instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OMXCodec::fillOutputBuffer(IOMX::buffer_id buffer) {
Vector<BufferInfo> *buffers = &mPortBuffers[kPortIndexOutput];
for (size_t i = 0; i < buffers->size(); ++i) {
if ((*buffers)[i].mBuffer == buffer) {
fillOutputBuffer(&buffers->editItemAt(i));
return;
}
}
CHECK(!"should not be here.");
}
Commit Message: OMXCodec: check IMemory::pointer() before using allocation
Bug: 29421811
Change-Id: I0a73ba12bae4122f1d89fc92e5ea4f6a96cd1ed1
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct dentry *lookup_hash(struct nameidata *nd)
{
return __lookup_hash(&nd->last, nd->path.dentry, nd->flags);
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 36,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ShapeInsideInfo* RenderBlock::layoutShapeInsideInfo() const
{
ShapeInsideInfo* shapeInsideInfo = view()->layoutState()->shapeInsideInfo();
if (!shapeInsideInfo && flowThreadContainingBlock() && allowsShapeInsideInfoSharing()) {
LayoutUnit offset = logicalHeight() + logicalHeightForLine(this, false) - LayoutUnit(1);
RenderRegion* region = regionAtBlockOffset(offset);
if (region)
shapeInsideInfo = region->shapeInsideInfo();
}
return shapeInsideInfo;
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SyncManager::ReceivedExperiment(browser_sync::Experiments* experiments)
const {
ReadTransaction trans(FROM_HERE, GetUserShare());
ReadNode node(&trans);
if (node.InitByTagLookup(kNigoriTag) != sync_api::BaseNode::INIT_OK) {
DVLOG(1) << "Couldn't find Nigori node.";
return false;
}
bool found_experiment = false;
if (node.GetNigoriSpecifics().sync_tabs()) {
experiments->sync_tabs = true;
found_experiment = true;
}
if (node.GetNigoriSpecifics().sync_tab_favicons()) {
experiments->sync_tab_favicons = true;
found_experiment = true;
}
return found_experiment;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 170,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void predictor_decode_stereo_3950(APEContext *ctx, int count)
{
APEPredictor *p = &ctx->predictor;
int32_t *decoded0 = ctx->decoded[0];
int32_t *decoded1 = ctx->decoded[1];
ape_apply_filters(ctx, ctx->decoded[0], ctx->decoded[1], count);
while (count--) {
/* Predictor Y */
*decoded0 = predictor_update_filter(p, *decoded0, 0, YDELAYA, YDELAYB,
YADAPTCOEFFSA, YADAPTCOEFFSB);
decoded0++;
*decoded1 = predictor_update_filter(p, *decoded1, 1, XDELAYA, XDELAYB,
XADAPTCOEFFSA, XADAPTCOEFFSB);
decoded1++;
/* Combined */
p->buf++;
/* Have we filled the history buffer? */
if (p->buf == p->historybuffer + HISTORY_SIZE) {
memmove(p->historybuffer, p->buf,
PREDICTOR_SIZE * sizeof(*p->historybuffer));
p->buf = p->historybuffer;
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/apedec: Fix integer overflow
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: PoC.ape and others
Found-by: Bingchang, Liu@VARAS of IIE
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 63,425 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_vm_readpages(
struct file *unused,
struct address_space *mapping,
struct list_head *pages,
unsigned nr_pages)
{
trace_xfs_vm_readpages(mapping->host, nr_pages);
return mpage_readpages(mapping, pages, nr_pages, xfs_get_blocks);
}
Commit Message: xfs: don't BUG() on mixed direct and mapped I/O
We've had reports of generic/095 causing XFS to BUG() in
__xfs_get_blocks() due to the existence of delalloc blocks on a
direct I/O read. generic/095 issues a mix of various types of I/O,
including direct and memory mapped I/O to a single file. This is
clearly not supported behavior and is known to lead to such
problems. E.g., the lack of exclusion between the direct I/O and
write fault paths means that a write fault can allocate delalloc
blocks in a region of a file that was previously a hole after the
direct read has attempted to flush/inval the file range, but before
it actually reads the block mapping. In turn, the direct read
discovers a delalloc extent and cannot proceed.
While the appropriate solution here is to not mix direct and memory
mapped I/O to the same regions of the same file, the current
BUG_ON() behavior is probably overkill as it can crash the entire
system. Instead, localize the failure to the I/O in question by
returning an error for a direct I/O that cannot be handled safely
due to delalloc blocks. Be careful to allow the case of a direct
write to post-eof delalloc blocks. This can occur due to speculative
preallocation and is safe as post-eof blocks are not accompanied by
dirty pages in pagecache (conversely, preallocation within eof must
have been zeroed, and thus dirtied, before the inode size could have
been increased beyond said blocks).
Finally, provide an additional warning if a direct I/O write occurs
while the file is memory mapped. This may not catch all problematic
scenarios, but provides a hint that some known-to-be-problematic I/O
methods are in use.
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 93,972 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void writeTransferredMessagePort(uint32_t index)
{
append(MessagePortTag);
doWriteUint32(index);
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: stf_status ikev2parent_inR1outI2(struct msg_digest *md)
{
struct state *st = md->st;
/* struct connection *c = st->st_connection; */
pb_stream *keyex_pbs;
/* check if the responder replied with v2N with DOS COOKIE */
if ( md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N] &&
md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N]->payload.v2n.isan_type ==
v2N_COOKIE) {
u_int8_t spisize;
const pb_stream *dc_pbs;
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log(
"inR1OutI2 received a DOS v2N_COOKIE from the responder");
DBG_log("resend the I1 with a cookie payload"));
spisize = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N]->payload.v2n.isan_spisize;
dc_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N]->pbs;
clonetochunk(st->st_dcookie, (dc_pbs->cur + spisize),
(pbs_left(
dc_pbs) - spisize),
"saved received dcookie");
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_dump_chunk("dcookie received (instead of a R1):",
st->st_dcookie);
DBG_log("next STATE_PARENT_I1 resend I1 with the dcookie"));
md->svm = ikev2_parent_firststate();
change_state(st, STATE_PARENT_I1);
st->st_msgid_lastack = INVALID_MSGID;
md->msgid_received = INVALID_MSGID; /* AAA hack */
st->st_msgid_nextuse = 0;
return ikev2_parent_outI1_common(md, st);
}
/*
* If we did not get a KE payload, we cannot continue. There * should be
* a Notify telling us why. We inform the user, but continue to try this
* connection via regular retransmit intervals.
*/
if ( md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N] &&
(md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE] == NULL)) {
const char *from_state_name = enum_name(&state_names,
st->st_state);
const u_int16_t isan_type =
md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N]->payload.v2n.isan_type;
libreswan_log("%s: received %s",
from_state_name,
enum_name(&ikev2_notify_names, isan_type));
return STF_FAIL + isan_type;
} else if ( md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N]) {
DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("received a notify.."));
}
/*
* the responder sent us back KE, Gr, Nr, and it's our time to calculate
* the shared key values.
*/
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log(
"ikev2 parent inR1: calculating g^{xy} in order to send I2"));
/* KE in */
keyex_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE]->pbs;
RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_KE(&st->st_gr, "Gr", st->st_oakley.group,
keyex_pbs));
/* Ni in */
RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_v2_nonce(md, &st->st_nr, "Ni"));
if (md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA] == NULL) {
libreswan_log("No responder SA proposal found");
return v2N_INVALID_SYNTAX;
}
/* process and confirm the SA selected */
{
struct payload_digest *const sa_pd =
md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA];
v2_notification_t rn;
/* SA body in and out */
rn = ikev2_parse_parent_sa_body(&sa_pd->pbs,
&sa_pd->payload.v2sa,
NULL, st, FALSE);
if (rn != v2N_NOTHING_WRONG)
return STF_FAIL + rn;
}
/* update state */
ikev2_update_counters(md);
/* now. we need to go calculate the g^xy */
{
struct dh_continuation *dh = alloc_thing(
struct dh_continuation,
"ikev2_inR1outI2 KE");
stf_status e;
dh->md = md;
set_suspended(st, dh->md);
pcrc_init(&dh->dh_pcrc);
dh->dh_pcrc.pcrc_func = ikev2_parent_inR1outI2_continue;
e = start_dh_v2(&dh->dh_pcrc, st, st->st_import, INITIATOR,
st->st_oakley.groupnum);
if (e != STF_SUSPEND && e != STF_INLINE) {
loglog(RC_CRYPTOFAILED, "system too busy");
delete_state(st);
}
reset_globals();
return e;
}
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: Properly handle IKEv2 I1 notification packet without KE payload
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSValue jsFloat64ArrayConstructor(ExecState* exec, JSValue slotBase, const Identifier&)
{
JSFloat64Array* domObject = jsCast<JSFloat64Array*>(asObject(slotBase));
return JSFloat64Array::getConstructor(exec, domObject->globalObject());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gst_qtdemux_chain (GstPad * sinkpad, GstBuffer * inbuf)
{
GstQTDemux *demux;
GstFlowReturn ret = GST_FLOW_OK;
demux = GST_QTDEMUX (gst_pad_get_parent (sinkpad));
gst_adapter_push (demux->adapter, inbuf);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "pushing in inbuf %p, neededbytes:%u, available:%u",
inbuf, demux->neededbytes, gst_adapter_available (demux->adapter));
while (((gst_adapter_available (demux->adapter)) >= demux->neededbytes) &&
(ret == GST_FLOW_OK)) {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux,
"state:%d , demux->neededbytes:%d, demux->offset:%lld", demux->state,
demux->neededbytes, demux->offset);
switch (demux->state) {
case QTDEMUX_STATE_INITIAL:{
const guint8 *data;
guint32 fourcc;
guint64 size;
data = gst_adapter_peek (demux->adapter, demux->neededbytes);
/* get fourcc/length, set neededbytes */
extract_initial_length_and_fourcc ((guint8 *) data, &size, &fourcc);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux,
"Peeking found [%" GST_FOURCC_FORMAT "] size: %u",
GST_FOURCC_ARGS (fourcc), (guint) size);
if (size == 0) {
GST_ELEMENT_ERROR (demux, STREAM, DECODE,
(_("This file is invalid and cannot be played.")),
("initial atom '%" GST_FOURCC_FORMAT "' has empty length",
GST_FOURCC_ARGS (fourcc)));
ret = GST_FLOW_ERROR;
break;
}
if (fourcc == FOURCC_mdat) {
if (demux->n_streams > 0) {
demux->state = QTDEMUX_STATE_MOVIE;
demux->neededbytes = next_entry_size (demux);
} else {
demux->state = QTDEMUX_STATE_BUFFER_MDAT;
demux->neededbytes = size;
demux->mdatoffset = demux->offset;
}
} else {
demux->neededbytes = size;
demux->state = QTDEMUX_STATE_HEADER;
}
break;
}
case QTDEMUX_STATE_HEADER:{
guint8 *data;
guint32 fourcc;
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "In header");
data = gst_adapter_take (demux->adapter, demux->neededbytes);
/* parse the header */
extract_initial_length_and_fourcc (data, NULL, &fourcc);
if (fourcc == FOURCC_moov) {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "Parsing [moov]");
qtdemux_parse_moov (demux, data, demux->neededbytes);
qtdemux_node_dump (demux, demux->moov_node);
qtdemux_parse_tree (demux);
g_node_destroy (demux->moov_node);
g_free (data);
demux->moov_node = NULL;
} else {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (demux,
"Unknown fourcc while parsing header : %" GST_FOURCC_FORMAT,
GST_FOURCC_ARGS (fourcc));
/* Let's jump that one and go back to initial state */
}
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "Finished parsing the header");
if (demux->mdatbuffer && demux->n_streams) {
/* the mdat was before the header */
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "We have n_streams:%d and mdatbuffer:%p",
demux->n_streams, demux->mdatbuffer);
gst_adapter_clear (demux->adapter);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "mdatbuffer starts with %" GST_FOURCC_FORMAT,
GST_FOURCC_ARGS (QT_UINT32 (demux->mdatbuffer)));
gst_adapter_push (demux->adapter, demux->mdatbuffer);
demux->mdatbuffer = NULL;
demux->offset = demux->mdatoffset;
demux->neededbytes = next_entry_size (demux);
demux->state = QTDEMUX_STATE_MOVIE;
} else {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "Carrying on normally");
demux->offset += demux->neededbytes;
demux->neededbytes = 16;
demux->state = QTDEMUX_STATE_INITIAL;
}
break;
}
case QTDEMUX_STATE_BUFFER_MDAT:{
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "Got our buffer at offset %lld",
demux->mdatoffset);
if (demux->mdatbuffer)
gst_buffer_unref (demux->mdatbuffer);
demux->mdatbuffer = gst_buffer_new ();
gst_buffer_set_data (demux->mdatbuffer,
gst_adapter_take (demux->adapter, demux->neededbytes),
demux->neededbytes);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "mdatbuffer starts with %" GST_FOURCC_FORMAT,
GST_FOURCC_ARGS (QT_UINT32 (demux->mdatbuffer)));
demux->offset += demux->neededbytes;
demux->neededbytes = 16;
demux->state = QTDEMUX_STATE_INITIAL;
gst_qtdemux_post_progress (demux, 1, 1);
break;
}
case QTDEMUX_STATE_MOVIE:{
guint8 *data;
GstBuffer *outbuf;
QtDemuxStream *stream = NULL;
int i = -1;
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "BEGIN // in MOVIE for offset %lld",
demux->offset);
if (demux->todrop) {
gst_adapter_flush (demux->adapter, demux->todrop);
demux->neededbytes -= demux->todrop;
demux->offset += demux->todrop;
}
/* Figure out which stream this is packet belongs to */
for (i = 0; i < demux->n_streams; i++) {
stream = demux->streams[i];
GST_LOG_OBJECT (demux,
"Checking stream %d (sample_index:%d / offset:%lld / size:%d / chunk:%d)",
i, stream->sample_index,
stream->samples[stream->sample_index].offset,
stream->samples[stream->sample_index].size,
stream->samples[stream->sample_index].chunk);
if (stream->samples[stream->sample_index].offset == demux->offset)
break;
}
if (stream == NULL)
goto unknown_stream;
/* first buffer? */
/* FIXME : this should be handled in sink_event */
if (demux->last_ts == GST_CLOCK_TIME_NONE) {
gst_qtdemux_push_event (demux,
gst_event_new_new_segment (FALSE, 1.0, GST_FORMAT_TIME,
0, GST_CLOCK_TIME_NONE, 0));
}
/* get data */
data = gst_adapter_take (demux->adapter, demux->neededbytes);
/* Put data in a buffer, set timestamps, caps, ... */
outbuf = gst_buffer_new ();
gst_buffer_set_data (outbuf, data, demux->neededbytes);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "stream : %" GST_FOURCC_FORMAT,
GST_FOURCC_ARGS (stream->fourcc));
if (stream->samples[stream->sample_index].pts_offset) {
demux->last_ts = stream->samples[stream->sample_index].timestamp;
GST_BUFFER_TIMESTAMP (outbuf) = demux->last_ts +
stream->samples[stream->sample_index].pts_offset;
} else {
