instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CWebServer::Cmd_GetAuth(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "GetAuth";
if (session.rights != -1)
{
root["version"] = szAppVersion;
}
root["user"] = session.username;
root["rights"] = session.rights;
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 90,988 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void gen_jmp_im(target_ulong pc)
{
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_tmp0, pc);
gen_op_jmp_v(cpu_tmp0);
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-94 | 0 | 66,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tipc_nl_compat_media_dump(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct nlattr *media[TIPC_NLA_MEDIA_MAX + 1];
int err;
if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_MEDIA])
return -EINVAL;
err = nla_parse_nested(media, TIPC_NLA_MEDIA_MAX, attrs[TIPC_NLA_MEDIA],
NULL);
if (err)
return err;
return tipc_add_tlv(msg->rep, TIPC_TLV_MEDIA_NAME,
nla_data(media[TIPC_NLA_MEDIA_NAME]),
nla_len(media[TIPC_NLA_MEDIA_NAME]));
}
Commit Message: tipc: fix an infoleak in tipc_nl_compat_link_dump
link_info.str is a char array of size 60. Memory after the NULL
byte is not initialized. Sending the whole object out can cause
a leak.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 52,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void UnrestrictedDoubleOrStringAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
UnrestrictedDoubleOrString result;
impl->unrestrictedDoubleOrStringAttribute(result);
V8SetReturnValue(info, result);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~Core() {}
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void netdev_update_features(struct net_device *dev)
{
if (__netdev_update_features(dev))
netdev_features_change(dev);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CommandLatencyQuery::Begin() {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add bounds validation to AsyncPixelTransfersCompletedQuery::End
BUG=351852
R=jbauman@chromium.org, jorgelo@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/198253002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@256723 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,430 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void arcmsr_write_ioctldata2iop_in_DWORD(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
uint8_t *pQbuffer;
struct QBUFFER __iomem *pwbuffer;
uint8_t *buf1 = NULL;
uint32_t __iomem *iop_data;
uint32_t allxfer_len = 0, data_len, *buf2 = NULL, data;
if (acb->acb_flags & ACB_F_MESSAGE_WQBUFFER_READED) {
buf1 = kmalloc(128, GFP_ATOMIC);
buf2 = (uint32_t *)buf1;
if (buf1 == NULL)
return;
acb->acb_flags &= (~ACB_F_MESSAGE_WQBUFFER_READED);
pwbuffer = arcmsr_get_iop_wqbuffer(acb);
iop_data = (uint32_t __iomem *)pwbuffer->data;
while ((acb->wqbuf_getIndex != acb->wqbuf_putIndex)
&& (allxfer_len < 124)) {
pQbuffer = &acb->wqbuffer[acb->wqbuf_getIndex];
*buf1 = *pQbuffer;
acb->wqbuf_getIndex++;
acb->wqbuf_getIndex %= ARCMSR_MAX_QBUFFER;
buf1++;
allxfer_len++;
}
data_len = allxfer_len;
buf1 = (uint8_t *)buf2;
while (data_len >= 4) {
data = *buf2++;
writel(data, iop_data);
iop_data++;
data_len -= 4;
}
if (data_len) {
data = *buf2;
writel(data, iop_data);
}
writel(allxfer_len, &pwbuffer->data_len);
kfree(buf1);
arcmsr_iop_message_wrote(acb);
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const AtomicString& HTMLInputElement::name() const
{
return m_name.isNull() ? emptyAtom : m_name;
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int parse_windowargs(const char *tag,
struct windowargs **wa,
int updates)
{
struct windowargs windowargs;
struct buf arg = BUF_INITIALIZER;
struct buf ext_folder = BUF_INITIALIZER;
int c;
memset(&windowargs, 0, sizeof(windowargs));
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c == EOF)
goto out;
if (c != '(') {
/* no window args at all */
prot_ungetc(c, imapd_in);
goto out;
}
for (;;)
{
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c == EOF)
goto out;
if (c == ')')
break; /* end of window args */
prot_ungetc(c, imapd_in);
c = getword(imapd_in, &arg);
if (!arg.len)
goto syntax_error;
if (!strcasecmp(arg.s, "CONVERSATIONS"))
windowargs.conversations = 1;
else if (!strcasecmp(arg.s, "POSITION")) {
if (updates)
goto syntax_error;
if (c != ' ')
goto syntax_error;
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '(')
goto syntax_error;
c = getuint32(imapd_in, &windowargs.position);
if (c != ' ')
goto syntax_error;
c = getuint32(imapd_in, &windowargs.limit);
if (c != ')')
goto syntax_error;
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (windowargs.position == 0)
goto syntax_error;
}
else if (!strcasecmp(arg.s, "ANCHOR")) {
if (updates)
goto syntax_error;
if (c != ' ')
goto syntax_error;
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '(')
goto syntax_error;
c = getuint32(imapd_in, &windowargs.anchor);
if (c != ' ')
goto syntax_error;
c = getuint32(imapd_in, &windowargs.offset);
if (c != ' ')
goto syntax_error;
c = getuint32(imapd_in, &windowargs.limit);
if (c != ')')
goto syntax_error;
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (windowargs.anchor == 0)
goto syntax_error;
}
else if (!strcasecmp(arg.s, "MULTIANCHOR")) {
if (updates)
goto syntax_error;
if (c != ' ')
goto syntax_error;
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '(')
goto syntax_error;
c = getuint32(imapd_in, &windowargs.anchor);
if (c != ' ')
goto syntax_error;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &ext_folder);
if (c != ' ')
goto syntax_error;
c = getuint32(imapd_in, &windowargs.offset);
if (c != ' ')
goto syntax_error;
c = getuint32(imapd_in, &windowargs.limit);
if (c != ')')
goto syntax_error;
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (windowargs.anchor == 0)
goto syntax_error;
}
else if (!strcasecmp(arg.s, "CHANGEDSINCE")) {
if (!updates)
goto syntax_error;
windowargs.changedsince = 1;
if (c != ' ')
goto syntax_error;
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '(')
goto syntax_error;
c = getmodseq(imapd_in, &windowargs.modseq);
if (c != ' ')
goto syntax_error;
c = getuint32(imapd_in, &windowargs.uidnext);
if (c != ')')
goto syntax_error;
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
} else if (!strcasecmp(arg.s, "UPTO")) {
if (!updates)
goto syntax_error;
if (c != ' ')
goto syntax_error;
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '(')
goto syntax_error;
c = getuint32(imapd_in, &windowargs.upto);
if (c != ')')
goto syntax_error;
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (windowargs.upto == 0)
goto syntax_error;
}
else
goto syntax_error;
if (c == ')')
break;
if (c != ' ')
goto syntax_error;
}
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != ' ')
goto syntax_error;
out:
/* these two are mutually exclusive */
if (windowargs.anchor && windowargs.position)
goto syntax_error;
/* changedsince is mandatory for XCONVUPDATES
* and illegal for XCONVSORT */
if (!!updates != windowargs.changedsince)
goto syntax_error;
if (ext_folder.len) {
windowargs.anchorfolder = mboxname_from_external(buf_cstring(&ext_folder),
&imapd_namespace,
imapd_userid);
}
*wa = xmemdup(&windowargs, sizeof(windowargs));
buf_free(&ext_folder);
buf_free(&arg);
return c;
syntax_error:
free(windowargs.anchorfolder);
buf_free(&ext_folder);
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s BAD Syntax error in window arguments\r\n", tag);
return EOF;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptPromise Document::createCSSStyleSheet(ScriptState* script_state,
const String& text,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
return Document::createCSSStyleSheet(
script_state, text, CSSStyleSheetInit::Create(), exception_state);
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 152,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dns_packet_truncate_opt(DnsPacket *p) {
assert(p);
if (p->opt_start == (size_t) -1) {
assert(p->opt_size == (size_t) -1);
return 0;
}
assert(p->opt_size != (size_t) -1);
assert(DNS_PACKET_ARCOUNT(p) > 0);
if (p->opt_start + p->opt_size != p->size)
return -EBUSY;
dns_packet_truncate(p, p->opt_start);
DNS_PACKET_HEADER(p)->arcount = htobe16(DNS_PACKET_ARCOUNT(p) - 1);
p->opt_start = p->opt_size = (size_t) -1;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: resolved: bugfix of null pointer p->question dereferencing (#6020)
See https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/systemd/+bug/1621396
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 64,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
size_t alpnlen = 0;
const char **cur;
*olen = 0;
if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL )
{
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding alpn extension" ) );
for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ )
alpnlen += (unsigned char)( strlen( *cur ) & 0xFF ) + 1;
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 6 + alpnlen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
return;
}
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN ) & 0xFF );
/*
* opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>;
*
* struct {
* ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1>
* } ProtocolNameList;
*/
/* Skip writing extension and list length for now */
p += 4;
for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ )
{
*p = (unsigned char)( strlen( *cur ) & 0xFF );
memcpy( p + 1, *cur, *p );
p += 1 + *p;
}
*olen = p - buf;
/* List length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) - 2 (list_len) */
buf[4] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 6 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
buf[5] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 6 ) ) & 0xFF );
/* Extension length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) */
buf[2] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
buf[3] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) ) & 0xFF );
}
Commit Message: Add bounds check before length read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 83,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static HB_Error Lookup_ChainContextPos3(
GPOS_Instance* gpi,
HB_ChainContextPosFormat3* ccpf3,
HB_Buffer buffer,
HB_UShort flags,
HB_UShort context_length,
int nesting_level )
{
HB_UShort index, i, j, property;
HB_UShort bgc, igc, lgc;
HB_Error error;
HB_GPOSHeader* gpos = gpi->gpos;
HB_Coverage* bc;
HB_Coverage* ic;
HB_Coverage* lc;
HB_GDEFHeader* gdef;
gdef = gpos->gdef;
if ( CHECK_Property( gdef, IN_CURITEM(), flags, &property ) )
return error;
bgc = ccpf3->BacktrackGlyphCount;
igc = ccpf3->InputGlyphCount;
lgc = ccpf3->LookaheadGlyphCount;
if ( context_length != 0xFFFF && context_length < igc )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
/* check whether context is too long; it is a first guess only */
if ( bgc > buffer->in_pos || buffer->in_pos + igc + lgc > buffer->in_length )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
if ( bgc )
{
/* Since we don't know in advance the number of glyphs to inspect,
we search backwards for matches in the backtrack glyph array */
bc = ccpf3->BacktrackCoverage;
for ( i = 0, j = buffer->in_pos - 1; i < bgc; i++, j-- )
{
while ( CHECK_Property( gdef, IN_ITEM( j ), flags, &property ) )
{
if ( error && error != HB_Err_Not_Covered )
return error;
if ( j + 1 == bgc - i )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
j--;
}
error = _HB_OPEN_Coverage_Index( &bc[i], IN_GLYPH( j ), &index );
if ( error )
return error;
}
}
ic = ccpf3->InputCoverage;
for ( i = 0, j = buffer->in_pos; i < igc; i++, j++ )
{
/* We already called CHECK_Property for IN_GLYPH ( buffer->in_pos ) */
while ( j > buffer->in_pos && CHECK_Property( gdef, IN_ITEM( j ), flags, &property ) )
{
if ( error && error != HB_Err_Not_Covered )
return error;
if ( j + igc - i + lgc == (HB_Int)buffer->in_length )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
j++;
}
error = _HB_OPEN_Coverage_Index( &ic[i], IN_GLYPH( j ), &index );
if ( error )
return error;
}
/* we are starting to check for lookahead glyphs right after the
last context glyph */
lc = ccpf3->LookaheadCoverage;
for ( i = 0; i < lgc; i++, j++ )
{
while ( CHECK_Property( gdef, IN_ITEM( j ), flags, &property ) )
{
if ( error && error != HB_Err_Not_Covered )
return error;
if ( j + lgc - i == (HB_Int)buffer->in_length )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
j++;
}
error = _HB_OPEN_Coverage_Index( &lc[i], IN_GLYPH( j ), &index );
if ( error )
return error;
}
return Do_ContextPos( gpi, igc,
ccpf3->PosCount,
ccpf3->PosLookupRecord,
buffer,
nesting_level );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gboolean tcmulib_callback(GIOChannel *source,
GIOCondition condition,
gpointer data)
{
struct tcmulib_context *ctx = data;
tcmulib_master_fd_ready(ctx);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: fixed local DoS when UnregisterHandler was called for a not existing handler
Any user with DBUS access could cause a SEGFAULT in tcmu-runner by
running something like this:
dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.kernel.TCMUService1 /org/kernel/TCMUService1/HandlerManager1 org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.UnregisterHandler string:123
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 59,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256(void)
{
return ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & AESNI_CAPABLE) &&
aesni_cbc_sha256_enc(NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) ?
