instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static off_t proxy_telldir(FsContext *ctx, V9fsFidOpenState *fs)
{
return telldir(fs->dir.stream);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 7,653 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
{
struct task_struct *task = current;
const struct cred *old = task->real_cred;
kdebug("commit_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
atomic_read(&new->usage),
read_cred_subscribers(new));
BUG_ON(task->cred != old);
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(old) < 2);
validate_creds(old);
validate_creds(new);
#endif
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */
/* dumpability changes */
if (old->euid != new->euid ||
old->egid != new->egid ||
old->fsuid != new->fsuid ||
old->fsgid != new->fsgid ||
!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) {
if (task->mm)
set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
task->pdeath_signal = 0;
smp_wmb();
}
/* alter the thread keyring */
if (new->fsuid != old->fsuid)
key_fsuid_changed(task);
if (new->fsgid != old->fsgid)
key_fsgid_changed(task);
/* do it
* RLIMIT_NPROC limits on user->processes have already been checked
* in set_user().
*/
alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
if (new->user != old->user)
atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new);
rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new);
if (new->user != old->user)
atomic_dec(&old->user->processes);
alter_cred_subscribers(old, -2);
/* send notifications */
if (new->uid != old->uid ||
new->euid != old->euid ||
new->suid != old->suid ||
new->fsuid != old->fsuid)
proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_UID);
if (new->gid != old->gid ||
new->egid != old->egid ||
new->sgid != old->sgid ||
new->fsgid != old->fsgid)
proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_GID);
/* release the old obj and subj refs both */
put_cred(old);
put_cred(old);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: cred: copy_process() should clear child->replacement_session_keyring
keyctl_session_to_parent(task) sets ->replacement_session_keyring,
it should be processed and cleared by key_replace_session_keyring().
However, this task can fork before it notices TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and
the new child gets the bogus ->replacement_session_keyring copied by
dup_task_struct(). This is obviously wrong and, if nothing else, this
leads to put_cred(already_freed_cred).
change copy_creds() to clear this member. If copy_process() fails
before this point the wrong ->replacement_session_keyring doesn't
matter, exit_creds() won't be called.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataDirectoryService::GetEntryInfoPairByPathsAfterGetSecond(
const FilePath& second_path,
const GetEntryInfoPairCallback& callback,
scoped_ptr<EntryInfoPairResult> result,
GDataFileError error,
scoped_ptr<GDataEntryProto> entry_proto) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
DCHECK(result.get());
result->second.path = second_path;
result->second.error = error;
result->second.proto = entry_proto.Pass();
callback.Run(result.Pass());
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,092 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _nfs4_proc_getdeviceinfo(struct nfs_server *server,
struct pnfs_device *pdev,
struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
struct nfs4_getdeviceinfo_args args = {
.pdev = pdev,
.notify_types = NOTIFY_DEVICEID4_CHANGE |
NOTIFY_DEVICEID4_DELETE,
};
struct nfs4_getdeviceinfo_res res = {
.pdev = pdev,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_GETDEVICEINFO],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
.rpc_cred = cred,
};
int status;
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
status = nfs4_call_sync(server->client, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
if (res.notification & ~args.notify_types)
dprintk("%s: unsupported notification\n", __func__);
if (res.notification != args.notify_types)
pdev->nocache = 1;
dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, status);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OVS_REQUIRES(ofproto_mutex)
{
struct rule_collection *old_rules = &ofm->old_rules;
struct rule_collection *new_rules = &ofm->new_rules;
enum ofperr error;
if (rule_collection_n(old_rules) > 0) {
/* Create a new 'modified' rule for each old rule. */
struct rule *old_rule, *new_rule;
const struct rule_actions *actions = rule_get_actions(ofm->temp_rule);
/* Must check actions while holding ofproto_mutex to avoid a race. */
error = ofproto_check_ofpacts(ofproto, actions->ofpacts,
actions->ofpacts_len);
if (error) {
return error;
}
/* Use the temp rule as the first new rule, and as the template for
* the rest. */
struct rule *temp = ofm->temp_rule;
ofm->temp_rule = NULL; /* We consume the template. */
bool first = true;
RULE_COLLECTION_FOR_EACH (old_rule, old_rules) {
if (first) {
/* The template rule's match is possibly a loose one, so it
* must be replaced with the old rule's match so that the new
* rule actually replaces the old one. */
cls_rule_destroy(CONST_CAST(struct cls_rule *, &temp->cr));
cls_rule_clone(CONST_CAST(struct cls_rule *, &temp->cr),
&old_rule->cr);
if (temp->match_tlv_bitmap != old_rule->match_tlv_bitmap) {
mf_vl_mff_unref(&temp->ofproto->vl_mff_map,
temp->match_tlv_bitmap);
temp->match_tlv_bitmap = old_rule->match_tlv_bitmap;
mf_vl_mff_ref(&temp->ofproto->vl_mff_map,
temp->match_tlv_bitmap);
}
*CONST_CAST(uint8_t *, &temp->table_id) = old_rule->table_id;
rule_collection_add(new_rules, temp);
first = false;
} else {
struct cls_rule cr;
cls_rule_clone(&cr, &old_rule->cr);
error = ofproto_rule_create(ofproto, &cr, old_rule->table_id,
temp->flow_cookie,
temp->idle_timeout,
temp->hard_timeout, temp->flags,
temp->importance,
temp->actions->ofpacts,
temp->actions->ofpacts_len,
old_rule->match_tlv_bitmap,
temp->ofpacts_tlv_bitmap,
&new_rule);
if (!error) {
rule_collection_add(new_rules, new_rule);
} else {
/* Return the template rule in place in the error case. */
ofm->temp_rule = temp;
rule_collection_rules(new_rules)[0] = NULL;
rule_collection_unref(new_rules);
rule_collection_destroy(new_rules);
return error;
}
}
}
ovs_assert(rule_collection_n(new_rules)
== rule_collection_n(old_rules));
RULE_COLLECTIONS_FOR_EACH (old_rule, new_rule, old_rules, new_rules) {
replace_rule_start(ofproto, ofm, old_rule, new_rule);
}
} else if (ofm->modify_may_add_flow) {
/* No match, add a new flow, consumes 'temp'. */
error = add_flow_start(ofproto, ofm);
} else {
/* No flow to modify and may not add a flow. */
ofproto_rule_unref(ofm->temp_rule);
ofm->temp_rule = NULL; /* We consume the template. */
error = 0;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sha512_ssse3_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
struct sha512_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
unsigned int i, index, padlen;
__be64 *dst = (__be64 *)out;
__be64 bits[2];
static const u8 padding[SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0x80, };
/* save number of bits */
bits[1] = cpu_to_be64(sctx->count[0] << 3);
bits[0] = cpu_to_be64(sctx->count[1] << 3 | sctx->count[0] >> 61);
/* Pad out to 112 mod 128 and append length */
index = sctx->count[0] & 0x7f;
padlen = (index < 112) ? (112 - index) : ((128+112) - index);
if (!irq_fpu_usable()) {
crypto_sha512_update(desc, padding, padlen);
crypto_sha512_update(desc, (const u8 *)&bits, sizeof(bits));
} else {
kernel_fpu_begin();
/* We need to fill a whole block for __sha512_ssse3_update() */
if (padlen <= 112) {
sctx->count[0] += padlen;
if (sctx->count[0] < padlen)
sctx->count[1]++;
memcpy(sctx->buf + index, padding, padlen);
} else {
__sha512_ssse3_update(desc, padding, padlen, index);
}
__sha512_ssse3_update(desc, (const u8 *)&bits,
sizeof(bits), 112);
kernel_fpu_end();
}
/* Store state in digest */
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
dst[i] = cpu_to_be64(sctx->state[i]);
/* Wipe context */
memset(sctx, 0, sizeof(*sctx));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int insert_reserved_file_extent(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct inode *inode, u64 file_pos,
u64 disk_bytenr, u64 disk_num_bytes,
u64 num_bytes, u64 ram_bytes,
u8 compression, u8 encryption,
u16 other_encoding, int extent_type)
{
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct btrfs_file_extent_item *fi;
struct btrfs_path *path;
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
struct btrfs_key ins;
int extent_inserted = 0;
int ret;
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path)
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* we may be replacing one extent in the tree with another.
* The new extent is pinned in the extent map, and we don't want
* to drop it from the cache until it is completely in the btree.
*
* So, tell btrfs_drop_extents to leave this extent in the cache.
