instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct thread_q *tq_new(void)
{
struct thread_q *tq;
tq = (struct thread_q *)calloc(1, sizeof(*tq));
if (!tq)
return NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tq->q);
pthread_mutex_init(&tq->mutex, NULL);
pthread_cond_init(&tq->cond, NULL);
return tq;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t GraphicBuffer::flatten(void*& buffer, size_t& size, int*& fds, size_t& count) const {
size_t sizeNeeded = GraphicBuffer::getFlattenedSize();
if (size < sizeNeeded) return NO_MEMORY;
size_t fdCountNeeded = GraphicBuffer::getFdCount();
if (count < fdCountNeeded) return NO_MEMORY;
int32_t* buf = static_cast<int32_t*>(buffer);
buf[0] = 'GBFR';
buf[1] = width;
buf[2] = height;
buf[3] = stride;
buf[4] = format;
buf[5] = usage;
buf[6] = static_cast<int32_t>(mId >> 32);
buf[7] = static_cast<int32_t>(mId & 0xFFFFFFFFull);
buf[8] = 0;
buf[9] = 0;
if (handle) {
buf[8] = handle->numFds;
buf[9] = handle->numInts;
native_handle_t const* const h = handle;
memcpy(fds, h->data, h->numFds*sizeof(int));
memcpy(&buf[10], h->data + h->numFds, h->numInts*sizeof(int));
}
buffer = reinterpret_cast<void*>(static_cast<int*>(buffer) + sizeNeeded);
size -= sizeNeeded;
if (handle) {
fds += handle->numFds;
count -= handle->numFds;
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fix for corruption when numFds or numInts is too large.
Bug: 18076253
Change-Id: I4c5935440013fc755e1d123049290383f4659fb6
(cherry picked from commit dfd06b89a4b77fc75eb85a3c1c700da3621c0118)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,675 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __udp6_lib_err(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt,
u8 type, u8 code, int offset, __be32 info,
struct udp_table *udptable)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np;
const struct ipv6hdr *hdr = (const struct ipv6hdr *)skb->data;
const struct in6_addr *saddr = &hdr->saddr;
const struct in6_addr *daddr = &hdr->daddr;
struct udphdr *uh = (struct udphdr*)(skb->data+offset);
struct sock *sk;
int err;
sk = __udp6_lib_lookup(dev_net(skb->dev), daddr, uh->dest,
saddr, uh->source, inet6_iif(skb), udptable);
if (sk == NULL)
return;
np = inet6_sk(sk);
if (!icmpv6_err_convert(type, code, &err) && !np->recverr)
goto out;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED && !np->recverr)
goto out;
if (np->recverr)
ipv6_icmp_error(sk, skb, err, uh->dest, ntohl(info), (u8 *)(uh+1));
sk->sk_err = err;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
out:
sock_put(sk);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable
IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for
IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS
attacks.
Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and
scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide)
This patch :
1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper
2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results
3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fib6_gc_timer_cb(unsigned long arg)
{
fib6_run_gc(0, (struct net *)arg);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: only static routes qualify for equal cost multipathing
Static routes in this case are non-expiring routes which did not get
configured by autoconf or by icmpv6 redirects.
To make sure we actually get an ecmp route while searching for the first
one in this fib6_node's leafs, also make sure it matches the ecmp route
assumptions.
v2:
a) Removed RTF_EXPIRE check in dst.from chain. The check of RTF_ADDRCONF
already ensures that this route, even if added again without
RTF_EXPIRES (in case of a RA announcement with infinite timeout),
does not cause the rt6i_nsiblings logic to go wrong if a later RA
updates the expiration time later.
v3:
a) Allow RTF_EXPIRES routes to enter the ecmp route set. We have to do so,
because an pmtu event could update the RTF_EXPIRES flag and we would
not count this route, if another route joins this set. We now filter
only for RTF_GATEWAY|RTF_ADDRCONF|RTF_DYNAMIC, which are flags that
don't get changed after rt6_info construction.
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 30,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: update_stats_enqueue_sleeper(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = NULL;
u64 sleep_start, block_start;
if (!schedstat_enabled())
return;
sleep_start = schedstat_val(se->statistics.sleep_start);
block_start = schedstat_val(se->statistics.block_start);
if (entity_is_task(se))
tsk = task_of(se);
if (sleep_start) {
u64 delta = rq_clock(rq_of(cfs_rq)) - sleep_start;
if ((s64)delta < 0)
delta = 0;
if (unlikely(delta > schedstat_val(se->statistics.sleep_max)))
__schedstat_set(se->statistics.sleep_max, delta);
__schedstat_set(se->statistics.sleep_start, 0);
__schedstat_add(se->statistics.sum_sleep_runtime, delta);
if (tsk) {
account_scheduler_latency(tsk, delta >> 10, 1);
trace_sched_stat_sleep(tsk, delta);
}
}
if (block_start) {
u64 delta = rq_clock(rq_of(cfs_rq)) - block_start;
if ((s64)delta < 0)
delta = 0;
if (unlikely(delta > schedstat_val(se->statistics.block_max)))
__schedstat_set(se->statistics.block_max, delta);
__schedstat_set(se->statistics.block_start, 0);
__schedstat_add(se->statistics.sum_sleep_runtime, delta);
if (tsk) {
if (tsk->in_iowait) {
__schedstat_add(se->statistics.iowait_sum, delta);
__schedstat_inc(se->statistics.iowait_count);
trace_sched_stat_iowait(tsk, delta);
}
trace_sched_stat_blocked(tsk, delta);
/*
* Blocking time is in units of nanosecs, so shift by
* 20 to get a milliseconds-range estimation of the
* amount of time that the task spent sleeping:
*/
if (unlikely(prof_on == SLEEP_PROFILING)) {
profile_hits(SLEEP_PROFILING,
(void *)get_wchan(tsk),
delta >> 20);
}
account_scheduler_latency(tsk, delta >> 10, 0);
}
}
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RendererSchedulerImpl::IPCTaskRunner() {
return ipc_task_queue_;
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 143,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t sleep_millisecs_store(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t count)
{
unsigned long msecs;
int err;
err = strict_strtoul(buf, 10, &msecs);
if (err || msecs > UINT_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
ksm_thread_sleep_millisecs = msecs;
return count;
}
Commit Message: ksm: fix NULL pointer dereference in scan_get_next_rmap_item()
Andrea Righi reported a case where an exiting task can race against
ksmd::scan_get_next_rmap_item (http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/6/1/742) easily
triggering a NULL pointer dereference in ksmd.
ksm_scan.mm_slot == &ksm_mm_head with only one registered mm
CPU 1 (__ksm_exit) CPU 2 (scan_get_next_rmap_item)
list_empty() is false
lock slot == &ksm_mm_head
list_del(slot->mm_list)
(list now empty)
unlock
lock
slot = list_entry(slot->mm_list.next)
(list is empty, so slot is still ksm_mm_head)
unlock
slot->mm == NULL ... Oops
Close this race by revalidating that the new slot is not simply the list
head again.
Andrea's test case:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define BUFSIZE getpagesize()
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
void *ptr;
if (posix_memalign(&ptr, getpagesize(), BUFSIZE) < 0) {
perror("posix_memalign");
exit(1);
}
if (madvise(ptr, BUFSIZE, MADV_MERGEABLE) < 0) {
perror("madvise");
exit(1);
}
*(char *)NULL = 0;
return 0;
}
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void red_channel_client_seamless_migration_done(RedChannelClient *rcc)
{
rcc->wait_migrate_data = FALSE;
pthread_mutex_lock(&rcc->client->lock);
rcc->client->num_migrated_channels--;
/* we assume we always have at least one channel who has migration data transfer,
* otherwise, this flag will never be set back to FALSE*/
if (!rcc->client->num_migrated_channels) {
rcc->client->during_target_migrate = FALSE;
rcc->client->seamless_migrate = FALSE;
/* migration completion might have been triggered from a different thread
* than the main thread */
main_dispatcher_seamless_migrate_dst_complete(rcc->client);
if (rcc->latency_monitor.timer) {
red_channel_client_start_ping_timer(rcc, PING_TEST_IDLE_NET_TIMEOUT_MS);
}
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&rcc->client->lock);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: local void free_track(struct mem_track_s *mem, void *ptr)
{
size_t size;
if (ptr != NULL) {
size = MALLOC_SIZE(ptr);
mem_track_grab(mem);
mem->num--;
mem->size -= size;
mem_track_drop(mem);
free(ptr);
}
}
Commit Message: When decompressing with -N or -NT, strip any path from header name.
This uses the path of the compressed file combined with the name
from the header as the name of the decompressed output file. Any
path information in the header name is stripped. This avoids a
possible vulnerability where absolute or descending paths are put
in the gzip header.
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 44,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void longMethodOptionalLongArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::longMethodOptionalLongArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,399 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObj::derefObject(void* object)
{
static_cast<TestObj*>(object)->deref();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionDevToolsClientHost::InfoBarDestroyed() {
infobar_delegate_ = NULL;
SendDetachedEvent();
Close();
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int l2cap_sock_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct sock *sk;
BT_DBG("sock %p", sock);
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
if (sock->type != SOCK_SEQPACKET && sock->type != SOCK_STREAM &&
sock->type != SOCK_DGRAM && sock->type != SOCK_RAW)
return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW && !kern && !capable(CAP_NET_RAW))
return -EPERM;
sock->ops = &l2cap_sock_ops;
sk = l2cap_sock_alloc(net, sock, protocol, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sk)
return -ENOMEM;
l2cap_sock_init(sk, NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: L2CAP - Fix info leak via getsockname()
The L2CAP code fails to initialize the l2_bdaddr_type member of struct
sockaddr_l2 and the padding byte added for alignment. It that for leaks
two bytes kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 94,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void suffix_object(cJSON *prev,cJSON *item) {prev->next=item;item->prev=prev;}
Commit Message: fix buffer overflow (#30)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 93,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Dispatcher::RunScriptsAtDocumentStart(content::RenderFrame* render_frame) {
ExtensionFrameHelper* frame_helper = ExtensionFrameHelper::Get(render_frame);
if (!frame_helper)
return; // The frame is invisible to extensions.
frame_helper->RunScriptsAtDocumentStart();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Mutex* CameraService::getClientLockById(int cameraId) {
if (cameraId < 0 || cameraId >= mNumberOfCameras) return NULL;
return &mClientLock[cameraId];
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint64_t WebMediaPlayerMS::AudioDecodedByteCount() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,132 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void stopIgnoringSpaces(LineMidpointState& lineMidpointState, const InlineIterator& midpoint)
{
ASSERT(lineMidpointState.numMidpoints % 2);
deprecatedAddMidpoint(lineMidpointState, midpoint);
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,426 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: off_t find_volume_de(DOS_FS * fs, DIR_ENT * de)
{
uint32_t cluster;
off_t offset;
int i;
if (fs->root_cluster) {
for (cluster = fs->root_cluster;
cluster != 0 && cluster != -1;
cluster = next_cluster(fs, cluster)) {
offset = cluster_start(fs, cluster);
for (i = 0; i * sizeof(DIR_ENT) < fs->cluster_size; i++) {
fs_read(offset, sizeof(DIR_ENT), de);
if (de->attr != VFAT_LN_ATTR && de->attr & ATTR_VOLUME)
return offset;
offset += sizeof(DIR_ENT);
}
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < fs->root_entries; i++) {
offset = fs->root_start + i * sizeof(DIR_ENT);
fs_read(offset, sizeof(DIR_ENT), de);
if (de->attr != VFAT_LN_ATTR && de->attr & ATTR_VOLUME)
return offset;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: read_boot(): Handle excessive FAT size specifications
The variable used for storing the FAT size (in bytes) was an unsigned
int. Since the size in sectors read from the BPB was not sufficiently
checked, this could end up being zero after multiplying it with the
sector size while some offsets still stayed excessive. Ultimately it
would cause segfaults when accessing FAT entries for which no memory
was allocated.