GST_BUFFER_TIMESTAMP (outbuf) =
stream->samples[stream->sample_index].timestamp;
demux->last_ts = GST_BUFFER_TIMESTAMP (outbuf);
}
GST_BUFFER_DURATION (outbuf) =
stream->samples[stream->sample_index].duration;
/* send buffer */
if (stream->pad) {
GST_LOG_OBJECT (demux,
"Pushing buffer with time %" GST_TIME_FORMAT " on pad %p",
GST_TIME_ARGS (GST_BUFFER_TIMESTAMP (outbuf)), stream->pad);
gst_buffer_set_caps (outbuf, stream->caps);
ret = gst_pad_push (stream->pad, outbuf);
} else {
gst_buffer_unref (outbuf);
ret = GST_FLOW_OK;
}
/* combine flows */
ret = gst_qtdemux_combine_flows (demux, stream, ret);
stream->sample_index++;
/* update current offset and figure out size of next buffer */
GST_LOG_OBJECT (demux, "increasing offset %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT " by %u",
demux->offset, demux->neededbytes);
demux->offset += demux->neededbytes;
GST_LOG_OBJECT (demux, "offset is now %lld", demux->offset);
if ((demux->neededbytes = next_entry_size (demux)) == -1)
goto eos;
break;
}
default:
goto invalid_state;
}
}
/* when buffering movie data, at least show user something is happening */
if (ret == GST_FLOW_OK && demux->state == QTDEMUX_STATE_BUFFER_MDAT &&
gst_adapter_available (demux->adapter) <= demux->neededbytes) {
gst_qtdemux_post_progress (demux, gst_adapter_available (demux->adapter),
demux->neededbytes);
}
done:
gst_object_unref (demux);
return ret;
/* ERRORS */
unknown_stream:
{
GST_ELEMENT_ERROR (demux, STREAM, FAILED, (NULL), ("unknown stream found"));
ret = GST_FLOW_ERROR;
goto done;
}
eos:
{
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "no next entry, EOS");
ret = GST_FLOW_UNEXPECTED;
goto done;
}
invalid_state:
{
GST_ELEMENT_ERROR (demux, STREAM, FAILED,
(NULL), ("qtdemuxer invalid state %d", demux->state));
ret = GST_FLOW_ERROR;
goto done;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int brcmf_setup_wiphybands(struct wiphy *wiphy)
{
struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg = wiphy_priv(wiphy);
struct brcmf_if *ifp = netdev_priv(cfg_to_ndev(cfg));
u32 nmode = 0;
u32 vhtmode = 0;
u32 bw_cap[2] = { WLC_BW_20MHZ_BIT, WLC_BW_20MHZ_BIT };
u32 rxchain;
u32 nchain;
int err;
s32 i;
struct ieee80211_supported_band *band;
u32 txstreams = 0;
u32 txbf_bfe_cap = 0;
u32 txbf_bfr_cap = 0;
(void)brcmf_fil_iovar_int_get(ifp, "vhtmode", &vhtmode);
err = brcmf_fil_iovar_int_get(ifp, "nmode", &nmode);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("nmode error (%d)\n", err);
} else {
brcmf_get_bwcap(ifp, bw_cap);
}
brcmf_dbg(INFO, "nmode=%d, vhtmode=%d, bw_cap=(%d, %d)\n",
nmode, vhtmode, bw_cap[NL80211_BAND_2GHZ],
bw_cap[NL80211_BAND_5GHZ]);
err = brcmf_fil_iovar_int_get(ifp, "rxchain", &rxchain);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("rxchain error (%d)\n", err);
nchain = 1;
} else {
for (nchain = 0; rxchain; nchain++)
rxchain = rxchain & (rxchain - 1);
}
brcmf_dbg(INFO, "nchain=%d\n", nchain);
err = brcmf_construct_chaninfo(cfg, bw_cap);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("brcmf_construct_chaninfo failed (%d)\n", err);
return err;
}
if (vhtmode) {
(void)brcmf_fil_iovar_int_get(ifp, "txstreams", &txstreams);
(void)brcmf_fil_iovar_int_get(ifp, "txbf_bfe_cap",
&txbf_bfe_cap);
(void)brcmf_fil_iovar_int_get(ifp, "txbf_bfr_cap",
&txbf_bfr_cap);
}
wiphy = cfg_to_wiphy(cfg);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(wiphy->bands); i++) {
band = wiphy->bands[i];
if (band == NULL)
continue;
if (nmode)
brcmf_update_ht_cap(band, bw_cap, nchain);
if (vhtmode)
brcmf_update_vht_cap(band, bw_cap, nchain, txstreams,
txbf_bfe_cap, txbf_bfr_cap);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char * check_special_flags (char * sfs, Node * e)
{
char * p = sfs;
int cont = 1;
/* special flags */
while (cont) {
switch (*p) {
case 'P':
p++;
e->flags |= MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0;
break;
case 'O':
p++;
e->flags |= MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY;
break;
case 'C':
p++;
/* this flags also implies the
open-binary flag */
e->flags |= (MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS |
MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY);
break;
default:
cont = 0;
}
}
return p;
}
Commit Message: exec: do not leave bprm->interp on stack
If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via
unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak
into the command line.
Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively.
However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the
bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching
binfmt modules. Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and
binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted. They leave bprm->interp
pointing to their local stack. This means on restart bprm->interp is
left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the
userspace argv areas.
After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains
the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules. As
such, we need to protect the changes to interp.
This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the
bprm->interp. To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default
value is left as-is. Only when passing through binfmt_script or
binfmt_misc does an allocation take place.
For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from:
http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: halfdog <me@halfdog.net>
Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,512 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BpMemoryHeap::BpMemoryHeap(const sp<IBinder>& impl)
: BpInterface<IMemoryHeap>(impl),
mHeapId(-1), mBase(MAP_FAILED), mSize(0), mFlags(0), mOffset(0), mRealHeap(false)
{
}
Commit Message: Sanity check IMemory access versus underlying mmap
Bug 26877992
Change-Id: Ibbf4b1061e4675e4e96bc944a865b53eaf6984fe
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebGL2RenderingContextBase::ValidateTransformFeedbackPrimitiveMode(
const char* function_name,
GLenum primitive_mode) {
switch (primitive_mode) {
case GL_POINTS:
case GL_LINES:
case GL_TRIANGLES:
return true;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, function_name,
"invalid transform feedback primitive mode");
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofpacts_format(const struct ofpact *ofpacts, size_t ofpacts_len,
struct ds *string)
{
if (!ofpacts_len) {
ds_put_format(string, "%sdrop%s", colors.drop, colors.end);
} else {
const struct ofpact *a;
OFPACT_FOR_EACH (a, ofpacts, ofpacts_len) {
if (a != ofpacts) {
ds_put_char(string, ',');
}
ofpact_format(a, string);
}
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 77,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RendererCapabilities::~RendererCapabilities() {}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: print_option_list(opt, printer, arg)
option_t *opt;
printer_func printer;
void *arg;
{
while (opt->name != NULL) {
if (opt->priority != OPRIO_DEFAULT
&& opt->winner != (short int) -1)
print_option(opt + opt->winner, opt, printer, arg);
do {
++opt;
} while (opt->flags & OPT_PRIOSUB);
}
}
Commit Message: pppd: Eliminate potential integer overflow in option parsing
When we are reading in a word from an options file, we maintain a count
of the length we have seen so far in 'len', which is an int. When len
exceeds MAXWORDLEN - 1 (i.e. 1023) we cease storing characters in the
buffer but we continue to increment len. Since len is an int, it will
wrap around to -2147483648 after it reaches 2147483647. At that point
our test of (len < MAXWORDLEN-1) will succeed and we will start writing
characters to memory again.
This may enable an attacker to overwrite the heap and thereby corrupt
security-relevant variables. For this reason it has been assigned a
CVE identifier, CVE-2014-3158.
This fixes the bug by ceasing to increment len once it reaches MAXWORDLEN.
Reported-by: Lee Campbell <leecam@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 38,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_unfreeze(struct super_block *sb)
{
if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)
return 0;
lock_super(sb);
/* Reset the needs_recovery flag before the fs is unlocked. */
EXT4_SET_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_RECOVER);
ext4_commit_super(sb, 1);
unlock_super(sb);
jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t flatten_binder(const sp<ProcessState>& /*proc*/,
const wp<IBinder>& binder, Parcel* out)
{
flat_binder_object obj;
obj.flags = 0x7f | FLAT_BINDER_FLAG_ACCEPTS_FDS;
if (binder != NULL) {
sp<IBinder> real = binder.promote();
if (real != NULL) {
IBinder *local = real->localBinder();
if (!local) {
BpBinder *proxy = real->remoteBinder();
if (proxy == NULL) {
ALOGE("null proxy");
}
const int32_t handle = proxy ? proxy->handle() : 0;
obj.type = BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_HANDLE;
obj.binder = 0; /* Don't pass uninitialized stack data to a remote process */
obj.handle = handle;
obj.cookie = 0;
} else {
obj.type = BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_BINDER;
obj.binder = reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(binder.get_refs());
obj.cookie = reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(binder.unsafe_get());
}
return finish_flatten_binder(real, obj, out);
}
ALOGE("Unable to unflatten Binder weak reference!");
obj.type = BINDER_TYPE_BINDER;
obj.binder = 0;
obj.cookie = 0;
return finish_flatten_binder(NULL, obj, out);
} else {
obj.type = BINDER_TYPE_BINDER;
obj.binder = 0;
obj.cookie = 0;
return finish_flatten_binder(NULL, obj, out);
}
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,267 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssize_t nfsd_copy_file_range(struct file *src, u64 src_pos, struct file *dst,
u64 dst_pos, u64 count)
{
/*
* Limit copy to 4MB to prevent indefinitely blocking an nfsd
* thread and client rpc slot. The choice of 4MB is somewhat
* arbitrary. We might instead base this on r/wsize, or make it
* tunable, or use a time instead of a byte limit, or implement
* asynchronous copy. In theory a client could also recognize a
* limit like this and pipeline multiple COPY requests.
*/
count = min_t(u64, count, 1 << 22);
return vfs_copy_file_range(src, src_pos, dst, dst_pos, count, 0);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,885 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionInstallDialogView::LinkClicked(views::Link* source,
int event_flags) {
GURL store_url(extension_urls::GetWebstoreItemDetailURLPrefix() +
prompt_->extension()->id());
OpenURLParams params(store_url, Referrer(),
WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK, false);
if (navigator_) {
navigator_->OpenURL(params);
} else {
chrome::ScopedTabbedBrowserDisplayer displayer(profile_);
displayer.browser()->OpenURL(params);
}
GetWidget()->Close();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions UI] Initially disabled OK button for extension install prompts and enable them after a 500 ms time period.
BUG=394518
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2716353003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461933}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 154,029 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pvscsi_reset_state(PVSCSIState *s)
{
s->curr_cmd = PVSCSI_CMD_FIRST;
s->curr_cmd_data_cntr = 0;
s->reg_command_status = PVSCSI_COMMAND_PROCESSING_SUCCEEDED;
s->reg_interrupt_status = 0;
pvscsi_ring_cleanup(&s->rings);
s->rings_info_valid = FALSE;
s->msg_ring_info_valid = FALSE;
QTAILQ_INIT(&s->pending_queue);
QTAILQ_INIT(&s->completion_queue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,445 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePDFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define CFormat "/Filter [ /%s ]\n"
#define ObjectsPerImage 14
#define ThrowPDFException(exception,message) \
{ \
if (xref != (MagickOffsetType *) NULL) \
xref=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(xref); \
ThrowWriterException((exception),(message)); \
}
DisableMSCWarning(4310)
static const char
XMPProfile[]=
{
"<?xpacket begin=\"%s\" id=\"W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d\"?>\n"
"<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x=\"adobe:ns:meta/\" x:xmptk=\"Adobe XMP Core 4.0-c316 44.253921, Sun Oct 01 2006 17:08:23\">\n"
" <rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#\">\n"
" <rdf:Description rdf:about=\"\"\n"
" xmlns:xap=\"http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/\">\n"
" <xap:ModifyDate>%s</xap:ModifyDate>\n"
" <xap:CreateDate>%s</xap:CreateDate>\n"
" <xap:MetadataDate>%s</xap:MetadataDate>\n"
" <xap:CreatorTool>%s</xap:CreatorTool>\n"
" </rdf:Description>\n"
" <rdf:Description rdf:about=\"\"\n"
" xmlns:dc=\"http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/\">\n"
" <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>\n"
" <dc:title>\n"
" <rdf:Alt>\n"
" <rdf:li xml:lang=\"x-default\">%s</rdf:li>\n"
" </rdf:Alt>\n"
" </dc:title>\n"
" </rdf:Description>\n"
" <rdf:Description rdf:about=\"\"\n"
" xmlns:xapMM=\"http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/\">\n"
" <xapMM:DocumentID>uuid:6ec119d7-7982-4f56-808d-dfe64f5b35cf</xapMM:DocumentID>\n"
" <xapMM:InstanceID>uuid:a79b99b4-6235-447f-9f6c-ec18ef7555cb</xapMM:InstanceID>\n"
" </rdf:Description>\n"
" <rdf:Description rdf:about=\"\"\n"
" xmlns:pdf=\"http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/\">\n"
" <pdf:Producer>%s</pdf:Producer>\n"
" </rdf:Description>\n"
" <rdf:Description rdf:about=\"\"\n"
" xmlns:pdfaid=\"http://www.aiim.org/pdfa/ns/id/\">\n"
" <pdfaid:part>3</pdfaid:part>\n"
" <pdfaid:conformance>B</pdfaid:conformance>\n"
" </rdf:Description>\n"
" </rdf:RDF>\n"
"</x:xmpmeta>\n"
"<?xpacket end=\"w\"?>\n"
},
XMPProfileMagick[4]= { (char) 0xef, (char) 0xbb, (char) 0xbf, (char) 0x00 };
RestoreMSCWarning
char
basename[MagickPathExtent],
buffer[MagickPathExtent],
*escape,
date[MagickPathExtent],
**labels,
page_geometry[MagickPathExtent],
*url;
CompressionType
compression;
const char
*device,
*option,
*value;
const StringInfo
*profile;
double
pointsize;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
Image
*next,
*tile_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset,
scene,
*xref;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
MagickStatusType
flags;
PointInfo
delta,
resolution,
scale;
RectangleInfo
geometry,
media_info,
page_info;
register const Quantum
*p;
register unsigned char
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
size_t
channels,
imageListLength,
info_id,
length,
object,
pages_id,
root_id,
text_size,
version;
ssize_t
count,
page_count,
y;
struct tm
local_time;
time_t
seconds;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
/*
Allocate X ref memory.