* the caller is expected to unpin it and allow it to be merged
* with the others.
*/
ret = __btrfs_drop_extents(trans, root, inode, path, file_pos,
file_pos + num_bytes, NULL, 0,
1, sizeof(*fi), &extent_inserted);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (!extent_inserted) {
ins.objectid = btrfs_ino(inode);
ins.offset = file_pos;
ins.type = BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY;
path->leave_spinning = 1;
ret = btrfs_insert_empty_item(trans, root, path, &ins,
sizeof(*fi));
if (ret)
goto out;
}
leaf = path->nodes[0];
fi = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, path->slots[0],
struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
btrfs_set_file_extent_generation(leaf, fi, trans->transid);
btrfs_set_file_extent_type(leaf, fi, extent_type);
btrfs_set_file_extent_disk_bytenr(leaf, fi, disk_bytenr);
btrfs_set_file_extent_disk_num_bytes(leaf, fi, disk_num_bytes);
btrfs_set_file_extent_offset(leaf, fi, 0);
btrfs_set_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi, num_bytes);
btrfs_set_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, fi, ram_bytes);
btrfs_set_file_extent_compression(leaf, fi, compression);
btrfs_set_file_extent_encryption(leaf, fi, encryption);
btrfs_set_file_extent_other_encoding(leaf, fi, other_encoding);
btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty(leaf);
btrfs_release_path(path);
inode_add_bytes(inode, num_bytes);
ins.objectid = disk_bytenr;
ins.offset = disk_num_bytes;
ins.type = BTRFS_EXTENT_ITEM_KEY;
ret = btrfs_alloc_reserved_file_extent(trans, root,
root->root_key.objectid,
btrfs_ino(inode), file_pos, &ins);
out:
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 41,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dissect_spoolss_string_parm(tvbuff_t *tvb, gint offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep, const char *text)
{
offset = dissect_ndr_pointer(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
dissect_spoolss_string_parm_data, NDR_POINTER_UNIQUE,
text, -1);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 52,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void die_if_data_is_missing(GHashTable *problem_info)
{
gboolean missing_data = FALSE;
gchar **pstring;
static const gchar *const needed[] = {
FILENAME_TYPE,
FILENAME_REASON,
/* FILENAME_BACKTRACE, - ECC errors have no such elements */
/* FILENAME_EXECUTABLE, */
NULL
};
for (pstring = (gchar**) needed; *pstring; pstring++)
{
if (!g_hash_table_lookup(problem_info, *pstring))
{
error_msg("Element '%s' is missing", *pstring);
missing_data = TRUE;
}
}
if (missing_data)
error_msg_and_die("Some data is missing, aborting");
}
Commit Message: make the dump directories owned by root by default
It was discovered that the abrt event scripts create a user-readable
copy of a sosreport file in abrt problem directories, and include
excerpts of /var/log/messages selected by the user-controlled process
name, leading to an information disclosure.
This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security.
Related: #1212868
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 96,381 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __receive_buf(struct tty_struct *tty, const unsigned char *cp,
char *fp, int count)
{
struct n_tty_data *ldata = tty->disc_data;
bool preops = I_ISTRIP(tty) || (I_IUCLC(tty) && L_IEXTEN(tty));
if (ldata->real_raw)
n_tty_receive_buf_real_raw(tty, cp, fp, count);
else if (ldata->raw || (L_EXTPROC(tty) && !preops))
n_tty_receive_buf_raw(tty, cp, fp, count);
else if (tty->closing && !L_EXTPROC(tty))
n_tty_receive_buf_closing(tty, cp, fp, count);
else {
if (ldata->lnext) {
char flag = TTY_NORMAL;
if (fp)
flag = *fp++;
n_tty_receive_char_lnext(tty, *cp++, flag);
count--;
}
if (!preops && !I_PARMRK(tty))
n_tty_receive_buf_fast(tty, cp, fp, count);
else
n_tty_receive_buf_standard(tty, cp, fp, count);
flush_echoes(tty);
if (tty->ops->flush_chars)
tty->ops->flush_chars(tty);
}
if (ldata->icanon && !L_EXTPROC(tty))
return;
/* publish read_head to consumer */
smp_store_release(&ldata->commit_head, ldata->read_head);
if (read_cnt(ldata)) {
kill_fasync(&tty->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
wake_up_interruptible_poll(&tty->read_wait, POLLIN);
}
}
Commit Message: n_tty: fix EXTPROC vs ICANON interaction with TIOCINQ (aka FIONREAD)
We added support for EXTPROC back in 2010 in commit 26df6d13406d ("tty:
Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE") and the intent was to allow it to
override some (all?) ICANON behavior. Quoting from that original commit
message:
There is a new bit in the termios local flag word, EXTPROC.
When this bit is set, several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled. Input line editing, character echo, and mapping
of signals are all disabled. This allows the telnetd to turn
off these functions when in linemode, but still keep track of
what state the user wants the terminal to be in.
but the problem turns out that "several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled" is a bit ambiguous, and you can really confuse the n_tty
layer by setting EXTPROC and then causing some of the ICANON invariants
to no longer be maintained.
This fixes at least one such case (TIOCINQ) becoming unhappy because of
the confusion over whether ICANON really means ICANON when EXTPROC is set.
This basically makes TIOCINQ match the case of read: if EXTPROC is set,
we ignore ICANON. Also, make sure to reset the ICANON state ie EXTPROC
changes, not just if ICANON changes.
Fixes: 26df6d13406d ("tty: Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 76,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ContentUtilityClient* ShellMainDelegate::CreateContentUtilityClient() {
utility_client_.reset(new ShellContentUtilityClient);
return utility_client_.get();
}
Commit Message: Fix content_shell with network service enabled not loading pages.
This regressed in my earlier cl r528763.
This is a reland of r547221.
Bug: 833612
Change-Id: I4c2649414d42773f2530e1abe5912a04fcd0ed9b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1064702
Reviewed-by: Jay Civelli <jcivelli@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560011}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 172,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileAPIMessageFilter::OnCreate(
int request_id, const GURL& path, bool exclusive,
bool is_directory, bool recursive) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
base::PlatformFileError error;
FileSystemURL url(path);
if (!HasPermissionsForFile(url, kCreateFilePermissions, &error)) {
Send(new FileSystemMsg_DidFail(request_id, error));
return;
}
FileSystemOperation* operation = GetNewOperation(url, request_id);
if (!operation)
return;
if (is_directory) {
operation->CreateDirectory(
url, exclusive, recursive,
base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::DidFinish, this, request_id));
} else {
operation->CreateFile(
url, exclusive,
base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::DidFinish, this, request_id));
}
}
Commit Message: File permission fix: now we selectively grant read permission for Sandboxed files
We also need to check the read permission and call GrantReadFile() for
sandboxed files for CreateSnapshotFile().
BUG=162114
TEST=manual
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11280231
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@170181 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 119,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t show_cons_active(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct console *cs[16];
int i = 0;
struct console *c;
ssize_t count = 0;
console_lock();
for_each_console(c) {
if (!c->device)
continue;
if (!c->write)
continue;
if ((c->flags & CON_ENABLED) == 0)
continue;
cs[i++] = c;
if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(cs))
break;
}
while (i--) {
int index = cs[i]->index;
struct tty_driver *drv = cs[i]->device(cs[i], &index);
/* don't resolve tty0 as some programs depend on it */
if (drv && (cs[i]->index > 0 || drv->major != TTY_MAJOR))
count += tty_line_name(drv, index, buf + count);
else
count += sprintf(buf + count, "%s%d",
cs[i]->name, cs[i]->index);
count += sprintf(buf + count, "%c", i ? ' ':'\n');
}
console_unlock();
return count;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 55,885 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_pmu_sched_task(struct task_struct *prev,
struct task_struct *next,
bool sched_in)
{
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx;
struct pmu *pmu;
if (prev == next)
return;
list_for_each_entry(cpuctx, this_cpu_ptr(&sched_cb_list), sched_cb_entry) {
pmu = cpuctx->unique_pmu; /* software PMUs will not have sched_task */
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!pmu->sched_task))
continue;
perf_ctx_lock(cpuctx, cpuctx->task_ctx);
perf_pmu_disable(pmu);
pmu->sched_task(cpuctx->task_ctx, sched_in);
perf_pmu_enable(pmu);
perf_ctx_unlock(cpuctx, cpuctx->task_ctx);
}
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 68,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Convert_rgn (SDLS_SYNTHESIZER_DATA *pDLSData, EAS_U16 regionIndex, EAS_U16 artIndex, EAS_U16 waveIndex, S_WSMP_DATA *pWsmp)
{
S_DLS_REGION *pRgn;
/* setup pointers to data structures */
pRgn = &pDLSData->pDLS->pDLSRegions[regionIndex];
/* intiailize indices */
pRgn->wtRegion.artIndex = artIndex;
pRgn->wtRegion.waveIndex = waveIndex;
/* convert region data */
/*lint -e{704} use shift for performance */
pRgn->wtRegion.gain = (EAS_I16) (pWsmp->gain >> 16);
pRgn->wtRegion.loopStart = pWsmp->loopStart;
pRgn->wtRegion.loopEnd = (pWsmp->loopStart + pWsmp->loopLength);
pRgn->wtRegion.tuning = pWsmp->fineTune -(pWsmp->unityNote * 100) + ConvertSampleRate(pWsmp->sampleRate);
if (pWsmp->loopLength != 0)
pRgn->wtRegion.region.keyGroupAndFlags |= REGION_FLAG_IS_LOOPED;
}
Commit Message: DLS parser: fix wave pool size check.
