instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void paravirt_enter_lazy_mmu(void)
{
enter_lazy(PARAVIRT_LAZY_MMU);
}
Commit Message: x86/paravirt: Fix spectre-v2 mitigations for paravirt guests
Nadav reported that on guests we're failing to rewrite the indirect
calls to CALLEE_SAVE paravirt functions. In particular the
pv_queued_spin_unlock() call is left unpatched and that is all over the
place. This obviously wrecks Spectre-v2 mitigation (for paravirt
guests) which relies on not actually having indirect calls around.
The reason is an incorrect clobber test in paravirt_patch_call(); this
function rewrites an indirect call with a direct call to the _SAME_
function, there is no possible way the clobbers can be different
because of this.
Therefore remove this clobber check. Also put WARNs on the other patch
failure case (not enough room for the instruction) which I've not seen
trigger in my (limited) testing.
Three live kernel image disassemblies for lock_sock_nested (as a small
function that illustrates the problem nicely). PRE is the current
situation for guests, POST is with this patch applied and NATIVE is with
or without the patch for !guests.
PRE:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: callq *0xffffffff822299e8
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
POST:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: callq 0xffffffff810a0c20 <__raw_callee_save___pv_queued_spin_unlock>
0xffffffff817be9a5 <+53>: xchg %ax,%ax
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063aa0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
NATIVE:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: movb $0x0,(%rdi)
0xffffffff817be9a3 <+51>: nopl 0x0(%rax)
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
Fixes: 63f70270ccd9 ("[PATCH] i386: PARAVIRT: add common patching machinery")
Fixes: 3010a0663fd9 ("x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls")
Reported-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 79,060 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool skb_loop_sk(struct packet_type *ptype, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (!ptype->af_packet_priv || !skb->sk)
return false;
if (ptype->id_match)
return ptype->id_match(ptype, skb->sk);
else if ((struct sock *)ptype->af_packet_priv == skb->sk)
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t streamReplyWithRange(client *c, stream *s, streamID *start, streamID *end, size_t count, int rev, streamCG *group, streamConsumer *consumer, int flags, streamPropInfo *spi) {
void *arraylen_ptr = NULL;
size_t arraylen = 0;
streamIterator si;
int64_t numfields;
streamID id;
/* If a group was passed, we check if the request is about messages
* never delivered so far (normally this happens when ">" ID is passed).
*
* If instead the client is asking for some history, we serve it
* using a different function, so that we return entries *solely*
* from its own PEL. This ensures each consumer will always and only
* see the history of messages delivered to it and not yet confirmed
* as delivered. */
if (group && streamCompareID(start,&group->last_id) <= 0) {
return streamReplyWithRangeFromConsumerPEL(c,s,start,end,count,
consumer);
}
if (!(flags & STREAM_RWR_RAWENTRIES))
arraylen_ptr = addDeferredMultiBulkLength(c);
streamIteratorStart(&si,s,start,end,rev);
while(streamIteratorGetID(&si,&id,&numfields)) {
/* Update the group last_id if needed. */
if (group && streamCompareID(&id,&group->last_id) > 0)
group->last_id = id;
/* Emit a two elements array for each item. The first is
* the ID, the second is an array of field-value pairs. */
addReplyMultiBulkLen(c,2);
addReplyStreamID(c,&id);
addReplyMultiBulkLen(c,numfields*2);
/* Emit the field-value pairs. */
while(numfields--) {
unsigned char *key, *value;
int64_t key_len, value_len;
streamIteratorGetField(&si,&key,&value,&key_len,&value_len);
addReplyBulkCBuffer(c,key,key_len);
addReplyBulkCBuffer(c,value,value_len);
}
/* If a group is passed, we need to create an entry in the
* PEL (pending entries list) of this group *and* this consumer.
*
* Note that we cannot be sure about the fact the message is not
* already owned by another consumer, because the admin is able
* to change the consumer group last delivered ID using the
* XGROUP SETID command. So if we find that there is already
* a NACK for the entry, we need to associate it to the new
* consumer. */
if (group && !(flags & STREAM_RWR_NOACK)) {
unsigned char buf[sizeof(streamID)];
streamEncodeID(buf,&id);
/* Try to add a new NACK. Most of the time this will work and
* will not require extra lookups. We'll fix the problem later
* if we find that there is already a entry for this ID. */
streamNACK *nack = streamCreateNACK(consumer);
int retval = 0;
retval += raxTryInsert(group->pel,buf,sizeof(buf),nack,NULL);
retval += raxTryInsert(consumer->pel,buf,sizeof(buf),nack,NULL);
/* Now we can check if the entry was already busy, and
* in that case reassign the entry to the new consumer. */
if (retval == 0) {
streamFreeNACK(nack);
nack = raxFind(group->pel,buf,sizeof(buf));
serverAssert(nack != raxNotFound);
raxRemove(nack->consumer->pel,buf,sizeof(buf),NULL);
/* Update the consumer and idle time. */
nack->consumer = consumer;
nack->delivery_time = mstime();
nack->delivery_count++;
/* Add the entry in the new consumer local PEL. */
raxInsert(consumer->pel,buf,sizeof(buf),nack,NULL);
} else if (retval == 1) {
serverPanic("NACK half-created. Should not be possible.");
}
/* Propagate as XCLAIM. */
if (spi) {
robj *idarg = createObjectFromStreamID(&id);
streamPropagateXCLAIM(c,spi->keyname,spi->groupname,idarg,nack);
decrRefCount(idarg);
}
}
arraylen++;
if (count && count == arraylen) break;
}
streamIteratorStop(&si);
if (arraylen_ptr) setDeferredMultiBulkLength(c,arraylen_ptr,arraylen);
return arraylen;
}
Commit Message: Abort in XGROUP if the key is not a stream
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 81,807 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnSetTrusted(bool success) {
LOG_IF(WARNING, !success) << object_path_.value()
<< ": Failed to set device as trusted";
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void shmem_free_inode(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct shmem_sb_info *sbinfo = SHMEM_SB(sb);
if (sbinfo->max_inodes) {
spin_lock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
sbinfo->free_inodes++;
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
}
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ocfs2_change_file_space(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
struct ocfs2_space_resv *sr)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct ocfs2_super *osb = OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb);
int ret;
if ((cmd == OCFS2_IOC_RESVSP || cmd == OCFS2_IOC_RESVSP64) &&
!ocfs2_writes_unwritten_extents(osb))
return -ENOTTY;
else if ((cmd == OCFS2_IOC_UNRESVSP || cmd == OCFS2_IOC_UNRESVSP64) &&
!ocfs2_sparse_alloc(osb))
return -ENOTTY;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EINVAL;
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
return -EBADF;
ret = mnt_want_write_file(file);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = __ocfs2_change_file_space(file, inode, file->f_pos, cmd, sr, 0);
mnt_drop_write_file(file);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()
we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in
ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen:
process 1 process 2 process 3
truncate file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A' receiving the bast messages
ocfs2_setattr
ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker
ocfs2_inode_lock_full
inode_dio_wait
__inode_dio_wait
-->waiting for all dio
requests finish
dlm_proxy_ast_handler
dlm_do_local_bast
ocfs2_blocking_ast
ocfs2_generic_handle_bast
set OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag
dio_end_io
dio_bio_end_aio
dio_complete
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
ocfs2_inode_lock
__ocfs2_cluster_lock
ocfs2_wait_for_mask
-->waiting for OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED
flag to be cleared, that is waiting
for 'process 1' unlocking the inode lock
inode_dio_end
-->here dec the i_dio_count, but will never
be called, so a deadlock happened.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59F81636.70508@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 85,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool mac80211_hwsim_addr_match(struct mac80211_hwsim_data *data,
const u8 *addr)
{
struct mac80211_hwsim_addr_match_data md = {
.ret = false,
};
if (data->scanning && memcmp(addr, data->scan_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0)
return true;
memcpy(md.addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
ieee80211_iterate_active_interfaces_atomic(data->hw,
IEEE80211_IFACE_ITER_NORMAL,
mac80211_hwsim_addr_iter,
&md);
return md.ret;
}
Commit Message: mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 83,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reflectedCustomURLAttrAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::reflectedCustomURLAttrAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebKitWebViewViewMode webkit_web_view_get_view_mode(WebKitWebView* webView)
{
g_return_val_if_fail(WEBKIT_IS_WEB_VIEW(webView), WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW_VIEW_MODE_WINDOWED);
Page* page = core(webView);
Page::ViewMode mode = page->viewMode();
if (mode == Page::ViewModeFloating)
return WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW_VIEW_MODE_FLOATING;
if (mode == Page::ViewModeFullscreen)
return WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW_VIEW_MODE_FULLSCREEN;
if (mode == Page::ViewModeMaximized)
return WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW_VIEW_MODE_MAXIMIZED;
if (mode == Page::ViewModeMinimized)
return WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW_VIEW_MODE_MINIMIZED;
return WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW_VIEW_MODE_WINDOWED;
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int backupOnePage(
sqlite3_backup *p, /* Backup handle */
Pgno iSrcPg, /* Source database page to backup */
const u8 *zSrcData, /* Source database page data */
int bUpdate /* True for an update, false otherwise */
){
Pager * const pDestPager = sqlite3BtreePager(p->pDest);
const int nSrcPgsz = sqlite3BtreeGetPageSize(p->pSrc);
int nDestPgsz = sqlite3BtreeGetPageSize(p->pDest);
const int nCopy = MIN(nSrcPgsz, nDestPgsz);
const i64 iEnd = (i64)iSrcPg*(i64)nSrcPgsz;
#ifdef SQLITE_HAS_CODEC
/* Use BtreeGetReserveNoMutex() for the source b-tree, as although it is
** guaranteed that the shared-mutex is held by this thread, handle
** p->pSrc may not actually be the owner. */
int nSrcReserve = sqlite3BtreeGetReserveNoMutex(p->pSrc);
int nDestReserve = sqlite3BtreeGetOptimalReserve(p->pDest);
#endif
int rc = SQLITE_OK;
i64 iOff;
assert( sqlite3BtreeGetReserveNoMutex(p->pSrc)>=0 );
assert( p->bDestLocked );
assert( !isFatalError(p->rc) );
assert( iSrcPg!=PENDING_BYTE_PAGE(p->pSrc->pBt) );
assert( zSrcData );
