instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gs_pop_integer(gs_main_instance * minst, long *result)
{
i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p;
ref vref;
int code = pop_value(i_ctx_p, &vref);
if (code < 0)
return code;
check_type_only(vref, t_integer);
*result = vref.value.intval;
ref_stack_pop(&o_stack, 1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 2,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IDNSpoofChecker::SetAllowedUnicodeSet(UErrorCode* status) {
if (U_FAILURE(*status))
return;
const icu::UnicodeSet* recommended_set =
uspoof_getRecommendedUnicodeSet(status);
icu::UnicodeSet allowed_set;
allowed_set.addAll(*recommended_set);
const icu::UnicodeSet* inclusion_set = uspoof_getInclusionUnicodeSet(status);
allowed_set.addAll(*inclusion_set);
allowed_set.remove(0x338u);
allowed_set.remove(0x58au); // Armenian Hyphen
allowed_set.remove(0x2010u);
allowed_set.remove(0x2019u); // Right Single Quotation Mark
allowed_set.remove(0x2027u);
allowed_set.remove(0x30a0u); // Katakana-Hiragana Double Hyphen
allowed_set.remove(0x2bbu); // Modifier Letter Turned Comma
allowed_set.remove(0x2bcu); // Modifier Letter Apostrophe
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
allowed_set.remove(0x0620u);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Cu);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Du);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Eu);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Fu);
#endif
allowed_set.remove(0x01CDu, 0x01DCu); // Latin Ext B; Pinyin
allowed_set.remove(0x1C80u, 0x1C8Fu); // Cyrillic Extended-C
allowed_set.remove(0x1E00u, 0x1E9Bu); // Latin Extended Additional
allowed_set.remove(0x1F00u, 0x1FFFu); // Greek Extended
allowed_set.remove(0xA640u, 0xA69Fu); // Cyrillic Extended-B
allowed_set.remove(0xA720u, 0xA7FFu); // Latin Extended-D
uspoof_setAllowedUnicodeSet(checker_, &allowed_set, status);
}
Commit Message: Block modifier-letter-voicing character from domain names
This character (ˬ) is easy to miss between other characters. It's one of the three characters from Spacing-Modifier-Letters block that ICU lists in its recommended set in uspoof.cpp. Two of these characters (modifier-letter-turned-comma and modifier-letter-apostrophe) are already blocked in crbug/678812.
Bug: 896717
Change-Id: I24b2b591de8cc7822cd55aa005b15676be91175e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303037
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604128}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,638 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePNGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
(void) image;
printf("Your PNG library is too old: You have libpng-%s\n",
PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING);
ThrowBinaryException(CoderError,"PNG library is too old",
image_info->filename);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/58
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 63,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Ins_MD( INS_ARG )
{
Long K, L;
TT_F26Dot6 D;
K = args[1];
L = args[0];
if( BOUNDS( args[0], CUR.zp2.n_points ) ||
BOUNDS( args[1], CUR.zp1.n_points ) )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
if ( CUR.opcode & 1 )
D = CUR_Func_project( CUR.zp2.cur_x[L] - CUR.zp1.cur_x[K],
CUR.zp2.cur_y[L] - CUR.zp1.cur_y[K] );
else
D = CUR_Func_dualproj( CUR.zp2.org_x[L] - CUR.zp1.org_x[K],
CUR.zp2.org_y[L] - CUR.zp1.org_y[K] );
args[0] = D;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,406 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InFlightBackendIO::DoomEntryImpl(EntryImpl* entry) {
scoped_refptr<BackendIO> operation(
new BackendIO(this, backend_, net::CompletionCallback()));
operation->DoomEntryImpl(entry);
PostOperation(FROM_HERE, operation.get());
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int au1100fb_fb_pan_display(struct fb_var_screeninfo *var, struct fb_info *fbi)
{
struct au1100fb_device *fbdev;
int dy;
fbdev = to_au1100fb_device(fbi);
print_dbg("fb_pan_display %p %p", var, fbi);
if (!var || !fbdev) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (var->xoffset - fbi->var.xoffset) {
/* No support for X panning for now! */
return -EINVAL;
}
print_dbg("fb_pan_display 2 %p %p", var, fbi);
dy = var->yoffset - fbi->var.yoffset;
if (dy) {
u32 dmaaddr;
print_dbg("Panning screen of %d lines", dy);
dmaaddr = fbdev->regs->lcd_dmaaddr0;
dmaaddr += (fbi->fix.line_length * dy);
/* TODO: Wait for current frame to finished */
fbdev->regs->lcd_dmaaddr0 = LCD_DMA_SA_N(dmaaddr);
if (panel_is_dual(fbdev->panel)) {
dmaaddr = fbdev->regs->lcd_dmaaddr1;
dmaaddr += (fbi->fix.line_length * dy);
fbdev->regs->lcd_dmaaddr0 = LCD_DMA_SA_N(dmaaddr);
}
}
print_dbg("fb_pan_display 3 %p %p", var, fbi);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,329 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int validation_checkfp(int count, int argc, char **argv)
{
int result;
checkfp_command command;
checkfp_control control;
command.number[0] = 0;
command.limit = 3;
command.verbose = verbose;
command.ctimes = 0;
command.cmillions = 0;
command.cinvalid = 0;
command.cnoaccept = 0;
while (--argc > 0)
{
++argv;
if (argc > 1 && strcmp(*argv, "-l") == 0)
{
--argc;
command.limit = atoi(*++argv);
}
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "unknown argument %s\n", *argv);
return 1;
}
}
control.cnumber = 0;
control.check_state = start;
control.at_start = 1;
control.cdigits_in_state = 0;
control.limit = command.limit;
control.state = 0;
control.is_negative = 0;
control.is_zero = 1;
control.number_was_valid = 0;
result = check_all_characters(&command, control);
printf("checkfp: %s: checked %d,%.3d,%.3d,%.3d strings (%d invalid)\n",
result ? "pass" : "FAIL", command.cmillions / 1000,
command.cmillions % 1000, command.ctimes / 1000, command.ctimes % 1000,
command.cinvalid);
return result;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DiskCacheBackendTest::BackendInvalidEntry11(bool eviction) {
const int kSize = 0x3000; // 12 kB.
SetMaxSize(kSize * 10);
SetNewEviction();
InitCache();
std::string first("some key");
std::string second("something else");
disk_cache::Entry* entry;
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry(first, &entry), IsOk());
entry->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(OpenEntry(first, &entry), IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0, WriteData(entry, 0, 200, NULL, 0, false));
entry->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry(second, &entry), IsOk());
entry->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(OpenEntry(second, &entry), IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0, WriteData(entry, 0, 200, NULL, 0, false));
disk_cache::EntryImpl* entry_impl =
static_cast<disk_cache::EntryImpl*>(entry);
entry_impl->entry()->Data()->state = 0xbad;
entry_impl->entry()->Store();
entry->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("third", &entry), IsOk());
entry->Close();
FlushQueueForTest();
EXPECT_EQ(3, cache_->GetEntryCount());
if (eviction) {
TrimForTest(false);
EXPECT_EQ(2, cache_->GetEntryCount());
TrimForTest(false);
EXPECT_EQ(1, cache_->GetEntryCount());
TrimForTest(false);
EXPECT_EQ(1, cache_->GetEntryCount());
} else {
std::unique_ptr<TestIterator> iter = CreateIterator();
ASSERT_THAT(iter->OpenNextEntry(&entry), IsOk());
entry->Close();
EXPECT_NE(net::OK, iter->OpenNextEntry(&entry));
ASSERT_THAT(iter->OpenNextEntry(&entry), IsOk());
entry->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(iter->OpenNextEntry(&entry), IsOk());
entry->Close();
EXPECT_NE(net::OK, iter->OpenNextEntry(&entry));
}
DisableIntegrityCheck();
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Camera2Client::updateProcessorStream(sp<ProcessorT> processor,
camera2::Parameters params) {
return updateProcessorStream<ProcessorT, &ProcessorT::updateStream>(
processor, params);
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bitsubstring(VarBit *arg, int32 s, int32 l, bool length_not_specified)
{
VarBit *result;
int bitlen,
rbitlen,
len,
ipad = 0,
ishift,
i;
int e,
s1,
e1;
bits8 mask,
*r,
*ps;
bitlen = VARBITLEN(arg);
s1 = Max(s, 1);
/* If we do not have an upper bound, use end of string */
if (length_not_specified)
{
e1 = bitlen + 1;
}
else
{
e = s + l;
/*
* A negative value for L is the only way for the end position to be
* before the start. SQL99 says to throw an error.
