instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void thp_pmd_to_pagemap_entry(pagemap_entry_t *pme, struct pagemapread *pm,
pmd_t pmd, int offset, int pmd_flags2)
{
/*
* Currently pmd for thp is always present because thp can not be
* swapped-out, migrated, or HWPOISONed (split in such cases instead.)
* This if-check is just to prepare for future implementation.
*/
if (pmd_present(pmd))
*pme = make_pme(PM_PFRAME(pmd_pfn(pmd) + offset)
| PM_STATUS2(pm->v2, pmd_flags2) | PM_PRESENT);
else
*pme = make_pme(PM_NOT_PRESENT(pm->v2) | PM_STATUS2(pm->v2, pmd_flags2));
}
Commit Message: pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.
This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.
[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html
[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
this is the simple model. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 55,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8WindowShell::setSecurityToken()
{
ASSERT(m_world->isMainWorld());
Document* document = m_frame->document();
SecurityOrigin* origin = document->securityOrigin();
String token;
if (!origin->domainWasSetInDOM()
&& !m_frame->loader()->stateMachine()->isDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument())
token = document->securityOrigin()->toString();
v8::HandleScope handleScope(m_isolate);
v8::Handle<v8::Context> context = m_context.newLocal(m_isolate);
if (token.isEmpty() || token == "null") {
context->UseDefaultSecurityToken();
return;
}
CString utf8Token = token.utf8();
context->SetSecurityToken(v8::String::NewSymbol(utf8Token.data(), utf8Token.length()));
}
Commit Message: Fix tracking of the id attribute string if it is shared across elements.
The patch to remove AtomicStringImpl:
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&rev=154790
Exposed a lifetime issue with strings for id attributes. We simply need to use
AtomicString.
BUG=290566
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/33793004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hci_sock_release(struct socket *sock)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct hci_dev *hdev;
BT_DBG("sock %p sk %p", sock, sk);
if (!sk)
return 0;
hdev = hci_pi(sk)->hdev;
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel == HCI_CHANNEL_MONITOR)
atomic_dec(&monitor_promisc);
bt_sock_unlink(&hci_sk_list, sk);
if (hdev) {
atomic_dec(&hdev->promisc);
hci_dev_put(hdev);
}
sock_orphan(sk);
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_write_queue);
sock_put(sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: HCI - Fix info leak in getsockopt(HCI_FILTER)
The HCI code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
hci_ufilter before copying it to userland -- that for leaking two
bytes kernel stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the
structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void unmap_mapping_range(struct address_space *mapping,
loff_t const holebegin, loff_t const holelen, int even_cows)
{
struct zap_details details;
pgoff_t hba = holebegin >> PAGE_SHIFT;
pgoff_t hlen = (holelen + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/* Check for overflow. */
if (sizeof(holelen) > sizeof(hlen)) {
long long holeend =
(holebegin + holelen + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (holeend & ~(long long)ULONG_MAX)
hlen = ULONG_MAX - hba + 1;
}
details.check_mapping = even_cows? NULL: mapping;
details.nonlinear_vma = NULL;
details.first_index = hba;
details.last_index = hba + hlen - 1;
if (details.last_index < details.first_index)
details.last_index = ULONG_MAX;
mutex_lock(&mapping->i_mmap_mutex);
if (unlikely(!RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&mapping->i_mmap)))
unmap_mapping_range_tree(&mapping->i_mmap, &details);
if (unlikely(!list_empty(&mapping->i_mmap_nonlinear)))
unmap_mapping_range_list(&mapping->i_mmap_nonlinear, &details);
mutex_unlock(&mapping->i_mmap_mutex);
}
Commit Message: vm: add vm_iomap_memory() helper function
Various drivers end up replicating the code to mmap() their memory
buffers into user space, and our core memory remapping function may be
very flexible but it is unnecessarily complicated for the common cases
to use.
Our internal VM uses pfn's ("page frame numbers") which simplifies
things for the VM, and allows us to pass physical addresses around in a
denser and more efficient format than passing a "phys_addr_t" around,
and having to shift it up and down by the page size. But it just means
that drivers end up doing that shifting instead at the interface level.
It also means that drivers end up mucking around with internal VM things
like the vma details (vm_pgoff, vm_start/end) way more than they really
need to.
So this just exports a function to map a certain physical memory range
into user space (using a phys_addr_t based interface that is much more
natural for a driver) and hides all the complexity from the driver.
Some drivers will still end up tweaking the vm_page_prot details for
things like prefetching or cacheability etc, but that's actually
relevant to the driver, rather than caring about what the page offset of
the mapping is into the particular IO memory region.
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 94,459 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static apr_status_t fill_buffer(h2_stream *stream, apr_size_t amount)
{
conn_rec *c = stream->session->c;
apr_bucket *b;
apr_status_t status;
if (!stream->output) {
return APR_EOF;
}
status = h2_beam_receive(stream->output, stream->out_buffer,
APR_NONBLOCK_READ, amount);
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE2, status, stream->session->c,
"h2_stream(%ld-%d): beam_received",
stream->session->id, stream->id);
/* The buckets we reveive are using the stream->out_buffer pool as
* lifetime which is exactly what we want since this is stream->pool.
*
* However: when we send these buckets down the core output filters, the
* filter might decide to setaside them into a pool of its own. And it
* might decide, after having sent the buckets, to clear its pool.
*
* This is problematic for file buckets because it then closed the contained
* file. Any split off buckets we sent afterwards will result in a
* APR_EBADF.
*/
for (b = APR_BRIGADE_FIRST(stream->out_buffer);
b != APR_BRIGADE_SENTINEL(stream->out_buffer);
b = APR_BUCKET_NEXT(b)) {
if (APR_BUCKET_IS_FILE(b)) {
apr_bucket_file *f = (apr_bucket_file *)b->data;
apr_pool_t *fpool = apr_file_pool_get(f->fd);
if (fpool != c->pool) {
apr_bucket_setaside(b, c->pool);
if (!stream->files) {
stream->files = apr_array_make(stream->pool,
5, sizeof(apr_file_t*));
}
APR_ARRAY_PUSH(stream->files, apr_file_t*) = f->fd;
}
}
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740
mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory.
Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <naveen.tiwari@asu.edu> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 48,697 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: key_is_zero (struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < kt->cipher_length; ++i)
if (key->cipher[i])
return false;
msg (D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "CRYPTO INFO: WARNING: zero key detected");
return true;
}
Commit Message: Use constant time memcmp when comparing HMACs in openvpn_decrypt.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 32,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int au1200_setlocation (struct au1200fb_device *fbdev, int plane,
int xpos, int ypos)
{
uint32 winctrl0, winctrl1, winenable, fb_offset = 0;
int xsz, ysz;
/* FIX!!! NOT CHECKING FOR COMPLETE OFFSCREEN YET */
winctrl0 = lcd->window[plane].winctrl0;
winctrl1 = lcd->window[plane].winctrl1;
winctrl0 &= (LCD_WINCTRL0_A | LCD_WINCTRL0_AEN);
winctrl1 &= ~(LCD_WINCTRL1_SZX | LCD_WINCTRL1_SZY);
/* Check for off-screen adjustments */
xsz = win->w[plane].xres;
ysz = win->w[plane].yres;
if ((xpos + win->w[plane].xres) > panel->Xres) {
/* Off-screen to the right */
xsz = panel->Xres - xpos; /* off by 1 ??? */
/*printk("off screen right\n");*/
}
if ((ypos + win->w[plane].yres) > panel->Yres) {
/* Off-screen to the bottom */
ysz = panel->Yres - ypos; /* off by 1 ??? */
/*printk("off screen bottom\n");*/
}
if (xpos < 0) {
/* Off-screen to the left */
xsz = win->w[plane].xres + xpos;
fb_offset += (((0 - xpos) * winbpp(lcd->window[plane].winctrl1))/8);
xpos = 0;
/*printk("off screen left\n");*/
}
if (ypos < 0) {
/* Off-screen to the top */
ysz = win->w[plane].yres + ypos;
/* fixme: fb_offset += ((0-ypos)*fb_pars[plane].line_length); */
ypos = 0;
/*printk("off screen top\n");*/
}
/* record settings */
win->w[plane].xpos = xpos;
win->w[plane].ypos = ypos;
xsz -= 1;
ysz -= 1;
winctrl0 |= (xpos << 21);
winctrl0 |= (ypos << 10);
winctrl1 |= (xsz << 11);
winctrl1 |= (ysz << 0);
/* Disable the window while making changes, then restore WINEN */
winenable = lcd->winenable & (1 << plane);
au_sync();
lcd->winenable &= ~(1 << plane);
lcd->window[plane].winctrl0 = winctrl0;
lcd->window[plane].winctrl1 = winctrl1;
lcd->window[plane].winbuf0 =
lcd->window[plane].winbuf1 = fbdev->fb_phys;
lcd->window[plane].winbufctrl = 0; /* select winbuf0 */
lcd->winenable |= winenable;
au_sync();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaStreamManager::PostRequestToUI(
const std::string& label,
const MediaDeviceEnumeration& enumeration,
const base::Optional<media::AudioParameters>& output_parameters) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DCHECK(!output_parameters || output_parameters->IsValid());
DVLOG(1) << "PostRequestToUI({label= " << label << "})";
DeviceRequest* request = FindRequest(label);
if (!request)
return;
DCHECK(request->HasUIRequest());
const MediaStreamType audio_type = request->audio_type();
const MediaStreamType video_type = request->video_type();
if (IsAudioInputMediaType(audio_type))
request->SetState(audio_type, MEDIA_REQUEST_STATE_PENDING_APPROVAL);
if (IsVideoInputMediaType(video_type))
request->SetState(video_type, MEDIA_REQUEST_STATE_PENDING_APPROVAL);
if (fake_ui_factory_) {
MediaStreamDevices devices;
if (request->video_type() == MEDIA_DISPLAY_VIDEO_CAPTURE) {
devices.push_back(MediaStreamDeviceFromFakeDeviceConfig());
} else if (request->video_type() == MEDIA_GUM_DESKTOP_VIDEO_CAPTURE) {
MediaStreamDevice device;
if (request->request_type() == MEDIA_DEVICE_UPDATE) {
DesktopMediaID media_id(DesktopMediaID::TYPE_WINDOW,
DesktopMediaID::kNullId);
device = MediaStreamDevice(MEDIA_GUM_DESKTOP_VIDEO_CAPTURE,
media_id.ToString(), label);
} else {
DesktopMediaID media_id(DesktopMediaID::TYPE_SCREEN,
DesktopMediaID::kNullId);
device = MediaStreamDevice(MEDIA_GUM_DESKTOP_VIDEO_CAPTURE,
media_id.ToString(), label);
}
devices.push_back(device);
} else {
MediaStreamDevices audio_devices = ConvertToMediaStreamDevices(
request->audio_type(), enumeration[MEDIA_DEVICE_TYPE_AUDIO_INPUT]);
MediaStreamDevices video_devices = ConvertToMediaStreamDevices(
request->video_type(), enumeration[MEDIA_DEVICE_TYPE_VIDEO_INPUT]);
devices.reserve(audio_devices.size() + video_devices.size());
devices.insert(devices.end(), audio_devices.begin(), audio_devices.end());
devices.insert(devices.end(), video_devices.begin(), video_devices.end());
}
std::unique_ptr<FakeMediaStreamUIProxy> fake_ui = fake_ui_factory_.Run();
fake_ui->SetAvailableDevices(devices);
request->ui_proxy = std::move(fake_ui);
} else if (!request->ui_proxy) {
request->ui_proxy = MediaStreamUIProxy::Create();
}
request->ui_proxy->RequestAccess(
request->DetachUIRequest(),
base::BindOnce(&MediaStreamManager::HandleAccessRequestResponse,
base::Unretained(this), label,
output_parameters.value_or(
media::AudioParameters::UnavailableDeviceParams())));
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannelPixels(Image *image,
const size_t channels,const size_t row,const ssize_t type,
const unsigned char *pixels,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Quantum
pixel;
register const unsigned char
*p;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
packet_size;
unsigned short
nibble;
p=pixels;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,row,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
packet_size=GetPSDPacketSize(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (packet_size == 1)
pixel=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
else
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&nibble);
pixel=ScaleShortToQuantum(nibble);
}
if (image->depth > 1)
{
SetPSDPixel(image,channels,type,packet_size,pixel,q,exception);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
else
{
ssize_t
bit,
number_bits;
number_bits=image->columns-x;
if (number_bits > 8)
number_bits=8;
for (bit = 0; bit < number_bits; bit++)
{
SetPSDPixel(image,channels,type,packet_size,(((unsigned char) pixel)
& (0x01 << (7-bit))) != 0 ? 0 : 255,q,exception);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
x++;
}
if (x != (ssize_t) image->columns)
x--;
continue;
}
}
return(SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception));
}
Commit Message: Added check for out of bounds read (https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/108).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 73,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool tcp_checksum_complete_user(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return !skb_csum_unnecessary(skb) &&
__tcp_checksum_complete_user(sk, skb);
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction
Patch 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode
conditionally") introduced a bug that cwnd may become 0 when both
inflight and sndcnt are 0 (cwnd = inflight + sndcnt). This may lead
to a div-by-zero if the connection starts another cwnd reduction
phase by setting tp->prior_cwnd to the current cwnd (0) in
tcp_init_cwnd_reduction().