&aesni_256_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher : NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 12,856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptResource::ScriptResource(
const ResourceRequest& resource_request,
const ResourceLoaderOptions& options,
const TextResourceDecoderOptions& decoder_options)
: TextResource(resource_request, kScript, options, decoder_options) {}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 149,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: wifi_error wifi_initialize(wifi_handle *handle)
{
srand(getpid());
ALOGI("Initializing wifi");
hal_info *info = (hal_info *)malloc(sizeof(hal_info));
if (info == NULL) {
ALOGE("Could not allocate hal_info");
return WIFI_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
}
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
ALOGI("Creating socket");
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, info->cleanup_socks) == -1) {
ALOGE("Could not create cleanup sockets");
free(info);
return WIFI_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
}
struct nl_sock *cmd_sock = wifi_create_nl_socket(WIFI_HAL_CMD_SOCK_PORT);
if (cmd_sock == NULL) {
ALOGE("Could not create handle");
free(info);
return WIFI_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
}
struct nl_sock *event_sock = wifi_create_nl_socket(WIFI_HAL_EVENT_SOCK_PORT);
if (event_sock == NULL) {
ALOGE("Could not create handle");
nl_socket_free(cmd_sock);
free(info);
return WIFI_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
}
struct nl_cb *cb = nl_socket_get_cb(event_sock);
if (cb == NULL) {
ALOGE("Could not create handle");
nl_socket_free(cmd_sock);
nl_socket_free(event_sock);
free(info);
return WIFI_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
}
nl_cb_set(cb, NL_CB_SEQ_CHECK, NL_CB_CUSTOM, internal_no_seq_check, info);
nl_cb_set(cb, NL_CB_VALID, NL_CB_CUSTOM, internal_valid_message_handler, info);
nl_cb_put(cb);
info->cmd_sock = cmd_sock;
info->event_sock = event_sock;
info->clean_up = false;
info->in_event_loop = false;
info->event_cb = (cb_info *)malloc(sizeof(cb_info) * DEFAULT_EVENT_CB_SIZE);
info->alloc_event_cb = DEFAULT_EVENT_CB_SIZE;
info->num_event_cb = 0;
info->cmd = (cmd_info *)malloc(sizeof(cmd_info) * DEFAULT_CMD_SIZE);
info->alloc_cmd = DEFAULT_CMD_SIZE;
info->num_cmd = 0;
info->nl80211_family_id = genl_ctrl_resolve(cmd_sock, "nl80211");
if (info->nl80211_family_id < 0) {
ALOGE("Could not resolve nl80211 familty id");
nl_socket_free(cmd_sock);
nl_socket_free(event_sock);
free(info);
return WIFI_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
}
pthread_mutex_init(&info->cb_lock, NULL);
*handle = (wifi_handle) info;
wifi_add_membership(*handle, "scan");
wifi_add_membership(*handle, "mlme");
wifi_add_membership(*handle, "regulatory");
wifi_add_membership(*handle, "vendor");
wifi_init_interfaces(*handle);
ALOGI("Initialized Wifi HAL Successfully; vendor cmd = %d", NL80211_CMD_VENDOR);
return WIFI_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix use-after-free in wifi_cleanup()
Release reference to cmd only after possibly calling getType().
BUG: 25753768
Change-Id: Id2156ce51acec04e8364706cf7eafc7d4adae9eb
(cherry picked from commit d7f3cb9915d9ac514393d0ad7767662958054b8f https://googleplex-android-review.git.corp.google.com/#/c/815223)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,966 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char* InputDispatcher::Connection::getStatusLabel() const {
switch (status) {
case STATUS_NORMAL:
return "NORMAL";
case STATUS_BROKEN:
return "BROKEN";
case STATUS_ZOMBIE:
return "ZOMBIE";
default:
return "UNKNOWN";
}
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 163,772 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const sc_acl_entry_t * sc_file_get_acl_entry(const sc_file_t *file,
unsigned int operation)
{
sc_acl_entry_t *p;
static const sc_acl_entry_t e_never = {
SC_AC_NEVER, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE, {{0, 0, 0, {0}}}, NULL
};
static const sc_acl_entry_t e_none = {
SC_AC_NONE, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE, {{0, 0, 0, {0}}}, NULL
};
static const sc_acl_entry_t e_unknown = {
SC_AC_UNKNOWN, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE, {{0, 0, 0, {0}}}, NULL
};
if (file == NULL || operation >= SC_MAX_AC_OPS) {
return NULL;
}
p = file->acl[operation];
if (p == (sc_acl_entry_t *) 1)
return &e_never;
if (p == (sc_acl_entry_t *) 2)
return &e_none;
if (p == (sc_acl_entry_t *) 3)
return &e_unknown;
return file->acl[operation];
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 78,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HostCache::Entry* HostCache::LookupInternal(const Key& key) {
auto it = entries_.find(key);
return (it != entries_.end()) ? &it->second : nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Add PersistenceDelegate to HostCache
PersistenceDelegate is a new interface for persisting the contents of
the HostCache. This commit includes the interface itself, the logic in
HostCache for interacting with it, and a mock implementation of the
interface for testing. It does not include support for immediate data
removal since that won't be needed for the currently planned use case.
BUG=605149
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2943143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#481015}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,451 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BOOLEAN btif_hl_find_app_idx_using_app_id(UINT8 app_id,
UINT8 *p_app_idx){
BOOLEAN found=FALSE;
UINT8 i;
*p_app_idx = 0;
for (i=0; i < BTA_HL_NUM_APPS ; i ++)
{
if (btif_hl_cb.acb[i].in_use &&
(btif_hl_cb.acb[i].app_id == app_id))
{
found = TRUE;
*p_app_idx = i;
break;
}
}
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s found=%d app_id=%d app_idx=%d ",
__FUNCTION__, found, app_id , i);
return found;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: datum_to_json(Datum val, bool is_null, StringInfo result,
JsonTypeCategory tcategory, Oid outfuncoid,
bool key_scalar)
{
char *outputstr;
text *jsontext;
/* callers are expected to ensure that null keys are not passed in */
char *outputstr;
text *jsontext;
/* callers are expected to ensure that null keys are not passed in */
Assert(!(key_scalar && is_null));
if (key_scalar &&
(tcategory == JSONTYPE_ARRAY ||
tcategory == JSONTYPE_COMPOSITE ||
tcategory == JSONTYPE_JSON ||
tcategory == JSONTYPE_CAST))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("key value must be scalar, not array, composite, or json")));
switch (tcategory)
{
case JSONTYPE_ARRAY:
array_to_json_internal(val, result, false);
break;
case JSONTYPE_COMPOSITE:
composite_to_json(val, result, false);
break;
case JSONTYPE_BOOL:
outputstr = DatumGetBool(val) ? "true" : "false";
if (key_scalar)
escape_json(result, outputstr);
else
appendStringInfoString(result, outputstr);
break;
case JSONTYPE_NUMERIC:
outputstr = OidOutputFunctionCall(outfuncoid, val);
/*
* Don't call escape_json for a non-key if it's a valid JSON
* number.
*/
if (!key_scalar && IsValidJsonNumber(outputstr, strlen(outputstr)))
appendStringInfoString(result, outputstr);
else
escape_json(result, outputstr);
pfree(outputstr);
break;
case JSONTYPE_DATE:
{
DateADT date;
struct pg_tm tm;
char buf[MAXDATELEN + 1];
date = DatumGetDateADT(val);
if (DATE_NOT_FINITE(date))
{
/* we have to format infinity ourselves */
appendStringInfoString(result, DT_INFINITY);
}
else
{
j2date(date + POSTGRES_EPOCH_JDATE,
&(tm.tm_year), &(tm.tm_mon), &(tm.tm_mday));
EncodeDateOnly(&tm, USE_XSD_DATES, buf);
appendStringInfo(result, "\"%s\"", buf);
}
}
break;
case JSONTYPE_TIMESTAMP:
{
Timestamp timestamp;
struct pg_tm tm;
fsec_t fsec;
char buf[MAXDATELEN + 1];
timestamp = DatumGetTimestamp(val);
if (TIMESTAMP_NOT_FINITE(timestamp))
{
/* we have to format infinity ourselves */
appendStringInfoString(result, DT_INFINITY);
}
else if (timestamp2tm(timestamp, NULL, &tm, &fsec, NULL, NULL) == 0)
{
EncodeDateTime(&tm, fsec, false, 0, NULL, USE_XSD_DATES, buf);
appendStringInfo(result, "\"%s\"", buf);
}
else
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_DATETIME_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE),
errmsg("timestamp out of range")));
}
break;
case JSONTYPE_TIMESTAMPTZ:
{
TimestampTz timestamp;
struct pg_tm tm;
int tz;
fsec_t fsec;
const char *tzn = NULL;
char buf[MAXDATELEN + 1];
timestamp = DatumGetTimestamp(val);
if (TIMESTAMP_NOT_FINITE(timestamp))
{
/* we have to format infinity ourselves */
appendStringInfoString(result, DT_INFINITY);
}
else if (timestamp2tm(timestamp, &tz, &tm, &fsec, &tzn, NULL) == 0)
{
EncodeDateTime(&tm, fsec, true, tz, tzn, USE_XSD_DATES, buf);
appendStringInfo(result, "\"%s\"", buf);
}
else
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_DATETIME_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE),
errmsg("timestamp out of range")));
}
break;
case JSONTYPE_JSON:
/* JSON and JSONB output will already be escaped */
outputstr = OidOutputFunctionCall(outfuncoid, val);
appendStringInfoString(result, outputstr);
pfree(outputstr);
break;
case JSONTYPE_CAST:
/* outfuncoid refers to a cast function, not an output function */
jsontext = DatumGetTextP(OidFunctionCall1(outfuncoid, val));
outputstr = text_to_cstring(jsontext);
appendStringInfoString(result, outputstr);
pfree(outputstr);
pfree(jsontext);
break;
default:
outputstr = OidOutputFunctionCall(outfuncoid, val);
escape_json(result, outputstr);
pfree(outputstr);
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 164,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int arcmsr_abort(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
{
struct AdapterControlBlock *acb =
(struct AdapterControlBlock *)cmd->device->host->hostdata;
int i = 0;
int rtn = FAILED;
uint32_t intmask_org;
printk(KERN_NOTICE
"arcmsr%d: abort device command of scsi id = %d lun = %d\n",
acb->host->host_no, cmd->device->id, (u32)cmd->device->lun);
acb->acb_flags |= ACB_F_ABORT;
acb->num_aborts++;
/*
************************************************
** the all interrupt service routine is locked
** we need to handle it as soon as possible and exit
************************************************
*/
if (!atomic_read(&acb->ccboutstandingcount)) {
acb->acb_flags &= ~ACB_F_ABORT;
return rtn;
}
intmask_org = arcmsr_disable_outbound_ints(acb);
for (i = 0; i < ARCMSR_MAX_FREECCB_NUM; i++) {
struct CommandControlBlock *ccb = acb->pccb_pool[i];
if (ccb->startdone == ARCMSR_CCB_START && ccb->pcmd == cmd) {
ccb->startdone = ARCMSR_CCB_ABORTED;
rtn = arcmsr_abort_one_cmd(acb, ccb);
break;
}
}
acb->acb_flags &= ~ACB_F_ABORT;
arcmsr_enable_outbound_ints(acb, intmask_org);
return rtn;
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_delayed_ack(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_sack_info params;
struct sctp_association *asoc = NULL;
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
if (len >= sizeof(struct sctp_sack_info)) {
len = sizeof(struct sctp_sack_info);
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, optval, len))
return -EFAULT;
} else if (len == sizeof(struct sctp_assoc_value)) {
pr_warn_ratelimited(DEPRECATED
"%s (pid %d) "
"Use of struct sctp_assoc_value in delayed_ack socket option.\n"
"Use struct sctp_sack_info instead\n",
current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, optval, len))
return -EFAULT;
} else
return -EINVAL;
/* Get association, if sack_assoc_id != 0 and the socket is a one
* to many style socket, and an association was not found, then
* the id was invalid.
*/
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, params.sack_assoc_id);
if (!asoc && params.sack_assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP))
return -EINVAL;
if (asoc) {
/* Fetch association values. */
if (asoc->param_flags & SPP_SACKDELAY_ENABLE) {
params.sack_delay = jiffies_to_msecs(
asoc->sackdelay);
params.sack_freq = asoc->sackfreq;
} else {
params.sack_delay = 0;
params.sack_freq = 1;
}
} else {
/* Fetch socket values. */
if (sp->param_flags & SPP_SACKDELAY_ENABLE) {
params.sack_delay = sp->sackdelay;
params.sack_freq = sp->sackfreq;
} else {
params.sack_delay = 0;
params.sack_freq = 1;
}
}
if (copy_to_user(optval, ¶ms, len))
return -EFAULT;
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 43,538 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FakePluginServiceFilter::IsPluginEnabled(int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
const void* context,
const GURL& url,
const GURL& policy_url,
webkit::WebPluginInfo* plugin) {
std::map<FilePath, bool>::iterator it = plugin_state_.find(plugin->path);
if (it == plugin_state_.end()) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "No plug-in state for '" << plugin->path.value() << "'";
return false;
}
return it->second;
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 1 | 171,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: release_files(struct iso9660 *iso9660)
{
struct content *con, *connext;
struct file_info *file;
file = iso9660->use_files;
while (file != NULL) {
struct file_info *next = file->use_next;
archive_string_free(&file->name);
archive_string_free(&file->symlink);
free(file->utf16be_name);
con = file->contents.first;
while (con != NULL) {
connext = con->next;
free(con);
con = connext;
}
free(file);
file = next;
}
}
Commit Message: Issue 717: Fix integer overflow when computing location of volume descriptor
The multiplication here defaulted to 'int' but calculations
of file positions should always use int64_t. A simple cast
suffices to fix this since the base location is always 32 bits
for ISO, so multiplying by the sector size will never overflow
a 64-bit integer.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 51,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int shmem_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(dentry->d_inode);
int err;
/*
* If this is a request for a synthetic attribute in the system.*
* namespace use the generic infrastructure to resolve a handler
* for it via sb->s_xattr.
*/
if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN))
return generic_removexattr(dentry, name);
err = shmem_xattr_validate(name);
if (err)
return err;
return simple_xattr_remove(&info->xattrs, name);
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int zero_disk_area(struct pstore *ps, chunk_t area)
{
return chunk_io(ps, ps->zero_area, area_location(ps, area), WRITE, 0);
}
Commit Message: dm snapshot: fix data corruption
This patch fixes a particular type of data corruption that has been
encountered when loading a snapshot's metadata from disk.
When we allocate a new chunk in persistent_prepare, we increment
ps->next_free and we make sure that it doesn't point to a metadata area
by further incrementing it if necessary.
When we load metadata from disk on device activation, ps->next_free is
positioned after the last used data chunk. However, if this last used
data chunk is followed by a metadata area, ps->next_free is positioned
erroneously to the metadata area. A newly-allocated chunk is placed at
the same location as the metadata area, resulting in data or metadata
corruption.
This patch changes the code so that ps->next_free skips the metadata
area when metadata are loaded in function read_exceptions.
The patch also moves a piece of code from persistent_prepare_exception
to a separate function skip_metadata to avoid code duplication.