*/
if (e < s)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_SUBSTRING_ERROR),
errmsg("negative substring length not allowed")));
e1 = Min(e, bitlen + 1);
}
if (s1 > bitlen || e1 <= s1)
{
/* Need to return a zero-length bitstring */
len = VARBITTOTALLEN(0);
result = (VarBit *) palloc(len);
SET_VARSIZE(result, len);
VARBITLEN(result) = 0;
}
else
{
/*
* OK, we've got a true substring starting at position s1-1 and ending
* at position e1-1
*/
rbitlen = e1 - s1;
len = VARBITTOTALLEN(rbitlen);
result = (VarBit *) palloc(len);
SET_VARSIZE(result, len);
VARBITLEN(result) = rbitlen;
len -= VARHDRSZ + VARBITHDRSZ;
/* Are we copying from a byte boundary? */
if ((s1 - 1) % BITS_PER_BYTE == 0)
{
/* Yep, we are copying bytes */
memcpy(VARBITS(result), VARBITS(arg) + (s1 - 1) / BITS_PER_BYTE,
len);
}
else
{
/* Figure out how much we need to shift the sequence by */
ishift = (s1 - 1) % BITS_PER_BYTE;
r = VARBITS(result);
ps = VARBITS(arg) + (s1 - 1) / BITS_PER_BYTE;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
{
*r = (*ps << ishift) & BITMASK;
if ((++ps) < VARBITEND(arg))
*r |= *ps >> (BITS_PER_BYTE - ishift);
r++;
}
}
/* Do we need to pad at the end? */
ipad = VARBITPAD(result);
if (ipad > 0)
{
mask = BITMASK << ipad;
*(VARBITS(result) + len - 1) &= mask;
}
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 39,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r;
bool req_int_win = !irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm) &&
vcpu->run->request_interrupt_window;
bool req_immediate_exit = false;
if (vcpu->requests) {
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MMU_RELOAD, vcpu))
kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MIGRATE_TIMER, vcpu))
__kvm_migrate_timers(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MASTERCLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu))
kvm_gen_update_masterclock(vcpu->kvm);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_GLOBAL_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu))
kvm_gen_kvmclock_update(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu)) {
r = kvm_guest_time_update(vcpu);
if (unlikely(r))
goto out;
}
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MMU_SYNC, vcpu))
kvm_mmu_sync_roots(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu))
kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_REPORT_TPR_ACCESS, vcpu)) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_TPR_ACCESS;
r = 0;
goto out;
}
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu)) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN;
r = 0;
goto out;
}
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_DEACTIVATE_FPU, vcpu)) {
vcpu->fpu_active = 0;
kvm_x86_ops->fpu_deactivate(vcpu);
}
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_APF_HALT, vcpu)) {
/* Page is swapped out. Do synthetic halt */
vcpu->arch.apf.halted = true;
r = 1;
goto out;
}
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_STEAL_UPDATE, vcpu))
record_steal_time(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_NMI, vcpu))
process_nmi(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_PMU, vcpu))
kvm_handle_pmu_event(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_PMI, vcpu))
kvm_deliver_pmi(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_SCAN_IOAPIC, vcpu))
vcpu_scan_ioapic(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD, vcpu))
kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page(vcpu);
}
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu) || req_int_win) {
kvm_apic_accept_events(vcpu);
if (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED) {
r = 1;
goto out;
}
if (inject_pending_event(vcpu, req_int_win) != 0)
req_immediate_exit = true;
/* enable NMI/IRQ window open exits if needed */
else if (vcpu->arch.nmi_pending)
kvm_x86_ops->enable_nmi_window(vcpu);
else if (kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr(vcpu) || req_int_win)
kvm_x86_ops->enable_irq_window(vcpu);
if (kvm_lapic_enabled(vcpu)) {
/*
* Update architecture specific hints for APIC
* virtual interrupt delivery.
*/
if (kvm_x86_ops->hwapic_irr_update)
kvm_x86_ops->hwapic_irr_update(vcpu,
kvm_lapic_find_highest_irr(vcpu));
update_cr8_intercept(vcpu);
kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic(vcpu);
}
}
r = kvm_mmu_reload(vcpu);
if (unlikely(r)) {
goto cancel_injection;
}
preempt_disable();
kvm_x86_ops->prepare_guest_switch(vcpu);
if (vcpu->fpu_active)
kvm_load_guest_fpu(vcpu);
kvm_load_guest_xcr0(vcpu);
vcpu->mode = IN_GUEST_MODE;
srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
/* We should set ->mode before check ->requests,
* see the comment in make_all_cpus_request.
*/
smp_mb__after_srcu_read_unlock();
local_irq_disable();
if (vcpu->mode == EXITING_GUEST_MODE || vcpu->requests
|| need_resched() || signal_pending(current)) {
vcpu->mode = OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE;
smp_wmb();
local_irq_enable();
preempt_enable();
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
r = 1;
goto cancel_injection;
}
if (req_immediate_exit)
smp_send_reschedule(vcpu->cpu);
kvm_guest_enter();
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs)) {
set_debugreg(0, 7);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[0], 0);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[1], 1);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[2], 2);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[3], 3);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6);
}
trace_kvm_entry(vcpu->vcpu_id);
kvm_x86_ops->run(vcpu);
/*
* Do this here before restoring debug registers on the host. And
* since we do this before handling the vmexit, a DR access vmexit
* can (a) read the correct value of the debug registers, (b) set
* KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT again.
*/
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)) {
int i;
WARN_ON(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP);
kvm_x86_ops->sync_dirty_debug_regs(vcpu);
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_DB_REGS; i++)
vcpu->arch.eff_db[i] = vcpu->arch.db[i];
}
/*
* If the guest has used debug registers, at least dr7
* will be disabled while returning to the host.
* If we don't have active breakpoints in the host, we don't
* care about the messed up debug address registers. But if
* we have some of them active, restore the old state.
*/
if (hw_breakpoint_active())
hw_breakpoint_restore();
vcpu->arch.last_guest_tsc = kvm_x86_ops->read_l1_tsc(vcpu,
native_read_tsc());
vcpu->mode = OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE;
smp_wmb();
/* Interrupt is enabled by handle_external_intr() */
kvm_x86_ops->handle_external_intr(vcpu);
++vcpu->stat.exits;
/*
* We must have an instruction between local_irq_enable() and
* kvm_guest_exit(), so the timer interrupt isn't delayed by
* the interrupt shadow. The stat.exits increment will do nicely.