Make it more robust by changing the types used to store FAT size to
off_t and abort if there is no room for data clusters. Additionally
check that FAT size is not specified as zero.
Fixes #25 and fixes #26.
Reported-by: Hanno Böck
Signed-off-by: Andreas Bombe <aeb@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int get_space_object(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, ref *arr, PS_colour_space_t **obj)
{
ref spacename, nref;
int i, nprocs = sizeof(colorProcs) / sizeof(PS_colour_space_t), code;
/* If the spaece is an array, the first element is always the name */
if (r_is_array(arr)) {
code = array_get(imemory, arr, 0, &spacename);
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
else
ref_assign(&spacename, arr);
/* Check that it really is a name */
if (!r_has_type(&spacename, t_name))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
/* Find the relevant color space object */
for (i=0;i<nprocs;i++) {
code = names_ref(imemory->gs_lib_ctx->gs_name_table, (const byte *)colorProcs[i].name, strlen(colorProcs[i].name), &nref, 0);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (name_eq(&spacename, &nref)) {
*obj = &colorProcs[i];
return 0;
}
}
return_error(gs_error_undefined);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __init snd_seq_queues_init(void)
{
/*
memset(queue_list, 0, sizeof(queue_list));
num_queues = 0;
*/
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix race at timer setup and close
ALSA sequencer code has an open race between the timer setup ioctl and
the close of the client. This was triggered by syzkaller fuzzer, and
a use-after-free was caught there as a result.
This patch papers over it by adding a proper queue->timer_mutex lock
around the timer-related calls in the relevant code path.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 54,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PolicyKitBackend::setupAction(const QString &action)
{
connect(PolkitQt::Context::instance(), SIGNAL(configChanged()),
this, SLOT(checkForResultChanged()));
connect(PolkitQt::Context::instance(), SIGNAL(consoleKitDBChanged()),
this, SLOT(checkForResultChanged()));
m_cachedResults[action] = actionStatus(action);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-290 | 0 | 7,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void StringMethodOptionalLongArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "stringMethodOptionalLongArg");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
int32_t optional_long_arg;
int num_args_passed = info.Length();
while (num_args_passed > 0) {
if (!info[num_args_passed - 1]->IsUndefined())
break;
--num_args_passed;
}
if (UNLIKELY(num_args_passed <= 0)) {
V8SetReturnValueString(info, impl->stringMethodOptionalLongArg(), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
optional_long_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
V8SetReturnValueString(info, impl->stringMethodOptionalLongArg(optional_long_arg), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_encoding( T1_Face face,
T1_Loader loader )
{
T1_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
FT_Byte* cur;
FT_Byte* limit = parser->root.limit;
PSAux_Service psaux = (PSAux_Service)face->psaux;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
cur = parser->root.cursor;
if ( cur >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "parse_encoding: out of bounds\n" ));
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
return;
}
/* if we have a number or `[', the encoding is an array, */
/* and we must load it now */
if ( ft_isdigit( *cur ) || *cur == '[' )
{
T1_Encoding encode = &face->type1.encoding;
FT_Int count, n;
PS_Table char_table = &loader->encoding_table;
FT_Memory memory = parser->root.memory;
FT_Error error;
FT_Bool only_immediates = 0;
/* read the number of entries in the encoding; should be 256 */
if ( *cur == '[' )
{
count = 256;
only_immediates = 1;
parser->root.cursor++;
}
else
count = (FT_Int)T1_ToInt( parser );
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit )
return;
/* we use a T1_Table to store our charnames */
loader->num_chars = encode->num_chars = count;
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( encode->char_index, count ) ||
FT_NEW_ARRAY( encode->char_name, count ) ||
FT_SET_ERROR( psaux->ps_table_funcs->init(
char_table, count, memory ) ) )
{
parser->root.error = error;
return;
}
/* We need to `zero' out encoding_table.elements */
for ( n = 0; n < count; n++ )
{
char* notdef = (char *)".notdef";
T1_Add_Table( char_table, n, notdef, 8 );
}
/* Now we need to read records of the form */
/* */
/* ... charcode /charname ... */
/* */
/* for each entry in our table. */
/* */
/* We simply look for a number followed by an immediate */
/* name. Note that this ignores correctly the sequence */
/* that is often seen in type1 fonts: */
/* */
/* 0 1 255 { 1 index exch /.notdef put } for dup */
/* */
/* used to clean the encoding array before anything else. */
/* */
/* Alternatively, if the array is directly given as */
/* */
/* /Encoding [ ... ] */
/* */
/* we only read immediates. */
n = 0;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
while ( parser->root.cursor < limit )
{
cur = parser->root.cursor;
/* we stop when we encounter a `def' or `]' */
if ( *cur == 'd' && cur + 3 < limit )
{
if ( cur[1] == 'e' &&
cur[2] == 'f' &&
IS_PS_DELIM( cur[3] ) )
{
FT_TRACE6(( "encoding end\n" ));
cur += 3;
break;
}
}
if ( *cur == ']' )
{
FT_TRACE6(( "encoding end\n" ));
cur++;
break;
}
/* check whether we've found an entry */
if ( ft_isdigit( *cur ) || only_immediates )
{
FT_Int charcode;
if ( only_immediates )
charcode = n;
else
{
charcode = (FT_Int)T1_ToInt( parser );
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
}
cur = parser->root.cursor;
if ( cur + 2 < limit && *cur == '/' && n < count )
{
FT_PtrDist len;
cur++;
parser->root.cursor = cur;
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit )
return;
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
len = parser->root.cursor - cur;
parser->root.error = T1_Add_Table( char_table, charcode,
cur, len + 1 );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
char_table->elements[charcode][len] = '\0';
n++;
}
else if ( only_immediates )
{
/* Since the current position is not updated for */
/* immediates-only mode we would get an infinite loop if */
/* we don't do anything here. */
/* */
/* This encoding array is not valid according to the type1 */
/* specification (it might be an encoding for a CID type1 */
/* font, however), so we conclude that this font is NOT a */
/* type1 font. */
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Unknown_File_Format );
return;
}
}
else
{
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
}
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
}
face->type1.encoding_type = T1_ENCODING_TYPE_ARRAY;
parser->root.cursor = cur;
}
/* Otherwise, we should have either `StandardEncoding', */
/* `ExpertEncoding', or `ISOLatin1Encoding' */
else
{
if ( cur + 17 < limit &&
ft_strncmp( (const char*)cur, "StandardEncoding", 16 ) == 0 )
face->type1.encoding_type = T1_ENCODING_TYPE_STANDARD;
else if ( cur + 15 < limit &&
ft_strncmp( (const char*)cur, "ExpertEncoding", 14 ) == 0 )
face->type1.encoding_type = T1_ENCODING_TYPE_EXPERT;
else if ( cur + 18 < limit &&
ft_strncmp( (const char*)cur, "ISOLatin1Encoding", 17 ) == 0 )
face->type1.encoding_type = T1_ENCODING_TYPE_ISOLATIN1;
else
parser->root.error = FT_ERR( Ignore );
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MimeHandlerViewContainer::CreateMimeHandlerViewGuestIfNecessary() {
if (guest_created_ || !element_size_.has_value() || view_id_.empty())
return;
if (loader_) {
DCHECK(is_embedded_);
loader_.reset();
}
DCHECK_NE(element_instance_id(), guest_view::kInstanceIDNone);
if (!render_frame())
return;
render_frame()->Send(
new ExtensionsGuestViewHostMsg_CreateMimeHandlerViewGuest(
render_frame()->GetRoutingID(), view_id_, element_instance_id(),
*element_size_));
guest_created_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Skip Service workers in requests for mime handler plugins
BUG=808838
TEST=./browser_tests --gtest_filter=*/ServiceWorkerTest.MimeHandlerView*
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: I82e75c200091babbab648a04232db47e2938d914
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914150
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Istiaque Ahmed <lazyboy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#537386}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,457 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bit_or(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
VarBit *arg1 = PG_GETARG_VARBIT_P(0);
VarBit *arg2 = PG_GETARG_VARBIT_P(1);
VarBit *result;
int len,
bitlen1,
bitlen2,
i;
bits8 *p1,
*p2,
*r;
bits8 mask;
bitlen1 = VARBITLEN(arg1);
bitlen2 = VARBITLEN(arg2);
if (bitlen1 != bitlen2)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_STRING_DATA_LENGTH_MISMATCH),
errmsg("cannot OR bit strings of different sizes")));
len = VARSIZE(arg1);
result = (VarBit *) palloc(len);
SET_VARSIZE(result, len);
VARBITLEN(result) = bitlen1;
p1 = VARBITS(arg1);
p2 = VARBITS(arg2);
r = VARBITS(result);
for (i = 0; i < VARBITBYTES(arg1); i++)
*r++ = *p1++ | *p2++;
/* Pad the result */
mask = BITMASK << VARBITPAD(result);
if (mask)
{
r--;
*r &= mask;
}
PG_RETURN_VARBIT_P(result);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 39,070 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_func_state *state, /* func where register points to */
int off, int size, int value_regno, int insn_idx)
{
struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */
int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err;
enum bpf_reg_type type;
err = realloc_func_state(state, round_up(slot + 1, BPF_REG_SIZE),
true);
if (err)
return err;
/* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0,
* so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits
*/
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL &&
size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n");
return -EACCES;
}
cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe];
if (value_regno >= 0 &&
is_spillable_regtype((type = cur->regs[value_regno].type))) {
/* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */
if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n");
return -EACCES;
}
if (state != cur && type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
verbose(env, "cannot spill pointers to stack into stack frame of the caller\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* save register state */
state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = cur->regs[value_regno];
state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_MISC &&
!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
int *poff = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_off;
int soff = (-spi - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE;
/* detected reuse of integer stack slot with a pointer
* which means either llvm is reusing stack slot or
* an attacker is trying to exploit CVE-2018-3639
* (speculative store bypass)
* Have to sanitize that slot with preemptive
* store of zero.