CVE-2013-4299
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 29,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int shash_finup_unaligned(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len, u8 *out)
{
return crypto_shash_update(desc, data, len) ?:
crypto_shash_final(desc, out);
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tcm_loop_release_adapter(struct device *dev)
{
struct tcm_loop_hba *tl_hba = to_tcm_loop_hba(dev);
kfree(tl_hba);
}
Commit Message: loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,153 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int HttpStreamParser::DoReadBodyComplete(int result) {
if (result == 0 && !IsResponseBodyComplete() && CanFindEndOfResponse()) {
if (chunked_decoder_.get())
result = ERR_INCOMPLETE_CHUNKED_ENCODING;
else
result = ERR_CONTENT_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
}
if (result > 0 && chunked_decoder_.get()) {
result = chunked_decoder_->FilterBuf(user_read_buf_->data(), result);
if (result == 0 && !chunked_decoder_->reached_eof()) {
io_state_ = STATE_READ_BODY;
return OK;
}
}
if (result > 0)
response_body_read_ += result;
if (result <= 0 || IsResponseBodyComplete()) {
io_state_ = STATE_DONE;
int additional_save_amount = read_buf_->offset() - read_buf_unused_offset_;
int save_amount = 0;
if (chunked_decoder_.get()) {
save_amount = chunked_decoder_->bytes_after_eof();
} else if (response_body_length_ >= 0) {
int64 extra_data_read = response_body_read_ - response_body_length_;
if (extra_data_read > 0) {
save_amount = static_cast<int>(extra_data_read);
if (result > 0)
result -= save_amount;
}
}
CHECK_LE(save_amount + additional_save_amount, kMaxBufSize);
if (read_buf_->capacity() < save_amount + additional_save_amount) {
read_buf_->SetCapacity(save_amount + additional_save_amount);
}
if (save_amount) {
memcpy(read_buf_->StartOfBuffer(), user_read_buf_->data() + result,
save_amount);
}
read_buf_->set_offset(save_amount);
if (additional_save_amount) {
memmove(read_buf_->data(),
read_buf_->StartOfBuffer() + read_buf_unused_offset_,
additional_save_amount);
read_buf_->set_offset(save_amount + additional_save_amount);
}
read_buf_unused_offset_ = 0;
} else {
io_state_ = STATE_BODY_PENDING;
user_read_buf_ = NULL;
user_read_buf_len_ = 0;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: net: don't process truncated headers on HTTPS connections.
This change causes us to not process any headers unless they are correctly
terminated with a \r\n\r\n sequence.
BUG=244260
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15688012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202927 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void shm_destroy(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct shmid_kernel *shp)
{
struct file *shm_file;
shm_file = shp->shm_file;
shp->shm_file = NULL;
ns->shm_tot -= (shp->shm_segsz + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
shm_rmid(ns, shp);
shm_unlock(shp);
if (!is_file_hugepages(shm_file))
shmem_lock(shm_file, 0, shp->mlock_user);
else if (shp->mlock_user)
user_shm_unlock(i_size_read(file_inode(shm_file)),
shp->mlock_user);
fput(shm_file);
ipc_rcu_putref(shp, shm_rcu_free);
}
Commit Message: Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid()
As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before
having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC
object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work,
that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen.
We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329:
"ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we
clearly forgot about msg and shm.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 42,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaStreamManager::MediaStreamManager(
media::AudioSystem* audio_system,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> audio_task_runner,
std::unique_ptr<VideoCaptureProvider> video_capture_provider)
: audio_system_(audio_system),
#if defined(OS_WIN)
video_capture_thread_("VideoCaptureThread"),
#endif
fake_ui_factory_() {
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kUseFakeUIForMediaStream)) {
fake_ui_factory_ = base::Bind([] {
return std::make_unique<FakeMediaStreamUIProxy>(
/*tests_use_fake_render_frame_hosts=*/false);
});
}
DCHECK(audio_system_);
if (!video_capture_provider) {
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> device_task_runner =
std::move(audio_task_runner);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
video_capture_thread_.init_com_with_mta(false);
CHECK(video_capture_thread_.Start());
device_task_runner = video_capture_thread_.task_runner();
#endif
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kMojoVideoCapture)) {
video_capture_provider = std::make_unique<VideoCaptureProviderSwitcher>(
std::make_unique<ServiceVideoCaptureProvider>(
base::BindRepeating(&SendVideoCaptureLogMessage)),
InProcessVideoCaptureProvider::CreateInstanceForNonDeviceCapture(
std::move(device_task_runner),
base::BindRepeating(&SendVideoCaptureLogMessage)));
} else {
video_capture::uma::LogVideoCaptureServiceEvent(
video_capture::uma::BROWSER_USING_LEGACY_CAPTURE);
video_capture_provider = InProcessVideoCaptureProvider::CreateInstance(
std::make_unique<media::VideoCaptureSystemImpl>(
media::VideoCaptureDeviceFactory::CreateFactory(
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::UI),
BrowserGpuMemoryBufferManager::current(),
base::BindRepeating(&CreateJpegDecodeAccelerator))),
std::move(device_task_runner),
base::BindRepeating(&SendVideoCaptureLogMessage));
}
}
InitializeMaybeAsync(std::move(video_capture_provider));
base::PowerMonitor* power_monitor = base::PowerMonitor::Get();
if (power_monitor)
power_monitor->AddObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const CuePoint* Cues::GetNext(const CuePoint* pCurr) const
{
if (pCurr == NULL)
return NULL;
assert(pCurr->GetTimeCode() >= 0);
assert(m_cue_points);
assert(m_count >= 1);
#if 0
const size_t count = m_count + m_preload_count;
size_t index = pCurr->m_index;
assert(index < count);
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
assert(pp);
assert(pp[index] == pCurr);
++index;
if (index >= count)
return NULL;
CuePoint* const pNext = pp[index];
assert(pNext);
pNext->Load(m_pSegment->m_pReader);
#else
long index = pCurr->m_index;
assert(index < m_count);
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
assert(pp);
assert(pp[index] == pCurr);
++index;
if (index >= m_count)
return NULL;
CuePoint* const pNext = pp[index];
assert(pNext);
assert(pNext->GetTimeCode() >= 0);
#endif
return pNext;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: irc_server_print_log ()
{
struct t_irc_server *ptr_server;
struct t_irc_channel *ptr_channel;
int i;
for (ptr_server = irc_servers; ptr_server;
ptr_server = ptr_server->next_server)
{
weechat_log_printf ("");
weechat_log_printf ("[server %s (addr:0x%lx)]", ptr_server->name, ptr_server);
/* addresses */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_ADDRESSES]))
weechat_log_printf (" addresses. . . . . . : null ('%s')",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_ADDRESSES));
else
weechat_log_printf (" addresses. . . . . . : '%s'",
weechat_config_string (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_ADDRESSES]));
/* proxy */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_PROXY]))
weechat_log_printf (" proxy. . . . . . . . : null ('%s')",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_PROXY));
else
weechat_log_printf (" proxy. . . . . . . . : '%s'",
weechat_config_string (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_PROXY]));
/* ipv6 */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_IPV6]))
weechat_log_printf (" ipv6 . . . . . . . . : null (%s)",
(IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_IPV6)) ?
"on" : "off");
else
weechat_log_printf (" ipv6 . . . . . . . . : %s",
weechat_config_boolean (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_IPV6]) ?
"on" : "off");
/* ssl */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL]))
weechat_log_printf (" ssl. . . . . . . . . : null (%s)",
(IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL)) ?
"on" : "off");
else
weechat_log_printf (" ssl. . . . . . . . . : %s",
weechat_config_boolean (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL]) ?
"on" : "off");
/* ssl_cert */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL_CERT]))
weechat_log_printf (" ssl_cert . . . . . . : null ('%s')",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL_CERT));
else
weechat_log_printf (" ssl_cert . . . . . . : '%s'",
weechat_config_string (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL_CERT]));
/* ssl_dhkey_size */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL_DHKEY_SIZE]))
weechat_log_printf (" ssl_dhkey_size . . . : null ('%d')",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL_DHKEY_SIZE));
else
weechat_log_printf (" ssl_dhkey_size . . . : '%d'",
weechat_config_integer (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL_DHKEY_SIZE]));
/* ssl_verify */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL_VERIFY]))
weechat_log_printf (" ssl_verify . . . . . : null (%s)",
(IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL_VERIFY)) ?
"on" : "off");
else
weechat_log_printf (" ssl_verify . . . . . : %s",
weechat_config_boolean (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL_VERIFY]) ?
"on" : "off");
/* password */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_PASSWORD]))
weechat_log_printf (" password . . . . . . : null");
else
weechat_log_printf (" password . . . . . . : (hidden)");
/* sasl_mechanism */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SASL_MECHANISM]))
weechat_log_printf (" sasl_mechanism . . . : null ('%s')",
irc_sasl_mechanism_string[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SASL_MECHANISM)]);
else
weechat_log_printf (" sasl_mechanism . . . : '%s'",
irc_sasl_mechanism_string[weechat_config_integer (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SASL_MECHANISM])]);
/* sasl_username */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SASL_USERNAME]))
weechat_log_printf (" sasl_username. . . . : null ('%s')",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SASL_USERNAME));
else
weechat_log_printf (" sasl_username. . . . : '%s'",
weechat_config_string (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_USERNAME]));
/* sasl_password */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SASL_PASSWORD]))
weechat_log_printf (" sasl_password. . . . : null");
else
weechat_log_printf (" sasl_password. . . . : (hidden)");
/* autoconnect */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTOCONNECT]))
weechat_log_printf (" autoconnect. . . . . : null (%s)",
(IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTOCONNECT)) ?
"on" : "off");
else
weechat_log_printf (" autoconnect. . . . . : %s",
weechat_config_boolean (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTOCONNECT]) ?
"on" : "off");
/* autoreconnect */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTORECONNECT]))
weechat_log_printf (" autoreconnect. . . . : null (%s)",
(IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTORECONNECT)) ?
"on" : "off");
else
weechat_log_printf (" autoreconnect. . . . : %s",
weechat_config_boolean (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTORECONNECT]) ?
"on" : "off");
/* autoreconnect_delay */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTORECONNECT_DELAY]))
weechat_log_printf (" autoreconnect_delay. : null (%d)",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTORECONNECT_DELAY));
else
weechat_log_printf (" autoreconnect_delay. : %d",
weechat_config_integer (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTORECONNECT_DELAY]));
/* nicks */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_NICKS]))
weechat_log_printf (" nicks. . . . . . . . : null ('%s')",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_NICKS));
else
weechat_log_printf (" nicks. . . . . . . . : '%s'",
weechat_config_string (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_NICKS]));
/* username */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_USERNAME]))
weechat_log_printf (" username . . . . . . : null ('%s')",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_USERNAME));
else
weechat_log_printf (" username . . . . . . : '%s'",
weechat_config_string (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_USERNAME]));
/* realname */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_REALNAME]))
weechat_log_printf (" realname . . . . . . : null ('%s')",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_REALNAME));
else
weechat_log_printf (" realname . . . . . . : '%s'",
weechat_config_string (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_REALNAME]));
/* local_hostname */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_LOCAL_HOSTNAME]))
weechat_log_printf (" local_hostname . . . : null ('%s')",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_LOCAL_HOSTNAME));
else
weechat_log_printf (" local_hostname . . . : '%s'",
weechat_config_string (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_LOCAL_HOSTNAME]));
/* command */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_COMMAND]))
weechat_log_printf (" command. . . . . . . : null");
else
weechat_log_printf (" command. . . . . . . : (hidden)");
/* command_delay */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_COMMAND_DELAY]))
weechat_log_printf (" command_delay. . . . : null (%d)",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_COMMAND_DELAY));
else
weechat_log_printf (" command_delay. . . . : %d",
weechat_config_integer (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_COMMAND_DELAY]));
/* autojoin */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTOJOIN]))
weechat_log_printf (" autojoin . . . . . . : null ('%s')",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTOJOIN));
else
weechat_log_printf (" autojoin . . . . . . : '%s'",
weechat_config_string (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTOJOIN]));
/* autorejoin */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTOREJOIN]))
weechat_log_printf (" autorejoin . . . . . : null (%s)",
(IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTOREJOIN)) ?
"on" : "off");
else
weechat_log_printf (" autorejoin . . . . . : %s",
weechat_config_boolean (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTOREJOIN]) ?