* But we need to prevent reordering, hence this barrier():
*/
barrier();
kvm_guest_exit();
preempt_enable();
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
/*
* Profile KVM exit RIPs:
*/
if (unlikely(prof_on == KVM_PROFILING)) {
unsigned long rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
profile_hit(KVM_PROFILING, (void *)rip);
}
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.tsc_always_catchup))
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
if (vcpu->arch.apic_attention)
kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic(vcpu);
r = kvm_x86_ops->handle_exit(vcpu);
return r;
cancel_injection:
kvm_x86_ops->cancel_injection(vcpu);
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.apic_attention))
kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic(vcpu);
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 37,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: feed_table1(struct table *tbl, Str tok, struct table_mode *mode, int width)
{
Str tokbuf;
int status;
char *line;
if (!tok)
return;
tokbuf = Strnew();
status = R_ST_NORMAL;
line = tok->ptr;
while (read_token
(tokbuf, &line, &status, mode->pre_mode & TBLM_PREMODE, 0))
feed_table(tbl, tokbuf->ptr, mode, width, TRUE);
}
Commit Message: Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 84,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcXFixesDispatch(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXFixesReq);
XFixesClientPtr pXFixesClient = GetXFixesClient(client);
if (pXFixesClient->major_version >= NUM_VERSION_REQUESTS)
return BadRequest;
if (stuff->xfixesReqType > version_requests[pXFixesClient->major_version])
return BadRequest;
return (*ProcXFixesVector[stuff->xfixesReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: process_running(const char *pid_file)
{
FILE *pidfile = fopen(pid_file, "r");
pid_t pid = 0;
int ret;
/* No pidfile */
if (!pidfile)
return 0;
ret = fscanf(pidfile, "%d", &pid);
fclose(pidfile);
if (ret != 1) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Error reading pid file %s", pid_file);
pid = 0;
pidfile_rm(pid_file);
}
/* What should we return - we don't know if it is running or not. */
if (!pid)
return 1;
/* If no process is attached to pidfile, remove it */
if (kill(pid, 0)) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Remove a zombie pid file %s", pid_file);
pidfile_rm(pid_file);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 75,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _job_limits_free(void *x)
{
xfree(x);
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 72,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderBox::hasRelativeLogicalHeight() const
{
return style()->logicalHeight().isPercent()
|| style()->logicalMinHeight().isPercent()
|| style()->logicalMaxHeight().isPercent();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pkinit_init_kdc_req_context(krb5_context context, pkinit_kdc_req_context *ctx)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
pkinit_kdc_req_context reqctx = NULL;
reqctx = malloc(sizeof(*reqctx));
if (reqctx == NULL)
return retval;
memset(reqctx, 0, sizeof(*reqctx));
reqctx->magic = PKINIT_CTX_MAGIC;
retval = pkinit_init_req_crypto(&reqctx->cryptoctx);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack = NULL;
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack9 = NULL;
pkiDebug("%s: returning reqctx at %p\n", __FUNCTION__, reqctx);
*ctx = reqctx;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (retval)
pkinit_fini_kdc_req_context(context, reqctx);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT (draft9) null ptr deref [CVE-2012-1016]
Don't check for an agility KDF identifier in the non-draft9 reply
structure when we're building a draft9 reply, because it'll be NULL.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when handling
a draft9 request, leading to a crash of the KDC process. An attacker
would need to have a valid PKINIT certificate, or an unauthenticated
attacker could execute the attack if anonymous PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
[tlyu@mit.edu: reformat comment and edit log message]
(back ported from commit cd5ff932c9d1439c961b0cf9ccff979356686aff)
ticket: 7527 (new)
version_fixed: 1.10.4
status: resolved
CWE ID: | 0 | 34,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResetVLogInitialized() {
UninitializeStatisticsRecorder();
StatisticsRecorder::is_vlog_initialized_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 131,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: view_focus_set(Browser_Window *window, Eina_Bool focus)
{
/* We steal focus away from elm's focus model and start to do things
* manually here, so elm now has no clue what's up. Tell elm that its
* toplevel widget is to be unfocused so elm gives up the focus */
elm_object_focus_set(elm_object_top_widget_get(window->window), EINA_FALSE);
evas_object_focus_set(window->webview, focus);
}
Commit Message: [EFL][WK2] Add --window-size command line option to EFL MiniBrowser
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100942
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-11-05
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Added window-size (-s) command line option to EFL MiniBrowser.
* MiniBrowser/efl/main.c:
(window_create):
(parse_window_size):
(elm_main):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@133450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoStencilMaskSeparate(GLenum face, GLuint mask) {
if (face == GL_FRONT || face == GL_FRONT_AND_BACK) {
mask_stencil_front_ = mask;
}
if (face == GL_BACK || face == GL_FRONT_AND_BACK) {
mask_stencil_back_ = mask;
}
state_dirty_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int perf_unregister_guest_info_callbacks(struct perf_guest_info_callbacks *cbs)
{
perf_guest_cbs = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int create_history_entry(krb5_context context,
krb5_keyblock *hist_key, int n_key_data,
krb5_key_data *key_data, osa_pw_hist_ent *hist)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_keyblock key;
krb5_keysalt salt;
int i;
hist->key_data = k5calloc(n_key_data, sizeof(krb5_key_data), &ret);
if (hist->key_data == NULL)
return ret;
for (i = 0; i < n_key_data; i++) {
ret = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(context, NULL, &key_data[i], &key,
&salt);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = krb5_dbe_encrypt_key_data(context, hist_key, &key, &salt,
key_data[i].key_data_kvno,
&hist->key_data[i]);
if (ret)
return ret;
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &key);
/* krb5_free_keysalt(context, &salt); */
}
hist->n_key_data = n_key_data;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Return only new keys in randkey [CVE-2014-5351]
In kadmind's randkey operation, if a client specifies the keepold
flag, do not include the preserved old keys in the response.
CVE-2014-5351:
An authenticated remote attacker can retrieve the current keys for a
service principal when generating a new set of keys for that
principal. The attacker needs to be authenticated as a user who has
the elevated privilege for randomizing the keys of other principals.
Normally, when a Kerberos administrator randomizes the keys of a
service principal, kadmind returns only the new keys. This prevents
an administrator who lacks legitimate privileged access to a service
from forging tickets to authenticate to that service. If the
"keepold" flag to the kadmin randkey RPC operation is true, kadmind
retains the old keys in the KDC database as intended, but also
unexpectedly returns the old keys to the client, which exposes the
service to ticket forgery attacks from the administrator.
A mitigating factor is that legitimate clients of the affected service
will start failing to authenticate to the service once they begin to
receive service tickets encrypted in the new keys. The affected
service will be unable to decrypt the newly issued tickets, possibly
alerting the legitimate administrator of the affected service.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[tlyu@mit.edu: CVE description and CVSS score]
ticket: 8018 (new)
target_version: 1.13
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-255 | 0 | 36,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PixarLogFixupTags(TIFF* tif)
{
(void) tif;
return (1);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 48,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void blk_mq_wake_waiters(struct request_queue *q)
{
struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx;
unsigned int i;
queue_for_each_hw_ctx(q, hctx, i)
if (blk_mq_hw_queue_mapped(hctx))
blk_mq_tag_wakeup_all(hctx->tags, true);
/*
* If we are called because the queue has now been marked as
* dying, we need to ensure that processes currently waiting on
* the queue are notified as well.
*/
wake_up_all(&q->mq_freeze_wq);
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 86,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long sock_wait_for_wmem(struct sock *sk, long timeo)
{
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
for (;;) {
if (!timeo)
break;
if (signal_pending(current))
break;
set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) < sk->sk_sndbuf)
break;
if (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN)
break;
if (sk->sk_err)
break;
timeo = schedule_timeout(timeo);
}
finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
return timeo;
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xdr_set_page_base(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
unsigned int base, unsigned int len)
{
unsigned int pgnr;
unsigned int maxlen;
unsigned int pgoff;
unsigned int pgend;
void *kaddr;
maxlen = xdr->buf->page_len;
if (base >= maxlen)
return -EINVAL;
maxlen -= base;
if (len > maxlen)
len = maxlen;
base += xdr->buf->page_base;
pgnr = base >> PAGE_SHIFT;
xdr->page_ptr = &xdr->buf->pages[pgnr];
kaddr = page_address(*xdr->page_ptr);
pgoff = base & ~PAGE_MASK;
xdr->p = (__be32*)(kaddr + pgoff);
pgend = pgoff + len;
if (pgend > PAGE_SIZE)
pgend = PAGE_SIZE;
xdr->end = (__be32*)(kaddr + pgend);
xdr->iov = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,538 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vol_prc_lib_create(const effect_uuid_t *uuid,
int32_t session_id,
int32_t io_id,
effect_handle_t *p_handle)
{
int itt = 0;
vol_listener_context_t *context = NULL;
ALOGV("volume_prc_lib_create .. called ..");
if (lib_init() != 0) {
return init_status;
}
if (p_handle == NULL || uuid == NULL) {
ALOGE("%s: %s is NULL", __func__, (p_handle == NULL) ? "p_handle" : "uuid");
return -EINVAL;
}
context = (vol_listener_context_t *)calloc(1, sizeof(vol_listener_context_t));
if (context == NULL) {
ALOGE("%s: failed to allocate for context .. oops !!", __func__);
return -EINVAL;
}
for (itt = 0; descriptors[itt] != NULL; itt++) {
if (memcmp(uuid, &descriptors[itt]->uuid, sizeof(effect_uuid_t)) == 0) {
context->desc = descriptors[itt];
context->stream_type = itt;
PRINT_STREAM_TYPE(itt)
break;
}
}
if (descriptors[itt] == NULL) {
ALOGE("%s .. couldnt find passed uuid, something wrong", __func__);
free(context);
return -EINVAL;
}
ALOGV("%s CREATED_CONTEXT %p", __func__, context);
context->itfe = &effect_interface;
context->state = VOL_LISTENER_STATE_INITIALIZED;
context->dev_id = AUDIO_DEVICE_NONE;
context->session_id = session_id;
pthread_mutex_lock(&vol_listner_init_lock);
list_add_tail(&vol_effect_list, &context->effect_list_node);
if (dumping_enabled) {
dump_list_l();
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&vol_listner_init_lock);
*p_handle = (effect_handle_t)context;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: post proc : volume listener : fix effect release crash
Fix access to deleted effect context in vol_prc_lib_release()
Bug: 25753245.
