,972 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetTopUnavailable() {
mbptr_->up_available = 0;
for (int p = 0; p < num_planes_; p++)
memset(&data_ptr_[p][-1 - stride_], 127, block_size_ + 2);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_venc::set_parameter(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_INDEXTYPE paramIndex,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR paramData)
{
(void)hComp;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Set Param in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (paramData == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Get Param in Invalid paramData");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
/*set_parameter can be called in loaded state
or disabled port */
if (m_state == OMX_StateLoaded
|| m_sInPortDef.bEnabled == OMX_FALSE
|| m_sOutPortDef.bEnabled == OMX_FALSE) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set Parameter called in valid state");
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
switch ((int)paramIndex) {
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *portDefn;
portDefn = (OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition H= %d, W = %d",
(int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight,
(int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth);
if (PORT_INDEX_IN == portDefn->nPortIndex) {
if (!dev_is_video_session_supported(portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("video session not supported");
omx_report_unsupported_setting();
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p actual cnt requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p min cnt requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountMin);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p buffersize requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferSize);
if (portDefn->nBufferCountMin > portDefn->nBufferCountActual) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: (In_PORT) Min buffers (%u) > actual count (%u)",
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountMin, (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: venc_set_param input failed");
return handle->hw_overload ? OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources :
OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p previous actual cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p previous min cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountMin);
memcpy(&m_sInPortDef, portDefn,sizeof(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE));
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
if (portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat ==
(OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)QOMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque) {
m_sInPortDef.format.video.eColorFormat = (OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)
QOMX_COLOR_FORMATYUV420PackedSemiPlanar32m;
if (!mUseProxyColorFormat) {
if (!c2d_conv.init()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("C2D init failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("C2D init is successful");
}
mUseProxyColorFormat = true;
m_input_msg_id = OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB_OPQ;
} else
mUseProxyColorFormat = false;
#endif
/*Query Input Buffer Requirements*/
dev_get_buf_req (&m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sInPortDef.nPortIndex);
/*Query ouput Buffer Requirements*/
dev_get_buf_req (&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex);
m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
} else if (PORT_INDEX_OUT == portDefn->nPortIndex) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p actual cnt requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p min cnt requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountMin);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p buffersize requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferSize);
if (portDefn->nBufferCountMin > portDefn->nBufferCountActual) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: (Out_PORT) Min buffers (%u) > actual count (%u)",
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountMin, (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: venc_set_param output failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
#ifdef _MSM8974_
/*Query ouput Buffer Requirements*/
dev_get_buf_req(&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex);
#endif
memcpy(&m_sOutPortDef,portDefn,sizeof(struct OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE));
update_profile_level(); //framerate , bitrate
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p previous actual cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p previous min cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin);
m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Set_parameter: Bad Port idx %d",
(int)portDefn->nPortIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
m_sConfigFramerate.xEncodeFramerate = portDefn->format.video.xFramerate;
m_sConfigBitrate.nEncodeBitrate = portDefn->format.video.nBitrate;
m_sParamBitrate.nTargetBitrate = portDefn->format.video.nBitrate;
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *portFmt =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat %d",
portFmt->eColorFormat);
if (PORT_INDEX_IN == portFmt->nPortIndex) {
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat %d",
portFmt->eColorFormat);
update_profile_level(); //framerate
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
if (portFmt->eColorFormat ==
(OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)QOMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque) {
m_sInPortFormat.eColorFormat = (OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)
QOMX_COLOR_FORMATYUV420PackedSemiPlanar32m;
if (!mUseProxyColorFormat) {
if (!c2d_conv.init()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("C2D init failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("C2D init is successful");
}
mUseProxyColorFormat = true;
m_input_msg_id = OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB_OPQ;
} else
#endif
{
m_sInPortFormat.eColorFormat = portFmt->eColorFormat;
m_sInPortDef.format.video.eColorFormat = portFmt->eColorFormat;
m_input_msg_id = OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB;
mUseProxyColorFormat = false;
}
m_sInPortFormat.xFramerate = portFmt->xFramerate;
}
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamVideoInit:
{ //TODO, do we need this index set param
OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE* pParam = (OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE*)(paramData);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set OMX_IndexParamVideoInit called");
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate");
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sParamBitrate.nTargetBitrate = pParam->nTargetBitrate;
m_sParamBitrate.eControlRate = pParam->eControlRate;
update_profile_level(); //bitrate
m_sConfigBitrate.nEncodeBitrate = pParam->nTargetBitrate;
m_sInPortDef.format.video.nBitrate = pParam->nTargetBitrate;
m_sOutPortDef.format.video.nBitrate = pParam->nTargetBitrate;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("bitrate = %u", (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.format.video.nBitrate);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE*)paramData;
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE mp4_param;
memcpy(&mp4_param, pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE));
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4");
if (pParam->eProfile == OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4ProfileAdvancedSimple) {
#ifdef MAX_RES_1080P
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("INFO: Only 1 Bframe is supported");
mp4_param.nBFrames = 1;
}
#else
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
mp4_param.nBFrames = 0;
}
#endif
#ifdef _MSM8974_
if (pParam->nBFrames || bframes)
mp4_param.nBFrames = (pParam->nBFrames > (unsigned int) bframes)? pParam->nBFrames : bframes;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("MPEG4: %u BFrames are being set", (unsigned int)mp4_param.nBFrames);
#endif
} else {
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
mp4_param.nBFrames = 0;
}
}
if (handle->venc_set_param(&mp4_param,OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamMPEG4,pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE));
m_sIntraperiod.nPFrames = m_sParamMPEG4.nPFrames;
if (pParam->nBFrames || bframes)
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamMPEG4.nBFrames = mp4_param.nBFrames;
else
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamMPEG4.nBFrames;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoH263:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoH263");
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamVideoH263) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamH263,pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE));
m_sIntraperiod.nPFrames = m_sParamH263.nPFrames;
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamH263.nBFrames;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE*)paramData;
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE avc_param;
memcpy(&avc_param, pParam, sizeof( struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE));
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc");
if ((pParam->eProfile == OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileHigh)||
(pParam->eProfile == OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileMain)) {
#ifdef MAX_RES_1080P
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("INFO: Only 1 Bframe is supported");
avc_param.nBFrames = 1;
}
if (pParam->nRefFrames != 2) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: 2 RefFrames are needed, changing RefFrames from %u to 2", (unsigned int)pParam->nRefFrames);
avc_param.nRefFrames = 2;
}
#else
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
avc_param.nBFrames = 0;
}
if (pParam->nRefFrames != 1) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: Only 1 RefFrame is supported, changing RefFrame from %u to 1)", (unsigned int)pParam->nRefFrames);
avc_param.nRefFrames = 1;
}
#endif
#ifdef _MSM8974_
if (pParam->nBFrames || bframes) {
avc_param.nBFrames = (pParam->nBFrames > (unsigned int) bframes)? pParam->nBFrames : bframes;
avc_param.nRefFrames = (avc_param.nBFrames < 4)? avc_param.nBFrames + 1 : 4;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("AVC: RefFrames: %u, BFrames: %u", (unsigned int)avc_param.nRefFrames, (unsigned int)avc_param.nBFrames);
avc_param.bEntropyCodingCABAC = (OMX_BOOL)(avc_param.bEntropyCodingCABAC && entropy);
avc_param.nCabacInitIdc = entropy ? avc_param.nCabacInitIdc : 0;
#endif
} else {
if (pParam->nRefFrames != 1) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: Only 1 RefFrame is supported, changing RefFrame from %u to 1)", (unsigned int)pParam->nRefFrames);
avc_param.nRefFrames = 1;
}
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
avc_param.nBFrames = 0;
}
}
if (handle->venc_set_param(&avc_param,OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamAVC,pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE));
m_sIntraperiod.nPFrames = m_sParamAVC.nPFrames;
if (pParam->nBFrames || bframes)
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamAVC.nBFrames = avc_param.nBFrames;
else
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamAVC.nBFrames;
break;
}
case (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE*)paramData;
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE vp8_param;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8");
if (pParam->nDCTPartitions != m_sParamVP8.nDCTPartitions ||
pParam->bErrorResilientMode != m_sParamVP8.bErrorResilientMode) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("VP8 doesn't support nDCTPartitions or bErrorResilientMode");
}
memcpy(&vp8_param, pParam, sizeof( struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE));
if (handle->venc_set_param(&vp8_param, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamVP8,pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE));
break;
}
case (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE*)paramData;
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE hevc_param;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc");
memcpy(&hevc_param, pParam, sizeof( struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE));
if (handle->venc_set_param(&hevc_param, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed : set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamHEVC, pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent");
if (handle->venc_set_param(pParam,OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent failed for Profile: %u "
"Level :%u", (unsigned int)pParam->eProfile, (unsigned int)pParam->eLevel);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile = pParam->eProfile;
m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel = pParam->eLevel;
if (!strncmp((char *)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.mpeg4",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamMPEG4.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4PROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamMPEG4.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4LEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("MPEG4 profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamMPEG4.eProfile,
m_sParamMPEG4.eLevel);
} else if (!strncmp((char *)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.h263",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamH263.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_H263PROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamH263.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_H263LEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("H263 profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamH263.eProfile,
m_sParamH263.eLevel);
} else if (!strncmp((char *)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.avc",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamAVC.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCPROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamAVC.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCLEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("AVC profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamAVC.eProfile,
m_sParamAVC.eLevel);
} else if (!strncmp((char *)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.avc.secure",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamAVC.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCPROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamAVC.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCLEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("\n AVC profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamAVC.eProfile,
m_sParamAVC.eLevel);
}
else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.vp8",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamVP8.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_VP8PROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamVP8.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_VP8LEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("VP8 profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamVP8.eProfile,