"on" : "off");
/* autorejoin_delay */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTOREJOIN_DELAY]))
weechat_log_printf (" autorejoin_delay . . : null (%d)",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTOREJOIN_DELAY));
else
weechat_log_printf (" autorejoin_delay . . : %d",
weechat_config_integer (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTOREJOIN_DELAY]));
/* connection_timeout */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT]))
weechat_log_printf (" connection_timeout . : null (%d)",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT));
else
weechat_log_printf (" connection_timeout . : %d",
weechat_config_integer (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT]));
/* anti_flood_prio_high */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_ANTI_FLOOD_PRIO_HIGH]))
weechat_log_printf (" anti_flood_prio_high : null (%d)",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_ANTI_FLOOD_PRIO_HIGH));
else
weechat_log_printf (" anti_flood_prio_high : %d",
weechat_config_integer (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_ANTI_FLOOD_PRIO_HIGH]));
/* anti_flood_prio_low */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_ANTI_FLOOD_PRIO_LOW]))
weechat_log_printf (" anti_flood_prio_low. : null (%d)",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_ANTI_FLOOD_PRIO_LOW));
else
weechat_log_printf (" anti_flood_prio_low. : %d",
weechat_config_integer (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_ANTI_FLOOD_PRIO_LOW]));
/* away_check */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AWAY_CHECK]))
weechat_log_printf (" away_check . . . . . : null (%d)",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AWAY_CHECK));
else
weechat_log_printf (" away_check . . . . . : %d",
weechat_config_integer (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AWAY_CHECK]));
/* away_check_max_nicks */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AWAY_CHECK_MAX_NICKS]))
weechat_log_printf (" away_check_max_nicks : null (%d)",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AWAY_CHECK_MAX_NICKS));
else
weechat_log_printf (" away_check_max_nicks : %d",
weechat_config_integer (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AWAY_CHECK_MAX_NICKS]));
/* default_msg_part */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_DEFAULT_MSG_PART]))
weechat_log_printf (" default_msg_part . . : null ('%s')",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_DEFAULT_MSG_PART));
else
weechat_log_printf (" default_msg_part . . : '%s'",
weechat_config_string (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_DEFAULT_MSG_PART]));
/* default_msg_quit */
if (weechat_config_option_is_null (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_DEFAULT_MSG_QUIT]))
weechat_log_printf (" default_msg_quit . . : null ('%s')",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_DEFAULT_MSG_QUIT));
else
weechat_log_printf (" default_msg_quit . . : '%s'",
weechat_config_string (ptr_server->options[IRC_SERVER_OPTION_DEFAULT_MSG_QUIT]));
/* other server variables */
weechat_log_printf (" temp_server. . . . . : %d", ptr_server->temp_server);
weechat_log_printf (" reloading_from_config: %d", ptr_server->reloaded_from_config);
weechat_log_printf (" reloaded_from_config : %d", ptr_server->reloaded_from_config);
weechat_log_printf (" addresses_count. . . : %d", ptr_server->addresses_count);
weechat_log_printf (" addresses_array. . . : 0x%lx", ptr_server->addresses_array);
weechat_log_printf (" ports_array. . . . . : 0x%lx", ptr_server->ports_array);
weechat_log_printf (" index_current_address: %d", ptr_server->index_current_address);
weechat_log_printf (" current_address. . . : '%s'", ptr_server->current_address);
weechat_log_printf (" current_ip . . . . . : '%s'", ptr_server->current_ip);
weechat_log_printf (" current_port . . . . : %d", ptr_server->current_port);
weechat_log_printf (" sock . . . . . . . . : %d", ptr_server->sock);
weechat_log_printf (" hook_connect . . . . : 0x%lx", ptr_server->hook_connect);
weechat_log_printf (" hook_fd. . . . . . . : 0x%lx", ptr_server->hook_fd);
weechat_log_printf (" hook_timer_connection: 0x%lx", ptr_server->hook_timer_connection);
weechat_log_printf (" hook_timer_sasl. . . : 0x%lx", ptr_server->hook_timer_sasl);
weechat_log_printf (" is_connected . . . . : %d", ptr_server->is_connected);
weechat_log_printf (" ssl_connected. . . . : %d", ptr_server->ssl_connected);
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS
weechat_log_printf (" gnutls_sess. . . . . : 0x%lx", ptr_server->gnutls_sess);
#endif
weechat_log_printf (" unterminated_message : '%s'", ptr_server->unterminated_message);
weechat_log_printf (" nicks_count. . . . . : %d", ptr_server->nicks_count);
weechat_log_printf (" nicks_array. . . . . : 0x%lx", ptr_server->nicks_array);
weechat_log_printf (" nick_first_tried . . : %d", ptr_server->nick_first_tried);
weechat_log_printf (" nick . . . . . . . . : '%s'", ptr_server->nick);
weechat_log_printf (" nick_modes . . . . . : '%s'", ptr_server->nick_modes);
weechat_log_printf (" isupport . . . . . . : '%s'", ptr_server->isupport);
weechat_log_printf (" prefix_modes . . . . : '%s'", ptr_server->prefix_modes);
weechat_log_printf (" prefix_chars . . . . : '%s'", ptr_server->prefix_chars);
weechat_log_printf (" reconnect_delay. . . : %d", ptr_server->reconnect_delay);
weechat_log_printf (" reconnect_start. . . : %ld", ptr_server->reconnect_start);
weechat_log_printf (" command_time . . . . : %ld", ptr_server->command_time);
weechat_log_printf (" reconnect_join . . . : %d", ptr_server->reconnect_join);
weechat_log_printf (" disable_autojoin . . : %d", ptr_server->disable_autojoin);
weechat_log_printf (" is_away. . . . . . . : %d", ptr_server->is_away);
weechat_log_printf (" away_message . . . . : '%s'", ptr_server->away_message);
weechat_log_printf (" away_time. . . . . . : %ld", ptr_server->away_time);
weechat_log_printf (" lag. . . . . . . . . : %d", ptr_server->lag);
weechat_log_printf (" lag_check_time . . . : tv_sec:%d, tv_usec:%d",
ptr_server->lag_check_time.tv_sec,
ptr_server->lag_check_time.tv_usec);
weechat_log_printf (" lag_next_check . . . : %ld", ptr_server->lag_next_check);
weechat_log_printf (" lag_last_refresh . . : %ld", ptr_server->lag_last_refresh);
weechat_log_printf (" cmd_list_regexp. . . : 0x%lx", ptr_server->cmd_list_regexp);
weechat_log_printf (" last_user_message. . : %ld", ptr_server->last_user_message);
weechat_log_printf (" last_away_check. . . : %ld", ptr_server->last_away_check);
for (i = 0; i < IRC_SERVER_NUM_OUTQUEUES_PRIO; i++)
{
weechat_log_printf (" outqueue[%02d] . . . . : 0x%lx", i, ptr_server->outqueue[i]);
weechat_log_printf (" last_outqueue[%02d]. . : 0x%lx", i, ptr_server->last_outqueue[i]);
}
weechat_log_printf (" redirects. . . . . . : 0x%lx", ptr_server->redirects);
weechat_log_printf (" last_redirect. . . . : 0x%lx", ptr_server->last_redirect);
weechat_log_printf (" notify_list. . . . . : 0x%lx", ptr_server->notify_list);
weechat_log_printf (" last_notify. . . . . : 0x%lx", ptr_server->last_notify);
weechat_log_printf (" buffer . . . . . . . : 0x%lx", ptr_server->buffer);
weechat_log_printf (" buffer_as_string . . : 0x%lx", ptr_server->buffer_as_string);
weechat_log_printf (" channels . . . . . . : 0x%lx", ptr_server->channels);
weechat_log_printf (" last_channel . . . . : 0x%lx", ptr_server->last_channel);
weechat_log_printf (" prev_server. . . . . : 0x%lx", ptr_server->prev_server);
weechat_log_printf (" next_server. . . . . : 0x%lx", ptr_server->next_server);
irc_redirect_print_log (ptr_server);
irc_notify_print_log (ptr_server);
for (ptr_channel = ptr_server->channels; ptr_channel;
ptr_channel = ptr_channel->next_channel)
{
irc_channel_print_log (ptr_channel);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,503 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ext4_free_io_end(ext4_io_end_t *io)
{
BUG_ON(!io);
iput(io->inode);
kfree(io);
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 1 | 167,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GahpClient::ec2_vm_status( const char *service_url, const char * publickeyfile, const char * privatekeyfile,
const char * instance_id, StringList &returnStatus, char* & error_code )
{
static const char* command = "EC2_VM_STATUS";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if ( (service_url == NULL) || (publickeyfile == NULL) || (privatekeyfile == NULL) || (instance_id == NULL) ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
std::string reqline;
char* esc1 = strdup( escapeGahpString(service_url) );
char* esc2 = strdup( escapeGahpString(publickeyfile) );
char* esc3 = strdup( escapeGahpString(privatekeyfile) );
char* esc4 = strdup( escapeGahpString(instance_id) );
int x = sprintf(reqline, "%s %s %s %s", esc1, esc2, esc3, esc4 );
free( esc1 );
free( esc2 );
free( esc3 );
free( esc4 );
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command, buf, deleg_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command, buf);
if ( result ) {
int rc = 0;
if (result->argc == 2) {
rc = atoi(result->argv[1]);
if (rc == 1) {
error_string = "";
}
}
else if (result->argc == 4) {
rc = atoi( result->argv[1] );
error_code = strdup(result->argv[2]);
error_string = result->argv[3];
}
else if (result->argc == 5)
{
rc = atoi(result->argv[1]);
if (rc == 1) {
EXCEPT( "Bad %s result", command );
}
else {
if ( strcmp(result->argv[3], "running") == 0) {
rc = 1;
}
else
{
for (int i=2; i<result->argc; i++) {
returnStatus.append( strdup(result->argv[i]) );
}
}
returnStatus.rewind();
}
}
else if (result->argc < 9) {
EXCEPT( "Bad %s result", command );
} else {
rc = atoi(result->argv[1]);
if (rc == 1) {
EXCEPT( "Bad %s result", command );
}
else {
if ( (strcmp(result->argv[3], "pending")!=0) &&
(strcmp(result->argv[3], "running")!=0) ) {
rc = 1;
}
else
{
for (int i=2; i<result->argc; i++) {
returnStatus.append( strdup(result->argv[i]) );
}
}
returnStatus.rewind();
}
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command, buf) )
{
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,177 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AudioHandler::AddOutput(unsigned number_of_channels) {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
outputs_.push_back(AudioNodeOutput::Create(this, number_of_channels));
GetNode()->DidAddOutput(NumberOfOutputs());
}
Commit Message: Revert "Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted."
This reverts commit 071df33edf2c8b4375fa432a83953359f93ea9e4.
Reason for revert:
This CL seems to cause an AudioNode leak on the Linux leak bot.
The log is:
https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.webkit/WebKit%20Linux%20Trusty%20Leak/14252
* webaudio/AudioNode/audionode-connect-method-chaining.html
* webaudio/Panner/pannernode-basic.html
* webaudio/dom-exceptions.html
Original change's description:
> Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted.
>
> When an AudioNode is disposed, the handler is also disposed. But add
> the handler to the orphan list so that the handler stays alive until
> the context can safely delete it. If we don't do this, the handler
> may get deleted while the audio thread is processing the handler (due
> to, say, channel count changes and such).
>
> For an realtime context, always save the handler just in case the
> audio thread is running after the context is marked as closed (because
> the audio thread doesn't instantly stop when requested).
>
> For an offline context, only need to do this when the context is
> running because the context is guaranteed to be stopped if we're not
> in the running state. Hence, there's no possibility of deleting the
> handler while the graph is running.
>
> This is a revert of
> https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/860779, with
> a fix for the leak.
>
> Bug: 780919
> Change-Id: Ifb6b5fcf3fbc373f5779256688731245771da33c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/862723
> Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528829}
TBR=rtoy@chromium.org,hongchan@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ibf406bf6ed34ea1f03e86a64a1e5ba6de0970c6f
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 780919
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863402
Reviewed-by: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528888}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 148,788 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int query_formats(AVFilterContext *ctx)
{
LutContext *s = ctx->priv;
const enum AVPixelFormat *pix_fmts = s->is_rgb ? rgb_pix_fmts :
s->is_yuv ? yuv_pix_fmts : all_pix_fmts;
ff_set_common_formats(ctx, ff_make_format_list(pix_fmts));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ResourceRequestInfoImpl* ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::CreateRequestInfo(
ResourceHandler* handler,
int child_id,
int route_id,
bool download,
ResourceContext* context) {
return new ResourceRequestInfoImpl(
handler,
PROCESS_TYPE_RENDERER,
child_id,
route_id,
0,
request_id_,
false, // is_main_frame
-1, // frame_id
false, // parent_is_main_frame
-1, // parent_frame_id
ResourceType::SUB_RESOURCE,
PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK,
0, // upload_size
download, // is_download
download, // allow_download
false, // has_user_gesture
WebKit::WebReferrerPolicyDefault,
context);
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,875 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void push(v8::Local<v8::Value> value) { m_stack.append(value); }
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,499 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tsk_set_unreliable(struct tipc_sock *tsk, bool unreliable)
{
msg_set_src_droppable(&tsk->phdr, unreliable ? 1 : 0);
}
Commit Message: tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.cm>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 52,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::ResumeInterruptedDownload(
std::unique_ptr<download::DownloadUrlParameters> params,
const GURL& site_url) {
BeginDownloadInternal(std::move(params), nullptr /* blob_data_handle */,
nullptr /* blob_url_loader_factory */, false, site_url);
}
Commit Message: Early return if a download Id is already used when creating a download
This is protect against download Id overflow and use-after-free
issue.
BUG=958533
Change-Id: I2c183493cb09106686df9822b3987bfb95bcf720
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1591485
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#656910}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 151,233 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int http_remove_header2(struct http_msg *msg, struct hdr_idx *idx, struct hdr_ctx *ctx)
{
int cur_idx = ctx->idx;
char *sol = ctx->line;
struct hdr_idx_elem *hdr;
int delta, skip_comma;
if (!cur_idx)
return 0;
hdr = &idx->v[cur_idx];
if (sol[ctx->del] == ':' && ctx->val + ctx->vlen + ctx->tws == hdr->len) {
/* This was the only value of the header, we must now remove it entirely. */
delta = buffer_replace2(msg->chn->buf, sol, sol + hdr->len + hdr->cr + 1, NULL, 0);
http_msg_move_end(msg, delta);
idx->used--;
hdr->len = 0; /* unused entry */
idx->v[ctx->prev].next = idx->v[ctx->idx].next;
if (idx->tail == ctx->idx)
idx->tail = ctx->prev;
ctx->idx = ctx->prev; /* walk back to the end of previous header */
ctx->line -= idx->v[ctx->idx].len + idx->v[ctx->idx].cr + 1;
ctx->val = idx->v[ctx->idx].len; /* point to end of previous header */
ctx->tws = ctx->vlen = 0;
return ctx->idx;
}
/* This was not the only value of this header. We have to remove between
* ctx->del+1 and ctx->val+ctx->vlen+ctx->tws+1 included. If it is the
* last entry of the list, we remove the last separator.