Change-Id: I64ca99e4d5d09667be4c8c605f66700b9ae67949
(cherry picked from commit 93ab6fdda7b7557ccb34372670c30fa6178f8426)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 161,564 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: add_posix_context(struct kvec *iov, unsigned int *num_iovec, umode_t mode)
{
struct smb2_create_req *req = iov[0].iov_base;
unsigned int num = *num_iovec;
iov[num].iov_base = create_posix_buf(mode);
if (iov[num].iov_base == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
iov[num].iov_len = sizeof(struct create_posix);
if (!req->CreateContextsOffset)
req->CreateContextsOffset = cpu_to_le32(
sizeof(struct smb2_create_req) +
iov[num - 1].iov_len);
le32_add_cpu(&req->CreateContextsLength, sizeof(struct create_posix));
*num_iovec = num + 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 88,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void OverloadedMethodA2Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "overloadedMethodA");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
int32_t long_arg_1;
int32_t long_arg_2;
long_arg_1 = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
long_arg_2 = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[1], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->overloadedMethodA(long_arg_1, long_arg_2);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt;
gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, flags;
u_char *p;
size_t len;
int r;
if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
recv_tok.value = p;
recv_tok.length = len;
maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
&send_tok, &flags));
free(p);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
if (send_tok.length != 0) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
authctxt->postponed = 0;
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
userauth_finish(ssh, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
} else {
if (send_tok.length != 0) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC,
&input_gssapi_mic);
else
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh,
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,
&input_gssapi_exchange_complete);
}
}
gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: delay bailout for invalid authenticating user until after the packet
containing the request has been fully parsed. Reported by Dariusz Tytko
and Michał Sajdak; ok deraadt
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 79,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AP_DECLARE(void) ap_set_context_info(request_rec *r, const char *context_prefix,
const char *context_document_root)
{
core_request_config *conf = ap_get_core_module_config(r->request_config);
if (context_prefix)
conf->context_prefix = context_prefix;
if (context_document_root)
conf->context_document_root = context_document_root;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,212 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: global_init_keywords(void)
{
/* global definitions mapping */
init_global_keywords(true);
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
init_vrrp_keywords(false);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
init_check_keywords(false);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
init_bfd_keywords(false);
#endif
return keywords;
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 75,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestWebKitPlatformSupport::createLocalStorageNamespace(
const WebKit::WebString& path, unsigned quota) {
#ifdef ENABLE_NEW_DOM_STORAGE_BACKEND
return dom_storage_system_.CreateLocalStorageNamespace();
#else
return WebKit::WebStorageNamespace::createLocalStorageNamespace(path, quota);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::OnSwapOut(const ViewMsg_SwapOut_Params& params) {
if (is_swapped_out_)
return;
SyncNavigationState();
webview()->dispatchUnloadEvent();
SetSwappedOut(true);
webview()->mainFrame()->loadHTMLString(std::string(),
GURL("about:swappedout"),
GURL("about:swappedout"),
false);
Send(new ViewHostMsg_SwapOut_ACK(routing_id_, params));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PasswordInputType::DisableSecureTextInput() {
LocalFrame* frame = GetElement().GetDocument().GetFrame();
if (!frame)
return;
frame->Selection().SetUseSecureKeyboardEntryWhenActive(false);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfsd4_cb_recall_release(struct nfsd4_callback *cb)
{
struct nfs4_delegation *dp = cb_to_delegation(cb);
nfs4_put_stid(&dp->dl_stid);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int btrfs_readpage(struct file *file, struct page *page)
{
struct extent_io_tree *tree;
tree = &BTRFS_I(page->mapping->host)->io_tree;
return extent_read_full_page(tree, page, btrfs_get_extent, 0);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderFlexibleBox::adjustChildSizeForMinAndMax(RenderBox* child, LayoutUnit childSize)
{
Length max = isHorizontalFlow() ? child->style()->maxWidth() : child->style()->maxHeight();
if (max.isSpecifiedOrIntrinsic()) {
LayoutUnit maxExtent = computeMainAxisExtentForChild(child, MaxSize, max);
if (maxExtent != -1 && childSize > maxExtent)
childSize = maxExtent;
}
Length min = isHorizontalFlow() ? child->style()->minWidth() : child->style()->minHeight();
LayoutUnit minExtent = 0;
if (min.isSpecifiedOrIntrinsic())
minExtent = computeMainAxisExtentForChild(child, MinSize, min);
return std::max(childSize, minExtent);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::uniform1iv(const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
const FlexibleInt32ArrayView& v) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateUniformParameters<WTF::Int32Array>(
"uniform1iv", location, v, 1, 0, v.length()))
return;
ContextGL()->Uniform1iv(location->Location(), v.length(),
v.DataMaybeOnStack());
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ClearStates() {
STLDeleteContainerPointers(states_.begin(), states_.end());
states_.clear();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ipc_rmid(struct ipc_ids *ids, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
int lid = ipcid_to_idx(ipcp->id);
idr_remove(&ids->ipcs_idr, lid);
ids->in_use--;
ipcp->deleted = 1;
return;
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameImpl::RenderFrameImpl(CreateParams params)
: frame_(nullptr),
is_main_frame_(true),
unique_name_frame_adapter_(this),
unique_name_helper_(&unique_name_frame_adapter_),
in_browser_initiated_detach_(false),
in_frame_tree_(false),
render_view_(params.render_view),
routing_id_(params.routing_id),
proxy_routing_id_(MSG_ROUTING_NONE),
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
plugin_power_saver_helper_(nullptr),
plugin_find_handler_(nullptr),
#endif
cookie_jar_(this),
selection_text_offset_(0),
selection_range_(gfx::Range::InvalidRange()),
handling_select_range_(false),
web_user_media_client_(nullptr),
presentation_dispatcher_(nullptr),
push_messaging_client_(nullptr),
render_accessibility_(nullptr),
previews_state_(PREVIEWS_UNSPECIFIED),
effective_connection_type_(
blink::WebEffectiveConnectionType::kTypeUnknown),
is_pasting_(false),
suppress_further_dialogs_(false),
blame_context_(nullptr),
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
focused_pepper_plugin_(nullptr),
pepper_last_mouse_event_target_(nullptr),
#endif
engagement_binding_(this),
media_engagement_binding_(this),
frame_binding_(this),
host_zoom_binding_(this),
frame_bindings_control_binding_(this),
frame_navigation_control_binding_(this),
fullscreen_binding_(this),
has_accessed_initial_document_(false),
media_factory_(this,
base::Bind(&RenderFrameImpl::RequestOverlayRoutingToken,
base::Unretained(this))),
input_target_client_impl_(this),
devtools_frame_token_(
blink::WebString::FromUTF8(params.devtools_frame_token.ToString())),
weak_factory_(this) {
CHECK(params.interface_provider.is_bound());
remote_interfaces_.Bind(std::move(params.interface_provider));
blink_interface_registry_.reset(new BlinkInterfaceRegistryImpl(
registry_.GetWeakPtr(), associated_interfaces_.GetWeakPtr()));
media_factory_.SetupMojo();
std::pair<RoutingIDFrameMap::iterator, bool> result =
g_routing_id_frame_map.Get().insert(std::make_pair(routing_id_, this));
CHECK(result.second) << "Inserting a duplicate item.";
RenderThread::Get()->AddRoute(routing_id_, this);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
new GinJavaBridgeDispatcher(this);
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
plugin_power_saver_helper_ = new PluginPowerSaverHelper(this);
#endif
manifest_manager_ = std::make_unique<ManifestManager>(this);
if (IsMainFrame()) {
new ManifestChangeNotifier(this);
}
memset(&peak_memory_metrics_, 0,
sizeof(RenderThreadImpl::RendererMemoryMetrics));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void crypto_pcbc_exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct crypto_pcbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
crypto_free_cipher(ctx->child);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,857 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char *am_filepath_dirname(apr_pool_t *p, const char *path)
{
char *cp;
/*
* Try Unix and then Windows style. Borrowed from
* apr_match_glob(), it seems it cannot be made more
* portable.