To prevent this we skip PRR operation when nothing is acked or
sacked. Then cwnd must be positive in all cases as long as ssthresh
is positive:
1) The proportional reduction mode
inflight > ssthresh > 0
2) The reduction bound mode
a) inflight == ssthresh > 0
b) inflight < ssthresh
sndcnt > 0 since newly_acked_sacked > 0 and inflight < ssthresh
Therefore in all cases inflight and sndcnt can not both be 0.
We check invalid tp->prior_cwnd to avoid potential div0 bugs.
In reality this bug is triggered only with a sequence of less common
events. For example, the connection is terminating an ECN-triggered
cwnd reduction with an inflight 0, then it receives reordered/old
ACKs or DSACKs from prior transmission (which acks nothing). Or the
connection is in fast recovery stage that marks everything lost,
but fails to retransmit due to local issues, then receives data
packets from other end which acks nothing.
Fixes: 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally")
Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 55,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SharedMemory::Create(const SharedMemoryCreateOptions& options) {
DCHECK_EQ(-1, mapped_file_);
if (options.size == 0) return false;
if (options.size > static_cast<size_t>(std::numeric_limits<int>::max()))
return false;
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowIO allow_io;
FILE *fp;
bool fix_size = true;
FilePath path;
if (options.name == NULL || options.name->empty()) {
DCHECK(!options.open_existing);
fp = file_util::CreateAndOpenTemporaryShmemFile(&path, options.executable);
if (fp) {
if (unlink(path.value().c_str()))
PLOG(WARNING) << "unlink";
}
} else {
if (!FilePathForMemoryName(*options.name, &path))
return false;
fp = file_util::OpenFile(path, "w+x");
if (fp == NULL && options.open_existing) {
fp = file_util::OpenFile(path, "a+");
fix_size = false;
}
}
if (fp && fix_size) {
struct stat stat;
if (fstat(fileno(fp), &stat) != 0) {
file_util::CloseFile(fp);
return false;
}
const size_t current_size = stat.st_size;
if (current_size != options.size) {
if (HANDLE_EINTR(ftruncate(fileno(fp), options.size)) != 0) {
file_util::CloseFile(fp);
return false;
}
}
requested_size_ = options.size;
}
if (fp == NULL) {
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
PLOG(ERROR) << "Creating shared memory in " << path.value() << " failed";
FilePath dir = path.DirName();
if (access(dir.value().c_str(), W_OK | X_OK) < 0) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to access(W_OK|X_OK) " << dir.value();
if (dir.value() == "/dev/shm") {
LOG(FATAL) << "This is frequently caused by incorrect permissions on "
<< "/dev/shm. Try 'sudo chmod 1777 /dev/shm' to fix.";
}
}
#else
PLOG(ERROR) << "Creating shared memory in " << path.value() << " failed";
#endif
return false;
}
return PrepareMapFile(fp);
}
Commit Message: Posix: fix named SHM mappings permissions.
Make sure that named mappings in /dev/shm/ aren't created with
broad permissions.
BUG=254159
R=mark@chromium.org, markus@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/17779002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209814 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 171,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct rdma_umap_priv *rdma_user_mmap_pre(struct ib_ucontext *ucontext,
struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long size)
{
struct ib_uverbs_file *ufile = ucontext->ufile;
struct rdma_umap_priv *priv;
if (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start != size)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/* Driver is using this wrong, must be called by ib_uverbs_mmap */
if (WARN_ON(!vma->vm_file ||
vma->vm_file->private_data != ufile))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
lockdep_assert_held(&ufile->device->disassociate_srcu);
priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!priv)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
return priv;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,478 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: entry_guards_changed(void)
{
entry_guards_changed_for_guard_selection(get_guard_selection_info());
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 69,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnDestroyVideoDecoder(int decoder_route_id) {
channel_->RemoveRoute(decoder_route_id);
video_decoders_.Remove(decoder_route_id);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_vop_header(Mpeg4DecContext *ctx, GetBitContext *gb)
{
MpegEncContext *s = &ctx->m;
int time_incr, time_increment;
int64_t pts;
s->mcsel = 0;
s->pict_type = get_bits(gb, 2) + AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I; /* pict type: I = 0 , P = 1 */
if (s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B && s->low_delay &&
ctx->vol_control_parameters == 0 && !(s->avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_LOW_DELAY)) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "low_delay flag set incorrectly, clearing it\n");
s->low_delay = 0;
}
s->partitioned_frame = s->data_partitioning && s->pict_type != AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B;
if (s->partitioned_frame)
s->decode_mb = mpeg4_decode_partitioned_mb;
else
s->decode_mb = mpeg4_decode_mb;
time_incr = 0;
while (get_bits1(gb) != 0)
time_incr++;
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "before time_increment");
if (ctx->time_increment_bits == 0 ||
!(show_bits(gb, ctx->time_increment_bits + 1) & 1)) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"time_increment_bits %d is invalid in relation to the current bitstream, this is likely caused by a missing VOL header\n", ctx->time_increment_bits);
for (ctx->time_increment_bits = 1;
ctx->time_increment_bits < 16;
ctx->time_increment_bits++) {
if (s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_P ||
(s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_S &&
ctx->vol_sprite_usage == GMC_SPRITE)) {
if ((show_bits(gb, ctx->time_increment_bits + 6) & 0x37) == 0x30)
break;
} else if ((show_bits(gb, ctx->time_increment_bits + 5) & 0x1F) == 0x18)
break;
}
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"time_increment_bits set to %d bits, based on bitstream analysis\n", ctx->time_increment_bits);
if (s->avctx->framerate.num && 4*s->avctx->framerate.num < 1<<ctx->time_increment_bits) {
s->avctx->framerate.num = 1<<ctx->time_increment_bits;
s->avctx->time_base = av_inv_q(av_mul_q(s->avctx->framerate, (AVRational){s->avctx->ticks_per_frame, 1}));
}
}
if (IS_3IV1)
time_increment = get_bits1(gb); // FIXME investigate further
else
time_increment = get_bits(gb, ctx->time_increment_bits);
if (s->pict_type != AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B) {
s->last_time_base = s->time_base;
s->time_base += time_incr;
s->time = s->time_base * (int64_t)s->avctx->framerate.num + time_increment;
if (s->workaround_bugs & FF_BUG_UMP4) {
if (s->time < s->last_non_b_time) {
/* header is not mpeg-4-compatible, broken encoder,
* trying to workaround */
s->time_base++;
s->time += s->avctx->framerate.num;
}
}
s->pp_time = s->time - s->last_non_b_time;
s->last_non_b_time = s->time;
} else {
s->time = (s->last_time_base + time_incr) * (int64_t)s->avctx->framerate.num + time_increment;
s->pb_time = s->pp_time - (s->last_non_b_time - s->time);
if (s->pp_time <= s->pb_time ||
s->pp_time <= s->pp_time - s->pb_time ||
s->pp_time <= 0) {
/* messed up order, maybe after seeking? skipping current B-frame */
return FRAME_SKIPPED;
}
ff_mpeg4_init_direct_mv(s);
if (ctx->t_frame == 0)
ctx->t_frame = s->pb_time;
if (ctx->t_frame == 0)
ctx->t_frame = 1; // 1/0 protection
s->pp_field_time = (ROUNDED_DIV(s->last_non_b_time, ctx->t_frame) -
ROUNDED_DIV(s->last_non_b_time - s->pp_time, ctx->t_frame)) * 2;
s->pb_field_time = (ROUNDED_DIV(s->time, ctx->t_frame) -
ROUNDED_DIV(s->last_non_b_time - s->pp_time, ctx->t_frame)) * 2;
if (s->pp_field_time <= s->pb_field_time || s->pb_field_time <= 1) {
s->pb_field_time = 2;
s->pp_field_time = 4;
if (!s->progressive_sequence)
return FRAME_SKIPPED;
}
}
if (s->avctx->framerate.den)
pts = ROUNDED_DIV(s->time, s->avctx->framerate.den);
else
pts = AV_NOPTS_VALUE;
ff_dlog(s->avctx, "MPEG4 PTS: %"PRId64"\n", pts);
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "before vop_coded");
/* vop coded */
if (get_bits1(gb) != 1) {
if (s->avctx->debug & FF_DEBUG_PICT_INFO)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "vop not coded\n");
return FRAME_SKIPPED;
}
if (ctx->new_pred)
decode_new_pred(ctx, gb);
if (ctx->shape != BIN_ONLY_SHAPE &&
(s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_P ||
(s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_S &&
ctx->vol_sprite_usage == GMC_SPRITE))) {
/* rounding type for motion estimation */
s->no_rounding = get_bits1(gb);
} else {
s->no_rounding = 0;
}
if (ctx->shape != RECT_SHAPE) {
if (ctx->vol_sprite_usage != 1 || s->pict_type != AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I) {
skip_bits(gb, 13); /* width */
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after width");
skip_bits(gb, 13); /* height */
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after height");
skip_bits(gb, 13); /* hor_spat_ref */
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after hor_spat_ref");
skip_bits(gb, 13); /* ver_spat_ref */
}
skip_bits1(gb); /* change_CR_disable */
if (get_bits1(gb) != 0)
skip_bits(gb, 8); /* constant_alpha_value */
}
if (ctx->shape != BIN_ONLY_SHAPE) {
skip_bits_long(gb, ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_i);
if (s->pict_type != AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I)
skip_bits_long(gb, ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_p);
if (s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B)
skip_bits_long(gb, ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_b);
if (get_bits_left(gb) < 3) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Header truncated\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
ctx->intra_dc_threshold = ff_mpeg4_dc_threshold[get_bits(gb, 3)];
if (!s->progressive_sequence) {
s->top_field_first = get_bits1(gb);
s->alternate_scan = get_bits1(gb);
} else
s->alternate_scan = 0;
}
if (s->alternate_scan) {
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->inter_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_h_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_v_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
} else {
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->inter_scantable, ff_zigzag_direct);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_scantable, ff_zigzag_direct);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_h_scantable, ff_alternate_horizontal_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_v_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
}
if (s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_S) {
if((ctx->vol_sprite_usage == STATIC_SPRITE ||
ctx->vol_sprite_usage == GMC_SPRITE)) {
if (mpeg4_decode_sprite_trajectory(ctx, gb) < 0)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (ctx->sprite_brightness_change)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"sprite_brightness_change not supported\n");
if (ctx->vol_sprite_usage == STATIC_SPRITE)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "static sprite not supported\n");
} else {
memset(s->sprite_offset, 0, sizeof(s->sprite_offset));
memset(s->sprite_delta, 0, sizeof(s->sprite_delta));
}
}
if (ctx->shape != BIN_ONLY_SHAPE) {
s->chroma_qscale = s->qscale = get_bits(gb, s->quant_precision);
if (s->qscale == 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Error, header damaged or not MPEG-4 header (qscale=0)\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA; // makes no sense to continue, as there is nothing left from the image then
}
if (s->pict_type != AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I) {
s->f_code = get_bits(gb, 3); /* fcode_for */
if (s->f_code == 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Error, header damaged or not MPEG-4 header (f_code=0)\n");
s->f_code = 1;
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA; // makes no sense to continue, as there is nothing left from the image then
}
} else
s->f_code = 1;
if (s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B) {
s->b_code = get_bits(gb, 3);
if (s->b_code == 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Error, header damaged or not MPEG4 header (b_code=0)\n");
s->b_code=1;
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA; // makes no sense to continue, as the MV decoding will break very quickly
}
} else
s->b_code = 1;
if (s->avctx->debug & FF_DEBUG_PICT_INFO) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG,
"qp:%d fc:%d,%d %s size:%d pro:%d alt:%d top:%d %spel part:%d resync:%d w:%d a:%d rnd:%d vot:%d%s dc:%d ce:%d/%d/%d time:%"PRId64" tincr:%d\n",
s->qscale, s->f_code, s->b_code,
s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I ? "I" : (s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_P ? "P" : (s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B ? "B" : "S")),
gb->size_in_bits,s->progressive_sequence, s->alternate_scan,
s->top_field_first, s->quarter_sample ? "q" : "h",
s->data_partitioning, ctx->resync_marker,
ctx->num_sprite_warping_points, s->sprite_warping_accuracy,
1 - s->no_rounding, s->vo_type,
ctx->vol_control_parameters ? " VOLC" : " ", ctx->intra_dc_threshold,
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_i, ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_p,
ctx->cplx_estimation_trash_b,
s->time,
time_increment
);
}
if (!ctx->scalability) {
if (ctx->shape != RECT_SHAPE && s->pict_type != AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I)
skip_bits1(gb); // vop shape coding type
} else {
if (ctx->enhancement_type) {
int load_backward_shape = get_bits1(gb);
if (load_backward_shape)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"load backward shape isn't supported\n");
}
skip_bits(gb, 2); // ref_select_code
}
}
/* detect buggy encoders which don't set the low_delay flag
* (divx4/xvid/opendivx). Note we cannot detect divx5 without B-frames
* easily (although it's buggy too) */
if (s->vo_type == 0 && ctx->vol_control_parameters == 0 &&
ctx->divx_version == -1 && s->picture_number == 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"looks like this file was encoded with (divx4/(old)xvid/opendivx) -> forcing low_delay flag\n");
s->low_delay = 1;
}
s->picture_number++; // better than pic number==0 always ;)
s->y_dc_scale_table = ff_mpeg4_y_dc_scale_table;
s->c_dc_scale_table = ff_mpeg4_c_dc_scale_table;
if (s->workaround_bugs & FF_BUG_EDGE) {
s->h_edge_pos = s->width;
s->v_edge_pos = s->height;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Remove use of FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO as indicator of studio profile
The profile field is changed by code inside and outside the decoder,
its not a reliable indicator of the internal codec state.
