instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PermissionRequestType PermissionUtil::GetRequestType(ContentSettingsType type) {
switch (type) {
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_GEOLOCATION:
return PermissionRequestType::PERMISSION_GEOLOCATION;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_NOTIFICATIONS:
return PermissionRequestType::PERMISSION_NOTIFICATIONS;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MIDI_SYSEX:
return PermissionRequestType::PERMISSION_MIDI_SYSEX;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PUSH_MESSAGING:
return PermissionRequestType::PERMISSION_PUSH_MESSAGING;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PROTECTED_MEDIA_IDENTIFIER:
return PermissionRequestType::PERMISSION_PROTECTED_MEDIA_IDENTIFIER;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PLUGINS:
return PermissionRequestType::PERMISSION_FLASH;
default:
NOTREACHED();
return PermissionRequestType::UNKNOWN;
}
}
Commit Message: PermissionUtil::GetPermissionType needs to handle MIDI
After the recent PermissionManager's change, it calls
GetPermissionType even for CONTENT_SETTING_TYPE_MIDI.
BUG=697771
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454231}
CWE ID: | 0 | 129,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_one_set_err(struct sock *sk, struct netlink_set_err_data *p)
{
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
int ret = 0;
if (sk == p->exclude_sk)
goto out;
if (!net_eq(sock_net(sk), sock_net(p->exclude_sk)))
goto out;
if (nlk->pid == p->pid || p->group - 1 >= nlk->ngroups ||
!test_bit(p->group - 1, nlk->groups))
goto out;
if (p->code == ENOBUFS && nlk->flags & NETLINK_RECV_NO_ENOBUFS) {
ret = 1;
goto out;
}
sk->sk_err = p->code;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 19,210 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lvm2_lv_create_device_added_cb (Daemon *daemon,
const char *object_path,
gpointer user_data)
{
CreateLvm2LVData *data = user_data;
Device *device;
g_debug ("added %s", object_path);
device = lvm2_lv_create_has_lv (data);
if (device != NULL)
{
/* yay! it is.. now create the file system if requested */
lvm2_lv_create_found_device (device, data);
g_signal_handler_disconnect (daemon, data->device_added_signal_handler_id);
g_signal_handler_disconnect (daemon, data->device_changed_signal_handler_id);
g_source_remove (data->device_added_timeout_id);
lvm2_lv_create_data_unref (data);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int asf_read_frame_header(AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext *pb)
{
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
ASFStream *asfst;
int rsize = 1;
int num = avio_r8(pb);
int i;
int64_t ts0, ts1 av_unused;
asf->packet_segments--;
asf->packet_key_frame = num >> 7;
asf->stream_index = asf->asfid2avid[num & 0x7f];
asfst = &asf->streams[num & 0x7f];
DO_2BITS(asf->packet_property >> 4, asf->packet_seq, 0);
DO_2BITS(asf->packet_property >> 2, asf->packet_frag_offset, 0);
DO_2BITS(asf->packet_property, asf->packet_replic_size, 0);
av_log(asf, AV_LOG_TRACE, "key:%d stream:%d seq:%d offset:%d replic_size:%d num:%X packet_property %X\n",
asf->packet_key_frame, asf->stream_index, asf->packet_seq,
asf->packet_frag_offset, asf->packet_replic_size, num, asf->packet_property);
if (rsize+(int64_t)asf->packet_replic_size > asf->packet_size_left) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "packet_replic_size %d is invalid\n", asf->packet_replic_size);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (asf->packet_replic_size >= 8) {
int64_t end = avio_tell(pb) + asf->packet_replic_size;
AVRational aspect;
asfst->packet_obj_size = avio_rl32(pb);
if (asfst->packet_obj_size >= (1 << 24) || asfst->packet_obj_size < 0) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "packet_obj_size %d invalid\n", asfst->packet_obj_size);
asfst->packet_obj_size = 0;
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
asf->packet_frag_timestamp = avio_rl32(pb); // timestamp
for (i = 0; i < asfst->payload_ext_ct; i++) {
ASFPayload *p = &asfst->payload[i];
int size = p->size;
int64_t payend;
if (size == 0xFFFF)
size = avio_rl16(pb);
payend = avio_tell(pb) + size;
if (payend > end) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "too long payload\n");
break;
}
switch (p->type) {
case 0x50:
break;
case 0x54:
aspect.num = avio_r8(pb);
aspect.den = avio_r8(pb);
if (aspect.num > 0 && aspect.den > 0 && asf->stream_index >= 0) {
s->streams[asf->stream_index]->sample_aspect_ratio = aspect;
}
break;
case 0x2A:
avio_skip(pb, 8);
ts0 = avio_rl64(pb);
ts1 = avio_rl64(pb);
if (ts0!= -1) asf->packet_frag_timestamp = ts0/10000;
else asf->packet_frag_timestamp = AV_NOPTS_VALUE;
asf->ts_is_pts = 1;
break;
case 0x5B:
case 0xB7:
case 0xCC:
case 0xC0:
case 0xA0:
break;
}
avio_seek(pb, payend, SEEK_SET);
}
avio_seek(pb, end, SEEK_SET);
rsize += asf->packet_replic_size; // FIXME - check validity
} else if (asf->packet_replic_size == 1) {
asf->packet_time_start = asf->packet_frag_offset;
asf->packet_frag_offset = 0;
asf->packet_frag_timestamp = asf->packet_timestamp;
asf->packet_time_delta = avio_r8(pb);
rsize++;
} else if (asf->packet_replic_size != 0) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "unexpected packet_replic_size of %d\n",
asf->packet_replic_size);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (asf->packet_flags & 0x01) {
DO_2BITS(asf->packet_segsizetype >> 6, asf->packet_frag_size, 0); // 0 is illegal
if (rsize > asf->packet_size_left) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "packet_replic_size is invalid\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
} else if (asf->packet_frag_size > asf->packet_size_left - rsize) {
if (asf->packet_frag_size > asf->packet_size_left - rsize + asf->packet_padsize) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "packet_frag_size is invalid (%d>%d-%d+%d)\n",
asf->packet_frag_size, asf->packet_size_left, rsize, asf->packet_padsize);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
} else {
int diff = asf->packet_frag_size - (asf->packet_size_left - rsize);
asf->packet_size_left += diff;
asf->packet_padsize -= diff;
}
}
} else {
asf->packet_frag_size = asf->packet_size_left - rsize;
}
if (asf->packet_replic_size == 1) {
asf->packet_multi_size = asf->packet_frag_size;
if (asf->packet_multi_size > asf->packet_size_left)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
asf->packet_size_left -= rsize;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec: Fix DoS in asf_build_simple_index()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 61,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::shouldAutocomplete() const
{
if (m_autocomplete != Uninitialized)
return m_autocomplete == On;
return HTMLTextFormControlElement::shouldAutocomplete();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 113,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jpc_ns_fwdlift_col(jpc_fix_t *a, int numrows, int stride,
int parity)
{
jpc_fix_t *lptr;
jpc_fix_t *hptr;
register jpc_fix_t *lptr2;
register jpc_fix_t *hptr2;
register int n;
int llen;
llen = (numrows + 1 - parity) >> 1;
if (numrows > 1) {
/* Apply the first lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
if (parity) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_pluseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * ALPHA),
lptr2[0]));
++hptr2;
++lptr2;
hptr += stride;
}
n = numrows - llen - parity - (parity == (numrows & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_pluseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(ALPHA),
jpc_fix_add(lptr2[0], lptr2[stride])));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
hptr += stride;
lptr += stride;
}
if (parity == (numrows & 1)) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_pluseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * ALPHA),
lptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
/* Apply the second lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
if (!parity) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_pluseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * BETA),
hptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
lptr += stride;
}
n = llen - (!parity) - (parity != (numrows & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_pluseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(BETA),
jpc_fix_add(hptr2[0], hptr2[stride])));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
lptr += stride;
hptr += stride;
}
if (parity != (numrows & 1)) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_pluseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * BETA),
hptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
/* Apply the third lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
if (parity) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_pluseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * GAMMA),
lptr2[0]));
++hptr2;
++lptr2;
hptr += stride;
}
n = numrows - llen - parity - (parity == (numrows & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_pluseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(GAMMA),
jpc_fix_add(lptr2[0], lptr2[stride])));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
hptr += stride;
lptr += stride;
}
if (parity == (numrows & 1)) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_pluseq(hptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * GAMMA),
lptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
/* Apply the fourth lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
if (!parity) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_pluseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * DELTA),
hptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
lptr += stride;
}
n = llen - (!parity) - (parity != (numrows & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_pluseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(DELTA),
jpc_fix_add(hptr2[0], hptr2[stride])));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
lptr += stride;
hptr += stride;
}
if (parity != (numrows & 1)) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
jpc_fix_pluseq(lptr2[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * DELTA),
hptr2[0]));
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
/* Apply the scaling step. */
#if defined(WT_DOSCALE)
lptr = &a[0];
n = llen;
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
lptr2[0] = jpc_fix_mul(lptr2[0], jpc_dbltofix(LGAIN));
++lptr2;
lptr += stride;
}
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
n = numrows - llen;
while (n-- > 0) {
hptr2 = hptr;
hptr2[0] = jpc_fix_mul(hptr2[0], jpc_dbltofix(HGAIN));
++hptr2;
hptr += stride;
}
#endif
} else {
#if defined(WT_LENONE)
if (parity) {
lptr2 = &a[0];
lptr2[0] = jpc_fix_asl(lptr2[0], 1);
++lptr2;
}
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed a buffer overrun problem in the QMFB code in the JPC codec
that was caused by a buffer being allocated with a size that was too small
in some cases.
Added a new regression test case.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cachedValueAttrSetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, v8::Local<v8::Value> value, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cachedValue._set");
TestSerializedScriptValueInterface* imp = V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::toNative(info.Holder());
RefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> v = SerializedScriptValue::create(value, info.GetIsolate());
imp->setCachedValue(WTF::getPtr(v));
info.Holder()->DeleteHiddenValue(v8::String::NewSymbol("cachedValue")); // Invalidate the cached value.
return;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,670 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxViewViews::EnterKeywordModeForDefaultSearchProvider() {
model()->EnterKeywordModeForDefaultSearchProvider(
KeywordModeEntryMethod::KEYBOARD_SHORTCUT);
}
Commit Message: Strip JavaScript schemas on Linux text drop
When dropping text onto the Omnibox, any leading JavaScript schemes
should be stripped to avoid a "self-XSS" attack. This stripping already
occurs in all cases except when plaintext is dropped on Linux. This CL
corrects that oversight.
Bug: 768910
Change-Id: I43af24ace4a13cf61d15a32eb9382dcdd498a062
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/685638
Reviewed-by: Justin Donnelly <jdonnelly@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#504695}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 150,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __devinit pmcraid_init_buffers(struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance)
{
int i;
if (pmcraid_allocate_host_rrqs(pinstance)) {
pmcraid_err("couldn't allocate memory for %d host rrqs\n",
pinstance->num_hrrq);
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (pmcraid_allocate_config_buffers(pinstance)) {
pmcraid_err("couldn't allocate memory for config buffers\n");
pmcraid_release_host_rrqs(pinstance, pinstance->num_hrrq);
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (pmcraid_allocate_cmd_blocks(pinstance)) {
pmcraid_err("couldn't allocate memory for cmd blocks\n");
pmcraid_release_config_buffers(pinstance);
pmcraid_release_host_rrqs(pinstance, pinstance->num_hrrq);
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (pmcraid_allocate_control_blocks(pinstance)) {
pmcraid_err("couldn't allocate memory control blocks\n");
pmcraid_release_config_buffers(pinstance);
pmcraid_release_cmd_blocks(pinstance, PMCRAID_MAX_CMD);
pmcraid_release_host_rrqs(pinstance, pinstance->num_hrrq);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* allocate DMAable memory for page D0 INQUIRY buffer */
pinstance->inq_data = pci_alloc_consistent(
pinstance->pdev,
sizeof(struct pmcraid_inquiry_data),
&pinstance->inq_data_baddr);
if (pinstance->inq_data == NULL) {
pmcraid_err("couldn't allocate DMA memory for INQUIRY\n");
pmcraid_release_buffers(pinstance);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* allocate DMAable memory for set timestamp data buffer */
pinstance->timestamp_data = pci_alloc_consistent(
pinstance->pdev,
sizeof(struct pmcraid_timestamp_data),
&pinstance->timestamp_data_baddr);
if (pinstance->timestamp_data == NULL) {
pmcraid_err("couldn't allocate DMA memory for \
set time_stamp \n");
pmcraid_release_buffers(pinstance);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Initialize all the command blocks and add them to free pool. No
* need to lock (free_pool_lock) as this is done in initialization
* itself
*/
for (i = 0; i < PMCRAID_MAX_CMD; i++) {
struct pmcraid_cmd *cmdp = pinstance->cmd_list[i];
pmcraid_init_cmdblk(cmdp, i);
cmdp->drv_inst = pinstance;
list_add_tail(&cmdp->free_list, &pinstance->free_cmd_pool);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GaiaOAuthClient::Core::OnAuthTokenFetchComplete(
const net::URLRequestStatus& status,
int response_code,
const std::string& response) {
request_.reset();
if (!status.is_success()) {
delegate_->OnNetworkError(response_code);
return;
}
if (response_code == net::HTTP_BAD_REQUEST) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Gaia response: response code=net::HTTP_BAD_REQUEST.";
delegate_->OnOAuthError();
return;
}
if (response_code == net::HTTP_OK) {
scoped_ptr<Value> message_value(base::JSONReader::Read(response));
if (message_value.get() &&
message_value->IsType(Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY)) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> response_dict(
static_cast<DictionaryValue*>(message_value.release()));
response_dict->GetString(kAccessTokenValue, &access_token_);
response_dict->GetInteger(kExpiresInValue, &expires_in_seconds_);
}
VLOG(1) << "Gaia response: acess_token='" << access_token_
<< "', expires in " << expires_in_seconds_ << " second(s)";
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Gaia response: response code=" << response_code;
}
if (access_token_.empty()) {
delegate_->OnNetworkError(response_code);
} else {
FetchUserInfoAndInvokeCallback();
}
}
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,807 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void llc_build_and_send_xid_pkt(struct llc_sap *sap, struct sk_buff *skb,
u8 *dmac, u8 dsap)
{
struct llc_sap_state_ev *ev = llc_sap_ev(skb);
ev->saddr.lsap = sap->laddr.lsap;
ev->daddr.lsap = dsap;
memcpy(ev->saddr.mac, skb->dev->dev_addr, IFHWADDRLEN);
memcpy(ev->daddr.mac, dmac, IFHWADDRLEN);
ev->type = LLC_SAP_EV_TYPE_PRIM;
ev->prim = LLC_XID_PRIM;
ev->prim_type = LLC_PRIM_TYPE_REQ;
llc_sap_state_process(sap, skb);
}
Commit Message: net/llc: avoid BUG_ON() in skb_orphan()
It seems nobody used LLC since linux-3.12.