/* Catch the case where the destination is an in-memory database and the
** page sizes of the source and destination differ.
*/
if( nSrcPgsz!=nDestPgsz && sqlite3PagerIsMemdb(pDestPager) ){
rc = SQLITE_READONLY;
}
#ifdef SQLITE_HAS_CODEC
/* Backup is not possible if the page size of the destination is changing
** and a codec is in use.
*/
if( nSrcPgsz!=nDestPgsz && sqlite3PagerGetCodec(pDestPager)!=0 ){
rc = SQLITE_READONLY;
}
/* Backup is not possible if the number of bytes of reserve space differ
** between source and destination. If there is a difference, try to
** fix the destination to agree with the source. If that is not possible,
** then the backup cannot proceed.
*/
if( nSrcReserve!=nDestReserve ){
u32 newPgsz = nSrcPgsz;
rc = sqlite3PagerSetPagesize(pDestPager, &newPgsz, nSrcReserve);
if( rc==SQLITE_OK && newPgsz!=nSrcPgsz ) rc = SQLITE_READONLY;
}
#endif
/* This loop runs once for each destination page spanned by the source
** page. For each iteration, variable iOff is set to the byte offset
** of the destination page.
*/
for(iOff=iEnd-(i64)nSrcPgsz; rc==SQLITE_OK && iOff<iEnd; iOff+=nDestPgsz){
DbPage *pDestPg = 0;
Pgno iDest = (Pgno)(iOff/nDestPgsz)+1;
if( iDest==PENDING_BYTE_PAGE(p->pDest->pBt) ) continue;
if( SQLITE_OK==(rc = sqlite3PagerGet(pDestPager, iDest, &pDestPg, 0))
&& SQLITE_OK==(rc = sqlite3PagerWrite(pDestPg))
){
const u8 *zIn = &zSrcData[iOff%nSrcPgsz];
u8 *zDestData = sqlite3PagerGetData(pDestPg);
u8 *zOut = &zDestData[iOff%nDestPgsz];
/* Copy the data from the source page into the destination page.
** Then clear the Btree layer MemPage.isInit flag. Both this module
** and the pager code use this trick (clearing the first byte
** of the page 'extra' space to invalidate the Btree layers
** cached parse of the page). MemPage.isInit is marked
** "MUST BE FIRST" for this purpose.
*/
memcpy(zOut, zIn, nCopy);
((u8 *)sqlite3PagerGetExtra(pDestPg))[0] = 0;
if( iOff==0 && bUpdate==0 ){
sqlite3Put4byte(&zOut[28], sqlite3BtreeLastPage(p->pSrc));
}
}
sqlite3PagerUnref(pDestPg);
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 151,655 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CoordinatorImpl::ClientInfo::~ClientInfo() {}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 150,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool CheckGsm(const uint8_t* buffer, int buffer_size) {
RCHECK(buffer_size >= 1024); // Need enough data to do a decent check.
int offset = 0;
while (offset < buffer_size) {
RCHECK((buffer[offset] & 0xf0) == 0xd0);
offset += 33;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup media BitReader ReadBits() calls
Initialize temporary values, check return values.
Small tweaks to solution proposed by adtolbar@microsoft.com.
Bug: 929962
Change-Id: Iaa7da7534174882d040ec7e4c353ba5cd0da5735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481085
Commit-Queue: Chrome Cunningham <chcunningham@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634889}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 151,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoundTriggerHwService::sendRecognitionEvent(struct sound_trigger_recognition_event *event,
Module *module)
{
AutoMutex lock(mServiceLock);
if (module == NULL) {
return;
}
sp<IMemory> eventMemory = prepareRecognitionEvent_l(event);
if (eventMemory == 0) {
return;
}
sp<Module> strongModule;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mModules.size(); i++) {
if (mModules.valueAt(i).get() == module) {
strongModule = mModules.valueAt(i);
break;
}
}
if (strongModule == 0) {
return;
}
sendCallbackEvent_l(new CallbackEvent(CallbackEvent::TYPE_RECOGNITION,
eventMemory, strongModule));
}
Commit Message: soundtrigger: add size check on sound model and recogntion data
Bug: 30148546
Change-Id: I082f535a853c96571887eeea37c6d41ecee7d8c0
(cherry picked from commit bb00d8f139ff51336ab3c810d35685003949bcf8)
(cherry picked from commit ef0c91518446e65533ca8bab6726a845f27c73fd)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(SSL *s)
{
return s->statem.in_handshake;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void withScriptStateVoidMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::withScriptStateVoidMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vivid_fb_init(struct vivid_dev *dev)
{
int ret;
dev->video_buffer_size = MAX_OSD_HEIGHT * MAX_OSD_WIDTH * 2;
dev->video_vbase = kzalloc(dev->video_buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA32);
if (dev->video_vbase == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
dev->video_pbase = virt_to_phys(dev->video_vbase);
pr_info("Framebuffer at 0x%lx, mapped to 0x%p, size %dk\n",
dev->video_pbase, dev->video_vbase,
dev->video_buffer_size / 1024);
/* Set the startup video mode information */
ret = vivid_fb_init_vidmode(dev);
if (ret) {
vivid_fb_release_buffers(dev);
return ret;
}
vivid_clear_fb(dev);
/* Register the framebuffer */
if (register_framebuffer(&dev->fb_info) < 0) {
vivid_fb_release_buffers(dev);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Set the card to the requested mode */
vivid_fb_set_par(&dev->fb_info);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] media/vivid-osd: fix info leak in ioctl
The vivid_fb_ioctl() code fails to initialize the 16 _reserved bytes of
struct fb_vblank after the ->hcount member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speirofr@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 41,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int edge_startup(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
struct edgeport_serial *edge_serial;
int status;
u16 product_id;
/* create our private serial structure */
edge_serial = kzalloc(sizeof(struct edgeport_serial), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!edge_serial)
return -ENOMEM;
mutex_init(&edge_serial->es_lock);
edge_serial->serial = serial;
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&edge_serial->heartbeat_work, edge_heartbeat_work);
usb_set_serial_data(serial, edge_serial);
status = download_fw(edge_serial);
if (status < 0) {
kfree(edge_serial);
return status;
}
if (status > 0)
return 1; /* bind but do not register any ports */
product_id = le16_to_cpu(
edge_serial->serial->dev->descriptor.idProduct);
/* Currently only the EP/416 models require heartbeat support */
if (edge_serial->fw_version > FW_HEARTBEAT_VERSION_CUTOFF) {
if (product_id == ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416 ||
product_id == ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416B) {
edge_serial->use_heartbeat = true;
}
}
edge_heartbeat_schedule(edge_serial);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix div-by-zero in set_termios
Fix a division-by-zero in set_termios when debugging is enabled and a
high-enough speed has been requested so that the divisor value becomes
zero.
Instead of just fixing the offending debug statement, cap the baud rate
at the base as a zero divisor value also appears to crash the firmware.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.12
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 93,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CustomButton::OnDragDone() {
if (state_ != STATE_DISABLED)
SetState(STATE_NORMAL);
}
Commit Message: Custom buttons should only handle accelerators when focused.
BUG=541415
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1437523005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360130}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
const unsigned char *key, uint16_t type, uint32_t handle)
{
unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
int ret;
ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
return ret;
INIT_BUF(tb);
store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
store32(tb, TPM_OSAP_SIZE);
store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OSAP);
store16(tb, type);
store32(tb, handle);
storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
s->handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
memcpy(s->enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)]),
TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
memcpy(enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) +
TPM_NONCE_SIZE]), TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
return TSS_rawhmac(s->secret, key, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 0, 0);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @u
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 57,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> longSequenceAttrAttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.longSequenceAttr._get");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
return v8Array(imp->longSequenceAttr(), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DECLAREwriteFunc(writeBufferToContigTiles)
{
uint32 imagew = TIFFScanlineSize(out);
uint32 tilew = TIFFTileRowSize(out);
int iskew = imagew - tilew;
tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(out);
tdata_t obuf;
uint8* bufp = (uint8*) buf;
uint32 tl, tw;
uint32 row;
(void) spp;
obuf = _TIFFmalloc(TIFFTileSize(out));
if (obuf == NULL)
return 0;
_TIFFmemset(obuf, 0, tilesize);
(void) TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tl);
(void) TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tw);
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tilelength) {
uint32 nrow = (row+tl > imagelength) ? imagelength-row : tl;
uint32 colb = 0;
uint32 col;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth; col += tw) {
/*
* Tile is clipped horizontally. Calculate
* visible portion and skewing factors.