Bug: 21132860.
Change-Id: I8ae872ea2cc2e8fec5fa0b7815f0b6b31ce744ff
(cherry picked from commit 2d7f8e1be2241e48458f5d3cab5e90be2b07c699)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,512 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: trace_eval_jmp_to_tail(union trace_eval_map_item *ptr)
{
/* Return tail of array given the head */
return ptr + ptr->head.length + 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,390 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void usbip_dump_usb_device(struct usb_device *udev)
{
struct device *dev = &udev->dev;
int i;
dev_dbg(dev, " devnum(%d) devpath(%s) usb speed(%s)",
udev->devnum, udev->devpath, usb_speed_string(udev->speed));
pr_debug("tt %p, ttport %d\n", udev->tt, udev->ttport);
dev_dbg(dev, " ");
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
pr_debug(" %2u", i);
pr_debug("\n");
dev_dbg(dev, " toggle0(IN) :");
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
pr_debug(" %2u", (udev->toggle[0] & (1 << i)) ? 1 : 0);
pr_debug("\n");
dev_dbg(dev, " toggle1(OUT):");
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
pr_debug(" %2u", (udev->toggle[1] & (1 << i)) ? 1 : 0);
pr_debug("\n");
dev_dbg(dev, " epmaxp_in :");
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
if (udev->ep_in[i])
pr_debug(" %2u",
le16_to_cpu(udev->ep_in[i]->desc.wMaxPacketSize));
}
pr_debug("\n");
dev_dbg(dev, " epmaxp_out :");
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
if (udev->ep_out[i])
pr_debug(" %2u",
le16_to_cpu(udev->ep_out[i]->desc.wMaxPacketSize));
}
pr_debug("\n");
dev_dbg(dev, "parent %p, bus %p\n", udev->parent, udev->bus);
dev_dbg(dev,
"descriptor %p, config %p, actconfig %p, rawdescriptors %p\n",
&udev->descriptor, udev->config,
udev->actconfig, udev->rawdescriptors);
dev_dbg(dev, "have_langid %d, string_langid %d\n",
udev->have_langid, udev->string_langid);
dev_dbg(dev, "maxchild %d\n", udev->maxchild);
}
Commit Message: USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write
Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MSG_WriteBigString( msg_t *sb, const char *s ) {
if ( !s ) {
MSG_WriteData (sb, "", 1);
} else {
int l,i;
char string[BIG_INFO_STRING];
l = strlen( s );
if ( l >= BIG_INFO_STRING ) {
Com_Printf( "MSG_WriteString: BIG_INFO_STRING" );
MSG_WriteData (sb, "", 1);
return;
}
Q_strncpyz( string, s, sizeof( string ) );
for ( i = 0 ; i < l ; i++ ) {
if ( ((byte *)string)[i] > 127 || string[i] == '%' ) {
string[i] = '.';
}
}
MSG_WriteData (sb, string, l+1);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 63,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ext4_force_commit(struct super_block *sb)
{
journal_t *journal;
int ret = 0;
if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)
return 0;
journal = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal;
if (journal)
ret = ext4_journal_force_commit(journal);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,567 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CWebServer::RemoveUsersSessions(const std::string& username, const WebEmSession & exceptSession) {
m_sql.safe_query("DELETE FROM UserSessions WHERE (Username=='%q') and (SessionID!='%q')", username.c_str(), exceptSession.id.c_str());
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 91,072 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nr_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct nr_sock *nr = nr_sk(sk);
unsigned long opt;
if (level != SOL_NETROM)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (optlen < sizeof(unsigned int))
return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(opt, (unsigned int __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
switch (optname) {
case NETROM_T1:
if (opt < 1 || opt > ULONG_MAX / HZ)
return -EINVAL;
nr->t1 = opt * HZ;
return 0;
case NETROM_T2:
if (opt < 1 || opt > ULONG_MAX / HZ)
return -EINVAL;
nr->t2 = opt * HZ;
return 0;
case NETROM_N2:
if (opt < 1 || opt > 31)
return -EINVAL;
nr->n2 = opt;
return 0;
case NETROM_T4:
if (opt < 1 || opt > ULONG_MAX / HZ)
return -EINVAL;
nr->t4 = opt * HZ;
return 0;
case NETROM_IDLE:
if (opt > ULONG_MAX / (60 * HZ))
return -EINVAL;
nr->idle = opt * 60 * HZ;
return 0;
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
}
Commit Message: netrom: fix info leak via msg_name in nr_recvmsg()
In case msg_name is set the sockaddr info gets filled out, as
requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of
struct sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Also
the sax25_ndigis member does not get assigned, leaking four more
bytes.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,529 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SProcRenderReferenceGlyphSet(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xRenderReferenceGlyphSetReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderReferenceGlyphSetReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->gsid);
swapl(&stuff->existing);
return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,629 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: apprentice_map(struct magic_set *ms, const char *fn)
{
int fd;
struct stat st;
char *dbname = NULL;
struct magic_map *map;
fd = -1;
if ((map = CAST(struct magic_map *, calloc(1, sizeof(*map)))) == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, sizeof(*map));
goto error;
}
dbname = mkdbname(ms, fn, 0);
if (dbname == NULL)
goto error;
if ((fd = open(dbname, O_RDONLY|O_BINARY)) == -1)
goto error;
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
file_error(ms, errno, "cannot stat `%s'", dbname);
goto error;
}
if (st.st_size < 8 || st.st_size > MAXMAGIC_SIZE) {
file_error(ms, 0, "file `%s' is too %s", dbname,
st.st_size < 8 ? "small" : "large");
goto error;
}
map->len = (size_t)st.st_size;
#ifdef QUICK
if ((map->p = mmap(0, (size_t)st.st_size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FILE, fd, (off_t)0)) == MAP_FAILED) {
file_error(ms, errno, "cannot map `%s'", dbname);
goto error;
}
map->type = MAP_TYPE_MMAP;
#else
if ((map->p = CAST(void *, malloc(map->len))) == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, map->len);
goto error;
}
if (read(fd, map->p, map->len) != (ssize_t)map->len) {
file_badread(ms);
goto error;
}
map->type = MAP_TYPE_MALLOC;
#define RET 1
#endif
(void)close(fd);
fd = -1;
if (check_buffer(ms, map, dbname) != 0)
goto error;
free(dbname);
return map;
error:
if (fd != -1)
(void)close(fd);
apprentice_unmap(map);
free(dbname);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 45,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *Stream::getLine(char *buf, int size) {
int i;
int c;
if (lookChar() == EOF || size < 0)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < size - 1; ++i) {
c = getChar();
if (c == EOF || c == '\n')
break;
if (c == '\r') {
if ((c = lookChar()) == '\n')
getChar();
break;
}
buf[i] = c;
}
buf[i] = '\0';
return buf;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: isis_print_mt_capability_subtlv(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *tptr, int len)
{
int stlv_type, stlv_len, tmp;
while (len > 2)
{
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 2);
stlv_type = *(tptr++);
stlv_len = *(tptr++);
/* first lets see if we know the subTLVs name*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s subTLV #%u, length: %u",
tok2str(isis_mt_capability_subtlv_values, "unknown", stlv_type),
stlv_type,
stlv_len));
len = len - 2;
/* Make sure the subTLV fits within the space left */
if (len < stlv_len)
goto trunc;
/* Make sure the entire subTLV is in the captured data */
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), stlv_len);
switch (stlv_type)
{
case ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE:
if (stlv_len < ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE_MIN_LEN)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t CIST Root-ID: %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Path Cost: %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Prio: %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr + 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t RES: %d",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) >> 5));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", V: %d",
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) >> 4) & 0x0001));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", SPSource-ID: %d",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr) & 0x000fffff)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", No of Trees: %x", *(tptr)));
tmp = *(tptr++);
len = len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE_MIN_LEN;
stlv_len = stlv_len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE_MIN_LEN;
while (tmp)
{
if (stlv_len < ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE_VLAN_TUPLE_LEN)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t U:%d, M:%d, A:%d, RES:%d",
*(tptr) >> 7, (*(tptr) >> 6) & 0x01,
(*(tptr) >> 5) & 0x01, (*(tptr) & 0x1f)));
tptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", ECT: %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr + 4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", BVID: %d, SPVID: %d",
(EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr) >> 12) & 0x000fff,
EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr) & 0x000fff));
tptr = tptr + 3;
len = len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE_VLAN_TUPLE_LEN;
stlv_len = stlv_len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE_VLAN_TUPLE_LEN;
tmp--;
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_SPBM_SI:
if (stlv_len < 8)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t BMAC: %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RES: %d, VID: %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) >> 12,
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)) & 0x0fff));
tptr = tptr+2;
len = len - 8;
stlv_len = stlv_len - 8;
while (stlv_len >= 4) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t T: %d, R: %d, RES: %d, ISID: %d",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr) >> 31),
(EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr) >> 30) & 0x01,
(EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr) >> 24) & 0x03f,
(EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)) & 0x0ffffff));
tptr = tptr + 4;
len = len - 4;
stlv_len = stlv_len - 4;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
tptr += stlv_len;
len -= stlv_len;
}
return 0;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return(1);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13055/IS-IS: fix an Extended IS Reachability sub-TLV
In isis_print_is_reach_subtlv() one of the case blocks did not check that
the sub-TLV "V" is actually present and could over-read the input buffer.