*/
if (((cp = strrchr(path, (int)'/')) == NULL) &&
((cp = strrchr(path, (int)'\\')) == NULL))
return ".";
return apr_pstrndup(p, path, cp - path);
}
Commit Message: Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes.
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 91,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TextCodecUTF8::ConsumePartialSequenceBytes(int num_bytes) {
DCHECK_GE(partial_sequence_size_, num_bytes);
partial_sequence_size_ -= num_bytes;
memmove(partial_sequence_, partial_sequence_ + num_bytes,
partial_sequence_size_);
}
Commit Message: Add bounds CHECK to UTF-8 decoder memory allocation.
Avoid integer overflow when computing a total buffer size from a base
buffer and small partial sequence buffer.
Bug: 901030
Change-Id: Ic82db2c6af770bd748fb1ec881999d0dfaac30f0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1313833
Reviewed-by: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605011}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 143,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void res_clear_info(vorbis_info_residue *info){
if(info){
if(info->stagemasks)_ogg_free(info->stagemasks);
if(info->stagebooks)_ogg_free(info->stagebooks);
memset(info,0,sizeof(*info));
}
}
Commit Message: Check partword is in range for # of partitions
and reformat tabs->spaces for readability.
Bug: 28556125
Change-Id: Id02819a6a5bcc24ba4f8a502081e5cb45272681c
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 159,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ASCIIHexStream::~ASCIIHexStream() {
delete str;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Splash::strokeWide(SplashPath *path, SplashCoord w) {
SplashPath *path2;
path2 = makeStrokePath(path, w, gFalse);
fillWithPattern(path2, gFalse, state->strokePattern, state->strokeAlpha);
delete path2;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ib_destroy_cm_id(struct ib_cm_id *cm_id)
{
cm_destroy_id(cm_id, 0);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_note_info(struct elf_note_info *info)
{
struct elf_thread_core_info *threads = info->thread;
while (threads) {
unsigned int i;
struct elf_thread_core_info *t = threads;
threads = t->next;
WARN_ON(t->notes[0].data && t->notes[0].data != &t->prstatus);
for (i = 1; i < info->thread_notes; ++i)
kfree(t->notes[i].data);
kfree(t);
}
kfree(info->psinfo.data);
vfree(info->files.data);
}
Commit Message: x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on
64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow.
The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file
"fs/binfmt_elf.c":
static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
unsigned int random_variable = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
}
Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int".
Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which
is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
"random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold
the (22+12) result.
These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to
2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy).
This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved
in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and
stack_maxrandom_size().
The successful fix can be tested with:
$ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
...
Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff,
rather than always being 7fff.
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
[ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: CVE-2015-1593
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didAddMessageToConsole(
const blink::WebConsoleMessage& message,
const blink::WebString& source_name,
unsigned source_line,
const blink::WebString& stack_trace) {
logging::LogSeverity log_severity = logging::LOG_VERBOSE;
switch (message.level) {
case blink::WebConsoleMessage::LevelDebug:
log_severity = logging::LOG_VERBOSE;
break;
case blink::WebConsoleMessage::LevelLog:
case blink::WebConsoleMessage::LevelInfo:
log_severity = logging::LOG_INFO;
break;
case blink::WebConsoleMessage::LevelWarning:
log_severity = logging::LOG_WARNING;
break;
case blink::WebConsoleMessage::LevelError:
log_severity = logging::LOG_ERROR;
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
if (shouldReportDetailedMessageForSource(source_name)) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
RenderViewObserver, render_view_->observers(),
DetailedConsoleMessageAdded(message.text,
source_name,
stack_trace,
source_line,
static_cast<int32>(log_severity)));
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
RenderFrameObserver, observers_,
DetailedConsoleMessageAdded(message.text,
source_name,
stack_trace,
source_line,
static_cast<int32>(log_severity)));
}
Send(new FrameHostMsg_AddMessageToConsole(routing_id_,
static_cast<int32>(log_severity),
message.text,
static_cast<int32>(source_line),
source_name));
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::DocumentAvailableInMainFrame(
RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_,
DocumentAvailableInMainFrame());
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ProfilingProcessHost::OnMemoryDump(
const base::trace_event::MemoryDumpArgs& args,
base::trace_event::ProcessMemoryDump* pmd) {
profiling_service_->DumpProcessesForTracing(
base::BindOnce(&ProfilingProcessHost::OnDumpProcessesForTracingCallback,
base::Unretained(this), args.dump_guid));
return true;
}
Commit Message: [Reland #1] Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
The original CL added a javatest and its dependencies to the apk_under_test.
This causes the dependencies to be stripped from the instrumentation_apk, which
causes issue. This CL updates the build configuration so that the javatest and
its dependencies are only added to the instrumentation_apk.
This is a reland of e0b4355f0651adb1ebc2c513dc4410471af712f5
Original change's description:
> Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
>
> This CL has three components:
> 1) The bulk of the logic in OOP HP was refactored into ProfilingTestDriver.
> 2) Adds a java instrumentation test, along with a JNI shim that forwards into
> ProfilingTestDriver.
> 3) Creates a new apk: chrome_public_apk_for_test that contains the same
> content as chrome_public_apk, as well as native files needed for (2).
> chrome_public_apk_test now targets chrome_public_apk_for_test instead of
> chrome_public_apk.
>
> Other ideas, discarded:
> * Originally, I attempted to make the browser_tests target runnable on
> Android. The primary problem is that native test harness cannot fork
> or spawn processes. This is difficult to solve.
>
> More details on each of the components:
> (1) ProfilingTestDriver
> * The TracingController test was migrated to use ProfilingTestDriver, but the
> write-to-file test was left as-is. The latter behavior will likely be phased
> out, but I'll clean that up in a future CL.
> * gtest isn't supported for Android instrumentation tests. ProfilingTestDriver
> has a single function RunTest that returns a 'bool' indicating success. On
> failure, the class uses LOG(ERROR) to print the nature of the error. This will
> cause the error to be printed out on browser_test error. On instrumentation
> test failure, the error will be forwarded to logcat, which is available on all
> infra bot test runs.
> (2) Instrumentation test
> * For now, I only added a single test for the "browser" mode. Furthermore, I'm
> only testing the start with command-line path.
> (3) New apk
> * libchromefortest is a new shared library that contains all content from
> libchrome, but also contains native sources for the JNI shim.
> * chrome_public_apk_for_test is a new apk that contains all content from
> chrome_public_apk, but uses a single shared library libchromefortest rather
> than libchrome. This also contains java sources for the JNI shim.
> * There is no way to just add a second shared library to chrome_public_apk
> that just contains the native sources from the JNI shim without causing ODR
> issues.
> * chrome_public_test_apk now has apk_under_test = chrome_public_apk_for_test.
> * There is no way to add native JNI sources as a shared library to
> chrome_public_test_apk without causing ODR issues.
>
> Finally, this CL drastically increases the timeout to wait for native
> initialization. The previous timeout was 2 *
> CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL, which flakily failed for this test.
> This suggests that this step/timeout is generally flaky. I increased the timeout
> to 20 * CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL.