*/
if (colb + tilew > imagew) {
uint32 width = imagew - colb;
int oskew = tilew - width;
cpStripToTile(obuf, bufp + colb, nrow, width,
oskew, oskew + iskew);
} else
cpStripToTile(obuf, bufp + colb, nrow, tilew,
0, iskew);
if (TIFFWriteTile(out, obuf, col, row, 0, 0) < 0) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out),
"Error, can't write tile at %lu %lu",
(unsigned long) col,
(unsigned long) row);
_TIFFfree(obuf);
return 0;
}
colb += tilew;
}
bufp += nrow * imagew;
}
_TIFFfree(obuf);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix read of undefined variable in case of missing
required tags. Found on test case of MSVR 35100.
* tools/tiffcrop.c: fix read of undefined buffer in
readContigStripsIntoBuffer() due to uint16 overflow. Probably not a
security issue but I can be wrong. Reported as MSVR 35100 by Axel
Souchet from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 48,295 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void set_ftrace_pid_function(ftrace_func_t func)
{
/* do not set ftrace_pid_function to itself! */
if (func != ftrace_pid_func)
ftrace_pid_function = func;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 30,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltExtModuleTopLevelLookup(const xmlChar * name, const xmlChar * URI)
{
xsltTopLevelFunction ret;
if ((xsltTopLevelsHash == NULL) || (name == NULL) || (URI == NULL))
return (NULL);
xmlMutexLock(xsltExtMutex);
XML_CAST_FPTR(ret) = xmlHashLookup2(xsltTopLevelsHash, name, URI);
xmlMutexUnlock(xsltExtMutex);
/* if lookup fails, attempt a dynamic load on supported platforms */
if (NULL == ret) {
if (!xsltExtModuleRegisterDynamic(URI)) {
xmlMutexLock(xsltExtMutex);
XML_CAST_FPTR(ret) = xmlHashLookup2(xsltTopLevelsHash, name, URI);
xmlMutexUnlock(xsltExtMutex);
}
}
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fuse_request_init(struct fuse_req *req, struct page **pages,
struct fuse_page_desc *page_descs,
unsigned npages)
{
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&req->list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&req->intr_entry);
init_waitqueue_head(&req->waitq);
refcount_set(&req->count, 1);
req->pages = pages;
req->page_descs = page_descs;
req->max_pages = npages;
__set_bit(FR_PENDING, &req->flags);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::printPage(WebFrame* frame) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, observers_, PrintPage(frame));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TIFFReadEncodedTile(TIFF* tif, uint32 tile, void* buf, tmsize_t size)
{
static const char module[] = "TIFFReadEncodedTile";
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
tmsize_t tilesize = tif->tif_tilesize;
if (!TIFFCheckRead(tif, 1))
return ((tmsize_t)(-1));
if (tile >= td->td_nstrips) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"%lu: Tile out of range, max %lu",
(unsigned long) tile, (unsigned long) td->td_nstrips);
return ((tmsize_t)(-1));
}
/* shortcut to avoid an extra memcpy() */
if( td->td_compression == COMPRESSION_NONE &&
size!=(tmsize_t)(-1) && size >= tilesize &&
!isMapped(tif) &&
((tif->tif_flags&TIFF_NOREADRAW)==0) )
{
if (TIFFReadRawTile1(tif, tile, buf, tilesize, module) != tilesize)
return ((tmsize_t)(-1));
if (!isFillOrder(tif, td->td_fillorder) &&
(tif->tif_flags & TIFF_NOBITREV) == 0)
TIFFReverseBits(buf,tilesize);
(*tif->tif_postdecode)(tif,buf,tilesize);
return (tilesize);
}
if (size == (tmsize_t)(-1))
size = tilesize;
else if (size > tilesize)
size = tilesize;
if (TIFFFillTile(tif, tile) && (*tif->tif_decodetile)(tif,
(uint8*) buf, size, (uint16)(tile/td->td_stripsperimage))) {
(*tif->tif_postdecode)(tif, (uint8*) buf, size);
return (size);
} else
return ((tmsize_t)(-1));
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_read.c, libtiff/tiffiop.h: fix uint32 overflow in
TIFFReadEncodedStrip() that caused an integer division by zero.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2596
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 70,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iperf_on_new_stream(struct iperf_stream *sp)
{
connect_msg(sp);
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,406 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __ip_append_data(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff_head *queue,
struct inet_cork *cork,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset,
int len, int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int transhdrlen,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct ip_options *opt = cork->opt;
int hh_len;
int exthdrlen;
int mtu;
int copy;
int err;
int offset = 0;
unsigned int maxfraglen, fragheaderlen;
int csummode = CHECKSUM_NONE;
struct rtable *rt = (struct rtable *)cork->dst;
exthdrlen = transhdrlen ? rt->dst.header_len : 0;
length += exthdrlen;
transhdrlen += exthdrlen;
mtu = cork->fragsize;
hh_len = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev);
fragheaderlen = sizeof(struct iphdr) + (opt ? opt->optlen : 0);
maxfraglen = ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen;
if (cork->length + length > 0xFFFF - fragheaderlen) {
ip_local_error(sk, EMSGSIZE, rt->rt_dst, inet->inet_dport,
mtu-exthdrlen);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
/*
* transhdrlen > 0 means that this is the first fragment and we wish
* it won't be fragmented in the future.
*/
if (transhdrlen &&
length + fragheaderlen <= mtu &&
rt->dst.dev->features & NETIF_F_V4_CSUM &&
!exthdrlen)
csummode = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
skb = skb_peek_tail(queue);
cork->length += length;
if (((length > mtu) || (skb && skb_is_gso(skb))) &&
(sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP) &&
(rt->dst.dev->features & NETIF_F_UFO)) {
err = ip_ufo_append_data(sk, queue, getfrag, from, length,
hh_len, fragheaderlen, transhdrlen,
mtu, flags);
if (err)
goto error;
return 0;
}
/* So, what's going on in the loop below?
*
* We use calculated fragment length to generate chained skb,
* each of segments is IP fragment ready for sending to network after
* adding appropriate IP header.
*/
if (!skb)
goto alloc_new_skb;
while (length > 0) {
/* Check if the remaining data fits into current packet. */
copy = mtu - skb->len;
if (copy < length)
copy = maxfraglen - skb->len;
if (copy <= 0) {
char *data;
unsigned int datalen;
unsigned int fraglen;
unsigned int fraggap;
unsigned int alloclen;
struct sk_buff *skb_prev;
alloc_new_skb:
skb_prev = skb;
if (skb_prev)
fraggap = skb_prev->len - maxfraglen;
else
fraggap = 0;
/*
* If remaining data exceeds the mtu,
* we know we need more fragment(s).
*/
datalen = length + fraggap;
if (datalen > mtu - fragheaderlen)
datalen = maxfraglen - fragheaderlen;
fraglen = datalen + fragheaderlen;
if ((flags & MSG_MORE) &&
!(rt->dst.dev->features&NETIF_F_SG))
alloclen = mtu;
else
alloclen = fraglen;
/* The last fragment gets additional space at tail.
* Note, with MSG_MORE we overallocate on fragments,
* because we have no idea what fragment will be
* the last.
*/
if (datalen == length + fraggap) {
alloclen += rt->dst.trailer_len;
/* make sure mtu is not reached */
if (datalen > mtu - fragheaderlen - rt->dst.trailer_len)
datalen -= ALIGN(rt->dst.trailer_len, 8);
}
if (transhdrlen) {
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
alloclen + hh_len + 15,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
} else {
skb = NULL;
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) <=
2 * sk->sk_sndbuf)
skb = sock_wmalloc(sk,
alloclen + hh_len + 15, 1,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (unlikely(skb == NULL))
err = -ENOBUFS;
else
/* only the initial fragment is
time stamped */
cork->tx_flags = 0;
}
if (skb == NULL)
goto error;
/*
* Fill in the control structures
*/
skb->ip_summed = csummode;
skb->csum = 0;
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len);
skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags = cork->tx_flags;
/*
* Find where to start putting bytes.
*/
data = skb_put(skb, fraglen);
skb_set_network_header(skb, exthdrlen);
skb->transport_header = (skb->network_header +
fragheaderlen);
data += fragheaderlen;
if (fraggap) {
skb->csum = skb_copy_and_csum_bits(
skb_prev, maxfraglen,
data + transhdrlen, fraggap, 0);
skb_prev->csum = csum_sub(skb_prev->csum,
skb->csum);
data += fraggap;
pskb_trim_unique(skb_prev, maxfraglen);
}
copy = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap;
if (copy > 0 && getfrag(from, data + transhdrlen, offset, copy, fraggap, skb) < 0) {
err = -EFAULT;
kfree_skb(skb);
goto error;
}
offset += copy;
length -= datalen - fraggap;
transhdrlen = 0;
exthdrlen = 0;
csummode = CHECKSUM_NONE;
/*
* Put the packet on the pending queue.