*/
skip_comma = (ctx->val + ctx->vlen + ctx->tws == hdr->len) ? 0 : 1;
delta = buffer_replace2(msg->chn->buf, sol + ctx->del + skip_comma,
sol + ctx->val + ctx->vlen + ctx->tws + skip_comma,
NULL, 0);
hdr->len += delta;
http_msg_move_end(msg, delta);
ctx->val = ctx->del;
ctx->tws = ctx->vlen = 0;
return ctx->idx;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void staticStringAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
TestObjectPython::setStaticStringAttribute(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::CreateImportsController() {
DCHECK(!imports_controller_);
imports_controller_ = HTMLImportsController::Create(*this);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int perf_event_period(struct perf_event *event, u64 __user *arg)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
int ret = 0, active;
u64 value;
if (!is_sampling_event(event))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&value, arg, sizeof(value)))
return -EFAULT;
if (!value)
return -EINVAL;
raw_spin_lock_irq(&ctx->lock);
if (event->attr.freq) {
if (value > sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto unlock;
}
event->attr.sample_freq = value;
} else {
event->attr.sample_period = value;
event->hw.sample_period = value;
}
active = (event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE);
if (active) {
perf_pmu_disable(ctx->pmu);
event->pmu->stop(event, PERF_EF_UPDATE);
}
local64_set(&event->hw.period_left, 0);
if (active) {
event->pmu->start(event, PERF_EF_RELOAD);
perf_pmu_enable(ctx->pmu);
}
unlock:
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 50,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline unsigned int rt_hash(__be32 daddr, __be32 saddr, int idx,
int genid)
{
return jhash_3words((__force u32)daddr, (__force u32)saddr,
idx, genid)
& rt_hash_mask;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sysvipc_proc_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
struct ipc_proc_iter *iter = seq->private;
put_ipc_ns(iter->ns);
return seq_release_private(inode, file);
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *print_object(cJSON *item,int depth,int fmt,printbuffer *p)
{
char **entries=0,**names=0;
char *out=0,*ptr,*ret,*str;int len=7,i=0,j;
cJSON *child=item->child;
int numentries=0,fail=0;
size_t tmplen=0;
/* Count the number of entries. */
while (child) numentries++,child=child->next;
/* Explicitly handle empty object case */
if (!numentries)
{
if (p) out=ensure(p,fmt?depth+4:3);
else out=(char*)cJSON_malloc(fmt?depth+4:3);
if (!out) return 0;
ptr=out;*ptr++='{';
if (fmt) {*ptr++='\n';for (i=0;i<depth;i++) *ptr++='\t';}
*ptr++='}';*ptr++=0;
return out;
}
if (p)
{
/* Compose the output: */
i=p->offset;
len=fmt?2:1; ptr=ensure(p,len+1); if (!ptr) return 0;
*ptr++='{'; if (fmt) *ptr++='\n'; *ptr=0; p->offset+=len;
child=item->child;depth++;
while (child)
{
if (fmt)
{
ptr=ensure(p,depth); if (!ptr) return 0;
for (j=0;j<depth;j++) *ptr++='\t';
p->offset+=depth;
}
print_string_ptr(child->string,p);
p->offset=update(p);
len=fmt?2:1;
ptr=ensure(p,len); if (!ptr) return 0;
*ptr++=':';if (fmt) *ptr++='\t';
p->offset+=len;
print_value(child,depth,fmt,p);
p->offset=update(p);
len=(fmt?1:0)+(child->next?1:0);
ptr=ensure(p,len+1); if (!ptr) return 0;
if (child->next) *ptr++=',';
if (fmt) *ptr++='\n';*ptr=0;
p->offset+=len;
child=child->next;
}
ptr=ensure(p,fmt?(depth+1):2); if (!ptr) return 0;
if (fmt) for (i=0;i<depth-1;i++) *ptr++='\t';
*ptr++='}';*ptr=0;
out=(p->buffer)+i;
}
else
{
/* Allocate space for the names and the objects */
entries=(char**)cJSON_malloc(numentries*sizeof(char*));
if (!entries) return 0;
names=(char**)cJSON_malloc(numentries*sizeof(char*));
if (!names) {cJSON_free(entries);return 0;}
memset(entries,0,sizeof(char*)*numentries);
memset(names,0,sizeof(char*)*numentries);
/* Collect all the results into our arrays: */
child=item->child;depth++;if (fmt) len+=depth;
while (child && !fail)
{
names[i]=str=print_string_ptr(child->string,0);
entries[i++]=ret=print_value(child,depth,fmt,0);
if (str && ret) len+=strlen(ret)+strlen(str)+2+(fmt?2+depth:0); else fail=1;
child=child->next;
}
/* Try to allocate the output string */
if (!fail) out=(char*)cJSON_malloc(len);
if (!out) fail=1;
/* Handle failure */
if (fail)
{
for (i=0;i<numentries;i++) {if (names[i]) cJSON_free(names[i]);if (entries[i]) cJSON_free(entries[i]);}
cJSON_free(names);cJSON_free(entries);
return 0;
}
/* Compose the output: */
*out='{';ptr=out+1;if (fmt)*ptr++='\n';*ptr=0;
for (i=0;i<numentries;i++)
{
if (fmt) for (j=0;j<depth;j++) *ptr++='\t';
tmplen=strlen(names[i]);memcpy(ptr,names[i],tmplen);ptr+=tmplen;
*ptr++=':';if (fmt) *ptr++='\t';
strcpy(ptr,entries[i]);ptr+=strlen(entries[i]);
if (i!=numentries-1) *ptr++=',';
if (fmt) *ptr++='\n';*ptr=0;
cJSON_free(names[i]);cJSON_free(entries[i]);
}
cJSON_free(names);cJSON_free(entries);
if (fmt) for (i=0;i<depth-1;i++) *ptr++='\t';
*ptr++='}';*ptr++=0;
}
return out;
}
Commit Message: fix buffer overflow (#30)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 93,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __register_pernet_operations(struct list_head *list,
struct pernet_operations *ops)
{
if (!init_net_initialized) {
list_add_tail(&ops->list, list);
return 0;
}
return ops_init(ops, &init_net);
}
Commit Message: net: Fix double free and memory corruption in get_net_ns_by_id()
(I can trivially verify that that idr_remove in cleanup_net happens
after the network namespace count has dropped to zero --EWB)
Function get_net_ns_by_id() does not check for net::count
after it has found a peer in netns_ids idr.
It may dereference a peer, after its count has already been
finaly decremented. This leads to double free and memory
corruption:
put_net(peer) rtnl_lock()
atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0] ...
__put_net(peer) get_net_ns_by_id(net, id)
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
queue_work() peer = idr_find(&net->netns_ids, id)
| get_net(peer) [count=1]
| ...
| (use after final put)
v ...
cleanup_net() ...
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..) ...
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
... ...
... put_net(peer)
... atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0]
... spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
... spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... queue_work()
... rtnl_unlock()
rtnl_lock() ...
for_each_net(tmp) { ...
id = __peernet2id(tmp, peer) ...
spin_lock_irq(&tmp->nsid_lock) ...
idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id) ...
... ...
net_drop_ns() ...
net_free(peer) ...
} ...
|
v
cleanup_net()
...
(Second free of peer)
Also, put_net() on the right cpu may reorder with left's cpu
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..), and then cleanup_list
will be corrupted.
Since cleanup_net() is executed in worker thread, while
put_net(peer) can happen everywhere, there should be
enough time for concurrent get_net_ns_by_id() to pick
the peer up, and the race does not seem to be unlikely.
The patch fixes the problem in standard way.
(Also, there is possible problem in peernet2id_alloc(), which requires
check for net::count under nsid_lock and maybe_get_net(peer), but
in current stable kernel it's used under rtnl_lock() and it has to be
safe. Openswitch begun to use peernet2id_alloc(), and possibly it should
be fixed too. While this is not in stable kernel yet, so I'll send
a separate message to netdev@ later).
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Fixes: 0c7aecd4bde4 "netns: add rtnl cmd to add and get peer netns ids"
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 86,267 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int inet_release(struct socket *sock)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
if (sk) {
long timeout;
/* Applications forget to leave groups before exiting */
ip_mc_drop_socket(sk);
/* If linger is set, we don't return until the close
* is complete. Otherwise we return immediately. The
* actually closing is done the same either way.
*
* If the close is due to the process exiting, we never
* linger..
*/
timeout = 0;
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_LINGER) &&
!(current->flags & PF_EXITING))
timeout = sk->sk_lingertime;
sock->sk = NULL;
sk->sk_prot->close(sk, timeout);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 41,538 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: to_ioeventfd(struct kvm_io_device *dev)
{
return container_of(dev, struct _ioeventfd, dev);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Don't accept obviously wrong gsi values via KVM_IRQFD
We cannot add routes for gsi values >= KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES -- see
kvm_set_irq_routing(). Hence, there is no sense in accepting them
via KVM_IRQFD. Prevent them from entering the system in the first
place.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 58,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_encode_ofp12_packet_in(const struct ofputil_packet_in *pin,
enum ofp_version version)
{
enum ofpraw raw = (version >= OFP13_VERSION
? OFPRAW_OFPT13_PACKET_IN
: OFPRAW_OFPT12_PACKET_IN);
struct ofpbuf *msg;
/* The final argument is just an estimate of the space required. */
msg = ofpraw_alloc_xid(raw, version,
htonl(0), NXM_TYPICAL_LEN + 2 + pin->packet_len);
struct ofp12_packet_in *opi = ofpbuf_put_zeros(msg, sizeof *opi);
opi->buffer_id = htonl(UINT32_MAX);
opi->total_len = htons(pin->packet_len);
opi->reason = encode_packet_in_reason(pin->reason, version);
opi->table_id = pin->table_id;
if (version >= OFP13_VERSION) {
ovs_be64 cookie = pin->cookie;
ofpbuf_put(msg, &cookie, sizeof cookie);
}
oxm_put_match(msg, &pin->flow_metadata, version);
ofpbuf_put_zeros(msg, 2);
return msg;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void perf_callchain_kernel(struct perf_callchain_entry *entry,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long sp = regs->regs[29];
#ifdef CONFIG_KALLSYMS
unsigned long ra = regs->regs[31];
unsigned long pc = regs->cp0_epc;
if (raw_show_trace || !__kernel_text_address(pc)) {
unsigned long stack_page =
(unsigned long)task_stack_page(current);
if (stack_page && sp >= stack_page &&
sp <= stack_page + THREAD_SIZE - 32)
save_raw_perf_callchain(entry, sp);
return;
}
do {
perf_callchain_store(entry, pc);
if (entry->nr >= PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH)
break;
pc = unwind_stack(current, &sp, pc, &ra);
} while (pc);
#else
save_raw_perf_callchain(entry, sp);
#endif
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,381 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ComputeBuiltInPlugins(std::vector<content::PepperPluginInfo>* plugins) {
static bool skip_pdf_file_check = false;
FilePath path;
if (PathService::Get(chrome::FILE_PDF_PLUGIN, &path)) {
if (skip_pdf_file_check || file_util::PathExists(path)) {
content::PepperPluginInfo pdf;
pdf.path = path;
pdf.name = kPDFPluginName;
webkit::WebPluginMimeType pdf_mime_type(kPDFPluginMimeType,
kPDFPluginExtension,
kPDFPluginDescription);
webkit::WebPluginMimeType print_preview_pdf_mime_type(
kPDFPluginPrintPreviewMimeType,
kPDFPluginExtension,
kPDFPluginDescription);
pdf.mime_types.push_back(pdf_mime_type);
pdf.mime_types.push_back(print_preview_pdf_mime_type);
plugins->push_back(pdf);
skip_pdf_file_check = true;
}
}
static bool skip_nacl_file_check = false;
if (PathService::Get(chrome::FILE_NACL_PLUGIN, &path)) {
if (skip_nacl_file_check || file_util::PathExists(path)) {
content::PepperPluginInfo nacl;
nacl.path = path;
nacl.name = kNaClPluginName;
webkit::WebPluginMimeType nacl_mime_type(kNaClPluginMimeType,
kNaClPluginExtension,
kNaClPluginDescription);
nacl.mime_types.push_back(nacl_mime_type);
plugins->push_back(nacl);
skip_nacl_file_check = true;
}
}
static bool skip_o3d_file_check = false;
if (PathService::Get(chrome::FILE_O3D_PLUGIN, &path)) {
if (skip_o3d_file_check || file_util::PathExists(path)) {
content::PepperPluginInfo o3d;
o3d.path = path;
o3d.name = kO3DPluginName;
o3d.is_out_of_process = true;
o3d.is_sandboxed = false;
webkit::WebPluginMimeType o3d_mime_type(kO3DPluginMimeType,
kO3DPluginExtension,
kO3DPluginDescription);
o3d.mime_types.push_back(o3d_mime_type);
plugins->push_back(o3d);
skip_o3d_file_check = true;
}
}
static bool skip_gtalk_file_check = false;
if (PathService::Get(chrome::FILE_GTALK_PLUGIN, &path)) {
if (skip_gtalk_file_check || file_util::PathExists(path)) {
content::PepperPluginInfo gtalk;
gtalk.path = path;
gtalk.name = kGTalkPluginName;
gtalk.is_out_of_process = true;
gtalk.is_sandboxed = false;
webkit::WebPluginMimeType gtalk_mime_type(kGTalkPluginMimeType,
kGTalkPluginExtension,
kGTalkPluginDescription);
gtalk.mime_types.push_back(gtalk_mime_type);
plugins->push_back(gtalk);
skip_gtalk_file_check = true;
}
}
#if defined(ENABLE_REMOTING)
content::PepperPluginInfo info;
info.is_internal = true;
info.name = kRemotingViewerPluginName;
info.path = FilePath(kRemotingViewerPluginPath);
webkit::WebPluginMimeType remoting_mime_type(
kRemotingViewerPluginMimeType,
std::string(),
std::string());
info.mime_types.push_back(remoting_mime_type);
webkit::WebPluginMimeType old_remoting_mime_type(
kRemotingViewerPluginOldMimeType,
std::string(),
std::string());
info.mime_types.push_back(old_remoting_mime_type);
info.internal_entry_points.get_interface = remoting::PPP_GetInterface;
info.internal_entry_points.initialize_module =
remoting::PPP_InitializeModule;
info.internal_entry_points.shutdown_module = remoting::PPP_ShutdownModule;
plugins->push_back(info);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int process_preds(struct trace_event_call *call,
const char *filter_string,
struct event_filter *filter,
struct filter_parse_error *pe)
{
struct prog_entry *prog;
int nr_parens;
int nr_preds;
int index;
int ret;
ret = calc_stack(filter_string, &nr_parens, &nr_preds, &index);
if (ret < 0) {
switch (ret) {
case MISSING_QUOTE:
parse_error(pe, FILT_ERR_MISSING_QUOTE, index);
break;
case TOO_MANY_OPEN:
parse_error(pe, FILT_ERR_TOO_MANY_OPEN, index);
break;
default:
parse_error(pe, FILT_ERR_TOO_MANY_CLOSE, index);
}
return ret;
}
if (!nr_preds)
return -EINVAL;
prog = predicate_parse(filter_string, nr_parens, nr_preds,
parse_pred, call, pe);
if (IS_ERR(prog))
return PTR_ERR(prog);
rcu_assign_pointer(filter->prog, prog);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: path_mountpoint(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags, struct path *path)
{
const char *s = path_init(nd, flags);
int err;
if (IS_ERR(s))
return PTR_ERR(s);
while (!(err = link_path_walk(s, nd)) &&
(err = mountpoint_last(nd)) > 0) {
s = trailing_symlink(nd);
if (IS_ERR(s)) {
err = PTR_ERR(s);
break;
}
}
if (!err) {
*path = nd->path;
nd->path.mnt = NULL;
nd->path.dentry = NULL;
follow_mount(path);
}
terminate_walk(nd);
return err;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,457 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_set_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int dr, unsigned long val)
{
if (__kvm_set_dr(vcpu, dr, val)) {
kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_read_avss(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
return mov_read_extradata(c, pb, atom, CODEC_ID_AVS);
}
Commit Message: mov: reset dref_count on realloc to keep values consistent.