m_sParamVP8.eLevel);
}
else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.hevc",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamHEVC.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_HEVCPROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamHEVC.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_HEVCLEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("HEVC profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamHEVC.eProfile,
m_sParamHEVC.eLevel);
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *comp_role;
comp_role = (OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole %s",
comp_role->cRole);
if ((m_state == OMX_StateLoaded)&&
!BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_IDLE_PENDING)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set Parameter called in valid state");
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.avc.secure",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s\n", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
#ifdef _MSM8974_
else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
#endif
else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.hevc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.hevc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.hevc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown param %s", m_nkind);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInvalidComponentName;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt");
if (m_state != OMX_StateLoaded) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE *priorityMgmtype = (OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt %u",
(unsigned int)priorityMgmtype->nGroupID);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: priorityMgmtype %u",
(unsigned int)priorityMgmtype->nGroupPriority);
m_sPriorityMgmt.nGroupID = priorityMgmtype->nGroupID;
m_sPriorityMgmt.nGroupPriority = priorityMgmtype->nGroupPriority;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier");
OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE *bufferSupplierType = (OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier %d",
bufferSupplierType->eBufferSupplier);
if (bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex == 0 || bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex ==1)
m_sInBufSupplier.eBufferSupplier = bufferSupplierType->eBufferSupplier;
else
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoQuantization:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoQuantization");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_QUANTIZATIONTYPE *session_qp = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_QUANTIZATIONTYPE*) paramData;
if (session_qp->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData, OMX_IndexParamVideoQuantization) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sSessionQuantization.nQpI = session_qp->nQpI;
m_sSessionQuantization.nQpP = session_qp->nQpP;
m_sSessionQuantization.nQpB = session_qp->nQpB;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unsupported port Index for Session QP setting");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPRange:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPRange");
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_QPRANGETYPE *qp_range = (OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_QPRANGETYPE*) paramData;
if (qp_range->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPRange) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sSessionQPRange.minQP= qp_range->minQP;
m_sSessionQPRange.maxQP= qp_range->maxQP;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unsupported port Index for QP range setting");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexPortDefn:
{
OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE* pParam =
(OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexPortDefn");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_IN) {
if (pParam->nMemRegion > OMX_QCOM_MemRegionInvalid &&
pParam->nMemRegion < OMX_QCOM_MemRegionMax) {
m_use_input_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
} else {
m_use_input_pmem = OMX_FALSE;
}
} else if (pParam->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (pParam->nMemRegion > OMX_QCOM_MemRegionInvalid &&
pParam->nMemRegion < OMX_QCOM_MemRegionMax) {
m_use_output_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
} else {
m_use_output_pmem = OMX_FALSE;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: SetParameter called on unsupported Port Index for QcomPortDefn");
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ERRORCORRECTIONTYPE* pParam =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ERRORCORRECTIONTYPE*)paramData;
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData, OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting Error Resilience failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sErrorCorrection,pParam, sizeof(m_sErrorCorrection));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoIntraRefresh:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_param:OMX_IndexParamVideoIntraRefresh");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_INTRAREFRESHTYPE* pParam =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_INTRAREFRESHTYPE*)paramData;
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamVideoIntraRefresh)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting intra refresh failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sIntraRefresh, pParam, sizeof(m_sIntraRefresh));
break;
}
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMetaBufferMode:
{
StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams *pParam =
(StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter:OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMetaBufferMode: "
"port_index = %u, meta_mode = %d", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex, pParam->bStoreMetaData);
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_IN) {
if (pParam->bStoreMetaData != meta_mode_enable) {
if (!handle->venc_set_meta_mode(pParam->bStoreMetaData)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: set Metabuffer mode %d fail",
pParam->bStoreMetaData);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
meta_mode_enable = pParam->bStoreMetaData;
if (meta_mode_enable) {
m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual = m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountMin;
if (handle->venc_set_param(&m_sInPortDef,OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: venc_set_param input failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
/*TODO: reset encoder driver Meta mode*/
dev_get_buf_req (&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex);
}
}
} else if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT && secure_session) {
if (pParam->bStoreMetaData != meta_mode_enable) {
if (!handle->venc_set_meta_mode(pParam->bStoreMetaData)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("\nERROR: set Metabuffer mode %d fail",
pParam->bStoreMetaData);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
meta_mode_enable = pParam->bStoreMetaData;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: metamode is "
"valid for input port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
break;
#endif
#if !defined(MAX_RES_720P) || defined(_MSM8974_)
case OMX_QcomIndexParamIndexExtraDataType:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamIndexExtraDataType");
QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE *pParam = (QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE *)paramData;
bool enable = false;
OMX_U32 mask = 0;
if (pParam->nIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderSliceInfo) {
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
mask = VEN_EXTRADATA_SLICEINFO;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("SliceInfo extradata %s",
((pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: Slice information is "
"valid for output port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
} else if (pParam->nIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderMBInfo) {
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
mask = VEN_EXTRADATA_MBINFO;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("MBInfo extradata %s",
((pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: MB information is "
"valid for output port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
}
#ifndef _MSM8974_
else if (pParam->nIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_ExtraDataVideoLTRInfo) {
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE)
mask = VEN_EXTRADATA_LTRINFO;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("LTRInfo extradata %s",
((pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: LTR information is "
"valid for output port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
}
#endif
else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: unsupported extrdata index (%x)",
pParam->nIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
if (pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE)
m_sExtraData |= mask;
else
m_sExtraData &= ~mask;
enable = !!(m_sExtraData & mask);
if (handle->venc_set_param(&enable,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)pParam->nIndex) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting Extradata (%x) failed", pParam->nIndex);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex = PORT_INDEX_OUT;
dev_get_buf_req(&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("updated out_buf_req: buffer cnt=%u, "
"count min=%u, buffer size=%u",
(unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
(unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
(unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize);
}
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRMode:
{
QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRMODE_TYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRMODE_TYPE*)paramData;
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRMode)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting LTR mode failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamLTRMode, pParam, sizeof(m_sParamLTRMode));
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRCount:
{
QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRCOUNT_TYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRCOUNT_TYPE*)paramData;
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRCount)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting LTR count failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamLTRCount, pParam, sizeof(m_sParamLTRCount));
break;
}
#endif
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMaxAllowedBitrateCheck:
{
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE*)paramData;
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
handle->m_max_allowed_bitrate_check =
((pParam->bEnable == OMX_TRUE) ? true : false);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: max allowed bitrate check %s",
((pParam->bEnable == OMX_TRUE) ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMaxAllowedBitrateCheck "
" called on wrong port(%u)", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
#ifdef MAX_RES_1080P
case OMX_QcomIndexEnableSliceDeliveryMode:
{
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE*)paramData;
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexEnableSliceDeliveryMode)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting slice delivery mode failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMX_QcomIndexEnableSliceDeliveryMode "
"called on wrong port(%u)", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
#endif
case OMX_QcomIndexEnableH263PlusPType:
{
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_QcomIndexEnableH263PlusPType");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexEnableH263PlusPType)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting PlusPType failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMX_QcomIndexEnableH263PlusPType "
"called on wrong port(%u)", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamSequenceHeaderWithIDR:
{
if(!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamSequenceHeaderWithIDR)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("%s: %s",
"OMX_QComIndexParamSequenceHeaderWithIDR:",
"request for inband sps/pps failed.");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamH264AUDelimiter:
{
if(!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamH264AUDelimiter)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("%s: %s",
"OMX_QComIndexParamh264AUDelimiter:",
"request for AU Delimiters failed.");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure:
{
QOMX_VIDEO_HIERARCHICALLAYERS* pParam =
(QOMX_VIDEO_HIERARCHICALLAYERS*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting PlusPType failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if((pParam->eHierarchicalCodingType == QOMX_HIERARCHICALCODING_B) && pParam->nNumLayers)
hier_b_enabled = true;
m_sHierLayers.nNumLayers = pParam->nNumLayers;
m_sHierLayers.eHierarchicalCodingType = pParam->eHierarchicalCodingType;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure called on wrong port(%u)",
(unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamPerfLevel:
{
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_QcomIndexParamPerfLevel)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting performance level");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamH264VUITimingInfo:
{
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_QcomIndexParamH264VUITimingInfo)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting VUI timing info");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamPeakBitrate:
{
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_QcomIndexParamPeakBitrate)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting peak bitrate");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexParamVideoInitialQp:
{
if(!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexParamVideoInitialQp)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Request to Enable initial QP failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamInitqp, paramData, sizeof(m_sParamInitqp));
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamSetMVSearchrange:
{
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_QcomIndexParamSetMVSearchrange)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting Searchrange");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoHybridHierpMode:
{
if(!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoHybridHierpMode)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Request to Enable Hybrid Hier-P failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoSliceFMO:
default:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown param %d", paramIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
}
return eRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vidc: validate omx param/config data
Check the sanity of config/param strcuture objects
passed to get/set _ config()/parameter() methods.