*/
__skb_queue_tail(queue, skb);
continue;
}
if (copy > length)
copy = length;
if (!(rt->dst.dev->features&NETIF_F_SG)) {
unsigned int off;
off = skb->len;
if (getfrag(from, skb_put(skb, copy),
offset, copy, off, skb) < 0) {
__skb_trim(skb, off);
err = -EFAULT;
goto error;
}
} else {
int i = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
skb_frag_t *frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i-1];
struct page *page = cork->page;
int off = cork->off;
unsigned int left;
if (page && (left = PAGE_SIZE - off) > 0) {
if (copy >= left)
copy = left;
if (page != frag->page) {
if (i == MAX_SKB_FRAGS) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto error;
}
get_page(page);
skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page, off, 0);
frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i];
}
} else if (i < MAX_SKB_FRAGS) {
if (copy > PAGE_SIZE)
copy = PAGE_SIZE;
page = alloc_pages(sk->sk_allocation, 0);
if (page == NULL) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
cork->page = page;
cork->off = 0;
skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page, 0, 0);
frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i];
} else {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto error;
}
if (getfrag(from, page_address(frag->page)+frag->page_offset+frag->size, offset, copy, skb->len, skb) < 0) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto error;
}
cork->off += copy;
frag->size += copy;
skb->len += copy;
skb->data_len += copy;
skb->truesize += copy;
atomic_add(copy, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
}
offset += copy;
length -= copy;
}
return 0;
error:
cork->length -= length;
IP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
return err;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadDCMPixels(Image *image,DCMInfo *info,
DCMStreamInfo *stream_info,MagickBooleanType first_segment,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
int
byte,
index;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PixelPacket
pixel;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register Quantum
*q;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Convert DCM Medical image to pixel packets.
*/
byte=0;
i=0;
status=MagickTrue;
(void) memset(&pixel,0,sizeof(pixel));
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (info->samples_per_pixel == 1)
{
int
pixel_value;
if (info->bytes_per_pixel == 1)
pixel_value=info->polarity != MagickFalse ?
((int) info->max_value-ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)) :
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
else
if ((info->bits_allocated != 12) || (info->significant_bits != 12))
{
if (info->signed_data)
pixel_value=ReadDCMSignedShort(stream_info,image);
else
pixel_value=(int) ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
if (info->polarity != MagickFalse)
pixel_value=(int)info->max_value-pixel_value;
}
else
{
if ((i & 0x01) != 0)
pixel_value=(ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image) << 8) |
byte;
else
{
pixel_value=ReadDCMSignedShort(stream_info,image);
byte=(int) (pixel_value & 0x0f);
pixel_value>>=4;
}
i++;
}
if (info->signed_data == 1)
pixel_value-=32767;
index=pixel_value;
if (info->rescale != MagickFalse)
{
double
scaled_value;
scaled_value=pixel_value*info->rescale_slope+
info->rescale_intercept;
index=(int) scaled_value;
if (info->window_width != 0)
{
double
window_max,
window_min;
window_min=ceil(info->window_center-
(info->window_width-1.0)/2.0-0.5);
window_max=floor(info->window_center+
(info->window_width-1.0)/2.0+0.5);
if (scaled_value <= window_min)
index=0;
else
if (scaled_value > window_max)
index=(int) info->max_value;
else
index=(int) (info->max_value*(((scaled_value-
info->window_center-0.5)/(info->window_width-1))+0.5));
}
}
index&=info->mask;
index=(int) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) index,exception);
if (first_segment)
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) index,q);
else
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) (((size_t) index) |
(((size_t) GetPixelIndex(image,q)) << 8)),q);
pixel.red=(unsigned int) image->colormap[index].red;
pixel.green=(unsigned int) image->colormap[index].green;
pixel.blue=(unsigned int) image->colormap[index].blue;
}
else
{
if (info->bytes_per_pixel == 1)
{
pixel.red=(unsigned int) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
pixel.green=(unsigned int) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
pixel.blue=(unsigned int) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
}
else
{
pixel.red=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
pixel.green=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
pixel.blue=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
}
pixel.red&=info->mask;
pixel.green&=info->mask;
pixel.blue&=info->mask;
if (info->scale != (Quantum *) NULL)
{
if ((MagickSizeType) pixel.red <= GetQuantumRange(info->depth))
pixel.red=info->scale[pixel.red];
if ((MagickSizeType) pixel.green <= GetQuantumRange(info->depth))
pixel.green=info->scale[pixel.green];
if ((MagickSizeType) pixel.blue <= GetQuantumRange(info->depth))
pixel.blue=info->scale[pixel.blue];
}
}
if (first_segment != MagickFalse)
{
SetPixelRed(image,(Quantum) pixel.red,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,(Quantum) pixel.green,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,(Quantum) pixel.blue,q);
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(image,(Quantum) (((size_t) pixel.red) |
(((size_t) GetPixelRed(image,q)) << 8)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,(Quantum) (((size_t) pixel.green) |
(((size_t) GetPixelGreen(image,q)) << 8)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,(Quantum) (((size_t) pixel.blue) |
(((size_t) GetPixelBlue(image,q)) << 8)),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1199
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 77,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WorkerProcessLauncher::Send(IPC::Message* message) {
core_->Send(message);
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string DownloadItemImpl::DebugString(bool verbose) const {
std::string description =
base::StringPrintf("{ id = %d"
" state = %s",
download_id_.local(),
DebugDownloadStateString(GetState()));
std::string url_list("<none>");
if (!url_chain_.empty()) {
std::vector<GURL>::const_iterator iter = url_chain_.begin();
std::vector<GURL>::const_iterator last = url_chain_.end();
url_list = (*iter).spec();
++iter;
for ( ; verbose && (iter != last); ++iter) {
url_list += " ->\n\t";
const GURL& next_url = *iter;
url_list += next_url.spec();
}
}
if (verbose) {
description += base::StringPrintf(
" db_handle = %" PRId64
" total = %" PRId64
" received = %" PRId64
" reason = %s"
" paused = %c"
" otr = %c"
" safety = %s"
" last_modified = '%s'"
" etag = '%s'"
" url_chain = \n\t\"%s\"\n\t"
" full_path = \"%" PRFilePath "\""
" target_path = \"%" PRFilePath "\"",
GetDbHandle(),
GetTotalBytes(),
GetReceivedBytes(),
InterruptReasonDebugString(last_reason_).c_str(),
IsPaused() ? 'T' : 'F',
IsOtr() ? 'T' : 'F',
DebugSafetyStateString(GetSafetyState()),
GetLastModifiedTime().c_str(),
GetETag().c_str(),
url_list.c_str(),
GetFullPath().value().c_str(),
GetTargetFilePath().value().c_str());
} else {
description += base::StringPrintf(" url = \"%s\"", url_list.c_str());
}
description += " }";
return description;
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint64 ReadBits(BitReader* reader, int num_bits) {
DCHECK_GE(reader->bits_available(), num_bits);
DCHECK((num_bits > 0) && (num_bits <= 64));
uint64 value;
reader->ReadBits(num_bits, &value);
return value;
}
Commit Message: Add extra checks to avoid integer overflow.
BUG=425980
TEST=no crash with ASAN
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/659743004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#301249}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 119,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void put_filp(struct file *file)
{
if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&file->f_count)) {
security_file_free(file);
file_sb_list_del(file);
file_free(file);
}
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 1 | 166,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void DidReceiveDataForClient(const char* data, unsigned data_length) {
if (!data_length)
return;
raw_data_->Append(data, data_length);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsClientClosed() { return client_peer_->quic_transport()->IsClosed(); }
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int blkcipher_next_copy(struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
{
u8 *tmp = walk->page;
blkcipher_map_src(walk);
memcpy(tmp, walk->src.virt.addr, walk->nbytes);
blkcipher_unmap_src(walk);
walk->src.virt.addr = tmp;
walk->dst.virt.addr = tmp;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::OpenRemotePage(const std::string& browser_id,
const std::string& url) {
if (!remote_targets_handler_)
return;
remote_targets_handler_->Open(browser_id, url);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 138,337 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BlockUntilStopped(WaitableEvent* task_start_event,
WaitableEvent* task_stop_event) {
task_start_event->Signal();
task_stop_event->Wait();
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: htmlSkipBlankChars(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
int res = 0;
while (IS_BLANK_CH(*(ctxt->input->cur))) {
if ((*ctxt->input->cur == 0) &&
(xmlParserInputGrow(ctxt->input, INPUT_CHUNK) <= 0)) {
xmlPopInput(ctxt);
} else {
if (*(ctxt->input->cur) == '\n') {
ctxt->input->line++; ctxt->input->col = 1;
} else ctxt->input->col++;
ctxt->input->cur++;
ctxt->nbChars++;
if (*ctxt->input->cur == 0)
xmlParserInputGrow(ctxt->input, INPUT_CHUNK);
}
res++;
}
return(res);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 150,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::BindPendingImagesForSamplers() {
for (TexturePendingBinding& pending : textures_pending_binding_)
BindOnePendingImage(pending.target, pending.texture.get());
textures_pending_binding_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void stringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestInterfaceNodeV8Internal::stringAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: binding: Removes unused code in templates/attributes.cpp.
Faking {{cpp_class}} and {{c8_class}} doesn't make sense.
Probably it made sense before the introduction of virtual
ScriptWrappable::wrap().
Checking the existence of window->document() doesn't seem
making sense to me, and CQ tests seem passing without the
check.