*/
if (*poff && *poff != soff) {
/* disallow programs where single insn stores
* into two different stack slots, since verifier
* cannot sanitize them
*/
verbose(env,
"insn %d cannot access two stack slots fp%d and fp%d",
insn_idx, *poff, soff);
return -EINVAL;
}
*poff = soff;
}
state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_SPILL;
}
} else {
u8 type = STACK_MISC;
/* regular write of data into stack */
state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = (struct bpf_reg_state) {};
/* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written
* otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon
* when stack slots are partially written.
* This heuristic means that read propagation will be
* conservative, since it will add reg_live_read marks
* to stack slots all the way to first state when programs
* writes+reads less than 8 bytes
*/
if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE)
state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
/* when we zero initialize stack slots mark them as such */
if (value_regno >= 0 &&
register_is_null(&cur->regs[value_regno]))
type = STACK_ZERO;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] =
type;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 76,387 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sa_needs_refresh(sa_handle_t handle)
{
return (B_TRUE);
}
Commit Message: Move nfs.c:foreach_nfs_shareopt() to libshare.c:foreach_shareopt()
so that it can be (re)used in other parts of libshare.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 96,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
{
struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx->trees) {
ctx->trees = p;
return 0;
}
if (p)
p->next = ctx->trees;
else
ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
ctx->tree_count = 31;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1]. Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.
This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s). In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).
As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25
[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.
[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data. I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation). The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 51,173 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ospf6_decode_v3(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const struct ospf6hdr *op,
register const u_char *dataend)
{
register const rtrid_t *ap;
register const struct lsr6 *lsrp;
register const struct lsa6_hdr *lshp;
register const struct lsa6 *lsap;
register int i;
switch (op->ospf6_type) {
case OSPF_TYPE_HELLO: {
register const struct hello6 *hellop = (const struct hello6 *)((const uint8_t *)op + OSPF6HDR_LEN);
ND_TCHECK_32BITS(&hellop->hello_options);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tOptions [%s]",
bittok2str(ospf6_option_values, "none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&hellop->hello_options))));
ND_TCHECK(hellop->hello_deadint);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Hello Timer %us, Dead Timer %us, Interface-ID %s, Priority %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&hellop->hello_helloint),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&hellop->hello_deadint),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &hellop->hello_ifid),
hellop->hello_priority));
ND_TCHECK(hellop->hello_dr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&hellop->hello_dr) != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Designated Router %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &hellop->hello_dr)));
ND_TCHECK(hellop->hello_bdr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&hellop->hello_bdr) != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Backup Designated Router %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &hellop->hello_bdr)));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Neighbor List:"));
ap = hellop->hello_neighbor;
while ((const u_char *)ap < dataend) {
ND_TCHECK(*ap);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, ap)));
++ap;
}
}
break; /* HELLO */
}
case OSPF_TYPE_DD: {
register const struct dd6 *ddp = (const struct dd6 *)((const uint8_t *)op + OSPF6HDR_LEN);
ND_TCHECK(ddp->db_options);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tOptions [%s]",
bittok2str(ospf6_option_values, "none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ddp->db_options))));
ND_TCHECK(ddp->db_flags);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", DD Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(ospf6_dd_flag_values,"none",ddp->db_flags)));
ND_TCHECK(ddp->db_seq);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", MTU %u, DD-Sequence 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&ddp->db_mtu),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ddp->db_seq)));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
/* Print all the LS adv's */
lshp = ddp->db_lshdr;
while ((const u_char *)lshp < dataend) {
if (ospf6_print_lshdr(ndo, lshp++, dataend))
goto trunc;
}
}
break;
}
case OSPF_TYPE_LS_REQ:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
lsrp = (const struct lsr6 *)((const uint8_t *)op + OSPF6HDR_LEN);
while ((const u_char *)lsrp < dataend) {
ND_TCHECK(*lsrp);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Advertising Router %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &lsrp->ls_router)));
ospf6_print_ls_type(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(&lsrp->ls_type),
&lsrp->ls_stateid);
++lsrp;
}
}
break;
case OSPF_TYPE_LS_UPDATE:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
register const struct lsu6 *lsup = (const struct lsu6 *)((const uint8_t *)op + OSPF6HDR_LEN);
ND_TCHECK(lsup->lsu_count);
i = EXTRACT_32BITS(&lsup->lsu_count);
lsap = lsup->lsu_lsa;
while ((const u_char *)lsap < dataend && i--) {
if (ospf6_print_lsa(ndo, lsap, dataend))
goto trunc;
lsap = (const struct lsa6 *)((const u_char *)lsap +
EXTRACT_16BITS(&lsap->ls_hdr.ls_length));
}
}
break;
case OSPF_TYPE_LS_ACK:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
lshp = (const struct lsa6_hdr *)((const uint8_t *)op + OSPF6HDR_LEN);
while ((const u_char *)lshp < dataend) {
if (ospf6_print_lshdr(ndo, lshp++, dataend))
goto trunc;
}
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return (0);
trunc:
return (1);
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14880/OSPFv3: Fix a bounds check
Need to test bounds check for the last field of the structure lsa6_hdr.
No need to test other fields.
Include Security working under the Mozilla SOS program had independently
identified this vulnerability in 2018 by means of code audit.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 93,173 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BluetoothSocketGetSocketsFunction::BluetoothSocketGetSocketsFunction() {}
Commit Message: chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <tbarzic@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 154,050 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: shmem_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
loff_t pos, unsigned len, unsigned flags,
struct page **pagep, void **fsdata)
{
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
pgoff_t index = pos >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
return shmem_getpage(inode, index, pagep, SGP_WRITE, NULL);
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void acceptTcpHandler(aeEventLoop *el, int fd, void *privdata, int mask) {
int cport, cfd, max = MAX_ACCEPTS_PER_CALL;
char cip[NET_IP_STR_LEN];
UNUSED(el);
UNUSED(mask);
UNUSED(privdata);
while(max--) {
cfd = anetTcpAccept(server.neterr, fd, cip, sizeof(cip), &cport);
if (cfd == ANET_ERR) {
if (errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
serverLog(LL_WARNING,
"Accepting client connection: %s", server.neterr);
return;
}
serverLog(LL_VERBOSE,"Accepted %s:%d", cip, cport);
acceptCommonHandler(cfd,0,cip);
}
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 69,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int network_config_set_interface (const oconfig_item_t *ci, /* {{{ */
int *interface)
{
if ((ci->values_num != 1)
|| (ci->values[0].type != OCONFIG_TYPE_STRING))
{
WARNING ("network plugin: The `Interface' config option needs exactly "
"one string argument.");
return (-1);
}
if (interface == NULL)
return (-1);
*interface = if_nametoindex (ci->values[0].value.string);
return (0);
} /* }}} int network_config_set_interface */
Commit Message: network plugin: Fix heap overflow in parse_packet().
Emilien Gaspar has identified a heap overflow in parse_packet(), the
function used by the network plugin to parse incoming network packets.
This is a vulnerability in collectd, though the scope is not clear at
this point. At the very least specially crafted network packets can be
used to crash the daemon. We can't rule out a potential remote code
execution though.
Fixes: CVE-2016-6254
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 50,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DiskCacheBackendTest::BackendDoomBetween() {
InitCache();
disk_cache::Entry* entry;
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("first", &entry), IsOk());
entry->Close();
FlushQueueForTest();
AddDelay();
Time middle_start = Time::Now();
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("second", &entry), IsOk());
entry->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("third", &entry), IsOk());
entry->Close();
FlushQueueForTest();
AddDelay();
Time middle_end = Time::Now();
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("fourth", &entry), IsOk());
entry->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(OpenEntry("fourth", &entry), IsOk());
entry->Close();
FlushQueueForTest();
AddDelay();
Time final = Time::Now();
ASSERT_EQ(4, cache_->GetEntryCount());
EXPECT_THAT(DoomEntriesBetween(middle_start, middle_end), IsOk());
ASSERT_EQ(2, cache_->GetEntryCount());
ASSERT_THAT(OpenEntry("fourth", &entry), IsOk());
entry->Close();
EXPECT_THAT(DoomEntriesBetween(middle_start, final), IsOk());
ASSERT_EQ(1, cache_->GetEntryCount());
ASSERT_THAT(OpenEntry("first", &entry), IsOk());
entry->Close();
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,150 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: foreach_nfs_host_cb(const char *opt, const char *value, void *pcookie)
{
int rc;
const char *access;
char *host_dup, *host, *next;
nfs_host_cookie_t *udata = (nfs_host_cookie_t *)pcookie;
#ifdef DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "foreach_nfs_host_cb: key=%s, value=%s\n", opt, value);
#endif
if (strcmp(opt, "sec") == 0)
udata->security = value;
if (strcmp(opt, "rw") == 0 || strcmp(opt, "ro") == 0) {
if (value == NULL)
value = "*";
access = opt;
host_dup = strdup(value);
if (host_dup == NULL)
return (SA_NO_MEMORY);
host = host_dup;
do {
next = strchr(host, ':');
if (next != NULL) {
*next = '\0';
next++;
}
rc = udata->callback(udata->sharepath, host,
udata->security, access, udata->cookie);
if (rc != SA_OK) {
free(host_dup);
return (rc);
}
host = next;
} while (host != NULL);
free(host_dup);
}
return (SA_OK);
}
Commit Message: Move nfs.c:foreach_nfs_shareopt() to libshare.c:foreach_shareopt()
so that it can be (re)used in other parts of libshare.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 96,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hwsim_tx_info_frame_received_nl(struct sk_buff *skb_2,
struct genl_info *info)
{
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
struct mac80211_hwsim_data *data2;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *txi;
struct hwsim_tx_rate *tx_attempts;
u64 ret_skb_cookie;
struct sk_buff *skb, *tmp;
const u8 *src;
unsigned int hwsim_flags;
int i;
bool found = false;
if (!info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_ADDR_TRANSMITTER] ||
!info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_FLAGS] ||
!info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_COOKIE] ||
!info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_SIGNAL] ||
!info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_TX_INFO])
goto out;
src = (void *)nla_data(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_ADDR_TRANSMITTER]);
hwsim_flags = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_FLAGS]);
ret_skb_cookie = nla_get_u64(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_COOKIE]);
data2 = get_hwsim_data_ref_from_addr(src);
if (!data2)
goto out;
if (hwsim_net_get_netgroup(genl_info_net(info)) != data2->netgroup)
goto out;
if (info->snd_portid != data2->wmediumd)
goto out;
/* look for the skb matching the cookie passed back from user */
skb_queue_walk_safe(&data2->pending, skb, tmp) {
u64 skb_cookie;
txi = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
skb_cookie = (u64)(uintptr_t)txi->rate_driver_data[0];
if (skb_cookie == ret_skb_cookie) {
skb_unlink(skb, &data2->pending);
found = true;
break;
}
}
/* not found */
if (!found)
goto out;
/* Tx info received because the frame was broadcasted on user space,
so we get all the necessary info: tx attempts and skb control buff */
tx_attempts = (struct hwsim_tx_rate *)nla_data(
info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_TX_INFO]);
/* now send back TX status */
txi = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
ieee80211_tx_info_clear_status(txi);
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_TX_MAX_RATES; i++) {
txi->status.rates[i].idx = tx_attempts[i].idx;
txi->status.rates[i].count = tx_attempts[i].count;
}
txi->status.ack_signal = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_SIGNAL]);
if (!(hwsim_flags & HWSIM_TX_CTL_NO_ACK) &&
(hwsim_flags & HWSIM_TX_STAT_ACK)) {
if (skb->len >= 16) {
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
mac80211_hwsim_monitor_ack(data2->channel,
hdr->addr2);
}
txi->flags |= IEEE80211_TX_STAT_ACK;
}
ieee80211_tx_status_irqsafe(data2->hw, skb);
return 0;
out:
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 83,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void webkitWebViewBaseDragDataGet(GtkWidget* widget, GdkDragContext* context, GtkSelectionData* selectionData, guint info, guint time)
{
WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW_BASE(widget)->priv->dragAndDropHelper.handleGetDragData(context, selectionData, info);
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 108,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DebuggerAttachFunction::DebuggerAttachFunction() {
}
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 120,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fib6_age(struct rt6_info *rt, void *arg)
{
unsigned long now = jiffies;
/*
* check addrconf expiration here.