Fortunately fuzzers like syzkaller still know how to run this code,
otherwise it would be no fun.
Setting skb->sk without skb->destructor leads to all kinds of
bugs, we now prefer to be very strict about it.
Ideally here we would use skb_set_owner() but this helper does not exist yet,
only CAN seems to have a private helper for that.
Fixes: 376c7311bdb6 ("net: add a temporary sanity check in skb_orphan()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 68,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Clipboard::FormatType Clipboard::GetHtmlFormatType() {
return std::string(kMimeTypeHTML);
}
Commit Message: Use XFixes to update the clipboard sequence number.
BUG=73478
TEST=manual testing
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8501002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109528 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void print_header()
{
printf("%-9s %5s %10s %4s %9s %18s %9s %10s %s\n",
"COMMAND",
"PID",
"USER",
"FD",
"TYPE",
"DEVICE",
"SIZE/OFF",
"NODE",
"NAME");
}
Commit Message: Fix scanf %s in lsof.
Bug: http://b/28175237
Change-Id: Ief0ba299b09693ad9afc0e3d17a8f664c2fbb8c2
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 159,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderObject* TextAutosizer::nextInPreOrderSkippingDescendantsOfContainers(const RenderObject* current, const RenderObject* stayWithin)
{
if (current == stayWithin || !isAutosizingContainer(current))
for (RenderObject* child = current->firstChild(); child; child = child->nextSibling())
return child;
for (const RenderObject* ancestor = current; ancestor; ancestor = ancestor->parent()) {
if (ancestor == stayWithin)
return 0;
for (RenderObject* sibling = ancestor->nextSibling(); sibling; sibling = sibling->nextSibling())
return sibling;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Text Autosizing: Counteract funky window sizing on Android.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=98809
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
In Chrome for Android, the window sizes provided to WebCore are
currently in physical screen pixels instead of
device-scale-adjusted units. For example window width on a
Galaxy Nexus is 720 instead of 360. Text autosizing expects
device-independent pixels. When Chrome for Android cuts over to
the new coordinate space, it will be tied to the setting
applyPageScaleFactorInCompositor.
No new tests.
* rendering/TextAutosizer.cpp:
(WebCore::TextAutosizer::processSubtree):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@130866 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cac_get_challenge(sc_card_t *card, u8 *rnd, size_t len)
{
/* CAC requires 8 byte response */
u8 rbuf[8];
u8 *rbufp = &rbuf[0];
size_t out_len = sizeof rbuf;
int r;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
r = cac_apdu_io(card, 0x84, 0x00, 0x00, NULL, 0, &rbufp, &out_len);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Could not get challenge");
if (len < out_len) {
out_len = len;
}
memcpy(rnd, rbuf, out_len);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, (int) out_len);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mailimf_custom_string_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx, char ** result,
int (* is_custom_char)(char))
{
size_t begin;
size_t end;
char * gstr;
begin = * indx;
end = begin;
if (end >= length)
return MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE;
while (is_custom_char(message[end])) {
end ++;
if (end >= length)
break;
}
if (end != begin) {
/*
gstr = strndup(message + begin, end - begin);
*/
gstr = malloc(end - begin + 1);
if (gstr == NULL)
return MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
strncpy(gstr, message + begin, end - begin);
gstr[end - begin] = '\0';
* indx = end;
* result = gstr;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
}
else
return MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 66,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, setSignatureAlgorithm)
{
long algo;
char *error, *key = NULL;
int key_len = 0;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !phar_obj->arc.archive->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Cannot set signature algorithm, phar is read-only");
return;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l|s", &algo, &key, &key_len) != SUCCESS) {
return;
}
switch (algo) {
case PHAR_SIG_SHA256:
case PHAR_SIG_SHA512:
#ifndef PHAR_HASH_OK
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"SHA-256 and SHA-512 signatures are only supported if the hash extension is enabled and built non-shared");
return;
#endif
case PHAR_SIG_MD5:
case PHAR_SIG_SHA1:
case PHAR_SIG_OPENSSL:
if (phar_obj->arc.archive->is_persistent && FAILURE == phar_copy_on_write(&(phar_obj->arc.archive) TSRMLS_CC)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar \"%s\" is persistent, unable to copy on write", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
return;
}
phar_obj->arc.archive->sig_flags = algo;
phar_obj->arc.archive->is_modified = 1;
PHAR_G(openssl_privatekey) = key;
PHAR_G(openssl_privatekey_len) = key_len;
phar_flush(phar_obj->arc.archive, 0, 0, 0, &error TSRMLS_CC);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
break;
default:
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Unknown signature algorithm specified");
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int svm_hardware_enable(void)
{
struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
uint64_t efer;
struct desc_ptr gdt_descr;
struct desc_struct *gdt;
int me = raw_smp_processor_id();
rdmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer);
if (efer & EFER_SVME)
return -EBUSY;
if (!has_svm()) {
pr_err("%s: err EOPNOTSUPP on %d\n", __func__, me);
return -EINVAL;
}
sd = per_cpu(svm_data, me);
if (!sd) {
pr_err("%s: svm_data is NULL on %d\n", __func__, me);
return -EINVAL;
}
sd->asid_generation = 1;
sd->max_asid = cpuid_ebx(SVM_CPUID_FUNC) - 1;
sd->next_asid = sd->max_asid + 1;
native_store_gdt(&gdt_descr);
gdt = (struct desc_struct *)gdt_descr.address;
sd->tss_desc = (struct kvm_ldttss_desc *)(gdt + GDT_ENTRY_TSS);
wrmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer | EFER_SVME);
wrmsrl(MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, page_to_pfn(sd->save_area) << PAGE_SHIFT);
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) {
wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO, TSC_RATIO_DEFAULT);
__this_cpu_write(current_tsc_ratio, TSC_RATIO_DEFAULT);
}
/*
* Get OSVW bits.
*
* Note that it is possible to have a system with mixed processor
* revisions and therefore different OSVW bits. If bits are not the same
* on different processors then choose the worst case (i.e. if erratum
* is present on one processor and not on another then assume that the
* erratum is present everywhere).
*/
if (cpu_has(&boot_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_OSVW)) {
uint64_t len, status = 0;
int err;
len = native_read_msr_safe(MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH, &err);
if (!err)
status = native_read_msr_safe(MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS,
&err);
if (err)
osvw_status = osvw_len = 0;
else {
if (len < osvw_len)
osvw_len = len;
osvw_status |= status;
osvw_status &= (1ULL << osvw_len) - 1;
}
} else
osvw_status = osvw_len = 0;
svm_init_erratum_383();
amd_pmu_enable_virt();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 37,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Polkit1Backend::setupAction(const QString &action)
{
m_cachedResults[action] = actionStatus(action);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-290 | 0 | 7,211 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: path_simplify (enum url_scheme scheme, char *path)
{
char *h = path; /* hare */
char *t = path; /* tortoise */
char *beg = path;
char *end = strchr (path, '\0');
while (h < end)
{
/* Hare should be at the beginning of a path element. */
if (h[0] == '.' && (h[1] == '/' || h[1] == '\0'))
{
/* Ignore "./". */
h += 2;
}
else if (h[0] == '.' && h[1] == '.' && (h[2] == '/' || h[2] == '\0'))
{
/* Handle "../" by retreating the tortoise by one path
element -- but not past beginning. */
if (t > beg)
{
/* Move backwards until T hits the beginning of the
previous path element or the beginning of path. */
for (--t; t > beg && t[-1] != '/'; t--)
;
}
else if (scheme == SCHEME_FTP
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
|| scheme == SCHEME_FTPS
#endif
)
{
/* If we're at the beginning, copy the "../" literally
and move the beginning so a later ".." doesn't remove
it. This violates RFC 3986; but we do it for FTP
anyway because there is otherwise no way to get at a
parent directory, when the FTP server drops us in a
non-root directory (which is not uncommon). */
beg = t + 3;
goto regular;
}
h += 3;
}
else
{
regular:
/* A regular path element. If H hasn't advanced past T,
simply skip to the next path element. Otherwise, copy
the path element until the next slash. */
if (t == h)
{
/* Skip the path element, including the slash. */
while (h < end && *h != '/')
t++, h++;
if (h < end)
t++, h++;
}
else
{
/* Copy the path element, including the final slash. */
while (h < end && *h != '/')
*t++ = *h++;
if (h < end)
*t++ = *h++;
}
}
}
if (t != h)
*t = '\0';
return t != h;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-93 | 0 | 8,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: INST_HANDLER (fmulsu) { // FMULSU Rd, Rr
int d = ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0x7) + 16;
int r = (buf[0] & 0x7) + 16;
ESIL_A ("1,");
ESIL_A ("r%d,DUP,0x80,&,?{,0xffff00,|,},", d); // sign extension Rd
ESIL_A ("r%d", r); // unsigned Rr
ESIL_A ("*,<<,"); // 0: (Rd*Rr)<<1
ESIL_A ("0xffff,&,"); // prevent overflow
ESIL_A ("DUP,0xff,&,r0,=,"); // r0 = LO(0)
ESIL_A ("8,0,RPICK,>>,0xff,&,r1,=,"); // r1 = HI(0)
ESIL_A ("DUP,0x8000,&,!,!,cf,=,"); // C = R/16
ESIL_A ("DUP,!,zf,=,"); // Z = !R
}
Commit Message: Fix #9943 - Invalid free on RAnal.avr
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 82,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: aiptek_command(struct aiptek *aiptek, unsigned char command, unsigned char data)
{
const int sizeof_buf = 3 * sizeof(u8);
int ret;
u8 *buf;
buf = kmalloc(sizeof_buf, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
buf[0] = 2;
buf[1] = command;
buf[2] = data;
if ((ret =
aiptek_set_report(aiptek, 3, 2, buf, sizeof_buf)) != sizeof_buf) {
dev_dbg(&aiptek->intf->dev,
"aiptek_program: failed, tried to send: 0x%02x 0x%02x\n",
command, data);
}
kfree(buf);
return ret < 0 ? ret : 0;
}
Commit Message: Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB
device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device
has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value
is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline NPIdentifierInfo *npidentifier_cache_lookup(NPIdentifier ident)
{
if (G_UNLIKELY(g_npidentifier_cache == NULL))
return NULL;
return g_hash_table_lookup(g_npidentifier_cache, ident);
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
{
int i;
if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
/* fill default hostkeys */
options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE;
options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE;
options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE;
options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE;
}
/* No certificates by default */
if (options->num_ports == 0)
options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
if (options->address_family == -1)
options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
if (options->listen_addrs == NULL)
add_listen_addr(options, NULL, 0);
if (options->pid_file == NULL)
options->pid_file = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE);
if (options->login_grace_time == -1)
options->login_grace_time = 120;
if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET)
options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD;
if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1)
options->ignore_rhosts = 1;
if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1)
options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0;
if (options->print_motd == -1)
options->print_motd = 1;
if (options->print_lastlog == -1)
options->print_lastlog = 1;
if (options->x11_forwarding == -1)
options->x11_forwarding = 0;
if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
options->x11_display_offset = 10;
if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
options->xauth_location = xstrdup(_PATH_XAUTH);
if (options->permit_tty == -1)
options->permit_tty = 1;
if (options->permit_user_rc == -1)
options->permit_user_rc = 1;
if (options->strict_modes == -1)
options->strict_modes = 1;
if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1)
options->tcp_keep_alive = 1;
if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
if (options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only == -1)
options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = 0;
if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1)
options->kerberos_authentication = 0;
if (options->kerberos_or_local_passwd == -1)
options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = 1;
if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1)
options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
options->gss_authentication = 0;
if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
options->gss_strict_acceptor = 0;
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
options->password_authentication = 1;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1)
options->permit_empty_passwd = 0;
if (options->permit_user_env == -1)
options->permit_user_env = 0;
if (options->compression == -1)
options->compression = COMP_DELAYED;
if (options->rekey_limit == -1)
options->rekey_limit = 0;
if (options->rekey_interval == -1)
options->rekey_interval = 0;
if (options->allow_tcp_forwarding == -1)
options->allow_tcp_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW;
if (options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding == -1)
options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW;
if (options->allow_agent_forwarding == -1)
options->allow_agent_forwarding = 1;
if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1)
options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0;
if (options->max_startups == -1)
options->max_startups = 100;
if (options->max_startups_rate == -1)
options->max_startups_rate = 30; /* 30% */
if (options->max_startups_begin == -1)
options->max_startups_begin = 10;
if (options->max_authtries == -1)
options->max_authtries = DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX;
if (options->max_sessions == -1)
options->max_sessions = DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX;
if (options->use_dns == -1)
options->use_dns = 0;
if (options->client_alive_interval == -1)
options->client_alive_interval = 0;
if (options->client_alive_count_max == -1)
options->client_alive_count_max = 3;
if (options->num_authkeys_files == 0) {
options->authorized_keys_files[options->num_authkeys_files++] =
xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS);
options->authorized_keys_files[options->num_authkeys_files++] =
xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2);
}
if (options->permit_tun == -1)
options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_LOWDELAY;
if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT;
if (options->version_addendum == NULL)
options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0;
if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1)
options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
assemble_algorithms(options);
/* Turn privilege separation and sandboxing on by default */
if (use_privsep == -1)
use_privsep = PRIVSEP_ON;
#define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \
do { \
if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \
free(v); \
v = NULL; \
} \
} while(0)
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->pid_file);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->xauth_location);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->banner);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->trusted_user_ca_keys);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_keys_file);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->authorized_principals_file);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->adm_forced_command);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->chroot_directory);
for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_key_files; i++)
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_files[i]);
for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_cert_files; i++)
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_cert_files[i]);
#undef CLEAR_ON_NONE
/* Similar handling for AuthenticationMethods=any */
if (options->num_auth_methods == 1 &&
strcmp(options->auth_methods[0], "any") == 0) {
free(options->auth_methods[0]);
options->auth_methods[0] = NULL;
options->num_auth_methods = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 72,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LibRaw::foveon_thumb_loader (void)
{
unsigned bwide, row, col, bitbuf=0, bit=1, c, i;
struct decode *dindex;
short pred[3];
if(T.thumb) free(T.thumb);
T.thumb = NULL;
bwide = get4();
if (bwide > 0)
{
if (bwide < (unsigned)T.twidth*3) return;
T.thumb = (char*)malloc(3*T.twidth * T.theight);
merror (T.thumb, "foveon_thumb()");
char *buf = (char*)malloc(bwide);
merror (buf, "foveon_thumb()");
for (row=0; row < T.theight; row++)
{
ID.input->read(buf, 1, bwide);
memmove(T.thumb+(row*T.twidth*3),buf,T.twidth*3);
}
free(buf);
T.tlength = 3*T.twidth * T.theight;
T.tformat = LIBRAW_THUMBNAIL_BITMAP;
return;
}
else
{
foveon_decoder (256, 0);
T.thumb = (char*)malloc(3*T.twidth * T.theight);
char *bufp = T.thumb;
merror (T.thumb, "foveon_thumb()");
for (row=0; row < T.theight; row++)
{
memset (pred, 0, sizeof pred);
if (!bit) get4();
for (bit=col=0; col < T.twidth; col++)
for(c=0;c<3;c++)
{
for (dindex=first_decode; dindex->branch[0]; )
{
if ((bit = (bit-1) & 31) == 31)
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
bitbuf = (bitbuf << 8) + ID.input->get_char();
dindex = dindex->branch[bitbuf >> bit & 1];
}
pred[c] += dindex->leaf;
(*bufp++)=pred[c];
}
}
T.tformat = LIBRAW_THUMBNAIL_BITMAP;
T.tlength = 3*T.twidth * T.theight;
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible foveon buffer overrun (Secunia SA750000)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 67,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data;
int rc = 0;
rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest);
if (rc == 0) {
xattr_data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
&xattr_data,
sizeof(xattr_data), 0);
}
else if (rc == -ENODATA)
rc = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: evm: checking if removexattr is not a NULL
The following lines of code produce a kernel oops.