BUG=
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2268433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#413375}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 119,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LockContentsView::CreateLowDensityLayout(
const std::vector<mojom::LoginUserInfoPtr>& users) {
DCHECK_EQ(users.size(), 2u);
main_view_->AddChildView(MakeOrientationViewWithWidths(
kLowDensityDistanceBetweenUsersInLandscapeDp,
kLowDensityDistanceBetweenUsersInPortraitDp));
opt_secondary_big_view_ =
AllocateLoginBigUserView(users[1], false /*is_primary*/);
main_view_->AddChildView(opt_secondary_big_view_);
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebDOMNode WebPage::nodeAtDocumentPoint(const Platform::IntPoint& documentPoint)
{
HitTestResult result = d->m_mainFrame->eventHandler()->hitTestResultAtPoint(WebCore::IntPoint(documentPoint), false);
Node* node = result.innerNonSharedNode();
return WebDOMNode(node);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_GFV( INS_ARG )
{
DO_GFV
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DownloadItem* DownloadManagerImpl::CreateDownloadItem(
const std::string& guid,
uint32_t id,
const base::FilePath& current_path,
const base::FilePath& target_path,
const std::vector<GURL>& url_chain,
const GURL& referrer_url,
const GURL& site_url,
const GURL& tab_url,
const GURL& tab_refererr_url,
const std::string& mime_type,
const std::string& original_mime_type,
base::Time start_time,
base::Time end_time,
const std::string& etag,
const std::string& last_modified,
int64_t received_bytes,
int64_t total_bytes,
const std::string& hash,
DownloadItem::DownloadState state,
DownloadDangerType danger_type,
DownloadInterruptReason interrupt_reason,
bool opened,
base::Time last_access_time,
bool transient,
const std::vector<DownloadItem::ReceivedSlice>& received_slices) {
if (base::ContainsKey(downloads_, id)) {
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
DCHECK(!base::ContainsKey(downloads_by_guid_, guid));
DownloadItemImpl* item = item_factory_->CreatePersistedItem(
this, guid, id, current_path, target_path, url_chain, referrer_url,
site_url, tab_url, tab_refererr_url, mime_type, original_mime_type,
start_time, end_time, etag, last_modified, received_bytes, total_bytes,
hash, state, danger_type, interrupt_reason, opened, last_access_time,
transient, received_slices);
downloads_[id] = base::WrapUnique(item);
downloads_by_guid_[guid] = item;
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.OnDownloadCreated(this, item);
DVLOG(20) << __func__ << "() download = " << item->DebugString(true);
return item;
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,423 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PageInfoTest() { SetURL("http://www.example.com"); }
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 138,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ~ExpectNoWriteBarrierFires() {
EXPECT_TRUE(marking_worklist_->IsGlobalEmpty());
for (const auto& pair : headers_) {
EXPECT_EQ(pair.second, pair.first->IsMarked());
pair.first->Unmark();
}
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 153,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
time_t *ptime;
int i;
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
else
ptime = NULL;
i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
if (i == 0) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
ctx->current_cert = x;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
if (i > 0) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
ctx->current_cert = x;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
if (i == 0) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
ctx->current_cert = x;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
if (i < 0) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
ctx->current_cert = x;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 5,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void SerializedScriptValueAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "serializedScriptValueAttribute");
scoped_refptr<SerializedScriptValue> cpp_value = NativeValueTraits<SerializedScriptValue>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, SerializedScriptValue::SerializeOptions(SerializedScriptValue::kNotForStorage), exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setSerializedScriptValueAttribute(std::move(cpp_value));
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::willPerformClientRedirect(
WebFrame* frame, const WebURL& from, const WebURL& to, double interval,
double fire_time) {
const WebURL& blank_url = GURL(chrome::kAboutBlankURL);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
RenderViewObserver, observers_,
WillPerformClientRedirect(frame,
from == GURL(kSwappedOutURL) ? blank_url : from,
to, interval, fire_time));
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,647 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void net_enable_timestamp(void)
{
#ifdef HAVE_JUMP_LABEL
int deferred = atomic_xchg(&netstamp_needed_deferred, 0);
if (deferred) {
while (--deferred)
static_key_slow_dec(&netstamp_needed);
return;
}
#endif
static_key_slow_inc(&netstamp_needed);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sc_compare_oid(const struct sc_object_id *oid1, const struct sc_object_id *oid2)
{
int i;
if (oid1 == NULL || oid2 == NULL) {
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
}
for (i = 0; i < SC_MAX_OBJECT_ID_OCTETS; i++) {
if (oid1->value[i] != oid2->value[i])
return 0;
if (oid1->value[i] == -1)
break;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 78,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SynchronousCompositorImpl::OnComputeScroll(
base::TimeTicks animation_time) {
if (need_animate_input_) {
need_animate_input_ = false;
synchronous_input_handler_proxy_->SynchronouslyAnimate(animation_time);
}
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int map_operations (int commandbyte )
{
unsigned int op = (unsigned int)-1;
switch ( (commandbyte & 0xfe) ) {
case 0xe2: /* append record */ op = SC_AC_OP_UPDATE; break;
case 0x24: /* change password */ op = SC_AC_OP_UPDATE; break;
case 0xe0: /* create */ op = SC_AC_OP_CREATE; break;
case 0xe4: /* delete */ op = SC_AC_OP_DELETE; break;
case 0xe8: /* exclude sfi */ op = SC_AC_OP_WRITE; break;
case 0x82: /* external auth */ op = SC_AC_OP_READ; break;
case 0xe6: /* include sfi */ op = SC_AC_OP_WRITE; break;
case 0x88: /* internal auth */ op = SC_AC_OP_READ; break;
case 0x04: /* invalidate */ op = SC_AC_OP_INVALIDATE; break;
case 0x2a: /* perform sec. op */ op = SC_AC_OP_SELECT; break;
case 0xb0: /* read binary */ op = SC_AC_OP_READ; break;
case 0xb2: /* read record */ op = SC_AC_OP_READ; break;
case 0x44: /* rehabilitate */ op = SC_AC_OP_REHABILITATE; break;
case 0xa4: /* select */ op = SC_AC_OP_SELECT; break;
case 0xee: /* set permanent */ op = SC_AC_OP_CREATE; break;
case 0x2c: /* unblock password */op = SC_AC_OP_WRITE; break;
case 0xd6: /* update binary */ op = SC_AC_OP_WRITE; break;
case 0xdc: /* update record */ op = SC_AC_OP_WRITE; break;
case 0x20: /* verify password */ op = SC_AC_OP_SELECT; break;
case 0x60: /* admin group */ op = SC_AC_OP_CREATE; break;
}
return op;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 78,775 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ocfs2_remove_inode_range(struct inode *inode,
struct buffer_head *di_bh, u64 byte_start,
u64 byte_len)
{
int ret = 0, flags = 0, done = 0, i;
u32 trunc_start, trunc_len, trunc_end, trunc_cpos, phys_cpos;
u32 cluster_in_el;
struct ocfs2_super *osb = OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb);
struct ocfs2_cached_dealloc_ctxt dealloc;
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
struct ocfs2_extent_tree et;
struct ocfs2_path *path = NULL;
struct ocfs2_extent_list *el = NULL;
struct ocfs2_extent_rec *rec = NULL;
struct ocfs2_dinode *di = (struct ocfs2_dinode *)di_bh->b_data;
u64 blkno, refcount_loc = le64_to_cpu(di->i_refcount_loc);
ocfs2_init_dinode_extent_tree(&et, INODE_CACHE(inode), di_bh);
ocfs2_init_dealloc_ctxt(&dealloc);
trace_ocfs2_remove_inode_range(
(unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno,
(unsigned long long)byte_start,
(unsigned long long)byte_len);
if (byte_len == 0)
return 0;
if (OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) {
ret = ocfs2_truncate_inline(inode, di_bh, byte_start,
byte_start + byte_len, 0);
if (ret) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
/*
* There's no need to get fancy with the page cache
* truncate of an inline-data inode. We're talking
* about less than a page here, which will be cached
* in the dinode buffer anyway.
*/
unmap_mapping_range(mapping, 0, 0, 0);
truncate_inode_pages(mapping, 0);
goto out;
}
/*
* For reflinks, we may need to CoW 2 clusters which might be
* partially zero'd later, if hole's start and end offset were
* within one cluster(means is not exactly aligned to clustersize).
*/
if (ocfs2_is_refcount_inode(inode)) {
ret = ocfs2_cow_file_pos(inode, di_bh, byte_start);
if (ret) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
ret = ocfs2_cow_file_pos(inode, di_bh, byte_start + byte_len);
if (ret) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
}
trunc_start = ocfs2_clusters_for_bytes(osb->sb, byte_start);
trunc_end = (byte_start + byte_len) >> osb->s_clustersize_bits;
cluster_in_el = trunc_end;
ret = ocfs2_zero_partial_clusters(inode, byte_start, byte_len);
if (ret) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
path = ocfs2_new_path_from_et(&et);
if (!path) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
while (trunc_end > trunc_start) {
ret = ocfs2_find_path(INODE_CACHE(inode), path,
cluster_in_el);
if (ret) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
el = path_leaf_el(path);
i = ocfs2_find_rec(el, trunc_end);
/*
* Need to go to previous extent block.
*/
if (i < 0) {
if (path->p_tree_depth == 0)
break;
ret = ocfs2_find_cpos_for_left_leaf(inode->i_sb,
path,
&cluster_in_el);
if (ret) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
/*
* We've reached the leftmost extent block,
* it's safe to leave.
*/
if (cluster_in_el == 0)
break;
/*
* The 'pos' searched for previous extent block is
* always one cluster less than actual trunc_end.