Add a length check to fix that and remove a useless boundary check from
a loop because the boundary is tested for the full length of "V" before
the switch block.
Update one of the prior test cases as it turns out it depended on this
previously incorrect code path to make it to its own malformed structure
further down the buffer, the bugfix has changed its output.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SVGLayoutSupport::mapToVisualRectInAncestorSpace(const LayoutObject& object, const LayoutBoxModelObject* ancestor, const FloatRect& localPaintInvalidationRect, LayoutRect& resultRect, VisualRectFlags visualRectFlags)
{
AffineTransform rootBorderBoxTransform;
const LayoutSVGRoot& svgRoot = computeTransformToSVGRoot(object, rootBorderBoxTransform);
resultRect = transformPaintInvalidationRect(object, rootBorderBoxTransform, localPaintInvalidationRect);
if (svgRoot.shouldApplyViewportClip()) {
LayoutRect clipRect(svgRoot.pixelSnappedBorderBoxRect());
if (visualRectFlags & EdgeInclusive) {
if (!resultRect.inclusiveIntersect(clipRect))
return false;
} else {
resultRect.intersect(clipRect);
}
}
return svgRoot.mapToVisualRectInAncestorSpace(ancestor, resultRect, visualRectFlags);
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID: | 0 | 121,165 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void messagePortArrayAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(Vector<RefPtr<MessagePort> >, cppValue, (toRefPtrNativeArray<MessagePort, V8MessagePort>(jsValue, 0, info.GetIsolate())));
imp->setMessagePortArray(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,763 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: panel_set_option(struct parsed_tagarg *arg)
{
FILE *f = NULL;
char *p;
Str s = Strnew(), tmp;
if (config_file == NULL) {
disp_message("There's no config file... config not saved", FALSE);
}
else {
f = fopen(config_file, "wt");
if (f == NULL) {
disp_message("Can't write option!", FALSE);
}
}
while (arg) {
/* InnerCharset -> SystemCharset */
if (arg->value) {
p = conv_to_system(arg->value);
if (set_param(arg->arg, p)) {
tmp = Sprintf("%s %s\n", arg->arg, p);
Strcat(tmp, s);
s = tmp;
}
}
arg = arg->next;
}
if (f) {
fputs(s->ptr, f);
fclose(f);
}
sync_with_option();
backBf();
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 84,564 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BinaryUploadService::OnGetResponse(Request* request,
DeepScanningClientResponse response) {
if (!IsActive(request))
return;
if (response.has_dlp_scan_verdict()) {
received_dlp_verdicts_[request].reset(response.release_dlp_scan_verdict());
}
if (response.has_malware_scan_verdict()) {
received_malware_verdicts_[request].reset(
response.release_malware_scan_verdict());
}
MaybeFinishRequest(request);
}
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <domfc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t WritePSDChannel(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
const QuantumType quantum_type, unsigned char *compact_pixels,
MagickOffsetType size_offset,const MagickBooleanType separate)
{
int
y;
MagickBooleanType
monochrome;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
count,
length;
unsigned char
*pixels;
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
#define CHUNK 16384
int
flush,
level;
unsigned char
*compressed_pixels;
z_stream
stream;
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) NULL;
flush=Z_NO_FLUSH;
#endif
count=0;
if (separate != MagickFalse)
{
size_offset=TellBlob(image)+2;
count+=WriteCompressionStart(psd_info,image,next_image,1);
}
if (next_image->depth > 8)
next_image->depth=16;
monochrome=IsMonochromeImage(image,&image->exception) && (image->depth == 1)
? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
return(0);
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
compressed_pixels=AcquireQuantumMemory(CHUNK,sizeof(*compressed_pixels));
if (compressed_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(0);
}
ResetMagickMemory(&stream,0,sizeof(stream));
stream.data_type=Z_BINARY;
level=Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION;
if ((image_info->quality > 0 && image_info->quality < 10))
level=(int) image_info->quality;
if (deflateInit(&stream,level) != Z_OK)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(0);
}
}
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) next_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(next_image,0,y,next_image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(next_image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
if (monochrome != MagickFalse)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
pixels[i]=(~pixels[i]);
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
length=PSDPackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,compact_pixels);
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,compact_pixels);
size_offset+=WritePSDOffset(psd_info,image,length,size_offset);
}
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
else if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
stream.avail_in=(uInt) length;
stream.next_in=(Bytef *) pixels;
if (y == (ssize_t) next_image->rows-1)
flush=Z_FINISH;
do {
stream.avail_out=(uInt) CHUNK;
stream.next_out=(Bytef *) compressed_pixels;
if (deflate(&stream,flush) == Z_STREAM_ERROR)
break;
length=(size_t) CHUNK-stream.avail_out;
if (length > 0)
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,compressed_pixels);
} while (stream.avail_out == 0);
}
#endif
else
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
(void) deflateEnd(&stream);
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
compressed_pixels);
}
#endif
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(count);
}
Commit Message: Fixed memory leak.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 71,920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: QWebNavigationHistory* QQuickWebViewExperimental::navigationHistory() const
{
return d_ptr->navigationHistory.get();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 101,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API RList *r_anal_bb_list_new() {
RList *list = r_list_newf ((RListFree)r_anal_bb_free);
if (!list) {
return NULL;
}
return list;
}
Commit Message: Fix #10293 - Use-after-free in r_anal_bb_free()
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 82,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameHostImpl* RenderFrameHostImpl::FromID(int process_id,
int routing_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
RoutingIDFrameMap* frames = g_routing_id_frame_map.Pointer();
RoutingIDFrameMap::iterator it = frames->find(
RenderFrameHostID(process_id, routing_id));
return it == frames->end() ? NULL : it->second;
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int incclasscanon(Reclass *cc, Rune c)
{
Rune *p, r;
for (p = cc->spans; p < cc->end; p += 2)
for (r = p[0]; r <= p[1]; ++r)
if (c == canon(r))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 90,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_io(struct mapped_device *md, struct dm_io *io)
{
mempool_free(io, md->io_pool);
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void voidMethodTestEnumArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("voidMethodTestEnumArg", "TestObjectPython", ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, testEnumTypeArg, info[0]);
String string = testEnumTypeArg;
if (!(string == "" || string == "EnumValue1" || string == "EnumValue2" || string == "EnumValue3")) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("voidMethodTestEnumArg", "TestObjectPython", "parameter 1 ('" + string + "') is not a valid enum value."), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
imp->voidMethodTestEnumArg(testEnumTypeArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLFormElement::checkValidity() {
return !CheckInvalidControlsAndCollectUnhandled(
nullptr, kCheckValidityDispatchInvalidEvent);
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 152,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void enforcedRangeUnsignedShortAttrAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueUnsigned(info, imp->enforcedRangeUnsignedShortAttr());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init set_handler(unsigned long offset, void *addr, unsigned long size)
{
memcpy((void *)(ebase + offset), addr, size);
local_flush_icache_range(ebase + offset, ebase + offset + size);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: QQmlComponent* QQuickWebViewExperimental::certificateVerificationDialog() const
{
Q_D(const QQuickWebView);
return d->certificateVerificationDialog;
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,973 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hns_xgmac_tx_enable(struct mac_driver *drv, u32 value)
{
dsaf_set_dev_bit(drv, XGMAC_MAC_ENABLE_REG, XGMAC_ENABLE_TX_B, !!value);
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 85,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::isRequiredFormControl() const
{
return m_inputType->supportsRequired() && isRequired();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void tcp_enter_frto(struct sock *sk)
{
const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
if ((!tp->frto_counter && icsk->icsk_ca_state <= TCP_CA_Disorder) ||
tp->snd_una == tp->high_seq ||
((icsk->icsk_ca_state == TCP_CA_Loss || tp->frto_counter) &&
!icsk->icsk_retransmits)) {
tp->prior_ssthresh = tcp_current_ssthresh(sk);
/* Our state is too optimistic in ssthresh() call because cwnd
* is not reduced until tcp_enter_frto_loss() when previous F-RTO
* recovery has not yet completed. Pattern would be this: RTO,
* Cumulative ACK, RTO (2xRTO for the same segment does not end
* up here twice).