fd = socket(PF_FILE, SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC|SOCK_NONBLOCK, 0);
fchmod(fd, 0666);
[ 139.922364] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 139.924982] IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[ 139.924982] *pde = 00000000
[ 139.924982] Oops: 0000 [#5] SMP
[ 139.924982] Modules linked in: fuse dm_crypt dm_mod i2c_piix4 serio_raw evdev binfmt_misc button
[ 139.924982] Pid: 3070, comm: acpid Tainted: G D 3.8.0-rc2-kds+ #465 Bochs Bochs
[ 139.924982] EIP: 0060:[<00000000>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 0
[ 139.924982] EIP is at 0x0
[ 139.924982] EAX: cf5ef000 EBX: cf5ef000 ECX: c143d600 EDX: c15225f2
[ 139.924982] ESI: cf4d2a1c EDI: cf4d2a1c EBP: cc02df10 ESP: cc02dee4
[ 139.924982] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
[ 139.924982] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000000 CR3: 0c059000 CR4: 000006d0
[ 139.924982] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
[ 139.924982] DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
[ 139.924982] Process acpid (pid: 3070, ti=cc02c000 task=d7705340 task.ti=cc02c000)
[ 139.924982] Stack:
[ 139.924982] c1203c88 00000000 cc02def4 cf4d2a1c ae21eefa 471b60d5 1083c1ba c26a5940
[ 139.924982] e891fb5e 00000041 00000004 cc02df1c c1203964 00000000 cc02df4c c10e20c3
[ 139.924982] 00000002 00000000 00000000 22222222 c1ff2222 cf5ef000 00000000 d76efb08
[ 139.924982] Call Trace:
[ 139.924982] [<c1203c88>] ? evm_update_evmxattr+0x5b/0x62
[ 139.924982] [<c1203964>] evm_inode_post_setattr+0x22/0x26
[ 139.924982] [<c10e20c3>] notify_change+0x25f/0x281
[ 139.924982] [<c10cbf56>] chmod_common+0x59/0x76
[ 139.924982] [<c10e27a1>] ? put_unused_fd+0x33/0x33
[ 139.924982] [<c10cca09>] sys_fchmod+0x39/0x5c
[ 139.924982] [<c13f4f30>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb
[ 139.924982] Code: Bad EIP value.
This happens because sockets do not define the removexattr operation.
Before removing the xattr, verify the removexattr function pointer is
not NULL.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: | 1 | 166,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dwc3_prepare_trbs(struct dwc3_ep *dep)
{
struct dwc3_request *req, *n;
BUILD_BUG_ON_NOT_POWER_OF_2(DWC3_TRB_NUM);
/*
* We can get in a situation where there's a request in the started list
* but there weren't enough TRBs to fully kick it in the first time
* around, so it has been waiting for more TRBs to be freed up.
*
* In that case, we should check if we have a request with pending_sgs
* in the started list and prepare TRBs for that request first,
* otherwise we will prepare TRBs completely out of order and that will
* break things.
*/
list_for_each_entry(req, &dep->started_list, list) {
if (req->num_pending_sgs > 0)
dwc3_prepare_one_trb_sg(dep, req);
if (!dwc3_calc_trbs_left(dep))
return;
}
list_for_each_entry_safe(req, n, &dep->pending_list, list) {
struct dwc3 *dwc = dep->dwc;
int ret;
ret = usb_gadget_map_request_by_dev(dwc->sysdev, &req->request,
dep->direction);
if (ret)
return;
req->sg = req->request.sg;
req->num_pending_sgs = req->request.num_mapped_sgs;
if (req->num_pending_sgs > 0)
dwc3_prepare_one_trb_sg(dep, req);
else
dwc3_prepare_one_trb_linear(dep, req);
if (!dwc3_calc_trbs_left(dep))
return;
}
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 88,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint64_t qcow2_alloc_compressed_cluster_offset(BlockDriverState *bs,
uint64_t offset,
int compressed_size)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
int l2_index, ret;
uint64_t *l2_table;
int64_t cluster_offset;
int nb_csectors;
ret = get_cluster_table(bs, offset, &l2_table, &l2_index);
if (ret < 0) {
return 0;
}
/* Compression can't overwrite anything. Fail if the cluster was already
* allocated. */
cluster_offset = be64_to_cpu(l2_table[l2_index]);
if (cluster_offset & L2E_OFFSET_MASK) {
qcow2_cache_put(bs, s->l2_table_cache, (void**) &l2_table);
return 0;
}
cluster_offset = qcow2_alloc_bytes(bs, compressed_size);
if (cluster_offset < 0) {
qcow2_cache_put(bs, s->l2_table_cache, (void**) &l2_table);
return 0;
}
nb_csectors = ((cluster_offset + compressed_size - 1) >> 9) -
(cluster_offset >> 9);
cluster_offset |= QCOW_OFLAG_COMPRESSED |
((uint64_t)nb_csectors << s->csize_shift);
/* update L2 table */
/* compressed clusters never have the copied flag */
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_L2_UPDATE_COMPRESSED);
qcow2_cache_entry_mark_dirty(s->l2_table_cache, l2_table);
l2_table[l2_index] = cpu_to_be64(cluster_offset);
ret = qcow2_cache_put(bs, s->l2_table_cache, (void**) &l2_table);
if (ret < 0) {
return 0;
}
return cluster_offset;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Action::AuthStatus PolicyKitBackend::actionStatus(const QString &action)
{
PolkitQt::Auth::Result r = PolkitQt::Auth::isCallerAuthorized(action, QCoreApplication::applicationPid(),
false);
switch (r) {
case PolkitQt::Auth::Yes:
return Action::StatusAuthorized;
case PolkitQt::Auth::No:
case PolkitQt::Auth::Unknown:
return Action::StatusDenied;
default:
return Action::StatusAuthRequired;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-290 | 0 | 7,194 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FromMojom(media::mojom::ResolutionChangePolicy input,
media::ResolutionChangePolicy* output) {
switch (input) {
case media::mojom::ResolutionChangePolicy::FIXED_RESOLUTION:
*output = media::ResolutionChangePolicy::FIXED_RESOLUTION;
return true;
case media::mojom::ResolutionChangePolicy::FIXED_ASPECT_RATIO:
*output = media::ResolutionChangePolicy::FIXED_ASPECT_RATIO;
return true;
case media::mojom::ResolutionChangePolicy::ANY_WITHIN_LIMIT:
*output = media::ResolutionChangePolicy::ANY_WITHIN_LIMIT;
return true;
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Enable camera blob stream when needed"
This reverts commit 10f4b93635e12f9fa0cba1641a10938ca38ed448.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 601492 as the
culprit for failures in the build cycles as shown on:
https://findit-for-me.appspot.com/waterfall/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyRAsSDVdmU3VzcGVjdGVkQ0wiMWNocm9taXVtLzEwZjRiOTM2MzVlMTJmOWZhMGNiYTE2NDFhMTA5MzhjYTM4ZWQ0NDgM
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.memory/Linux%20ChromiumOS%20MSan%20Tests/9190
Sample Failed Step: capture_unittests
Original change's description:
> Enable camera blob stream when needed
>
> Since blob stream needs higher resolution, it causes higher cpu loading
> to require higher resolution and resize to smaller resolution.
> In hangout app, we don't need blob stream. Enabling blob stream when
> needed can save a lot of cpu usage.
>
> BUG=b:114676133
> TEST=manually test in apprtc and CCA. make sure picture taking still
> works in CCA.
>
> Change-Id: I9144461bc76627903d0b3b359ce9cf962ff3628c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1261242
> Commit-Queue: Heng-ruey Hsu <henryhsu@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601492}
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
BUG=b:114676133
Change-Id: If173ffe9259f7eca849b184806bd56e2a9fbaac4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1292256
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601538}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 140,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CrashTab(WebContents* web_contents) {
RenderProcessHost* rph = web_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetProcess();
RenderProcessHostWatcher watcher(
rph, RenderProcessHostWatcher::WATCH_FOR_PROCESS_EXIT);
rph->Shutdown(0);
watcher.Wait();
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ContainerNode::replaceChild(PassRefPtr<Node> newChild, Node* oldChild, ExceptionCode& ec, bool shouldLazyAttach)
{
ASSERT(refCount() || parentOrHostNode());
RefPtr<Node> protect(this);
ec = 0;
if (oldChild == newChild) // nothing to do
return true;
checkReplaceChild(newChild.get(), oldChild, ec);
if (ec)
return false;
if (!oldChild || oldChild->parentNode() != this) {
ec = NOT_FOUND_ERR;
return false;
}
#if ENABLE(MUTATION_OBSERVERS)
ChildListMutationScope mutation(this);
#endif
RefPtr<Node> next = oldChild->nextSibling();
RefPtr<Node> removedChild = oldChild;
removeChild(oldChild, ec);
if (ec)
return false;
if (next && (next->previousSibling() == newChild || next == newChild)) // nothing to do
return true;
checkReplaceChild(newChild.get(), oldChild, ec);
if (ec)
return false;
NodeVector targets;
collectChildrenAndRemoveFromOldParent(newChild.get(), targets, ec);
if (ec)
return false;
InspectorInstrumentation::willInsertDOMNode(document(), this);
for (NodeVector::const_iterator it = targets.begin(); it != targets.end(); ++it) {
Node* child = it->get();
if (next && next->parentNode() != this)
break;
if (child->parentNode())
break;
treeScope()->adoptIfNeeded(child);
forbidEventDispatch();
if (next)
insertBeforeCommon(next.get(), child);
else
appendChildToContainer(child, this);
allowEventDispatch();
updateTreeAfterInsertion(this, child, shouldLazyAttach);
}
dispatchSubtreeModifiedEvent();
return true;
}
Commit Message: https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93587
Node::replaceChild() can create bad DOM topology with MutationEvent, Part 2
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
Source/WebCore:
This is a followup of r124156. replaceChild() has yet another hidden
MutationEvent trigger. This change added a guard for it.