* Routes are expired even if they are in use.
*
* Also age clones. Note, that clones are aged out
* only if they are not in use now.
*/
if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES && rt->dst.expires) {
if (time_after(now, rt->dst.expires)) {
RT6_TRACE("expiring %p\n", rt);
return -1;
}
gc_args.more++;
} else if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_CACHE) {
if (atomic_read(&rt->dst.__refcnt) == 0 &&
time_after_eq(now, rt->dst.lastuse + gc_args.timeout)) {
RT6_TRACE("aging clone %p\n", rt);
return -1;
} else if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_GATEWAY) {
struct neighbour *neigh;
__u8 neigh_flags = 0;
neigh = dst_neigh_lookup(&rt->dst, &rt->rt6i_gateway);
if (neigh) {
neigh_flags = neigh->flags;
neigh_release(neigh);
}
if (!(neigh_flags & NTF_ROUTER)) {
RT6_TRACE("purging route %p via non-router but gateway\n",
rt);
return -1;
}
}
gc_args.more++;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: fib: fib6_add: fix potential NULL pointer dereference
When the kernel is compiled with CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES, and we return
with an error in fn = fib6_add_1(), then error codes are encoded into
the return pointer e.g. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT). In such an error case, we
write the error code into err and jump to out, hence enter the if(err)
condition. Now, if CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES is enabled, we check for:
if (pn != fn && pn->leaf == rt)
...
if (pn != fn && !pn->leaf && !(pn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO))
...
Since pn is NULL and fn is f.e. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT), then pn != fn
evaluates to true and causes a NULL-pointer dereference on further
checks on pn. Fix it, by setting both NULL in error case, so that
pn != fn already evaluates to false and no further dereference
takes place.
This was first correctly implemented in 4a287eba2 ("IPv6 routing,
NLM_F_* flag support: REPLACE and EXCL flags support, warn about
missing CREATE flag"), but the bug got later on introduced by
188c517a0 ("ipv6: return errno pointers consistently for fib6_add_1()").
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Lin Ming <mlin@ss.pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Matti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Matti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 28,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virDomainMigratePerform3Params(virDomainPtr domain,
const char *dconnuri,
virTypedParameterPtr params,
int nparams,
const char *cookiein,
int cookieinlen,
char **cookieout,
int *cookieoutlen,
unsigned int flags)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "dconnuri=%s, params=%p, nparams=%d, cookiein=%p, "
"cookieinlen=%d, cookieout=%p, cookieoutlen=%p, flags=%x",
NULLSTR(dconnuri), params, nparams, cookiein,
cookieinlen, cookieout, cookieoutlen, flags);
VIR_TYPED_PARAMS_DEBUG(params, nparams);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
conn = domain->conn;
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
if (conn->driver->domainMigratePerform3Params) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainMigratePerform3Params(
domain, dconnuri, params, nparams, cookiein, cookieinlen,
cookieout, cookieoutlen, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 93,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::use_input_buffer(
OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_INOUT OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE** bufferHdr,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 port,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 bytes,
OMX_IN OMX_U8* buffer)
{
(void) hComp;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned i = 0;
unsigned char *buf_addr = NULL;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("use_input_buffer: port = %u appData = %p bytes = %u buffer = %p",(unsigned int)port,appData,(unsigned int)bytes,buffer);
if (bytes != m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: use_input_buffer: Size Mismatch!! "
"bytes[%u] != Port.nBufferSize[%u]", (unsigned int)bytes, (unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (!m_inp_mem_ptr) {
input_use_buffer = true;
m_inp_mem_ptr = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE*) \
calloc( (sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE)), m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_inp_mem_ptr == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_inp_mem_ptr");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Successfully allocated m_inp_mem_ptr = %p", m_inp_mem_ptr);
m_pInput_pmem = (struct pmem *) calloc(sizeof (struct pmem), m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_pInput_pmem == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_pInput_pmem");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#ifdef USE_ION
m_pInput_ion = (struct venc_ion *) calloc(sizeof (struct venc_ion), m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_pInput_ion == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_pInput_ion");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#endif
for (i=0; i< m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = -1;
#ifdef USE_ION
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd =-1;
m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data.fd =-1;
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data.handle = 0;
#endif
}
}
for (i=0; i< m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++) {
if (BITMASK_ABSENT(&m_inp_bm_count,i)) {
break;
}
}
if (i < m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual) {
*bufferHdr = (m_inp_mem_ptr + i);
BITMASK_SET(&m_inp_bm_count,i);
(*bufferHdr)->pBuffer = (OMX_U8 *)buffer;
(*bufferHdr)->nSize = sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE);
(*bufferHdr)->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
(*bufferHdr)->nAllocLen = m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize;
(*bufferHdr)->pAppPrivate = appData;
(*bufferHdr)->nInputPortIndex = PORT_INDEX_IN;
if (!m_use_input_pmem) {
#ifdef USE_ION
#ifdef _MSM8974_
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd = alloc_map_ion_memory(m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize,
&m_pInput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data,
&m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data,0);
#else
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd = alloc_map_ion_memory(m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize,
&m_pInput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data,
&m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data,ION_FLAG_CACHED);
#endif
if (m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:ION device open() Failed");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data.fd;
#else
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = open (MEM_DEVICE,O_RDWR);
if (m_pInput_pmem[i].fd == 0) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = open (MEM_DEVICE,O_RDWR);
}
if (m_pInput_pmem[i] .fd < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: /dev/pmem_adsp open() Failed");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#endif
m_pInput_pmem[i].size = m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize;
m_pInput_pmem[i].offset = 0;
m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = (OMX_U8 *)SECURE_BUFPTR;
if(!secure_session) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = (unsigned char *)mmap(
NULL,m_pInput_pmem[i].size,PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED,m_pInput_pmem[i].fd,0);
if (m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer == MAP_FAILED) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: mmap() Failed");
close(m_pInput_pmem[i].fd);
#ifdef USE_ION
free_ion_memory(&m_pInput_ion[i]);
#endif
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
}
} else {
OMX_QCOM_PLATFORM_PRIVATE_PMEM_INFO *pParam = reinterpret_cast<OMX_QCOM_PLATFORM_PRIVATE_PMEM_INFO *>((*bufferHdr)->pAppPrivate);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Inside qcom_ext with luma:(fd:%lu,offset:0x%x)", pParam->pmem_fd, (unsigned)pParam->offset);
if (pParam) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = pParam->pmem_fd;
m_pInput_pmem[i].offset = pParam->offset;
m_pInput_pmem[i].size = m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize;
m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = (unsigned char *)buffer;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("DBG:: pParam->pmem_fd = %u, pParam->offset = %u",
(unsigned int)pParam->pmem_fd, (unsigned int)pParam->offset);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid AppData given for PMEM i/p UseBuffer case");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("use_inp:: bufhdr = %p, pBuffer = %p, m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = %p",
(*bufferHdr), (*bufferHdr)->pBuffer, m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer);
if ( dev_use_buf(&m_pInput_pmem[i],PORT_INDEX_IN,i) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: dev_use_buf() Failed for i/p buf");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: All buffers are already used, invalid use_buf call for "
"index = %u", i);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
return eRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 173,503 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: calc_load_n(unsigned long load, unsigned long exp,
unsigned long active, unsigned int n)
{
return calc_load(load, fixed_power_int(exp, FSHIFT, n), active);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,358 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __be32 *nfs4_decode_dirent(__be32 *p, struct nfs_entry *entry, int plus)
{
uint32_t bitmap[2] = {0};
uint32_t len;
if (!*p++) {
if (!*p)
return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
entry->eof = 1;
return ERR_PTR(-EBADCOOKIE);
}
entry->prev_cookie = entry->cookie;
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &entry->cookie);
entry->len = ntohl(*p++);
entry->name = (const char *) p;
p += XDR_QUADLEN(entry->len);
/*
* In case the server doesn't return an inode number,
* we fake one here. (We don't use inode number 0,
* since glibc seems to choke on it...)
*/
entry->ino = 1;
len = ntohl(*p++); /* bitmap length */
if (len-- > 0) {
bitmap[0] = ntohl(*p++);
if (len-- > 0) {
bitmap[1] = ntohl(*p++);
p += len;
}
}
len = XDR_QUADLEN(ntohl(*p++)); /* attribute buffer length */
if (len > 0) {
if (bitmap[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_RDATTR_ERROR) {
bitmap[0] &= ~FATTR4_WORD0_RDATTR_ERROR;
/* Ignore the return value of rdattr_error for now */
p++;
len--;
}
if (bitmap[0] == 0 && bitmap[1] == FATTR4_WORD1_MOUNTED_ON_FILEID)
xdr_decode_hyper(p, &entry->ino);
else if (bitmap[0] == FATTR4_WORD0_FILEID)
xdr_decode_hyper(p, &entry->ino);
p += len;
}
entry->eof = !p[0] && p[1];
return p;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,094 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) { visitor->Trace(first); }
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 153,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GraphicBuffer::dumpAllocationsToSystemLog()
{
GraphicBufferAllocator::dumpToSystemLog();
}
Commit Message: Fix for corruption when numFds or numInts is too large.