Bug: 27533317
Security Vulnerability in MediaServer
omx_vdec::get_config() Can lead to arbitrary write
Change-Id: I6c3243afe12055ab94f1a1ecf758c10e88231809
Conflicts:
mm-core/inc/OMX_QCOMExtns.h
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/vdec/src/omx_vdec_msm8974.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_base.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_encoder.cpp
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 173,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DiscardableSharedMemoryManager::AllocateLockedDiscardableMemory(size_t size) {
DCHECK_NE(size, 0u);
int32_t new_id = g_next_discardable_shared_memory_id.GetNext();
base::SharedMemoryHandle handle;
AllocateLockedDiscardableSharedMemory(kInvalidUniqueClientID, size, new_id,
&handle);
std::unique_ptr<base::DiscardableSharedMemory> memory(
new base::DiscardableSharedMemory(handle));
if (!memory->Map(size))
base::TerminateBecauseOutOfMemory(size);
memory->Close();
return std::make_unique<DiscardableMemoryImpl>(
std::move(memory),
base::Bind(
&DiscardableSharedMemoryManager::DeletedDiscardableSharedMemory,
base::Unretained(this), new_id, kInvalidUniqueClientID));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CWebServer::CWebServer(void) : session_store()
{
m_pWebEm = NULL;
m_bDoStop = false;
#ifdef WITH_OPENZWAVE
m_ZW_Hwidx = -1;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 90,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnVideoAverageKeyframeDistanceUpdate() {
UpdateBackgroundVideoOptimizationState();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct srpt_rdma_ch *srpt_find_channel(struct srpt_device *sdev,
struct ib_cm_id *cm_id)
{
struct srpt_rdma_ch *ch;
bool found;
WARN_ON_ONCE(irqs_disabled());
BUG_ON(!sdev);
found = false;
spin_lock_irq(&sdev->spinlock);
list_for_each_entry(ch, &sdev->rch_list, list) {
if (ch->cm_id == cm_id) {
found = true;
break;
}
}
spin_unlock_irq(&sdev->spinlock);
return found ? ch : NULL;
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 50,651 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FileBrowserPrivateRequestAccessTokenFunction::RunAsync() {
using extensions::api::file_browser_private::RequestAccessToken::Params;
const scoped_ptr<Params> params(Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params);
drive::DriveServiceInterface* const drive_service =
drive::util::GetDriveServiceByProfile(GetProfile());
if (!drive_service) {
SetResult(new base::StringValue(""));
SendResponse(true);
return true;
}
if (params->refresh)
drive_service->ClearAccessToken();
drive_service->RequestAccessToken(
base::Bind(&FileBrowserPrivateRequestAccessTokenFunction::
OnAccessTokenFetched, this));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Reland r286968: The CL borrows ShareDialog from Files.app and add it to Gallery.
Previous Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/431293002
BUG=374667
TEST=manually
R=yoshiki@chromium.org, mtomasz@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/433733004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286975 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RecordDiceFetchTokenResult(DiceTokenFetchResult result) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(kDiceTokenFetchResultHistogram, result,
kDiceTokenFetchResultCount);
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PermissionsData::RequiresActionForScriptExecution(
const Extension* extension,
int tab_id,
const GURL& url) const {
if (!extension->ShouldDisplayInExtensionSettings() ||
Manifest::IsPolicyLocation(extension->location()) ||
Manifest::IsComponentLocation(extension->location()) ||
CanExecuteScriptEverywhere(extension) ||
!active_permissions()->ShouldWarnAllHosts()) {
return false;
}
if (HasTabSpecificPermissionToExecuteScript(tab_id, url))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 120,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::setFocusedElement(PassRefPtr<Element> prpNewFocusedElement, FocusDirection direction)
{
RefPtr<Element> newFocusedElement = prpNewFocusedElement;
if (newFocusedElement && (newFocusedElement->document() != this))
return true;
if (NodeChildRemovalTracker::isBeingRemoved(newFocusedElement.get()))
return true;
if (m_focusedElement == newFocusedElement)
return true;
bool focusChangeBlocked = false;
RefPtr<Element> oldFocusedElement = m_focusedElement;
m_focusedElement = 0;
if (oldFocusedElement) {
ASSERT(!oldFocusedElement->inDetach());
if (oldFocusedElement->active())
oldFocusedElement->setActive(false);
oldFocusedElement->setFocus(false);
if (oldFocusedElement->wasChangedSinceLastFormControlChangeEvent())
oldFocusedElement->dispatchFormControlChangeEvent();
oldFocusedElement->dispatchBlurEvent(newFocusedElement.get());
if (m_focusedElement) {
focusChangeBlocked = true;
newFocusedElement = 0;
}
oldFocusedElement->dispatchFocusOutEvent(EventTypeNames::focusout, newFocusedElement.get()); // DOM level 3 name for the bubbling blur event.
oldFocusedElement->dispatchFocusOutEvent(EventTypeNames::DOMFocusOut, newFocusedElement.get()); // DOM level 2 name for compatibility.
if (m_focusedElement) {
focusChangeBlocked = true;
newFocusedElement = 0;
}
if (view()) {
Widget* oldWidget = widgetForElement(oldFocusedElement.get());
if (oldWidget)
oldWidget->setFocus(false);
else
view()->setFocus(false);
}
updateLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
}
if (newFocusedElement && newFocusedElement->isFocusable()) {
if (newFocusedElement->isRootEditableElement() && !acceptsEditingFocus(newFocusedElement.get())) {
focusChangeBlocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
m_focusedElement = newFocusedElement;
m_focusedElement->dispatchFocusEvent(oldFocusedElement.get(), direction);
if (m_focusedElement != newFocusedElement) {
focusChangeBlocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
m_focusedElement->dispatchFocusInEvent(EventTypeNames::focusin, oldFocusedElement.get()); // DOM level 3 bubbling focus event.
if (m_focusedElement != newFocusedElement) {
focusChangeBlocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
m_focusedElement->dispatchFocusInEvent(EventTypeNames::DOMFocusIn, oldFocusedElement.get()); // DOM level 2 for compatibility.
if (m_focusedElement != newFocusedElement) {
focusChangeBlocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
m_focusedElement->setFocus(true);
if (m_focusedElement->isRootEditableElement())
frame()->editor().didBeginEditing(m_focusedElement.get());
if (view()) {
Widget* focusWidget = widgetForElement(m_focusedElement.get());
if (focusWidget) {
updateLayout();
focusWidget = widgetForElement(m_focusedElement.get());
}
if (focusWidget)
focusWidget->setFocus(true);
else
view()->setFocus(true);
}
}
if (!focusChangeBlocked && m_focusedElement) {
if (AXObjectCache* cache = axObjectCache())
cache->handleFocusedUIElementChanged(oldFocusedElement.get(), newFocusedElement.get());
}
if (!focusChangeBlocked && page())
page()->chrome().focusedNodeChanged(m_focusedElement.get());
SetFocusedElementDone:
updateStyleIfNeeded();
if (Frame* frame = this->frame())
frame->selection().didChangeFocus();
return !focusChangeBlocked;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLCanvasElement::SetNeedsCompositingUpdate() {
Element::SetNeedsCompositingUpdate();
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,114 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SelectionEditor::Dispose() {
ClearDocumentCachedRange();
ClearVisibleSelection();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void acm_tty_throttle(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct acm *acm = tty->driver_data;
spin_lock_irq(&acm->read_lock);
acm->throttle_req = 1;
spin_unlock_irq(&acm->read_lock);
}
Commit Message: USB: cdc-acm: more sanity checking
An attack has become available which pretends to be a quirky
device circumventing normal sanity checks and crashes the kernel
by an insufficient number of interfaces. This patch adds a check
to the code path for quirky devices.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void S_AL_AddLoopingSound(int entityNum, const vec3_t origin, const vec3_t velocity, sfxHandle_t sfx)
{
S_AL_SrcLoop(SRCPRI_ENTITY, sfx, origin, velocity, entityNum);
}
Commit Message: Don't open .pk3 files as OpenAL drivers.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mmput(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
might_sleep();
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mm->mm_users)) {
exit_aio(mm);
exit_mmap(mm);
set_mm_exe_file(mm, NULL);
if (!list_empty(&mm->mmlist)) {
spin_lock(&mmlist_lock);
list_del(&mm->mmlist);
spin_unlock(&mmlist_lock);
}
put_swap_token(mm);
mmdrop(mm);
}
}
Commit Message: Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Alex Efros <powerman@powerman.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 22,174 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: create_filesystem_object(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
/* Create the entry. */
const char *linkname;
mode_t final_mode, mode;
int r;
/* We identify hard/symlinks according to the link names. */
/* Since link(2) and symlink(2) don't handle modes, we're done here. */
linkname = archive_entry_hardlink(a->entry);
if (linkname != NULL) {
#if !HAVE_LINK
return (EPERM);
#else
r = link(linkname, a->name) ? errno : 0;
/*
* New cpio and pax formats allow hardlink entries
* to carry data, so we may have to open the file
* for hardlink entries.
*
* If the hardlink was successfully created and
* the archive doesn't have carry data for it,
* consider it to be non-authoritative for meta data.
* This is consistent with GNU tar and BSD pax.