This fixes a potential crash.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int userfaultfd_register(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = ctx->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev, *cur;
int ret;
struct uffdio_register uffdio_register;
struct uffdio_register __user *user_uffdio_register;
unsigned long vm_flags, new_flags;
bool found;
bool basic_ioctls;
unsigned long start, end, vma_end;
user_uffdio_register = (struct uffdio_register __user *) arg;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&uffdio_register, user_uffdio_register,
sizeof(uffdio_register)-sizeof(__u64)))
goto out;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (!uffdio_register.mode)
goto out;
if (uffdio_register.mode & ~(UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MISSING|
UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_WP))
goto out;
vm_flags = 0;
if (uffdio_register.mode & UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MISSING)
vm_flags |= VM_UFFD_MISSING;
if (uffdio_register.mode & UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_WP) {
vm_flags |= VM_UFFD_WP;
/*
* FIXME: remove the below error constraint by
* implementing the wprotect tracking mode.
*/
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ret = validate_range(mm, uffdio_register.range.start,
uffdio_register.range.len);
if (ret)
goto out;
start = uffdio_register.range.start;
end = start + uffdio_register.range.len;
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!mmget_not_zero(mm))
goto out;
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
vma = find_vma_prev(mm, start, &prev);
if (!vma)
goto out_unlock;
/* check that there's at least one vma in the range */
ret = -EINVAL;
if (vma->vm_start >= end)
goto out_unlock;
/*
* If the first vma contains huge pages, make sure start address
* is aligned to huge page size.
*/
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) {
unsigned long vma_hpagesize = vma_kernel_pagesize(vma);
if (start & (vma_hpagesize - 1))
goto out_unlock;
}
/*
* Search for not compatible vmas.
*/
found = false;
basic_ioctls = false;
for (cur = vma; cur && cur->vm_start < end; cur = cur->vm_next) {
cond_resched();
BUG_ON(!!cur->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx ^
!!(cur->vm_flags & (VM_UFFD_MISSING | VM_UFFD_WP)));
/* check not compatible vmas */
ret = -EINVAL;
if (!vma_can_userfault(cur))
goto out_unlock;
/*
* UFFDIO_COPY will fill file holes even without
* PROT_WRITE. This check enforces that if this is a
* MAP_SHARED, the process has write permission to the backing
* file. If VM_MAYWRITE is set it also enforces that on a
* MAP_SHARED vma: there is no F_WRITE_SEAL and no further
* F_WRITE_SEAL can be taken until the vma is destroyed.
*/
ret = -EPERM;
if (unlikely(!(cur->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE)))
goto out_unlock;
/*
* If this vma contains ending address, and huge pages
* check alignment.
*/
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(cur) && end <= cur->vm_end &&
end > cur->vm_start) {
unsigned long vma_hpagesize = vma_kernel_pagesize(cur);
ret = -EINVAL;
if (end & (vma_hpagesize - 1))
goto out_unlock;
}
/*
* Check that this vma isn't already owned by a
* different userfaultfd. We can't allow more than one
* userfaultfd to own a single vma simultaneously or we
* wouldn't know which one to deliver the userfaults to.
*/
ret = -EBUSY;
if (cur->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx &&
cur->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx != ctx)
goto out_unlock;
/*
* Note vmas containing huge pages
*/
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(cur))
basic_ioctls = true;
found = true;
}
BUG_ON(!found);
if (vma->vm_start < start)
prev = vma;
ret = 0;
do {
cond_resched();
BUG_ON(!vma_can_userfault(vma));
BUG_ON(vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx &&
vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx != ctx);
WARN_ON(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE));
/*
* Nothing to do: this vma is already registered into this
* userfaultfd and with the right tracking mode too.
*/
if (vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx == ctx &&
(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags) == vm_flags)
goto skip;
if (vma->vm_start > start)
start = vma->vm_start;
vma_end = min(end, vma->vm_end);
new_flags = (vma->vm_flags & ~vm_flags) | vm_flags;
prev = vma_merge(mm, prev, start, vma_end, new_flags,
vma->anon_vma, vma->vm_file, vma->vm_pgoff,
vma_policy(vma),
((struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx){ ctx }));
if (prev) {
vma = prev;
goto next;
}
if (vma->vm_start < start) {
ret = split_vma(mm, vma, start, 1);
if (ret)
break;
}
if (vma->vm_end > end) {
ret = split_vma(mm, vma, end, 0);
if (ret)
break;
}
next:
/*
* In the vma_merge() successful mprotect-like case 8:
* the next vma was merged into the current one and
* the current one has not been updated yet.
*/
vma->vm_flags = new_flags;
vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx = ctx;
skip:
prev = vma;
start = vma->vm_end;
vma = vma->vm_next;
} while (vma && vma->vm_start < end);
out_unlock:
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
mmput(mm);
if (!ret) {
/*
* Now that we scanned all vmas we can already tell
* userland which ioctls methods are guaranteed to
* succeed on this range.
*/
if (put_user(basic_ioctls ? UFFD_API_RANGE_IOCTLS_BASIC :
UFFD_API_RANGE_IOCTLS,
&user_uffdio_register->ioctls))
ret = -EFAULT;
}
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 169,687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nntp_auth(struct NntpServer *nserv)
{
struct Connection *conn = nserv->conn;
char buf[LONG_STRING];
char authenticators[LONG_STRING] = "USER";
char *method = NULL, *a = NULL, *p = NULL;
unsigned char flags = conn->account.flags;
while (true)
{
/* get login and password */
if ((mutt_account_getuser(&conn->account) < 0) || (conn->account.user[0] == '\0') ||
(mutt_account_getpass(&conn->account) < 0) || (conn->account.pass[0] == '\0'))
{
break;
}
/* get list of authenticators */
if (NntpAuthenticators && *NntpAuthenticators)
mutt_str_strfcpy(authenticators, NntpAuthenticators, sizeof(authenticators));
else if (nserv->hasCAPABILITIES)
{
mutt_str_strfcpy(authenticators, NONULL(nserv->authenticators), sizeof(authenticators));
p = authenticators;
while (*p)
{
if (*p == ' ')
*p = ':';
p++;
}
}
p = authenticators;
while (*p)
{
*p = toupper(*p);
p++;
}
mutt_debug(1, "available methods: %s\n", nserv->authenticators);
a = authenticators;
while (true)
{
if (!a)
{
mutt_error(_("No authenticators available"));
break;
}
method = a;
a = strchr(a, ':');
if (a)
*a++ = '\0';
/* check authenticator */
if (nserv->hasCAPABILITIES)
{
char *m = NULL;
if (!nserv->authenticators)
continue;
m = strcasestr(nserv->authenticators, method);
if (!m)
continue;
if (m > nserv->authenticators && *(m - 1) != ' ')
continue;
m += strlen(method);
if (*m != '\0' && *m != ' ')
continue;
}
mutt_debug(1, "trying method %s\n", method);
/* AUTHINFO USER authentication */
if (strcmp(method, "USER") == 0)
{
mutt_message(_("Authenticating (%s)..."), method);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "AUTHINFO USER %s\r\n", conn->account.user);
if (mutt_socket_send(conn, buf) < 0 ||
mutt_socket_readln(buf, sizeof(buf), conn) < 0)
{
break;
}
/* authenticated, password is not required */
if (mutt_str_strncmp("281", buf, 3) == 0)
return 0;
/* username accepted, sending password */
if (mutt_str_strncmp("381", buf, 3) == 0)
{
if (DebugLevel < MUTT_SOCK_LOG_FULL)
mutt_debug(MUTT_SOCK_LOG_CMD, "%d> AUTHINFO PASS *\n", conn->fd);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "AUTHINFO PASS %s\r\n", conn->account.pass);
if (mutt_socket_send_d(conn, buf, MUTT_SOCK_LOG_FULL) < 0 ||
mutt_socket_readln(buf, sizeof(buf), conn) < 0)
{
break;
}
/* authenticated */
if (mutt_str_strncmp("281", buf, 3) == 0)
return 0;
}
/* server doesn't support AUTHINFO USER, trying next method */
if (*buf == '5')
continue;
}
else
{
#ifdef USE_SASL
sasl_conn_t *saslconn = NULL;
sasl_interact_t *interaction = NULL;
int rc;
char inbuf[LONG_STRING] = "";
const char *mech = NULL;
const char *client_out = NULL;
unsigned int client_len, len;
if (mutt_sasl_client_new(conn, &saslconn) < 0)
{
mutt_debug(1, "error allocating SASL connection.\n");
continue;
}
while (true)
{
rc = sasl_client_start(saslconn, method, &interaction, &client_out,
&client_len, &mech);
if (rc != SASL_INTERACT)
break;
mutt_sasl_interact(interaction);
}
if (rc != SASL_OK && rc != SASL_CONTINUE)
{
sasl_dispose(&saslconn);
mutt_debug(1, "error starting SASL authentication exchange.\n");
continue;
}
mutt_message(_("Authenticating (%s)..."), method);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "AUTHINFO SASL %s", method);
/* looping protocol */
while (rc == SASL_CONTINUE || (rc == SASL_OK && client_len))
{
/* send out client response */
if (client_len)
{
if (DebugLevel >= MUTT_SOCK_LOG_FULL)
{
char tmp[LONG_STRING];
memcpy(tmp, client_out, client_len);
for (p = tmp; p < tmp + client_len; p++)
{
if (*p == '\0')
*p = '.';
}
*p = '\0';
mutt_debug(1, "SASL> %s\n", tmp);
}
if (*buf)
mutt_str_strcat(buf, sizeof(buf), " ");
len = strlen(buf);
if (sasl_encode64(client_out, client_len, buf + len,
sizeof(buf) - len, &len) != SASL_OK)
{
mutt_debug(1, "error base64-encoding client response.\n");
break;
}
}
mutt_str_strcat(buf, sizeof(buf), "\r\n");
if (DebugLevel < MUTT_SOCK_LOG_FULL)
{
if (strchr(buf, ' '))
{
mutt_debug(MUTT_SOCK_LOG_CMD, "%d> AUTHINFO SASL %s%s\n",
conn->fd, method, client_len ? " sasl_data" : "");
}
else
mutt_debug(MUTT_SOCK_LOG_CMD, "%d> sasl_data\n", conn->fd);
}
client_len = 0;
if (mutt_socket_send_d(conn, buf, MUTT_SOCK_LOG_FULL) < 0 ||
mutt_socket_readln_d(inbuf, sizeof(inbuf), conn, MUTT_SOCK_LOG_FULL) < 0)
{
break;
}
if ((mutt_str_strncmp(inbuf, "283 ", 4) != 0) &&
(mutt_str_strncmp(inbuf, "383 ", 4) != 0))
{
if (DebugLevel < MUTT_SOCK_LOG_FULL)
mutt_debug(MUTT_SOCK_LOG_CMD, "%d< %s\n", conn->fd, inbuf);
break;
}
if (DebugLevel < MUTT_SOCK_LOG_FULL)
{
inbuf[3] = '\0';
mutt_debug(MUTT_SOCK_LOG_CMD, "%d< %s sasl_data\n", conn->fd, inbuf);
}
if (strcmp("=", inbuf + 4) == 0)
len = 0;
else if (sasl_decode64(inbuf + 4, strlen(inbuf + 4), buf,
sizeof(buf) - 1, &len) != SASL_OK)
{
mutt_debug(1, "error base64-decoding server response.\n");
break;
}
else if (DebugLevel >= MUTT_SOCK_LOG_FULL)
{
char tmp[LONG_STRING];
memcpy(tmp, buf, len);
for (p = tmp; p < tmp + len; p++)
{
if (*p == '\0')
*p = '.';
}
*p = '\0';
mutt_debug(1, "SASL< %s\n", tmp);
}
while (true)
{
rc = sasl_client_step(saslconn, buf, len, &interaction, &client_out, &client_len);
if (rc != SASL_INTERACT)
break;
mutt_sasl_interact(interaction);
}
if (*inbuf != '3')
break;
*buf = '\0';
} /* looping protocol */
if (rc == SASL_OK && client_len == 0 && *inbuf == '2')
{
mutt_sasl_setup_conn(conn, saslconn);
return 0;
}
/* terminate SASL session */
sasl_dispose(&saslconn);
if (conn->fd < 0)
break;
if (mutt_str_strncmp(inbuf, "383 ", 4) == 0)
{
if (mutt_socket_send(conn, "*\r\n") < 0 ||
mutt_socket_readln(inbuf, sizeof(inbuf), conn) < 0)
{
break;
}
}
/* server doesn't support AUTHINFO SASL, trying next method */
if (*inbuf == '5')
continue;
#else
continue;
#endif /* USE_SASL */
}
mutt_error(_("%s authentication failed."), method);
break;
}
break;
}
/* error */
nserv->status = NNTP_BYE;
conn->account.flags = flags;
if (conn->fd < 0)
{
mutt_error(_("Server closed connection!"));
}
else
mutt_socket_close(conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Add alloc fail check in nntp_fetch_headers
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 79,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: oom (void)
{
g_error ("no memory");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _determine_leaf_words(int nodeb, int leafwidth){
if(leafwidth>nodeb)return 2;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix out of bounds access in codebook processing
Bug: 62800140
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: I9960d507be62ee0a3b0aa991240951d5a0784f37
(cherry picked from commit 2c4c4bd895f01fdecb90ebdd0412b60608a9ccf0)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 162,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void overloadedPerWorldMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (((info.Length() == 1))) {
overloadedPerWorldMethod1Method(info);
return;
}
if (((info.Length() == 2))) {
overloadedPerWorldMethod2Method(info);
return;
}
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "overloadedPerWorldMethod", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
exceptionState.throwTypeError("No function was found that matched the signature provided.");
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t GraphicBuffer::lockAsyncYCbCr(uint32_t usage, android_ycbcr *ycbcr, int fenceFd)
{
const Rect lockBounds(width, height);
status_t res = lockAsyncYCbCr(usage, lockBounds, ycbcr, fenceFd);
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fix for corruption when numFds or numInts is too large.