* RFC4138 should be more specific on what to do, even though
* RTO is quite unlikely to occur after the first Cumulative ACK
* due to back-off and complexity of triggering events ...
*/
if (tp->frto_counter) {
u32 stored_cwnd;
stored_cwnd = tp->snd_cwnd;
tp->snd_cwnd = 2;
tp->snd_ssthresh = icsk->icsk_ca_ops->ssthresh(sk);
tp->snd_cwnd = stored_cwnd;
} else {
tp->snd_ssthresh = icsk->icsk_ca_ops->ssthresh(sk);
}
/* ... in theory, cong.control module could do "any tricks" in
* ssthresh(), which means that ca_state, lost bits and lost_out
* counter would have to be faked before the call occurs. We
* consider that too expensive, unlikely and hacky, so modules
* using these in ssthresh() must deal these incompatibility
* issues if they receives CA_EVENT_FRTO and frto_counter != 0
*/
tcp_ca_event(sk, CA_EVENT_FRTO);
}
tp->undo_marker = tp->snd_una;
tp->undo_retrans = 0;
skb = tcp_write_queue_head(sk);
if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_RETRANS)
tp->undo_marker = 0;
if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_RETRANS) {
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked &= ~TCPCB_SACKED_RETRANS;
tp->retrans_out -= tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
}
tcp_verify_left_out(tp);
/* Too bad if TCP was application limited */
tp->snd_cwnd = min(tp->snd_cwnd, tcp_packets_in_flight(tp) + 1);
/* Earlier loss recovery underway (see RFC4138; Appendix B).
* The last condition is necessary at least in tp->frto_counter case.
*/
if (tcp_is_sackfrto(tp) && (tp->frto_counter ||
((1 << icsk->icsk_ca_state) & (TCPF_CA_Recovery|TCPF_CA_Loss))) &&
after(tp->high_seq, tp->snd_una)) {
tp->frto_highmark = tp->high_seq;
} else {
tp->frto_highmark = tp->snd_nxt;
}
tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Disorder);
tp->high_seq = tp->snd_nxt;
tp->frto_counter = 1;
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 41,146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: authentic_is_selected(struct sc_card *card, const struct sc_path *path, struct sc_file **file_out)
{
if (!path->len) {
if (file_out && card->cache.valid && card->cache.current_df)
sc_file_dup(file_out, card->cache.current_df);
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
else if (path->len == 2 && card->cache.valid && card->cache.current_ef) {
if (!memcmp(card->cache.current_ef->path.value, path->value, 2)) {
if (file_out)
sc_file_dup(file_out, card->cache.current_ef);
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
}
return SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static WebHistoryCommitType LoadTypeToCommitType(WebFrameLoadType type) {
switch (type) {
case WebFrameLoadType::kStandard:
return kWebStandardCommit;
case WebFrameLoadType::kBackForward:
return kWebBackForwardCommit;
case WebFrameLoadType::kReload:
case WebFrameLoadType::kReplaceCurrentItem:
case WebFrameLoadType::kReloadBypassingCache:
return kWebHistoryInertCommit;
}
NOTREACHED();
return kWebHistoryInertCommit;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 144,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fill_symbol_bind_and_type (struct r_bin_elf_symbol_t *ret, Elf_(Sym) *sym) {
#define s_bind(x) ret->bind = x
#define s_type(x) ret->type = x
switch (ELF_ST_BIND(sym->st_info)) {
case STB_LOCAL: s_bind ("LOCAL"); break;
case STB_GLOBAL: s_bind ("GLOBAL"); break;
case STB_WEAK: s_bind ("WEAK"); break;
case STB_NUM: s_bind ("NUM"); break;
case STB_LOOS: s_bind ("LOOS"); break;
case STB_HIOS: s_bind ("HIOS"); break;
case STB_LOPROC: s_bind ("LOPROC"); break;
case STB_HIPROC: s_bind ("HIPROC"); break;
default: s_bind ("UNKNOWN");
}
switch (ELF_ST_TYPE (sym->st_info)) {
case STT_NOTYPE: s_type ("NOTYPE"); break;
case STT_OBJECT: s_type ("OBJECT"); break;
case STT_FUNC: s_type ("FUNC"); break;
case STT_SECTION: s_type ("SECTION"); break;
case STT_FILE: s_type ("FILE"); break;
case STT_COMMON: s_type ("COMMON"); break;
case STT_TLS: s_type ("TLS"); break;
case STT_NUM: s_type ("NUM"); break;
case STT_LOOS: s_type ("LOOS"); break;
case STT_HIOS: s_type ("HIOS"); break;
case STT_LOPROC: s_type ("LOPROC"); break;
case STT_HIPROC: s_type ("HIPROC"); break;
default: s_type ("UNKNOWN");
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #8764 - huge vd_aux caused pointer wraparound
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 60,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool page_huge_active(struct page *page)
{
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageHuge(page), page);
return PageHead(page) && PagePrivate(&page[1]);
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SampleTable::SampleTable(const sp<DataSource> &source)
: mDataSource(source),
mChunkOffsetOffset(-1),
mChunkOffsetType(0),
mNumChunkOffsets(0),
mSampleToChunkOffset(-1),
mNumSampleToChunkOffsets(0),
mSampleSizeOffset(-1),
mSampleSizeFieldSize(0),
mDefaultSampleSize(0),
mNumSampleSizes(0),
mTimeToSampleCount(0),
mTimeToSample(NULL),
mSampleTimeEntries(NULL),
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries(NULL),
mNumCompositionTimeDeltaEntries(0),
mCompositionDeltaLookup(new CompositionDeltaLookup),
mSyncSampleOffset(-1),
mNumSyncSamples(0),
mSyncSamples(NULL),
mLastSyncSampleIndex(0),
mSampleToChunkEntries(NULL) {
mSampleIterator = new SampleIterator(this);
}
Commit Message: Fix several ineffective integer overflow checks
Commit edd4a76 (which addressed bugs 15328708, 15342615, 15342751) added
several integer overflow checks. Unfortunately, those checks fail to take into
account integer promotion rules and are thus themselves subject to an integer
overflow. Cast the sizeof() operator to a uint64_t to force promotion while
multiplying.