* If the hardlink does carry data, let the last
* archive entry decide ownership.
*/
if (r == 0 && a->filesize <= 0) {
a->todo = 0;
a->deferred = 0;
} else if (r == 0 && a->filesize > 0) {
a->fd = open(a->name,
O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC | O_BINARY | O_CLOEXEC);
__archive_ensure_cloexec_flag(a->fd);
if (a->fd < 0)
r = errno;
}
return (r);
#endif
}
linkname = archive_entry_symlink(a->entry);
if (linkname != NULL) {
#if HAVE_SYMLINK
return symlink(linkname, a->name) ? errno : 0;
#else
return (EPERM);
#endif
}
/*
* The remaining system calls all set permissions, so let's
* try to take advantage of that to avoid an extra chmod()
* call. (Recall that umask is set to zero right now!)
*/
/* Mode we want for the final restored object (w/o file type bits). */
final_mode = a->mode & 07777;
/*
* The mode that will actually be restored in this step. Note
* that SUID, SGID, etc, require additional work to ensure
* security, so we never restore them at this point.
*/
mode = final_mode & 0777 & ~a->user_umask;
switch (a->mode & AE_IFMT) {
default:
/* POSIX requires that we fall through here. */
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case AE_IFREG:
a->fd = open(a->name,
O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_BINARY | O_CLOEXEC, mode);
__archive_ensure_cloexec_flag(a->fd);
r = (a->fd < 0);
break;
case AE_IFCHR:
#ifdef HAVE_MKNOD
/* Note: we use AE_IFCHR for the case label, and
* S_IFCHR for the mknod() call. This is correct. */
r = mknod(a->name, mode | S_IFCHR,
archive_entry_rdev(a->entry));
break;
#else
/* TODO: Find a better way to warn about our inability
* to restore a char device node. */
return (EINVAL);
#endif /* HAVE_MKNOD */
case AE_IFBLK:
#ifdef HAVE_MKNOD
r = mknod(a->name, mode | S_IFBLK,
archive_entry_rdev(a->entry));
break;
#else
/* TODO: Find a better way to warn about our inability
* to restore a block device node. */
return (EINVAL);
#endif /* HAVE_MKNOD */
case AE_IFDIR:
mode = (mode | MINIMUM_DIR_MODE) & MAXIMUM_DIR_MODE;
r = mkdir(a->name, mode);
if (r == 0) {
/* Defer setting dir times. */
a->deferred |= (a->todo & TODO_TIMES);
a->todo &= ~TODO_TIMES;
/* Never use an immediate chmod(). */
/* We can't avoid the chmod() entirely if EXTRACT_PERM
* because of SysV SGID inheritance. */
if ((mode != final_mode)
|| (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_PERM))
a->deferred |= (a->todo & TODO_MODE);
a->todo &= ~TODO_MODE;
}
break;
case AE_IFIFO:
#ifdef HAVE_MKFIFO
r = mkfifo(a->name, mode);
break;
#else
/* TODO: Find a better way to warn about our inability
* to restore a fifo. */
return (EINVAL);
#endif /* HAVE_MKFIFO */
}
/* All the system calls above set errno on failure. */
if (r)
return (errno);
/* If we managed to set the final mode, we've avoided a chmod(). */
if (mode == final_mode)
a->todo &= ~TODO_MODE;
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Fixes for Issue #745 and Issue #746 from Doran Moppert.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 167,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_nx_flow_format_to_string(enum nx_flow_format flow_format)
{
switch (flow_format) {
case NXFF_OPENFLOW10:
return "openflow10";
case NXFF_NXM:
return "nxm";
default:
OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,640 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void efx_flush_all(struct efx_nic *efx)
{
/* Make sure the hardware monitor is stopped */
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&efx->monitor_work);
/* Stop scheduled port reconfigurations */
cancel_work_sync(&efx->mac_work);
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void copy_vmcb_control_area(struct vmcb *dst_vmcb, struct vmcb *from_vmcb)
{
struct vmcb_control_area *dst = &dst_vmcb->control;
struct vmcb_control_area *from = &from_vmcb->control;
dst->intercept_cr = from->intercept_cr;
dst->intercept_dr = from->intercept_dr;
dst->intercept_exceptions = from->intercept_exceptions;
dst->intercept = from->intercept;
dst->iopm_base_pa = from->iopm_base_pa;
dst->msrpm_base_pa = from->msrpm_base_pa;
dst->tsc_offset = from->tsc_offset;
dst->asid = from->asid;
dst->tlb_ctl = from->tlb_ctl;
dst->int_ctl = from->int_ctl;
dst->int_vector = from->int_vector;
dst->int_state = from->int_state;
dst->exit_code = from->exit_code;
dst->exit_code_hi = from->exit_code_hi;
dst->exit_info_1 = from->exit_info_1;
dst->exit_info_2 = from->exit_info_2;
dst->exit_int_info = from->exit_int_info;
dst->exit_int_info_err = from->exit_int_info_err;
dst->nested_ctl = from->nested_ctl;
dst->event_inj = from->event_inj;
dst->event_inj_err = from->event_inj_err;
dst->nested_cr3 = from->nested_cr3;
dst->lbr_ctl = from->lbr_ctl;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 37,743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int web_server_init()
{
int ret = 0;
if (bWebServerState == WEB_SERVER_DISABLED) {
/* decode media list */
media_list_init();
membuffer_init(&gDocumentRootDir);
glob_alias_init();
pVirtualDirList = NULL;
/* Initialize callbacks */
virtualDirCallback.get_info = NULL;
virtualDirCallback.open = NULL;
virtualDirCallback.read = NULL;
virtualDirCallback.write = NULL;
virtualDirCallback.seek = NULL;
virtualDirCallback.close = NULL;
if (ithread_mutex_init(&gWebMutex, NULL) == -1)
ret = UPNP_E_OUTOF_MEMORY;
else
bWebServerState = WEB_SERVER_ENABLED;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Don't allow unhandled POSTs to write to the filesystem by default
If there's no registered handler for a POST request, the default behaviour
is to write it to the filesystem. Several million deployed devices appear
to have this behaviour, making it possible to (at least) store arbitrary
data on them. Add a configure option that enables this behaviour, and change
the default to just drop POSTs that aren't directly handled.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 73,813 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hwsim_send_ps_poll(void *dat, u8 *mac, struct ieee80211_vif *vif)
{
struct mac80211_hwsim_data *data = dat;
struct hwsim_vif_priv *vp = (void *)vif->drv_priv;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct ieee80211_pspoll *pspoll;
if (!vp->assoc)
return;
wiphy_dbg(data->hw->wiphy,
"%s: send PS-Poll to %pM for aid %d\n",
__func__, vp->bssid, vp->aid);
skb = dev_alloc_skb(sizeof(*pspoll));
if (!skb)
return;
pspoll = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*pspoll));
pspoll->frame_control = cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FTYPE_CTL |
IEEE80211_STYPE_PSPOLL |
IEEE80211_FCTL_PM);
pspoll->aid = cpu_to_le16(0xc000 | vp->aid);
memcpy(pspoll->bssid, vp->bssid, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(pspoll->ta, mac, ETH_ALEN);
rcu_read_lock();
mac80211_hwsim_tx_frame(data->hw, skb,
rcu_dereference(vif->chanctx_conf)->def.chan);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 83,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ftp_readline(ftpbuf_t *ftp)
{
long size, rcvd;
char *data, *eol;
/* shift the extra to the front */
size = FTP_BUFSIZE;
rcvd = 0;
if (ftp->extra) {
memmove(ftp->inbuf, ftp->extra, ftp->extralen);
rcvd = ftp->extralen;
}
data = ftp->inbuf;
do {
size -= rcvd;
for (eol = data; rcvd; rcvd--, eol++) {
if (*eol == '\r') {
*eol = 0;
ftp->extra = eol + 1;
if (rcvd > 1 && *(eol + 1) == '\n') {
ftp->extra++;
rcvd--;
}
if ((ftp->extralen = --rcvd) == 0) {
ftp->extra = NULL;
}
return 1;
} else if (*eol == '\n') {
*eol = 0;
ftp->extra = eol + 1;
if ((ftp->extralen = --rcvd) == 0) {
ftp->extra = NULL;
}
return 1;
}
}
data = eol;
if ((rcvd = my_recv(ftp, ftp->fd, data, size)) < 1) {
return 0;
}
} while (size);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CommandLatencyQuery::End(base::subtle::Atomic32 submit_count) {
base::TimeDelta now = base::TimeTicks::HighResNow() - base::TimeTicks();
MarkAsPending(submit_count);
return MarkAsCompleted(now.InMicroseconds());
}
Commit Message: Add bounds validation to AsyncPixelTransfersCompletedQuery::End
BUG=351852
R=jbauman@chromium.org, jorgelo@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/198253002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@256723 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,447 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncWithAllThreads() {
for (int i = 0; i < 20; ++i) {
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
SyncWith(BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO));
SyncWith(audio_manager_->GetWorkerTaskRunner());
}
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,171 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
{
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
s->packet = rdata->packet;
s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
/* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
return(1);
}
Commit Message: A memory leak can occur in dtls1_buffer_record if either of the calls to
ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.