Maintaining it consistency with studio_profile is messy.
Its easier to just avoid it and use only studio_profile
Fixes: assertion failure
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_9.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 79,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vga_get_bpp(VGACommonState *s)
{
int ret;
if (vbe_enabled(s)) {
ret = s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_BPP];
} else {
ret = 0;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 3,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmcs_set_bits(unsigned long field, u32 mask)
{
vmcs_writel(field, vmcs_readl(field) | mask);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,212 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: authz_status oidc_authz_checker_claims_expr(request_rec *r, const char *require_args, const void *parsed_require_args) {
return oidc_authz_checker(r, require_args, parsed_require_args, oidc_authz_match_claims_expr);
}
Commit Message: release 2.3.10.2: fix XSS vulnerability for poll parameter
in OIDC Session Management RP iframe; CSNC-2019-001; thanks Mischa
Bachmann
Signed-off-by: Hans Zandbelt <hans.zandbelt@zmartzone.eu>
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 87,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsBool Type_LUT16_Write(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, void* Ptr, cmsUInt32Number nItems)
{
cmsUInt32Number nTabSize;
cmsPipeline* NewLUT = (cmsPipeline*) Ptr;
cmsStage* mpe;
_cmsStageToneCurvesData* PreMPE = NULL, *PostMPE = NULL;
_cmsStageMatrixData* MatMPE = NULL;
_cmsStageCLutData* clut = NULL;
int i, InputChannels, OutputChannels, clutPoints;
mpe = NewLUT -> Elements;
if (mpe != NULL && mpe ->Type == cmsSigMatrixElemType) {
MatMPE = (_cmsStageMatrixData*) mpe ->Data;
mpe = mpe -> Next;
}
if (mpe != NULL && mpe ->Type == cmsSigCurveSetElemType) {
PreMPE = (_cmsStageToneCurvesData*) mpe ->Data;
mpe = mpe -> Next;
}
if (mpe != NULL && mpe ->Type == cmsSigCLutElemType) {
clut = (_cmsStageCLutData*) mpe -> Data;
mpe = mpe ->Next;
}
if (mpe != NULL && mpe ->Type == cmsSigCurveSetElemType) {
PostMPE = (_cmsStageToneCurvesData*) mpe ->Data;
mpe = mpe -> Next;
}
if (mpe != NULL) {
cmsSignalError(mpe->ContextID, cmsERROR_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION, "LUT is not suitable to be saved as LUT16");
return FALSE;
}
InputChannels = cmsPipelineInputChannels(NewLUT);
OutputChannels = cmsPipelineOutputChannels(NewLUT);
if (clut == NULL)
clutPoints = 0;
else
clutPoints = clut->Params->nSamples[0];
if (!_cmsWriteUInt8Number(io, (cmsUInt8Number) InputChannels)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt8Number(io, (cmsUInt8Number) OutputChannels)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt8Number(io, (cmsUInt8Number) clutPoints)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt8Number(io, 0)) return FALSE; // Padding
if (MatMPE != NULL) {
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, MatMPE -> Double[0])) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, MatMPE -> Double[1])) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, MatMPE -> Double[2])) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, MatMPE -> Double[3])) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, MatMPE -> Double[4])) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, MatMPE -> Double[5])) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, MatMPE -> Double[6])) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, MatMPE -> Double[7])) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, MatMPE -> Double[8])) return FALSE;
}
else {
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, 1)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, 0)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, 0)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, 0)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, 1)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, 0)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, 0)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, 0)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, 1)) return FALSE;
}
if (PreMPE != NULL) {
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, (cmsUInt16Number) PreMPE ->TheCurves[0]->nEntries)) return FALSE;
} else {
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, 2)) return FALSE;
}
if (PostMPE != NULL) {
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, (cmsUInt16Number) PostMPE ->TheCurves[0]->nEntries)) return FALSE;
} else {
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, 2)) return FALSE;
}
if (PreMPE != NULL) {
if (!Write16bitTables(self ->ContextID, io, PreMPE)) return FALSE;
}
else {
for (i=0; i < InputChannels; i++) {
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, 0)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, 0xffff)) return FALSE;
}
}
nTabSize = uipow(OutputChannels, clutPoints, InputChannels);
if (nTabSize == (cmsUInt32Number) -1) return FALSE;
if (nTabSize > 0) {
if (clut != NULL) {
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Array(io, nTabSize, clut->Tab.T)) return FALSE;
}
}
if (PostMPE != NULL) {
if (!Write16bitTables(self ->ContextID, io, PostMPE)) return FALSE;
}
else {
for (i=0; i < OutputChannels; i++) {
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, 0)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, 0xffff)) return FALSE;
}
}
return TRUE;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(nItems);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::EnsureBackbuffer() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
auto callback = base::BindOnce(&SkiaOutputSurfaceImplOnGpu::EnsureBackbuffer,
base::Unretained(impl_on_gpu_.get()));
task_sequence_->ScheduleOrRetainTask(std::move(callback),
std::vector<gpu::SyncToken>());
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 135,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void show_regs(struct pt_regs * regs)
{
int i, trap;
show_regs_print_info(KERN_DEFAULT);
printk("NIP: "REG" LR: "REG" CTR: "REG"\n",
regs->nip, regs->link, regs->ctr);
printk("REGS: %p TRAP: %04lx %s (%s)\n",
regs, regs->trap, print_tainted(), init_utsname()->release);
printk("MSR: "REG" ", regs->msr);
printbits(regs->msr, msr_bits);
printk(" CR: %08lx XER: %08lx\n", regs->ccr, regs->xer);
trap = TRAP(regs);
if ((regs->trap != 0xc00) && cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_CFAR))
printk("CFAR: "REG" ", regs->orig_gpr3);
if (trap == 0x200 || trap == 0x300 || trap == 0x600)
#if defined(CONFIG_4xx) || defined(CONFIG_BOOKE)
printk("DEAR: "REG" ESR: "REG" ", regs->dar, regs->dsisr);
#else
printk("DAR: "REG" DSISR: %08lx ", regs->dar, regs->dsisr);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
printk("SOFTE: %ld ", regs->softe);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
if (MSR_TM_ACTIVE(regs->msr))
printk("\nPACATMSCRATCH: %016llx ", get_paca()->tm_scratch);
#endif
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
if ((i % REGS_PER_LINE) == 0)
printk("\nGPR%02d: ", i);
printk(REG " ", regs->gpr[i]);
if (i == LAST_VOLATILE && !FULL_REGS(regs))
break;
}
printk("\n");
#ifdef CONFIG_KALLSYMS
/*
* Lookup NIP late so we have the best change of getting the
* above info out without failing
*/
printk("NIP ["REG"] %pS\n", regs->nip, (void *)regs->nip);
printk("LR ["REG"] %pS\n", regs->link, (void *)regs->link);
#endif
show_stack(current, (unsigned long *) regs->gpr[1]);
if (!user_mode(regs))
show_instructions(regs);
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct net_device *dev_get_by_macvtap_minor(int minor)
{
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
struct macvlan_dev *vlan;
mutex_lock(&minor_lock);
vlan = idr_find(&minor_idr, minor);
if (vlan) {
dev = vlan->dev;
dev_hold(dev);
}
mutex_unlock(&minor_lock);
return dev;
}
Commit Message: macvtap: zerocopy: validate vectors before building skb
There're several reasons that the vectors need to be validated:
- Return error when caller provides vectors whose num is greater than UIO_MAXIOV.
- Linearize part of skb when userspace provides vectors grater than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
- Return error when userspace provides vectors whose total length may exceed
- MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 34,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const std::string& extension_id() { return extension_id_; }
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 120,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPreviewContext::generate_draft_pages() const {
return generate_draft_pages_;
}
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 102,601 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const MediaQueryEvaluator& screenEval()
{
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(const MediaQueryEvaluator, staticScreenEval, ("screen"));
return staticScreenEval;
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Cues::PreloadCuePoint(long& cue_points_size, long long pos) const {
assert(m_count == 0);
if (m_preload_count >= cue_points_size) {
const long n = (cue_points_size <= 0) ? 2048 : 2 * cue_points_size;
CuePoint** const qq = new CuePoint* [n];
CuePoint** q = qq; // beginning of target
CuePoint** p = m_cue_points; // beginning of source
CuePoint** const pp = p + m_preload_count; // end of source
while (p != pp)
*q++ = *p++;
delete[] m_cue_points;
m_cue_points = qq;
cue_points_size = n;
}
CuePoint* const pCP = new CuePoint(m_preload_count, pos);
m_cue_points[m_preload_count++] = pCP;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 173,861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void lxc_rename_phys_nics_on_shutdown(int netnsfd, struct lxc_conf *conf)
{
int i;
if (conf->num_savednics == 0)
return;
INFO("running to reset %d nic names", conf->num_savednics);
restore_phys_nics_to_netns(netnsfd, conf);
for (i=0; i<conf->num_savednics; i++) {
struct saved_nic *s = &conf->saved_nics[i];
INFO("resetting nic %d to %s", s->ifindex, s->orig_name);
lxc_netdev_rename_by_index(s->ifindex, s->orig_name);
free(s->orig_name);
}
conf->num_savednics = 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_variant_list(HLSContext *c)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < c->n_variants; i++) {
struct variant *var = c->variants[i];
av_freep(&var->playlists);
av_free(var);
}
av_freep(&c->variants);
c->n_variants = 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <lingjiujianke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 61,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseAudioContext::ContextDestroyed(ExecutionContext*) {
destination()->GetAudioDestinationHandler().ContextDestroyed();
Uninitialize();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,605 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_t5_timer_expire(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *reply = NULL;
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("Timer T5 expired.\n");
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_T5_SHUTDOWN_GUARD_EXPIREDS);
reply = sctp_make_abort(asoc, NULL, 0);
if (!reply)
goto nomem;
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(reply));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_SK_ERR,
SCTP_ERROR(ETIMEDOUT));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_FAILED,
SCTP_PERR(SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR));
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_ABORTEDS);
SCTP_DEC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB);
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DELETE_TCB;
nomem:
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 31,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::OnHistoryQueryComplete(
base::OnceClosure load_history_downloads_cb) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (!in_progress_cache_initialized_)
load_history_downloads_cb_ = std::move(load_history_downloads_cb);
else
std::move(load_history_downloads_cb).Run();
}
Commit Message: Early return if a download Id is already used when creating a download
This is protect against download Id overflow and use-after-free
issue.