Bug: 18076253
Change-Id: I4c5935440013fc755e1d123049290383f4659fb6
(cherry picked from commit dfd06b89a4b77fc75eb85a3c1c700da3621c0118)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeExtensionsAPIClient::CreateDevicePermissionsPrompt(
content::WebContents* web_contents) const {
return base::MakeUnique<ChromeDevicePermissionsPrompt>(web_contents);
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 146,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int compat_rawv6_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
switch (level) {
case SOL_RAW:
break;
case SOL_ICMPV6:
if (inet_sk(sk)->inet_num != IPPROTO_ICMPV6)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return rawv6_geticmpfilter(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
case SOL_IPV6:
if (optname == IPV6_CHECKSUM)
break;
default:
return compat_ipv6_getsockopt(sk, level, optname,
optval, optlen);
}
return do_rawv6_getsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
}
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 40,180 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: efx_tsoh_heap_alloc(struct efx_tx_queue *tx_queue, size_t header_len)
{
struct efx_tso_header *tsoh;
tsoh = kmalloc(TSOH_SIZE(header_len), GFP_ATOMIC | GFP_DMA);
if (unlikely(!tsoh))
return NULL;
tsoh->dma_addr = pci_map_single(tx_queue->efx->pci_dev,
TSOH_BUFFER(tsoh), header_len,
PCI_DMA_TODEVICE);
if (unlikely(pci_dma_mapping_error(tx_queue->efx->pci_dev,
tsoh->dma_addr))) {
kfree(tsoh);
return NULL;
}
tsoh->unmap_len = header_len;
return tsoh;
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,496 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: param(const char* name)
{
/* The zero means return NULL on not found instead of EXCEPT */
return param_with_default_abort(name, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint32_t mptsas_reply_post_read(MPTSASState *s)
{
uint32_t ret;
if (!MPTSAS_FIFO_EMPTY(s, reply_post)) {
ret = MPTSAS_FIFO_GET(s, reply_post);
} else {
ret = -1;
s->intr_status &= ~MPI_HIS_REPLY_MESSAGE_INTERRUPT;
mptsas_update_interrupt(s);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 8,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void setJSTestObjConditionalAttr5Constructor(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
jsCast<JSTestObj*>(thisObject)->putDirect(exec->globalData(), Identifier(exec, "conditionalAttr5"), value);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,326 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
{
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
pitem *item = NULL;
int i = -1, is_complete;
unsigned char seq64be[8];
unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len;
if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
goto err;
/* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set)
* maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum.
*/
if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH < s->max_cert_list)
max_len = s->max_cert_list;
else
max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len)
goto err;
/* Try to find item in queue */
memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
if (item == NULL)
{
frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1);
if ( frag == NULL)
goto err;
memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len;
frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
}
else
frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
* retransmit and can be dropped.
frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
if (i<=0) goto err;
frag_len -= i;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 165,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const AtomicString& ImageCapture::InterfaceName() const {
return EventTargetNames::ImageCapture;
}
Commit Message: Convert MediaTrackConstraints to a ScriptValue
IDLDictionaries such as MediaTrackConstraints should not be stored on
the heap which would happen when binding one as a parameter to a
callback. This change converts the object to a ScriptValue ahead of
time. This is fine because the value will be passed to a
ScriptPromiseResolver that will converted it to a V8 value if it
isn't already.
Bug: 759457
Change-Id: I3009a0f7711cc264aeaae07a36c18a6db8c915c8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/701358
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507177}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 151,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CompositorImpl::SetRootWindow(gfx::NativeWindow root_window) {
DCHECK(root_window);
DCHECK(!root_window->GetLayer());
DCHECK(!display_);
DCHECK(!window_);
scoped_refptr<cc::Layer> root_layer;
if (root_window_) {
root_layer = root_window_->GetLayer();
DetachRootWindow();
}
root_window_ = root_window;
root_window_->SetLayer(root_layer ? root_layer : cc::Layer::Create());
root_window_->GetLayer()->SetBounds(size_);
if (!readback_layer_tree_) {
readback_layer_tree_ = cc::Layer::Create();
readback_layer_tree_->SetHideLayerAndSubtree(true);
}
root_window->GetLayer()->AddChild(readback_layer_tree_);
root_window->AttachCompositor(this);
if (!host_) {
CreateLayerTreeHost();
resource_manager_.Init(host_->GetUIResourceManager());
}
host_->SetRootLayer(root_window_->GetLayer());
host_->SetViewportSizeAndScale(size_, root_window_->GetDipScale(),
GenerateLocalSurfaceId());
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID: | 0 | 130,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ipv6_count_addresses(struct inet6_dev *idev)
{
int cnt = 0;
struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp;
read_lock_bh(&idev->lock);
list_for_each_entry(ifp, &idev->addr_list, if_list)
cnt++;
read_unlock_bh(&idev->lock);
return cnt;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
{
int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/*
* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
* suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
* must contain uncompressed.
*/
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
&& (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
&& (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
&& (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
&& ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
|| (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
/* we are using an ECC cipher */
size_t i;
unsigned char *list;
int found_uncompressed = 0;
list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
found_uncompressed = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found_uncompressed) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
return -1;
}
}
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
ret =
s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
&& s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
ret =
s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
s->
initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) {
/*
* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on
* using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a
* value from the server too.
*/
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
}
/*
* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to
* check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size.
*/
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len !=
s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
}
}
# endif
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
/*
* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
* callback
*/
if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
&& !(s->hit) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
int r;
/*
* Call callback with resp == NULL and resplen == -1 so callback
* knows there is no response
*/
r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
if (r == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
}
if (r < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
}
}
switch (ret) {
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return -1;
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
return 1;
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
s->servername_done = 0;
default:
return 1;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String InputType::DefaultLabel() const {
return String();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CairoImageOutputDev::drawImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref, Stream *str,
int width, int height, GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
int *maskColors, GBool inlineImg)
{
cairo_t *cr;
cairo_surface_t *surface;
double x1, y1, x2, y2;
double *ctm;
double mat[6];
CairoImage *image;
ctm = state->getCTM();
mat[0] = ctm[0];
mat[1] = ctm[1];
mat[2] = -ctm[2];
mat[3] = -ctm[3];
mat[4] = ctm[2] + ctm[4];
mat[5] = ctm[3] + ctm[5];
x1 = mat[4];
y1 = mat[5];
x2 = x1 + width;
y2 = y1 + height;
image = new CairoImage (x1, y1, x2, y2);
saveImage (image);
if (imgDrawCbk && imgDrawCbk (numImages - 1, imgDrawCbkData)) {
surface = cairo_image_surface_create (CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32, width, height);
cr = cairo_create (surface);
setCairo (cr);
cairo_translate (cr, 0, height);
cairo_scale (cr, width, -height);
CairoOutputDev::drawImage(state, ref, str, width, height, colorMap, maskColors, inlineImg);
image->setImage (surface);
setCairo (NULL);
cairo_surface_destroy (surface);
cairo_destroy (cr);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DrawingBuffer* WebGLRenderingContextBase::GetDrawingBuffer() const {
return drawing_buffer_.get();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: should_get_mime_list (NautilusFile *file)
{
return lacks_mime_list (file)
&& !file->details->loading_directory;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void llc_sap_remove_socket(struct llc_sap *sap, struct sock *sk)
{
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk);
spin_lock_bh(&sap->sk_lock);
sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu(sk);
hlist_del(&llc->dev_hash_node);
sap->sk_count--;
spin_unlock_bh(&sap->sk_lock);
llc_sap_put(sap);
}
Commit Message: net/llc: avoid BUG_ON() in skb_orphan()
It seems nobody used LLC since linux-3.12.
Fortunately fuzzers like syzkaller still know how to run this code,
otherwise it would be no fun.
Setting skb->sk without skb->destructor leads to all kinds of
bugs, we now prefer to be very strict about it.
Ideally here we would use skb_set_owner() but this helper does not exist yet,
only CAN seems to have a private helper for that.
Fixes: 376c7311bdb6 ("net: add a temporary sanity check in skb_orphan()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 68,210 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ext4_ext_map_blocks(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map, int flags)
{
struct ext4_ext_path *path = NULL;
struct ext4_extent newex, *ex, *ex2;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
ext4_fsblk_t newblock = 0;
int free_on_err = 0, err = 0, depth, ret;
unsigned int allocated = 0, offset = 0;
unsigned int allocated_clusters = 0;
struct ext4_allocation_request ar;
ext4_io_end_t *io = ext4_inode_aio(inode);
ext4_lblk_t cluster_offset;
int set_unwritten = 0;
bool map_from_cluster = false;
ext_debug("blocks %u/%u requested for inode %lu\n",
map->m_lblk, map->m_len, inode->i_ino);
trace_ext4_ext_map_blocks_enter(inode, map->m_lblk, map->m_len, flags);
/* find extent for this block */
path = ext4_find_extent(inode, map->m_lblk, NULL, 0);
if (IS_ERR(path)) {
err = PTR_ERR(path);
path = NULL;
goto out2;
}
depth = ext_depth(inode);
/*
* consistent leaf must not be empty;
* this situation is possible, though, _during_ tree modification;
* this is why assert can't be put in ext4_find_extent()
*/
if (unlikely(path[depth].p_ext == NULL && depth != 0)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "bad extent address "
"lblock: %lu, depth: %d pblock %lld",
(unsigned long) map->m_lblk, depth,
path[depth].p_block);
err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto out2;
}
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
if (ex) {
ext4_lblk_t ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ext4_fsblk_t ee_start = ext4_ext_pblock(ex);
unsigned short ee_len;
/*
* unwritten extents are treated as holes, except that
* we split out initialized portions during a write.
*/
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
trace_ext4_ext_show_extent(inode, ee_block, ee_start, ee_len);
/* if found extent covers block, simply return it */
if (in_range(map->m_lblk, ee_block, ee_len)) {
newblock = map->m_lblk - ee_block + ee_start;
/* number of remaining blocks in the extent */
allocated = ee_len - (map->m_lblk - ee_block);
ext_debug("%u fit into %u:%d -> %llu\n", map->m_lblk,
ee_block, ee_len, newblock);
/*
* If the extent is initialized check whether the
* caller wants to convert it to unwritten.