CVE-2015-0206
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 45,164 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline av_flatten int get_symbol_inline(RangeCoder *c, uint8_t *state,
int is_signed)
{
if (get_rac(c, state + 0))
return 0;
else {
int i, e, a;
e = 0;
while (get_rac(c, state + 1 + FFMIN(e, 9))) // 1..10
e++;
a = 1;
for (i = e - 1; i >= 0; i--)
a += a + get_rac(c, state + 22 + FFMIN(i, 9)); // 22..31
e = -(is_signed && get_rac(c, state + 11 + FFMIN(e, 10))); // 11..21
return (a ^ e) - e;
}
}
Commit Message: ffv1dec: Check bits_per_raw_sample and colorspace for equality in ver 0/1 headers
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_registers(rtl8150_t * dev, u16 indx, u16 size, void *data)
{
return usb_control_msg(dev->udev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev->udev, 0),
RTL8150_REQ_GET_REGS, RTL8150_REQT_READ,
indx, 0, data, size, 500);
}
Commit Message: rtl8150: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 168,214 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct ctl_dir *xlate_dir(struct ctl_table_set *set, struct ctl_dir *dir)
{
struct ctl_dir *parent;
const char *procname;
if (!dir->header.parent)
return &set->dir;
parent = xlate_dir(set, dir->header.parent);
if (IS_ERR(parent))
return parent;
procname = dir->header.ctl_table[0].procname;
return find_subdir(parent, procname, strlen(procname));
}
Commit Message: sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir
Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.
The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:
[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265] [<ffffffff817cdaaf>] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817] [<ffffffff817d33fb>] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346] [<ffffffff817cf055>] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256] [<ffffffff817cf0d3>] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972] [<ffffffff810d1fd0>] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804] [<ffffffff8130de64>] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227] [<ffffffff8130de17>] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648] [<ffffffff8130decd>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654] [<ffffffff8130deff>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657] [<ffffffff810f57f5>] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344] [<ffffffff810d7704>] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447] [<ffffffff817d0761>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844] [<ffffffff81167684>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336] [<ffffffff8116789d>] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186] [<ffffffff81167acb>] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899] [<ffffffff810fce3d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234] [<ffffffff8115a9f5>] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049] [<ffffffff81167ae5>] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571] [<ffffffff8115aa2c>] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207] [<ffffffff810bc83f>] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736] [<ffffffff810bc7c0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461] [<ffffffff810bce9b>] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697] [<ffffffff810bcd70>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426] [<ffffffff810c3f7e>] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991] [<ffffffff817d4baf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041] [<ffffffff810c3e80>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230
One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex. The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.
See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13
Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Yang Shukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 48,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FillMiscNavigationParams(const CommonNavigationParams& common_params,
const CommitNavigationParams& commit_params,
blink::WebNavigationParams* navigation_params) {
navigation_params->navigation_timings = BuildNavigationTimings(
common_params.navigation_start, commit_params.navigation_timing,
common_params.input_start);
navigation_params->is_user_activated =
commit_params.was_activated == WasActivatedOption::kYes;
if (commit_params.origin_to_commit) {
navigation_params->origin_to_commit =
commit_params.origin_to_commit.value();
}
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256(void)
{
return ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & AESNI_CAPABLE) &&
aesni_cbc_sha256_enc(NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) ?
&aesni_128_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher : NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 12,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int copy_pmd_range(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, struct mm_struct *src_mm,
pud_t *dst_pud, pud_t *src_pud, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end)
{
pmd_t *src_pmd, *dst_pmd;
unsigned long next;
dst_pmd = pmd_alloc(dst_mm, dst_pud, addr);
if (!dst_pmd)
return -ENOMEM;
src_pmd = pmd_offset(src_pud, addr);
do {
next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
if (pmd_trans_huge(*src_pmd)) {
int err;
VM_BUG_ON(next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE);
err = copy_huge_pmd(dst_mm, src_mm,
dst_pmd, src_pmd, addr, vma);
if (err == -ENOMEM)
return -ENOMEM;
if (!err)
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(src_pmd))
continue;
if (copy_pte_range(dst_mm, src_mm, dst_pmd, src_pmd,
vma, addr, next))
return -ENOMEM;
} while (dst_pmd++, src_pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t WriteBlobMSBULong(Image *image,const size_t value)
{
unsigned char
buffer[4];
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
buffer[0]=(unsigned char) (value >> 24);
buffer[1]=(unsigned char) (value >> 16);
buffer[2]=(unsigned char) (value >> 8);
buffer[3]=(unsigned char) value;
return((size_t) WriteBlob(image,4,buffer));
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 62,148 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void classAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::classAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::WasShown() {
controller_.SetActive(true);
for (RenderWidgetHostView* view : GetRenderWidgetHostViewsInTree()) {
if (view) {
view->Show();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
view->SetActive(true);
#endif
}
}
last_active_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
RenderViewHostImpl* rvh = GetRenderViewHost();
if (rvh) {
rvh->GetWidget()->ResizeRectChanged(
GetRootWindowResizerRect(rvh->GetWidget()));
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_, WasShown());
should_normally_be_visible_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> InspectorParseScriptEvent::Data(
unsigned long identifier,
const String& url) {
String request_id = IdentifiersFactory::RequestId(identifier);
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> value = TracedValue::Create();
value->SetString("requestId", request_id);
value->SetString("url", url);
return value;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,640 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InspectorPageAgent::ResourceType InspectorPageAgent::cachedResourceType(const Resource& cachedResource)
{
switch (cachedResource.type()) {
case Resource::Image:
return InspectorPageAgent::ImageResource;
case Resource::Font:
return InspectorPageAgent::Font;
case Resource::CSSStyleSheet:
case Resource::XSLStyleSheet:
return InspectorPageAgent::StylesheetResource;
case Resource::Script:
return InspectorPageAgent::ScriptResource;
case Resource::Raw:
return InspectorPageAgent::XHRResource;
case Resource::ImportResource:
case Resource::MainResource:
return InspectorPageAgent::DocumentResource;
default:
break;
}
return InspectorPageAgent::OtherResource;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ContextResult CommandBufferProxyImpl::Initialize(
gpu::SurfaceHandle surface_handle,
CommandBufferProxyImpl* share_group,
gpu::SchedulingPriority stream_priority,
const gpu::ContextCreationAttribs& attribs,
const GURL& active_url) {
DCHECK(!share_group || (stream_id_ == share_group->stream_id_));
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu", "GpuChannelHost::CreateViewCommandBuffer",
"surface_handle", surface_handle);
auto channel = std::move(channel_);
GPUCreateCommandBufferConfig init_params;
init_params.surface_handle = surface_handle;
init_params.share_group_id =
share_group ? share_group->route_id_ : MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
init_params.stream_id = stream_id_;
init_params.stream_priority = stream_priority;
init_params.attribs = attribs;
init_params.active_url = active_url;
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "CommandBufferProxyImpl::Initialize");
shared_state_shm_ = AllocateAndMapSharedMemory(sizeof(*shared_state()));
if (!shared_state_shm_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "ContextResult::kFatalFailure: "
"AllocateAndMapSharedMemory failed";
return ContextResult::kFatalFailure;
}
shared_state()->Initialize();
base::SharedMemoryHandle handle =
channel->ShareToGpuProcess(shared_state_shm_->handle());
if (!base::SharedMemory::IsHandleValid(handle)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "ContextResult::kFatalFailure: "
"Shared memory handle is not valid";
return ContextResult::kFatalFailure;
}
channel->AddRouteWithTaskRunner(route_id_, weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
callback_thread_);
ContextResult result = ContextResult::kSuccess;
bool sent = channel->Send(new GpuChannelMsg_CreateCommandBuffer(
init_params, route_id_, handle, &result, &capabilities_));
if (!sent) {
channel->RemoveRoute(route_id_);
LOG(ERROR) << "ContextResult::kTransientFailure: "
"Failed to send GpuChannelMsg_CreateCommandBuffer.";
return ContextResult::kTransientFailure;
}
if (result != ContextResult::kSuccess) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failure processing GpuChannelMsg_CreateCommandBuffer.";
channel->RemoveRoute(route_id_);
return result;
}
channel_ = std::move(channel);
return result;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void PerWorldBindingsVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
impl->perWorldBindingsVoidMethod();
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_cavlc_parse4x4coeff_n8(WORD16 *pi2_coeff_block,
UWORD32 u4_isdc, /* is it a DC block */
WORD32 u4_n,
dec_struct_t *ps_dec,
UWORD32 *pu4_total_coeff)
{