BUG=958533
Change-Id: I2c183493cb09106686df9822b3987bfb95bcf720
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1591485
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#656910}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 151,226 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mpol_rebind_nodemask(struct mempolicy *pol, const nodemask_t *nodes,
enum mpol_rebind_step step)
{
nodemask_t tmp;
if (pol->flags & MPOL_F_STATIC_NODES)
nodes_and(tmp, pol->w.user_nodemask, *nodes);
else if (pol->flags & MPOL_F_RELATIVE_NODES)
mpol_relative_nodemask(&tmp, &pol->w.user_nodemask, nodes);
else {
/*
* if step == 1, we use ->w.cpuset_mems_allowed to cache the
* result
*/
if (step == MPOL_REBIND_ONCE || step == MPOL_REBIND_STEP1) {
nodes_remap(tmp, pol->v.nodes,
pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed, *nodes);
pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed = step ? tmp : *nodes;
} else if (step == MPOL_REBIND_STEP2) {
tmp = pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed;
pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed = *nodes;
} else
BUG();
}
if (nodes_empty(tmp))
tmp = *nodes;
if (step == MPOL_REBIND_STEP1)
nodes_or(pol->v.nodes, pol->v.nodes, tmp);
else if (step == MPOL_REBIND_ONCE || step == MPOL_REBIND_STEP2)
pol->v.nodes = tmp;
else
BUG();
if (!node_isset(current->il_next, tmp)) {
current->il_next = next_node(current->il_next, tmp);
if (current->il_next >= MAX_NUMNODES)
current->il_next = first_node(tmp);
if (current->il_next >= MAX_NUMNODES)
current->il_next = numa_node_id();
}
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TypingCommand::deleteKeyPressed(Document& document,
Options options,
TextGranularity granularity) {
if (granularity == CharacterGranularity) {
LocalFrame* frame = document.frame();
if (TypingCommand* lastTypingCommand =
lastTypingCommandIfStillOpenForTyping(frame)) {
if (lastTypingCommand->commandTypeOfOpenCommand() == DeleteKey) {
updateSelectionIfDifferentFromCurrentSelection(lastTypingCommand,
frame);
lastTypingCommand->setShouldPreventSpellChecking(options &
PreventSpellChecking);
EditingState editingState;
lastTypingCommand->deleteKeyPressed(granularity, options & KillRing,
&editingState);
return;
}
}
}
TypingCommand::create(document, DeleteKey, "", options, granularity)->apply();
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID: | 0 | 129,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gdImageBrushApply (gdImagePtr im, int x, int y)
{
int lx, ly;
int hy;
int hx;
int x1, y1, x2, y2;
int srcx, srcy;
if (!im->brush) {
return;
}
hy = gdImageSY (im->brush) / 2;
y1 = y - hy;
y2 = y1 + gdImageSY (im->brush);
hx = gdImageSX (im->brush) / 2;
x1 = x - hx;
x2 = x1 + gdImageSX (im->brush);
srcy = 0;
if (im->trueColor) {
if (im->brush->trueColor) {
for (ly = y1; (ly < y2); ly++) {
srcx = 0;
for (lx = x1; (lx < x2); lx++) {
int p;
p = gdImageGetTrueColorPixel (im->brush, srcx, srcy);
/* 2.0.9, Thomas Winzig: apply simple full transparency */
if (p != gdImageGetTransparent (im->brush)) {
gdImageSetPixel (im, lx, ly, p);
}
srcx++;
}
srcy++;
}
} else {
/* 2.0.12: Brush palette, image truecolor (thanks to Thorben Kundinger
for pointing out the issue) */
for (ly = y1; (ly < y2); ly++) {
srcx = 0;
for (lx = x1; (lx < x2); lx++) {
int p, tc;
p = gdImageGetPixel (im->brush, srcx, srcy);
tc = gdImageGetTrueColorPixel (im->brush, srcx, srcy);
/* 2.0.9, Thomas Winzig: apply simple full transparency */
if (p != gdImageGetTransparent (im->brush)) {
gdImageSetPixel (im, lx, ly, tc);
}
srcx++;
}
srcy++;
}
}
} else {
for (ly = y1; (ly < y2); ly++) {
srcx = 0;
for (lx = x1; (lx < x2); lx++) {
int p;
p = gdImageGetPixel (im->brush, srcx, srcy);
/* Allow for non-square brushes! */
if (p != gdImageGetTransparent (im->brush)) {
/* Truecolor brush. Very slow
on a palette destination. */
if (im->brush->trueColor) {
gdImageSetPixel (im, lx, ly,
gdImageColorResolveAlpha (im,
gdTrueColorGetRed
(p),
gdTrueColorGetGreen
(p),
gdTrueColorGetBlue
(p),
gdTrueColorGetAlpha
(p)));
} else {
gdImageSetPixel (im, lx, ly, im->brushColorMap[p]);
}
}
srcx++;
}
srcy++;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 73,036 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void fib_add_ifaddr(struct in_ifaddr *ifa)
{
struct in_device *in_dev = ifa->ifa_dev;
struct net_device *dev = in_dev->dev;
struct in_ifaddr *prim = ifa;
__be32 mask = ifa->ifa_mask;
__be32 addr = ifa->ifa_local;
__be32 prefix = ifa->ifa_address & mask;
if (ifa->ifa_flags & IFA_F_SECONDARY) {
prim = inet_ifa_byprefix(in_dev, prefix, mask);
if (!prim) {
pr_warn("%s: bug: prim == NULL\n", __func__);
return;
}
}
fib_magic(RTM_NEWROUTE, RTN_LOCAL, addr, 32, prim);
if (!(dev->flags & IFF_UP))
return;
/* Add broadcast address, if it is explicitly assigned. */
if (ifa->ifa_broadcast && ifa->ifa_broadcast != htonl(0xFFFFFFFF))
fib_magic(RTM_NEWROUTE, RTN_BROADCAST, ifa->ifa_broadcast, 32, prim);
if (!ipv4_is_zeronet(prefix) && !(ifa->ifa_flags & IFA_F_SECONDARY) &&
(prefix != addr || ifa->ifa_prefixlen < 32)) {
if (!(ifa->ifa_flags & IFA_F_NOPREFIXROUTE))
fib_magic(RTM_NEWROUTE,
dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK ? RTN_LOCAL : RTN_UNICAST,
prefix, ifa->ifa_prefixlen, prim);
/* Add network specific broadcasts, when it takes a sense */
if (ifa->ifa_prefixlen < 31) {
fib_magic(RTM_NEWROUTE, RTN_BROADCAST, prefix, 32, prim);
fib_magic(RTM_NEWROUTE, RTN_BROADCAST, prefix | ~mask,
32, prim);
}
}
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 54,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ipv6_push_nfrag_opts(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt,
u8 *proto,
struct in6_addr **daddr)
{
if (opt->srcrt) {
ipv6_push_rthdr(skb, proto, opt->srcrt, daddr);
/*
* IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS is ignored
* unless IPV6_RTHDR is set (RFC3542).
*/
if (opt->dst0opt)
ipv6_push_exthdr(skb, proto, NEXTHDR_DEST, opt->dst0opt);
}
if (opt->hopopt)
ipv6_push_exthdr(skb, proto, NEXTHDR_HOP, opt->hopopt);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 53,685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GfxDeviceNColorSpace::getRGB(GfxColor *color, GfxRGB *rgb) {
double x[gfxColorMaxComps], c[gfxColorMaxComps];
GfxColor color2;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nComps; ++i) {
x[i] = colToDbl(color->c[i]);
}
func->transform(x, c);
for (i = 0; i < alt->getNComps(); ++i) {
color2.c[i] = dblToCol(c[i]);
}
alt->getRGB(&color2, rgb);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void gen_op_jz_ecx(TCGMemOp size, TCGLabel *label1)
{
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_tmp0, cpu_regs[R_ECX]);
gen_extu(size, cpu_tmp0);
tcg_gen_brcondi_tl(TCG_COND_EQ, cpu_tmp0, 0, label1);
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-94 | 0 | 66,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t cdc_ncm_store_tx_max(struct device *d, struct device_attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t len)
{
struct usbnet *dev = netdev_priv(to_net_dev(d));
struct cdc_ncm_ctx *ctx = (struct cdc_ncm_ctx *)dev->data[0];
unsigned long val;
if (kstrtoul(buf, 0, &val) || cdc_ncm_check_tx_max(dev, val) != val)
return -EINVAL;
cdc_ncm_update_rxtx_max(dev, ctx->rx_max, val);
return len;
}
Commit Message: cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind
usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.
Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.
Fixes: 8a34b0ae8778 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,639 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void resched_curr(struct rq *rq)
{
struct task_struct *curr = rq->curr;
int cpu;
lockdep_assert_held(&rq->lock);
if (test_tsk_need_resched(curr))
return;
cpu = cpu_of(rq);
if (cpu == smp_processor_id()) {
set_tsk_need_resched(curr);
set_preempt_need_resched();
return;
}
if (set_nr_and_not_polling(curr))
smp_send_reschedule(cpu);
else
trace_sched_wake_idle_without_ipi(cpu);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_SRP0( INS_ARG )
{
DO_SRP0
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,180 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_buf_cmp(
void *priv,
struct list_head *a,
struct list_head *b)
{
struct xfs_buf *ap = container_of(a, struct xfs_buf, b_list);
struct xfs_buf *bp = container_of(b, struct xfs_buf, b_list);
xfs_daddr_t diff;
diff = ap->b_maps[0].bm_bn - bp->b_maps[0].bm_bn;
if (diff < 0)
return -1;
if (diff > 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix _xfs_buf_find oops on blocks beyond the filesystem end
When _xfs_buf_find is passed an out of range address, it will fail
to find a relevant struct xfs_perag and oops with a null
dereference. This can happen when trying to walk a filesystem with a
metadata inode that has a partially corrupted extent map (i.e. the
block number returned is corrupt, but is otherwise intact) and we
try to read from the corrupted block address.