*/
trunc_end = cluster_in_el + 1;
ocfs2_reinit_path(path, 1);
continue;
} else
rec = &el->l_recs[i];
ocfs2_calc_trunc_pos(inode, el, rec, trunc_start, &trunc_cpos,
&trunc_len, &trunc_end, &blkno, &done);
if (done)
break;
flags = rec->e_flags;
phys_cpos = ocfs2_blocks_to_clusters(inode->i_sb, blkno);
ret = ocfs2_remove_btree_range(inode, &et, trunc_cpos,
phys_cpos, trunc_len, flags,
&dealloc, refcount_loc, false);
if (ret < 0) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
cluster_in_el = trunc_end;
ocfs2_reinit_path(path, 1);
}
ocfs2_truncate_cluster_pages(inode, byte_start, byte_len);
out:
ocfs2_free_path(path);
ocfs2_schedule_truncate_log_flush(osb, 1);
ocfs2_run_deallocs(osb, &dealloc);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()
we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in
ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen:
process 1 process 2 process 3
truncate file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A' receiving the bast messages
ocfs2_setattr
ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker
ocfs2_inode_lock_full
inode_dio_wait
__inode_dio_wait
-->waiting for all dio
requests finish
dlm_proxy_ast_handler
dlm_do_local_bast
ocfs2_blocking_ast
ocfs2_generic_handle_bast
set OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag
dio_end_io
dio_bio_end_aio
dio_complete
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
ocfs2_inode_lock
__ocfs2_cluster_lock
ocfs2_wait_for_mask
-->waiting for OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED
flag to be cleared, that is waiting
for 'process 1' unlocking the inode lock
inode_dio_end
-->here dec the i_dio_count, but will never
be called, so a deadlock happened.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59F81636.70508@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 85,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::SetSurface(
const scoped_refptr<gl::GLSurface>& surface) {
DCHECK(context_->IsCurrent(nullptr));
DCHECK(surface_.get());
surface_ = surface;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ThreadableBlobRegistry::registerStreamURL(const KURL& url, const String& type)
{
if (isMainThread()) {
blobRegistry().registerStreamURL(url, type);
} else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url, type));
callOnMainThread(®isterStreamURLTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 1 | 170,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MojoResult Core::ReadData(MojoHandle data_pipe_consumer_handle,
void* elements,
uint32_t* num_bytes,
MojoReadDataFlags flags) {
RequestContext request_context;
scoped_refptr<Dispatcher> dispatcher(
GetDispatcher(data_pipe_consumer_handle));
if (!dispatcher)
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return dispatcher->ReadData(elements, num_bytes, flags);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned int skb_find_text(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int from,
unsigned int to, struct ts_config *config)
{
struct ts_state state;
unsigned int ret;
config->get_next_block = skb_ts_get_next_block;
config->finish = skb_ts_finish;
skb_prepare_seq_read(skb, from, to, TS_SKB_CB(&state));
ret = textsearch_find(config, &state);
return (ret <= to - from ? ret : UINT_MAX);
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 67,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BOOL CreateTaskbarList(void)
{
HRESULT hr;
if (nWindowsVersion < WINDOWS_7)
return FALSE;
hr = CoCreateInstance(&my_CLSID_TaskbarList, NULL, CLSCTX_ALL, &my_IID_ITaskbarList3, (LPVOID)&ptbl);
if (FAILED(hr)) {
uprintf("CoCreateInstance for TaskbarList failed: error %X\n", hr);
ptbl = NULL;
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: [pki] fix https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768
* This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as
it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit,
by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to
bypass the intended signature verification checks.
* It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed
certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells
them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it,
is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP.
* It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the
vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with
the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not
disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately,
before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a
generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not
immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability.
* Closes #1009
* Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which
doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately.
CWE ID: CWE-494 | 0 | 62,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mca_ccb_hdl_rsp(tMCA_CCB* p_ccb, tMCA_CCB_EVT* p_data) {
BT_HDR* p_pkt = &p_data->hdr;
uint8_t* p;
tMCA_CTRL evt_data;
bool chk_mdl = false;
tMCA_DCB* p_dcb;
tMCA_RESULT result = MCA_BAD_HANDLE;
tMCA_TC_TBL* p_tbl;
if (p_ccb->p_tx_req) {
/* verify that the received response matches the sent request */
p = (uint8_t*)(p_pkt + 1) + p_pkt->offset;
evt_data.hdr.op_code = *p++;
if ((evt_data.hdr.op_code == 0) ||
((p_ccb->p_tx_req->op_code + 1) == evt_data.hdr.op_code)) {
evt_data.rsp.rsp_code = *p++;
mca_stop_timer(p_ccb);
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(evt_data.hdr.mdl_id, p);
if (evt_data.hdr.op_code == MCA_OP_MDL_CREATE_RSP) {
evt_data.create_cfm.cfg = *p++;
chk_mdl = true;
} else if (evt_data.hdr.op_code == MCA_OP_MDL_RECONNECT_RSP)
chk_mdl = true;
if (chk_mdl) {
p_dcb = mca_dcb_by_hdl(p_ccb->p_tx_req->dcb_idx);
if (evt_data.rsp.rsp_code == MCA_RSP_SUCCESS) {
if (evt_data.hdr.mdl_id != p_dcb->mdl_id) {
MCA_TRACE_ERROR("peer's mdl_id=%d != our mdl_id=%d",
evt_data.hdr.mdl_id, p_dcb->mdl_id);
/* change the response code to be an error */
if (evt_data.rsp.rsp_code == MCA_RSP_SUCCESS) {
evt_data.rsp.rsp_code = MCA_RSP_BAD_MDL;
/* send Abort */
p_ccb->status = MCA_CCB_STAT_PENDING;
MCA_Abort(mca_ccb_to_hdl(p_ccb));
}
} else if (p_dcb->p_chnl_cfg) {
/* the data channel configuration is known. Proceed with data
* channel initiation */
BTM_SetSecurityLevel(true, "", BTM_SEC_SERVICE_MCAP_DATA,
p_ccb->sec_mask, p_ccb->data_vpsm,
BTM_SEC_PROTO_MCA, p_ccb->p_tx_req->dcb_idx);
p_dcb->lcid = mca_l2c_open_req(p_ccb->peer_addr, p_ccb->data_vpsm,
p_dcb->p_chnl_cfg);
if (p_dcb->lcid) {
p_tbl = mca_tc_tbl_dalloc(p_dcb);
if (p_tbl) {
p_tbl->state = MCA_TC_ST_CONN;
p_ccb->status = MCA_CCB_STAT_PENDING;
result = MCA_SUCCESS;
}
}
} else {
/* mark this MCL as pending and wait for MCA_DataChnlCfg */
p_ccb->status = MCA_CCB_STAT_PENDING;
result = MCA_SUCCESS;
}
}
if (result != MCA_SUCCESS && p_dcb) {
mca_dcb_dealloc(p_dcb, NULL);
}
} /* end of chk_mdl */
if (p_ccb->status != MCA_CCB_STAT_PENDING)
osi_free_and_reset((void**)&p_ccb->p_tx_req);
mca_ccb_report_event(p_ccb, evt_data.hdr.op_code, &evt_data);
}
/* else a bad response is received */
} else {
/* not expecting any response. drop it */
MCA_TRACE_WARNING("dropping received rsp (not expecting a response)");
}
osi_free(p_data);
}
Commit Message: Add packet length checks in mca_ccb_hdl_req
Bug: 110791536
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ica5d8037246682fdb190b2747a86ed8d44c2869a
(cherry picked from commit 4de7ccdd914b7a178df9180d15f675b257ea6e02)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: combine (gunichar a, gunichar b, gunichar * result)
{
gushort index_a, index_b;
if (combine_hangul (a, b, result))
return TRUE;
index_a = COMPOSE_INDEX (a);
if (index_a >= COMPOSE_FIRST_SINGLE_START && index_a < COMPOSE_SECOND_START)
{
if (b == compose_first_single[index_a - COMPOSE_FIRST_SINGLE_START][0])
{
*result =
compose_first_single[index_a - COMPOSE_FIRST_SINGLE_START][1];
return TRUE;
}
else
return FALSE;
}
index_b = COMPOSE_INDEX (b);
if (index_b >= COMPOSE_SECOND_SINGLE_START)
{
if (a ==
compose_second_single[index_b - COMPOSE_SECOND_SINGLE_START][0])
{
*result =
compose_second_single[index_b - COMPOSE_SECOND_SINGLE_START][1];
return TRUE;
}
else
return FALSE;
}
if (index_a >= COMPOSE_FIRST_START && index_a < COMPOSE_FIRST_SINGLE_START
&& index_b >= COMPOSE_SECOND_START
&& index_b < COMPOSE_SECOND_SINGLE_START)
{
gunichar res =
compose_array[index_a - COMPOSE_FIRST_START][index_b -
COMPOSE_SECOND_START];
if (res)
{
*result = res;
return TRUE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lz4_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct lz4_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
ctx->lz4_comp_mem = vmalloc(LZ4_MEM_COMPRESS);
if (!ctx->lz4_comp_mem)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bio_map_kern_endio(struct bio *bio)
{
bio_put(bio);
}
Commit Message: fix unbalanced page refcounting in bio_map_user_iov
bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if
IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page.
bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never
dropped.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 62,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport void UnregisterCINImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("CINEON");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hci_uart_set_flags(struct hci_uart *hu, unsigned long flags)
{
unsigned long valid_flags = BIT(HCI_UART_RAW_DEVICE) |
BIT(HCI_UART_RESET_ON_INIT) |
BIT(HCI_UART_CREATE_AMP) |
BIT(HCI_UART_INIT_PENDING) |
BIT(HCI_UART_EXT_CONFIG) |
BIT(HCI_UART_VND_DETECT);
if (flags & ~valid_flags)
return -EINVAL;
hu->hdev_flags = flags;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: hci_ldisc: Postpone HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit set in hci_uart_set_proto()
task A: task B:
hci_uart_set_proto flush_to_ldisc
- p->open(hu) -> h5_open //alloc h5 - receive_buf
- set_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY - tty_port_default_receive_buf
- hci_uart_register_dev - tty_ldisc_receive_buf
- hci_uart_tty_receive
- test_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY
- h5_recv
- clear_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY while() {
- p->open(hu) -> h5_close //free h5
- h5_rx_3wire_hdr
- h5_reset() //use-after-free
}
It could use ioctl to set hci uart proto, but there is
a use-after-free issue when hci_uart_register_dev() fail in
hci_uart_set_proto(), see stack above, fix this by setting
HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit only when hci_uart_register_dev()
return success.