Bug: 20139950
(cherry picked from commit e2e812e58e8d2716b00d7d82db99b08d3afb4b32)
Change-Id: I080eb3fa147601f18cedab86e0360406c3963d7b
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void putname(struct filename *name)
{
if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
return audit_putname(name);
final_putname(name);
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 36,371 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long perf_instruction_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long ip;
if (perf_guest_cbs && perf_guest_cbs->is_in_guest())
ip = perf_guest_cbs->get_guest_ip();
else
ip = instruction_pointer(regs);
return ip;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,765 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoVertexAttribI4uiv(GLuint index,
const volatile GLuint* v) {
GLuint t[4] = {v[0], v[1], v[2], v[3]};
if (SetVertexAttribValue("glVertexAttribI4uiv", index, t)) {
state_.SetGenericVertexAttribBaseType(
index, SHADER_VARIABLE_UINT);
api()->glVertexAttribI4uivFn(index, t);
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init l2tp_ip6_init(void)
{
int err;
pr_info("L2TP IP encapsulation support for IPv6 (L2TPv3)\n");
err = proto_register(&l2tp_ip6_prot, 1);
if (err != 0)
goto out;
err = inet6_add_protocol(&l2tp_ip6_protocol, IPPROTO_L2TP);
if (err)
goto out1;
inet6_register_protosw(&l2tp_ip6_protosw);
return 0;
out1:
proto_unregister(&l2tp_ip6_prot);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: l2tp: fix info leak in l2tp_ip6_recvmsg()
The L2TP code for IPv6 fails to initialize the l2tp_conn_id member of
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 and therefore leaks four bytes kernel stack
in l2tp_ip6_recvmsg() in case msg_name is set.
Initialize l2tp_conn_id with 0 to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,566 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned preProcessScanlines(unsigned char** out, size_t* outsize, const unsigned char* in,
unsigned w, unsigned h,
const LodePNGInfo* info_png, const LodePNGEncoderSettings* settings)
{
/*
This function converts the pure 2D image with the PNG's colortype, into filtered-padded-interlaced data. Steps:
*) if no Adam7: 1) add padding bits (= posible extra bits per scanline if bpp < 8) 2) filter
*) if adam7: 1) Adam7_interlace 2) 7x add padding bits 3) 7x filter
*/
unsigned bpp = lodepng_get_bpp(&info_png->color);
unsigned error = 0;
if(info_png->interlace_method == 0)
{
*outsize = h + (h * ((w * bpp + 7) / 8)); /*image size plus an extra byte per scanline + possible padding bits*/
*out = (unsigned char*)calloc(*outsize, 1);
if(!(*out) && (*outsize)) error = 83; /*alloc fail*/
if(!error)
{
/*non multiple of 8 bits per scanline, padding bits needed per scanline*/
if(bpp < 8 && w * bpp != ((w * bpp + 7) / 8) * 8)
{
unsigned char* padded = (unsigned char*)calloc(h * ((w * bpp + 7) / 8), 1);
if(!padded) error = 83; /*alloc fail*/
if(!error)
{
addPaddingBits(padded, in, ((w * bpp + 7) / 8) * 8, w * bpp, h);
error = filter(*out, padded, w, h, &info_png->color, settings);
}
free(padded);
}
else
{
/*we can immediatly filter into the out buffer, no other steps needed*/
error = filter(*out, in, w, h, &info_png->color, settings);
}
}
}
else /*interlace_method is 1 (Adam7)*/
{
unsigned passw[7], passh[7];
size_t filter_passstart[8], padded_passstart[8], passstart[8];
unsigned char* adam7;
Adam7_getpassvalues(passw, passh, filter_passstart, padded_passstart, passstart, w, h, bpp);
*outsize = filter_passstart[7]; /*image size plus an extra byte per scanline + possible padding bits*/
*out = (unsigned char*)calloc(*outsize, 1);
if(!(*out)) error = 83; /*alloc fail*/
adam7 = (unsigned char*)calloc(passstart[7], sizeof(unsigned char));
if(!adam7 && passstart[7]) error = 83; /*alloc fail*/
if(!error)
{
unsigned i;
Adam7_interlace(adam7, in, w, h, bpp);
for(i = 0; i < 7; i++)
{
if(bpp < 8)
{
unsigned char* padded = (unsigned char*)calloc(padded_passstart[i + 1] - padded_passstart[i], sizeof(unsigned char));
if(!padded) ERROR_BREAK(83); /*alloc fail*/
addPaddingBits(padded, &adam7[passstart[i]],
((passw[i] * bpp + 7) / 8) * 8, passw[i] * bpp, passh[i]);
error = filter(&(*out)[filter_passstart[i]], padded,
passw[i], passh[i], &info_png->color, settings);
free(padded);
}
else
{
error = filter(&(*out)[filter_passstart[i]], &adam7[padded_passstart[i]],
passw[i], passh[i], &info_png->color, settings);
}
if(error) break;
}
}
free(adam7);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nsPluginInstance::~nsPluginInstance()
{
if (_scriptObject) {
NPN_ReleaseObject(_scriptObject);
}
do { } while (g_source_remove_by_user_data(this));
if (_childpid > 0) {
int status;
int rv = waitpid(_childpid, &status, WNOHANG);
if (rv <= 0) {
int* pid = new int(_childpid);
gnashSleep(1000);
cleanup_childpid(pid);
} else {
gnash::log_debug("Child process exited with status %d", status);
}
}
_childpid = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 13,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ahci_set_signature(AHCIDevice *ad, uint32_t sig)
{
IDEState *s = &ad->port.ifs[0];
s->hcyl = sig >> 24 & 0xFF;
s->lcyl = sig >> 16 & 0xFF;
s->sector = sig >> 8 & 0xFF;
s->nsector = sig & 0xFF;
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "set hcyl:lcyl:sect:nsect = 0x%08x\n", sig);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 5,880 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExternalProtocolHandler::ClearData(Profile* profile) {
PrefService* prefs = profile->GetPrefs();
prefs->ClearPref(prefs::kExcludedSchemes);
}
Commit Message: Reland "Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL."
This is a reland of 2401e58572884b3561e4348d64f11ac74667ef02
Original change's description:
> Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL.
>
> Fixes bug introduced in r102449.
>
> Bug: 785809
> Change-Id: I9e6dd1031dd7e7b8d378b138ab151daefdc0c6dc
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/778747
> Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518848}
Bug: 785809
Change-Id: Ib8954584004ff5681654398db76d48cdf4437df7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/788551
Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519203}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct crypto_instance *chainiv_alloc(struct rtattr **tb)
{
struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
struct crypto_instance *inst;
int err;
algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
if (IS_ERR(algt))
return ERR_CAST(algt);
err = crypto_get_default_rng();
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
inst = skcipher_geniv_alloc(&chainiv_tmpl, tb, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(inst))
goto put_rng;
inst->alg.cra_ablkcipher.givencrypt = chainiv_givencrypt_first;
inst->alg.cra_init = chainiv_init;
inst->alg.cra_exit = skcipher_geniv_exit;
inst->alg.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chainiv_ctx);
if (!crypto_requires_sync(algt->type, algt->mask)) {
inst->alg.cra_flags |= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
inst->alg.cra_ablkcipher.givencrypt =
async_chainiv_givencrypt_first;
inst->alg.cra_init = async_chainiv_init;
inst->alg.cra_exit = async_chainiv_exit;
inst->alg.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct async_chainiv_ctx);
}
inst->alg.cra_ctxsize += inst->alg.cra_ablkcipher.ivsize;
out:
return inst;
put_rng:
crypto_put_default_rng();
goto out;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,608 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static HWBType * RGB_to_HWB (RGBType RGB, HWBType * HWB)
{
/*
* RGB are each on [0, 1]. W and B are returned on [0, 1] and H is
* returned on [0, 6]. Exception: H is returned UNDEFINED if W == 1 - B.
*/
float R = RGB.R, G = RGB.G, B = RGB.B, w, v, b, f;
int i;
w = MIN3 (R, G, B);
v = MAX3 (R, G, B);
b = 1 - v;
if (v == w) {
RETURN_HWB(HWB_UNDEFINED, w, b);
}
f = (R == w) ? G - B : ((G == w) ? B - R : R - G);
i = (R == w) ? 3 : ((G == w) ? 5 : 1);
RETURN_HWB(i - f / (v - w), w, b);
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 51,405 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderWidgetHostImpl::RequestRepaintForTesting() {
if (!view_)
return false;
return view_->RequestRepaintForTesting();
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lvm2_lv_create_device_changed_cb (Daemon *daemon,
const char *object_path,
gpointer user_data)
{
CreateLvm2LVData *data = user_data;
Device *device;
g_debug ("changed %s", object_path);
device = lvm2_lv_create_has_lv (data);
if (device != NULL)
{
/* yay! it is.. now create the file system if requested */
lvm2_lv_create_found_device (device, data);
g_signal_handler_disconnect (daemon, data->device_added_signal_handler_id);
g_signal_handler_disconnect (daemon, data->device_changed_signal_handler_id);
g_source_remove (data->device_added_timeout_id);
lvm2_lv_create_data_unref (data);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ASCII85Encoder::~ASCII85Encoder() {
if (str->isEncoder())
delete str;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void documentFragmentAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::documentFragmentAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_rt_tgsigqueueinfo(pid_t tgid, pid_t pid, int sig, siginfo_t *info)
{
/* This is only valid for single tasks */
if (pid <= 0 || tgid <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* Not even root can pretend to send signals from the kernel.