In this case, just fail the lookup. If it is readahead being issued,
it will simply not be done, but if it is real read that fails we
will get an error being reported. Ideally this case should result
in an EFSCORRUPTED error being reported, but we cannot return an
error through xfs_buf_read() or xfs_buf_get() so this lookup failure
may result in ENOMEM or EIO errors being reported instead.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pkinit_decode_data_pkcs11(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *data,
unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **decoded_data,
unsigned int *decoded_data_len)
{
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
CK_ULONG len;
CK_MECHANISM mech;
unsigned char *cp;
int r;
if (pkinit_open_session(context, id_cryptoctx)) {
pkiDebug("can't open pkcs11 session\n");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
pkinit_find_private_key(id_cryptoctx, CKA_DECRYPT, &obj);
mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
mech.pParameter = NULL;
mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_DecryptInit(id_cryptoctx->session, &mech,
obj)) != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_DecryptInit: 0x%x\n", (int) r);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
pkiDebug("data_len = %d\n", data_len);
cp = malloc((size_t) data_len);
if (cp == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
len = data_len;
pkiDebug("session %p edata %p edata_len %d data %p datalen @%p %d\n",
(void *) id_cryptoctx->session, (void *) data, (int) data_len,
(void *) cp, (void *) &len, (int) len);
if ((r = pkinit_C_Decrypt(id_cryptoctx, data, (CK_ULONG) data_len,
cp, &len)) != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_Decrypt: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
if (r == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
pkiDebug("decrypt %d needs %d\n", (int) data_len, (int) len);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
pkiDebug("decrypt %d -> %d\n", (int) data_len, (int) len);
*decoded_data_len = len;
*decoded_data = cp;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,659 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaStreamDispatcher* PepperMediaDeviceManager::GetMediaStreamDispatcher()
const {
DCHECK(render_frame());
MediaStreamDispatcher* const dispatcher =
static_cast<RenderFrameImpl*>(render_frame())->GetMediaStreamDispatcher();
DCHECK(dispatcher);
return dispatcher;
}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,392 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpClient::globus_gram_client_job_request(
const char * resource_manager_contact,
const char * description,
const int limited_deleg,
const char * callback_contact,
char ** job_contact)
{
static const char* command = "GRAM_JOB_REQUEST";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (!resource_manager_contact) resource_manager_contact=NULLSTRING;
if (!description) description=NULLSTRING;
if (!callback_contact) callback_contact=NULLSTRING;
std::string reqline;
char *esc1 = strdup( escapeGahpString(resource_manager_contact) );
char *esc2 = strdup( escapeGahpString(callback_contact) );
char *esc3 = strdup( escapeGahpString(description) );
int x = sprintf(reqline,"%s %s %d %s", esc1, esc2, limited_deleg, esc3 );
free( esc1 );
free( esc2 );
free( esc3 );
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command,buf,deleg_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command,buf);
if ( result ) {
if (result->argc != 3) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command);
}
int rc = atoi(result->argv[1]);
if ( strcasecmp(result->argv[2], NULLSTRING) ) {
*job_contact = strdup(result->argv[2]);
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,194 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TIFFComputeStrip(TIFF* tif, uint32 row, uint16 sample)
{
static const char module[] = "TIFFComputeStrip";
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
uint32 strip;
strip = row / td->td_rowsperstrip;
if (td->td_planarconfig == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE) {
if (sample >= td->td_samplesperpixel) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"%lu: Sample out of range, max %lu",
(unsigned long) sample, (unsigned long) td->td_samplesperpixel);
return (0);
}
strip += (uint32)sample*td->td_stripsperimage;
}
return (strip);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,210 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeSbyteShort(uint16 value)
{
if (value>0x7F)
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrRange);
else
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,153 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void runtimeEnabledLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "runtimeEnabledLongAttribute", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setRuntimeEnabledLongAttribute(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool handle_client_startup(PgSocket *client, PktHdr *pkt)
{
const char *passwd;
const uint8_t *key;
bool ok;
SBuf *sbuf = &client->sbuf;
/* don't tolerate partial packets */
if (incomplete_pkt(pkt)) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "client sent partial pkt in startup phase");
return false;
}
if (client->wait_for_welcome) {
if (finish_client_login(client)) {
/* the packet was already parsed */
sbuf_prepare_skip(sbuf, pkt->len);
return true;
} else
return false;
}
switch (pkt->type) {
case PKT_SSLREQ:
slog_noise(client, "C: req SSL");
slog_noise(client, "P: nak");
/* reject SSL attempt */
if (!sbuf_answer(&client->sbuf, "N", 1)) {
disconnect_client(client, false, "failed to nak SSL");
return false;
}
break;
case PKT_STARTUP_V2:
disconnect_client(client, true, "Old V2 protocol not supported");
return false;
case PKT_STARTUP:
if (client->pool) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "client re-sent startup pkt");
return false;
}
if (!decide_startup_pool(client, pkt))
return false;
if (client->pool->db->admin) {
if (!admin_pre_login(client))
return false;
}
if (cf_auth_type <= AUTH_TRUST || client->own_user) {
if (!finish_client_login(client))
return false;
} else {
if (!send_client_authreq(client)) {
disconnect_client(client, false, "failed to send auth req");
return false;
}
}
break;
case 'p': /* PasswordMessage */
/* haven't requested it */
if (cf_auth_type <= AUTH_TRUST) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "unrequested passwd pkt");
return false;
}
ok = mbuf_get_string(&pkt->data, &passwd);
if (ok && check_client_passwd(client, passwd)) {
if (!finish_client_login(client))
return false;
} else {
disconnect_client(client, true, "Auth failed");
return false;
}
break;
case PKT_CANCEL:
if (mbuf_avail_for_read(&pkt->data) == BACKENDKEY_LEN
&& mbuf_get_bytes(&pkt->data, BACKENDKEY_LEN, &key))
{
memcpy(client->cancel_key, key, BACKENDKEY_LEN);
accept_cancel_request(client);
} else
disconnect_client(client, false, "bad cancel request");
return false;
default:
disconnect_client(client, false, "bad packet");
return false;
}
sbuf_prepare_skip(sbuf, pkt->len);
client->request_time = get_cached_time();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Check if auth_user is set.
Fixes a crash if password packet appears before startup packet (#42).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 168,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_session(struct nfsd4_session *ses)
{
nfsd4_del_conns(ses);
nfsd4_put_drc_mem(&ses->se_fchannel);
__free_session(ses);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hfs_follow_hard_link(HFS_INFO * hfs, hfs_file * cat,
unsigned char *is_error)
{
TSK_FS_INFO *fs = (TSK_FS_INFO *) hfs;
TSK_INUM_T cnid;
time_t crtime;
uint32_t file_type;
uint32_t file_creator;
*is_error = 0; // default, not an error
if (cat == NULL) {
error_detected(TSK_ERR_FS_ARG,
"hfs_follow_hard_link: Pointer to Catalog entry (2nd arg) is null");
return 0;
}
cnid = tsk_getu32(fs->endian, cat->std.cnid);
if (cnid < HFS_FIRST_USER_CNID) {
return cnid;
}
crtime =
(time_t) hfs_convert_2_unix_time(tsk_getu32(fs->endian,
cat->std.crtime));
file_type = tsk_getu32(fs->endian, cat->std.u_info.file_type);
file_creator = tsk_getu32(fs->endian, cat->std.u_info.file_cr);
if (file_type == HFS_HARDLINK_FILE_TYPE
&& file_creator == HFS_HARDLINK_FILE_CREATOR) {
if (hfs->meta_inum == 0)
return cnid;
if ((!hfs->has_root_crtime) && (!hfs->has_meta_dir_crtime)
&& (!hfs->has_meta_crtime)) {
uint32_t linkNum =
tsk_getu32(fs->endian, cat->std.perm.special.inum);
*is_error = 1;
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"WARNING: hfs_follow_hard_link: File system creation times are not set. "
"Cannot test inode for hard link. File type and creator indicate that this"
" is a hard link (file), with LINK ID = %" PRIu32 "\n",
linkNum);
return cnid;
}
if ((!hfs->has_root_crtime) || (!hfs->has_meta_crtime)) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"WARNING: hfs_follow_hard_link: Either the root folder or the"
" file metadata folder is not accessible. Testing this potential hard link"
" may be impaired.\n");
}
if ((hfs->has_meta_crtime && (crtime == hfs->meta_crtime)) ||
(hfs->has_meta_dir_crtime && (crtime == hfs->metadir_crtime))
|| (hfs->has_root_crtime && (crtime == hfs->root_crtime))) {
uint32_t linkNum =
tsk_getu32(fs->endian, cat->std.perm.special.inum);
return linkNum;
}
}
else if (file_type == HFS_LINKDIR_FILE_TYPE
&& file_creator == HFS_LINKDIR_FILE_CREATOR) {
if (hfs->meta_dir_inum == 0)
return cnid;
if ((!hfs->has_root_crtime) && (!hfs->has_meta_dir_crtime)
&& (!hfs->has_meta_crtime)) {
uint32_t linkNum =
tsk_getu32(fs->endian, cat->std.perm.special.inum);
*is_error = 1;
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"WARNING: hfs_follow_hard_link: File system creation times are not set. "
"Cannot test inode for hard link. File type and creator indicate that this"
" is a hard link (directory), with LINK ID = %" PRIu32
"\n", linkNum);
return cnid;
}
if ((!hfs->has_root_crtime) || (!hfs->has_meta_crtime)
|| (!hfs->has_meta_dir_crtime)) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"WARNING: hfs_follow_hard_link: Either the root folder or the"
" file metadata folder or the directory metatdata folder is"
" not accessible. Testing this potential hard linked folder "
"may be impaired.\n");
}
if ((hfs->has_meta_crtime && (crtime == hfs->meta_crtime)) ||
(hfs->has_meta_dir_crtime && (crtime == hfs->metadir_crtime))
|| (hfs->has_root_crtime && (crtime == hfs->root_crtime))) {
uint32_t linkNum =
tsk_getu32(fs->endian, cat->std.perm.special.inum);
return linkNum;
}
}
return cnid;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 75,702 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JsVar *jsvGetFunctionArgumentLength(JsVar *functionScope) {
JsVar *args = jsvNewEmptyArray();
if (!args) return 0; // out of memory
JsvObjectIterator it;
jsvObjectIteratorNew(&it, functionScope);
while (jsvObjectIteratorHasValue(&it)) {
JsVar *idx = jsvObjectIteratorGetKey(&it);
if (jsvIsFunctionParameter(idx)) {
JsVar *val = jsvSkipOneName(idx);
jsvArrayPushAndUnLock(args, val);
}
jsvUnLock(idx);
jsvObjectIteratorNext(&it);
}
jsvObjectIteratorFree(&it);
return args;
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,420 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Maybe<bool> CollectValuesOrEntriesImpl(
Isolate* isolate, Handle<JSObject> object,
Handle<FixedArray> values_or_entries, bool get_entries, int* nof_items,
PropertyFilter filter) {
Handle<BackingStore> elements(BackingStore::cast(object->elements()),
isolate);
int count = 0;
uint32_t length = elements->length();
for (uint32_t index = 0; index < length; ++index) {
if (!HasEntryImpl(isolate, *elements, index)) continue;
Handle<Object> value = Subclass::GetImpl(isolate, *elements, index);
if (get_entries) {
value = MakeEntryPair(isolate, index, value);
}
values_or_entries->set(count++, *value);
}
*nof_items = count;
return Just(true);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 163,040 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void idt_init_desc(gate_desc *gate, const struct idt_data *d)
{
unsigned long addr = (unsigned long) d->addr;
gate->offset_low = (u16) addr;
gate->segment = (u16) d->segment;
gate->bits = d->bits;
gate->offset_middle = (u16) (addr >> 16);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
gate->offset_high = (u32) (addr >> 32);
gate->reserved = 0;
#endif
}
Commit Message: x86/entry/64: Don't use IST entry for #BP stack
There's nothing IST-worthy about #BP/int3. We don't allow kprobes
in the small handful of places in the kernel that run at CPL0 with
an invalid stack, and 32-bit kernels have used normal interrupt
gates for #BP forever.
Furthermore, we don't allow kprobes in places that have usergs while
in kernel mode, so "paranoid" is also unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 83,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_seq_hdr(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
UWORD16 u2_height;
UWORD16 u2_width;
if (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN) != SEQUENCE_HEADER_CODE)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
return IMPEG2D_FRM_HDR_START_CODE_NOT_FOUND;
}
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
u2_width = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,12);
u2_height = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,12);
if ((u2_width != ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size)
|| (u2_height != ps_dec->u2_vertical_size))
{
if (0 == ps_dec->u2_header_done)
{
/* This is the first time we are reading the resolution */
ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size = u2_width;
ps_dec->u2_vertical_size = u2_height;
if (0 == ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride)
{
ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride = (UWORD32) ALIGN16(u2_width);
}
}
else
{
if((u2_width > ps_dec->u2_create_max_width)
|| (u2_height > ps_dec->u2_create_max_height))
{
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = IMPEG2D_UNSUPPORTED_DIMENSIONS;
ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_height = u2_height;
ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_width = u2_width;
return e_error;
}
else
{
/* The resolution has changed */
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_RES_CHANGED;
}
}
}
if((ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size > ps_dec->u2_create_max_width)
|| (ps_dec->u2_vertical_size > ps_dec->u2_create_max_height))
{
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = IMPEG2D_UNSUPPORTED_DIMENSIONS;
return SET_IVD_FATAL_ERROR(e_error);
}
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush the following as they are not being used */
/* aspect_ratio_info (4 bits) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_aspect_ratio_info = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Frame rate code(4 bits) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush the following as they are not being used */
/* bit_rate_value (18 bits) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,18);
GET_MARKER_BIT(ps_dec,ps_stream);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush the following as they are not being used */
/* vbv_buffer_size_value(10 bits), constrained_parameter_flag (1 bit) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,11);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quantization matrix for the intra blocks */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream) == 1)
{
UWORD16 i;
for(i = 0; i < NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK; i++)
{
ps_dec->au1_intra_quant_matrix[gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_zig_zag[i]] = (UWORD8)impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,8);
}
}
else
{
memcpy(ps_dec->au1_intra_quant_matrix,gau1_impeg2_intra_quant_matrix_default,
NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK);
}
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quantization matrix for the inter blocks */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream) == 1)
{
UWORD16 i;
for(i = 0; i < NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK; i++)
{
ps_dec->au1_inter_quant_matrix[gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_zig_zag[i]] = (UWORD8)impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,8);
}
}
else
{
memcpy(ps_dec->au1_inter_quant_matrix,gau1_impeg2_inter_quant_matrix_default,
NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK);
}
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}
Commit Message: Check for Valid Frame Rate in Header
Bug: 34093952
Change-Id: I9f009edda84555e8d14b138684a38114fb888bf8
(cherry picked from commit 3f068a4e66cc972cf798c79a196099bd7d3bfceb)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 174,036 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserPluginGuest::SetVisibility(bool embedder_visible, bool visible) {
visible_ = visible;
if (embedder_visible && visible)
web_contents()->WasShown();
else
web_contents()->WasHidden();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,423 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static VncBasicInfo *vnc_basic_info_get(struct sockaddr_storage *sa,
socklen_t salen)
{
VncBasicInfo *info;
char host[NI_MAXHOST];
char serv[NI_MAXSERV];
int err;
if ((err = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)sa, salen,
host, sizeof(host),
serv, sizeof(serv),
NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
VNC_DEBUG("Cannot resolve address %d: %s\n",
err, gai_strerror(err));
return NULL;
}
info = g_malloc0(sizeof(VncBasicInfo));
info->host = g_strdup(host);
info->service = g_strdup(serv);
info->family = inet_netfamily(sa->ss_family);
return info;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void hid_destroy_device(struct hid_device *hdev)
{
hid_remove_device(hdev);
put_device(&hdev->dev);
}
Commit Message: HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings
Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of
out-of-bound readings.