*/
xref=(MagickOffsetType *) AcquireQuantumMemory(2048UL,sizeof(*xref));
if (xref == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(xref,0,2048UL*sizeof(*xref));
/*
Write Info object.
*/
object=0;
version=3;
if (image_info->compression == JPEG2000Compression)
version=(size_t) MagickMax(version,5);
for (next=image; next != (Image *) NULL; next=GetNextImageInList(next))
if (next->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
version=(size_t) MagickMax(version,4);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") == 0)
version=(size_t) MagickMax(version,6);
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
version=(size_t) MagickMax(version,7);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%%PDF-1.%.20g \n",(double)
version);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") == 0)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'%');
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0xe2);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0xe3);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0xcf);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0xd3);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\n');
}
/*
Write Catalog object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
root_id=object;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") != 0)
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Pages %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
else
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Metadata %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Pages %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+2);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Type /Catalog");
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pdf:page-direction");
if ((option != (const char *) NULL) &&
(LocaleCompare(option,"right-to-left") == 0))
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/ViewerPreferences<</PageDirection/R2L>>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
GetPathComponent(image->filename,BasePath,basename);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") == 0)
{
char
create_date[MagickPathExtent],
modify_date[MagickPathExtent],
timestamp[MagickPathExtent],
*url,
xmp_profile[MagickPathExtent];
/*
Write XMP object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Subtype /XML\n");
*modify_date='\0';
value=GetImageProperty(image,"date:modify",exception);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(modify_date,value,MagickPathExtent);
*create_date='\0';
value=GetImageProperty(image,"date:create",exception);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(create_date,value,MagickPathExtent);
(void) FormatMagickTime(time((time_t *) NULL),MagickPathExtent,timestamp);
url=(char *) MagickAuthoritativeURL;
escape=EscapeParenthesis(basename);
i=FormatLocaleString(xmp_profile,MagickPathExtent,XMPProfile,
XMPProfileMagick,modify_date,create_date,timestamp,url,escape,url);
escape=DestroyString(escape);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Length %.20g\n",
(double) i);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Type /Metadata\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\nstream\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,xmp_profile);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\nendstream\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
}
/*
Write Pages object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
pages_id=object;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Type /Pages\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Kids [ %.20g 0 R ",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
count=(ssize_t) (pages_id+ObjectsPerImage+1);
page_count=1;
if (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse)
{
Image
*kid_image;
/*
Predict page object id's.
*/
kid_image=image;
for ( ; GetNextImageInList(kid_image) != (Image *) NULL; count+=ObjectsPerImage)
{
page_count++;
profile=GetImageProfile(kid_image,"icc");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
count+=2;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 R ",(double)
count);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
kid_image=GetNextImageInList(kid_image);
}
xref=(MagickOffsetType *) ResizeQuantumMemory(xref,(size_t) count+2048UL,
sizeof(*xref));
if (xref == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"]\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Count %.20g\n",(double)
page_count);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
scene=0;
imageListLength=GetImageListLength(image);
do
{
MagickBooleanType
has_icc_profile;
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
has_icc_profile=(profile != (StringInfo *) NULL) ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
compression=image->compression;
if (image_info->compression != UndefinedCompression)
compression=image_info->compression;
switch (compression)
{
case FaxCompression:
case Group4Compression:
{
if ((SetImageMonochrome(image,exception) == MagickFalse) ||
(image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait))
compression=RLECompression;
break;
}
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_JPEG_DELEGATE)
case JPEGCompression:
{
compression=RLECompression;
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateError,"DelegateLibrarySupportNotBuiltIn","`%s' (JPEG)",
image->filename);
break;
}
#endif
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_LIBOPENJP2_DELEGATE)
case JPEG2000Compression:
{
compression=RLECompression;
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateError,"DelegateLibrarySupportNotBuiltIn","`%s' (JP2)",
image->filename);
break;
}
#endif
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
case ZipCompression:
{
compression=RLECompression;
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateError,"DelegateLibrarySupportNotBuiltIn","`%s' (ZLIB)",
image->filename);
break;
}
#endif
case LZWCompression:
{
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") == 0)
compression=RLECompression; /* LZW compression is forbidden */
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") == 0)
compression=RLECompression; /* ASCII 85 compression is forbidden */
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (compression == JPEG2000Compression)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
/*
Scale relative to dots-per-inch.
*/
delta.x=DefaultResolution;
delta.y=DefaultResolution;
resolution.x=image->resolution.x;
resolution.y=image->resolution.y;
if ((resolution.x == 0.0) || (resolution.y == 0.0))
{
flags=ParseGeometry(PSDensityGeometry,&geometry_info);
resolution.x=geometry_info.rho;
resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
resolution.y=resolution.x;
}
if (image_info->density != (char *) NULL)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(image_info->density,&geometry_info);
resolution.x=geometry_info.rho;
resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
resolution.y=resolution.x;
}
if (image->units == PixelsPerCentimeterResolution)
{
resolution.x=(double) ((size_t) (100.0*2.54*resolution.x+0.5)/100.0);
resolution.y=(double) ((size_t) (100.0*2.54*resolution.y+0.5)/100.0);
}
SetGeometry(image,&geometry);
(void) FormatLocaleString(page_geometry,MagickPathExtent,"%.20gx%.20g",
(double) image->columns,(double) image->rows);
if (image_info->page != (char *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(page_geometry,image_info->page,MagickPathExtent);
else
if ((image->page.width != 0) && (image->page.height != 0))
(void) FormatLocaleString(page_geometry,MagickPathExtent,
"%.20gx%.20g%+.20g%+.20g",(double) image->page.width,(double)
image->page.height,(double) image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
else
if ((image->gravity != UndefinedGravity) &&
(LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDF") == 0))
(void) CopyMagickString(page_geometry,PSPageGeometry,
MagickPathExtent);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(page_geometry,">",MagickPathExtent);
(void) ParseMetaGeometry(page_geometry,&geometry.x,&geometry.y,
&geometry.width,&geometry.height);
scale.x=(double) (geometry.width*delta.x)/resolution.x;
geometry.width=(size_t) floor(scale.x+0.5);
scale.y=(double) (geometry.height*delta.y)/resolution.y;
geometry.height=(size_t) floor(scale.y+0.5);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(page_geometry,&media_info);
(void) ParseGravityGeometry(image,page_geometry,&page_info,exception);
if (image->gravity != UndefinedGravity)
{
geometry.x=(-page_info.x);
geometry.y=(ssize_t) (media_info.height+page_info.y-image->rows);
}
pointsize=12.0;
if (image_info->pointsize != 0.0)
pointsize=image_info->pointsize;
text_size=0;
value=GetImageProperty(image,"label",exception);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
text_size=(size_t) (MultilineCensus(value)*pointsize+12);
(void) text_size;
/*
Write Page object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Type /Page\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Parent %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) pages_id);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Resources <<\n");
labels=(char **) NULL;
value=GetImageProperty(image,"label",exception);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
labels=StringToList(value);
if (labels != (char **) NULL)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"/Font << /F%.20g %.20g 0 R >>\n",(double) image->scene,(double)
object+4);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"/XObject << /Im%.20g %.20g 0 R >>\n",(double) image->scene,(double)
object+5);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/ProcSet %.20g 0 R >>\n",
(double) object+3);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"/MediaBox [0 0 %g %g]\n",72.0*media_info.width/resolution.x,
72.0*media_info.height/resolution.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"/CropBox [0 0 %g %g]\n",72.0*media_info.width/resolution.x,
72.0*media_info.height/resolution.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Contents %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Thumb %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+(has_icc_profile != MagickFalse ? 10 : 8));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Contents object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Length %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"stream\n");
offset=TellBlob(image);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"q\n");
if (labels != (char **) NULL)
for (i=0; labels[i] != (char *) NULL; i++)
{
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"BT\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/F%.20g %g Tf\n",
(double) image->scene,pointsize);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g %.20g Td\n",
(double) geometry.x,(double) (geometry.y+geometry.height+i*pointsize+
12));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"(%s) Tj\n",
labels[i]);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"ET\n");
labels[i]=DestroyString(labels[i]);
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%g 0 0 %g %.20g %.20g cm\n",scale.x,scale.y,(double) geometry.x,
(double) geometry.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Im%.20g Do\n",(double)
image->scene);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"Q\n");
offset=TellBlob(image)-offset;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\nendstream\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Length object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
offset);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Procset object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"[ /PDF /Text /ImageC",MagickPathExtent);
else
if ((compression == FaxCompression) || (compression == Group4Compression))
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"[ /PDF /Text /ImageB",MagickPathExtent);
else
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"[ /PDF /Text /ImageI",MagickPathExtent);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image," ]\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Font object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
if (labels != (char **) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Type /Font\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Subtype /Type1\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Name /F%.20g\n",
(double) image->scene);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/BaseFont /Helvetica\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Encoding /MacRomanEncoding\n");
labels=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(labels);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write XObject object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Type /XObject\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Subtype /Image\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Name /Im%.20g\n",
(double) image->scene);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
switch (compression)
{
case NoCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,
"ASCII85Decode");
break;
}
case JPEGCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,"DCTDecode");
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
break;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"/Decode [1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0]\n",
MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
case JPEG2000Compression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,"JPXDecode");
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
break;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"/Decode [1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0]\n",
MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
case LZWCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,"LZWDecode");
break;
}
case ZipCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,
"FlateDecode");
break;
}
case FaxCompression:
case Group4Compression:
{
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"/Filter [ /CCITTFaxDecode ]\n",
MagickPathExtent);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/DecodeParms [ << "
"/K %s /BlackIs1 false /Columns %.20g /Rows %.20g >> ]\n",CCITTParam,
(double) image->columns,(double) image->rows);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,
"RunLengthDecode");
break;
}
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Width %.20g\n",(double)
image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Height %.20g\n",(double)
image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/ColorSpace %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+2);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/BitsPerComponent %d\n",
(compression == FaxCompression) || (compression == Group4Compression) ?
1 : 8);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/SMask %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+(has_icc_profile != MagickFalse ? 9 : 7));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Length %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"stream\n");
offset=TellBlob(image);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((4*number_pixels) != (MagickSizeType) ((size_t) (4*number_pixels)))
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((compression == FaxCompression) || (compression == Group4Compression) ||
((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse)))
{
switch (compression)
{
case FaxCompression:
case Group4Compression:
{
if (LocaleCompare(CCITTParam,"0") == 0)
{
(void) HuffmanEncodeImage(image_info,image,image,exception);
break;
}
(void) Huffman2DEncodeImage(image_info,image,image,exception);
break;
}
case JPEGCompression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,image,"jpeg",exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case JPEG2000Compression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,image,"jp2",exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case RLECompression:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
/*
Allocate pixel array.
*/
length=(size_t) number_pixels;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Dump Runlength encoded pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(image,p)));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (compression == ZipCompression)
status=ZLIBEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
#endif
if (compression == LZWCompression)
status=LZWEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
status=PackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed PseudoColor packets.
*/
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p))));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
Ascii85Flush(image);
break;
}
}
}
else
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256) ||
(compression == JPEGCompression) ||
(compression == JPEG2000Compression))
switch (compression)
{
case JPEGCompression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,image,"jpeg",exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case JPEG2000Compression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,image,"jp2",exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case RLECompression:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
/*
Allocate pixel array.
*/
length=(size_t) number_pixels;
length*=image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace ? 4UL : 3UL;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
xref=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(xref);
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Dump runoffset encoded pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(image,p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(image,p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(image,p));
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlack(image,p));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (compression == ZipCompression)
status=ZLIBEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
#endif
if (compression == LZWCompression)
status=LZWEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
status=PackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed DirectColor packets.
*/
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(image,p)));
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(image,p)));
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(image,p)));
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelBlack(image,p)));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
Ascii85Flush(image);
break;
}
}
else
{
/*
Dump number of colors and colormap.
*/
switch (compression)
{
case RLECompression:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
/*
Allocate pixel array.
*/
length=(size_t) number_pixels;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
xref=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(xref);
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Dump Runlength encoded pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(image,p);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,
(MagickOffsetType) y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (compression == ZipCompression)
status=ZLIBEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
#endif
if (compression == LZWCompression)
status=LZWEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
status=PackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed PseudoColor packets.
*/
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(image,p));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,
(MagickOffsetType) y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
Ascii85Flush(image);
break;
}
}
}
offset=TellBlob(image)-offset;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\nendstream\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Length object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
offset);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Colorspace object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
device="DeviceRGB";
channels=0;
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
device="DeviceCMYK";
channels=4;
}
else
if ((compression == FaxCompression) ||
(compression == Group4Compression) ||
((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse)))
{
device="DeviceGray";
channels=1;
}
else
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) ||
(image->colors > 256) || (compression == JPEGCompression) ||
(compression == JPEG2000Compression))
{
device="DeviceRGB";
channels=3;
}
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
if ((profile == (StringInfo *) NULL) || (channels == 0))
{
if (channels != 0)
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/%s\n",device);
else
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"[ /Indexed /%s %.20g %.20g 0 R ]\n",device,(double) image->colors-
1,(double) object+3);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
else
{
const unsigned char
*p;
/*
Write ICC profile.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"[/ICCBased %.20g 0 R]\n",(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",
(double) object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"<<\n/N %.20g\n"
"/Filter /ASCII85Decode\n/Length %.20g 0 R\n/Alternate /%s\n>>\n"
"stream\n",(double) channels,(double) object+1,device);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
offset=TellBlob(image);
Ascii85Initialize(image);
p=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(profile); i++)
Ascii85Encode(image,(unsigned char) *p++);
Ascii85Flush(image);
offset=TellBlob(image)-offset;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endstream\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Length object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",
(double) object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
offset);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Thumb object.
*/
SetGeometry(image,&geometry);
(void) ParseMetaGeometry("106x106+0+0>",&geometry.x,&geometry.y,
&geometry.width,&geometry.height);
tile_image=ThumbnailImage(image,geometry.width,geometry.height,exception);
if (tile_image == (Image *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
switch (compression)
{
case NoCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,
"ASCII85Decode");
break;
}
case JPEGCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,"DCTDecode");
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
break;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"/Decode [1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0]\n",
MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
case JPEG2000Compression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,"JPXDecode");
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
break;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"/Decode [1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0]\n",
MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
case LZWCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,"LZWDecode");
break;
}
case ZipCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,
"FlateDecode");
break;
}
case FaxCompression:
case Group4Compression:
{
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"/Filter [ /CCITTFaxDecode ]\n",
MagickPathExtent);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/DecodeParms [ << "
"/K %s /BlackIs1 false /Columns %.20g /Rows %.20g >> ]\n",CCITTParam,
(double) tile_image->columns,(double) tile_image->rows);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,
"RunLengthDecode");
break;
}
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Width %.20g\n",(double)
tile_image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Height %.20g\n",(double)
tile_image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/ColorSpace %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object-(has_icc_profile != MagickFalse ? 3 : 1));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/BitsPerComponent %d\n",
(compression == FaxCompression) || (compression == Group4Compression) ?