Test: fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html
* dom/ContainerNode.cpp:
(WebCore::ContainerNode::replaceChild):
LayoutTests:
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@125237 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: eXosip_find_free_port (struct eXosip_t *excontext, int free_port, int transport)
{
int res1;
int res2;
struct addrinfo *addrinfo_rtp = NULL;
struct addrinfo *curinfo_rtp;
struct addrinfo *addrinfo_rtcp = NULL;
struct addrinfo *curinfo_rtcp;
int sock;
int count;
for (count = 0; count < 8; count++) {
if (excontext->ipv6_enable == 0)
res1 = _eXosip_get_addrinfo (excontext, &addrinfo_rtp, "0.0.0.0", free_port + count * 2, transport);
else
res1 = _eXosip_get_addrinfo (excontext, &addrinfo_rtp, "::", free_port + count * 2, transport);
if (res1 != 0)
return res1;
if (excontext->ipv6_enable == 0)
res2 = _eXosip_get_addrinfo (excontext, &addrinfo_rtcp, "0.0.0.0", free_port + count * 2 + 1, transport);
else
res2 = _eXosip_get_addrinfo (excontext, &addrinfo_rtcp, "::", free_port + count * 2 + 1, transport);
if (res2 != 0) {
_eXosip_freeaddrinfo (addrinfo_rtp);
return res2;
}
sock = -1;
for (curinfo_rtp = addrinfo_rtp; curinfo_rtp; curinfo_rtp = curinfo_rtp->ai_next) {
if (curinfo_rtp->ai_protocol && curinfo_rtp->ai_protocol != transport) {
OSIP_TRACE (osip_trace (__FILE__, __LINE__, OSIP_INFO3, NULL, "eXosip: Skipping protocol %d\n", curinfo_rtp->ai_protocol));
continue;
}
sock = (int) socket (curinfo_rtp->ai_family, curinfo_rtp->ai_socktype, curinfo_rtp->ai_protocol);
if (sock < 0) {
OSIP_TRACE (osip_trace (__FILE__, __LINE__, OSIP_ERROR, NULL, "eXosip: Cannot create socket!\n"));
continue;
}
if (curinfo_rtp->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
#ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY
if (setsockopt_ipv6only (sock)) {
close (sock);
sock = -1;
OSIP_TRACE (osip_trace (__FILE__, __LINE__, OSIP_ERROR, NULL, "eXosip: Cannot set socket option!\n"));
continue;
}
#endif /* IPV6_V6ONLY */
}
res1 = bind (sock, curinfo_rtp->ai_addr, curinfo_rtp->ai_addrlen);
if (res1 < 0) {
OSIP_TRACE (osip_trace (__FILE__, __LINE__, OSIP_WARNING, NULL, "eXosip: Cannot bind socket node: 0.0.0.0 family:%d\n", curinfo_rtp->ai_family));
close (sock);
sock = -1;
continue;
}
break;
}
_eXosip_freeaddrinfo (addrinfo_rtp);
if (sock == -1) {
_eXosip_freeaddrinfo (addrinfo_rtcp);
continue;
}
close (sock);
sock = -1;
for (curinfo_rtcp = addrinfo_rtcp; curinfo_rtcp; curinfo_rtcp = curinfo_rtcp->ai_next) {
if (curinfo_rtcp->ai_protocol && curinfo_rtcp->ai_protocol != transport) {
OSIP_TRACE (osip_trace (__FILE__, __LINE__, OSIP_INFO3, NULL, "eXosip: Skipping protocol %d\n", curinfo_rtcp->ai_protocol));
continue;
}
sock = (int) socket (curinfo_rtcp->ai_family, curinfo_rtcp->ai_socktype, curinfo_rtcp->ai_protocol);
if (sock < 0) {
OSIP_TRACE (osip_trace (__FILE__, __LINE__, OSIP_ERROR, NULL, "eXosip: Cannot create socket!\n"));
continue;
}
if (curinfo_rtcp->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
#ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY
if (setsockopt_ipv6only (sock)) {
close (sock);
sock = -1;
OSIP_TRACE (osip_trace (__FILE__, __LINE__, OSIP_ERROR, NULL, "eXosip: Cannot set socket option!\n"));
continue;
}
#endif /* IPV6_V6ONLY */
}
res1 = bind (sock, curinfo_rtcp->ai_addr, curinfo_rtcp->ai_addrlen);
if (res1 < 0) {
OSIP_TRACE (osip_trace (__FILE__, __LINE__, OSIP_WARNING, NULL, "eXosip: Cannot bind socket node: 0.0.0.0 family:%d\n", curinfo_rtp->ai_family));
close (sock);
sock = -1;
continue;
}
break;
}
_eXosip_freeaddrinfo (addrinfo_rtcp);
/* the pair must be free */
if (sock == -1)
continue;
close (sock);
sock = -1;
return free_port + count * 2;
}
/* just get a free port */
if (excontext->ipv6_enable == 0)
res1 = _eXosip_get_addrinfo (excontext, &addrinfo_rtp, "0.0.0.0", 0, transport);
else
res1 = _eXosip_get_addrinfo (excontext, &addrinfo_rtp, "::", 0, transport);
if (res1)
return res1;
sock = -1;
for (curinfo_rtp = addrinfo_rtp; curinfo_rtp; curinfo_rtp = curinfo_rtp->ai_next) {
socklen_t len;
struct sockaddr_storage ai_addr;
if (curinfo_rtp->ai_protocol && curinfo_rtp->ai_protocol != transport) {
OSIP_TRACE (osip_trace (__FILE__, __LINE__, OSIP_INFO3, NULL, "eXosip: Skipping protocol %d\n", curinfo_rtp->ai_protocol));
continue;
}
sock = (int) socket (curinfo_rtp->ai_family, curinfo_rtp->ai_socktype, curinfo_rtp->ai_protocol);
if (sock < 0) {
OSIP_TRACE (osip_trace (__FILE__, __LINE__, OSIP_ERROR, NULL, "eXosip: Cannot create socket!\n"));
continue;
}
if (curinfo_rtp->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
#ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY
if (setsockopt_ipv6only (sock)) {
close (sock);
sock = -1;
OSIP_TRACE (osip_trace (__FILE__, __LINE__, OSIP_ERROR, NULL, "eXosip: Cannot set socket option!\n"));
continue;
}
#endif /* IPV6_V6ONLY */
}
res1 = bind (sock, curinfo_rtp->ai_addr, curinfo_rtp->ai_addrlen);
if (res1 < 0) {
OSIP_TRACE (osip_trace (__FILE__, __LINE__, OSIP_WARNING, NULL, "eXosip: Cannot bind socket node: 0.0.0.0 family:%d\n", curinfo_rtp->ai_family));
close (sock);
sock = -1;
continue;
}
len = sizeof (ai_addr);
res1 = getsockname (sock, (struct sockaddr *) &ai_addr, &len);
if (res1 != 0) {
close (sock);
sock = -1;
continue;
}
close (sock);
sock = -1;
_eXosip_freeaddrinfo (addrinfo_rtp);
if (curinfo_rtp->ai_family == AF_INET)
return ntohs (((struct sockaddr_in *) &ai_addr)->sin_port);
else
return ntohs (((struct sockaddr_in6 *) &ai_addr)->sin6_port);
}
_eXosip_freeaddrinfo (addrinfo_rtp);
if (sock != -1) {
close (sock);
sock = -1;
}
return OSIP_UNDEFINED_ERROR;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 17,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int coroutine_fn v9fs_mark_fids_unreclaim(V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsPath *path)
{
int err;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
V9fsFidState *fidp, head_fid;
head_fid.next = s->fid_list;
for (fidp = s->fid_list; fidp; fidp = fidp->next) {
if (fidp->path.size != path->size) {
continue;
}
if (!memcmp(fidp->path.data, path->data, path->size)) {
/* Mark the fid non reclaimable. */
fidp->flags |= FID_NON_RECLAIMABLE;
/* reopen the file/dir if already closed */
err = v9fs_reopen_fid(pdu, fidp);
if (err < 0) {
return -1;
}
/*
* Go back to head of fid list because
* the list could have got updated when
* switched to the worker thread
*/
if (err == 0) {
fidp = &head_fid;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 7,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mp_cur_init(mp_cur *cursor, const unsigned char *s, size_t len) {
cursor->p = s;
cursor->left = len;
cursor->err = MP_CUR_ERROR_NONE;
}
Commit Message: Security: more cmsgpack fixes by @soloestoy.
@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOL zgfx_decompress_segment(ZGFX_CONTEXT* zgfx, wStream* stream, size_t segmentSize)
{
BYTE c;
BYTE flags;
UINT32 extra = 0;
int opIndex;
int haveBits;
int inPrefix;
UINT32 count;
UINT32 distance;
BYTE* pbSegment;
size_t cbSegment = segmentSize - 1;
if ((Stream_GetRemainingLength(stream) < segmentSize) || (segmentSize < 1))
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT8(stream, flags); /* header (1 byte) */
zgfx->OutputCount = 0;
pbSegment = Stream_Pointer(stream);
Stream_Seek(stream, cbSegment);
if (!(flags & PACKET_COMPRESSED))
{
zgfx_history_buffer_ring_write(zgfx, pbSegment, cbSegment);
CopyMemory(zgfx->OutputBuffer, pbSegment, cbSegment);
zgfx->OutputCount = cbSegment;
return TRUE;
}
zgfx->pbInputCurrent = pbSegment;
zgfx->pbInputEnd = &pbSegment[cbSegment - 1];
/* NumberOfBitsToDecode = ((NumberOfBytesToDecode - 1) * 8) - ValueOfLastByte */
zgfx->cBitsRemaining = 8 * (cbSegment - 1) - *zgfx->pbInputEnd;
zgfx->cBitsCurrent = 0;
zgfx->BitsCurrent = 0;
while (zgfx->cBitsRemaining)
{
haveBits = 0;
inPrefix = 0;
for (opIndex = 0; ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].prefixLength != 0; opIndex++)
{
while (haveBits < ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].prefixLength)
{
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, 1);
inPrefix = (inPrefix << 1) + zgfx->bits;
haveBits++;
}
if (inPrefix == ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].prefixCode)
{
if (ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].tokenType == 0)
{
/* Literal */
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].valueBits);
c = (BYTE)(ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].valueBase + zgfx->bits);
zgfx->HistoryBuffer[zgfx->HistoryIndex] = c;
if (++zgfx->HistoryIndex == zgfx->HistoryBufferSize)
zgfx->HistoryIndex = 0;
zgfx->OutputBuffer[zgfx->OutputCount++] = c;
}
else
{
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].valueBits);
distance = ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].valueBase + zgfx->bits;
if (distance != 0)
{
/* Match */
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, 1);
if (zgfx->bits == 0)
{
count = 3;
}
else
{
count = 4;
extra = 2;
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, 1);
while (zgfx->bits == 1)
{
count *= 2;
extra++;
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, 1);
}
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, extra);
count += zgfx->bits;
}
zgfx_history_buffer_ring_read(zgfx, distance, &(zgfx->OutputBuffer[zgfx->OutputCount]), count);
zgfx_history_buffer_ring_write(zgfx, &(zgfx->OutputBuffer[zgfx->OutputCount]), count);
zgfx->OutputCount += count;
}
else
{
/* Unencoded */
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, 15);
count = zgfx->bits;
zgfx->cBitsRemaining -= zgfx->cBitsCurrent;
zgfx->cBitsCurrent = 0;
zgfx->BitsCurrent = 0;
CopyMemory(&(zgfx->OutputBuffer[zgfx->OutputCount]), zgfx->pbInputCurrent, count);
zgfx_history_buffer_ring_write(zgfx, zgfx->pbInputCurrent, count);
zgfx->pbInputCurrent += count;
zgfx->cBitsRemaining -= (8 * count);
zgfx->OutputCount += count;
}
}
break;
}
}
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8784
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 169,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int phar_create_or_parse_filename(char *fname, int fname_len, char *alias, int alias_len, int is_data, int options, phar_archive_data** pphar, char **error TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
phar_archive_data *mydata;
php_stream *fp;
char *actual = NULL, *p;
if (!pphar) {
pphar = &mydata;
}
#if PHP_API_VERSION < 20100412
if (PG(safe_mode) && (!php_checkuid(fname, NULL, CHECKUID_ALLOW_ONLY_FILE))) {
return FAILURE;
}
#endif
if (php_check_open_basedir(fname TSRMLS_CC)) {
return FAILURE;
}
/* first open readonly so it won't be created if not present */
fp = php_stream_open_wrapper(fname, "rb", IGNORE_URL|STREAM_MUST_SEEK|0, &actual);
if (actual) {
fname = actual;
fname_len = strlen(actual);
}
if (fp) {
if (phar_open_from_fp(fp, fname, fname_len, alias, alias_len, options, pphar, is_data, error TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
if ((*pphar)->is_data || !PHAR_G(readonly)) {
(*pphar)->is_writeable = 1;
}
if (actual) {
efree(actual);
}
return SUCCESS;
} else {
/* file exists, but is either corrupt or not a phar archive */
if (actual) {
efree(actual);
}
return FAILURE;
}
}
if (actual) {
efree(actual);
}
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !is_data) {
if (options & REPORT_ERRORS) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "creating archive \"%s\" disabled by the php.ini setting phar.readonly", fname);
}
}
return FAILURE;
}
/* set up our manifest */
mydata = ecalloc(1, sizeof(phar_archive_data));
mydata->fname = expand_filepath(fname, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
fname_len = strlen(mydata->fname);
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
phar_unixify_path_separators(mydata->fname, fname_len);
#endif
p = strrchr(mydata->fname, '/');
if (p) {
mydata->ext = memchr(p, '.', (mydata->fname + fname_len) - p);
if (mydata->ext == p) {
mydata->ext = memchr(p + 1, '.', (mydata->fname + fname_len) - p - 1);
}
if (mydata->ext) {
mydata->ext_len = (mydata->fname + fname_len) - mydata->ext;
}
}
if (pphar) {
*pphar = mydata;
}
zend_hash_init(&mydata->manifest, sizeof(phar_entry_info),
zend_get_hash_value, destroy_phar_manifest_entry, 0);
zend_hash_init(&mydata->mounted_dirs, sizeof(char *),
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, 0);
zend_hash_init(&mydata->virtual_dirs, sizeof(char *),
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, (zend_bool)mydata->is_persistent);
mydata->fname_len = fname_len;
snprintf(mydata->version, sizeof(mydata->version), "%s", PHP_PHAR_API_VERSION);
mydata->is_temporary_alias = alias ? 0 : 1;
mydata->internal_file_start = -1;
mydata->fp = NULL;
mydata->is_writeable = 1;
mydata->is_brandnew = 1;
phar_request_initialize(TSRMLS_C);
zend_hash_add(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), mydata->fname, fname_len, (void*)&mydata, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), NULL);
if (is_data) {
alias = NULL;
alias_len = 0;
mydata->is_data = 1;
/* assume tar format, PharData can specify other */
mydata->is_tar = 1;
} else {
phar_archive_data **fd_ptr;
if (alias && SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), alias, alias_len, (void **)&fd_ptr)) {
if (SUCCESS != phar_free_alias(*fd_ptr, alias, alias_len TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: phar \"%s\" cannot set alias \"%s\", already in use by another phar archive", mydata->fname, alias);
}
zend_hash_del(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), mydata->fname, fname_len);
if (pphar) {
*pphar = NULL;
}
return FAILURE;
}
}
mydata->alias = alias ? estrndup(alias, alias_len) : estrndup(mydata->fname, fname_len);
mydata->alias_len = alias ? alias_len : fname_len;
}
if (alias_len && alias) {
if (FAILURE == zend_hash_add(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), alias, alias_len, (void*)&mydata, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), NULL)) {
if (options & REPORT_ERRORS) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "archive \"%s\" cannot be associated with alias \"%s\", already in use", fname, alias);
}
}
zend_hash_del(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), mydata->fname, fname_len);
if (pphar) {
*pphar = NULL;
}
return FAILURE;
}
}
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}}*/
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 4,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaRecorderHandler::OnEncodedVideo(
const media::WebmMuxer::VideoParameters& params,
std::unique_ptr<std::string> encoded_data,
std::unique_ptr<std::string> encoded_alpha,
TimeTicks timestamp,
bool is_key_frame) {
DCHECK(main_render_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (UpdateTracksAndCheckIfChanged()) {
client_->OnError("Amount of tracks in MediaStream has changed.");
return;
}
if (!webm_muxer_)
return;
if (!webm_muxer_->OnEncodedVideo(params, std::move(encoded_data),
std::move(encoded_alpha), timestamp,
is_key_frame)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Error muxing video data";
client_->OnError("Error muxing video data");
}
}
Commit Message: Check context is attached before creating MediaRecorder
Bug: 896736
Change-Id: I3ccfd2188fb15704af14c8af050e0a5667855d34
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324231
Commit-Queue: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606242}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 143,512 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::NotifySwappedFromRenderManager(RenderFrameHost* old_host,
RenderFrameHost* new_host,
bool is_main_frame) {
if (is_main_frame) {
NotifyViewSwapped(old_host ? old_host->GetRenderViewHost() : nullptr,
new_host->GetRenderViewHost());
if (delegate_)
view_->SetOverscrollControllerEnabled(CanOverscrollContent());
view_->RenderViewSwappedIn(new_host->GetRenderViewHost());
RenderWidgetHostViewBase* rwhv =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(GetRenderWidgetHostView());
if (rwhv)
rwhv->SetMainFrameAXTreeID(GetMainFrame()->GetAXTreeID());
}
NotifyFrameSwapped(old_host, new_host);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleBeginQueryEXT(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::BeginQueryEXT& c) {
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLuint client_id = static_cast<GLuint>(c.id);
int32 sync_shm_id = static_cast<int32>(c.sync_data_shm_id);
uint32 sync_shm_offset = static_cast<uint32>(c.sync_data_shm_offset);
switch (target) {
case GL_COMMANDS_ISSUED_CHROMIUM:
break;
default:
if (!feature_info_->feature_flags().occlusion_query_boolean) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glBeginQueryEXT: not enabled");
return error::kNoError;
}
break;
}
if (current_query_) {
SetGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glBeginQueryEXT: query already in progress");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (client_id == 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glBeginQueryEXT: id is 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
QueryManager::Query* query = query_manager_->GetQuery(client_id);
if (!query) {
query = query_manager_->CreateQuery(
target, client_id, sync_shm_id, sync_shm_offset);
}
if (query->target() != target) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glBeginQueryEXT: target does not match");
return error::kNoError;
} else if (query->shm_id() != sync_shm_id ||
query->shm_offset() != sync_shm_offset) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Shared memory used by query not the same as before";
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
if (!query_manager_->BeginQuery(query)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
current_query_ = query;
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int phar_call_openssl_signverify(int is_sign, php_stream *fp, zend_off_t end, char *key, int key_len, char **signature, int *signature_len) /* {{{ */