The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do
not have enough fields to fit the incoming values.
Add checks and silence KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 49,485 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u_bitwidth_to_subformat (int bits)
{ static int array [] =
{ SF_FORMAT_PCM_U8, SF_FORMAT_PCM_16, SF_FORMAT_PCM_24, SF_FORMAT_PCM_32
} ;
if (bits < 8 || bits > 32)
return 0 ;
return array [((bits + 7) / 8) - 1] ;
} /* bitwidth_to_subformat */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 95,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabSpecificContentSettings::OnCookieChanged(
const GURL& url,
const GURL& frame_url,
const std::string& cookie_line,
const net::CookieOptions& options,
bool blocked_by_policy) {
if (blocked_by_policy) {
blocked_local_shared_objects_.cookies()->AddChangedCookie(
frame_url, url, cookie_line, options);
OnContentBlocked(CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_COOKIES, std::string());
} else {
allowed_local_shared_objects_.cookies()->AddChangedCookie(
frame_url, url, cookie_line, options);
OnContentAccessed(CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_COOKIES);
}
NotifySiteDataObservers();
}
Commit Message: Check the content setting type is valid.
BUG=169770
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11875013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176687 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeHttpAuthHandler::CancelAuth(JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>&) {
if (observer_)
observer_->CancelAuth();
}
Commit Message: Auto-dismiss http auth dialogs on navigation for Android.
BUG=884179
Change-Id: I18287e9c641045d5a74f3804e06ca17485e38957
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227482
Commit-Queue: Ted Choc <tedchoc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yaron Friedman <yfriedman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#591747}
CWE ID: | 0 | 144,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void khazad_crypt(const u64 roundKey[KHAZAD_ROUNDS + 1],
u8 *ciphertext, const u8 *plaintext)
{
const __be64 *src = (const __be64 *)plaintext;
__be64 *dst = (__be64 *)ciphertext;
int r;
u64 state;
state = be64_to_cpu(*src) ^ roundKey[0];
for (r = 1; r < KHAZAD_ROUNDS; r++) {
state = T0[(int)(state >> 56) ] ^
T1[(int)(state >> 48) & 0xff] ^
T2[(int)(state >> 40) & 0xff] ^
T3[(int)(state >> 32) & 0xff] ^
T4[(int)(state >> 24) & 0xff] ^
T5[(int)(state >> 16) & 0xff] ^
T6[(int)(state >> 8) & 0xff] ^
T7[(int)(state ) & 0xff] ^
roundKey[r];
}
state = (T0[(int)(state >> 56) ] & 0xff00000000000000ULL) ^
(T1[(int)(state >> 48) & 0xff] & 0x00ff000000000000ULL) ^
(T2[(int)(state >> 40) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff0000000000ULL) ^
(T3[(int)(state >> 32) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff00000000ULL) ^
(T4[(int)(state >> 24) & 0xff] & 0x00000000ff000000ULL) ^
(T5[(int)(state >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x0000000000ff0000ULL) ^
(T6[(int)(state >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x000000000000ff00ULL) ^
(T7[(int)(state ) & 0xff] & 0x00000000000000ffULL) ^
roundKey[KHAZAD_ROUNDS];
*dst = cpu_to_be64(state);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,248 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MXFWrappingScheme mxf_get_wrapping_kind(UID *essence_container_ul)
{
int val;
const MXFCodecUL *codec_ul;
codec_ul = mxf_get_codec_ul(mxf_picture_essence_container_uls, essence_container_ul);
if (!codec_ul->uid[0])
codec_ul = mxf_get_codec_ul(mxf_sound_essence_container_uls, essence_container_ul);
if (!codec_ul->uid[0])
codec_ul = mxf_get_codec_ul(mxf_data_essence_container_uls, essence_container_ul);
if (!codec_ul->uid[0] || !codec_ul->wrapping_indicator_pos)
return UnknownWrapped;
val = (*essence_container_ul)[codec_ul->wrapping_indicator_pos];
switch (codec_ul->wrapping_indicator_type) {
case RawVWrap:
val = val % 4;
break;
case RawAWrap:
if (val == 0x03 || val == 0x04)
val -= 0x02;
break;
case D10D11Wrap:
if (val == 0x02)
val = 0x01;
break;
}
if (val == 0x01)
return FrameWrapped;
if (val == 0x02)
return ClipWrapped;
return UnknownWrapped;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix av_log context
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: mxf-crash-1c2e59bf07a34675bfb3ada5e1ec22fa9f38f923
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 74,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetBeforeValues(Layer* layer) {
layer->SetBounds(gfx::Size(10, 10));
layer->SetHideLayerAndSubtree(false);
layer->SetIsDrawable(false);
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,463 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaObserver* ContentBrowserClient::GetMediaObserver() {
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_append_meter_stats(struct ovs_list *replies,
const struct ofputil_meter_stats *ms)
{
struct ofp13_meter_stats *reply;
uint16_t n = 0;
uint16_t len;
len = sizeof *reply + ms->n_bands * sizeof(struct ofp13_meter_band_stats);
reply = ofpmp_append(replies, len);
reply->meter_id = htonl(ms->meter_id);
reply->len = htons(len);
memset(reply->pad, 0, sizeof reply->pad);
reply->flow_count = htonl(ms->flow_count);
reply->packet_in_count = htonll(ms->packet_in_count);
reply->byte_in_count = htonll(ms->byte_in_count);
reply->duration_sec = htonl(ms->duration_sec);
reply->duration_nsec = htonl(ms->duration_nsec);
for (n = 0; n < ms->n_bands; ++n) {
const struct ofputil_meter_band_stats *src = &ms->bands[n];
struct ofp13_meter_band_stats *dst = &reply->band_stats[n];
dst->packet_band_count = htonll(src->packet_count);
dst->byte_band_count = htonll(src->byte_count);
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OSCL_EXPORT_REF void PVSetPostProcType(VideoDecControls *decCtrl, int mode)
{
VideoDecData *video = (VideoDecData *)decCtrl->videoDecoderData;
video->postFilterType = mode;
}
Commit Message: Fix NPDs in h263 decoder
Bug: 35269635
Test: decoded PoC with and without patch
Change-Id: I636a14360c7801cc5bca63c9cb44d1d235df8fd8
(cherry picked from commit 2ad2a92318a3b9daf78ebcdc597085adbf32600d)
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,454 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SVGImage::dataChanged(bool allDataReceived)
{
TRACE_EVENT0("webkit", "SVGImage::dataChanged");
if (!data()->size())
return true;
if (allDataReceived) {
static FrameLoaderClient* dummyFrameLoaderClient = new EmptyFrameLoaderClient;
Page::PageClients pageClients;
fillWithEmptyClients(pageClients);
m_chromeClient = adoptPtr(new SVGImageChromeClient(this));
pageClients.chromeClient = m_chromeClient.get();
m_page = adoptPtr(new Page(pageClients));
m_page->settings().setScriptEnabled(false);
m_page->settings().setPluginsEnabled(false);
m_page->settings().setAcceleratedCompositingEnabled(false);
RefPtr<LocalFrame> frame = LocalFrame::create(FrameInit::create(&m_page->frameHost(), dummyFrameLoaderClient));
frame->setView(FrameView::create(frame.get()));
frame->init();
FrameLoader& loader = frame->loader();
loader.forceSandboxFlags(SandboxAll);
frame->view()->setScrollbarsSuppressed(true);
frame->view()->setCanHaveScrollbars(false); // SVG Images will always synthesize a viewBox, if it's not available, and thus never see scrollbars.
frame->view()->setTransparent(true); // SVG Images are transparent.
loader.load(FrameLoadRequest(0, blankURL(), SubstituteData(data(), "image/svg+xml", "UTF-8", KURL(), ForceSynchronousLoad)));
m_intrinsicSize = containerSize();
}
return m_page;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash when resizing a view destroys the render tree
This is a simple fix for not holding a renderer across FrameView
resizes. Calling view->resize() can destroy renderers so this patch
updates SVGImage::setContainerSize to query the renderer after the
resize is complete. A similar issue does not exist for the dom tree
which is not destroyed.
BUG=344492
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/178043006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@168113 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sk_buff *netlink_trim(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t allocation)
{
int delta;
WARN_ON(skb->sk != NULL);
delta = skb->end - skb->tail;
if (is_vmalloc_addr(skb->head) || delta * 2 < skb->truesize)
return skb;
if (skb_shared(skb)) {
struct sk_buff *nskb = skb_clone(skb, allocation);
if (!nskb)
return skb;
consume_skb(skb);
skb = nskb;
}
if (!pskb_expand_head(skb, 0, -delta, allocation))
skb->truesize -= delta;
return skb;
}
Commit Message: netlink: Fix dump skb leak/double free
When we free cb->skb after a dump, we do it after releasing the
lock. This means that a new dump could have started in the time
being and we'll end up freeing their skb instead of ours.
This patch saves the skb and module before we unlock so we free
the right memory.
Fixes: 16b304f3404f ("netlink: Eliminate kmalloc in netlink dump operation.")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 47,772 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeSlong8Long8(uint64 value)
{
if (value > TIFF_INT64_MAX)
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrRange);
else
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void intel_pmu_flush_branch_stack(void)
{
/*
* Intel LBR does not tag entries with the
* PID of the current task, then we need to
* flush it on ctxsw
* For now, we simply reset it
*/
if (x86_pmu.lbr_nr)
intel_pmu_lbr_reset();
}
Commit Message: perf/x86: Fix offcore_rsp valid mask for SNB/IVB
The valid mask for both offcore_response_0 and
offcore_response_1 was wrong for SNB/SNB-EP,
IVB/IVB-EP. It was possible to write to
reserved bit and cause a GP fault crashing
the kernel.
This patch fixes the problem by correctly marking the
reserved bits in the valid mask for all the processors
mentioned above.
A distinction between desktop and server parts is introduced
because bits 24-30 are only available on the server parts.