>
> Bug: 753218
> Change-Id: Ic224b7314fff57f1770a4048aa5753f54e040b55
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/770148
> Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Brett Wilson <brettw@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517541}
Bug: 753218
TBR: brettw@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ic6aafb34c2467253f75cc85da48200d19f3bc9af
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/777697
Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517850}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 150,214 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int FindPublicSession(const user_manager::UserList& users) {
int index = -1;
int i = 0;
for (user_manager::UserList::const_iterator it = users.begin();
it != users.end();
++it, ++i) {
if ((*it)->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_PUBLIC_ACCOUNT) {
index = i;
break;
}
}
return index;
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 127,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int FLTIsFeatureIdFilterType(const char *pszValue)
{
if (pszValue && (strcasecmp(pszValue, "FeatureId") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(pszValue, "GmlObjectId") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(pszValue, "ResourceId") == 0))
return MS_TRUE;
return MS_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 68,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int RenderBox::scrollLeft() const
{
return hasOverflowClip() ? layer()->scrollXOffset() : 0;
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OVS_REQUIRES(ofproto_mutex)
{
enum nx_flow_monitor_flags update;
if (rule_is_hidden(rule)) {
return;
}
if (!ofproto_rule_has_out_port(rule, m->out_port)) {
return;
}
if (seqno) {
if (rule->add_seqno > seqno) {
update = NXFMF_ADD | NXFMF_MODIFY;
} else if (rule->modify_seqno > seqno) {
update = NXFMF_MODIFY;
} else {
return;
}
if (!(m->flags & update)) {
return;
}
} else {
update = NXFMF_INITIAL;
}
if (!rule->monitor_flags) {
rule_collection_add(rules, rule);
}
rule->monitor_flags |= update | (m->flags & NXFMF_ACTIONS);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::stepMismatch() const
{
return willValidate() && m_inputType->stepMismatch(value());
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 113,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct packet *packet_alloc(const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len)
{
struct packet *p = osi_calloc(sizeof(*p));
uint8_t *buf = osi_malloc(len);
if (p && buf) {
p->data = buf;
p->len = len;
memcpy(p->data, data, len);
return p;
} else if (p)
osi_free(p);
else if (buf)
osi_free(buf);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PP_Resource PPB_Flash_MessageLoop_Impl::Create(PP_Instance instance) {
return (new PPB_Flash_MessageLoop_Impl(instance))->GetReference();
}
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 131,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long long PerformanceNavigationTiming::GetTransferSize() const {
return resource_timing_info_->TransferSize();
}
Commit Message: Fix the |name| of PerformanceNavigationTiming
Previously, the |name| of a PerformanceNavigationTiming entry was the initial
URL (the request URL). After this CL, it is the response URL, so for example
a url of the form 'redirect?location=newLoc' will have 'newLoc' as the |name|.
Bug: 797465
Change-Id: Icab53ad8027d066422562c82bcf0354c264fea40
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/996579
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <npm@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548773}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 155,541 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutomationProvider::RemoveLoginHandler(NavigationController* tab) {
DCHECK(login_handler_map_[tab]);
login_handler_map_.erase(tab);
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TextRun RenderBlockFlow::constructTextRun(RenderObject* context, const Font& font, const RenderText* text, unsigned offset, unsigned length, RenderStyle* style, TextDirection direction, TextRun::ExpansionBehavior expansion)
{
ASSERT(offset + length <= text->textLength());
if (text->is8Bit())
return constructTextRunInternal(context, font, text->characters8() + offset, length, style, direction, expansion);
return constructTextRunInternal(context, font, text->characters16() + offset, length, style, direction, expansion);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,349 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IndexedDBDatabase::CreateObjectStore(IndexedDBTransaction* transaction,
int64_t object_store_id,
const base::string16& name,
const IndexedDBKeyPath& key_path,
bool auto_increment) {
DCHECK(transaction);
IDB_TRACE1("IndexedDBDatabase::CreateObjectStore", "txn.id",
transaction->id());
DCHECK_EQ(transaction->mode(), blink::kWebIDBTransactionModeVersionChange);
if (base::ContainsKey(metadata_.object_stores, object_store_id)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Invalid object_store_id";
return;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("WebCore.IndexedDB.Schema.ObjectStore.KeyPathType",
HistogramKeyPathType(key_path), KEY_PATH_TYPE_MAX);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("WebCore.IndexedDB.Schema.ObjectStore.AutoIncrement",
auto_increment);
IndexedDBObjectStoreMetadata object_store_metadata;
Status s = metadata_coding_->CreateObjectStore(
transaction->BackingStoreTransaction()->transaction(),
transaction->database()->id(), object_store_id, name, key_path,
auto_increment, &object_store_metadata);
if (!s.ok()) {
ReportErrorWithDetails(s, "Internal error creating object store.");
return;
}
AddObjectStore(std::move(object_store_metadata), object_store_id);
transaction->ScheduleAbortTask(
base::BindOnce(&IndexedDBDatabase::CreateObjectStoreAbortOperation, this,
object_store_id));
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HeadlessWebContentsImpl::ForceAttachClient(
HeadlessDevToolsClient* client) {
HeadlessDevToolsClientImpl::From(client)->ForceAttachToHost(
agent_host_.get());
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 126,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void filter181(int16_t *data, int width, int height, ptrdiff_t stride)
{
int x, y;
/* horizontal filter */
for (y = 1; y < height - 1; y++) {
int prev_dc = data[0 + y * stride];
for (x = 1; x < width - 1; x++) {
int dc;
dc = -prev_dc +
data[x + y * stride] * 8 -
data[x + 1 + y * stride];
dc = (av_clip(dc, INT_MIN/10923, INT_MAX/10923 - 32768) * 10923 + 32768) >> 16;
prev_dc = data[x + y * stride];
data[x + y * stride] = dc;
}
}
/* vertical filter */
for (x = 1; x < width - 1; x++) {
int prev_dc = data[x];
for (y = 1; y < height - 1; y++) {
int dc;
dc = -prev_dc +
data[x + y * stride] * 8 -
data[x + (y + 1) * stride];
dc = (av_clip(dc, INT_MIN/10923, INT_MAX/10923 - 32768) * 10923 + 32768) >> 16;
prev_dc = data[x + y * stride];
data[x + y * stride] = dc;
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Remove use of FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO as indicator of studio profile
The profile field is changed by code inside and outside the decoder,
its not a reliable indicator of the internal codec state.
Maintaining it consistency with studio_profile is messy.