*/
if ((!ext4_ext_is_unwritten(ex)) &&
(flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT_UNWRITTEN)) {
allocated = convert_initialized_extent(
handle, inode, map, &path,
flags, allocated, newblock);
goto out2;
} else if (!ext4_ext_is_unwritten(ex))
goto out;
ret = ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents(
handle, inode, map, &path, flags,
allocated, newblock);
if (ret < 0)
err = ret;
else
allocated = ret;
goto out2;
}
}
/*
* requested block isn't allocated yet;
* we couldn't try to create block if create flag is zero
*/
if ((flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE) == 0) {
/*
* put just found gap into cache to speed up
* subsequent requests
*/
ext4_ext_put_gap_in_cache(inode, path, map->m_lblk);
goto out2;
}
/*
* Okay, we need to do block allocation.
*/
newex.ee_block = cpu_to_le32(map->m_lblk);
cluster_offset = EXT4_LBLK_COFF(sbi, map->m_lblk);
/*
* If we are doing bigalloc, check to see if the extent returned
* by ext4_find_extent() implies a cluster we can use.
*/
if (cluster_offset && ex &&
get_implied_cluster_alloc(inode->i_sb, map, ex, path)) {
ar.len = allocated = map->m_len;
newblock = map->m_pblk;
map_from_cluster = true;
goto got_allocated_blocks;
}
/* find neighbour allocated blocks */
ar.lleft = map->m_lblk;
err = ext4_ext_search_left(inode, path, &ar.lleft, &ar.pleft);
if (err)
goto out2;
ar.lright = map->m_lblk;
ex2 = NULL;
err = ext4_ext_search_right(inode, path, &ar.lright, &ar.pright, &ex2);
if (err)
goto out2;
/* Check if the extent after searching to the right implies a
* cluster we can use. */
if ((sbi->s_cluster_ratio > 1) && ex2 &&
get_implied_cluster_alloc(inode->i_sb, map, ex2, path)) {
ar.len = allocated = map->m_len;
newblock = map->m_pblk;
map_from_cluster = true;
goto got_allocated_blocks;
}
/*
* See if request is beyond maximum number of blocks we can have in
* a single extent. For an initialized extent this limit is
* EXT_INIT_MAX_LEN and for an unwritten extent this limit is
* EXT_UNWRITTEN_MAX_LEN.
*/
if (map->m_len > EXT_INIT_MAX_LEN &&
!(flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNWRIT_EXT))
map->m_len = EXT_INIT_MAX_LEN;
else if (map->m_len > EXT_UNWRITTEN_MAX_LEN &&
(flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNWRIT_EXT))
map->m_len = EXT_UNWRITTEN_MAX_LEN;
/* Check if we can really insert (m_lblk)::(m_lblk + m_len) extent */
newex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(map->m_len);
err = ext4_ext_check_overlap(sbi, inode, &newex, path);
if (err)
allocated = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(&newex);
else
allocated = map->m_len;
/* allocate new block */
ar.inode = inode;
ar.goal = ext4_ext_find_goal(inode, path, map->m_lblk);
ar.logical = map->m_lblk;
/*
* We calculate the offset from the beginning of the cluster
* for the logical block number, since when we allocate a
* physical cluster, the physical block should start at the
* same offset from the beginning of the cluster. This is
* needed so that future calls to get_implied_cluster_alloc()
* work correctly.
*/
offset = EXT4_LBLK_COFF(sbi, map->m_lblk);
ar.len = EXT4_NUM_B2C(sbi, offset+allocated);
ar.goal -= offset;
ar.logical -= offset;
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
ar.flags = EXT4_MB_HINT_DATA;
else
/* disable in-core preallocation for non-regular files */
ar.flags = 0;
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_NO_NORMALIZE)
ar.flags |= EXT4_MB_HINT_NOPREALLOC;
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE)
ar.flags |= EXT4_MB_DELALLOC_RESERVED;
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_METADATA_NOFAIL)
ar.flags |= EXT4_MB_USE_RESERVED;
newblock = ext4_mb_new_blocks(handle, &ar, &err);
if (!newblock)
goto out2;
ext_debug("allocate new block: goal %llu, found %llu/%u\n",
ar.goal, newblock, allocated);
free_on_err = 1;
allocated_clusters = ar.len;
ar.len = EXT4_C2B(sbi, ar.len) - offset;
if (ar.len > allocated)
ar.len = allocated;
got_allocated_blocks:
/* try to insert new extent into found leaf and return */
ext4_ext_store_pblock(&newex, newblock + offset);
newex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ar.len);
/* Mark unwritten */
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNWRIT_EXT){
ext4_ext_mark_unwritten(&newex);
map->m_flags |= EXT4_MAP_UNWRITTEN;
/*
* io_end structure was created for every IO write to an
* unwritten extent. To avoid unnecessary conversion,
* here we flag the IO that really needs the conversion.
* For non asycn direct IO case, flag the inode state
* that we need to perform conversion when IO is done.
*/
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO)
set_unwritten = 1;
}
err = 0;
if ((flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_KEEP_SIZE) == 0)
err = check_eofblocks_fl(handle, inode, map->m_lblk,
path, ar.len);
if (!err)
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, &path,
&newex, flags);
if (!err && set_unwritten) {
if (io)
ext4_set_io_unwritten_flag(inode, io);
else
ext4_set_inode_state(inode,
EXT4_STATE_DIO_UNWRITTEN);
}
if (err && free_on_err) {
int fb_flags = flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE ?
EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_NO_QUOT_UPDATE : 0;
/* free data blocks we just allocated */
/* not a good idea to call discard here directly,
* but otherwise we'd need to call it every free() */
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
ext4_free_blocks(handle, inode, NULL, newblock,
EXT4_C2B(sbi, allocated_clusters), fb_flags);
goto out2;
}
/* previous routine could use block we allocated */
newblock = ext4_ext_pblock(&newex);
allocated = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(&newex);
if (allocated > map->m_len)
allocated = map->m_len;
map->m_flags |= EXT4_MAP_NEW;
/*
* Update reserved blocks/metadata blocks after successful
* block allocation which had been deferred till now.
*/
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE) {
unsigned int reserved_clusters;
/*
* Check how many clusters we had reserved this allocated range
*/
reserved_clusters = get_reserved_cluster_alloc(inode,
map->m_lblk, allocated);
if (!map_from_cluster) {
BUG_ON(allocated_clusters < reserved_clusters);
if (reserved_clusters < allocated_clusters) {
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
int reservation = allocated_clusters -
reserved_clusters;
/*
* It seems we claimed few clusters outside of
* the range of this allocation. We should give
* it back to the reservation pool. This can
* happen in the following case:
*
* * Suppose s_cluster_ratio is 4 (i.e., each
* cluster has 4 blocks. Thus, the clusters
* are [0-3],[4-7],[8-11]...
* * First comes delayed allocation write for
* logical blocks 10 & 11. Since there were no
* previous delayed allocated blocks in the
* range [8-11], we would reserve 1 cluster
* for this write.
* * Next comes write for logical blocks 3 to 8.
* In this case, we will reserve 2 clusters
* (for [0-3] and [4-7]; and not for [8-11] as
* that range has a delayed allocated blocks.
* Thus total reserved clusters now becomes 3.
* * Now, during the delayed allocation writeout
* time, we will first write blocks [3-8] and
* allocate 3 clusters for writing these
* blocks. Also, we would claim all these
* three clusters above.
* * Now when we come here to writeout the
* blocks [10-11], we would expect to claim
* the reservation of 1 cluster we had made
* (and we would claim it since there are no
* more delayed allocated blocks in the range
* [8-11]. But our reserved cluster count had
* already gone to 0.
*
* Thus, at the step 4 above when we determine
* that there are still some unwritten delayed
* allocated blocks outside of our current
* block range, we should increment the
* reserved clusters count so that when the
* remaining blocks finally gets written, we
* could claim them.
*/
dquot_reserve_block(inode,
EXT4_C2B(sbi, reservation));
spin_lock(&ei->i_block_reservation_lock);
ei->i_reserved_data_blocks += reservation;
spin_unlock(&ei->i_block_reservation_lock);
}
/*
* We will claim quota for all newly allocated blocks.
* We're updating the reserved space *after* the
* correction above so we do not accidentally free
* all the metadata reservation because we might
* actually need it later on.
*/
ext4_da_update_reserve_space(inode, allocated_clusters,
1);
}
}
/*
* Cache the extent and update transaction to commit on fdatasync only
* when it is _not_ an unwritten extent.
*/
if ((flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNWRIT_EXT) == 0)
ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 1);
else
ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 0);
out:
if (allocated > map->m_len)
allocated = map->m_len;
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
map->m_flags |= EXT4_MAP_MAPPED;
map->m_pblk = newblock;
map->m_len = allocated;
out2:
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
kfree(path);
trace_ext4_ext_map_blocks_exit(inode, flags, map,
err ? err : allocated);
return err ? err : allocated;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 56,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::RequestAXTreeSnapshot(AXTreeSnapshotCallback callback,
ui::AXMode ax_mode) {
static int next_id = 1;
int callback_id = next_id++;
Send(new AccessibilityMsg_SnapshotTree(routing_id_, callback_id,
ax_mode.mode()));
ax_tree_snapshot_callbacks_.emplace(callback_id, std::move(callback));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,387 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mem_log_init(const char* prog_name, const char *banner)
{
size_t log_name_len;
char *log_name;
if (__test_bit(LOG_CONSOLE_BIT, &debug)) {
log_op = stderr;
return;
}
if (log_op)
fclose(log_op);
log_name_len = 5 + strlen(prog_name) + 5 + 7 + 4 + 1; /* "/tmp/" + prog_name + "_mem." + PID + ".log" + '\0" */
log_name = malloc(log_name_len);
if (!log_name) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to malloc log file name");
log_op = stderr;
return;
}
snprintf(log_name, log_name_len, "/tmp/%s_mem.%d.log", prog_name, getpid());
log_op = fopen(log_name, "a");
if (log_op == NULL) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to open %s for appending", log_name);
log_op = stderr;
}
else {
int fd = fileno(log_op);
/* We don't want any children to inherit the log file */
fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, fcntl(fd, F_GETFD) | FD_CLOEXEC);
/* Make the log output line buffered. This was to ensure that
* children didn't inherit the buffer, but the CLOEXEC above
* should resolve that. */
setlinebuf(log_op);
fprintf(log_op, "\n");
}
free(log_name);
terminate_banner = banner;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 1 | 168,995 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ShouldPropagateUserActivation(const url::Origin& previous_origin,
const url::Origin& new_origin) {
if ((previous_origin.scheme() != "http" &&
previous_origin.scheme() != "https") ||
(new_origin.scheme() != "http" && new_origin.scheme() != "https")) {
return false;
}
if (previous_origin.host() == new_origin.host())
return true;
std::string previous_domain =
net::registry_controlled_domains::GetDomainAndRegistry(
previous_origin.host(),
net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES);
std::string new_domain =
net::registry_controlled_domains::GetDomainAndRegistry(
new_origin.host(),
net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES);
return !previous_domain.empty() && previous_domain == new_domain;
}
Commit Message: Use an opaque URL rather than an empty URL for request's site for cookies.