{
zend_fcall_info fci;
zend_fcall_info_cache fcc;
zval retval, zp[3], openssl;
zend_string *str;
ZVAL_STRINGL(&openssl, is_sign ? "openssl_sign" : "openssl_verify", is_sign ? sizeof("openssl_sign")-1 : sizeof("openssl_verify")-1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&zp[1], *signature, *signature_len);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&zp[2], key, key_len);
php_stream_rewind(fp);
str = php_stream_copy_to_mem(fp, (size_t) end, 0);
if (str) {
ZVAL_STR(&zp[0], str);
} else {
ZVAL_EMPTY_STRING(&zp[0]);
}
if (end != Z_STRLEN(zp[0])) {
zval_dtor(&zp[0]);
zval_dtor(&zp[1]);
zval_dtor(&zp[2]);
zval_dtor(&openssl);
return FAILURE;
}
if (FAILURE == zend_fcall_info_init(&openssl, 0, &fci, &fcc, NULL, NULL)) {
zval_dtor(&zp[0]);
zval_dtor(&zp[1]);
zval_dtor(&zp[2]);
zval_dtor(&openssl);
return FAILURE;
}
fci.param_count = 3;
fci.params = zp;
Z_ADDREF(zp[0]);
if (is_sign) {
ZVAL_NEW_REF(&zp[1], &zp[1]);
} else {
Z_ADDREF(zp[1]);
}
Z_ADDREF(zp[2]);
fci.retval = &retval;
if (FAILURE == zend_call_function(&fci, &fcc)) {
zval_dtor(&zp[0]);
zval_dtor(&zp[1]);
zval_dtor(&zp[2]);
zval_dtor(&openssl);
return FAILURE;
}
zval_dtor(&openssl);
Z_DELREF(zp[0]);
if (is_sign) {
ZVAL_UNREF(&zp[1]);
} else {
Z_DELREF(zp[1]);
}
Z_DELREF(zp[2]);
zval_dtor(&zp[0]);
zval_dtor(&zp[2]);
switch (Z_TYPE(retval)) {
default:
case IS_LONG:
zval_dtor(&zp[1]);
if (1 == Z_LVAL(retval)) {
return SUCCESS;
}
return FAILURE;
case IS_TRUE:
*signature = estrndup(Z_STRVAL(zp[1]), Z_STRLEN(zp[1]));
*signature_len = Z_STRLEN(zp[1]);
zval_dtor(&zp[1]);
return SUCCESS;
case IS_FALSE:
zval_dtor(&zp[1]);
return FAILURE;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72928 - Out of bound when verify signature of zip phar in phar_parse_zipfile
(cherry picked from commit 19484ab77466f99c78fc0e677f7e03da0584d6a2)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dvb_usbv2_init(struct dvb_usb_device *d)
{
int ret;
dev_dbg(&d->udev->dev, "%s:\n", __func__);
dvb_usbv2_device_power_ctrl(d, 1);
if (d->props->read_config) {
ret = d->props->read_config(d);
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
}
ret = dvb_usbv2_i2c_init(d);
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
ret = dvb_usbv2_adapter_init(d);
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
if (d->props->init) {
ret = d->props->init(d);
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
}
ret = dvb_usbv2_remote_init(d);
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
dvb_usbv2_device_power_ctrl(d, 0);
return 0;
err:
dvb_usbv2_device_power_ctrl(d, 0);
dev_dbg(&d->udev->dev, "%s: failed=%d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: [media] dvb-usb-v2: avoid use-after-free
I ran into a stack frame size warning because of the on-stack copy of
the USB device structure:
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c: In function 'dvb_usbv2_disconnect':
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c:1029:1: error: the frame size of 1104 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]
Copying a device structure like this is wrong for a number of other reasons
too aside from the possible stack overflow. One of them is that the
dev_info() call will print the name of the device later, but AFAICT
we have only copied a pointer to the name earlier and the actual name
has been freed by the time it gets printed.
This removes the on-stack copy of the device and instead copies the
device name using kstrdup(). I'm ignoring the possible failure here
as both printk() and kfree() are able to deal with NULL pointers.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,693 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void swap_free_obj(struct page *page, unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
swap(((freelist_idx_t *)page->freelist)[a],
((freelist_idx_t *)page->freelist)[b]);
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 68,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ResetCounters() {
close_counter = 0;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_decode_flow_mod_flags(ovs_be16 raw_flags_,
enum ofp_flow_mod_command command,
enum ofp_version version,
enum ofputil_flow_mod_flags *flagsp)
{
uint16_t raw_flags = ntohs(raw_flags_);
const struct ofputil_flow_mod_flag *f;
*flagsp = 0;
for (f = ofputil_flow_mod_flags; f->raw_flag; f++) {
if (raw_flags & f->raw_flag
&& version >= f->min_version
&& (!f->max_version || version <= f->max_version)) {
raw_flags &= ~f->raw_flag;
*flagsp |= f->flag;
}
}
/* In OF1.0 and OF1.1, "add" always resets counters, and other commands
* never do.
*
* In OF1.2 and later, OFPFF12_RESET_COUNTS controls whether each command
* resets counters. */
if ((version == OFP10_VERSION || version == OFP11_VERSION)
&& command == OFPFC_ADD) {
*flagsp |= OFPUTIL_FF_RESET_COUNTS;
}
return raw_flags ? OFPERR_OFPFMFC_BAD_FLAGS : 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int RenderMenuList::selectedIndex() const
{
HTMLSelectElement* select = toHTMLSelectElement(node());
return select->optionToListIndex(select->selectedIndex());
}
Commit Message: PopupMenuClient::multiple() should be const
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=76771
Patch by Benjamin Poulain <bpoulain@apple.com> on 2012-01-21
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
* platform/PopupMenuClient.h:
(WebCore::PopupMenuClient::multiple):
* rendering/RenderMenuList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMenuList::multiple):
* rendering/RenderMenuList.h:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@105570 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 98,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::ValidateCompressedTexFuncData(const char* function_name,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLsizei depth,
GLenum format,
GLsizei size,
const GLvoid* data) {
GLsizei bytes_required = 0;
if (!GetCompressedTexSizeInBytes(function_name, width, height, depth, format,
&bytes_required, state_.GetErrorState())) {
return false;
}
if (size != bytes_required) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "size is not correct for dimensions");
return false;
}
Buffer* buffer = state_.bound_pixel_unpack_buffer.get();
if (buffer &&
!buffer_manager()->RequestBufferAccess(
state_.GetErrorState(), buffer, reinterpret_cast<GLintptr>(data),
static_cast<GLsizeiptr>(bytes_required), function_name,
"pixel unpack buffer")) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 145,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int fscrypt_fname_usr_to_disk(struct inode *inode,
const struct qstr *iname,
struct fscrypt_str *oname)
{
if (fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(iname)) {
oname->name[0] = '.';
oname->name[iname->len - 1] = '.';
oname->len = iname->len;
return 0;
}
if (inode->i_crypt_info)
return fname_encrypt(inode, iname, oname);
/*
* Without a proper key, a user is not allowed to modify the filenames
* in a directory. Consequently, a user space name cannot be mapped to
* a disk-space name
*/
return -ENOKEY;
}
Commit Message: fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 67,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dump_mask_stack(pdf14_mask_t *mask_stack)
{
pdf14_mask_t *curr_mask = mask_stack;
int level = 0;
while (curr_mask != NULL) {
if_debug1m('v', curr_mask->memory, "[v]mask_level, %d\n", level);
if_debug1m('v', curr_mask->memory, "[v]mask_buf, %x\n", curr_mask->rc_mask->mask_buf);
if_debug1m('v', curr_mask->memory, "[v]rc_count, %d\n", curr_mask->rc_mask->rc);
level++;
curr_mask = curr_mask->previous;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 13,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: juniper_parse_header(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, struct juniper_l2info_t *l2info)
{
const struct juniper_cookie_table_t *lp = juniper_cookie_table;
u_int idx, jnx_ext_len, jnx_header_len = 0;
uint8_t tlv_type,tlv_len;
uint32_t control_word;
int tlv_value;
const u_char *tptr;
l2info->header_len = 0;
l2info->cookie_len = 0;
l2info->proto = 0;
l2info->length = h->len;
l2info->caplen = h->caplen;
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], 4);
l2info->flags = p[3];
l2info->direction = p[3]&JUNIPER_BPF_PKT_IN;
if (EXTRACT_24BITS(p) != JUNIPER_MGC_NUMBER) { /* magic number found ? */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no magic-number found!"));
return 0;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) /* print direction */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%3s ", tok2str(juniper_direction_values, "---", l2info->direction)));
/* magic number + flags */
jnx_header_len = 4;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tJuniper PCAP Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(jnx_flag_values, "none", l2info->flags)));
/* extensions present ? - calculate how much bytes to skip */
if ((l2info->flags & JUNIPER_BPF_EXT ) == JUNIPER_BPF_EXT ) {
tptr = p+jnx_header_len;
/* ok to read extension length ? */
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
jnx_ext_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
jnx_header_len += 2;
tptr +=2;
/* nail up the total length -
* just in case something goes wrong
* with TLV parsing */
jnx_header_len += jnx_ext_len;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", PCAP Extension(s) total length %u", jnx_ext_len));
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], jnx_ext_len);
while (jnx_ext_len > JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_OVERHEAD) {
tlv_type = *(tptr++);
tlv_len = *(tptr++);
tlv_value = 0;
/* sanity checks */
if (tlv_type == 0 || tlv_len == 0)
break;
if (tlv_len+JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_OVERHEAD > jnx_ext_len)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Extension TLV #%u, length %u, value ",
tok2str(jnx_ext_tlv_values,"Unknown",tlv_type),
tlv_type,
tlv_len));
tlv_value = juniper_read_tlv_value(tptr, tlv_type, tlv_len);
switch (tlv_type) {
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFD_NAME:
/* FIXME */
break;
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFD_MEDIATYPE:
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_TTP_IFD_MEDIATYPE:
if (tlv_value != -1) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (%u)",
tok2str(juniper_ifmt_values, "Unknown", tlv_value),
tlv_value));
}
break;
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFL_ENCAPS:
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_TTP_IFL_ENCAPS:
if (tlv_value != -1) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (%u)",
tok2str(juniper_ifle_values, "Unknown", tlv_value),
tlv_value));
}
break;
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFL_IDX: /* fall through */
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFL_UNIT:
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFD_IDX:
default:
if (tlv_value != -1) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", tlv_value));
}
break;
}
tptr+=tlv_len;
jnx_ext_len -= tlv_len+JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_OVERHEAD;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t-----original packet-----\n\t"));
}
if ((l2info->flags & JUNIPER_BPF_NO_L2 ) == JUNIPER_BPF_NO_L2 ) {
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no-L2-hdr, "));
/* there is no link-layer present -
* perform the v4/v6 heuristics
* to figure out what it is
*/
ND_TCHECK2(p[jnx_header_len + 4], 1);
if (ip_heuristic_guess(ndo, p + jnx_header_len + 4,
l2info->length - (jnx_header_len + 4)) == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no IP-hdr found!"));
l2info->header_len=jnx_header_len+4;
return 0; /* stop parsing the output further */
}
l2info->header_len = jnx_header_len;
p+=l2info->header_len;
l2info->length -= l2info->header_len;
l2info->caplen -= l2info->header_len;
/* search through the cookie table and copy values matching for our PIC type */
ND_TCHECK(p[0]);
while (lp->s != NULL) {
if (lp->pictype == l2info->pictype) {
l2info->cookie_len += lp->cookie_len;
switch (p[0]) {
case LS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->cookie_type = LS_COOKIE_ID;
l2info->cookie_len += 2;
break;
case AS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->cookie_type = AS_COOKIE_ID;
l2info->cookie_len = 8;
break;
default:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[0];
break;
}
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_MFR
/* MFR child links don't carry cookies */
if (l2info->pictype == DLT_JUNIPER_MFR &&
(p[0] & MFR_BE_MASK) == MFR_BE_MASK) {
l2info->cookie_len = 0;
}
#endif
l2info->header_len += l2info->cookie_len;
l2info->length -= l2info->cookie_len;
l2info->caplen -= l2info->cookie_len;
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s-PIC, cookie-len %u",
lp->s,
l2info->cookie_len));
if (l2info->cookie_len > 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], l2info->cookie_len);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", cookie 0x"));
for (idx = 0; idx < l2info->cookie_len; idx++) {
l2info->cookie[idx] = p[idx]; /* copy cookie data */
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", p[idx]));
}
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) ND_PRINT((ndo, ": ")); /* print demarc b/w L2/L3*/
l2info->proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(p+l2info->cookie_len);
break;
}
++lp;
}
p+=l2info->cookie_len;
/* DLT_ specific parsing */
switch(l2info->pictype) {
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_MLPPP
case DLT_JUNIPER_MLPPP:
switch (l2info->cookie_type) {
case LS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[1];
break;
case AS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = (EXTRACT_16BITS(&l2info->cookie[6])>>3)&0xfff;
l2info->proto = (l2info->cookie[5])&JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_MASK;
break;
default:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[0];
break;
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_MLFR
case DLT_JUNIPER_MLFR:
switch (l2info->cookie_type) {
case LS_COOKIE_ID:
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], 2);
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[1];
l2info->proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
l2info->header_len += 2;
l2info->length -= 2;
l2info->caplen -= 2;
break;
case AS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = (EXTRACT_16BITS(&l2info->cookie[6])>>3)&0xfff;
l2info->proto = (l2info->cookie[5])&JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_MASK;
break;
default:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[0];
l2info->header_len += 2;
l2info->length -= 2;
l2info->caplen -= 2;
break;
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_MFR
case DLT_JUNIPER_MFR:
switch (l2info->cookie_type) {
case LS_COOKIE_ID:
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], 2);
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[1];
l2info->proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
l2info->header_len += 2;
l2info->length -= 2;
l2info->caplen -= 2;
break;
case AS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = (EXTRACT_16BITS(&l2info->cookie[6])>>3)&0xfff;
l2info->proto = (l2info->cookie[5])&JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_MASK;
break;
default:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[0];
break;
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_ATM2
case DLT_JUNIPER_ATM2:
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], 4);
/* ATM cell relay control word present ? */
if (l2info->cookie[7] & ATM2_PKT_TYPE_MASK) {
control_word = EXTRACT_32BITS(p);
/* some control word heuristics */
switch(control_word) {
case 0: /* zero control word */
case 0x08000000: /* < JUNOS 7.4 control-word */
case 0x08380000: /* cntl word plus cell length (56) >= JUNOS 7.4*/
l2info->header_len += 4;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "control-word 0x%08x ", control_word));
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_GGSN
case DLT_JUNIPER_GGSN:
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_ATM1
case DLT_JUNIPER_ATM1:
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_PPP
case DLT_JUNIPER_PPP:
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_CHDLC
case DLT_JUNIPER_CHDLC:
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_ETHER
case DLT_JUNIPER_ETHER:
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_FRELAY
case DLT_JUNIPER_FRELAY:
break;
#endif
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Unknown Juniper DLT_ type %u: ", l2info->pictype));
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "hlen %u, proto 0x%04x, ", l2info->header_len, l2info->proto));
return 1; /* everything went ok so far. continue parsing */
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|juniper_hdr], length %u", h->len));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13004/Juniper: Add a bounds check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 170,028 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputDispatcher::releaseDispatchEntryLocked(DispatchEntry* dispatchEntry) {
if (dispatchEntry->hasForegroundTarget()) {
decrementPendingForegroundDispatchesLocked(dispatchEntry->eventEntry);
}
delete dispatchEntry;
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 163,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct rtable *__ip_route_output_key(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *fl4)
{
struct net_device *dev_out = NULL;
__u8 tos = RT_FL_TOS(fl4);
unsigned int flags = 0;
struct fib_result res;
struct rtable *rth;
int orig_oif;
res.tclassid = 0;
res.fi = NULL;
res.table = NULL;
orig_oif = fl4->flowi4_oif;
fl4->flowi4_iif = LOOPBACK_IFINDEX;
fl4->flowi4_tos = tos & IPTOS_RT_MASK;
fl4->flowi4_scope = ((tos & RTO_ONLINK) ?