1 : 8);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Length %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"stream\n");
offset=TellBlob(image);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) tile_image->columns*tile_image->rows;
if ((compression == FaxCompression) ||
(compression == Group4Compression) ||
((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(SetImageGray(tile_image,exception) != MagickFalse)))
{
switch (compression)
{
case FaxCompression:
case Group4Compression:
{
if (LocaleCompare(CCITTParam,"0") == 0)
{
(void) HuffmanEncodeImage(image_info,image,tile_image,
exception);
break;
}
(void) Huffman2DEncodeImage(image_info,image,tile_image,exception);
break;
}
case JPEGCompression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,tile_image,"jpeg",
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case JPEG2000Compression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,tile_image,"jp2",exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case RLECompression:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
/*
Allocate pixel array.
*/
length=(size_t) number_pixels;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image);
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Dump runlength encoded pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(
tile_image,p)));
p+=GetPixelChannels(tile_image);
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (compression == ZipCompression)
status=ZLIBEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
#endif
if (compression == LZWCompression)
status=LZWEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
status=PackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed PseudoColor packets.
*/
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(tile_image,p))));
p+=GetPixelChannels(tile_image);
}
}
Ascii85Flush(image);
break;
}
}
}
else
if ((tile_image->storage_class == DirectClass) ||
(tile_image->colors > 256) || (compression == JPEGCompression) ||
(compression == JPEG2000Compression))
switch (compression)
{
case JPEGCompression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,tile_image,"jpeg",
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case JPEG2000Compression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,tile_image,"jp2",exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case RLECompression:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
/*
Allocate pixel array.
*/
length=(size_t) number_pixels;
length*=tile_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace ? 4UL : 3UL;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,4*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image);
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Dump runlength encoded pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(tile_image,p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(tile_image,p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(tile_image,p));
if (tile_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlack(tile_image,p));
p+=GetPixelChannels(tile_image);
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (compression == ZipCompression)
status=ZLIBEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
#endif
if (compression == LZWCompression)
status=LZWEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
status=PackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed DirectColor packets.
*/
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelRed(tile_image,p)));
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelGreen(tile_image,p)));
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelBlue(tile_image,p)));
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelBlack(tile_image,p)));
p+=GetPixelChannels(tile_image);
}
}
Ascii85Flush(image);
break;
}
}
else
{
/*
Dump number of colors and colormap.
*/
switch (compression)
{
case RLECompression:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
/*
Allocate pixel array.
*/
length=(size_t) number_pixels;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image);
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Dump runlength encoded pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(tile_image,p);
p+=GetPixelChannels(tile_image);
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (compression == ZipCompression)
status=ZLIBEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
#endif
if (compression == LZWCompression)
status=LZWEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
status=PackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed PseudoColor packets.
*/
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,(unsigned char)
GetPixelIndex(tile_image,p));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
Ascii85Flush(image);
break;
}
}
}
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image);
offset=TellBlob(image)-offset;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\nendstream\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Length object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
offset);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256) ||
(compression == FaxCompression) || (compression == Group4Compression))
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
else
{
/*
Write Colormap object.
*/
if (compression == NoCompression)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Filter [ /ASCII85Decode ]\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Length %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"stream\n");
offset=TellBlob(image);
if (compression == NoCompression)
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
if (compression == NoCompression)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(
image->colormap[i].red)));
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(
image->colormap[i].green)));
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(
image->colormap[i].blue)));
continue;
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].red)));
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].green)));
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].blue)));
}
if (compression == NoCompression)
Ascii85Flush(image);
offset=TellBlob(image)-offset;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\nendstream\n");
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Length object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
offset);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write softmask object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
if (image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
else
{
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Type /XObject\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Subtype /Image\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Name /Ma%.20g\n",
(double) image->scene);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
switch (compression)
{
case NoCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,
"ASCII85Decode");
break;
}
case LZWCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,
"LZWDecode");
break;
}
case ZipCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,
"FlateDecode");
break;
}
default:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,CFormat,
"RunLengthDecode");
break;
}
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Width %.20g\n",
(double) image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Height %.20g\n",
(double) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/ColorSpace /DeviceGray\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"/BitsPerComponent %d\n",(compression == FaxCompression) ||
(compression == Group4Compression) ? 1 : 8);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Length %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"stream\n");
offset=TellBlob(image);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
switch (compression)
{
case RLECompression:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
/*
Allocate pixel array.
*/
length=(size_t) number_pixels;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,4*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Dump Runlength encoded pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelAlpha(image,p));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (compression == ZipCompression)
status=ZLIBEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
#endif
if (compression == LZWCompression)
status=LZWEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
else
status=PackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,exception);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed PseudoColor packets.
*/
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelAlpha(image,p)));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
Ascii85Flush(image);
break;
}
}
offset=TellBlob(image)-offset;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\nendstream\n");
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Length object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
offset);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,imageListLength);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
/*
Write Metadata object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
info_id=object;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") == 0)
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Title (%s)\n",
EscapeParenthesis(basename));
else
{
wchar_t
*utf16;
utf16=ConvertUTF8ToUTF16((unsigned char *) basename,&length);
if (utf16 != (wchar_t *) NULL)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Title (\xfe\xff");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) utf16[i]);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,")\n");
utf16=(wchar_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory(utf16);
}
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
seconds=time((time_t *) NULL);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_LOCALTIME_R)
(void) localtime_r(&seconds,&local_time);
#else
(void) memcpy(&local_time,localtime(&seconds),sizeof(local_time));
#endif
(void) FormatLocaleString(date,MagickPathExtent,"D:%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d",
local_time.tm_year+1900,local_time.tm_mon+1,local_time.tm_mday,
local_time.tm_hour,local_time.tm_min,local_time.tm_sec);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/CreationDate (%s)\n",
date);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/ModDate (%s)\n",date);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
url=(char *) MagickAuthoritativeURL;
escape=EscapeParenthesis(url);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Producer (%s)\n",escape);
escape=DestroyString(escape);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Xref object.
*/
offset=TellBlob(image)-xref[0]+
(LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") == 0 ? 6 : 0)+10;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"xref\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"0 %.20g\n",(double)
object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"0000000000 65535 f \n");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) object; i++)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%010lu 00000 n \n",
(unsigned long) xref[i]);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"trailer\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Size %.20g\n",(double)
object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Info %.20g 0 R\n",(double)
info_id);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Root %.20g 0 R\n",(double)
root_id);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) SignatureImage(image,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/ID [<%s> <%s>]\n",
GetImageProperty(image,"signature",exception),
GetImageProperty(image,"signature",exception));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"startxref\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g\n",(double) offset);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%EOF\n");
xref=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(xref);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1454
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 169,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: loop_get_status(struct loop_device *lo, struct loop_info64 *info)
{
struct file *file = lo->lo_backing_file;
struct kstat stat;
int error;
if (lo->lo_state != Lo_bound)
return -ENXIO;
error = vfs_getattr(&file->f_path, &stat,
STATX_INO, AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT);
if (error)
return error;
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
info->lo_number = lo->lo_number;
info->lo_device = huge_encode_dev(stat.dev);
info->lo_inode = stat.ino;
info->lo_rdevice = huge_encode_dev(lo->lo_device ? stat.rdev : stat.dev);
info->lo_offset = lo->lo_offset;
info->lo_sizelimit = lo->lo_sizelimit;
info->lo_flags = lo->lo_flags;
memcpy(info->lo_file_name, lo->lo_file_name, LO_NAME_SIZE);
memcpy(info->lo_crypt_name, lo->lo_crypt_name, LO_NAME_SIZE);
info->lo_encrypt_type =
lo->lo_encryption ? lo->lo_encryption->number : 0;
if (lo->lo_encrypt_key_size && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
info->lo_encrypt_key_size = lo->lo_encrypt_key_size;
memcpy(info->lo_encrypt_key, lo->lo_encrypt_key,
lo->lo_encrypt_key_size);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <long7573@126.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 84,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int udp_send_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 daddr, __be32 dport)
{
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct udphdr *uh;
struct rtable *rt = (struct rtable *)skb_dst(skb);
int err = 0;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
int offset = skb_transport_offset(skb);
int len = skb->len - offset;
__wsum csum = 0;
/*
* Create a UDP header
*/
uh = udp_hdr(skb);
uh->source = inet->inet_sport;
uh->dest = dport;
uh->len = htons(len);
uh->check = 0;
if (is_udplite) /* UDP-Lite */
csum = udplite_csum(skb);
else if (sk->sk_no_check == UDP_CSUM_NOXMIT) { /* UDP csum disabled */
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
goto send;
} else if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) { /* UDP hardware csum */
udp4_hwcsum(skb, rt->rt_src, daddr);
goto send;
} else
csum = udp_csum(skb);
/* add protocol-dependent pseudo-header */
uh->check = csum_tcpudp_magic(rt->rt_src, daddr, len,
sk->sk_protocol, csum);
if (uh->check == 0)
uh->check = CSUM_MANGLED_0;
send:
err = ip_send_skb(skb);
if (err) {
if (err == -ENOBUFS && !inet->recverr) {
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_SNDBUFERRORS, is_udplite);
err = 0;
}
} else
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_OUTDATAGRAMS, is_udplite);
return err;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,102 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_WCVTF( INS_ARG )
{
DO_WCVTF
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,194 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoStencilThenCoverFillPathInstancedCHROMIUM(
GLsizei numPaths,
GLenum pathNameType,
const GLvoid* paths,
GLsizei pathsBufsize,
GLuint pathBase,
GLenum fillMode,
GLuint mask,
GLenum coverMode,
GLenum transformType,
const GLfloat* transformValues,
GLsizei transformValuesBufsize) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void megasas_shutdown(struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct megasas_instance *instance = pci_get_drvdata(pdev);
instance->unload = 1;
if (megasas_wait_for_adapter_operational(instance))
goto skip_firing_dcmds;
megasas_flush_cache(instance);
megasas_shutdown_controller(instance, MR_DCMD_CTRL_SHUTDOWN);
skip_firing_dcmds:
instance->instancet->disable_intr(instance);
megasas_destroy_irqs(instance);
if (instance->msix_vectors)
pci_free_irq_vectors(instance->pdev);
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,416 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_addrinfo_port(struct addrinfo *addrs, int port)
{
struct addrinfo *addr;
for (addr = addrs; addr != NULL; addr = addr->ai_next) {
switch (addr->ai_family) {
case AF_INET:
((struct sockaddr_in *)addr->ai_addr)->
sin_port = htons(port);
break;
case AF_INET6:
((struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr->ai_addr)->
sin6_port = htons(port);
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmxnet3_pre_save(void *opaque)
{
VMXNET3State *s = opaque;
s->mcast_list_buff_size = s->mcast_list_len * sizeof(MACAddr);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 9,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void XSSAuditor::InitForFragment() {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
DCHECK_EQ(state_, kUninitialized);
state_ = kFilteringTokens;
DCHECK(!is_enabled_);
}
Commit Message: Restrict the xss audit report URL to same origin
BUG=441275
R=tsepez@chromium.org,mkwst@chromium.org
Change-Id: I27bc8e251b9ad962c3b4fdebf084a2b9152f915d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768367
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516666}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 147,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GtkWidget* TabStripGtk::GetWidgetForViewID(ViewID view_id) {
if (GetTabCount() > 0) {
if (view_id == VIEW_ID_TAB_LAST) {
return GetTabAt(GetTabCount() - 1)->widget();
} else if ((view_id >= VIEW_ID_TAB_0) && (view_id < VIEW_ID_TAB_LAST)) {
int index = view_id - VIEW_ID_TAB_0;
if (index >= 0 && index < GetTabCount()) {
return GetTabAt(index)->widget();
} else {
return NULL;
}
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spnego_gss_inquire_name(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_name_t name,
int *name_is_MN,
gss_OID *MN_mech,
gss_buffer_set_t *attrs)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_inquire_name(minor_status,
name,
name_is_MN,
MN_mech,
attrs);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 36,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nfs4_destroy_session(struct nfs4_session *session)
{
struct rpc_xprt *xprt;
nfs4_proc_destroy_session(session);
rcu_read_lock();
xprt = rcu_dereference(session->clp->cl_rpcclient->cl_xprt);
rcu_read_unlock();
dprintk("%s Destroy backchannel for xprt %p\n",
__func__, xprt);
xprt_destroy_backchannel(xprt, NFS41_BC_MIN_CALLBACKS);
nfs4_destroy_slot_tables(session);
kfree(session);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vfio_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
{
struct vfio_pci_device *vdev;
struct iommu_group *group;
int ret;
if (pdev->hdr_type != PCI_HEADER_TYPE_NORMAL)
return -EINVAL;
group = vfio_iommu_group_get(&pdev->dev);
if (!group)
return -EINVAL;
vdev = kzalloc(sizeof(*vdev), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vdev) {
vfio_iommu_group_put(group, &pdev->dev);
return -ENOMEM;
}
vdev->pdev = pdev;
vdev->irq_type = VFIO_PCI_NUM_IRQS;
mutex_init(&vdev->igate);
spin_lock_init(&vdev->irqlock);
ret = vfio_add_group_dev(&pdev->dev, &vfio_pci_ops, vdev);
if (ret) {
vfio_iommu_group_put(group, &pdev->dev);
kfree(vdev);
return ret;
}
if (vfio_pci_is_vga(pdev)) {
vga_client_register(pdev, vdev, NULL, vfio_pci_set_vga_decode);
vga_set_legacy_decoding(pdev,
vfio_pci_set_vga_decode(vdev, false));
}
if (!disable_idle_d3) {
/*
* pci-core sets the device power state to an unknown value at
* bootup and after being removed from a driver. The only
* transition it allows from this unknown state is to D0, which
* typically happens when a driver calls pci_enable_device().
* We're not ready to enable the device yet, but we do want to
* be able to get to D3. Therefore first do a D0 transition
* before going to D3.
*/
pci_set_power_state(pdev, PCI_D0);
pci_set_power_state(pdev, PCI_D3hot);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 48,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __poll_t userfaultfd_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx = file->private_data;
__poll_t ret;
poll_wait(file, &ctx->fd_wqh, wait);
switch (ctx->state) {
case UFFD_STATE_WAIT_API:
return EPOLLERR;
case UFFD_STATE_RUNNING:
/*
* poll() never guarantees that read won't block.
* userfaults can be waken before they're read().
*/
if (unlikely(!(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)))
return EPOLLERR;
/*
* lockless access to see if there are pending faults
* __pollwait last action is the add_wait_queue but
* the spin_unlock would allow the waitqueue_active to
* pass above the actual list_add inside
* add_wait_queue critical section. So use a full
* memory barrier to serialize the list_add write of
* add_wait_queue() with the waitqueue_active read
* below.