Bug: 18076253
Change-Id: I4c5935440013fc755e1d123049290383f4659fb6
(cherry picked from commit dfd06b89a4b77fc75eb85a3c1c700da3621c0118)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QuotaTask::CallCompleted() {
DCHECK(original_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (observer_) {
observer_->UnregisterTask(this);
Completed();
}
}
Commit Message: Quota double-delete fix
BUG=142310
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10832407
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@152532 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::isTimeField() const
{
return m_inputType->isTimeField();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Isolate* isolate() const { return m_scriptState->isolate(); }
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,492 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ar6000_init_profile_info(struct ar6_softc *ar)
{
ar->arSsidLen = 0;
A_MEMZERO(ar->arSsid, sizeof(ar->arSsid));
switch(fwmode) {
case HI_OPTION_FW_MODE_IBSS:
ar->arNetworkType = ar->arNextMode = ADHOC_NETWORK;
break;
case HI_OPTION_FW_MODE_BSS_STA:
ar->arNetworkType = ar->arNextMode = INFRA_NETWORK;
break;
case HI_OPTION_FW_MODE_AP:
ar->arNetworkType = ar->arNextMode = AP_NETWORK;
break;
}
ar->arDot11AuthMode = OPEN_AUTH;
ar->arAuthMode = NONE_AUTH;
ar->arPairwiseCrypto = NONE_CRYPT;
ar->arPairwiseCryptoLen = 0;
ar->arGroupCrypto = NONE_CRYPT;
ar->arGroupCryptoLen = 0;
A_MEMZERO(ar->arWepKeyList, sizeof(ar->arWepKeyList));
A_MEMZERO(ar->arReqBssid, sizeof(ar->arReqBssid));
A_MEMZERO(ar->arBssid, sizeof(ar->arBssid));
ar->arBssChannel = 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HitTestResult HitTest(int x, int y) {
return WebView().CoreHitTestResultAt(WebPoint(x, y));
}
Commit Message: Reset virtual time state in scrollbar tests
This prevents ScrollbarTestWithVirtualTimer from polluting global state
for tests following it.
Bug: 791742
Change-Id: Iae3440451833408a6a5bd24b3319b307cd6d3547
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/969582
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Clarke <alexclarke@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544691}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 132,191 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: array_indexed_param_list_read(dict_param_list * plist, const ref * parray,
const ref * ppolicies, bool require_all,
gs_ref_memory_t *ref_memory)
{
iparam_list *const iplist = (iparam_list *) plist;
int code;
check_read_type(*parray, t_array);
plist->u.r.read = array_indexed_param_read;
plist->dict = *parray;
code = ref_param_read_init(iplist, r_size(parray), ppolicies,
require_all, ref_memory);
plist->int_keys = true;
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,248 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::vector<InspectorHandler*> InspectorHandler::ForAgentHost(
DevToolsAgentHostImpl* host) {
return DevToolsSession::HandlersForAgentHost<InspectorHandler>(
host, Inspector::Metainfo::domainName);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool send_client_authreq(PgSocket *client)
{
uint8_t saltlen = 0;
int res;
int auth = cf_auth_type;
uint8_t randbuf[2];
if (auth == AUTH_CRYPT) {
saltlen = 2;
get_random_bytes(randbuf, saltlen);
client->tmp_login_salt[0] = valid_crypt_salt[randbuf[0] & SALT_MASK];
client->tmp_login_salt[1] = valid_crypt_salt[randbuf[1] & SALT_MASK];
client->tmp_login_salt[2] = 0;
} else if (cf_auth_type == AUTH_MD5) {
saltlen = 4;
get_random_bytes((void*)client->tmp_login_salt, saltlen);
} else if (auth == AUTH_ANY)
auth = AUTH_TRUST;
SEND_generic(res, client, 'R', "ib", auth, client->tmp_login_salt, saltlen);
return res;
}
Commit Message: Check if auth_user is set.
Fixes a crash if password packet appears before startup packet (#42).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 74,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int FS_LoadStack( void ) {
return fs_loadStack;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,801 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void LocationByteStringAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "locationByteString");
v8::Local<v8::Value> target;
if (!holder->Get(isolate->GetCurrentContext(), V8AtomicString(isolate, "locationByteString"))
.ToLocal(&target)) {
return;
}
if (!target->IsObject()) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("The attribute value is not an object");
return;
}
bool result;
if (!target.As<v8::Object>()->Set(
isolate->GetCurrentContext(),
V8AtomicString(isolate, "hrefByteString"),
v8_value).To(&result)) {
return;
}
if (!result)
return;
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VModCreate(xkb_atom_t name, ExprDef *value)
{
VModDef *def = malloc(sizeof(*def));
if (!def)
return NULL;
def->common.type = STMT_VMOD;
def->common.next = NULL;
def->name = name;
def->value = value;
return def;
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: fix pointer value for FreeStmt
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 79,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_level1_header(LHAFileHeader **header, LHAInputStream *stream)
{
unsigned int ext_header_start;
if (!decode_level0_header(header, stream)) {
return 0;
}
ext_header_start = RAW_DATA_LEN(header) - 2;
if (!read_l1_extended_headers(header, stream)
|| !decode_extended_headers(header, ext_header_start)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer underflow vulnerability in L3 decode.
Marcin 'Icewall' Noga of Cisco TALOS discovered that the level 3 header
decoding routines were vulnerable to an integer underflow, if the 32-bit
header length was less than the base level 3 header length. This could
lead to an exploitable heap corruption condition.
Thanks go to Marcin Noga and Regina Wilson of Cisco TALOS for reporting
this vulnerability.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 73,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BrowserView::IsMaximized() const {
return frame_->IsMaximized();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,396 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteOneJNGImage(MngInfo *mng_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
Image
*jpeg_image;
ImageInfo
*jpeg_image_info;
int
unique_filenames;
MagickBooleanType
logging,
status;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*blob,
chunk[80],
*p;
unsigned int
jng_alpha_compression_method,
jng_alpha_sample_depth,
jng_color_type,
transparent;
size_t
jng_alpha_quality,
jng_quality;
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Enter WriteOneJNGImage()");
blob=(unsigned char *) NULL;
jpeg_image=(Image *) NULL;
jpeg_image_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
length=0;
unique_filenames=0;
status=MagickTrue;
transparent=image_info->type==GrayscaleMatteType ||
image_info->type==TrueColorMatteType || image->matte != MagickFalse;
jng_alpha_sample_depth = 0;
jng_quality=image_info->quality == 0UL ? 75UL : image_info->quality%1000;
jng_alpha_compression_method=image->compression==JPEGCompression? 8 : 0;
jng_alpha_quality=image_info->quality == 0UL ? 75UL :
image_info->quality;
if (jng_alpha_quality >= 1000)
jng_alpha_quality /= 1000;
if (transparent != 0)
{
jng_color_type=14;
/* Create JPEG blob, image, and image_info */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating jpeg_image_info for opacity.");
jpeg_image_info=(ImageInfo *) CloneImageInfo(image_info);
if (jpeg_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
{
jpeg_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(jpeg_image_info);
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating jpeg_image.");
jpeg_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,&image->exception);
if (jpeg_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
jpeg_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(jpeg_image_info);
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
(void) CopyMagickString(jpeg_image->magick,"JPEG",MaxTextExtent);
status=SeparateImageChannel(jpeg_image,OpacityChannel);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
status=NegateImage(jpeg_image,MagickFalse);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
jpeg_image->matte=MagickFalse;
jpeg_image_info->type=GrayscaleType;
jpeg_image->quality=jng_alpha_quality;
jpeg_image_info->type=GrayscaleType;
(void) SetImageType(jpeg_image,GrayscaleType);
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(jpeg_image->filename);
unique_filenames++;
(void) FormatLocaleString(jpeg_image_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,
"%s",jpeg_image->filename);
}
else
{
jng_alpha_compression_method=0;
jng_color_type=10;
jng_alpha_sample_depth=0;
}
/* To do: check bit depth of PNG alpha channel */
/* Check if image is grayscale. */
if (image_info->type != TrueColorMatteType && image_info->type !=
TrueColorType && SetImageGray(image,&image->exception))
jng_color_type-=2;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG Quality = %d",(int) jng_quality);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG Color Type = %d",jng_color_type);
if (transparent != 0)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG Alpha Compression = %d",jng_alpha_compression_method);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG Alpha Depth = %d",jng_alpha_sample_depth);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG Alpha Quality = %d",(int) jng_alpha_quality);
}
}
if (transparent != 0)
{
if (jng_alpha_compression_method==0)
{
const char
*value;
/* Encode opacity as a grayscale PNG blob */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating PNG blob for alpha.");
status=OpenBlob(jpeg_image_info,jpeg_image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,
&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
length=0;
(void) CopyMagickString(jpeg_image_info->magick,"PNG",MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(jpeg_image->magick,"PNG",MaxTextExtent);
jpeg_image_info->interlace=NoInterlace;
/* Exclude all ancillary chunks */
(void) SetImageArtifact(jpeg_image,"png:exclude-chunks","all");
blob=ImageToBlob(jpeg_image_info,jpeg_image,&length,
&image->exception);
/* Retrieve sample depth used */
value=GetImageProperty(jpeg_image,"png:bit-depth-written");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
jng_alpha_sample_depth= (unsigned int) value[0];
}
else
{
/* Encode opacity as a grayscale JPEG blob */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating JPEG blob for alpha.");
status=OpenBlob(jpeg_image_info,jpeg_image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,
&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) CopyMagickString(jpeg_image_info->magick,"JPEG",MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(jpeg_image->magick,"JPEG",MaxTextExtent);
jpeg_image_info->interlace=NoInterlace;
blob=ImageToBlob(jpeg_image_info,jpeg_image,&length,
&image->exception);
jng_alpha_sample_depth=8;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Successfully read jpeg_image into a blob, length=%.20g.",
(double) length);
}
/* Destroy JPEG image and image_info */
jpeg_image=DestroyImage(jpeg_image);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(jpeg_image_info->filename);
unique_filenames--;
jpeg_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(jpeg_image_info);
}
/* Write JHDR chunk */
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,16L); /* chunk data length=16 */
PNGType(chunk,mng_JHDR);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_JHDR,16L);
PNGLong(chunk+4,(png_uint_32) image->columns);
PNGLong(chunk+8,(png_uint_32) image->rows);
chunk[12]=jng_color_type;
chunk[13]=8; /* sample depth */
chunk[14]=8; /*jng_image_compression_method */
chunk[15]=(unsigned char) (image_info->interlace == NoInterlace ? 0 : 8);
chunk[16]=jng_alpha_sample_depth;
chunk[17]=jng_alpha_compression_method;
chunk[18]=0; /*jng_alpha_filter_method */
chunk[19]=0; /*jng_alpha_interlace_method */
(void) WriteBlob(image,20,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(0,chunk,20));
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG width:%15lu",(unsigned long) image->columns);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG height:%14lu",(unsigned long) image->rows);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG color type:%10d",jng_color_type);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG sample depth:%8d",8);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG compression:%9d",8);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG interlace:%11d",0);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG alpha depth:%9d",jng_alpha_sample_depth);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG alpha compression:%3d",jng_alpha_compression_method);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG alpha filter:%8d",0);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG alpha interlace:%5d",0);
}
/*
Write leading ancillary chunks
*/
if (transparent != 0)
{
/*
Write JNG bKGD chunk
*/
unsigned char
blue,
green,
red;
ssize_t
num_bytes;
if (jng_color_type == 8 || jng_color_type == 12)
num_bytes=6L;
else
num_bytes=10L;
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,(size_t) (num_bytes-4L));
PNGType(chunk,mng_bKGD);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_bKGD,(size_t) (num_bytes-4L));
red=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->background_color.red);
green=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->background_color.green);
blue=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->background_color.blue);
*(chunk+4)=0;
*(chunk+5)=red;
*(chunk+6)=0;
*(chunk+7)=green;
*(chunk+8)=0;
*(chunk+9)=blue;
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) num_bytes,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(0,chunk,(uInt) num_bytes));
}
if ((image->colorspace == sRGBColorspace || image->rendering_intent))
{
/*
Write JNG sRGB chunk
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,1L);
PNGType(chunk,mng_sRGB);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_sRGB,1L);
if (image->rendering_intent != UndefinedIntent)
chunk[4]=(unsigned char)
Magick_RenderingIntent_to_PNG_RenderingIntent(
(image->rendering_intent));
else
chunk[4]=(unsigned char)
Magick_RenderingIntent_to_PNG_RenderingIntent(
(PerceptualIntent));
(void) WriteBlob(image,5,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(0,chunk,5));
}
else
{
if (image->gamma != 0.0)
{
/*
Write JNG gAMA chunk
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,4L);
PNGType(chunk,mng_gAMA);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_gAMA,4L);
PNGLong(chunk+4,(png_uint_32) (100000*image->gamma+0.5));
(void) WriteBlob(image,8,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(0,chunk,8));
}
if ((mng_info->equal_chrms == MagickFalse) &&
(image->chromaticity.red_primary.x != 0.0))
{
PrimaryInfo
primary;
/*
Write JNG cHRM chunk
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,32L);
PNGType(chunk,mng_cHRM);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_cHRM,32L);
primary=image->chromaticity.white_point;
PNGLong(chunk+4,(png_uint_32) (100000*primary.x+0.5));
PNGLong(chunk+8,(png_uint_32) (100000*primary.y+0.5));
primary=image->chromaticity.red_primary;
PNGLong(chunk+12,(png_uint_32) (100000*primary.x+0.5));
PNGLong(chunk+16,(png_uint_32) (100000*primary.y+0.5));
primary=image->chromaticity.green_primary;
PNGLong(chunk+20,(png_uint_32) (100000*primary.x+0.5));
PNGLong(chunk+24,(png_uint_32) (100000*primary.y+0.5));
primary=image->chromaticity.blue_primary;
PNGLong(chunk+28,(png_uint_32) (100000*primary.x+0.5));
PNGLong(chunk+32,(png_uint_32) (100000*primary.y+0.5));