dec_bit_stream_t *ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 u4_bitstream_offset = ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
UWORD32 u4_code;
UNUSED(u4_n);
UNUSED(pi2_coeff_block);
GETBITS(u4_code, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf, 6);
ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst = u4_bitstream_offset;
*pu4_total_coeff = 0;
if(u4_code != 3)
{
UWORD8 *pu1_offset = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_total_coeff_fn_ptr_offset;
UWORD32 u4_trailing_ones, u4_offset, u4_total_coeff_tone;
*pu4_total_coeff = (u4_code >> 2) + 1;
u4_trailing_ones = u4_code & 0x03;
u4_offset = pu1_offset[*pu4_total_coeff - 1];
u4_total_coeff_tone = (*pu4_total_coeff << 16) | u4_trailing_ones;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_4x4res_block[u4_offset](u4_isdc,
u4_total_coeff_tone,
ps_bitstrm);
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Fix stack underflow in CAVLC 4x4 parse functions
Bug: 26399350
Change-Id: Id768751672a7b093ab6e53d4fc0b3188d470920e
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 161,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_map(codebook *s, oggpack_buffer *b, ogg_int32_t *v, int point){
ogg_uint32_t entry = decode_packed_entry_number(s,b);
int i;
if(oggpack_eop(b))return(-1);
/* 1 used by test file 0 */
/* according to decode type */
switch(s->dec_type){
case 1:{
/* packed vector of values */
int mask=(1<<s->q_bits)-1;
for(i=0;i<s->dim;i++){
v[i]=entry&mask;
entry>>=s->q_bits;
}
break;
}
case 2:{
/* packed vector of column offsets */
int mask=(1<<s->q_pack)-1;
for(i=0;i<s->dim;i++){
if(s->q_bits<=8)
v[i]=((unsigned char *)(s->q_val))[entry&mask];
else
v[i]=((ogg_uint16_t *)(s->q_val))[entry&mask];
entry>>=s->q_pack;
}
break;
}
case 3:{
/* offset into array */
void *ptr=((char *)s->q_val)+entry*s->q_pack;
if(s->q_bits<=8){
for(i=0;i<s->dim;i++)
v[i]=((unsigned char *)ptr)[i];
}else{
for(i=0;i<s->dim;i++)
v[i]=((ogg_uint16_t *)ptr)[i];
}
break;
}
default:
return -1;
}
/* we have the unpacked multiplicands; compute final vals */
{
int shiftM = point-s->q_delp;
ogg_int32_t add = point-s->q_minp;
int mul = s->q_del;
if(add>0)
add= s->q_min >> add;
else
add= s->q_min << -add;
if (shiftM<0)
{
mul <<= -shiftM;
shiftM = 0;
}
add <<= shiftM;
for(i=0;i<s->dim;i++)
v[i]= ((add + v[i] * mul) >> shiftM);
if(s->q_seq)
for(i=1;i<s->dim;i++)
v[i]+=v[i-1];
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix out of bounds access in codebook processing
Bug: 62800140
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: I9960d507be62ee0a3b0aa991240951d5a0784f37
(cherry picked from commit 2c4c4bd895f01fdecb90ebdd0412b60608a9ccf0)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 173,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport Quantum *GetAuthenticPixelQueue(const Image *image)
{
CacheInfo
*magick_restrict cache_info;
const int
id = GetOpenMPThreadId();
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (cache_info->methods.get_authentic_pixels_from_handler !=
(GetAuthenticPixelsFromHandler) NULL)
return(cache_info->methods.get_authentic_pixels_from_handler(image));
assert(id < (int) cache_info->number_threads);
return(cache_info->nexus_info[id]->pixels);
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillManager::OnFormSubmitted(const FormData& form) {
tab_contents_wrapper_->autocomplete_history_manager()->OnFormSubmitted(form);
if (!IsAutofillEnabled())
return;
if (tab_contents()->profile()->IsOffTheRecord())
return;
if (!form.user_submitted)
return;
FormStructure submitted_form(form);
if (!submitted_form.ShouldBeParsed(true))
return;
FormStructure* cached_submitted_form;
if (!FindCachedForm(form, &cached_submitted_form))
return;
submitted_form.UpdateFromCache(*cached_submitted_form);
DeterminePossibleFieldTypesForUpload(&submitted_form);
UploadFormData(submitted_form);
submitted_form.LogQualityMetrics(*metric_logger_);
if (!submitted_form.IsAutofillable(true))
return;
ImportFormData(submitted_form);
}
Commit Message: Add support for the "uploadrequired" attribute for Autofill query responses
BUG=84693
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutofillDownloadTest.QueryAndUploadTest
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6969090
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87729 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t read_data(serial_data_type_t type, uint8_t *buffer, size_t max_size, bool block) {
if (type == DATA_TYPE_ACL) {
return eager_reader_read(acl_stream, buffer, max_size, block);
} else if (type == DATA_TYPE_EVENT) {
return eager_reader_read(event_stream, buffer, max_size, block);
}
LOG_ERROR("%s invalid data type: %d", __func__, type);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,949 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs41_sequence_call_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nfs4_sequence_data *calldata = data;
struct nfs_client *clp = calldata->clp;
if (!nfs41_sequence_done(task, task->tk_msg.rpc_resp))
return;
if (task->tk_status < 0) {
dprintk("%s ERROR %d\n", __func__, task->tk_status);
if (atomic_read(&clp->cl_count) == 1)
goto out;
if (nfs41_sequence_handle_errors(task, clp) == -EAGAIN) {
rpc_restart_call_prepare(task);
return;
}
}
dprintk("%s rpc_cred %p\n", __func__, task->tk_msg.rpc_cred);
out:
dprintk("<-- %s\n", __func__);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ims_pcu_update_firmware_store(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *dattr,
const char *buf, size_t count)
{
struct usb_interface *intf = to_usb_interface(dev);
struct ims_pcu *pcu = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
const struct firmware *fw = NULL;
int value;
int error;
error = kstrtoint(buf, 0, &value);
if (error)
return error;
if (value != 1)
return -EINVAL;
error = mutex_lock_interruptible(&pcu->cmd_mutex);
if (error)
return error;
error = request_ihex_firmware(&fw, IMS_PCU_FIRMWARE_NAME, pcu->dev);
if (error) {
dev_err(pcu->dev, "Failed to request firmware %s, error: %d\n",
IMS_PCU_FIRMWARE_NAME, error);
goto out;
}
/*
* If we are already in bootloader mode we can proceed with
* flashing the firmware.
*
* If we are in application mode, then we need to switch into
* bootloader mode, which will cause the device to disconnect
* and reconnect as different device.
*/
if (pcu->bootloader_mode)
error = ims_pcu_handle_firmware_update(pcu, fw);
else
error = ims_pcu_switch_to_bootloader(pcu);
release_firmware(fw);
out:
mutex_unlock(&pcu->cmd_mutex);
return error ?: count;
}
Commit Message: Input: ims-pcu - sanity check against missing interfaces
A malicious device missing interface can make the driver oops.
Add sanity checking.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,042 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UnprivilegedProcessDelegate::~UnprivilegedProcessDelegate() {
KillProcess(CONTROL_C_EXIT);
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,807 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline v8::Local<v8::Context> contextForWorld(ScriptController* scriptController, DOMWrapperWorld* world)
{
return scriptController->windowShell(world)->context();
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t NuPlayer::GenericSource::selectTrack(size_t trackIndex, bool select, int64_t timeUs) {
ALOGV("%s track: %zu", select ? "select" : "deselect", trackIndex);
sp<AMessage> msg = new AMessage(kWhatSelectTrack, this);
msg->setInt32("trackIndex", trackIndex);
msg->setInt32("select", select);
msg->setInt64("timeUs", timeUs);
sp<AMessage> response;
status_t err = msg->postAndAwaitResponse(&response);
if (err == OK && response != NULL) {
CHECK(response->findInt32("err", &err));
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,435 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Editor::Undo() {
undo_stack_->Undo();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_mmu_change_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int goal_nr_mmu_pages)
{
LIST_HEAD(invalid_list);
spin_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
if (kvm->arch.n_used_mmu_pages > goal_nr_mmu_pages) {
/* Need to free some mmu pages to achieve the goal. */
while (kvm->arch.n_used_mmu_pages > goal_nr_mmu_pages)
if (!prepare_zap_oldest_mmu_page(kvm, &invalid_list))
break;
kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page(kvm, &invalid_list);
goal_nr_mmu_pages = kvm->arch.n_used_mmu_pages;
}
kvm->arch.n_max_mmu_pages = goal_nr_mmu_pages;
spin_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanReadRawCookies(int child_id) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id);
if (state == security_state_.end())
return false;
return state->second->can_read_raw_cookies();
}
Commit Message: Apply missing kParentDirectory check
BUG=161564
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11414046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rpc_register_client(struct rpc_clnt *clnt)
{
spin_lock(&rpc_client_lock);
list_add(&clnt->cl_clients, &all_clients);
spin_unlock(&rpc_client_lock);
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 34,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct ctl_table_header *sysctl_head_grab(struct ctl_table_header *head)
{
if (!head)
BUG();
spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
if (!use_table(head))
head = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
return head;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: restrict write access to dmesg_restrict
When dmesg_restrict is set to 1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to read the kernel
ring buffer. But a root user without CAP_SYS_ADMIN is able to reset
dmesg_restrict to 0.
This is an issue when e.g. LXC (Linux Containers) are used and complete
user space is running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A unprivileged and jailed
root user can bypass the dmesg_restrict protection.
With this patch writing to dmesg_restrict is only allowed when root has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType SetImageProfileInternal(Image *image,const char *name,
const StringInfo *profile,const MagickBooleanType recursive)
{
char
key[MaxTextExtent],
property[MaxTextExtent];
MagickBooleanType
status;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (image->profiles == (SplayTreeInfo *) NULL)
image->profiles=NewSplayTree(CompareSplayTreeString,RelinquishMagickMemory,
DestroyProfile);
(void) CopyMagickString(key,name,MaxTextExtent);
LocaleLower(key);
status=AddValueToSplayTree((SplayTreeInfo *) image->profiles,
ConstantString(key),CloneStringInfo(profile));
if ((status != MagickFalse) &&
((LocaleCompare(name,"icc") == 0) || (LocaleCompare(name,"icm") == 0)))
{
const StringInfo
*icc_profile;
/*
Continue to support deprecated color profile member.