*/
ret = 0;
smp_mb();
if (waitqueue_active(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh))
ret = EPOLLIN;
else if (waitqueue_active(&ctx->event_wqh))
ret = EPOLLIN;
return ret;
default:
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
return EPOLLERR;
}
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: shmem/hugetlbfs: only allow to register VM_MAYWRITE vmas
After the VMA to register the uffd onto is found, check that it has
VM_MAYWRITE set before allowing registration. This way we inherit all
common code checks before allowing to fill file holes in shmem and
hugetlbfs with UFFDIO_COPY.
The userfaultfd memory model is not applicable for readonly files unless
it's a MAP_PRIVATE.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126173452.26955-4-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: ff62a3421044 ("hugetlb: implement memfd sealing")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Fixes: 4c27fe4c4c84 ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char *bond_mode_name(int mode)
{
static const char *names[] = {
[BOND_MODE_ROUNDROBIN] = "load balancing (round-robin)",
[BOND_MODE_ACTIVEBACKUP] = "fault-tolerance (active-backup)",
[BOND_MODE_XOR] = "load balancing (xor)",
[BOND_MODE_BROADCAST] = "fault-tolerance (broadcast)",
[BOND_MODE_8023AD] = "IEEE 802.3ad Dynamic link aggregation",
[BOND_MODE_TLB] = "transmit load balancing",
[BOND_MODE_ALB] = "adaptive load balancing",
};
if (mode < 0 || mode > BOND_MODE_ALB)
return "unknown";
return names[mode];
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Widget* widgetForNode(Node* focusedNode)
{
if (!focusedNode)
return 0;
RenderObject* renderer = focusedNode->renderer();
if (!renderer || !renderer->isWidget())
return 0;
return toRenderWidget(renderer)->widget();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int HAL_unload(void)
{
int err = 0;
bdt_log("Unloading HAL lib");
sBtInterface = NULL;
bdt_log("HAL library unloaded (%s)", strerror(err));
return err;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 159,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnJSOutOfMemory() {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->JSOutOfMemory(this);
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutomationInternalCustomBindings::OnAtomicUpdateFinished(
ui::AXTree* tree,
bool root_changed,
const std::vector<ui::AXTreeDelegate::Change>& changes) {
auto iter = axtree_to_tree_cache_map_.find(tree);
if (iter == axtree_to_tree_cache_map_.end())
return;
for (const auto change : changes) {
ui::AXNode* node = change.node;
switch (change.type) {
case NODE_CREATED:
SendTreeChangeEvent(
api::automation::TREE_CHANGE_TYPE_NODECREATED,
tree, node);
break;
case SUBTREE_CREATED:
SendTreeChangeEvent(
api::automation::TREE_CHANGE_TYPE_SUBTREECREATED,
tree, node);
break;
case NODE_CHANGED:
SendTreeChangeEvent(
api::automation::TREE_CHANGE_TYPE_NODECHANGED,
tree, node);
break;
}
}
for (int id : text_changed_node_ids_) {
SendTreeChangeEvent(api::automation::TREE_CHANGE_TYPE_TEXTCHANGED, tree,
tree->GetFromId(id));
}
text_changed_node_ids_.clear();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | 0 | 156,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int itacns_check_and_add_keyset(sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card,
const char *label, int sec_env, size_t cert_offset,
const char *cert_path, const char *pubkey_path, const char *prkey_path,
u8 pin_ref, int *found_certificates)
{
int r;
sc_path_t path;
sc_pkcs15_id_t cert_id;
int ext_info_ok;
int ku = 0, xku = 0;
int pubkey_usage_flags = 0, prkey_usage_flags = 0;
cert_id.len = 1;
cert_id.value[0] = sec_env;
*found_certificates = 0;
/* Certificate */
if (!cert_path) {
sc_debug(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"We cannot use keys without a matching certificate");
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
sc_format_path(cert_path, &path);
r = sc_select_file(p15card->card, &path, NULL);
if (r == SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND)
return 0;
if (r != SC_SUCCESS) {
sc_debug(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Could not find certificate for %s", label);
return r;
}
/*
* Infocamere 1204 (and others?) store a more complex structure. We
* are going to read the first bytes to guess its length, and invoke
* itacns_add_cert so that it only reads the certificate.
*/
if (cert_offset) {
u8 certlen[3];
r = loadFile(p15card, &path, certlen, sizeof(certlen));
SC_TEST_RET(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r,
"Could not read certificate file");
path.index = cert_offset;
path.count = (certlen[1] << 8) + certlen[2];
/* If those bytes are 00, then we are probably dealing with an
* empty file. */
if (path.count == 0)
return 0;
}
r = itacns_add_cert(p15card, SC_PKCS15_TYPE_CERT_X509, 0,
&path, &cert_id, label, 0, &ext_info_ok, &ku, &xku);
if (r == SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT)
return 0;
SC_TEST_RET(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r,
"Could not add certificate");
(*found_certificates)++;
/* Set usage flags */
if(ext_info_ok) {
#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL
if (ku & KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) {
pubkey_usage_flags |= SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_VERIFY;
prkey_usage_flags |= SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_SIGN;
}
if (ku & KU_NON_REPUDIATION) {
pubkey_usage_flags |= SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_VERIFY;
prkey_usage_flags |= SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_NONREPUDIATION;
}
if (ku & KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT || ku & KU_KEY_AGREEMENT
|| xku & XKU_SSL_CLIENT) {
pubkey_usage_flags |= SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_WRAP;
prkey_usage_flags |= SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_UNWRAP;
}
if (ku & KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT || xku & XKU_SMIME) {
pubkey_usage_flags |= SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT;
prkey_usage_flags |= SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_DECRYPT;
}
#else /* ENABLE_OPENSSL */
sc_debug(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Extended certificate info retrieved without OpenSSL. "
"How is this possible?");
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
#endif /* ENABLE_OPENSSL */
} else {
/* Certificate info not retrieved; fall back onto defaults */
pubkey_usage_flags =
SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_VERIFY
| SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_WRAP;
prkey_usage_flags =
SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_SIGN
| SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_UNWRAP;
}
r = itacns_add_keyset(p15card, label, sec_env, &cert_id,
pubkey_path, prkey_path, pubkey_usage_flags, prkey_usage_flags,
pin_ref);
SC_TEST_RET(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r,
"Could not add keys for this certificate");
return r;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,716 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint64_t FrameIndexForView(RenderWidgetHostViewAura* view) {
return ImageTransportFactory::GetInstance()
->GetContextFactoryPrivate()
->GetFrameSinkManager()
->surface_manager()
->GetSurfaceForId(view->GetCurrentSurfaceId())
->GetActiveFrameIndex();
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u32 Maj(u32 x, u32 y, u32 z)
{
return (x & y) | (z & (x | y));
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void setup_send_key(struct packet_command *cgc, unsigned agid, unsigned type)
{
cgc->cmd[0] = GPCMD_SEND_KEY;
cgc->cmd[10] = type | (agid << 6);
switch (type) {
case 1: {
cgc->buflen = 16;
break;
}
case 3: {
cgc->buflen = 12;
break;
}
case 6: {
cgc->buflen = 8;
break;
}
}
cgc->cmd[9] = cgc->buflen;
cgc->data_direction = CGC_DATA_WRITE;
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 76,311 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tx3g_dump_style(FILE * trace, GF_StyleRecord *rec)
{
fprintf(trace, "<StyleRecord startChar=\"%d\" endChar=\"%d\" fontID=\"%d\" styles=\"", rec->startCharOffset, rec->endCharOffset, rec->fontID);
if (!rec->style_flags) {
fprintf(trace, "Normal");
} else {
if (rec->style_flags & 1) fprintf(trace, "Bold ");
if (rec->style_flags & 2) fprintf(trace, "Italic ");
if (rec->style_flags & 4) fprintf(trace, "Underlined ");
}
fprintf(trace, "\" fontSize=\"%d\" ", rec->font_size);
tx3g_dump_rgba8(trace, "textColor", rec->text_color);
fprintf(trace, "/>\n");
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerMS::EnterPictureInPicture(
blink::WebMediaPlayer::PipWindowOpenedCallback callback) {
DCHECK(bridge_);
const viz::SurfaceId& surface_id = bridge_->GetSurfaceId();
DCHECK(surface_id.is_valid());
delegate_->DidPictureInPictureModeStart(delegate_id_, surface_id,
NaturalSize(), std::move(callback),
false /* show_play_pause_button */);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,143 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FullscreenTestBrowserWindow() : fullscreen_(false) {}
Commit Message: Fix OS_MACOS typos. Should be OS_MACOSX.
BUG=163208
TEST=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12829005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@189130 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 118,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void set_reg_mkey_segment(struct mlx5_mkey_seg *seg,
const struct ib_send_wr *wr)
{
const struct mlx5_umr_wr *umrwr = umr_wr(wr);
memset(seg, 0, sizeof(*seg));
if (wr->send_flags & MLX5_IB_SEND_UMR_DISABLE_MR)
seg->status = MLX5_MKEY_STATUS_FREE;
seg->flags = convert_access(umrwr->access_flags);
if (umrwr->pd)
seg->flags_pd = cpu_to_be32(to_mpd(umrwr->pd)->pdn);
if (wr->send_flags & MLX5_IB_SEND_UMR_UPDATE_TRANSLATION &&
!umrwr->length)
seg->flags_pd |= cpu_to_be32(MLX5_MKEY_LEN64);
seg->start_addr = cpu_to_be64(umrwr->virt_addr);
seg->len = cpu_to_be64(umrwr->length);
seg->log2_page_size = umrwr->page_shift;
seg->qpn_mkey7_0 = cpu_to_be32(0xffffff00 |
mlx5_mkey_variant(umrwr->mkey));
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FrameFocusedObserver::~FrameFocusedObserver() {}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SoftMPEG4Encoder::SoftMPEG4Encoder(
const char *name,
const char *componentRole,
OMX_VIDEO_CODINGTYPE codingType,
const char *mime,
const CodecProfileLevel *profileLevels,
size_t numProfileLevels,
const OMX_CALLBACKTYPE *callbacks,
OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_COMPONENTTYPE **component)
: SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent(
name, componentRole, codingType,
profileLevels, numProfileLevels,
176 /* width */, 144 /* height */,
callbacks, appData, component),
mEncodeMode(COMBINE_MODE_WITH_ERR_RES),
mIDRFrameRefreshIntervalInSec(1),
mNumInputFrames(-1),
mStarted(false),
mSawInputEOS(false),
mSignalledError(false),
mHandle(new tagvideoEncControls),
mEncParams(new tagvideoEncOptions),
mInputFrameData(NULL) {
if (codingType == OMX_VIDEO_CodingH263) {
mEncodeMode = H263_MODE;
}
const size_t kOutputBufferSize = 256 * 1024;
initPorts(kNumBuffers, kNumBuffers, kOutputBufferSize, mime);
ALOGI("Construct SoftMPEG4Encoder");
}
Commit Message: SoftMPEG4: Check the buffer size before writing the reference frame.
Also prevent overflow in SoftMPEG4 and division by zero in SoftMPEG4Encoder.
Bug: 30033990
Change-Id: I7701f5fc54c2670587d122330e5dc851f64ed3c2
(cherry picked from commit 695123195034402ca76169b195069c28c30342d3)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dump_icc_buffer(int buffersize, char filename[],byte *Buffer)
{
char full_file_name[50];
FILE *fid;
gs_sprintf(full_file_name,"%d)%s_debug.icc",global_icc_index,filename);
fid = gp_fopen(full_file_name,"wb");
fwrite(Buffer,sizeof(unsigned char),buffersize,fid);
fclose(fid);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bs_open_read (Bitstream *bs, void *buffer_start, void *buffer_end)
{
bs->error = bs->sr = bs->bc = 0;
bs->ptr = (bs->buf = buffer_start) - 1;
bs->end = buffer_end;
bs->wrap = bs_read;
}
Commit Message: fixes for 4 fuzz failures posted to SourceForge mailing list
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,885 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int setcos_process_fci(sc_card_t *card, sc_file_t *file,
const u8 *buf, size_t buflen)
{
int r = iso_ops->process_fci(card, file, buf, buflen);
/* SetCOS 4.4: RSA key file is an internal EF but it's
* file descriptor doesn't seem to follow ISO7816. */
if (r >= 0 && (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_SETCOS_44 ||
SETCOS_IS_EID_APPLET(card))) {
const u8 *tag;
size_t taglen = 1;
tag = (u8 *) sc_asn1_find_tag(card->ctx, buf, buflen, 0x82, &taglen);
if (tag != NULL && taglen == 1 && *tag == 0x11)
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF;
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,703 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: print_radiotap_field(netdissect_options *ndo,
struct cpack_state *s, uint32_t bit, uint8_t *flagsp,
uint32_t presentflags)
{
u_int i;
int rc;
switch (bit) {
case IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_TSFT: {
uint64_t tsft;
rc = cpack_uint64(s, &tsft);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%" PRIu64 "us tsft ", tsft));
break;
}
case IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_FLAGS: {
uint8_t flagsval;
rc = cpack_uint8(s, &flagsval);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
*flagsp = flagsval;
if (flagsval & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_F_CFP)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "cfp "));
if (flagsval & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_F_SHORTPRE)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "short preamble "));
if (flagsval & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_F_WEP)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "wep "));
if (flagsval & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_F_FRAG)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "fragmented "));
if (flagsval & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_F_BADFCS)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "bad-fcs "));
break;
}
case IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_RATE: {
uint8_t rate;
rc = cpack_uint8(s, &rate);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
/*
* XXX On FreeBSD rate & 0x80 means we have an MCS. On
* Linux and AirPcap it does not. (What about
* Mac OS X, NetBSD, OpenBSD, and DragonFly BSD?)
*
* This is an issue either for proprietary extensions
* to 11a or 11g, which do exist, or for 11n
* implementations that stuff a rate value into
* this field, which also appear to exist.
*
* We currently handle that by assuming that
* if the 0x80 bit is set *and* the remaining
* bits have a value between 0 and 15 it's
* an MCS value, otherwise it's a rate. If
* there are cases where systems that use
* "0x80 + MCS index" for MCS indices > 15,
* or stuff a rate value here between 64 and
* 71.5 Mb/s in here, we'll need a preference
* setting. Such rates do exist, e.g. 11n
* MCS 7 at 20 MHz with a long guard interval.
*/
if (rate >= 0x80 && rate <= 0x8f) {
/*
* XXX - we don't know the channel width
* or guard interval length, so we can't
* convert this to a data rate.
*
* If you want us to show a data rate,
* use the MCS field, not the Rate field;
* the MCS field includes not only the
* MCS index, it also includes bandwidth
* and guard interval information.
*
* XXX - can we get the channel width
* from XChannel and the guard interval
* information from Flags, at least on
* FreeBSD?