Apparently this makes a big difference to the cookie settings backend.
Bug: 881715
Change-Id: Id87fa0c6a858bae6a3f8fff4d6af3f974b00d5e4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1212846
Commit-Queue: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#589512}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 132,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err gnrm_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FileReaderLoader::FileReaderLoader(ReadType readType, FileReaderLoaderClient* client)
: m_readType(readType)
, m_client(client)
, m_isRawDataConverted(false)
, m_stringResult("")
, m_variableLength(false)
, m_bytesLoaded(0)
, m_totalBytes(0)
, m_hasRange(false)
, m_rangeStart(0)
, m_rangeEnd(0)
, m_errorCode(0)
{
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,485 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int is_idle_stream_id(h2o_http2_conn_t *conn, uint32_t stream_id)
{
return (h2o_http2_stream_is_push(stream_id) ? conn->push_stream_ids.max_open : conn->pull_stream_ids.max_open) < stream_id;
}
Commit Message: h2: use after free on premature connection close #920
lib/http2/connection.c:on_read() calls parse_input(), which might free
`conn`. It does so in particular if the connection preface isn't
the expected one in expect_preface(). `conn` is then used after the free
in `if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)`.
We fix this by adding a return value to close_connection that returns a
negative value if `conn` has been free'd and can't be used anymore.
Credits for finding the bug to Tim Newsham.
CWE ID: | 0 | 52,572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_text_distance(gs_point *pdist, double dx, double dy, const gs_matrix *pmat)
{
int code = gs_distance_transform_inverse(dx, dy, pmat, pdist);
double rounded;
if (code == gs_error_undefinedresult) {
/* The CTM is degenerate.
Can't know the distance in user space.
} else if (code < 0)
return code;
/* If the distance is very close to integers, round it. */
if (fabs(pdist->x - (rounded = floor(pdist->x + 0.5))) < 0.0005)
pdist->x = rounded;
if (fabs(pdist->y - (rounded = floor(pdist->y + 0.5))) < 0.0005)
pdist->y = rounded;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 164,898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static jpc_mstabent_t *jpc_mstab_lookup(int id)
{
jpc_mstabent_t *mstabent;
for (mstabent = jpc_mstab;; ++mstabent) {
if (mstabent->id == id || mstabent->id < 0) {
return mstabent;
}
}
assert(0);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(struct kvm *kvm, enum kvm_bus bus_idx,
struct kvm_io_device *dev)
{
int i, r;
struct kvm_io_bus *new_bus, *bus;
bus = kvm->buses[bus_idx];
r = -ENOENT;
for (i = 0; i < bus->dev_count; i++)
if (bus->range[i].dev == dev) {
r = 0;
break;
}
if (r)
return r;
new_bus = kzalloc(sizeof(*bus) + ((bus->dev_count - 1) *
sizeof(struct kvm_io_range)), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_bus)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(new_bus, bus, sizeof(*bus) + i * sizeof(struct kvm_io_range));
new_bus->dev_count--;
memcpy(new_bus->range + i, bus->range + i + 1,
(new_bus->dev_count - i) * sizeof(struct kvm_io_range));
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->buses[bus_idx], new_bus);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
kfree(bus);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: perform an invalid memslot step for gpa base change
PPC must flush all translations before the new memory slot
is visible.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,083 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RegisterContentSchemes(const char** additional_savable_schemes) {
url_util::AddStandardScheme(chrome::kChromeDevToolsScheme);
url_util::AddStandardScheme(chrome::kChromeUIScheme);
url_util::AddStandardScheme(chrome::kMetadataScheme);
url_util::LockStandardSchemes();
if (additional_savable_schemes) {
int schemes = 0;
while (additional_savable_schemes[++schemes]);
g_savable_schemes = new char*[schemes + arraysize(kDefaultSavableSchemes)];
memcpy(g_savable_schemes,
kDefaultSavableSchemes,
arraysize(kDefaultSavableSchemes) * sizeof(char*));
for (int i = 0; i < schemes; ++i) {
g_savable_schemes[arraysize(kDefaultSavableSchemes) + i - 1] =
base::strdup(additional_savable_schemes[i]);
}
g_savable_schemes[arraysize(kDefaultSavableSchemes) + schemes - 1] = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BackFramebuffer::AttachRenderBuffer(GLenum target,
BackRenderbuffer* render_buffer) {
DCHECK_NE(id_, 0u);
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(
"BackFramebuffer::AttachRenderBuffer", decoder_->GetErrorState());
ScopedFrameBufferBinder binder(decoder_, id_);
GLuint attach_id = render_buffer ? render_buffer->id() : 0;
glFramebufferRenderbufferEXT(GL_FRAMEBUFFER,
target,
GL_RENDERBUFFER,
attach_id);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void spl_filesystem_info_set_filename(spl_filesystem_object *intern, char *path, int len, int use_copy TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char *p1, *p2;
if (intern->file_name) {
efree(intern->file_name);
}
intern->file_name = use_copy ? estrndup(path, len) : path;
intern->file_name_len = len;
while(IS_SLASH_AT(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len-1) && intern->file_name_len > 1) {
intern->file_name[intern->file_name_len-1] = 0;
intern->file_name_len--;
}
p1 = strrchr(intern->file_name, '/');
#if defined(PHP_WIN32) || defined(NETWARE)
p2 = strrchr(intern->file_name, '\\');
#else
p2 = 0;
#endif
if (p1 || p2) {
intern->_path_len = (p1 > p2 ? p1 : p2) - intern->file_name;
} else {
intern->_path_len = 0;
}
if (intern->_path) {
efree(intern->_path);
}
intern->_path = estrndup(path, intern->_path_len);
} /* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 167,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPagePrivate::notifyTransformedScrollChanged()
{
const IntPoint pos = transformedScrollPosition();
m_backingStore->d->scrollChanged(pos);
m_client->scrollChanged();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: first_transform(int transforms)
{
return transforms & -transforms; /* lowest set bit */
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool vhost_work_seq_done(struct vhost_dev *dev, struct vhost_work *work,
unsigned seq)
{
int left;
spin_lock_irq(&dev->work_lock);
left = seq - work->done_seq;
spin_unlock_irq(&dev->work_lock);
return left <= 0;
}
Commit Message: vhost: fix length for cross region descriptor
If a single descriptor crosses a region, the
second chunk length should be decremented
by size translated so far, instead it includes
the full descriptor length.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int yr_object_has_undefined_value(
YR_OBJECT* object,
const char* field,
...)
{
YR_OBJECT* field_obj;
va_list args;
va_start(args, field);
if (field != NULL)
field_obj = _yr_object_lookup(object, 0, field, args);
else
field_obj = object;
va_end(args);
if (field_obj == NULL)
return TRUE;
switch(field_obj->type)
{
case OBJECT_TYPE_FLOAT:
return isnan(field_obj->value.d);
case OBJECT_TYPE_STRING:
return field_obj->value.ss == NULL;
case OBJECT_TYPE_INTEGER:
return field_obj->value.i == UNDEFINED;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Fix heap overflow (reported by Jurriaan Bremer)
When setting a new array item with yr_object_array_set_item() the array size is doubled if the index for the new item is larger than the already allocated ones. No further checks were made to ensure that the index fits into the array after doubling its capacity. If the array capacity was for example 64, and a new object is assigned to an index larger than 128 the overflow occurs. As yr_object_array_set_item() is usually invoked with indexes that increase monotonically by one, this bug never triggered before. But the new "dotnet" module has the potential to allow the exploitation of this bug by scanning a specially crafted .NET binary.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 63,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int snd_disconnect_poll(struct file * file, poll_table * wait)
{
return POLLERR | POLLNVAL;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 36,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int virtnet_vlan_rx_kill_vid(struct net_device *dev,
__be16 proto, u16 vid)
{
struct virtnet_info *vi = netdev_priv(dev);
struct scatterlist sg;
sg_init_one(&sg, &vid, sizeof(vid));
if (!virtnet_send_command(vi, VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_VLAN,
VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_VLAN_DEL, &sg))
dev_warn(&dev->dev, "Failed to kill VLAN ID %d.\n", vid);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: virtio-net: drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST
virtio declares support for NETIF_F_FRAGLIST, but assumes
that there are at most MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2 fragments which isn't
always true with a fraglist.
A longer fraglist in the skb will make the call to skb_to_sgvec overflow
the sg array, leading to memory corruption.
Drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST so we only get what we can handle.
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,018 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SSLCertErrorHandler::OnDispatched() {
manager_->policy()->OnCertError(this);
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fm10k_set_num_queues(struct fm10k_intfc *interface)
{
/* Attempt to setup QoS and RSS first */
if (fm10k_set_qos_queues(interface))
return;
/* If we don't have QoS, just fallback to only RSS. */
fm10k_set_rss_queues(interface);
}
Commit Message: fm10k: Fix a potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 4378 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.0.0+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x95b/0x3200 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3573
Code: 00 0f 85 28 1e 00 00 48 81 c4 08 01 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 4c 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 24 00 00 49 81 7d 00 e0 de 03 a6 41 bc 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e3c07a40 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000080
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8881e3c07d98 R11: ffff8881c7f21f80 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007fce2252e700(0000) GS:ffff8881f2400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fffc7eb0228 CR3: 00000001e5bea002 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
lock_acquire+0xff/0x2c0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4211
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xdf/0x1050 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1072
drain_workqueue+0x24/0x3f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2934
destroy_workqueue+0x23/0x630 kernel/workqueue.c:4319
__do_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:1018 [inline]
__se_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:961 [inline]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x30c/0x480 kernel/module.c:961
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fce2252dc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fce2252e6bc
R13: 00000000004bcca9 R14: 00000000006f6b48 R15: 00000000ffffffff
If alloc_workqueue fails, it should return -ENOMEM, otherwise may
trigger this NULL pointer dereference while unloading drivers.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 0a38c17a21a0 ("fm10k: Remove create_workqueue")
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 87,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<RenderFrameHostImpl> RenderFrameHostManager::SetRenderFrameHost(
std::unique_ptr<RenderFrameHostImpl> render_frame_host) {
std::unique_ptr<RenderFrameHostImpl> old_render_frame_host =
std::move(render_frame_host_);
render_frame_host_ = std::move(render_frame_host);
if (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
if (render_frame_host_) {
render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance()->
IncrementRelatedActiveContentsCount();
}
if (old_render_frame_host) {
old_render_frame_host->GetSiteInstance()->
DecrementRelatedActiveContentsCount();
}
}
return old_render_frame_host;
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,235 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string observed_proxy_server_uri() const {
return observed_proxy_server_uri_;
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: blink::WebGraphicsContext3D::Attributes GetOffscreenAttribs() {
blink::WebGraphicsContext3D::Attributes attributes;
attributes.shareResources = true;
attributes.depth = false;
attributes.stencil = false;
attributes.antialias = false;
attributes.noAutomaticFlushes = true;
return attributes;
}
Commit Message: Disable forwarding tasks to the Blink scheduler
Disable forwarding tasks to the Blink scheduler to avoid some
regressions which it has introduced.