*/
icc_profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
if (icc_profile != (const StringInfo *) NULL)
{
image->color_profile.length=GetStringInfoLength(icc_profile);
image->color_profile.info=GetStringInfoDatum(icc_profile);
}
}
if ((status != MagickFalse) &&
((LocaleCompare(name,"iptc") == 0) || (LocaleCompare(name,"8bim") == 0)))
{
const StringInfo
*iptc_profile;
/*
Continue to support deprecated IPTC profile member.
*/
iptc_profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
if (iptc_profile != (const StringInfo *) NULL)
{
image->iptc_profile.length=GetStringInfoLength(iptc_profile);
image->iptc_profile.info=GetStringInfoDatum(iptc_profile);
}
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
if (LocaleCompare(name,"8bim") == 0)
GetProfilesFromResourceBlock(image,profile);
else if (recursive == MagickFalse)
WriteTo8BimProfile(image,name,profile);
}
/*
Inject profile into image properties.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(property,MaxTextExtent,"%s:*",name);
(void) GetImageProperty(image,property);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Fixed SEGV reported in https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/130
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 73,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
{
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::UpdateTargetURL(RenderViewHost* render_view_host,
const GURL& url) {
if (fullscreen_widget_routing_id_ != MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
RenderWidgetHostView* fs = GetFullscreenRenderWidgetHostView();
if (fs && fs->GetRenderWidgetHost() != render_view_host->GetWidget())
return;
}
if (delegate_)
delegate_->UpdateTargetURL(this, url);
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormControlElement::didMoveToNewDocument(Document& oldDocument)
{
FormAssociatedElement::didMoveToNewDocument(oldDocument);
HTMLElement::didMoveToNewDocument(oldDocument);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::NullableStringMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_nullableStringMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::NullableStringMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderBlockFlow::RenderBlockFlowRareData& RenderBlockFlow::ensureRareData()
{
if (m_rareData)
return *m_rareData;
m_rareData = adoptPtr(new RenderBlockFlowRareData(this));
return *m_rareData;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,365 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void copy_io_context(struct io_context **pdst, struct io_context **psrc)
{
struct io_context *src = *psrc;
struct io_context *dst = *pdst;
if (src) {
BUG_ON(atomic_long_read(&src->refcount) == 0);
atomic_long_inc(&src->refcount);
put_io_context(dst);
*pdst = src;
}
}
Commit Message: block: Fix io_context leak after clone with CLONE_IO
With CLONE_IO, copy_io() increments both ioc->refcount and ioc->nr_tasks.
However exit_io_context() only decrements ioc->refcount if ioc->nr_tasks
reaches 0.
Always call put_io_context() in exit_io_context().
Signed-off-by: Louis Rilling <louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct device *tty_get_device(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
dev_t devt = tty_devnum(tty);
return class_find_device(tty_class, NULL, &devt, dev_match_devt);
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 55,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: omx_venc::~omx_venc()
{
get_syntaxhdr_enable = false;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,243 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void process_queued_ios(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct multipath *m =
container_of(work, struct multipath, process_queued_ios);
struct pgpath *pgpath = NULL;
unsigned must_queue = 1;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&m->lock, flags);
if (!m->queue_size)
goto out;
if (!m->current_pgpath)
__choose_pgpath(m, 0);
pgpath = m->current_pgpath;
if ((pgpath && !m->queue_io) ||
(!pgpath && !m->queue_if_no_path))
must_queue = 0;
if (m->pg_init_required && !m->pg_init_in_progress && pgpath)
__pg_init_all_paths(m);
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&m->lock, flags);
if (!must_queue)
dispatch_queued_ios(m);
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,610 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AXNodeObject::isDescendantOfElementType(
HashSet<QualifiedName>& tagNames) const {
if (!getNode())
return false;
for (Element* parent = getNode()->parentElement(); parent;
parent = parent->parentElement()) {
if (tagNames.contains(parent->tagQName()))
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,160 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormControlElement::requiredAttributeChanged() {
setNeedsValidityCheck();
pseudoStateChanged(CSSSelector::PseudoRequired);
pseudoStateChanged(CSSSelector::PseudoOptional);
}
Commit Message: Form validation: Do not show validation bubble if the page is invisible.
BUG=673163
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2572813003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#438476}
CWE ID: CWE-1021 | 0 | 139,985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xml_log_changes(uint8_t log_level, const char *function, xmlNode * xml)
{
GListPtr gIter = NULL;
xml_private_t *doc = NULL;
CRM_ASSERT(xml);
CRM_ASSERT(xml->doc);
doc = xml->doc->_private;
if(is_not_set(doc->flags, xpf_dirty)) {
return;
}
for(gIter = doc->deleted_paths; gIter; gIter = gIter->next) {
do_crm_log_alias(log_level, __FILE__, function, __LINE__, "-- %s", (char*)gIter->data);
}
log_data_element(log_level, __FILE__, function, __LINE__, "+ ", xml, 0,
xml_log_option_formatted|xml_log_option_dirty_add);
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: irqreturn_t floppy_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
{
int do_print;
unsigned long f;
void (*handler)(void) = do_floppy;
lasthandler = handler;
interruptjiffies = jiffies;
f = claim_dma_lock();
fd_disable_dma();
release_dma_lock(f);
do_floppy = NULL;
if (fdc >= N_FDC || FDCS->address == -1) {
/* we don't even know which FDC is the culprit */
pr_info("DOR0=%x\n", fdc_state[0].dor);
pr_info("floppy interrupt on bizarre fdc %d\n", fdc);
pr_info("handler=%ps\n", handler);
is_alive(__func__, "bizarre fdc");
return IRQ_NONE;
}
FDCS->reset = 0;
/* We have to clear the reset flag here, because apparently on boxes
* with level triggered interrupts (PS/2, Sparc, ...), it is needed to
* emit SENSEI's to clear the interrupt line. And FDCS->reset blocks the
* emission of the SENSEI's.
* It is OK to emit floppy commands because we are in an interrupt
* handler here, and thus we have to fear no interference of other
* activity.
*/
do_print = !handler && print_unex && initialized;
inr = result();
if (do_print)
print_result("unexpected interrupt", inr);
if (inr == 0) {
int max_sensei = 4;
do {
output_byte(FD_SENSEI);
inr = result();
if (do_print)
print_result("sensei", inr);
max_sensei--;
} while ((ST0 & 0x83) != UNIT(current_drive) &&
inr == 2 && max_sensei);
}
if (!handler) {
FDCS->reset = 1;
return IRQ_NONE;
}
schedule_bh(handler);
is_alive(__func__, "normal interrupt end");
/* FIXME! Was it really for us? */
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
Commit Message: floppy: fix div-by-zero in setup_format_params
This fixes a divide by zero error in the setup_format_params function of
the floppy driver.
Two consecutive ioctls can trigger the bug: The first one should set the
drive geometry with such .sect and .rate values for the F_SECT_PER_TRACK
to become zero. Next, the floppy format operation should be called.
A floppy disk is not required to be inserted. An unprivileged user
could trigger the bug if the device is accessible.
The patch checks F_SECT_PER_TRACK for a non-zero value in the
set_geometry function. The proper check should involve a reasonable
upper limit for the .sect and .rate fields, but it could change the
UAPI.
The patch also checks F_SECT_PER_TRACK in the setup_format_params, and
cancels the formatting operation in case of zero.
The bug was found by syzkaller.
Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@ispras.ru>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 88,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE0(vfork)
{
return _do_fork(CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM | SIGCHLD, 0,
0, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
Commit Message: fork: fix incorrect fput of ->exe_file causing use-after-free
Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().
However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
a reference is taken on the mm_struct's ->exe_file. Since the
->exe_file of the new mm_struct was already set to the old ->exe_file by
the memcpy() in dup_mm(), it was possible for the mmput() in the error
path of dup_mm() to drop a reference to ->exe_file which was never
taken.
This caused the struct file to later be freed prematurely.
Fix it by updating mm_init() to NULL out the ->exe_file, in the same
place it clears other things like the list of mmaps.
This bug was found by syzkaller. It can be reproduced using the
following C program:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *mmap_thread(void *_arg)
{
for (;;) {
mmap(NULL, 0x1000000, PROT_READ,
MAP_POPULATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
}
}
static void *fork_thread(void *_arg)
{
usleep(rand() % 10000);
fork();
}
int main(void)
{
fork();
fork();
fork();
for (;;) {
if (fork() == 0) {
pthread_t t;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, mmap_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t, NULL, fork_thread, NULL);
usleep(rand() % 10000);
syscall(__NR_exit_group, 0);
}
wait(NULL);
}
}
No special kernel config options are needed. It usually causes a NULL
pointer dereference in __remove_shared_vm_struct() during exit, or in
dup_mmap() (which is usually inlined into copy_process()) during fork.
Both are due to a vm_area_struct's ->vm_file being used after it's
already been freed.