This version of the patch is just a rebase to perf/urgent tree
and should apply to older kernels as well.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: jolsa@redhat.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 31,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void sanitize_value(unsigned flags, char *str, size_t len, zval *zv, zend_bool rfc5987 TSRMLS_DC)
{
char *language = NULL;
zend_bool latin1 = 0;
zval_dtor(zv);
php_trim(str, len, NULL, 0, zv, 3 TSRMLS_CC);
if (rfc5987) {
sanitize_rfc5987(zv, &language, &latin1 TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (flags & PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_ESCAPED) {
sanitize_escaped(zv TSRMLS_CC);
}
if ((flags & PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_URLENCODED) || (rfc5987 && language)) {
sanitize_urlencoded(zv TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (rfc5987 && language) {
zval *tmp;
if (latin1) {
utf8encode(zv);
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(tmp, zv);
array_init(zv);
add_assoc_zval(zv, language, tmp);
PTR_FREE(language);
}
}
Commit Message: fix bug #73055
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 94,007 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionAppItem::ExtensionAppItem(
Profile* profile,
const app_list::AppListSyncableService::SyncItem* sync_item,
const std::string& extension_id,
const std::string& extension_name,
const gfx::ImageSkia& installing_icon,
bool is_platform_app)
: app_list::AppListItem(extension_id),
profile_(profile),
extension_id_(extension_id),
extension_enable_flow_controller_(NULL),
extension_name_(extension_name),
installing_icon_(CreateDisabledIcon(installing_icon)),
is_platform_app_(is_platform_app),
has_overlay_(false) {
Reload();
if (sync_item && sync_item->item_ordinal.IsValid()) {
set_position(sync_item->item_ordinal);
if (name().empty())
SetName(sync_item->item_name);
return;
}
GetAppSorting(profile_)->EnsureValidOrdinals(extension_id_,
syncer::StringOrdinal());
UpdatePositionFromExtensionOrdering();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sha1_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
sctx->state[0] = SHA1_H0;
sctx->state[1] = SHA1_H1;
sctx->state[2] = SHA1_H2;
sctx->state[3] = SHA1_H3;
sctx->state[4] = SHA1_H4;
sctx->count = 0;
sctx->func = KIMD_SHA_1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,713 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hstore_slice_to_hstore(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
HStore *hs = PG_GETARG_HS(0);
HEntry *entries = ARRPTR(hs);
char *ptr = STRPTR(hs);
ArrayType *key_array = PG_GETARG_ARRAYTYPE_P(1);
HStore *out;
int nkeys;
Pairs *key_pairs = hstoreArrayToPairs(key_array, &nkeys);
Pairs *out_pairs;
int bufsiz;
int lastidx = 0;
int i;
int out_count = 0;
if (nkeys == 0)
{
out = hstorePairs(NULL, 0, 0);
PG_RETURN_POINTER(out);
}
out_pairs = palloc(sizeof(Pairs) * nkeys);
bufsiz = 0;
/*
* we exploit the fact that the pairs list is already sorted into strictly
* increasing order to narrow the hstoreFindKey search; each search can
* start one entry past the previous "found" entry, or at the lower bound
* of the last search.
*/
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; ++i)
{
int idx = hstoreFindKey(hs, &lastidx,
key_pairs[i].key, key_pairs[i].keylen);
if (idx >= 0)
{
out_pairs[out_count].key = key_pairs[i].key;
bufsiz += (out_pairs[out_count].keylen = key_pairs[i].keylen);
out_pairs[out_count].val = HS_VAL(entries, ptr, idx);
bufsiz += (out_pairs[out_count].vallen = HS_VALLEN(entries, idx));
out_pairs[out_count].isnull = HS_VALISNULL(entries, idx);
out_pairs[out_count].needfree = false;
++out_count;
}
}
/*
* we don't use uniquePairs here because we know that the pairs list is
* already sorted and uniq'ed.
*/
out = hstorePairs(out_pairs, out_count, bufsiz);
PG_RETURN_POINTER(out);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 166,401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::FlipVertically(
uint8* framebuffer,
unsigned int width,
unsigned int height) {
if (width == 0)
return;
scanline_.resize(width * 4);
uint8* scanline = &scanline_[0];
unsigned int row_bytes = width * 4;
unsigned int count = height / 2;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
uint8* row_a = framebuffer + i * row_bytes;
uint8* row_b = framebuffer + (height - i - 1) * row_bytes;
memcpy(scanline, row_b, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_b, row_a, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_a, scanline, row_bytes);
}
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long sched_group_rt_runtime(struct task_group *tg)
{
u64 rt_runtime_us;
if (tg->rt_bandwidth.rt_runtime == RUNTIME_INF)
return -1;
rt_runtime_us = tg->rt_bandwidth.rt_runtime;
do_div(rt_runtime_us, NSEC_PER_USEC);
return rt_runtime_us;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,610 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChooserController::PostSuccessCallback(
const std::string& device_address) {
if (!base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(success_callback_, std::move(options_),
device_address))) {
LOG(WARNING) << "No TaskRunner.";
}
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ghash_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst)
{
struct ghash_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
struct ghash_ctx *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
u8 *buf = dctx->buffer;
ghash_flush(ctx, dctx);
memcpy(dst, buf, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: ghash - Avoid null pointer dereference if no key is set
The ghash_update function passes a pointer to gf128mul_4k_lle which will
be NULL if ghash_setkey is not called or if the most recent call to
ghash_setkey failed to allocate memory. This causes an oops. Fix this
up by returning an error code in the null case.
This is trivially triggered from unprivileged userspace through the
AF_ALG interface by simply writing to the socket without setting a key.
The ghash_final function has a similar issue, but triggering it requires
a memory allocation failure in ghash_setkey _after_ at least one
successful call to ghash_update.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000670
IP: [<d88c92d4>] gf128mul_4k_lle+0x23/0x60 [gf128mul]
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: ghash_generic gf128mul algif_hash af_alg nfs lockd nfs_acl sunrpc bridge ipv6 stp llc
Pid: 1502, comm: hashatron Tainted: G W 3.1.0-rc9-00085-ge9308cf #32 Bochs Bochs
EIP: 0060:[<d88c92d4>] EFLAGS: 00000202 CPU: 0
EIP is at gf128mul_4k_lle+0x23/0x60 [gf128mul]
EAX: d69db1f0 EBX: d6b8ddac ECX: 00000004 EDX: 00000000
ESI: 00000670 EDI: d6b8ddac EBP: d6b8ddc8 ESP: d6b8dda4
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
Process hashatron (pid: 1502, ti=d6b8c000 task=d6810000 task.ti=d6b8c000)
Stack:
00000000 d69db1f0 00000163 00000000 d6b8ddc8 c101a520 d69db1f0 d52aa000
00000ff0 d6b8dde8 d88d310f d6b8a3f8 d52aa000 00001000 d88d502c d6b8ddfc
00001000 d6b8ddf4 c11676ed d69db1e8 d6b8de24 c11679ad d52aa000 00000000
Call Trace:
[<c101a520>] ? kmap_atomic_prot+0x37/0xa6
[<d88d310f>] ghash_update+0x85/0xbe [ghash_generic]
[<c11676ed>] crypto_shash_update+0x18/0x1b
[<c11679ad>] shash_ahash_update+0x22/0x36
[<c11679cc>] shash_async_update+0xb/0xd
[<d88ce0ba>] hash_sendpage+0xba/0xf2 [algif_hash]
[<c121b24c>] kernel_sendpage+0x39/0x4e
[<d88ce000>] ? 0xd88cdfff
[<c121b298>] sock_sendpage+0x37/0x3e
[<c121b261>] ? kernel_sendpage+0x4e/0x4e
[<c10b4dbc>] pipe_to_sendpage+0x56/0x61
[<c10b4e1f>] splice_from_pipe_feed+0x58/0xcd
[<c10b4d66>] ? splice_from_pipe_begin+0x10/0x10
[<c10b51f5>] __splice_from_pipe+0x36/0x55
[<c10b4d66>] ? splice_from_pipe_begin+0x10/0x10
[<c10b6383>] splice_from_pipe+0x51/0x64
[<c10b63c2>] ? default_file_splice_write+0x2c/0x2c
[<c10b63d5>] generic_splice_sendpage+0x13/0x15
[<c10b4d66>] ? splice_from_pipe_begin+0x10/0x10
[<c10b527f>] do_splice_from+0x5d/0x67
[<c10b6865>] sys_splice+0x2bf/0x363
[<c129373b>] ? sysenter_exit+0xf/0x16
[<c104dc1e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x10e/0x13f
[<c129370c>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x32
Code: 83 c4 0c 5b 5e 5f c9 c3 55 b9 04 00 00 00 89 e5 57 8d 7d e4 56 53 8d 5d e4 83 ec 18 89 45 e0 89 55 dc 0f b6 70 0f c1 e6 04 01 d6 <f3> a5 be 0f 00 00 00 4e 89 d8 e8 48 ff ff ff 8b 45 e0 89 da 0f
EIP: [<d88c92d4>] gf128mul_4k_lle+0x23/0x60 [gf128mul] SS:ESP 0068:d6b8dda4
CR2: 0000000000000670
---[ end trace 4eaa2a86a8e2da24 ]---
note: hashatron[1502] exited with preempt_count 1
BUG: scheduling while atomic: hashatron/1502/0x10000002
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[...]
Signed-off-by: Nick Bowler <nbowler@elliptictech.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org [2.6.37+]
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: | 1 | 165,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Downmix_setParameter(downmix_object_t *pDownmixer, int32_t param, uint32_t size, void *pValue) {
int16_t value16;
ALOGV("Downmix_setParameter, context %p, param %" PRId32 ", value16 %" PRId16 ", value32 %" PRId32,
pDownmixer, param, *(int16_t *)pValue, *(int32_t *)pValue);
switch (param) {
case DOWNMIX_PARAM_TYPE:
if (size != sizeof(downmix_type_t)) {
ALOGE("Downmix_setParameter(DOWNMIX_PARAM_TYPE) invalid size %" PRIu32 ", should be %zu",
size, sizeof(downmix_type_t));
return -EINVAL;
}
value16 = *(int16_t *)pValue;
ALOGV("set DOWNMIX_PARAM_TYPE, type %" PRId16, value16);
if (!((value16 > DOWNMIX_TYPE_INVALID) && (value16 <= DOWNMIX_TYPE_LAST))) {
ALOGE("Downmix_setParameter invalid DOWNMIX_PARAM_TYPE value %" PRId16, value16);
return -EINVAL;
} else {
pDownmixer->type = (downmix_type_t) value16;
break;
default:
ALOGE("Downmix_setParameter unknown parameter %" PRId32, param);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
} /* end Downmix_setParameter */
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ShouldMarkQuicBrokenWhenNetworkBlackholes(
const VariationParameters& quic_trial_params) {
return base::LowerCaseEqualsASCII(
GetVariationParam(quic_trial_params,
"mark_quic_broken_when_network_blackholes"),
"true");
}
Commit Message: Fix a bug in network_session_configurator.cc in which support for HTTPS URLS in QUIC proxies was always set to false.