Its easier to just avoid it and use only studio_profile
Fixes: assertion failure
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_9.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 79,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int bitmap_position(const unsigned char *sha1)
{
int pos = bitmap_position_packfile(sha1);
return (pos >= 0) ? pos : bitmap_position_extended(sha1);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,922 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: g_NPP_SetWindow(NPP instance, NPWindow *np_window)
{
if (instance == NULL)
return NPERR_INVALID_INSTANCE_ERROR;
PluginInstance *plugin = PLUGIN_INSTANCE(instance);
if (plugin == NULL)
return NPERR_INVALID_INSTANCE_ERROR;
if (plugin_funcs.setwindow == NULL)
return NPERR_INVALID_FUNCTABLE_ERROR;
plugin->is_windowless = np_window && np_window->type == NPWindowTypeDrawable;
NPWindow *window = np_window;
if (window && (window->window || plugin->is_windowless)) {
if (plugin->toolkit_data) {
if (update_window(plugin, window) < 0)
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
else {
if (create_window(plugin, window) < 0)
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
window = &plugin->window;
}
D(bugiI("NPP_SetWindow instance=%p, window=%p\n", instance, window ? window->window : NULL));
NPError ret = plugin_funcs.setwindow(instance, window);
D(bugiD("NPP_SetWindow return: %d [%s]\n", ret, string_of_NPError(ret)));
if (np_window == NULL || (np_window->window == NULL && !plugin->is_windowless))
destroy_window(plugin);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,087 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnSurfaceIdUpdated(viz::SurfaceId surface_id) {
if (client_ && IsInPictureInPicture() && !client_->IsInAutoPIP()) {
delegate_->DidPictureInPictureSurfaceChange(
delegate_id_, surface_id, pipeline_metadata_.natural_size,
true /* show_play_pause_button */);
}
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,469 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: event(WebKitWebView *page, GArray *argv, GString *result) {
(void) page; (void) result;
GString *event_name;
gchar **split = NULL;
if(!argv_idx(argv, 0))
return;
split = g_strsplit(argv_idx(argv, 0), " ", 2);
if(split[0])
event_name = g_string_ascii_up(g_string_new(split[0]));
else
return;
send_event(0, split[1]?split[1]:"", event_name->str);
g_string_free(event_name, TRUE);
g_strfreev(split);
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int log_host_event(host *hst) {
char *temp_buffer = NULL;
unsigned long log_options = 0L;
/* get the log options */
if(hst->current_state == HOST_DOWN)
log_options = NSLOG_HOST_DOWN;
else if(hst->current_state == HOST_UNREACHABLE)
log_options = NSLOG_HOST_UNREACHABLE;
else
log_options = NSLOG_HOST_UP;
asprintf(&temp_buffer, "HOST ALERT: %s;%s;%s;%d;%s\n",
hst->name,
host_state_name(hst->current_state),
state_type_name(hst->state_type),
hst->current_attempt,
(hst->plugin_output == NULL) ? "" : hst->plugin_output);
write_to_all_logs(temp_buffer, log_options);
my_free(temp_buffer);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'maint'
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 48,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child, struct task_struct *new_parent,
const struct cred *ptracer_cred)
{
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&child->ptrace_entry));
list_add(&child->ptrace_entry, &new_parent->ptraced);
child->parent = new_parent;
child->ptracer_cred = get_cred(ptracer_cred);
}
Commit Message: ptrace: Fix ->ptracer_cred handling for PTRACE_TRACEME
Fix two issues:
When called for PTRACE_TRACEME, ptrace_link() would obtain an RCU
reference to the parent's objective credentials, then give that pointer
to get_cred(). However, the object lifetime rules for things like
struct cred do not permit unconditionally turning an RCU reference into
a stable reference.
PTRACE_TRACEME records the parent's credentials as if the parent was
acting as the subject, but that's not the case. If a malicious
unprivileged child uses PTRACE_TRACEME and the parent is privileged, and
at a later point, the parent process becomes attacker-controlled
(because it drops privileges and calls execve()), the attacker ends up
with control over two processes with a privileged ptrace relationship,
which can be abused to ptrace a suid binary and obtain root privileges.
Fix both of these by always recording the credentials of the process
that is requesting the creation of the ptrace relationship:
current_cred() can't change under us, and current is the proper subject
for access control.
This change is theoretically userspace-visible, but I am not aware of
any code that it will actually break.
Fixes: 64b875f7ac8a ("ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 89,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::InitAsChild(
gfx::NativeView parent_view) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PP_Resource Resource::GetReferenceNoAddRef() const {
return resource_id_;
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_attr_error(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap, int32_t *res)
{
__be32 *p;
if (unlikely(bitmap[0] & (FATTR4_WORD0_RDATTR_ERROR - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_RDATTR_ERROR)) {
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
bitmap[0] &= ~FATTR4_WORD0_RDATTR_ERROR;
*res = -be32_to_cpup(p);
}
return 0;
out_overflow:
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,257 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FormAssociatedElement::patternMismatch() const
{
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash when a form control is in a past naems map of a demoted form element.
Note that we wanted to add the protector in FormAssociatedElement::setForm(),
but we couldn't do it because it is called from the constructor.
BUG=326854
TEST=automated.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/105693013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@163680 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 123,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Ins_DEPTH( INS_ARG )
{
args[0] = CUR.top;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: getprivs_ret * get_privs_2_svc(krb5_ui_4 *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static getprivs_ret ret;
gss_buffer_desc client_name, service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_getprivs_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(*arg, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
ret.code = kadm5_get_privs((void *)handle, &ret.privs);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_privs", client_name.value, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 167,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: views::Label* AutofillPopupItemView::CreateLabelWithStyleAndContext(
const base::string16& text,
int text_context,
int text_style) const {
views::Label* label =
CreateLabelWithColorReadabilityDisabled(text, text_context, text_style);
label->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
return label;
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,546 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_event_context_sched_in(struct perf_event_context *ctx,
struct task_struct *task)
{
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx;
cpuctx = __get_cpu_context(ctx);
if (cpuctx->task_ctx == ctx)
return;
perf_ctx_lock(cpuctx, ctx);
perf_pmu_disable(ctx->pmu);
/*
* We want to keep the following priority order:
* cpu pinned (that don't need to move), task pinned,
* cpu flexible, task flexible.
*/
cpu_ctx_sched_out(cpuctx, EVENT_FLEXIBLE);
perf_event_sched_in(cpuctx, ctx, task);
cpuctx->task_ctx = ctx;
perf_pmu_enable(ctx->pmu);
perf_ctx_unlock(cpuctx, ctx);
/*
* Since these rotations are per-cpu, we need to ensure the
* cpu-context we got scheduled on is actually rotating.
*/
perf_pmu_rotate_start(ctx->pmu);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: StateStore* TestExtensionSystem::state_store() {
return state_store_.get();
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void put_nfs_open_context(struct nfs_open_context *ctx)
{
__put_nfs_open_context(ctx, 0);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::IsCompressedTextureFormat(unsigned format) {
return feature_info_->validators()->compressed_texture_format.IsValid(
format);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::AudioSourceProviderImpl::ProvideInput(
AudioBus* bus,
size_t frames_to_process) {
DCHECK(bus);
MutexTryLocker try_locker(provide_input_lock);
if (!try_locker.Locked() || !web_audio_source_provider_ || !client_.Get()) {
bus->Zero();
return;
}
size_t n = bus->NumberOfChannels();
WebVector<float*> web_audio_data(n);
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; ++i)
web_audio_data[i] = bus->Channel(i)->MutableData();
web_audio_source_provider_->ProvideInput(web_audio_data, frames_to_process);
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 154,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::SelectedVideoTrackChanged(
blink::WebMediaPlayer::TrackId* selectedTrackId) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
base::Optional<MediaTrack::Id> selected_video_track_id;
if (selectedTrackId && !video_track_disabled_)
selected_video_track_id = MediaTrack::Id(selectedTrackId->Utf8().data());
MEDIA_LOG(INFO, media_log_.get())
<< "Selected video track: [" << selected_video_track_id.value_or("")
<< "]";
pipeline_controller_.OnSelectedVideoTrackChanged(selected_video_track_id);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Instance::OnEvent(uint32 control_id, uint32 event_id, void* data) {
if (event_id == Button::EVENT_ID_BUTTON_CLICKED ||
event_id == Button::EVENT_ID_BUTTON_STATE_CHANGED) {
switch (control_id) {
case kFitToPageButtonId:
UserMetricsRecordAction("PDF.FitToPageButton");
SetZoom(ZOOM_FIT_TO_PAGE, 0);
ZoomChanged(zoom_);
break;
case kFitToWidthButtonId:
UserMetricsRecordAction("PDF.FitToWidthButton");
SetZoom(ZOOM_FIT_TO_WIDTH, 0);
ZoomChanged(zoom_);
break;
case kZoomOutButtonId:
case kZoomInButtonId:
UserMetricsRecordAction(control_id == kZoomOutButtonId ?
"PDF.ZoomOutButton" : "PDF.ZoomInButton");
SetZoom(ZOOM_SCALE, CalculateZoom(control_id));
ZoomChanged(zoom_);
break;
case kSaveButtonId:
UserMetricsRecordAction("PDF.SaveButton");
SaveAs();
break;
case kPrintButtonId:
UserMetricsRecordAction("PDF.PrintButton");
Print();
break;
}
}
if (control_id == kThumbnailsId &&
event_id == ThumbnailControl::EVENT_ID_THUMBNAIL_SELECTED) {
int page = *static_cast<int*>(data);
pp::Rect page_rc(engine_->GetPageRect(page));
ScrollToY(static_cast<int>(page_rc.y() * zoom_ * device_scale_));
}
}
Commit Message: Let PDFium handle event when there is not yet a visible page.