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "MCS %u ", rate & 0x7f));
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%2.1f Mb/s ", .5 * rate));
break;
}
case IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_CHANNEL: {
uint16_t frequency;
uint16_t flags;
rc = cpack_uint16(s, &frequency);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
rc = cpack_uint16(s, &flags);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
/*
* If CHANNEL and XCHANNEL are both present, skip
* CHANNEL.
*/
if (presentflags & (1 << IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_XCHANNEL))
break;
print_chaninfo(ndo, frequency, flags, presentflags);
break;
}
case IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_FHSS: {
uint8_t hopset;
uint8_t hoppat;
rc = cpack_uint8(s, &hopset);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
rc = cpack_uint8(s, &hoppat);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "fhset %d fhpat %d ", hopset, hoppat));
break;
}
case IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_DBM_ANTSIGNAL: {
int8_t dbm_antsignal;
rc = cpack_int8(s, &dbm_antsignal);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%ddBm signal ", dbm_antsignal));
break;
}
case IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_DBM_ANTNOISE: {
int8_t dbm_antnoise;
rc = cpack_int8(s, &dbm_antnoise);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%ddBm noise ", dbm_antnoise));
break;
}
case IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_LOCK_QUALITY: {
uint16_t lock_quality;
rc = cpack_uint16(s, &lock_quality);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u sq ", lock_quality));
break;
}
case IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_TX_ATTENUATION: {
uint16_t tx_attenuation;
rc = cpack_uint16(s, &tx_attenuation);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%d tx power ", -(int)tx_attenuation));
break;
}
case IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_DB_TX_ATTENUATION: {
uint8_t db_tx_attenuation;
rc = cpack_uint8(s, &db_tx_attenuation);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%ddB tx attenuation ", -(int)db_tx_attenuation));
break;
}
case IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_DBM_TX_POWER: {
int8_t dbm_tx_power;
rc = cpack_int8(s, &dbm_tx_power);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%ddBm tx power ", dbm_tx_power));
break;
}
case IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_ANTENNA: {
uint8_t antenna;
rc = cpack_uint8(s, &antenna);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "antenna %u ", antenna));
break;
}
case IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_DB_ANTSIGNAL: {
uint8_t db_antsignal;
rc = cpack_uint8(s, &db_antsignal);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%ddB signal ", db_antsignal));
break;
}
case IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_DB_ANTNOISE: {
uint8_t db_antnoise;
rc = cpack_uint8(s, &db_antnoise);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%ddB noise ", db_antnoise));
break;
}
case IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_RX_FLAGS: {
uint16_t rx_flags;
rc = cpack_uint16(s, &rx_flags);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
/* Do nothing for now */
break;
}
case IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_XCHANNEL: {
uint32_t flags;
uint16_t frequency;
uint8_t channel;
uint8_t maxpower;
rc = cpack_uint32(s, &flags);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
rc = cpack_uint16(s, &frequency);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
rc = cpack_uint8(s, &channel);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
rc = cpack_uint8(s, &maxpower);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
print_chaninfo(ndo, frequency, flags, presentflags);
break;
}
case IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_MCS: {
uint8_t known;
uint8_t flags;
uint8_t mcs_index;
static const char *ht_bandwidth[4] = {
"20 MHz",
"40 MHz",
"20 MHz (L)",
"20 MHz (U)"
};
float htrate;
rc = cpack_uint8(s, &known);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
rc = cpack_uint8(s, &flags);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
rc = cpack_uint8(s, &mcs_index);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
if (known & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_MCS_MCS_INDEX_KNOWN) {
/*
* We know the MCS index.
*/
if (mcs_index <= MAX_MCS_INDEX) {
/*
* And it's in-range.
*/
if (known & (IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_MCS_BANDWIDTH_KNOWN|IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_MCS_GUARD_INTERVAL_KNOWN)) {
/*
* And we know both the bandwidth and
* the guard interval, so we can look
* up the rate.
*/
htrate =
ieee80211_float_htrates \
[mcs_index] \
[((flags & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_MCS_BANDWIDTH_MASK) == IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_MCS_BANDWIDTH_40 ? 1 : 0)] \
[((flags & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_MCS_SHORT_GI) ? 1 : 0)];
} else {
/*
* We don't know both the bandwidth
* and the guard interval, so we can
* only report the MCS index.
*/
htrate = 0.0;
}
} else {
/*
* The MCS value is out of range.
*/
htrate = 0.0;
}
if (htrate != 0.0) {
/*
* We have the rate.
* Print it.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%.1f Mb/s MCS %u ", htrate, mcs_index));
} else {
/*
* We at least have the MCS index.
* Print it.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "MCS %u ", mcs_index));
}
}
if (known & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_MCS_BANDWIDTH_KNOWN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ",
ht_bandwidth[flags & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_MCS_BANDWIDTH_MASK]));
}
if (known & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_MCS_GUARD_INTERVAL_KNOWN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s GI ",
(flags & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_MCS_SHORT_GI) ?
"short" : "long"));
}
if (known & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_MCS_HT_FORMAT_KNOWN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ",
(flags & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_MCS_HT_GREENFIELD) ?
"greenfield" : "mixed"));
}
if (known & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_MCS_FEC_TYPE_KNOWN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s FEC ",
(flags & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_MCS_FEC_LDPC) ?
"LDPC" : "BCC"));
}
if (known & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_MCS_STBC_KNOWN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RX-STBC%u ",
(flags & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_MCS_STBC_MASK) >> IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_MCS_STBC_SHIFT));
}
break;
}
case IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_AMPDU_STATUS: {
uint32_t reference_num;
uint16_t flags;
uint8_t delim_crc;
uint8_t reserved;
rc = cpack_uint32(s, &reference_num);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
rc = cpack_uint16(s, &flags);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
rc = cpack_uint8(s, &delim_crc);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
rc = cpack_uint8(s, &reserved);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
/* Do nothing for now */
break;
}
case IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_VHT: {
uint16_t known;
uint8_t flags;
uint8_t bandwidth;
uint8_t mcs_nss[4];
uint8_t coding;
uint8_t group_id;
uint16_t partial_aid;
static const char *vht_bandwidth[32] = {
"20 MHz",
"40 MHz",
"20 MHz (L)",
"20 MHz (U)",
"80 MHz",
"80 MHz (L)",
"80 MHz (U)",
"80 MHz (LL)",
"80 MHz (LU)",
"80 MHz (UL)",
"80 MHz (UU)",
"160 MHz",
"160 MHz (L)",
"160 MHz (U)",
"160 MHz (LL)",
"160 MHz (LU)",
"160 MHz (UL)",
"160 MHz (UU)",
"160 MHz (LLL)",
"160 MHz (LLU)",
"160 MHz (LUL)",
"160 MHz (UUU)",
"160 MHz (ULL)",
"160 MHz (ULU)",
"160 MHz (UUL)",
"160 MHz (UUU)",
"unknown (26)",
"unknown (27)",
"unknown (28)",
"unknown (29)",
"unknown (30)",
"unknown (31)"
};
rc = cpack_uint16(s, &known);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
rc = cpack_uint8(s, &flags);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
rc = cpack_uint8(s, &bandwidth);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
rc = cpack_uint8(s, &mcs_nss[i]);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
}
rc = cpack_uint8(s, &coding);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
rc = cpack_uint8(s, &group_id);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
rc = cpack_uint16(s, &partial_aid);
if (rc != 0)
goto trunc;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
u_int nss, mcs;
nss = mcs_nss[i] & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_VHT_NSS_MASK;
mcs = (mcs_nss[i] & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_VHT_MCS_MASK) >> IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_VHT_MCS_SHIFT;
if (nss == 0)
continue;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "User %u MCS %u ", i, mcs));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s FEC ",
(coding & (IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_CODING_LDPC_USERn << i)) ?
"LDPC" : "BCC"));
}
if (known & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_VHT_BANDWIDTH_KNOWN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ",
vht_bandwidth[bandwidth & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_VHT_BANDWIDTH_MASK]));
}
if (known & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_VHT_GUARD_INTERVAL_KNOWN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s GI ",
(flags & IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_VHT_SHORT_GI) ?
"short" : "long"));
}
break;
}
default:
/* this bit indicates a field whose
* size we do not know, so we cannot
* proceed. Just print the bit number.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[bit %u] ", bit));
return -1;
}
return 0;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return rc;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13008/IEEE 802.11: Fix TIM bitmap copy to copy from p + offset.
offset has already been advanced to point to the bitmap; we shouldn't
add the amount to advance again.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, remove some redundant tests - we've already checked,
before the case statement, whether we have captured the entire
information element and whether the entire information element is
present in the on-the-wire packet; in the cases for particular IEs, we
only need to make sure we don't go past the end of the IE.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void print_md5(FILE *stream, unsigned char digest[16]) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
fprintf(stream, "%02x", digest[i]);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long iov_iter_alignment(const struct iov_iter *i)
{
unsigned long res = 0;
size_t size = i->count;
if (unlikely(i->type & ITER_PIPE)) {
if (size && i->iov_offset && allocated(&i->pipe->bufs[i->idx]))
return size | i->iov_offset;
return size;
}
iterate_all_kinds(i, size, v,
(res |= (unsigned long)v.iov_base | v.iov_len, 0),
res |= v.bv_offset | v.bv_len,
res |= (unsigned long)v.iov_base | v.iov_len
)
return res;
}
Commit Message: fix a fencepost error in pipe_advance()
The logics in pipe_advance() used to release all buffers past the new
position failed in cases when the number of buffers to release was equal
to pipe->buffers. If that happened, none of them had been released,
leaving pipe full. Worse, it was trivial to trigger and we end up with
pipe full of uninitialized pages. IOW, it's an infoleak.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9
Reported-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Tested-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 68,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _nfs41_test_stateid(struct nfs_server *server, nfs4_stateid *stateid)
{
int status;
struct nfs41_test_stateid_args args = {
.stateid = stateid,
};
struct nfs41_test_stateid_res res;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_TEST_STATEID],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
dprintk("NFS call test_stateid %p\n", stateid);
nfs41_init_sequence(&args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
status = nfs4_call_sync_sequence(server->client, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 1);
if (status != NFS_OK) {
dprintk("NFS reply test_stateid: failed, %d\n", status);
return status;
}
dprintk("NFS reply test_stateid: succeeded, %d\n", -res.status);
return -res.status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntRect RenderBox::visualOverflowRectForPropagation(RenderStyle* parentStyle) const
{
IntRect rect = visualOverflowRect();
if (parentStyle->writingMode() == style()->writingMode())
return rect;
if (style()->writingMode() == RightToLeftWritingMode || parentStyle->writingMode() == RightToLeftWritingMode)
rect.setX(width() - rect.maxX());
else if (style()->writingMode() == BottomToTopWritingMode || parentStyle->writingMode() == BottomToTopWritingMode)
rect.setY(height() - rect.maxY());
return rect;
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void makeBitReader(
const void *data, size_t size,
ogg_buffer *buf, ogg_reference *ref, oggpack_buffer *bits) {
buf->data = (uint8_t *)data;
buf->size = size;
buf->refcount = 1;
buf->ptr.owner = NULL;
ref->buffer = buf;
ref->begin = 0;
ref->length = size;
ref->next = NULL;
oggpack_readinit(bits, ref);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (vorbis|opus)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: I1ccdd16a00741da072527a6d13e87fd7c7fe8c54
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned HTMLFormElement::length() const {
const FormAssociatedElement::List& elements = associatedElements();
unsigned len = 0;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < elements.size(); ++i) {
if (elements[i]->isEnumeratable())
++len;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: Enforce form-action CSP even when form.target is present.
BUG=630332
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2464123004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#429922}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 142,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::SetRendererProcessType(
blink::scheduler::RendererProcessType type) {
renderer_scheduler_->SetRendererProcessType(type);
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,596 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool jslIsIDOrReservedWord() {
return lex->tk == LEX_ID ||
(lex->tk >= _LEX_R_LIST_START && lex->tk <= _LEX_R_LIST_END);
}
Commit Message: Fix strncat/cpy bounding issues (fix #1425)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SMB2_rmdir(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
u64 persistent_fid, u64 volatile_fid)
{
__u8 delete_pending = 1;
void *data;
unsigned int size;
data = &delete_pending;
size = 1; /* sizeof __u8 */
return send_set_info(xid, tcon, persistent_fid, volatile_fid,
current->tgid, FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION, 1, &data,
&size);
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 84,917 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CSSStyleSheet::deleteRule(unsigned index,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (!CanAccessRules()) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError(
"Cannot access StyleSheet to deleteRule");
return;
}
DCHECK(child_rule_cssom_wrappers_.IsEmpty() ||
child_rule_cssom_wrappers_.size() == contents_->RuleCount());
if (index >= length()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kIndexSizeError,
"The index provided (" + String::Number(index) +
") is larger than the maximum index (" +
String::Number(length() - 1) + ").");
return;
}
RuleMutationScope mutation_scope(this);
bool success = contents_->WrapperDeleteRule(index);
if (!success) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"Failed to delete rule");
return;
}
if (!child_rule_cssom_wrappers_.IsEmpty()) {
if (child_rule_cssom_wrappers_[index])
child_rule_cssom_wrappers_[index]->SetParentStyleSheet(nullptr);
child_rule_cssom_wrappers_.EraseAt(index);
}
}
Commit Message: Disallow access to opaque CSS responses.