(void) WriteBlob(image,36,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(0,chunk,36));
}
}
if (image->x_resolution && image->y_resolution && !mng_info->equal_physs)
{
/*
Write JNG pHYs chunk
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,9L);
PNGType(chunk,mng_pHYs);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_pHYs,9L);
if (image->units == PixelsPerInchResolution)
{
PNGLong(chunk+4,(png_uint_32)
(image->x_resolution*100.0/2.54+0.5));
PNGLong(chunk+8,(png_uint_32)
(image->y_resolution*100.0/2.54+0.5));
chunk[12]=1;
}
else
{
if (image->units == PixelsPerCentimeterResolution)
{
PNGLong(chunk+4,(png_uint_32)
(image->x_resolution*100.0+0.5));
PNGLong(chunk+8,(png_uint_32)
(image->y_resolution*100.0+0.5));
chunk[12]=1;
}
else
{
PNGLong(chunk+4,(png_uint_32) (image->x_resolution+0.5));
PNGLong(chunk+8,(png_uint_32) (image->y_resolution+0.5));
chunk[12]=0;
}
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,13,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(0,chunk,13));
}
if (mng_info->write_mng == 0 && (image->page.x || image->page.y))
{
/*
Write JNG oFFs chunk
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,9L);
PNGType(chunk,mng_oFFs);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_oFFs,9L);
PNGsLong(chunk+4,(ssize_t) (image->page.x));
PNGsLong(chunk+8,(ssize_t) (image->page.y));
chunk[12]=0;
(void) WriteBlob(image,13,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(0,chunk,13));
}
if (transparent != 0)
{
if (jng_alpha_compression_method==0)
{
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
len;
/* Write IDAT chunk header */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Write IDAT chunks from blob, length=%.20g.",(double)
length);
/* Copy IDAT chunks */
len=0;
p=blob+8;
for (i=8; i<(ssize_t) length; i+=len+12)
{
len=(((unsigned int) *(p ) & 0xff) << 24) +
(((unsigned int) *(p + 1) & 0xff) << 16) +
(((unsigned int) *(p + 2) & 0xff) << 8) +
(((unsigned int) *(p + 3) & 0xff) ) ;
p+=4;
if (*(p)==73 && *(p+1)==68 && *(p+2)==65 && *(p+3)==84) /* IDAT */
{
/* Found an IDAT chunk. */
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,len);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IDAT,len);
(void) WriteBlob(image,len+4,p);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(0,p,(uInt) len+4));
}
else
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Skipping %c%c%c%c chunk, length=%.20g.",
*(p),*(p+1),*(p+2),*(p+3),(double) len);
}
p+=(8+len);
}
}
else if (length != 0)
{
/* Write JDAA chunk header */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Write JDAA chunk, length=%.20g.",(double) length);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,(size_t) length);
PNGType(chunk,mng_JDAA);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_JDAA,length);
/* Write JDAT chunk(s) data */
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,chunk);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,blob);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(crc32(0,chunk,4),blob,
(uInt) length));
}
blob=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blob);
}
/* Encode image as a JPEG blob */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating jpeg_image_info.");
jpeg_image_info=(ImageInfo *) CloneImageInfo(image_info);
if (jpeg_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating jpeg_image.");
jpeg_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,&image->exception);
if (jpeg_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) CopyMagickString(jpeg_image->magick,"JPEG",MaxTextExtent);
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(jpeg_image->filename);
unique_filenames++;
(void) FormatLocaleString(jpeg_image_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"%s",
jpeg_image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(jpeg_image_info,jpeg_image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,
&image->exception);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Created jpeg_image, %.20g x %.20g.",(double) jpeg_image->columns,
(double) jpeg_image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (jng_color_type == 8 || jng_color_type == 12)
jpeg_image_info->type=GrayscaleType;
jpeg_image_info->quality=jng_quality;
jpeg_image->quality=jng_quality;
(void) CopyMagickString(jpeg_image_info->magick,"JPEG",MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(jpeg_image->magick,"JPEG",MaxTextExtent);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating blob.");
blob=ImageToBlob(jpeg_image_info,jpeg_image,&length,&image->exception);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Successfully read jpeg_image into a blob, length=%.20g.",
(double) length);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Write JDAT chunk, length=%.20g.",(double) length);
}
/* Write JDAT chunk(s) */
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,(size_t) length);
PNGType(chunk,mng_JDAT);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_JDAT,length);
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,chunk);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,blob);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(crc32(0,chunk,4),blob,(uInt) length));
jpeg_image=DestroyImage(jpeg_image);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(jpeg_image_info->filename);
unique_filenames--;
jpeg_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(jpeg_image_info);
blob=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blob);
/* Write IEND chunk */
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,0L);
PNGType(chunk,mng_IEND);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IEND,0);
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(0,chunk,4));
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit WriteOneJNGImage(); unique_filenames=%d",unique_filenames);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1119
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool QQuickWebView::childMouseEventFilter(QQuickItem* item, QEvent* event)
{
if (!isVisible() || !isEnabled() || !s_flickableViewportEnabled)
return QQuickFlickable::childMouseEventFilter(item, event);
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
if (d->m_dialogActive) {
event->ignore();
return false;
}
switch (event->type()) {
case QEvent::MouseButtonPress:
mousePressEvent(static_cast<QMouseEvent*>(event));
return event->isAccepted();
case QEvent::MouseMove:
mouseMoveEvent(static_cast<QMouseEvent*>(event));
return event->isAccepted();
case QEvent::MouseButtonRelease:
mouseReleaseEvent(static_cast<QMouseEvent*>(event));
return event->isAccepted();
case QEvent::TouchBegin:
case QEvent::TouchUpdate:
case QEvent::TouchEnd:
touchEvent(static_cast<QTouchEvent*>(event));
return event->isAccepted();
default:
break;
}
return QQuickFlickable::childMouseEventFilter(item, event);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::AddDevToolsExtensionsToClient() {
const extensions::ExtensionRegistry* registry =
extensions::ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile_->GetOriginalProfile());
if (!registry)
return;
base::ListValue results;
for (const scoped_refptr<const extensions::Extension>& extension :
registry->enabled_extensions()) {
if (extensions::chrome_manifest_urls::GetDevToolsPage(extension.get())
.is_empty())
continue;
std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> extension_info(
new base::DictionaryValue());
extension_info->Set(
"startPage",
new base::StringValue(extensions::chrome_manifest_urls::GetDevToolsPage(
extension.get()).spec()));
extension_info->Set("name", new base::StringValue(extension->name()));
extension_info->Set("exposeExperimentalAPIs",
new base::FundamentalValue(
extension->permissions_data()->HasAPIPermission(
extensions::APIPermission::kExperimental)));
results.Append(std::move(extension_info));
}
if (!results.empty()) {
content::ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::GetInstance()->GrantScheme(
web_contents_->GetMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID(),
extensions::kExtensionScheme);
}
CallClientFunction("DevToolsAPI.addExtensions",
&results, NULL, NULL);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 138,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderObject* RenderBlock::hoverAncestor() const
{
return isAnonymousBlockContinuation() ? continuation() : RenderBox::hoverAncestor();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,215 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnAudioStateChanged(bool is_audible) {
SendPageMessage(new PageMsg_AudioStateChanged(MSG_ROUTING_NONE, is_audible));
NotifyNavigationStateChanged(INVALIDATE_TYPE_TAB);
if (delegate_)
delegate_->OnAudioStateChanged(is_audible);
}
Commit Message: If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 150,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Splash::setSoftMask(SplashBitmap *softMask) {
state->setSoftMask(softMask);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,288 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormElement::removeImgElement(HTMLImageElement* e)
{
ASSERT(m_imageElements.find(e) != kNotFound);
removeFromPastNamesMap(*e);
removeFromVector(m_imageElements, e);
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash in HTMLFormElement::prepareForSubmission.
BUG=297478
TEST=automated with ASAN.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24910003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158428 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FakeCentral::GetLastWrittenCharacteristicValue(
const std::string& characteristic_id,
const std::string& service_id,
const std::string& peripheral_address,
GetLastWrittenCharacteristicValueCallback callback) {
FakeRemoteGattCharacteristic* fake_remote_gatt_characteristic =
GetFakeRemoteGattCharacteristic(peripheral_address, service_id,
characteristic_id);
if (fake_remote_gatt_characteristic == nullptr) {
std::move(callback).Run(false, base::nullopt);
}
std::move(callback).Run(
true, fake_remote_gatt_characteristic->last_written_value());
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MetricsWebContentsObserver::RecordFeatureUsage(
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
const mojom::PageLoadFeatures& new_features) {
content::WebContents* web_contents =
content::WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(render_frame_host);
MetricsWebContentsObserver* observer =
MetricsWebContentsObserver::FromWebContents(web_contents);
if (observer)
observer->OnBrowserFeatureUsage(render_frame_host, new_features);
}
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 140,153 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool rps_may_expire_flow(struct net_device *dev, u16 rxq_index,
u32 flow_id, u16 filter_id)
{
struct netdev_rx_queue *rxqueue = dev->_rx + rxq_index;
struct rps_dev_flow_table *flow_table;
struct rps_dev_flow *rflow;
bool expire = true;
unsigned int cpu;
rcu_read_lock();
flow_table = rcu_dereference(rxqueue->rps_flow_table);
if (flow_table && flow_id <= flow_table->mask) {
rflow = &flow_table->flows[flow_id];
cpu = ACCESS_ONCE(rflow->cpu);
if (rflow->filter == filter_id && cpu < nr_cpu_ids &&
((int)(per_cpu(softnet_data, cpu).input_queue_head -
rflow->last_qtail) <
(int)(10 * flow_table->mask)))
expire = false;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return expire;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Editor::PasteAsPlainTextWithPasteboard(Pasteboard* pasteboard) {
String text = pasteboard->PlainText();
PasteAsPlainText(text, CanSmartReplaceWithPasteboard(pasteboard));
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_7zip_uint64(struct archive_read *a, uint64_t *val)
{
const unsigned char *p;
unsigned char avail, mask;
int i;
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
return (-1);
avail = *p;
mask = 0x80;
*val = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
if (avail & mask) {
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
return (-1);
*val |= ((uint64_t)*p) << (8 * i);
mask >>= 1;
continue;
}
*val += ((uint64_t)(avail & (mask -1))) << (8 * i);
break;
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Issue #718: Fix TALOS-CAN-152
If a 7-Zip archive declares a rediculously large number of substreams,
it can overflow an internal counter, leading a subsequent memory
allocation to be too small for the substream data.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco
for reporting this issue.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 53,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void floppy_ready(void)
{
if (FDCS->reset) {
reset_fdc();
return;
}
if (start_motor(floppy_ready))
return;
if (fdc_dtr())
return;
debug_dcl(DP->flags, "calling disk change from floppy_ready\n");
if (!(raw_cmd->flags & FD_RAW_NO_MOTOR) &&
disk_change(current_drive) && !DP->select_delay)
twaddle(); /* this clears the dcl on certain
* drive/controller combinations */
#ifdef fd_chose_dma_mode
if ((raw_cmd->flags & FD_RAW_READ) || (raw_cmd->flags & FD_RAW_WRITE)) {
unsigned long flags = claim_dma_lock();
fd_chose_dma_mode(raw_cmd->kernel_data, raw_cmd->length);
release_dma_lock(flags);
}
#endif
if (raw_cmd->flags & (FD_RAW_NEED_SEEK | FD_RAW_NEED_DISK)) {
perpendicular_mode();
fdc_specify(); /* must be done here because of hut, hlt ... */
seek_floppy();
} else {
if ((raw_cmd->flags & FD_RAW_READ) ||
(raw_cmd->flags & FD_RAW_WRITE))
fdc_specify();
setup_rw_floppy();
}
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 39,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string display_text() { return display_text_; }
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vips_foreign_load_generate( VipsRegion *or,
void *seq, void *a, void *b, gboolean *stop )
{
VipsRegion *ir = (VipsRegion *) seq;
VipsRect *r = &or->valid;
/* Ask for input we need.
*/
if( vips_region_prepare( ir, r ) )
return( -1 );
/* Attach output region to that.
*/
if( vips_region_region( or, ir, r, r->left, r->top ) )
return( -1 );
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: fix a crash with delayed load
If a delayed load failed, it could leave the pipeline only half-set up.
Sebsequent threads could then segv.
Set a load-has-failed flag and test before generate.
See https://github.com/jcupitt/libvips/issues/893
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 83,903 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WorkerProcessLauncherTest::TearDown() {
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,828 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __send_write_zeroes(struct clone_info *ci)
{
return __send_changing_extent_only(ci, get_num_write_zeroes_bios, NULL);
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ffs_epfile_async_io_complete(struct usb_ep *_ep,
struct usb_request *req)
{
struct ffs_io_data *io_data = req->context;
ENTER();
INIT_WORK(&io_data->work, ffs_user_copy_worker);
schedule_work(&io_data->work);
}
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tg3_get_macaddr_sparc(struct tg3 *tp)
{
struct net_device *dev = tp->dev;
struct pci_dev *pdev = tp->pdev;
struct device_node *dp = pci_device_to_OF_node(pdev);
const unsigned char *addr;
int len;
addr = of_get_property(dp, "local-mac-address", &len);
if (addr && len == 6) {
memcpy(dev->dev_addr, addr, 6);
return 0;
}
return -ENODEV;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct crypto_alg *crypto_mod_get(struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
return try_module_get(alg->cra_module) ? crypto_alg_get(alg) : NULL;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,144 |
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