Reported-by: syzbot+899a33dc0fa0dbaf06a6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 88,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bubbleSort(double array[])
{
for (int j = 0; j < 3; ++j) {
int kk = j;
for (int k = j + 1; k < 4; ++k) {
if (array[k] < array[kk]) {
kk = k;
}
}
double tmp = array[j];
array[j] = array[kk];
array[kk] = tmp;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,068 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::GetWebScreenInfo(blink::WebScreenInfo* result) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer_host", "RenderWidgetHostImpl::GetWebScreenInfo");
if (view_)
view_->GetScreenInfo(result);
else
RenderWidgetHostViewBase::GetDefaultScreenInfo(result);
latency_tracker_.set_device_scale_factor(result->deviceScaleFactor);
if (scale_input_to_viewport_)
input_router_->SetDeviceScaleFactor(result->deviceScaleFactor);
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID: | 0 | 130,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u64 __update_clear_spte_slow(u64 *sptep, u64 spte)
{
return xchg(sptep, spte);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void variadicStringMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::variadicStringMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PluginServiceImpl::GetPluginInfo(int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
ResourceContext* context,
const GURL& url,
const GURL& page_url,
const std::string& mime_type,
bool allow_wildcard,
bool* is_stale,
webkit::WebPluginInfo* info,
std::string* actual_mime_type) {
std::vector<webkit::WebPluginInfo> plugins;
std::vector<std::string> mime_types;
bool stale = GetPluginInfoArray(
url, mime_type, allow_wildcard, &plugins, &mime_types);
if (is_stale)
*is_stale = stale;
for (size_t i = 0; i < plugins.size(); ++i) {
if (!filter_ || filter_->IsPluginEnabled(render_process_id,
render_view_id,
context,
url,
page_url,
&plugins[i])) {
*info = plugins[i];
if (actual_mime_type)
*actual_mime_type = mime_types[i];
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 1 | 171,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsTopLevelNavigation(WebFrame* frame) {
return frame->Parent() == nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static jas_image_cmpt_t *jas_image_cmpt_copy(jas_image_cmpt_t *cmpt)
{
jas_image_cmpt_t *newcmpt;
if (!(newcmpt = jas_image_cmpt_create0())) {
return 0;
}
newcmpt->tlx_ = cmpt->tlx_;
newcmpt->tly_ = cmpt->tly_;
newcmpt->hstep_ = cmpt->hstep_;
newcmpt->vstep_ = cmpt->vstep_;
newcmpt->width_ = cmpt->width_;
newcmpt->height_ = cmpt->height_;
newcmpt->prec_ = cmpt->prec_;
newcmpt->sgnd_ = cmpt->sgnd_;
newcmpt->cps_ = cmpt->cps_;
newcmpt->type_ = cmpt->type_;
if (!(newcmpt->stream_ = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_seek(cmpt->stream_, 0, SEEK_SET)) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_copy(newcmpt->stream_, cmpt->stream_, -1)) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_seek(newcmpt->stream_, 0, SEEK_SET)) {
goto error;
}
return newcmpt;
error:
if (newcmpt) {
jas_image_cmpt_destroy(newcmpt);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String Document::webkitVisibilityState() const
{
return pageVisibilityStateString(visibilityState());
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sysapi_condor_arch(void)
{
SYSTEM_INFO info;
GetNativeSystemInfo(&info);
if ( info.wProcessorArchitecture >= PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE_INTEL
&& info.wProcessorArchitecture <= PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE_IA32_ON_WIN64 ) {
return windows_architectures[info.wProcessorArchitecture];
} else {
return unknown_architecture;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mxf_read_content_storage(void *arg, AVIOContext *pb, int tag, int size, UID uid, int64_t klv_offset)
{
MXFContext *mxf = arg;
switch (tag) {
case 0x1901:
if (mxf->packages_refs)
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "Multiple packages_refs\n");
av_free(mxf->packages_refs);
return mxf_read_strong_ref_array(pb, &mxf->packages_refs, &mxf->packages_count);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix DoS issues in mxf_read_index_entry_array()
Fixes: 20170829A.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <wangchu.zhl@alibaba-inc.com>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: exsltDateCastDateToNumber (const exsltDateValPtr dt)
{
double ret = 0.0;
if (dt == NULL)
return 0.0;
if ((dt->type & XS_GYEAR) == XS_GYEAR) {
ret = (double)_exsltDateCastYMToDays(dt) * SECS_PER_DAY;
}
/* add in days */
if (dt->type == XS_DURATION) {
ret += (double)dt->value.dur.day * SECS_PER_DAY;
ret += dt->value.dur.sec;
} else {
ret += (double)dt->value.date.day * SECS_PER_DAY;
/* add in time */
ret += TIME_TO_NUMBER(dt);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::EnsureMediaStreamImpl() {
#if defined(ENABLE_P2P_APIS)
if (!p2p_socket_dispatcher_)
p2p_socket_dispatcher_ = new content::P2PSocketDispatcher(this);
#endif
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
if (!media_stream_dispatcher_)
media_stream_dispatcher_ = new MediaStreamDispatcher(this);
if (!media_stream_impl_.get()) {
MediaStreamDependencyFactory* factory = new MediaStreamDependencyFactory();
media_stream_impl_ = new MediaStreamImpl(
media_stream_dispatcher_,
p2p_socket_dispatcher_,
RenderThreadImpl::current()->video_capture_impl_manager(),
factory);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u16 bnep_net_eth_proto(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ethhdr *eh = (void *) skb->data;
u16 proto = ntohs(eh->h_proto);
if (proto >= 1536)
return proto;
if (get_unaligned((__be16 *) skb->data) == htons(0xFFFF))
return ETH_P_802_3;
return ETH_P_802_2;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Editor::CountEvent(ExecutionContext* execution_context,
const Event* event) {
if (!execution_context)
return;
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::textInput) {
CountEditingEvent(execution_context, event,
WebFeature::kTextInputEventOnInput,
WebFeature::kTextInputEventOnTextArea,
WebFeature::kTextInputEventOnContentEditable,
WebFeature::kTextInputEventOnNotNode);
return;
}
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::webkitBeforeTextInserted) {
CountEditingEvent(execution_context, event,
WebFeature::kWebkitBeforeTextInsertedOnInput,
WebFeature::kWebkitBeforeTextInsertedOnTextArea,
WebFeature::kWebkitBeforeTextInsertedOnContentEditable,
WebFeature::kWebkitBeforeTextInsertedOnNotNode);
return;
}
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::webkitEditableContentChanged) {
CountEditingEvent(
execution_context, event,
WebFeature::kWebkitEditableContentChangedOnInput,
WebFeature::kWebkitEditableContentChangedOnTextArea,
WebFeature::kWebkitEditableContentChangedOnContentEditable,
WebFeature::kWebkitEditableContentChangedOnNotNode);
}
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SupervisedUserService::OnPermissionRequestIssued(
const CreatePermissionRequestCallback& create_request,
SuccessCallback callback,
size_t index,
bool success) {
if (success) {
std::move(callback).Run(true);
return;
}
AddPermissionRequestInternal(create_request, std::move(callback), index + 1);
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HeadlessWebContentsImpl* HeadlessWebContentsImpl::From(
HeadlessWebContents* web_contents) {
return static_cast<HeadlessWebContentsImpl*>(web_contents);
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 126,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseArena::prepareForSweep() {
ASSERT(getThreadState()->isInGC());
ASSERT(!m_firstUnsweptPage);
m_firstUnsweptPage = m_firstPage;
m_firstPage = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 147,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pipe_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
{
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe = filp->private_data;
int retval = 0;
__pipe_lock(pipe);
if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
retval = fasync_helper(fd, filp, on, &pipe->fasync_readers);
if ((filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) && retval >= 0) {
retval = fasync_helper(fd, filp, on, &pipe->fasync_writers);
if (retval < 0 && (filp->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
/* this can happen only if on == T */
fasync_helper(-1, filp, 0, &pipe->fasync_readers);
}
__pipe_unlock(pipe);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: new helper: copy_page_from_iter()
parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became
->write_iter()).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 44,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameImpl::Reload() {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <kmarshall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <fdegans@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 131,212 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ipa_udata_set(wmfAPI * API, wmfUserData_t * userdata)
{
(void) API;
(void) userdata;
/* wmf_magick_t* ddata = WMF_MAGICK_GetData (API); */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Get(int64 metahandle, syncable::IsDelField field) {
return GetField(metahandle, field, false);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport ssize_t FormatLocaleString(char *magick_restrict string,
const size_t length,const char *magick_restrict format,...)