Bug: 848786
Change-Id: Ie53fbf644afdd76d7c65649a05c939c63d89b4ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1088335
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565537}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 153,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void add_kid(int id, xref_t *xref)
{
/* Make some space */
if (((xref->n_kids + 1) * KID_SIZE) > (xref->n_kids_allocs*KIDS_PER_ALLOC))
xref->kids = realloc(
xref->kids, (++xref->n_kids_allocs)*(KIDS_PER_ALLOC * KID_SIZE));
xref->kids[xref->n_kids++] = id;
}
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 88,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ZIPARCHIVE_METHOD(getCommentIndex)
{
struct zip *intern;
zval *this = getThis();
long index, flags = 0;
const char * comment;
int comment_len = 0;
struct zip_stat sb;
if (!this) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZIP_FROM_OBJECT(intern, this);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l|l",
&index, &flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
PHP_ZIP_STAT_INDEX(intern, index, 0, sb);
comment = zip_get_file_comment(intern, index, &comment_len, (int)flags);
RETURN_STRINGL((char *)comment, (long)comment_len, 1);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 51,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int roland_load_info(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
struct snd_ctl_elem_info *info)
{
static const char *const names[] = { "High Load", "Light Load" };
return snd_ctl_enum_info(info, 1, 2, names);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: avoid freeing umidi object twice
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer (TIFF *in, uint8 *obuf, uint32 length,
uint32 width, uint16 spp,
struct dump_opts *dump)
{
int i, bytes_per_sample, bytes_per_pixel, shift_width, result = 1;
uint32 j;
int32 bytes_read = 0;
uint16 bps, planar;
uint32 nstrips;
uint32 strips_per_sample;
uint32 src_rowsize, dst_rowsize, rows_processed, rps;
uint32 rows_this_strip = 0;
tsample_t s;
tstrip_t strip;
tsize_t scanlinesize = TIFFScanlineSize(in);
tsize_t stripsize = TIFFStripSize(in);
unsigned char *srcbuffs[MAX_SAMPLES];
unsigned char *buff = NULL;
unsigned char *dst = NULL;
if (obuf == NULL)
{
TIFFError("readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer","Invalid buffer argument");
return (0);
}
memset (srcbuffs, '\0', sizeof(srcbuffs));
TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps);
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG, &planar);
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, &rps);
if (rps > length)
rps = length;
bytes_per_sample = (bps + 7) / 8;
bytes_per_pixel = ((bps * spp) + 7) / 8;
if (bytes_per_pixel < (bytes_per_sample + 1))
shift_width = bytes_per_pixel;
else
shift_width = bytes_per_sample + 1;
src_rowsize = ((bps * width) + 7) / 8;
dst_rowsize = ((bps * width * spp) + 7) / 8;
dst = obuf;
if ((dump->infile != NULL) && (dump->level == 3))
{
dump_info (dump->infile, dump->format, "",
"Image width %d, length %d, Scanline size, %4d bytes",
width, length, scanlinesize);
dump_info (dump->infile, dump->format, "",
"Bits per sample %d, Samples per pixel %d, Shift width %d",
bps, spp, shift_width);
}
/* Libtiff seems to assume/require that data for separate planes are
* written one complete plane after another and not interleaved in any way.
* Multiple scanlines and possibly strips of the same plane must be
* written before data for any other plane.
*/
nstrips = TIFFNumberOfStrips(in);
strips_per_sample = nstrips /spp;
for (s = 0; (s < spp) && (s < MAX_SAMPLES); s++)
{
srcbuffs[s] = NULL;
buff = _TIFFmalloc(stripsize);
if (!buff)
{
TIFFError ("readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer",
"Unable to allocate strip read buffer for sample %d", s);
for (i = 0; i < s; i++)
_TIFFfree (srcbuffs[i]);
return 0;
}
srcbuffs[s] = buff;
}
rows_processed = 0;
for (j = 0; (j < strips_per_sample) && (result == 1); j++)
{
for (s = 0; (s < spp) && (s < MAX_SAMPLES); s++)
{
buff = srcbuffs[s];
strip = (s * strips_per_sample) + j;
bytes_read = TIFFReadEncodedStrip (in, strip, buff, stripsize);
rows_this_strip = bytes_read / src_rowsize;
if (bytes_read < 0 && !ignore)
{
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read strip %lu for sample %d",
(unsigned long) strip, s + 1);
result = 0;
break;
}
#ifdef DEVELMODE
TIFFError("", "Strip %2d, read %5d bytes for %4d scanlines, shift width %d",
strip, bytes_read, rows_this_strip, shift_width);
#endif
}
if (rps > rows_this_strip)
rps = rows_this_strip;
dst = obuf + (dst_rowsize * rows_processed);
if ((bps % 8) == 0)
{
if (combineSeparateSamplesBytes (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
}
else
{
switch (shift_width)
{
case 1: if (combineSeparateSamples8bits (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
break;
case 2: if (combineSeparateSamples16bits (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
break;
case 3: if (combineSeparateSamples24bits (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
break;
case 4:
case 5:
case 6:
case 7:
case 8: if (combineSeparateSamples32bits (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
break;
default: TIFFError ("readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer", "Unsupported bit depth: %d", bps);
result = 0;
break;
}
}
if ((rows_processed + rps) > length)
{
rows_processed = length;
rps = length - rows_processed;
}
else
rows_processed += rps;
}
/* free any buffers allocated for each plane or scanline and
* any temporary buffers
*/
for (s = 0; (s < spp) && (s < MAX_SAMPLES); s++)
{
buff = srcbuffs[s];
if (buff != NULL)
_TIFFfree(buff);
}
return (result);
} /* end readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer */
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 48,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2Implementation::GetBoundPixelTransferBuffer(GLenum target,
const char* function_name,
GLuint* buffer_id) {
*buffer_id = 0;
switch (target) {
case GL_PIXEL_PACK_TRANSFER_BUFFER_CHROMIUM:
*buffer_id = bound_pixel_pack_transfer_buffer_id_;
break;
case GL_PIXEL_UNPACK_TRANSFER_BUFFER_CHROMIUM:
*buffer_id = bound_pixel_unpack_transfer_buffer_id_;
break;
default:
return false;
}
if (!*buffer_id) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name, "no buffer bound");
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RemoveActiveInputMethodId(const std::string& ime_id) {
base::EraseIf(active_input_method_ids_,
[&ime_id](const std::string& id) { return id == ime_id; });
}
Commit Message: Clear |composing_text_| after CommitText() is called.
|composing_text_| of InputConnectionImpl should be cleared after
CommitText() is called. Otherwise, FinishComposingText() will commit the
same text twice.
Bug: 899736
Test: unit_tests
Change-Id: Idb22d968ffe95d946789fbe62454e8e79cb0b384
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1304773
Commit-Queue: Yusuke Sato <yusukes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yusuke Sato <yusukes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#603518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __ext4_warning_inode(const struct inode *inode, const char *function,
unsigned int line, const char *fmt, ...)
{
struct va_format vaf;
va_list args;
if (!ext4_warning_ratelimit(inode->i_sb))
return;
va_start(args, fmt);
vaf.fmt = fmt;
vaf.va = &args;
printk(KERN_WARNING "EXT4-fs warning (device %s): %s:%d: "
"inode #%lu: comm %s: %pV\n", inode->i_sb->s_id,
function, line, inode->i_ino, current->comm, &vaf);
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 56,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(snmp_set_valueretrieval)
{
zend_long method;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "l", &method) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (method >= 0 && method <= (SNMP_VALUE_LIBRARY|SNMP_VALUE_PLAIN|SNMP_VALUE_OBJECT)) {
SNMP_G(valueretrieval) = method;
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unknown SNMP value retrieval method '%pd'", method);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_cwd(void)
{
char *dir = MALLOC(PATH_MAX);
/* Since keepalived doesn't do a chroot(), we don't need to be concerned
* about (unreachable) - see getcwd(3) man page. */
return getcwd(dir, PATH_MAX);
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UpdatedExtensionPermissionsInfo::Reason reason() const { return reason_; }
Commit Message: [Extensions] Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check schemes
Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check the schemes of the patterns
when evaluating if one pattern contains another. This is important in
order to prevent extensions from requesting chrome:-scheme permissions
via the permissions API when <all_urls> is specified as an optional
permission.
Bug: 859600,918470
Change-Id: If04d945ad0c939e84a80d83502c0f84b6ef0923d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1396561
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621410}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 153,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8WindowShell::clearForNavigation()
{
if (m_context.isEmpty())
return;
v8::HandleScope handleScope(m_isolate);
m_document.clear();
v8::Handle<v8::Context> context = m_context.newLocal(m_isolate);
v8::Context::Scope contextScope(context);
clearDocumentProperty();
v8::Handle<v8::Object> windowWrapper = m_global.newLocal(m_isolate)->FindInstanceInPrototypeChain(V8Window::GetTemplate(m_isolate, worldTypeInMainThread(m_isolate)));
ASSERT(!windowWrapper.IsEmpty());
windowWrapper->TurnOnAccessCheck();
context->DetachGlobal();
disposeContext();
}
Commit Message: Fix tracking of the id attribute string if it is shared across elements.
The patch to remove AtomicStringImpl:
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&rev=154790
Exposed a lifetime issue with strings for id attributes. We simply need to use
AtomicString.
BUG=290566
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/33793004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void testInterfaceEmptyMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::testInterfaceEmptyMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,708 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unhash_client_locked(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(clp->net, nfsd_net_id);
struct nfsd4_session *ses;
lockdep_assert_held(&nn->client_lock);
/* Mark the client as expired! */
clp->cl_time = 0;
/* Make it invisible */
if (!list_empty(&clp->cl_idhash)) {
list_del_init(&clp->cl_idhash);
if (test_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_CONFIRMED, &clp->cl_flags))
rb_erase(&clp->cl_namenode, &nn->conf_name_tree);
else
rb_erase(&clp->cl_namenode, &nn->unconf_name_tree);
}
list_del_init(&clp->cl_lru);
spin_lock(&clp->cl_lock);
list_for_each_entry(ses, &clp->cl_sessions, se_perclnt)
list_del_init(&ses->se_hash);
spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AXObjectCacheImpl::handleAttributeChanged(const QualifiedName& attrName,
Element* element) {
if (attrName == roleAttr)
handleAriaRoleChanged(element);
else if (attrName == altAttr || attrName == titleAttr)
textChanged(element);
else if (attrName == forAttr && isHTMLLabelElement(*element))
labelChanged(element);
else if (attrName == idAttr)
updateTreeIfElementIdIsAriaOwned(element);
if (!attrName.localName().startsWith("aria-"))
return;
if (attrName == aria_activedescendantAttr)
handleActiveDescendantChanged(element);
else if (attrName == aria_valuenowAttr || attrName == aria_valuetextAttr)
postNotification(element, AXObjectCacheImpl::AXValueChanged);
else if (attrName == aria_labelAttr || attrName == aria_labeledbyAttr ||
attrName == aria_labelledbyAttr)
textChanged(element);
else if (attrName == aria_checkedAttr)
checkedStateChanged(element);
else if (attrName == aria_selectedAttr)
handleAriaSelectedChanged(element);
else if (attrName == aria_expandedAttr)
handleAriaExpandedChange(element);
else if (attrName == aria_hiddenAttr)
childrenChanged(element->parentNode());
else if (attrName == aria_invalidAttr)
postNotification(element, AXObjectCacheImpl::AXInvalidStatusChanged);
else if (attrName == aria_ownsAttr)
childrenChanged(element);
else
postNotification(element, AXObjectCacheImpl::AXAriaAttributeChanged);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,347 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Upload(const scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedString>& file_contents,
scoped_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> metadata,
base::Callback<void()> done_callback) {
receive_count_ += 1;
EXPECT_TRUE(file_contents);
size_t compressed_length = file_contents->data().length();
const size_t kOutputBufferLength = 10 * 1024 * 1024;
std::vector<char> output_str(kOutputBufferLength);
z_stream stream = {0};
stream.avail_in = compressed_length;
stream.avail_out = kOutputBufferLength;
stream.next_in = (Bytef*)&file_contents->data()[0];
stream.next_out = (Bytef*)vector_as_array(&output_str);
int result = inflateInit2(&stream, 16 + MAX_WBITS);
EXPECT_EQ(Z_OK, result);
result = inflate(&stream, Z_FINISH);
int bytes_written = kOutputBufferLength - stream.avail_out;
inflateEnd(&stream);
EXPECT_EQ(Z_STREAM_END, result);
last_file_contents_.assign(vector_as_array(&output_str), bytes_written);
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(done_callback));
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(callback_));
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CrostiniUpgrader::Backup() {
base::PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE, {content::BrowserThread::UI},
base::BindOnce(&CrostiniUpgrader::OnBackup,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), CrostiniResult::SUCCESS),
base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(5));
}
Commit Message: Revert "Creates a WebUI-based Crostini Upgrader"
This reverts commit 29c8bb394dd8b8c03e006efb39ec77fc42f96900.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 717476 as the
culprit for failures in the build cycles as shown on:
https://analysis.chromium.org/waterfall/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyRAsSDVdmU3VzcGVjdGVkQ0wiMWNocm9taXVtLzI5YzhiYjM5NGRkOGI4YzAzZTAwNmVmYjM5ZWM3N2ZjNDJmOTY5MDAM
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/b/8896211200981346592
Sample Failed Step: compile
Original change's description:
> Creates a WebUI-based Crostini Upgrader
>
> The UI is behind the new crostini-webui-upgrader flag
> (currently disabled by default)
>
> The main areas for review are
>
> calamity@:
> html/js - chrome/browser/chromeos/crostini_upgrader/
> mojo and webui glue classes - chrome/browser/ui/webui/crostini_upgrader/
>
> davidmunro@
> crostini business logic - chrome/browser/chromeos/crostini/
>
> In this CL, the optional container backup stage is stubbed, and will be
> in a subsequent CL.
>
> A suite of unit/browser tests are also currently lacking. I intend them for
> follow-up CLs.
>
>
> Bug: 930901
> Change-Id: Ic52c5242e6c57232ffa6be5d6af65aaff5e8f4ff
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1900520
> Commit-Queue: Nicholas Verne <nverne@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: calamity <calamity@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#717476}
Change-Id: I704f549216a7d1dc21942fbf6cf4ab9a1d600380
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 930901
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1928159
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#717481}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API RBinObject *r_bin_file_object_find_by_id(RBinFile *binfile, ut32 binobj_id) {
RBinObject *obj;
RListIter *iter;
if (binfile) {
r_list_foreach (binfile->objs, iter, obj) {
if (obj->id == binobj_id) {
return obj;
}
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9902 - Fix oobread in RBin.string_scan_range
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport const Quantum *GetVirtualPixels(const Image *image,
const ssize_t x,const ssize_t y,const size_t columns,const size_t rows,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheInfo
*magick_restrict cache_info;
const int
id = GetOpenMPThreadId();
const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (cache_info->methods.get_virtual_pixel_handler !=
(GetVirtualPixelHandler) NULL)
return(cache_info->methods.get_virtual_pixel_handler(image,
GetPixelCacheVirtualMethod(image),x,y,columns,rows,exception));
assert(id < (int) cache_info->number_threads);
p=GetVirtualPixelsFromNexus(image,GetPixelCacheVirtualMethod(image),x,y,
columns,rows,cache_info->nexus_info[id],exception);
return(p);
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FetchManager::Loader::PerformDataFetch() {
DCHECK(fetch_request_data_->Url().ProtocolIsData());
ResourceRequest request(fetch_request_data_->Url());
request.SetRequestContext(fetch_request_data_->Context());
request.SetUseStreamOnResponse(true);
request.SetHTTPMethod(fetch_request_data_->Method());
request.SetFetchCredentialsMode(network::mojom::FetchCredentialsMode::kOmit);
request.SetFetchRedirectMode(FetchRedirectMode::kError);
ResourceLoaderOptions resource_loader_options;
resource_loader_options.data_buffering_policy = kDoNotBufferData;
resource_loader_options.security_origin = fetch_request_data_->Origin().get();
ThreadableLoaderOptions threadable_loader_options;
probe::willStartFetch(execution_context_, this);
threadable_loader_ = ThreadableLoader::Create(*execution_context_, this,
threadable_loader_options,
resource_loader_options);
threadable_loader_->Start(request);
}
Commit Message: [Fetch API] Fix redirect leak on "no-cors" requests
The spec issue is now fixed, and this CL follows the spec change[1].