* Nor can they impersonate a kill()/tgkill(), which adds source info.
*/
if (((info->si_code >= 0 || info->si_code == SI_TKILL)) &&
(task_pid_vnr(current) != pid)) {
/* We used to allow any < 0 si_code */
WARN_ON_ONCE(info->si_code < 0);
return -EPERM;
}
info->si_signo = sig;
return do_send_specific(tgid, pid, sig, info);
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RBinElfSymbol *Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_imports)(ELFOBJ *bin) {
if (!bin->g_imports) {
bin->g_imports = Elf_(_r_bin_elf_get_symbols_imports) (bin, R_BIN_ELF_IMPORTS);
}
return bin->g_imports;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8764 - huge vd_aux caused pointer wraparound
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 60,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int blk_send_start_stop(struct request_queue *q,
struct gendisk *bd_disk, int data)
{
return __blk_send_generic(q, bd_disk, GPCMD_START_STOP_UNIT, data);
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 94,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: horAcc8(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
unsigned char* cp = (unsigned char*) cp0;
if((cc%stride)!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "horAcc8",
"%s", "(cc%stride)!=0");
return 0;
}
if (cc > stride) {
/*
* Pipeline the most common cases.
*/
if (stride == 3) {
unsigned int cr = cp[0];
unsigned int cg = cp[1];
unsigned int cb = cp[2];
cc -= 3;
cp += 3;
while (cc>0) {
cp[0] = (unsigned char) ((cr += cp[0]) & 0xff);
cp[1] = (unsigned char) ((cg += cp[1]) & 0xff);
cp[2] = (unsigned char) ((cb += cp[2]) & 0xff);
cc -= 3;
cp += 3;
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
unsigned int cr = cp[0];
unsigned int cg = cp[1];
unsigned int cb = cp[2];
unsigned int ca = cp[3];
cc -= 4;
cp += 4;
while (cc>0) {
cp[0] = (unsigned char) ((cr += cp[0]) & 0xff);
cp[1] = (unsigned char) ((cg += cp[1]) & 0xff);
cp[2] = (unsigned char) ((cb += cp[2]) & 0xff);
cp[3] = (unsigned char) ((ca += cp[3]) & 0xff);
cc -= 4;
cp += 4;
}
} else {
cc -= stride;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] =
(unsigned char) ((cp[stride] + *cp) & 0xff); cp++)
cc -= stride;
} while (cc>0);
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predic.c: fix memory leaks in error code paths added in
previous commit (fix for MSVR 35105)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::CheckGLError() {
FailGLError(GetGLError());
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: authentic_update_blob(struct sc_context *ctx, unsigned tag, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len,
unsigned char **blob, size_t *blob_size)
{
unsigned char *pp = NULL;
int offs = 0, sz;
if (data_len == 0)
return SC_SUCCESS;
sz = data_len + 2;
if (tag > 0xFF)
sz++;
if (data_len > 0x7F && data_len < 0x100)
sz++;
else if (data_len >= 0x100)
sz += 2;
pp = realloc(*blob, *blob_size + sz);
if (!pp)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
if (tag > 0xFF)
*(pp + *blob_size + offs++) = (tag >> 8) & 0xFF;
*(pp + *blob_size + offs++) = tag & 0xFF;
if (data_len >= 0x100) {
*(pp + *blob_size + offs++) = 0x82;
*(pp + *blob_size + offs++) = (data_len >> 8) & 0xFF;
}
else if (data_len > 0x7F) {
*(pp + *blob_size + offs++) = 0x81;
}
*(pp + *blob_size + offs++) = data_len & 0xFF;
memcpy(pp + *blob_size + offs, data, data_len);
*blob_size += sz;
*blob = pp;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SVGLayoutSupport::pointInClippingArea(const LayoutObject* object, const FloatPoint& point)
{
ASSERT(object);
SVGResources* resources = SVGResourcesCache::cachedResourcesForLayoutObject(object);
if (!resources)
return true;
if (LayoutSVGResourceClipper* clipper = resources->clipper())
return clipper->hitTestClipContent(object->objectBoundingBox(), point);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID: | 0 | 121,166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hook_signal_send (const char *signal, const char *type_data, void *signal_data)
{
struct t_hook *ptr_hook, *next_hook;
hook_exec_start ();
ptr_hook = weechat_hooks[HOOK_TYPE_SIGNAL];
while (ptr_hook)
{
next_hook = ptr_hook->next_hook;
if (!ptr_hook->deleted
&& !ptr_hook->running
&& (string_match (signal, HOOK_SIGNAL(ptr_hook, signal), 0)))
{
ptr_hook->running = 1;
(void) (HOOK_SIGNAL(ptr_hook, callback))
(ptr_hook->callback_data, signal, type_data, signal_data);
ptr_hook->running = 0;
}
ptr_hook = next_hook;
}
hook_exec_end ();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8ContextNativeHandler::GetModuleSystem(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK_EQ(args.Length(), 1);
CHECK(args[0]->IsObject());
ScriptContext* context = ScriptContextSet::GetContextByObject(
v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(args[0]));
if (blink::WebFrame::scriptCanAccess(context->web_frame()))
args.GetReturnValue().Set(context->module_system()->NewInstance());
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,640 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: x11_open_helper(Buffer *b)
{
u_char *ucp;
u_int proto_len, data_len;
u_char *ucp;
u_int proto_len, data_len;
/* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
if (buffer_len(b) < 12)
return 0;
debug2("Initial X11 packet contains bad byte order byte: 0x%x",
ucp[0]);
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 164,666 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: put_chunk(const unsigned char *chunk, uInt length)
{
uLong crc;
put_uLong(length-4); /* Exclude the tag */
fwrite(chunk, length, 1, stdout);
crc = crc32(0, Z_NULL, 0);
put_uLong(crc32(crc, chunk, length));
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Chapters::Chapters(Segment* pSegment, long long payload_start,
long long payload_size, long long element_start,
long long element_size)
: m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_start(payload_start),
m_size(payload_size),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_element_size(element_size),
m_editions(NULL),
m_editions_size(0),
m_editions_count(0) {}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,705 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Parcel::restoreAllowFds(bool lastValue)
{
mAllowFds = lastValue;
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::SetWebContentsBlocked(content::WebContents* web_contents,
bool blocked) {
int index = tab_strip_model_->GetIndexOfWebContents(web_contents);
if (index == TabStripModel::kNoTab) {
return;
}
tab_strip_model_->SetTabBlocked(index, blocked);
bool browser_active = BrowserList::GetInstance()->GetLastActive() == this;
bool contents_is_active =
tab_strip_model_->GetActiveWebContents() == web_contents;
if (!blocked && contents_is_active && browser_active)
web_contents->Focus();
}
Commit Message: Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <msw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 155,074 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: print_sesssetup(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *words, const u_char *data, const u_char *buf _U_, const u_char *maxbuf)
{
u_int wct, bcc;
const char *f1 = NULL, *f2 = NULL;
ND_TCHECK(words[0]);
wct = words[0];
if (request) {
if (wct == 10)
f1 = "Com2=[w]\nOff2=[d]\nBufSize=[d]\nMpxMax=[d]\nVcNum=[d]\nSessionKey=[W]\nPassLen=[d]\nCryptLen=[d]\nCryptOff=[d]\nPass&Name=\n";
else
f1 = "Com2=[B]\nRes1=[B]\nOff2=[d]\nMaxBuffer=[d]\nMaxMpx=[d]\nVcNumber=[d]\nSessionKey=[W]\nCaseInsensitivePasswordLength=[d]\nCaseSensitivePasswordLength=[d]\nRes=[W]\nCapabilities=[W]\nPass1&Pass2&Account&Domain&OS&LanMan=\n";
} else {
if (wct == 3) {
f1 = "Com2=[w]\nOff2=[d]\nAction=[w]\n";
} else if (wct == 13) {
f1 = "Com2=[B]\nRes=[B]\nOff2=[d]\nAction=[w]\n";
f2 = "NativeOS=[S]\nNativeLanMan=[S]\nPrimaryDomain=[S]\n";
}
}
if (f1)
smb_fdata(ndo, words + 1, f1, min(words + 1 + wct * 2, maxbuf),
unicodestr);
else
smb_print_data(ndo, words + 1, min(wct * 2, PTR_DIFF(maxbuf, words + 1)));
ND_TCHECK2(*data, 2);
bcc = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(data);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "smb_bcc=%u\n", bcc));
if (bcc > 0) {
if (f2)
smb_fdata(ndo, data + 2, f2, min(data + 2 + EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(data),
maxbuf), unicodestr);
else
smb_print_data(ndo, data + 2, min(EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(data), PTR_DIFF(maxbuf, data + 2)));
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) SMB: Add two missing bounds checks
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 93,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_commit_done(struct rpc_task *task, struct nfs_write_data *data)
{
if (!nfs4_sequence_done(task, &data->res.seq_res))
return -EAGAIN;
return data->write_done_cb(task, data);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Camera3Device::PreparerThread::setNotificationListener(NotificationListener *listener) {
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
mListener = listener;
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CtapDeviceResponseCode GetResponseCode(base::span<const uint8_t> buffer) {
if (buffer.empty())
return CtapDeviceResponseCode::kCtap2ErrInvalidCBOR;
auto code = static_cast<CtapDeviceResponseCode>(buffer[0]);
return base::ContainsValue(GetCtapResponseCodeList(), code)
? code
: CtapDeviceResponseCode::kCtap2ErrInvalidCBOR;
}
Commit Message: [base] Make dynamic container to static span conversion explicit
This change disallows implicit conversions from dynamic containers to
static spans. This conversion can cause CHECK failures, and thus should
be done carefully. Requiring explicit construction makes it more obvious
when this happens. To aid usability, appropriate base::make_span<size_t>
overloads are added.