Google Bug Id: 64772007
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823211408.31198-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v4.7+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,253 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MediaPlayerService::Client::setParameter(int key, const Parcel &request) {
ALOGV("[%d] setParameter(%d)", mConnId, key);
switch (key) {
case KEY_PARAMETER_AUDIO_ATTRIBUTES:
{
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
return setAudioAttributes_l(request);
}
default:
sp<MediaPlayerBase> p = getPlayer();
if (p == 0) { return UNKNOWN_ERROR; }
return p->setParameter(key, request);
}
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLMediaElement::isMediaDataCORSSameOrigin(SecurityOrigin* origin) const {
return hasSingleSecurityOrigin() &&
((webMediaPlayer() && webMediaPlayer()->didPassCORSAccessCheck()) ||
!origin->taintsCanvas(currentSrc()));
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 128,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err pdin_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 i;
GF_ProgressiveDownloadBox *ptr = (GF_ProgressiveDownloadBox*)s;
ptr->count = (u32) (ptr->size) / 8;
ptr->rates = (u32*)gf_malloc(sizeof(u32)*ptr->count);
ptr->times = (u32*)gf_malloc(sizeof(u32)*ptr->count);
for (i=0; i<ptr->count; i++) {
ptr->rates[i] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->times[i] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int migration_cpu_stop(void *data)
{
struct migration_arg *arg = data;
/*
* The original target cpu might have gone down and we might
* be on another cpu but it doesn't matter.
*/
local_irq_disable();
__migrate_task(arg->task, raw_smp_processor_id(), arg->dest_cpu);
local_irq_enable();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _dbus_daemon_publish_session_bus_address (const char* address, const char *scope)
{
HANDLE lock;
char *shared_addr = NULL;
DBusString shm_name;
DBusString mutex_name;
_dbus_assert (address);
if (!_dbus_get_mutex_name(&mutex_name,scope))
{
_dbus_string_free( &mutex_name );
return FALSE;
}
lock = _dbus_global_lock( cUniqueDBusInitMutex );
if (!hDBusDaemonMutex)
{
hDBusDaemonMutex = CreateMutexA( NULL, FALSE, _dbus_string_get_const_data(&mutex_name) );
}
_dbus_string_free( &mutex_name );
if (WaitForSingleObject( hDBusDaemonMutex, 10 ) != WAIT_OBJECT_0)
{
_dbus_global_unlock( lock );
CloseHandle( hDBusDaemonMutex );
return FALSE;
}
if (!_dbus_get_shm_name(&shm_name,scope))
{
_dbus_string_free( &shm_name );
_dbus_global_unlock( lock );
return FALSE;
}
hDBusSharedMem = CreateFileMappingA( INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE, NULL, PAGE_READWRITE,
0, strlen( address ) + 1, _dbus_string_get_const_data(&shm_name) );
_dbus_assert( hDBusSharedMem );
shared_addr = MapViewOfFile( hDBusSharedMem, FILE_MAP_WRITE, 0, 0, 0 );
_dbus_assert (shared_addr);
strcpy( shared_addr, address);
UnmapViewOfFile( shared_addr );
_dbus_global_unlock( lock );
_dbus_verbose( "published session bus address at %s\n",_dbus_string_get_const_data (&shm_name) );
_dbus_string_free( &shm_name );
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ib_ucm_event_req_get(struct ib_ucm_req_event_resp *ureq,
struct ib_cm_req_event_param *kreq)
{
ureq->remote_ca_guid = kreq->remote_ca_guid;
ureq->remote_qkey = kreq->remote_qkey;
ureq->remote_qpn = kreq->remote_qpn;
ureq->qp_type = kreq->qp_type;
ureq->starting_psn = kreq->starting_psn;
ureq->responder_resources = kreq->responder_resources;
ureq->initiator_depth = kreq->initiator_depth;
ureq->local_cm_response_timeout = kreq->local_cm_response_timeout;
ureq->flow_control = kreq->flow_control;
ureq->remote_cm_response_timeout = kreq->remote_cm_response_timeout;
ureq->retry_count = kreq->retry_count;
ureq->rnr_retry_count = kreq->rnr_retry_count;
ureq->srq = kreq->srq;
ureq->port = kreq->port;
ib_copy_path_rec_to_user(&ureq->primary_path, kreq->primary_path);
if (kreq->alternate_path)
ib_copy_path_rec_to_user(&ureq->alternate_path,
kreq->alternate_path);
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline MagickSizeType GetPSDSize(const PSDInfo *psd_info,Image *image)
{
if (psd_info->version == 1)
return((MagickSizeType) ReadBlobLong(image));
return((MagickSizeType) ReadBlobLongLong(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/714
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderThreadImpl::HistogramCustomizer::IsAlexaTop10NonGoogleSite(
const std::string& host) {
if (host == "sina.com.cn")
return true;
std::string sanitized_host =
net::registry_controlled_domains::GetDomainAndRegistry(
host, net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES);
if (sanitized_host == "facebook.com")
return true;
if (sanitized_host == "baidu.com")
return true;
if (sanitized_host == "qq.com")
return true;
if (sanitized_host == "twitter.com")
return true;
if (sanitized_host == "taobao.com")
return true;
if (sanitized_host == "live.com")
return true;
if (!sanitized_host.empty()) {
std::vector<base::StringPiece> host_tokens = base::SplitStringPiece(
sanitized_host, ".", base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_NONEMPTY);
if (host_tokens.size() >= 2) {
if ((host_tokens[0] == "yahoo") || (host_tokens[0] == "amazon") ||
(host_tokens[0] == "wikipedia")) {
return true;
}
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,538 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionDevToolsClientHost::Attach() {
if (!agent_host_->AttachClient(this))
return false;
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
::switches::kSilentDebuggerExtensionAPI)) {
return true;
}
if (Manifest::IsPolicyLocation(extension_->location()))
return true;
infobar_ = ExtensionDevToolsInfoBar::Create(
extension_id(), extension_->name(), this,
base::Bind(&ExtensionDevToolsClientHost::InfoBarDismissed,
base::Unretained(this)));
return true;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void fsck_set_msg_type(struct fsck_options *options,
const char *msg_id, const char *msg_type)
{
int id = parse_msg_id(msg_id), type;
if (id < 0)
die("Unhandled message id: %s", msg_id);
type = parse_msg_type(msg_type);
if (type != FSCK_ERROR && msg_id_info[id].msg_type == FSCK_FATAL)
die("Cannot demote %s to %s", msg_id, msg_type);
if (!options->msg_type) {
int i;
int *msg_type;
ALLOC_ARRAY(msg_type, FSCK_MSG_MAX);
for (i = 0; i < FSCK_MSG_MAX; i++)
msg_type[i] = fsck_msg_type(i, options);
options->msg_type = msg_type;
}
options->msg_type[id] = type;
}
Commit Message: fsck: detect submodule urls starting with dash
Urls with leading dashes can cause mischief on older
versions of Git. We should detect them so that they can be
rejected by receive.fsckObjects, preventing modern versions
of git from being a vector by which attacks can spread.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 76,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ComponentUpdaterPolicyTest::ComponentUpdaterPolicyTest()
: https_server_(net::EmbeddedTestServer::TYPE_HTTPS) {}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,019 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: load_xpath_expr (xmlDocPtr parent_doc, const char* filename) {
xmlXPathObjectPtr xpath;
xmlDocPtr doc;
xmlChar *expr;
xmlXPathContextPtr ctx;
xmlNodePtr node;
xmlNsPtr ns;
/*
* load XPath expr as a file
*/
xmlLoadExtDtdDefaultValue = XML_DETECT_IDS | XML_COMPLETE_ATTRS;
xmlSubstituteEntitiesDefault(1);
doc = xmlReadFile(filename, NULL, XML_PARSE_DTDATTR | XML_PARSE_NOENT);
if (doc == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: unable to parse file \"%s\"\n", filename);
return(NULL);
}
/*
* Check the document is of the right kind
*/
if(xmlDocGetRootElement(doc) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr,"Error: empty document for file \"%s\"\n", filename);
xmlFreeDoc(doc);
return(NULL);
}
node = doc->children;
while(node != NULL && !xmlStrEqual(node->name, (const xmlChar *)"XPath")) {
node = node->next;
}
if(node == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr,"Error: XPath element expected in the file \"%s\"\n", filename);
xmlFreeDoc(doc);
return(NULL);
}
expr = xmlNodeGetContent(node);
if(expr == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr,"Error: XPath content element is NULL \"%s\"\n", filename);
xmlFreeDoc(doc);
return(NULL);
}
ctx = xmlXPathNewContext(parent_doc);
if(ctx == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr,"Error: unable to create new context\n");
xmlFree(expr);
xmlFreeDoc(doc);
return(NULL);
}
/*
* Register namespaces
*/
ns = node->nsDef;
while(ns != NULL) {
if(xmlXPathRegisterNs(ctx, ns->prefix, ns->href) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr,"Error: unable to register NS with prefix=\"%s\" and href=\"%s\"\n", ns->prefix, ns->href);
xmlFree(expr);
xmlXPathFreeContext(ctx);
xmlFreeDoc(doc);
return(NULL);
}
ns = ns->next;
}
/*
* Evaluate xpath
*/
xpath = xmlXPathEvalExpression(expr, ctx);
if(xpath == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr,"Error: unable to evaluate xpath expression\n");
xmlFree(expr);
xmlXPathFreeContext(ctx);
xmlFreeDoc(doc);
return(NULL);
}
/* print_xpath_nodes(xpath->nodesetval); */
xmlFree(expr);
xmlXPathFreeContext(ctx);
xmlFreeDoc(doc);
return(xpath);
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 59,599 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.