1: https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/commit/14858d3e9402285a7ff3b5e47a22896ff3adc95d
Bug: 791324
Change-Id: Ic3e3955f43578b38fc44a5a6b2a1b43d56a2becb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1023613
Reviewed-by: Tsuyoshi Horo <horo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552964}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 154,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mxf_read_seek(AVFormatContext *s, int stream_index, int64_t sample_time, int flags)
{
AVStream *st = s->streams[stream_index];
int64_t seconds;
MXFContext* mxf = s->priv_data;
int64_t seekpos;
int i, ret;
MXFIndexTable *t;
MXFTrack *source_track = st->priv_data;
if (!source_track)
return 0;
/* if audio then truncate sample_time to EditRate */
if (st->codecpar->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO)
sample_time = av_rescale_q(sample_time, st->time_base,
av_inv_q(source_track->edit_rate));
if (mxf->nb_index_tables <= 0) {
if (!s->bit_rate)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (sample_time < 0)
sample_time = 0;
seconds = av_rescale(sample_time, st->time_base.num, st->time_base.den);
seekpos = avio_seek(s->pb, (s->bit_rate * seconds) >> 3, SEEK_SET);
if (seekpos < 0)
return seekpos;
ff_update_cur_dts(s, st, sample_time);
mxf->current_klv_data = (KLVPacket){{0}};
} else {
MXFPartition *partition;
t = &mxf->index_tables[0];
if (t->index_sid != source_track->index_sid) {
/* If the first index table does not belong to the stream, then find a stream which does belong to the index table */
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++) {
MXFTrack *new_source_track = s->streams[i]->priv_data;
if (new_source_track && new_source_track->index_sid == t->index_sid) {
sample_time = av_rescale_q(sample_time, new_source_track->edit_rate, source_track->edit_rate);
source_track = new_source_track;
st = s->streams[i];
break;
}
}
if (i == s->nb_streams)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
/* clamp above zero, else ff_index_search_timestamp() returns negative
* this also means we allow seeking before the start */
sample_time = FFMAX(sample_time, 0);
if (t->fake_index) {
/* The first frames may not be keyframes in presentation order, so
* we have to advance the target to be able to find the first
* keyframe backwards... */
if (!(flags & AVSEEK_FLAG_ANY) &&
(flags & AVSEEK_FLAG_BACKWARD) &&
t->ptses[0] != AV_NOPTS_VALUE &&
sample_time < t->ptses[0] &&
(t->fake_index[t->ptses[0]].flags & AVINDEX_KEYFRAME))
sample_time = t->ptses[0];
/* behave as if we have a proper index */
if ((sample_time = ff_index_search_timestamp(t->fake_index, t->nb_ptses, sample_time, flags)) < 0)
return sample_time;
/* get the stored order index from the display order index */
sample_time += t->offsets[sample_time];
} else {
/* no IndexEntryArray (one or more CBR segments)
* make sure we don't seek past the end */
sample_time = FFMIN(sample_time, source_track->original_duration - 1);
}
if (source_track->wrapping == UnknownWrapped)
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "attempted seek in an UnknownWrapped essence\n");
if ((ret = mxf_edit_unit_absolute_offset(mxf, t, sample_time, source_track->edit_rate, &sample_time, &seekpos, &partition, 1)) < 0)
return ret;
ff_update_cur_dts(s, st, sample_time);
if (source_track->wrapping == ClipWrapped) {
KLVPacket klv = partition->first_essence_klv;
if (seekpos < klv.next_klv - klv.length || seekpos >= klv.next_klv) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "attempted seek out of clip wrapped KLV\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
mxf->current_klv_data = klv;
} else {
mxf->current_klv_data = (KLVPacket){{0}};
}
avio_seek(s->pb, seekpos, SEEK_SET);
}
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++) {
AVStream *cur_st = s->streams[i];
MXFTrack *cur_track = cur_st->priv_data;
if (cur_track) {
int64_t track_edit_unit = sample_time;
if (st != cur_st)
mxf_get_next_track_edit_unit(mxf, cur_track, seekpos, &track_edit_unit);
cur_track->sample_count = mxf_compute_sample_count(mxf, cur_st, track_edit_unit);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix av_log context
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: mxf-crash-1c2e59bf07a34675bfb3ada5e1ec22fa9f38f923
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 74,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestURLFetcherDelegate(
scoped_refptr<net::URLRequestContextGetter> context_getter,
const GURL& url,
net::URLRequestStatus expected_request_status)
: expected_request_status_(expected_request_status),
fetcher_(net::URLFetcher::Create(url,
net::URLFetcher::GET,
this,
TRAFFIC_ANNOTATION_FOR_TESTS)) {
fetcher_->SetRequestContext(context_getter.get());
fetcher_->Start();
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 146,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void anyAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(ScriptValue, cppValue, ScriptValue(jsValue, info.GetIsolate()));
imp->setAnyAttribute(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::OverrideEncoding(int encoding_id) {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("OverrideEncoding"), profile_);
const std::string selected_encoding =
CharacterEncoding::GetCanonicalEncodingNameByCommandId(encoding_id);
TabContents* contents = GetSelectedTabContents();
if (!selected_encoding.empty() && contents)
contents->SetOverrideEncoding(selected_encoding);
std::string new_selected_encoding_list;
if (CharacterEncoding::UpdateRecentlySelectedEncoding(
profile_->GetPrefs()->GetString(prefs::kRecentlySelectedEncoding),
encoding_id,
&new_selected_encoding_list)) {
profile_->GetPrefs()->SetString(prefs::kRecentlySelectedEncoding,
new_selected_encoding_list);
}
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnReplaceMisspelling(const base::string16& text) {
if (!frame_->HasSelection())
return;
frame_->ReplaceMisspelledRange(WebString::FromUTF16(text));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: reactor_status_t reactor_run_once(reactor_t *reactor) {
assert(reactor != NULL);
return run_reactor(reactor, 1);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 159,013 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ShellWindow::NavigationStateChanged(
const content::WebContents* source, unsigned changed_flags) {
DCHECK(source == web_contents_);
if (changed_flags & content::INVALIDATE_TYPE_TITLE)
UpdateWindowTitle();
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int npages_for_summary_flush(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool for_ra)
{
int valid_sum_count = 0;
int i, sum_in_page;
for (i = CURSEG_HOT_DATA; i <= CURSEG_COLD_DATA; i++) {
if (sbi->ckpt->alloc_type[i] == SSR)
valid_sum_count += sbi->blocks_per_seg;
else {
if (for_ra)
valid_sum_count += le16_to_cpu(
F2FS_CKPT(sbi)->cur_data_blkoff[i]);
else
valid_sum_count += curseg_blkoff(sbi, i);
}
}
sum_in_page = (PAGE_SIZE - 2 * SUM_JOURNAL_SIZE -
SUM_FOOTER_SIZE) / SUMMARY_SIZE;
if (valid_sum_count <= sum_in_page)
return 1;
else if ((valid_sum_count - sum_in_page) <=
(PAGE_SIZE - SUM_FOOTER_SIZE) / SUMMARY_SIZE)
return 2;
return 3;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 85,413 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabAnimation(TabStripGtk* tabstrip, Type type)
: tabstrip_(tabstrip),
animation_(this),
start_selected_width_(0),
start_unselected_width_(0),
end_selected_width_(0),
end_unselected_width_(0),
layout_on_completion_(false),
type_(type) {
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,171 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sha1_ssse3_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
struct sha1_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
*sctx = (struct sha1_state){
.state = { SHA1_H0, SHA1_H1, SHA1_H2, SHA1_H3, SHA1_H4 },
};
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileBrowserPrivateSearchDriveMetadataFunction::OnEntryDefinitionList(
scoped_ptr<drive::MetadataSearchResultVector> search_result_info_list,
scoped_ptr<EntryDefinitionList> entry_definition_list) {
DCHECK_EQ(search_result_info_list->size(), entry_definition_list->size());
base::ListValue* results_list = new base::ListValue();
for (size_t i = 0; i < entry_definition_list->size(); ++i) {
base::DictionaryValue* result_dict = new base::DictionaryValue();
base::DictionaryValue* entry = new base::DictionaryValue();
entry->SetString(
"fileSystemName", entry_definition_list->at(i).file_system_name);
entry->SetString(
"fileSystemRoot", entry_definition_list->at(i).file_system_root_url);
entry->SetString(
"fileFullPath",
"/" + entry_definition_list->at(i).full_path.AsUTF8Unsafe());
entry->SetBoolean("fileIsDirectory",
entry_definition_list->at(i).is_directory);
result_dict->Set("entry", entry);
result_dict->SetString(
"highlightedBaseName",
search_result_info_list->at(i).highlighted_base_name);
results_list->Append(result_dict);
}
SetResult(results_list);
SendResponse(true);
}
Commit Message: Reland r286968: The CL borrows ShareDialog from Files.app and add it to Gallery.
Previous Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/431293002
BUG=374667
TEST=manually
R=yoshiki@chromium.org, mtomasz@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/433733004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286975 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ref_param_read_get_policy(gs_param_list * plist, gs_param_name pkey)
{
iparam_list *const iplist = (iparam_list *) plist;
ref *pvalue;
if (!(r_has_type(&iplist->u.r.policies, t_dictionary) &&
dict_find_string(&iplist->u.r.policies, pkey, &pvalue) > 0 &&
r_has_type(pvalue, t_integer))
)
return gs_param_policy_ignore;
return (int)pvalue->value.intval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _PUBLIC_ bool strhaslower(const char *string)
{
struct smb_iconv_handle *ic = get_iconv_handle();
return strhaslower_handle(ic, string);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 2,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sctp_v6_add_protocol(void)
{
/* Register notifier for inet6 address additions/deletions. */
register_inet6addr_notifier(&sctp_inet6addr_notifier);
if (inet6_add_protocol(&sctpv6_protocol, IPPROTO_SCTP) < 0)
return -EAGAIN;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix ipv6 ipsec encryption bug in sctp_v6_xmit
Alan Chester reported an issue with IPv6 on SCTP that IPsec traffic is not
being encrypted, whereas on IPv4 it is. Setting up an AH + ESP transport
does not seem to have the desired effect:
SCTP + IPv4:
22:14:20.809645 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 116)
192.168.0.2 > 192.168.0.5: AH(spi=0x00000042,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00000044,seq=0x1), length 72
22:14:20.813270 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 340)
192.168.0.5 > 192.168.0.2: AH(spi=0x00000043,sumlen=16,seq=0x1):
SCTP + IPv6:
22:31:19.215029 IP6 (class 0x02, hlim 64, next-header SCTP (132) payload length: 364)
fe80::222:15ff:fe87:7fc.3333 > fe80::92e6:baff:fe0d:5a54.36767: sctp
1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 747759530] [rwnd: 62464] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10]
Moreover, Alan says:
This problem was seen with both Racoon and Racoon2. Other people have seen
this with OpenSwan. When IPsec is configured to encrypt all upper layer
protocols the SCTP connection does not initialize. After using Wireshark to
follow packets, this is because the SCTP packet leaves Box A unencrypted and
Box B believes all upper layer protocols are to be encrypted so it drops
this packet, causing the SCTP connection to fail to initialize. When IPsec
is configured to encrypt just SCTP, the SCTP packets are observed unencrypted.
In fact, using `socat sctp6-listen:3333 -` on one end and transferring "plaintext"
string on the other end, results in cleartext on the wire where SCTP eventually
does not report any errors, thus in the latter case that Alan reports, the
non-paranoid user might think he's communicating over an encrypted transport on
SCTP although he's not (tcpdump ... -X):
...
0x0030: 5d70 8e1a 0003 001a 177d eb6c 0000 0000 ]p.......}.l....
0x0040: 0000 0000 706c 6169 6e74 6578 740a 0000 ....plaintext...
Only in /proc/net/xfrm_stat we can see XfrmInTmplMismatch increasing on the
receiver side. Initial follow-up analysis from Alan's bug report was done by
Alexey Dobriyan. Also thanks to Vlad Yasevich for feedback on this.
SCTP has its own implementation of sctp_v6_xmit() not calling inet6_csk_xmit().
This has the implication that it probably never really got updated along with
changes in inet6_csk_xmit() and therefore does not seem to invoke xfrm handlers.
SCTP's IPv4 xmit however, properly calls ip_queue_xmit() to do the work. Since
a call to inet6_csk_xmit() would solve this problem, but result in unecessary
route lookups, let us just use the cached flowi6 instead that we got through
sctp_v6_get_dst(). Since all SCTP packets are being sent through sctp_packet_transmit(),
we do the route lookup / flow caching in sctp_transport_route(), hold it in
tp->dst and skb_dst_set() right after that. If we would alter fl6->daddr in
sctp_v6_xmit() to np->opt->srcrt, we possibly could run into the same effect
of not having xfrm layer pick it up, hence, use fl6_update_dst() in sctp_v6_get_dst()
instead to get the correct source routed dst entry, which we assign to the skb.
Also source address routing example from 625034113 ("sctp: fix sctp to work with
ipv6 source address routing") still works with this patch! Nevertheless, in RFC5095
it is actually 'recommended' to not use that anyway due to traffic amplification [1].
So it seems we're not supposed to do that anyway in sctp_v6_xmit(). Moreover, if
we overwrite the flow destination here, the lower IPv6 layer will be unable to
put the correct destination address into IP header, as routing header is added in
ipv6_push_nfrag_opts() but then probably with wrong final destination. Things aside,
result of this patch is that we do not have any XfrmInTmplMismatch increase plus on
the wire with this patch it now looks like:
SCTP + IPv6:
08:17:47.074080 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a > 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba:
AH(spi=0x00005fb4,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00005fb5,seq=0x1), length 72
08:17:47.074264 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba > 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a:
AH(spi=0x00003d54,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00003d55,seq=0x1), length 296
This fixes Kernel Bugzilla 24412. This security issue seems to be present since
2.6.18 kernels. Lets just hope some big passive adversary in the wild didn't have
its fun with that. lksctp-tools IPv6 regression test suite passes as well with
this patch.
[1] http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf
Reported-by: Alan Chester <alan.chester@tekelec.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 29,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentLoader::notifyFinished(CachedResource* resource)
{
ASSERT_UNUSED(resource, m_mainResource == resource);
ASSERT(m_mainResource);
if (!m_mainResource->errorOccurred() && !m_mainResource->wasCanceled()) {
finishedLoading(m_mainResource->loadFinishTime());
return;
}
#if !PLATFORM(CHROMIUM)
if (m_request.cachePolicy() == ReturnCacheDataDontLoad && !m_mainResource->wasCanceled()) {
frameLoader()->retryAfterFailedCacheOnlyMainResourceLoad();
return;
}
#endif
mainReceivedError(m_mainResource->resourceError());
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::clearFullscreenElementStack()
{
m_fullScreenElementStack.clear();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,456 |
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