RT_SCOPE_LINK : RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE);
rcu_read_lock();
if (fl4->saddr) {
rth = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (ipv4_is_multicast(fl4->saddr) ||
ipv4_is_lbcast(fl4->saddr) ||
ipv4_is_zeronet(fl4->saddr))
goto out;
/* I removed check for oif == dev_out->oif here.
It was wrong for two reasons:
1. ip_dev_find(net, saddr) can return wrong iface, if saddr
is assigned to multiple interfaces.
2. Moreover, we are allowed to send packets with saddr
of another iface. --ANK
*/
if (fl4->flowi4_oif == 0 &&
(ipv4_is_multicast(fl4->daddr) ||
ipv4_is_lbcast(fl4->daddr))) {
/* It is equivalent to inet_addr_type(saddr) == RTN_LOCAL */
dev_out = __ip_dev_find(net, fl4->saddr, false);
if (dev_out == NULL)
goto out;
/* Special hack: user can direct multicasts
and limited broadcast via necessary interface
without fiddling with IP_MULTICAST_IF or IP_PKTINFO.
This hack is not just for fun, it allows
vic,vat and friends to work.
They bind socket to loopback, set ttl to zero
and expect that it will work.
From the viewpoint of routing cache they are broken,
because we are not allowed to build multicast path
with loopback source addr (look, routing cache
cannot know, that ttl is zero, so that packet
will not leave this host and route is valid).
Luckily, this hack is good workaround.
*/
fl4->flowi4_oif = dev_out->ifindex;
goto make_route;
}
if (!(fl4->flowi4_flags & FLOWI_FLAG_ANYSRC)) {
/* It is equivalent to inet_addr_type(saddr) == RTN_LOCAL */
if (!__ip_dev_find(net, fl4->saddr, false))
goto out;
}
}
if (fl4->flowi4_oif) {
dev_out = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, fl4->flowi4_oif);
rth = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
if (dev_out == NULL)
goto out;
/* RACE: Check return value of inet_select_addr instead. */
if (!(dev_out->flags & IFF_UP) || !__in_dev_get_rcu(dev_out)) {
rth = ERR_PTR(-ENETUNREACH);
goto out;
}
if (ipv4_is_local_multicast(fl4->daddr) ||
ipv4_is_lbcast(fl4->daddr)) {
if (!fl4->saddr)
fl4->saddr = inet_select_addr(dev_out, 0,
RT_SCOPE_LINK);
goto make_route;
}
if (!fl4->saddr) {
if (ipv4_is_multicast(fl4->daddr))
fl4->saddr = inet_select_addr(dev_out, 0,
fl4->flowi4_scope);
else if (!fl4->daddr)
fl4->saddr = inet_select_addr(dev_out, 0,
RT_SCOPE_HOST);
}
}
if (!fl4->daddr) {
fl4->daddr = fl4->saddr;
if (!fl4->daddr)
fl4->daddr = fl4->saddr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
dev_out = net->loopback_dev;
fl4->flowi4_oif = LOOPBACK_IFINDEX;
res.type = RTN_LOCAL;
flags |= RTCF_LOCAL;
goto make_route;
}
if (fib_lookup(net, fl4, &res)) {
res.fi = NULL;
res.table = NULL;
if (fl4->flowi4_oif) {
/* Apparently, routing tables are wrong. Assume,
that the destination is on link.
WHY? DW.
Because we are allowed to send to iface
even if it has NO routes and NO assigned
addresses. When oif is specified, routing
tables are looked up with only one purpose:
to catch if destination is gatewayed, rather than
direct. Moreover, if MSG_DONTROUTE is set,
we send packet, ignoring both routing tables
and ifaddr state. --ANK
We could make it even if oif is unknown,
likely IPv6, but we do not.
*/
if (fl4->saddr == 0)
fl4->saddr = inet_select_addr(dev_out, 0,
RT_SCOPE_LINK);
res.type = RTN_UNICAST;
goto make_route;
}
rth = ERR_PTR(-ENETUNREACH);
goto out;
}
if (res.type == RTN_LOCAL) {
if (!fl4->saddr) {
if (res.fi->fib_prefsrc)
fl4->saddr = res.fi->fib_prefsrc;
else
fl4->saddr = fl4->daddr;
}
dev_out = net->loopback_dev;
fl4->flowi4_oif = dev_out->ifindex;
flags |= RTCF_LOCAL;
goto make_route;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_MULTIPATH
if (res.fi->fib_nhs > 1 && fl4->flowi4_oif == 0)
fib_select_multipath(&res);
else
#endif
if (!res.prefixlen &&
res.table->tb_num_default > 1 &&
res.type == RTN_UNICAST && !fl4->flowi4_oif)
fib_select_default(&res);
if (!fl4->saddr)
fl4->saddr = FIB_RES_PREFSRC(net, res);
dev_out = FIB_RES_DEV(res);
fl4->flowi4_oif = dev_out->ifindex;
make_route:
rth = __mkroute_output(&res, fl4, orig_oif, dev_out, flags);
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
return rth;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 44,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InputEngine::~InputEngine() {}
Commit Message: ime-service: Delete InputEngine.ProcessText.
It is deprecated and no longer used.
Bug: 1009903
Change-Id: I6774a4506bd0bb41a5d1a5909a40a2a781564b16
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1833029
Auto-Submit: Darren Shen <shend@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Keith Lee <keithlee@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Shu Chen <shuchen@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Darren Shen <shend@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#705445}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 137,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UsbIsochronousTransferFunction::UsbIsochronousTransferFunction() {
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,423 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static V9fsFidState *alloc_fid(V9fsState *s, int32_t fid)
{
V9fsFidState *f;
for (f = s->fid_list; f; f = f->next) {
/* If fid is already there return NULL */
BUG_ON(f->clunked);
if (f->fid == fid) {
return NULL;
}
}
f = g_malloc0(sizeof(V9fsFidState));
f->fid = fid;
f->fid_type = P9_FID_NONE;
f->ref = 1;
/*
* Mark the fid as referenced so that the LRU
* reclaim won't close the file descriptor
*/
f->flags |= FID_REFERENCED;
f->next = s->fid_list;
s->fid_list = f;
v9fs_readdir_init(&f->fs.dir);
v9fs_readdir_init(&f->fs_reclaim.dir);
return f;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 1,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPluginProxy::SetAcceptsInputEvents(bool accepts) {
NOTREACHED();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltChoose(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr contextNode,
xmlNodePtr inst, xsltStylePreCompPtr comp ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
xmlNodePtr cur;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (contextNode == NULL) || (inst == NULL))
return;
/*
* TODO: Content model checks should be done only at compilation
* time.
*/
cur = inst->children;
if (cur == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:choose: The instruction has no content.\n");
return;
}
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
/*
* We don't check the content model during transformation.
*/
#else
if ((! IS_XSLT_ELEM(cur)) || (! IS_XSLT_NAME(cur, "when"))) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:choose: xsl:when expected first\n");
return;
}
#endif
{
int testRes = 0, res = 0;
xmlXPathContextPtr xpctxt = ctxt->xpathCtxt;
xmlDocPtr oldXPContextDoc = xpctxt->doc;
int oldXPProximityPosition = xpctxt->proximityPosition;
int oldXPContextSize = xpctxt->contextSize;
xmlNsPtr *oldXPNamespaces = xpctxt->namespaces;
int oldXPNsNr = xpctxt->nsNr;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemWhenPtr wcomp = NULL;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr wcomp = NULL;
#endif
/*
* Process xsl:when ---------------------------------------------------
*/
while (IS_XSLT_ELEM(cur) && IS_XSLT_NAME(cur, "when")) {
wcomp = cur->psvi;
if ((wcomp == NULL) || (wcomp->test == NULL) ||
(wcomp->comp == NULL))
{
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, cur,
"Internal error in xsltChoose(): "
"The XSLT 'when' instruction was not compiled.\n");
goto error;
}
#ifdef WITH_DEBUGGER
if (xslDebugStatus != XSLT_DEBUG_NONE) {
/*
* TODO: Isn't comp->templ always NULL for xsl:choose?
*/
xslHandleDebugger(cur, contextNode, NULL, ctxt);
}
#endif
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_CHOOSE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltChoose: test %s\n", wcomp->test));
#endif
xpctxt->node = contextNode;
xpctxt->doc = oldXPContextDoc;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = oldXPProximityPosition;
xpctxt->contextSize = oldXPContextSize;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
if (wcomp->inScopeNs != NULL) {
xpctxt->namespaces = wcomp->inScopeNs->list;
xpctxt->nsNr = wcomp->inScopeNs->xpathNumber;
} else {
xpctxt->namespaces = NULL;
xpctxt->nsNr = 0;
}
#else
xpctxt->namespaces = wcomp->nsList;
xpctxt->nsNr = wcomp->nsNr;
#endif
#ifdef XSLT_FAST_IF
res = xmlXPathCompiledEvalToBoolean(wcomp->comp, xpctxt);
if (res == -1) {
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
goto error;
}
testRes = (res == 1) ? 1 : 0;
#else /* XSLT_FAST_IF */
res = xmlXPathCompiledEval(wcomp->comp, xpctxt);
if (res != NULL) {
if (res->type != XPATH_BOOLEAN)
res = xmlXPathConvertBoolean(res);
if (res->type == XPATH_BOOLEAN)
testRes = res->boolval;
else {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_CHOOSE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltChoose: test didn't evaluate to a boolean\n"));
#endif
goto error;
}
xmlXPathFreeObject(res);
res = NULL;
} else {
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
goto error;
}
#endif /* else of XSLT_FAST_IF */
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_CHOOSE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltChoose: test evaluate to %d\n", testRes));
#endif
if (testRes)
goto test_is_true;
cur = cur->next;
}
/*
* Process xsl:otherwise ----------------------------------------------
*/
if (IS_XSLT_ELEM(cur) && IS_XSLT_NAME(cur, "otherwise")) {
#ifdef WITH_DEBUGGER
if (xslDebugStatus != XSLT_DEBUG_NONE)
xslHandleDebugger(cur, contextNode, NULL, ctxt);
#endif
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_CHOOSE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"evaluating xsl:otherwise\n"));
#endif
goto test_is_true;
}
xpctxt->node = contextNode;
xpctxt->doc = oldXPContextDoc;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = oldXPProximityPosition;
xpctxt->contextSize = oldXPContextSize;
xpctxt->namespaces = oldXPNamespaces;
xpctxt->nsNr = oldXPNsNr;
goto exit;
test_is_true:
xpctxt->node = contextNode;
xpctxt->doc = oldXPContextDoc;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = oldXPProximityPosition;
xpctxt->contextSize = oldXPContextSize;
xpctxt->namespaces = oldXPNamespaces;
xpctxt->nsNr = oldXPNsNr;
goto process_sequence;
}
process_sequence:
/*
* Instantiate the sequence constructor.