BUG=914497
Change-Id: I56ad16088168302598bb448553ba32795eee3756
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1417356
Auto-Submit: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623763}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 152,715 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void skcipher_free_async_sgls(struct skcipher_async_req *sreq)
{
struct skcipher_async_rsgl *rsgl, *tmp;
struct scatterlist *sgl;
struct scatterlist *sg;
int i, n;
list_for_each_entry_safe(rsgl, tmp, &sreq->list, list) {
af_alg_free_sg(&rsgl->sgl);
if (rsgl != &sreq->first_sgl)
kfree(rsgl);
}
sgl = sreq->tsg;
n = sg_nents(sgl);
for_each_sg(sgl, sg, n, i)
put_page(sg_page(sg));
kfree(sreq->tsg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: algif_skcipher - Require setkey before accept(2)
Some cipher implementations will crash if you try to use them
without calling setkey first. This patch adds a check so that
the accept(2) call will fail with -ENOKEY if setkey hasn't been
done on the socket yet.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 55,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::PrepForSetUniformByLocation(
GLint location, const char* function_name, GLenum* type, GLsizei* count) {
DCHECK(type);
DCHECK(count);
if (!CheckCurrentProgramForUniform(location, function_name)) {
return false;
}
GLint array_index = -1;
const ProgramManager::ProgramInfo::UniformInfo* info =
current_program_->GetUniformInfoByLocation(location, &array_index);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
(std::string(function_name) + ": unknown location").c_str());
return false;
}
if (*count > 1 && !info->is_array) {
SetGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
(std::string(function_name) + ": count > 1 for non-array").c_str());
return false;
}
*count = std::min(info->size - array_index, *count);
if (*count <= 0) {
return false;
}
*type = info->type;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,296 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reds_handle_link(RedLinkInfo *link)
{
if (link->link_mess->channel_type == SPICE_CHANNEL_MAIN) {
reds_handle_main_link(link);
} else {
reds_handle_other_links(link);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltFreeTemplateHashes(xsltStylesheetPtr style) {
if (style->templatesHash != NULL)
xmlHashFree((xmlHashTablePtr) style->templatesHash,
(xmlHashDeallocator) xsltFreeCompMatchList);
if (style->rootMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->rootMatch);
if (style->keyMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->keyMatch);
if (style->elemMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->elemMatch);
if (style->attrMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->attrMatch);
if (style->parentMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->parentMatch);
if (style->textMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->textMatch);
if (style->piMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->piMatch);
if (style->commentMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->commentMatch);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_x509_checkpurpose)
{
zval ** zcert, * zcainfo = NULL;
X509_STORE * cainfo = NULL;
X509 * cert = NULL;
long certresource = -1;
STACK_OF(X509) * untrustedchain = NULL;
long purpose;
char * untrusted = NULL;
int untrusted_len = 0, ret;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "Zl|a!s", &zcert, &purpose, &zcainfo, &untrusted, &untrusted_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETVAL_LONG(-1);
if (untrusted) {
untrustedchain = load_all_certs_from_file(untrusted);
if (untrustedchain == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
}
cainfo = setup_verify(zcainfo TSRMLS_CC);
if (cainfo == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(zcert, 0, &certresource TSRMLS_CC);
if (cert == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
ret = check_cert(cainfo, cert, untrustedchain, purpose);
if (ret != 0 && ret != 1) {
RETVAL_LONG(ret);
} else {
RETVAL_BOOL(ret);
}
clean_exit:
if (certresource == 1 && cert) {
X509_free(cert);
}
if (cainfo) {
X509_STORE_free(cainfo);
}
if (untrustedchain) {
sk_X509_pop_free(untrustedchain, X509_free);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 14,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ssl_write_hostname_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
size_t hostname_len;
*olen = 0;
if( ssl->hostname == NULL )
return;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding server name extension: %s",
ssl->hostname ) );
hostname_len = strlen( ssl->hostname );
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < hostname_len + 9 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
return;
}
/*
* Sect. 3, RFC 6066 (TLS Extensions Definitions)
*
* In order to provide any of the server names, clients MAY include an
* extension of type "server_name" in the (extended) client hello. The
* "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL contain
* "ServerNameList" where:
*
* struct {
* NameType name_type;
* select (name_type) {
* case host_name: HostName;
* } name;
* } ServerName;
*
* enum {
* host_name(0), (255)
* } NameType;
*
* opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>;
*
* struct {
* ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1>
* } ServerNameList;
*
*/
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( (hostname_len + 5) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( (hostname_len + 5) ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( (hostname_len + 3) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( (hostname_len + 3) ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( hostname_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( hostname_len ) & 0xFF );
memcpy( p, ssl->hostname, hostname_len );
*olen = hostname_len + 9;
}
Commit Message: Add bounds check before length read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 83,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::AddObserver(
DesktopWindowTreeHostObserverX11* observer) {
observer_list_.AddObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 140,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 pegasus_get_link(struct net_device *dev)
{
pegasus_t *pegasus = netdev_priv(dev);
return mii_link_ok(&pegasus->mii);
}
Commit Message: pegasus: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
References: https://bugs.debian.org/852556
Reported-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <lisandro@debian.org>
Tested-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <lisandro@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: is_visible_txid(txid value, const TxidSnapshot *snap)
{
if (value < snap->xmin)
return true;
else if (value >= snap->xmax)
return false;
#ifdef USE_BSEARCH_IF_NXIP_GREATER
else if (snap->nxip > USE_BSEARCH_IF_NXIP_GREATER)
{
void *res;
res = bsearch(&value, snap->xip, snap->nxip, sizeof(txid), cmp_txid);
/* if found, transaction is still in progress */
return (res) ? false : true;
}
#endif
else
{
uint32 i;
for (i = 0; i < snap->nxip; i++)
{
if (value == snap->xip[i])
return false;
}
return true;
}
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 39,052 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct posix_acl *ceph_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
int size;
const char *name;
char *value = NULL;
struct posix_acl *acl;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
BUG();
}
size = __ceph_getxattr(inode, name, "", 0);
if (size > 0) {
value = kzalloc(size, GFP_NOFS);
if (!value)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
size = __ceph_getxattr(inode, name, value, size);
}
if (size > 0)
acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, value, size);
else if (size == -ERANGE || size == -ENODATA || size == 0)
acl = NULL;
else
acl = ERR_PTR(-EIO);
kfree(value);
if (!IS_ERR(acl))
ceph_set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return acl;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 50,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int try_smi_init(struct smi_info *new_smi)
{
int rv = 0;
int i;
char *init_name = NULL;
pr_info("Trying %s-specified %s state machine at %s address 0x%lx, slave address 0x%x, irq %d\n",
ipmi_addr_src_to_str(new_smi->io.addr_source),
si_to_str[new_smi->io.si_type],
addr_space_to_str[new_smi->io.addr_type],
new_smi->io.addr_data,
new_smi->io.slave_addr, new_smi->io.irq);
switch (new_smi->io.si_type) {
case SI_KCS:
new_smi->handlers = &kcs_smi_handlers;
break;
case SI_SMIC:
new_smi->handlers = &smic_smi_handlers;
break;
case SI_BT:
new_smi->handlers = &bt_smi_handlers;
break;
default:
/* No support for anything else yet. */
rv = -EIO;
goto out_err;
}
new_smi->si_num = smi_num;
/* Do this early so it's available for logs. */
if (!new_smi->io.dev) {
init_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "ipmi_si.%d",
new_smi->si_num);
/*
* If we don't already have a device from something
* else (like PCI), then register a new one.
*/
new_smi->pdev = platform_device_alloc("ipmi_si",
new_smi->si_num);
if (!new_smi->pdev) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate platform device\n");
rv = -ENOMEM;
goto out_err;
}
new_smi->io.dev = &new_smi->pdev->dev;
new_smi->io.dev->driver = &ipmi_platform_driver.driver;
/* Nulled by device_add() */
new_smi->io.dev->init_name = init_name;
}
/* Allocate the state machine's data and initialize it. */
new_smi->si_sm = kmalloc(new_smi->handlers->size(), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_smi->si_sm) {
rv = -ENOMEM;
goto out_err;
}
new_smi->io.io_size = new_smi->handlers->init_data(new_smi->si_sm,
&new_smi->io);
/* Now that we know the I/O size, we can set up the I/O. */
rv = new_smi->io.io_setup(&new_smi->io);
if (rv) {
dev_err(new_smi->io.dev, "Could not set up I/O space\n");
goto out_err;
}
/* Do low-level detection first. */
if (new_smi->handlers->detect(new_smi->si_sm)) {
if (new_smi->io.addr_source)
dev_err(new_smi->io.dev,
"Interface detection failed\n");
rv = -ENODEV;
goto out_err;
}
/*
* Attempt a get device id command. If it fails, we probably
* don't have a BMC here.
*/
rv = try_get_dev_id(new_smi);
if (rv) {
if (new_smi->io.addr_source)
dev_err(new_smi->io.dev,
"There appears to be no BMC at this location\n");
goto out_err;
}
setup_oem_data_handler(new_smi);
setup_xaction_handlers(new_smi);
check_for_broken_irqs(new_smi);
new_smi->waiting_msg = NULL;
new_smi->curr_msg = NULL;
atomic_set(&new_smi->req_events, 0);
new_smi->run_to_completion = false;
for (i = 0; i < SI_NUM_STATS; i++)
atomic_set(&new_smi->stats[i], 0);
new_smi->interrupt_disabled = true;
atomic_set(&new_smi->need_watch, 0);
rv = try_enable_event_buffer(new_smi);
if (rv == 0)
new_smi->has_event_buffer = true;
/*
* Start clearing the flags before we enable interrupts or the
* timer to avoid racing with the timer.
*/
start_clear_flags(new_smi);
/*
* IRQ is defined to be set when non-zero. req_events will
* cause a global flags check that will enable interrupts.
*/
if (new_smi->io.irq) {
new_smi->interrupt_disabled = false;
atomic_set(&new_smi->req_events, 1);
}
if (new_smi->pdev && !new_smi->pdev_registered) {
rv = platform_device_add(new_smi->pdev);
if (rv) {
dev_err(new_smi->io.dev,
"Unable to register system interface device: %d\n",
rv);
goto out_err;
}
new_smi->pdev_registered = true;
}
dev_set_drvdata(new_smi->io.dev, new_smi);
rv = device_add_group(new_smi->io.dev, &ipmi_si_dev_attr_group);
if (rv) {
dev_err(new_smi->io.dev,
"Unable to add device attributes: error %d\n",
rv);
goto out_err;
}
new_smi->dev_group_added = true;
rv = ipmi_register_smi(&handlers,
new_smi,
new_smi->io.dev,
new_smi->io.slave_addr);
if (rv) {
dev_err(new_smi->io.dev,
"Unable to register device: error %d\n",
rv);
goto out_err;
}
/* Don't increment till we know we have succeeded. */
smi_num++;
dev_info(new_smi->io.dev, "IPMI %s interface initialized\n",
si_to_str[new_smi->io.si_type]);
WARN_ON(new_smi->io.dev->init_name != NULL);
out_err:
kfree(init_name);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 169,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct page *page = NULL;
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm))
return;
if (!kvm_x86_ops->set_apic_access_page_addr)
return;
page = gfn_to_page(vcpu->kvm, APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE >> PAGE_SHIFT);
kvm_x86_ops->set_apic_access_page_addr(vcpu, page_to_phys(page));
/*
* Do not pin apic access page in memory, the MMU notifier
* will call us again if it is migrated or swapped out.
*/
put_page(page);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 37,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ImageDataNaClBackend::~ImageDataNaClBackend() {
}
Commit Message: Security fix: integer overflow on checking image size
Test is left in another CL (codereview.chromiu,.org/11274036) to avoid conflict there. Hope it's fine.
BUG=160926
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11410081
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167882 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 102,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPluginDelegateProxy::OnFocusChanged(bool focused) {
if (render_view_)
render_view_->PluginFocusChanged(focused, instance_id_);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WriteFakeData(uint8* audio_data, size_t length) {
Type* output = reinterpret_cast<Type*>(audio_data);
for (size_t i = 0; i < length; i++) {
output[i] = i % 5 + 10;
}
}
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 171,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void llc_conn_send_pdus(struct sock *sk)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_write_queue)) != NULL) {
struct llc_pdu_sn *pdu = llc_pdu_sn_hdr(skb);
if (LLC_PDU_TYPE_IS_I(pdu) &&
!(skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)) {
struct sk_buff *skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
skb_queue_tail(&llc_sk(sk)->pdu_unack_q, skb);
if (!skb2)
break;
skb = skb2;
}
dev_queue_xmit(skb);
}
}
Commit Message: net/llc: avoid BUG_ON() in skb_orphan()
It seems nobody used LLC since linux-3.12.
Fortunately fuzzers like syzkaller still know how to run this code,
otherwise it would be no fun.
Setting skb->sk without skb->destructor leads to all kinds of
bugs, we now prefer to be very strict about it.
Ideally here we would use skb_set_owner() but this helper does not exist yet,
only CAN seems to have a private helper for that.
Fixes: 376c7311bdb6 ("net: add a temporary sanity check in skb_orphan()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 68,198 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool LiveSyncTest::SetupClients() {
if (num_clients_ <= 0)
LOG(FATAL) << "num_clients_ incorrectly initialized.";
if (!profiles_.empty() || !clients_.empty())
LOG(FATAL) << "SetupClients() has already been called.";
SetUpTestServerIfRequired();
for (int i = 0; i < num_clients_; ++i) {
profiles_.push_back(MakeProfile(
base::StringPrintf(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("Profile%d"), i)));
EXPECT_FALSE(GetProfile(i) == NULL) << "GetProfile(" << i << ") failed.";
clients_.push_back(
new ProfileSyncServiceHarness(GetProfile(i), username_, password_, i));
EXPECT_FALSE(GetClient(i) == NULL) << "GetClient(" << i << ") failed.";
}
verifier_.reset(MakeProfile(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("Verifier")));
return (verifier_.get() != NULL);
}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmxnet3_net_uninit(VMXNET3State *s)
{
g_free(s->mcast_list);
vmxnet_tx_pkt_reset(s->tx_pkt);
vmxnet_tx_pkt_uninit(s->tx_pkt);
vmxnet_rx_pkt_uninit(s->rx_pkt);
qemu_del_nic(s->nic);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: map_layer_by_name(const char* name)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < s_map->num_layers; ++i) {
if (strcmp(name, lstr_cstr(s_map->layers[0].name)) == 0)
return i;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 75,050 |
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