{
ssize_t
n;
va_list
operands;
va_start(operands,format);
n=FormatLocaleStringList(string,length,format,operands);
va_end(operands);
return(n);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 90,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cirrus_invalidate_region(CirrusVGAState * s, int off_begin,
int off_pitch, int bytesperline,
int lines)
{
int y;
int off_cur;
int off_cur_end;
for (y = 0; y < lines; y++) {
off_cur = off_begin;
off_cur_end = (off_cur + bytesperline) & s->cirrus_addr_mask;
memory_region_set_dirty(&s->vga.vram, off_cur, off_cur_end - off_cur);
off_begin += off_pitch;
}
uint8_t *dst;
dst = s->vga.vram_ptr + (s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask);
if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false))
return 0;
(*s->cirrus_rop) (s, dst, src,
s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, 0,
s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_width,
s->cirrus_blt_height);
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 165,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tcp_urg(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tcphdr *th)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
/* Check if we get a new urgent pointer - normally not. */
if (th->urg)
tcp_check_urg(sk, th);
/* Do we wait for any urgent data? - normally not... */
if (tp->urg_data == TCP_URG_NOTYET) {
u32 ptr = tp->urg_seq - ntohl(th->seq) + (th->doff * 4) -
th->syn;
/* Is the urgent pointer pointing into this packet? */
if (ptr < skb->len) {
u8 tmp;
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, ptr, &tmp, 1))
BUG();
tp->urg_data = TCP_URG_VALID | tmp;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 0);
}
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 41,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sock_diag_unregister(const struct sock_diag_handler *hnld)
{
int family = hnld->family;
if (family >= AF_MAX)
return;
mutex_lock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
BUG_ON(sock_diag_handlers[family] != hnld);
sock_diag_handlers[family] = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
}
Commit Message: sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[]
Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY
with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of
sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this
condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening
doors for a privilege escalation.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: device_partition_table_create_authorized_cb (Daemon *daemon,
Device *device,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
const gchar *action_id,
guint num_user_data,
gpointer *user_data_elements)
{
const char *scheme = user_data_elements[0];
char **options = user_data_elements[1];
int n;
int m;
char *argv[128];
GError *error;
error = NULL;
if (device_local_is_busy (device, TRUE, &error))
{
dbus_g_method_return_error (context, error);
g_error_free (error);
goto out;
}
if (strlen (scheme) == 0)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "type not specified");
goto out;
}
n = 0;
argv[n++] = "udisks-helper-create-partition-table";
if (device->priv->device_is_linux_dmmp)
argv[n++] = (gchar *) get_dmmp_device_node (device);
else
argv[n++] = device->priv->device_file;
argv[n++] = (char *) scheme;
for (m = 0; options[m] != NULL; m++)
{
if (n >= (int) sizeof(argv) - 1)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Too many options");
goto out;
}
/* the helper will validate each option */
argv[n++] = (char *) options[m];
}
argv[n++] = NULL;
if (!job_new (context,
"PartitionTableCreate",
TRUE,
device,
argv,
NULL,
partition_table_create_completed_cb,
FALSE,
partition_table_create_data_new (context, device, scheme),
(GDestroyNotify) partition_table_create_data_unref))
{
goto out;
}
out:
;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void t1_subset_ascii_part(void)
{
int i, j;
t1_getline();
while (!t1_prefix("/Encoding")) {
t1_scan_param();
if (!(t1_prefix("/UniqueID")
&& !strncmp(t1_line_array + strlen(t1_line_array) -4, "def", 3)))
t1_putline();
t1_getline();
}
if (is_reencoded(fm_cur))
t1_glyph_names = external_enc();
else
t1_glyph_names = t1_builtin_enc();
if (is_included(fm_cur) && is_subsetted(fm_cur)) {
make_subset_tag(fm_cur, t1_glyph_names);
update_subset_tag();
}
if (t1_encoding == ENC_STANDARD)
t1_puts("/Encoding StandardEncoding def\n");
else {
t1_puts
("/Encoding 256 array\n0 1 255 {1 index exch /.notdef put} for\n");
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < 256; i++) {
if (is_used_char(i) && t1_glyph_names[i] != notdef) {
j++;
t1_printf("dup %i /%s put\n", (int)t1_char(i), t1_glyph_names[i]);
}
}
if (j == 0)
/* We didn't mark anything for the Encoding array. */
/* We add "dup 0 /.notdef put" for compatibility */
/* with Acrobat 5.0. */
t1_puts("dup 0 /.notdef put\n");
t1_puts("readonly def\n");
}
do {
t1_getline();
t1_scan_param();
if (!t1_prefix("/UniqueID")) /* ignore UniqueID for subsetted fonts */
t1_putline();
} while (t1_in_eexec == 0);
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 76,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterMPCImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("CACHE");
entry->description=ConstantString("Magick Persistent Cache image format");
entry->module=ConstantString("CACHE");
entry->stealth=MagickTrue;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("MPC");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadMPCImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteMPCImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsMPC;
entry->description=ConstantString("Magick Persistent Cache image format");
entry->module=ConstantString("MPC");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 AuthenticatorGenericErrorSheetModel::GetStepTitle() const {
return title_;
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __init int init_posix_timers(void)
{
posix_timers_cache = kmem_cache_create("posix_timers_cache",
sizeof (struct k_itimer), 0, SLAB_PANIC,
NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify
timer_create() specifies via sigevent->sigev_notify the signal delivery for
the new timer. The valid modes are SIGEV_NONE, SIGEV_SIGNAL, SIGEV_THREAD
and (SIGEV_SIGNAL | SIGEV_THREAD_ID).
The sanity check in good_sigevent() is only checking the valid combination
for the SIGEV_THREAD_ID bit, i.e. SIGEV_SIGNAL, but if SIGEV_THREAD_ID is
not set it accepts any random value.
This has no real effects on the posix timer and signal delivery code, but
it affects show_timer() which handles the output of /proc/$PID/timers. That
function uses a string array to pretty print sigev_notify. The access to
that array has no bound checks, so random sigev_notify cause access beyond
the array bounds.
Add proper checks for the valid notify modes and remove the SIGEV_THREAD_ID
masking from various code pathes as SIGEV_NONE can never be set in
combination with SIGEV_THREAD_ID.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 85,138 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void svm_hardware_disable(void)
{
/* Make sure we clean up behind us */
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR))
wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO, TSC_RATIO_DEFAULT);
cpu_svm_disable();
amd_pmu_disable_virt();
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 37,861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<net::test_server::HttpResponse> BasicResponse(
const std::string& content,
const net::test_server::HttpRequest& request) {
auto response = std::make_unique<net::test_server::BasicHttpResponse>();
response->set_content(content);
response->set_content_type("text/plain");
return response;
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,832 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool migrate_balanced_pgdat(struct pglist_data *pgdat,
unsigned long nr_migrate_pages)
{
int z;
for (z = pgdat->nr_zones - 1; z >= 0; z--) {
struct zone *zone = pgdat->node_zones + z;
if (!populated_zone(zone))
continue;
if (!zone_reclaimable(zone))
continue;
/* Avoid waking kswapd by allocating pages_to_migrate pages. */
if (!zone_watermark_ok(zone, 0,
high_wmark_pages(zone) +
nr_migrate_pages,
0, 0))
continue;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: mm: migrate dirty page without clear_page_dirty_for_io etc
clear_page_dirty_for_io() has accumulated writeback and memcg subtleties
since v2.6.16 first introduced page migration; and the set_page_dirty()
which completed its migration of PageDirty, later had to be moderated to
__set_page_dirty_nobuffers(); then PageSwapBacked had to skip that too.
No actual problems seen with this procedure recently, but if you look into
what the clear_page_dirty_for_io(page)+set_page_dirty(newpage) is actually
achieving, it turns out to be nothing more than moving the PageDirty flag,
and its NR_FILE_DIRTY stat from one zone to another.
It would be good to avoid a pile of irrelevant decrementations and
incrementations, and improper event counting, and unnecessary descent of
the radix_tree under tree_lock (to set the PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY which
radix_tree_replace_slot() left in place anyway).
Do the NR_FILE_DIRTY movement, like the other stats movements, while
interrupts still disabled in migrate_page_move_mapping(); and don't even
bother if the zone is the same. Do the PageDirty movement there under
tree_lock too, where old page is frozen and newpage not yet visible:
bearing in mind that as soon as newpage becomes visible in radix_tree, an
un-page-locked set_page_dirty() might interfere (or perhaps that's just
not possible: anything doing so should already hold an additional
reference to the old page, preventing its migration; but play safe).
But we do still need to transfer PageDirty in migrate_page_copy(), for
those who don't go the mapping route through migrate_page_move_mapping().
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 54,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: normalizePublicId(XML_Char *publicId) {
XML_Char *p = publicId;
XML_Char *s;
for (s = publicId; *s; s++) {
switch (*s) {
case 0x20:
case 0xD:
case 0xA:
if (p != publicId && p[-1] != 0x20)
*p++ = 0x20;
break;
default:
*p++ = *s;
}
}
if (p != publicId && p[-1] == 0x20)
--p;
*p = XML_T('\0');
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 88,288 |
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