Speculative fix for 415307. CF will confirm.
The stack trace for that bug indicates an attempt to index by -1, which is consistent with no visible page.
BUG=415307
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/560133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#295421}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CSSPaintValue::TraceAfterDispatch(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(name_);
visitor->Trace(generator_);
visitor->Trace(paint_image_generator_observer_);
visitor->Trace(parsed_input_arguments_);
CSSImageGeneratorValue::TraceAfterDispatch(visitor);
}
Commit Message: [PaintWorklet] Do not paint when paint target is associated with a link
When the target element of a paint worklet has an associated link, then
the 'paint' function will be invoked when the link's href is changed
from a visited URL to an unvisited URL (or vice versa).
This CL changes the behavior by detecting whether the target element
of a paint worklet has an associated link or not. If it does, then don't
paint.
TBR=haraken@chromium.org
Bug: 835589
Change-Id: I5fdf85685f863c960a6f48cc9a345dda787bece1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1035524
Reviewed-by: Xida Chen <xidachen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Kilpatrick <ikilpatrick@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen McGruer <smcgruer@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Xida Chen <xidachen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#555788}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 155,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: poly_right(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
POLYGON *polya = PG_GETARG_POLYGON_P(0);
POLYGON *polyb = PG_GETARG_POLYGON_P(1);
bool result;
result = polya->boundbox.low.x > polyb->boundbox.high.x;
/*
* Avoid leaking memory for toasted inputs ... needed for rtree indexes
*/
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(polya, 0);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(polyb, 1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(result);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 39,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableV8IdleTasks(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetV8IdleTasksEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 154,690 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bson_iter_codewscope (const bson_iter_t *iter, /* IN */
uint32_t *length, /* OUT */
uint32_t *scope_len, /* OUT */
const uint8_t **scope) /* OUT */
{
uint32_t len;
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
if (ITER_TYPE (iter) == BSON_TYPE_CODEWSCOPE) {
if (length) {
memcpy (&len, iter->raw + iter->d2, sizeof (len));
/* The string length was checked > 0 in _bson_iter_next_internal. */
len = BSON_UINT32_FROM_LE (len);
BSON_ASSERT (len > 0);
*length = len - 1;
}
memcpy (&len, iter->raw + iter->d4, sizeof (len));
*scope_len = BSON_UINT32_FROM_LE (len);
*scope = iter->raw + iter->d4;
return (const char *) (iter->raw + iter->d3);
}
if (length) {
*length = 0;
}
if (scope_len) {
*scope_len = 0;
}
if (scope) {
*scope = NULL;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 77,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseAudioContext::NotifyStateChange() {
DispatchEvent(*Event::Create(EventTypeNames::statechange));
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,611 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::didFailProvisionalLoad(WebFrame* frame,
const WebURLError& error) {
WebDataSource* ds = frame->provisionalDataSource();
DCHECK(ds);
const WebURLRequest& failed_request = ds->request();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
RenderViewObserver, observers_, DidFailProvisionalLoad(frame, error));
bool show_repost_interstitial =
(error.reason == net::ERR_CACHE_MISS &&
EqualsASCII(failed_request.httpMethod(), "POST"));
ViewHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError_Params params;
params.frame_id = frame->identifier();
params.is_main_frame = !frame->parent();
params.error_code = error.reason;
GetContentClient()->renderer()->GetNavigationErrorStrings(
failed_request,
error,
NULL,
¶ms.error_description);
params.url = error.unreachableURL;
params.showing_repost_interstitial = show_repost_interstitial;
Send(new ViewHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError(
routing_id_, params));
if (error.reason == net::ERR_ABORTED)
return;
frame->enableViewSourceMode(false);
DocumentState* document_state = DocumentState::FromDataSource(ds);
NavigationState* navigation_state = document_state->navigation_state();
bool replace =
navigation_state->pending_page_id() != -1 ||
navigation_state->transition_type() ==
PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_SUBFRAME;
if (!navigation_state->is_content_initiated()) {
pending_navigation_params_.reset(new ViewMsg_Navigate_Params);
pending_navigation_params_->page_id =
navigation_state->pending_page_id();
pending_navigation_params_->pending_history_list_offset =
navigation_state->pending_history_list_offset();
pending_navigation_params_->transition =
navigation_state->transition_type();
pending_navigation_params_->request_time =
document_state->request_time();
}
if (MaybeLoadAlternateErrorPage(frame, error, replace))
return;
LoadNavigationErrorPage(frame, failed_request, error, std::string(), replace);
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,626 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLMediaElement::WasAutoplayInitiated() {
return autoplay_policy_->WasAutoplayInitiated();
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 154,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, getMetadata)
{
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (phar_obj->arc.archive->metadata) {
if (phar_obj->arc.archive->is_persistent) {
zval *ret;
char *buf = estrndup((char *) phar_obj->arc.archive->metadata, phar_obj->arc.archive->metadata_len);
/* assume success, we would have failed before */
phar_parse_metadata(&buf, &ret, phar_obj->arc.archive->metadata_len TSRMLS_CC);
efree(buf);
RETURN_ZVAL(ret, 0, 1);
}
RETURN_ZVAL(phar_obj->arc.archive->metadata, 1, 0);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gx_dc_pattern_get_dev_halftone(const gx_device_color * pdevc)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 1,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static php_mb_regex_t *php_mbregex_compile_pattern(const char *pattern, int patlen, OnigOptionType options, OnigEncoding enc, OnigSyntaxType *syntax TSRMLS_DC)
{
int err_code = 0;
int found = 0;
php_mb_regex_t *retval = NULL, **rc = NULL;
OnigErrorInfo err_info;
OnigUChar err_str[ONIG_MAX_ERROR_MESSAGE_LEN];
found = zend_hash_find(&MBREX(ht_rc), (char *)pattern, patlen+1, (void **) &rc);
if (found == FAILURE || (*rc)->options != options || (*rc)->enc != enc || (*rc)->syntax != syntax) {
if ((err_code = onig_new(&retval, (OnigUChar *)pattern, (OnigUChar *)(pattern + patlen), options, enc, syntax, &err_info)) != ONIG_NORMAL) {
onig_error_code_to_str(err_str, err_code, err_info);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "mbregex compile err: %s", err_str);
retval = NULL;
goto out;
}
zend_hash_update(&MBREX(ht_rc), (char *) pattern, patlen + 1, (void *) &retval, sizeof(retval), NULL);
} else if (found == SUCCESS) {
retval = *rc;
}
out:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 1 | 167,123 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSTestEventTarget::JSTestEventTarget(Structure* structure, JSDOMGlobalObject* globalObject, PassRefPtr<TestEventTarget> impl)
: JSDOMWrapper(structure, globalObject)
, m_impl(impl.leakRef())
{
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int add_recvbuf_small(struct virtnet_info *vi, struct receive_queue *rq,
gfp_t gfp)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct virtio_net_hdr_mrg_rxbuf *hdr;
int err;
skb = __netdev_alloc_skb_ip_align(vi->dev, GOOD_PACKET_LEN, gfp);
if (unlikely(!skb))
return -ENOMEM;
skb_put(skb, GOOD_PACKET_LEN);
hdr = skb_vnet_hdr(skb);
sg_init_table(rq->sg, MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2);
sg_set_buf(rq->sg, hdr, vi->hdr_len);
skb_to_sgvec(skb, rq->sg + 1, 0, skb->len);
err = virtqueue_add_inbuf(rq->vq, rq->sg, 2, skb, gfp);
if (err < 0)
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
Commit Message: virtio-net: drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST
virtio declares support for NETIF_F_FRAGLIST, but assumes
that there are at most MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2 fragments which isn't
always true with a fraglist.
A longer fraglist in the skb will make the call to skb_to_sgvec overflow
the sg array, leading to memory corruption.
Drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST so we only get what we can handle.
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 42,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SizeConstraintsChanged() {
UpdateMinAndMaxSize();
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 140,608 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ReceiveSetTextDirection(RenderWidget* widget,
blink::WebTextDirection direction) {
widget->OnSetTextDirection(direction);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,905 |
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