BUG=391005,415758,415478,412714,416362,416827,417608
TBR=jamesr@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/609483002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#296916}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int js_pcall(js_State *J, int n)
{
int savetop = TOP - n - 2;
if (js_try(J)) {
/* clean up the stack to only hold the error object */
STACK[savetop] = STACK[TOP-1];
TOP = savetop + 1;
return 1;
}
js_call(J, n);
js_endtry(J);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pp::VarDictionary TraverseBookmarks(FPDF_DOCUMENT doc,
FPDF_BOOKMARK bookmark,
unsigned int depth) {
pp::VarDictionary dict;
base::string16 title;
unsigned long buffer_size = FPDFBookmark_GetTitle(bookmark, nullptr, 0);
if (buffer_size > 0) {
PDFiumAPIStringBufferSizeInBytesAdapter<base::string16> api_string_adapter(
&title, buffer_size, true);
api_string_adapter.Close(FPDFBookmark_GetTitle(
bookmark, api_string_adapter.GetData(), buffer_size));
}
dict.Set(pp::Var("title"), pp::Var(base::UTF16ToUTF8(title)));
FPDF_DEST dest = FPDFBookmark_GetDest(doc, bookmark);
if (dest) {
int page_index = FPDFDest_GetPageIndex(doc, dest);
dict.Set(pp::Var("page"), pp::Var(page_index));
} else {
FPDF_ACTION action = FPDFBookmark_GetAction(bookmark);
buffer_size = FPDFAction_GetURIPath(doc, action, nullptr, 0);
if (buffer_size > 0) {
std::string uri;
PDFiumAPIStringBufferAdapter<std::string>
api_string_adapter(&uri, buffer_size, true);
api_string_adapter.Close(FPDFAction_GetURIPath(
doc, action, api_string_adapter.GetData(), buffer_size));
dict.Set(pp::Var("uri"), pp::Var(uri));
}
}
pp::VarArray children;
const unsigned int kMaxDepth = 128;
if (depth < kMaxDepth) {
int child_index = 0;
std::set<FPDF_BOOKMARK> seen_bookmarks;
for (FPDF_BOOKMARK child_bookmark =
FPDFBookmark_GetFirstChild(doc, bookmark);
child_bookmark;
child_bookmark = FPDFBookmark_GetNextSibling(doc, child_bookmark)) {
if (base::ContainsKey(seen_bookmarks, child_bookmark))
break;
seen_bookmarks.insert(child_bookmark);
children.Set(child_index,
TraverseBookmarks(doc, child_bookmark, depth + 1));
child_index++;
}
}
dict.Set(pp::Var("children"), children);
return dict;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct user_namespace *mntns_owner(struct ns_common *ns)
{
return to_mnt_ns(ns)->user_ns;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 50,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::PasteAndMatchStyle() {
RenderFrameHost* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->GetFrameInputHandler()->PasteAndMatchStyle();
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("PasteAndMatchStyle"));
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingGetterPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallbackForMainWorld(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_activityLoggingGetterPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::ActivityLoggingGetterPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterForMainWorld(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,510 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct kiocb *aio_get_req(struct kioctx *ctx)
{
struct kiocb *req;
if (!get_reqs_available(ctx))
return NULL;
req = kmem_cache_alloc(kiocb_cachep, GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO);
if (unlikely(!req))
goto out_put;
percpu_ref_get(&ctx->reqs);
req->ki_ctx = ctx;
return req;
out_put:
put_reqs_available(ctx, 1);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: aio: fix kernel memory disclosure in io_getevents() introduced in v3.10
A kernel memory disclosure was introduced in aio_read_events_ring() in v3.10
by commit a31ad380bed817aa25f8830ad23e1a0480fef797. The changes made to
aio_read_events_ring() failed to correctly limit the index into
ctx->ring_pages[], allowing an attacked to cause the subsequent kmap() of
an arbitrary page with a copy_to_user() to copy the contents into userspace.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2014-0206. Thanks to Mateusz and
Petr for disclosing this issue.
This patch applies to v3.12+. A separate backport is needed for 3.10/3.11.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kmo@daterainc.com>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: | 0 | 39,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::wstring GetClientStateMediumKeyPathForBinaries() {
return GetBinariesClientStateMediumKeyPath();
}
Commit Message: Ignore switches following "--" when parsing a command line.
BUG=933004
R=wfh@chromium.org
Change-Id: I911be4cbfc38a4d41dec85d85f7fe0f50ddca392
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481210
Auto-Submit: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634604}
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 152,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport void *ResizeMagickMemory(void *memory,const size_t size)
{
register void
*block;
if (memory == (void *) NULL)
return(AcquireMagickMemory(size));
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_ZERO_CONFIGURATION_SUPPORT)
block=memory_methods.resize_memory_handler(memory,size == 0 ? 1UL : size);
if (block == (void *) NULL)
memory=RelinquishMagickMemory(memory);
#else
LockSemaphoreInfo(memory_semaphore);
block=ResizeBlock(memory,size == 0 ? 1UL : size);
if (block == (void *) NULL)
{
if (ExpandHeap(size == 0 ? 1UL : size) == MagickFalse)
{
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(memory_semaphore);
memory=RelinquishMagickMemory(memory);
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
block=ResizeBlock(memory,size == 0 ? 1UL : size);
assert(block != (void *) NULL);
}
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(memory_semaphore);
memory=RelinquishMagickMemory(memory);
#endif
return(block);
}
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,441 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CompleteProxyLookup(const GURL& url,
const base::Optional<net::ProxyInfo>& result) {
if (IsHangingHost(url))
return;
auto it = proxy_lookup_clients_.find(url);
if (it == proxy_lookup_clients_.end()) {
ADD_FAILURE() << url.spec() << " wasn't found";
return;
}
it->second->OnProxyLookupComplete(net::ERR_FAILED, result);
proxy_lookup_clients_.erase(it);
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 136,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sort_regions (struct rsvd_region *rsvd_region, int max)
{
int j;
/* simple bubble sorting */
while (max--) {
for (j = 0; j < max; ++j) {
if (rsvd_region[j].start > rsvd_region[j+1].start) {
struct rsvd_region tmp;
tmp = rsvd_region[j];
rsvd_region[j] = rsvd_region[j + 1];
rsvd_region[j + 1] = tmp;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: [IA64] Workaround for RSE issue
Problem: An application violating the architectural rules regarding
operation dependencies and having specific Register Stack Engine (RSE)
state at the time of the violation, may result in an illegal operation
fault and invalid RSE state. Such faults may initiate a cascade of
repeated illegal operation faults within OS interruption handlers.
The specific behavior is OS dependent.
Implication: An application causing an illegal operation fault with
specific RSE state may result in a series of illegal operation faults
and an eventual OS stack overflow condition.
Workaround: OS interruption handlers that switch to kernel backing
store implement a check for invalid RSE state to avoid the series
of illegal operation faults.
The core of the workaround is the RSE_WORKAROUND code sequence
inserted into each invocation of the SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER and
SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER_R19 macros. This sequence includes hard-coded
constants that depend on the number of stacked physical registers
being 96. The rest of this patch consists of code to disable this
workaround should this not be the case (with the presumption that
if a future Itanium processor increases the number of registers, it
would also remove the need for this patch).
Move the start of the RBS up to a mod32 boundary to avoid some
corner cases.
The dispatch_illegal_op_fault code outgrew the spot it was
squatting in when built with this patch and CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING=y
Move it out to the end of the ivt.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 74,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static USHORT DetermineQueueNumber(PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext)
{
if (!pContext->bUsingMSIX)
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] No MSIX, using 1 queue\n", __FUNCTION__));
return 1;
}
if (pContext->bMultiQueue)
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] Number of hardware queues = %d\n", __FUNCTION__, pContext->nHardwareQueues));
}
else
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] - CTRL_MQ not acked, # bindles set to 1\n", __FUNCTION__));
return 1;
}
ULONG lnProcessors;
#if NDIS_SUPPORT_NDIS620
lnProcessors = NdisGroupActiveProcessorCount(ALL_PROCESSOR_GROUPS);
#elif NDIS_SUPPORT_NDIS6
lnProcessors = NdisSystemProcessorCount();
#else
lnProcessors = 1;
#endif
ULONG lnMSIs = (pContext->pMSIXInfoTable->MessageCount - 1) / 2; /* RX/TX pairs + control queue*/
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] %lu CPUs reported\n", __FUNCTION__, lnProcessors));
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] %lu MSIs, %lu queues\n", __FUNCTION__, pContext->pMSIXInfoTable->MessageCount, lnMSIs));
USHORT nMSIs = USHORT(lnMSIs & 0xFFFF);
USHORT nProcessors = USHORT(lnProcessors & 0xFFFF);
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] %u CPUs reported\n", __FUNCTION__, nProcessors));
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] %lu MSIs, %u queues\n", __FUNCTION__, pContext->pMSIXInfoTable->MessageCount, nMSIs));
USHORT nBundles = (pContext->nHardwareQueues < nProcessors) ? pContext->nHardwareQueues : nProcessors;
nBundles = (nMSIs < nBundles) ? nMSIs : nBundles;
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] # of path bundles = %u\n", __FUNCTION__, nBundles));
return nBundles;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<Text> Document::createTextNode(const String& data)
{
return Text::create(this, data);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::uniform1fv(const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
const FlexibleFloat32ArrayView& v) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateUniformParameters<WTF::Float32Array>(
"uniform1fv", location, v, 1, 0, v.length()))
return;
ContextGL()->Uniform1fv(location->Location(), v.length(),
v.DataMaybeOnStack());
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,880 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init ipc_init_proc_interface(const char *path, const char *header,
int ids, int (*show)(struct seq_file *, void *))
{
struct proc_dir_entry *pde;
struct ipc_proc_iface *iface;
iface = kmalloc(sizeof(*iface), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!iface)
return;
iface->path = path;
iface->header = header;
iface->ids = ids;
iface->show = show;
pde = proc_create_data(path,
S_IRUGO, /* world readable */
NULL, /* parent dir */
&sysvipc_proc_fops,
iface);
if (!pde)
kfree(iface);
}
Commit Message: Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid()
As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before
having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC
object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work,
that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen.
We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329:
"ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we
clearly forgot about msg and shm.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 42,037 |
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