*/
xsltApplySequenceConstructor(ctxt, ctxt->node, cur->children,
NULL);
exit:
error:
return;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltDebugDumpExtModulesCallback(void *function ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
FILE * output, const xmlChar * URI,
const xmlChar * not_used ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
const xmlChar * not_used2 ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
if (!URI)
return;
fprintf(output, "%s\n", URI);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentClient::AddNPAPIPlugins(
webkit::npapi::PluginList* plugin_list) {
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameHostImpl::GetRemoteAssociatedInterfaces() {
if (!remote_associated_interfaces_) {
mojom::AssociatedInterfaceProviderAssociatedPtr remote_interfaces;
IPC::ChannelProxy* channel = GetProcess()->GetChannel();
if (channel) {
RenderProcessHostImpl* process =
static_cast<RenderProcessHostImpl*>(GetProcess());
process->GetRemoteRouteProvider()->GetRoute(
GetRoutingID(), mojo::MakeRequest(&remote_interfaces));
} else {
mojo::MakeIsolatedRequest(&remote_interfaces);
}
remote_associated_interfaces_.reset(new AssociatedInterfaceProviderImpl(
std::move(remote_interfaces)));
}
return remote_associated_interfaces_.get();
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void doWriteUint32(uint32_t value)
{
doWriteUintHelper(value);
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gst_asf_demux_init (GstASFDemux * demux)
{
demux->sinkpad =
gst_pad_new_from_static_template (&gst_asf_demux_sink_template, "sink");
gst_pad_set_chain_function (demux->sinkpad,
GST_DEBUG_FUNCPTR (gst_asf_demux_chain));
gst_pad_set_event_function (demux->sinkpad,
GST_DEBUG_FUNCPTR (gst_asf_demux_sink_event));
gst_pad_set_activate_function (demux->sinkpad,
GST_DEBUG_FUNCPTR (gst_asf_demux_activate));
gst_pad_set_activatemode_function (demux->sinkpad,
GST_DEBUG_FUNCPTR (gst_asf_demux_activate_mode));
gst_element_add_pad (GST_ELEMENT (demux), demux->sinkpad);
/* set initial state */
gst_asf_demux_reset (demux, FALSE);
}
Commit Message: asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: detach_slave(ClientPtr client, xXIDetachSlaveInfo * c, int flags[MAXDEVICES])
{
DeviceIntPtr dev;
int rc;
rc = dixLookupDevice(&dev, c->deviceid, client, DixManageAccess);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
if (IsMaster(dev)) {
client->errorValue = c->deviceid;
rc = BadDevice;
goto unwind;
}
/* Don't allow changes to XTest Devices, these are fixed */
if (IsXTestDevice(dev, NULL)) {
client->errorValue = c->deviceid;
rc = BadDevice;
goto unwind;
}
ReleaseButtonsAndKeys(dev);
AttachDevice(client, dev, NULL);
flags[dev->id] |= XISlaveDetached;
unwind:
return rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,769 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Gfx::opFillStroke(Object args[], int numArgs) {
if (!state->isCurPt()) {
return;
}
if (state->isPath() && !contentIsHidden()) {
if (state->getFillColorSpace()->getMode() == csPattern) {
doPatternFill(gFalse);
} else {
out->fill(state);
}
if (state->getStrokeColorSpace()->getMode() == csPattern) {
doPatternStroke();
} else {
out->stroke(state);
}
}
doEndPath();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dev_disable_change(struct inet6_dev *idev)
{
struct netdev_notifier_info info;
if (!idev || !idev->dev)
return;
netdev_notifier_info_init(&info, idev->dev);
if (idev->cnf.disable_ipv6)
addrconf_notify(NULL, NETDEV_DOWN, &info);
else
addrconf_notify(NULL, NETDEV_UP, &info);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,810 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutocompleteResult::AppendMatches(const ACMatches& matches) {
#ifndef NDEBUG
for (ACMatches::const_iterator i = matches.begin(); i != matches.end(); ++i) {
DCHECK_EQ(AutocompleteMatch::SanitizeString(i->contents), i->contents);
DCHECK_EQ(AutocompleteMatch::SanitizeString(i->description),
i->description);
}
#endif
std::copy(matches.begin(), matches.end(), std::back_inserter(matches_));
default_match_ = end();
alternate_nav_url_ = GURL();
}
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int ok = 0, n;
X509 *xs, *xi;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
cb = ctx->verify_cb;
n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
n--;
xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
xs = xi;
else {
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
xs = xi;
goto check_cert;
}
if (n <= 0) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
ctx->current_cert = xi;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
goto end;
} else {
n--;
ctx->error_depth = n;
xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
}
}
/* ctx->error=0; not needed */
while (n >= 0) {
ctx->error_depth = n;
/*
* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
* explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
* time.
*/
if (!xs->valid
&& (xs != xi
|| (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
ctx->current_cert = xi;
ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
} else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
ctx->current_cert = xs;
ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
if (!ok) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
goto end;
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
pkey = NULL;
}
xs->valid = 1;
check_cert:
ok = x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, 0);
if (!ok)
goto end;
/* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
ctx->current_issuer = xi;
ctx->current_cert = xs;
ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
n--;
if (n >= 0) {
xi = xs;
xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
}
}
ok = 1;
end:
return ok;
}
Commit Message: Fix length checks in X509_cmp_time to avoid out-of-bounds reads.
Also tighten X509_cmp_time to reject more than three fractional
seconds in the time; and to reject trailing garbage after the offset.
CVE-2015-1789
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 44,249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void acct_clear(void)
{
memset(&acct_info, 0, sizeof(acct_info));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,834 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int firm_send_command(struct usb_serial_port *port, __u8 command,
__u8 *data, __u8 datasize)
{
struct usb_serial_port *command_port;
struct whiteheat_command_private *command_info;
struct whiteheat_private *info;
struct device *dev = &port->dev;
__u8 *transfer_buffer;
int retval = 0;
int t;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - command %d\n", __func__, command);
command_port = port->serial->port[COMMAND_PORT];
command_info = usb_get_serial_port_data(command_port);
mutex_lock(&command_info->mutex);
command_info->command_finished = false;
transfer_buffer = (__u8 *)command_port->write_urb->transfer_buffer;
transfer_buffer[0] = command;
memcpy(&transfer_buffer[1], data, datasize);
command_port->write_urb->transfer_buffer_length = datasize + 1;
retval = usb_submit_urb(command_port->write_urb, GFP_NOIO);
if (retval) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - submit urb failed\n", __func__);
goto exit;
}
/* wait for the command to complete */
t = wait_event_timeout(command_info->wait_command,
(bool)command_info->command_finished, COMMAND_TIMEOUT);
if (!t)
usb_kill_urb(command_port->write_urb);
if (command_info->command_finished == false) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - command timed out.\n", __func__);
retval = -ETIMEDOUT;
goto exit;
}
if (command_info->command_finished == WHITEHEAT_CMD_FAILURE) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - command failed.\n", __func__);
retval = -EIO;
goto exit;
}
if (command_info->command_finished == WHITEHEAT_CMD_COMPLETE) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - command completed.\n", __func__);
switch (command) {
case WHITEHEAT_GET_DTR_RTS:
info = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
memcpy(&info->mcr, command_info->result_buffer,
sizeof(struct whiteheat_dr_info));
break;
}
}
exit:
mutex_unlock(&command_info->mutex);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: USB: whiteheat: Added bounds checking for bulk command response
This patch fixes a potential security issue in the whiteheat USB driver
which might allow a local attacker to cause kernel memory corrpution. This
is due to an unchecked memcpy into a fixed size buffer (of 64 bytes). On
EHCI and XHCI busses it's possible to craft responses greater than 64
bytes leading a buffer overflow.
Signed-off-by: James Forshaw <forshaw@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 38,088 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sha256_ssse3_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
unsigned int i, index, padlen;
__be32 *dst = (__be32 *)out;
__be64 bits;
static const u8 padding[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0x80, };
bits = cpu_to_be64(sctx->count << 3);
/* Pad out to 56 mod 64 and append length */
index = sctx->count % SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE;
padlen = (index < 56) ? (56 - index) : ((SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE+56)-index);
if (!irq_fpu_usable()) {
crypto_sha256_update(desc, padding, padlen);
crypto_sha256_update(desc, (const u8 *)&bits, sizeof(bits));
} else {
kernel_fpu_begin();
/* We need to fill a whole block for __sha256_ssse3_update() */
if (padlen <= 56) {
sctx->count += padlen;
memcpy(sctx->buf + index, padding, padlen);
} else {
__sha256_ssse3_update(desc, padding, padlen, index);
}
__sha256_ssse3_update(desc, (const u8 *)&bits,
sizeof(bits), 56);
kernel_fpu_end();
}
/* Store state in digest */
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
dst[i] = cpu_to_be32(sctx->state[i]);
/* Wipe context */
memset(sctx, 0, sizeof(*sctx));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutocompleteInput::RemoveForcedQueryStringIfNecessary(Type type,
string16* text) {
if (type == FORCED_QUERY && !text->empty() && (*text)[0] == L'?')
text->erase(0, 1);
}
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vrend_renderer_context_destroy(uint32_t handle)
{
struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx;
bool ret;
if (handle >= VREND_MAX_CTX)
return;
ctx = dec_ctx[handle];
if (!ctx)
return;
dec_ctx[handle] = NULL;
ret = vrend_destroy_context(ctx->grctx);
free(ctx);
/* switch to ctx 0 */
if (ret && handle != 0)
vrend_hw_switch_context(dec_ctx[0]->grctx, true);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 9,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsWindow::IndexingDone(int request_id,
const std::string& file_system_path) {
indexing_jobs_.erase(request_id);
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
base::FundamentalValue request_id_value(request_id);
StringValue file_system_path_value(file_system_path);
CallClientFunction("InspectorFrontendAPI.indexingDone", &request_id_value,
&file_system_path_value, NULL);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,173 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void fuse_put_request(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct fuse_req *req)
{
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&req->count)) {
if (test_bit(FR_BACKGROUND, &req->flags)) {
/*
* We get here in the unlikely case that a background
* request was allocated but not sent
*/
spin_lock(&fc->bg_lock);
if (!fc->blocked)
wake_up(&fc->blocked_waitq);
spin_unlock(&fc->bg_lock);
}
if (test_bit(FR_WAITING, &req->flags)) {
__clear_bit(FR_WAITING, &req->flags);
fuse_drop_waiting(fc);
}
if (req->stolen_file)
put_reserved_req(fc, req);
else
fuse_request_free(req);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 vmx_get_pkru(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return to_vmx(vcpu)->guest_pkru;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Bool XvMCQueryExtension (Display *dpy, int *event_basep, int *error_basep)
{
XExtDisplayInfo *info = xvmc_find_display(dpy);
if (XextHasExtension(info)) {
*event_basep = info->codes->first_event;
*error_basep = info->codes->first_error;
return True;
} else {
return False;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Sort( PProfileList list )
{
PProfile *old, current, next;
/* First, set the new X coordinate of each profile */
current = *list;
while ( current )
{
current->X = *current->offset;
current->offset += current->flags & Flow_Up ? 1 : -1;
current->height--;
current = current->link;
}
/* Then sort them */
old = list;
current = *old;
if ( !current )
return;
next = current->link;
while ( next )
{
if ( current->X <= next->X )
{
old = ¤t->link;
current = *old;
if ( !current )
return;
}
else
{
*old = next;
current->link = next->link;
next->link = current;
old = list;
current = *old;
}
next = current->link;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FrameSequenceState_gif::~FrameSequenceState_gif() {
delete[] mPreserveBuffer;
}
Commit Message: Skip composition of frames lacking a color map
Bug:68399117
Change-Id: I32f1d6856221b8a60130633edb69da2d2986c27c
(cherry picked from commit 0dc887f70eeea8d707cb426b96c6756edd1c607d)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 163,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ActivityLoggingForAllWorldsPerWorldBindingsVoidMethodMethodForMainWorld(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
impl->activityLoggingForAllWorldsPerWorldBindingsVoidMethod();
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~FadeInAnimationDelegate() {}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,263 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: main( int argc,
char** argv )
{
grEvent event;
parse_cmdline( &argc, &argv );
/* Initialize engine */
handle = FTDemo_New( status.encoding );
handle->use_sbits = 0;
FTDemo_Update_Current_Flags( handle );
for ( ; argc > 0; argc--, argv++ )
{
error = FTDemo_Install_Font( handle, argv[0] );
if ( error )
{
fprintf( stderr, "failed to install %s", argv[0] );
if ( error == FT_Err_Invalid_CharMap_Handle )
fprintf( stderr, ": missing valid charmap\n" );
else
fprintf( stderr, "\n" );
}
}
if ( handle->num_fonts == 0 )
PanicZ( "could not open any font file" );
display = FTDemo_Display_New( gr_pixel_mode_gray );
display->back_color.value = 0;
display->fore_color.value = 0xff;
if ( !display )
PanicZ( "could not allocate display surface" );
grSetTitle( display->surface,
"FreeType String Viewer - press F1 for help" );
event_gamma_change( 0 );
event_font_change( 0 );
status.header = 0;
for ( ;; )
{
FTDemo_Display_Clear( display );
switch ( status.render_mode )
{
case RENDER_MODE_STRING:
status.sc.center = 1L << 15;
error = FTDemo_String_Draw( handle, display,
&status.sc,
display->bitmap->width / 2,
display->bitmap->rows / 2 );
break;
case RENDER_MODE_KERNCMP:
{
FTDemo_String_Context sc = status.sc;
FT_Int x, y;
FT_UInt height;
x = 55;
/* whatever.. */
height = status.ptsize * status.res / 72;
if ( height < CELLSTRING_HEIGHT )
height = CELLSTRING_HEIGHT;
/* First line: none */
sc.center = 0;
sc.kerning_mode = 0;
sc.kerning_degree = 0;
sc.vertical = 0;
sc.matrix = NULL;
y = CELLSTRING_HEIGHT * 2 + display->bitmap->rows / 4 + height;
grWriteCellString( display->bitmap, 5,
y - ( height + CELLSTRING_HEIGHT ) / 2,
"none", display->fore_color );
error = FTDemo_String_Draw( handle, display, &sc, x, y );
/* Second line: track kern only */
sc.kerning_degree = status.sc.kerning_degree;
y += height;
grWriteCellString( display->bitmap, 5,
y - ( height + CELLSTRING_HEIGHT ) / 2,
"track", display->fore_color );
error = FTDemo_String_Draw( handle, display, &sc, x, y );
/* Third line: track kern + pair kern */
sc.kerning_mode = status.sc.kerning_mode;
y += height;
grWriteCellString( display->bitmap, 5,
y - ( height + CELLSTRING_HEIGHT ) / 2,
"both", display->fore_color );
error = FTDemo_String_Draw( handle, display, &sc, x, y );
}
break;
}
if ( !error && status.sc.gamma_ramp )
gamma_ramp_draw( status.gamma_ramp, display->bitmap );
write_header( error );
status.header = 0;
grListenSurface( display->surface, 0, &event );
if ( Process_Event( &event ) )
break;
}
printf( "Execution completed successfully.\n" );
FTDemo_Display_Done( display );
FTDemo_Done( handle );
exit( 0 ); /* for safety reasons */
return 0; /* never reached */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void limitedWithMissingDefaultAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
TestObjectV8Internal::limitedWithMissingDefaultAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_METHOD(CURLFile, __wakeup)
{
zend_update_property_string(curl_CURLFile_class, getThis(), "name", sizeof("name")-1, "" TSRMLS_CC);
zend_throw_exception(NULL, "Unserialization of CURLFile instances is not allowed", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 165,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RequestExtensions(gl::GLApi* api,
const gfx::ExtensionSet& requestable_extensions,
const char* const* extensions_to_request,
size_t count) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (gfx::HasExtension(requestable_extensions, extensions_to_request[i])) {
api->glRequestExtensionANGLEFn(extensions_to_request[i]);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string16 ExtensionGlobalError::GetBubbleViewMessage() {
if (message_.empty()) {
message_ = GenerateMessage();
}
return message_;
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AppListSyncableService::ProcessSyncItemSpecifics(
const sync_pb::AppListSpecifics& specifics) {
const std::string& item_id = specifics.item_id();
if (item_id.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "AppList item with empty ID";
return false;
}
SyncItem* sync_item = FindSyncItem(item_id);
if (sync_item) {
if (sync_item->item_type == specifics.item_type()) {
UpdateSyncItemFromSync(specifics, sync_item);
ProcessExistingSyncItem(sync_item);
VLOG(2) << this << " <- SYNC UPDATE: " << sync_item->ToString();
return false;
}
if (sync_item->item_type !=
sync_pb::AppListSpecifics::TYPE_REMOVE_DEFAULT_APP &&
specifics.item_type() !=
sync_pb::AppListSpecifics::TYPE_REMOVE_DEFAULT_APP) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Synced item type: " << specifics.item_type()
<< " != existing sync item type: " << sync_item->item_type
<< " Deleting item from model!";
model_->DeleteItem(item_id);
}
VLOG(2) << this << " - ProcessSyncItem: Delete existing entry: "
<< sync_item->ToString();
delete sync_item;
sync_items_.erase(item_id);
}
sync_item = CreateSyncItem(item_id, specifics.item_type());
UpdateSyncItemFromSync(specifics, sync_item);
ProcessNewSyncItem(sync_item);
VLOG(2) << this << " <- SYNC ADD: " << sync_item->ToString();
return true;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline __maybe_unused uint64_t h2_get_n64(const struct buffer *b, int o)
{
return readv_n64(b_ptr(b, o), b_end(b) - b_ptr(b, o), b->data);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,766 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init setup_slub_min_order(char *str)
{
get_option(&str, &slub_min_order);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ShouldQuicGoAwaySessionsOnIpChange(
const VariationParameters& quic_trial_params) {
return base::LowerCaseEqualsASCII(
GetVariationParam(quic_trial_params, "goaway_sessions_on_ip_change"),
"true");
}
Commit Message: Fix a bug in network_session_configurator.cc in which support for HTTPS URLS in QUIC proxies was always set to false.
BUG=914497
Change-Id: I56ad16088168302598bb448553ba32795eee3756
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1417356
Auto-Submit: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623763}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 152,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutObject* SVGLayoutSupport::findClosestLayoutSVGText(LayoutObject* layoutObject, const FloatPoint& point)
{
return searchTreeForFindClosestLayoutSVGText(layoutObject, point).candidateLayoutObject;
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID: | 0 | 121,153 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool kvm_make_all_cpus_request(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int req)
{
int i, cpu, me;
cpumask_var_t cpus;
bool called = true;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
zalloc_cpumask_var(&cpus, GFP_ATOMIC);
me = get_cpu();
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
kvm_make_request(req, vcpu);
cpu = vcpu->cpu;
/* Set ->requests bit before we read ->mode. */
smp_mb__after_atomic();
if (cpus != NULL && cpu != -1 && cpu != me &&
kvm_vcpu_exiting_guest_mode(vcpu) != OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE)
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, cpus);
}
if (unlikely(cpus == NULL))
smp_call_function_many(cpu_online_mask, ack_flush, NULL, 1);
else if (!cpumask_empty(cpus))
smp_call_function_many(cpus, ack_flush, NULL, 1);
else
called = false;
put_cpu();
free_cpumask_var(cpus);
return called;
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 71,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DeleteAddress(PMIB_UNICASTIPADDRESS_ROW addr_row)
{
return DeleteUnicastIpAddressEntry(addr_row);
}
Commit Message: Fix potential double-free() in Interactive Service (CVE-2018-9336)
Malformed input data on the service pipe towards the OpenVPN interactive
service (normally used by the OpenVPN GUI to request openvpn instances
from the service) can result in a double free() in the error handling code.
This usually only leads to a process crash (DoS by an unprivileged local
account) but since it could possibly lead to memory corruption if
happening while multiple other threads are active at the same time,
CVE-2018-9336 has been assigned to acknowledge this risk.
Fix by ensuring that sud->directory is set to NULL in GetStartUpData()
for all error cases (thus not being free()ed in FreeStartupData()).
Rewrite control flow to use explicit error label for error exit.
Discovered and reported by Jacob Baines <jbaines@tenable.com>.
CVE: 2018-9336
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Acked-by: Selva Nair <selva.nair@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20180414072617.25075-1-gert@greenie.muc.de>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&q=20180414072617.25075-1-gert@greenie.muc.de
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 83,395 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ip_vs_genl_unregister(void)
{
genl_unregister_family(&ip_vs_genl_family);
}
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport const char *GetMagickProperty(ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image,const char *property,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
value[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*string;
assert(property[0] != '\0');
assert(image != (Image *) NULL || image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL );
if (property[1] == '\0') /* single letter property request */
return(GetMagickPropertyLetter(image_info,image,*property,exception));
if (image != (Image *) NULL && image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
else if( image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL && image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s","no-images");
*value='\0'; /* formated string */
string=(char *) NULL; /* constant string reference */
switch (*property)
{
case 'b':
{
if (LocaleCompare("basename",property) == 0)
{
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
GetPathComponent(image->magick_filename,BasePath,value);
if (*value == '\0') string="";
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("bit-depth",property) == 0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g",(double)
GetImageDepth(image, exception));
break;
}
break;
}
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare("channels",property) == 0)
{
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
/* FUTURE: return actual image channels */
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%s",
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickColorspaceOptions,(ssize_t)
image->colorspace));
LocaleLower(value);
if( image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait )
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(value,"a",MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("colorspace",property) == 0)
{
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
/* FUTURE: return actual colorspace - no 'gray' stuff */
string=CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickColorspaceOptions,(ssize_t)
image->colorspace);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("copyright",property) == 0)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(value,GetMagickCopyright(),MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare("depth",property) == 0)
{
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g",(double)
image->depth);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("directory",property) == 0)
{
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
GetPathComponent(image->magick_filename,HeadPath,value);
if (*value == '\0') string="";
break;
}
break;
}
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleCompare("entropy",property) == 0)
{
double
entropy;
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
(void) GetImageEntropy(image,&entropy,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%.*g",
GetMagickPrecision(),entropy);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("extension",property) == 0)
{
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
GetPathComponent(image->magick_filename,ExtensionPath,value);
if (*value == '\0') string="";
break;
}
break;
}
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare("gamma",property) == 0)
{
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%.*g",
GetMagickPrecision(),image->gamma);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare("height",property) == 0)
{
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g",
image->magick_rows != 0 ? (double) image->magick_rows : 256.0);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare("input",property) == 0)
{
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
string=image->filename;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'k':
{
if (LocaleCompare("kurtosis",property) == 0)
{
double
kurtosis,
skewness;
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
(void) GetImageKurtosis(image,&kurtosis,&skewness,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%.*g",
GetMagickPrecision(),kurtosis);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'm':
{
if (LocaleCompare("magick",property) == 0)
{
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
string=image->magick;
break;
}
if ((LocaleCompare("maxima",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("max",property) == 0))
{
double
maximum,
minimum;
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
(void) GetImageRange(image,&minimum,&maximum,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%.*g",
GetMagickPrecision(),maximum);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("mean",property) == 0)
{
double
mean,
standard_deviation;
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
(void) GetImageMean(image,&mean,&standard_deviation,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%.*g",
GetMagickPrecision(),mean);
break;
}
if ((LocaleCompare("minima",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("min",property) == 0))
{
double
maximum,
minimum;
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
(void) GetImageRange(image,&minimum,&maximum,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%.*g",
GetMagickPrecision(),minimum);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'o':
{
if (LocaleCompare("opaque",property) == 0)
{
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
string=CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickBooleanOptions,(ssize_t)
IsImageOpaque(image,exception));
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("orientation",property) == 0)
{
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
string=CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickOrientationOptions,(ssize_t)
image->orientation);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("output",property) == 0)
{
WarnNoImageInfoReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
(void) CopyMagickString(value,image_info->filename,MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'p':
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LCMS_DELEGATE)
if (LocaleCompare("profile:icc",property) == 0 ||
LocaleCompare("profile:icm",property) == 0)
{
#if !defined(LCMS_VERSION) || (LCMS_VERSION < 2000)
#define cmsUInt32Number DWORD
#endif
const StringInfo
*profile;
cmsHPROFILE
icc_profile;
profile=GetImageProfile(image,property+8);
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
break;
icc_profile=cmsOpenProfileFromMem(GetStringInfoDatum(profile),
(cmsUInt32Number) GetStringInfoLength(profile));
if (icc_profile != (cmsHPROFILE *) NULL)
{
#if defined(LCMS_VERSION) && (LCMS_VERSION < 2000)
string=cmsTakeProductName(icc_profile);
#else
(void) cmsGetProfileInfoASCII(icc_profile,cmsInfoDescription,
"en","US",value,MagickPathExtent);
#endif
(void) cmsCloseProfile(icc_profile);
}
}
#endif
if (LocaleCompare("profiles",property) == 0)
{
const char
*name;
ResetImageProfileIterator(image);
name=GetNextImageProfile(image);
if (name != (char *) NULL)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(value,name,MagickPathExtent);
name=GetNextImageProfile(image);
while (name != (char *) NULL)
{
ConcatenateMagickString(value,",",MagickPathExtent);
ConcatenateMagickString(value,name,MagickPathExtent);
name=GetNextImageProfile(image);
}
}
break;
}
break;
}
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare("resolution.x",property) == 0)
{
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%g",
image->resolution.x);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("resolution.y",property) == 0)
{
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%g",
image->resolution.y);
break;
}
break;
}
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare("scene",property) == 0)
{
WarnNoImageInfoReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g",(double)
image_info->scene);
else {
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g",(double)
image->scene);
}
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("scenes",property) == 0)
{
/* FUTURE: equivelent to %n? */
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g",(double)
GetImageListLength(image));
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("size",property) == 0)
{
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
(void) FormatMagickSize(GetBlobSize(image),MagickFalse,"B",
MagickPathExtent,value);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("skewness",property) == 0)
{
double
kurtosis,
skewness;
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
(void) GetImageKurtosis(image,&kurtosis,&skewness,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%.*g",
GetMagickPrecision(),skewness);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("standard-deviation",property) == 0)
{
double
mean,
standard_deviation;
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
(void) GetImageMean(image,&mean,&standard_deviation,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%.*g",
GetMagickPrecision(),standard_deviation);
break;
}
break;
}
case 't':
{
if (LocaleCompare("type",property) == 0)
{
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
string=CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickTypeOptions,(ssize_t)
IdentifyImageType(image,exception));
break;
}
break;
}
case 'u':
{
if (LocaleCompare("unique",property) == 0)
{
WarnNoImageInfoReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
string=image_info->unique;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("units",property) == 0)
{
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
string=CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickResolutionOptions,(ssize_t)
image->units);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("copyright",property) == 0)
break;
}
case 'v':
{
if (LocaleCompare("version",property) == 0)
{
string=GetMagickVersion((size_t *) NULL);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare("width",property) == 0)
{
WarnNoImageReturn("\"%%[%s]\"",property);
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g",(double)
(image->magick_columns != 0 ? image->magick_columns : 256));
break;
}
break;
}
}
if (string != (char *) NULL)
return(string);
if (*value != '\0')
{
/* create a cloned copy of result, that will get cleaned up, eventually */
if (image != (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageArtifact(image,"get-property",value);
return(GetImageArtifact(image,"get-property"));
}
else
{
(void) SetImageOption(image_info,"get-property",value);
return(GetImageOption(image_info,"get-property"));
}
}
return((char *) NULL);
}
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 94,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Label::PaintText(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
const std::wstring& text,
const gfx::Rect& text_bounds,
int flags) {
canvas->DrawStringInt(WideToUTF16Hack(text), font_, color_,
text_bounds.x(), text_bounds.y(),
text_bounds.width(), text_bounds.height(), flags);
if (HasFocus() || paint_as_focused_) {
gfx::Rect focus_bounds = text_bounds;
focus_bounds.Inset(-kFocusBorderPadding, -kFocusBorderPadding);
canvas->DrawFocusRect(focus_bounds.x(), focus_bounds.y(),
focus_bounds.width(), focus_bounds.height());
}
}
Commit Message: wstring: remove wstring version of SplitString
Retry of r84336.
BUG=23581
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6930047
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@84355 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::NotifyScreenInfoChanged() {
SynchronizeVisualProperties();
if (delegate_ && !delegate_->IsWidgetForMainFrame(this))
return;
if (auto* touch_emulator = GetExistingTouchEmulator())
touch_emulator->SetDeviceScaleFactor(GetScaleFactorForView(view_.get()));
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit LoadStateWaiter(content::WebContents* contents)
: web_contents_(contents) {
contents->SetDelegate(this);
}
Commit Message: Security drop fullscreen for any nested WebContents level.
This relands 3dcaec6e30feebefc11e with a fix to the test.
BUG=873080
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: Ie68b197fc6b92447e9633f233354a68fefcf20c7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1175925
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#583335}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_obj_not_equal_m(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
mrb_value arg;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "o", &arg);
return mrb_bool_value(!mrb_equal(mrb, self, arg));
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 82,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pkinit_fini_pkinit_oids(pkinit_plg_crypto_context ctx)
{
if (ctx == NULL)
return;
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->id_pkinit_san);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->id_pkinit_authData);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->id_pkinit_DHKeyData);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->id_pkinit_rkeyData);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->id_pkinit_KPClientAuth);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->id_pkinit_KPKdc);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->id_ms_kp_sc_logon);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->id_ms_san_upn);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->id_kp_serverAuth);
}
Commit Message: Fix PKINIT cert matching data construction
Rewrite X509_NAME_oneline_ex() and its call sites to use dynamic
allocation and to perform proper error checking.
ticket: 8617
target_version: 1.16
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 60,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mpol_shared_policy_init(struct shared_policy *sp, struct mempolicy *mpol)
{
int ret;
sp->root = RB_ROOT; /* empty tree == default mempolicy */
rwlock_init(&sp->lock);
if (mpol) {
struct vm_area_struct pvma;
struct mempolicy *new;
NODEMASK_SCRATCH(scratch);
if (!scratch)
goto put_mpol;
/* contextualize the tmpfs mount point mempolicy */
new = mpol_new(mpol->mode, mpol->flags, &mpol->w.user_nodemask);
if (IS_ERR(new))
goto free_scratch; /* no valid nodemask intersection */
task_lock(current);
ret = mpol_set_nodemask(new, &mpol->w.user_nodemask, scratch);
task_unlock(current);
if (ret)
goto put_new;
/* Create pseudo-vma that contains just the policy */
memset(&pvma, 0, sizeof(struct vm_area_struct));
pvma.vm_end = TASK_SIZE; /* policy covers entire file */
mpol_set_shared_policy(sp, &pvma, new); /* adds ref */
put_new:
mpol_put(new); /* drop initial ref */
free_scratch:
NODEMASK_SCRATCH_FREE(scratch);
put_mpol:
mpol_put(mpol); /* drop our incoming ref on sb mpol */
}
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy.c: fix error handling in set_mempolicy and mbind.
In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the
bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak
sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 67,191 |
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