Bug: 877931
Change-Id: Id9f526bc57bfd30a52d14df827b0445ca087381d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1189985
Reviewed-by: Ryan Sleevi <rsleevi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586657}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 132,885 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void remove_partial(struct kmem_cache *s,
struct page *page)
{
struct kmem_cache_node *n = get_node(s, page_to_nid(page));
spin_lock(&n->list_lock);
list_del(&page->lru);
n->nr_partial--;
spin_unlock(&n->list_lock);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DisableJavascriptCalls() {
call_javascript_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Update PrerenderBrowserTests to work with new
PrerenderContents.
Also update PrerenderContents to pass plugin
and HTML5 prerender tests.
BUG=81229
TEST=PrerenderBrowserTests (Once the new code is enabled)
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6905169
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83841 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 99,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int process_metadata(AVFormatContext *s, const uint8_t *name, uint16_t name_len,
uint16_t val_len, uint16_t type, AVDictionary **met)
{
int ret;
ff_asf_guid guid;
if (val_len) {
switch (type) {
case ASF_UNICODE:
asf_read_value(s, name, val_len, type, met);
break;
case ASF_BYTE_ARRAY:
if (!strcmp(name, "WM/Picture")) // handle cover art
asf_read_picture(s, val_len);
else if (!strcmp(name, "ID3")) // handle ID3 tag
get_id3_tag(s, val_len);
else
asf_read_value(s, name, val_len, type, met);
break;
case ASF_GUID:
ff_get_guid(s->pb, &guid);
break;
default:
if ((ret = asf_set_metadata(s, name, type, met)) < 0)
return ret;
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec_o: Check size_bmp more fully
Fixes: integer overflow and out of array access
Fixes: asfo-crash-46080c4341572a7137a162331af77f6ded45cbd7
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 74,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ap_device_remove(struct device *dev)
{
struct ap_device *ap_dev = to_ap_dev(dev);
struct ap_driver *ap_drv = ap_dev->drv;
ap_flush_queue(ap_dev);
del_timer_sync(&ap_dev->timeout);
spin_lock_bh(&ap_device_list_lock);
list_del_init(&ap_dev->list);
spin_unlock_bh(&ap_device_list_lock);
if (ap_drv->remove)
ap_drv->remove(ap_dev);
spin_lock_bh(&ap_dev->lock);
atomic_sub(ap_dev->queue_count, &ap_poll_requests);
spin_unlock_bh(&ap_dev->lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: *mk_vhost_fdt_chain_lookup(unsigned int hash, struct vhost_fdt_hash_table *ht)
{
int i;
struct vhost_fdt_hash_chain *hc = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < VHOST_FDT_HASHTABLE_CHAINS; i++) {
hc = &ht->chain[i];
if (hc->hash == hash) {
return hc;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Request: new request session flag to mark those files opened by FDT
This patch aims to fix a potential DDoS problem that can be caused
in the server quering repetitive non-existent resources.
When serving a static file, the core use Vhost FDT mechanism, but if
it sends a static error page it does a direct open(2). When closing
the resources for the same request it was just calling mk_vhost_close()
which did not clear properly the file descriptor.
This patch adds a new field on the struct session_request called 'fd_is_fdt',
which contains MK_TRUE or MK_FALSE depending of how fd_file was opened.
Thanks to Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com> for report and troubleshoot this
problem.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Silva <eduardo@monkey.io>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void webkitWebViewBaseCreateWebPage(WebKitWebViewBase* webkitWebViewBase, WKContextRef context, WKPageGroupRef pageGroup)
{
WebKitWebViewBasePrivate* priv = webkitWebViewBase->priv;
priv->pageProxy = toImpl(context)->createWebPage(priv->pageClient.get(), toImpl(pageGroup));
priv->pageProxy->initializeWebPage();
#if ENABLE(FULLSCREEN_API)
priv->pageProxy->fullScreenManager()->setWebView(webkitWebViewBase);
#endif
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 108,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vfs_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
struct inode **delegated_inode, unsigned int flags)
{
int error;
bool is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
const unsigned char *old_name;
struct inode *source = old_dentry->d_inode;
struct inode *target = new_dentry->d_inode;
bool new_is_dir = false;
unsigned max_links = new_dir->i_sb->s_max_links;
if (source == target)
return 0;
error = may_delete(old_dir, old_dentry, is_dir);
if (error)
return error;
if (!target) {
error = may_create(new_dir, new_dentry);
} else {
new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
if (!(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE))
error = may_delete(new_dir, new_dentry, is_dir);
else
error = may_delete(new_dir, new_dentry, new_is_dir);
}
if (error)
return error;
if (!old_dir->i_op->rename && !old_dir->i_op->rename2)
return -EPERM;
if (flags && !old_dir->i_op->rename2)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* If we are going to change the parent - check write permissions,
* we'll need to flip '..'.
*/
if (new_dir != old_dir) {
if (is_dir) {
error = inode_permission(source, MAY_WRITE);
if (error)
return error;
}
if ((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && new_is_dir) {
error = inode_permission(target, MAY_WRITE);
if (error)
return error;
}
}
error = security_inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry,
flags);
if (error)
return error;
old_name = fsnotify_oldname_init(old_dentry->d_name.name);
dget(new_dentry);
if (!is_dir || (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE))
lock_two_nondirectories(source, target);
else if (target)
mutex_lock(&target->i_mutex);
error = -EBUSY;
if (is_local_mountpoint(old_dentry) || is_local_mountpoint(new_dentry))
goto out;
if (max_links && new_dir != old_dir) {
error = -EMLINK;
if (is_dir && !new_is_dir && new_dir->i_nlink >= max_links)
goto out;
if ((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && !is_dir && new_is_dir &&
old_dir->i_nlink >= max_links)
goto out;
}
if (is_dir && !(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && target)
shrink_dcache_parent(new_dentry);
if (!is_dir) {
error = try_break_deleg(source, delegated_inode);
if (error)
goto out;
}
if (target && !new_is_dir) {
error = try_break_deleg(target, delegated_inode);
if (error)
goto out;
}
if (!old_dir->i_op->rename2) {
error = old_dir->i_op->rename(old_dir, old_dentry,
new_dir, new_dentry);
} else {
WARN_ON(old_dir->i_op->rename != NULL);
error = old_dir->i_op->rename2(old_dir, old_dentry,
new_dir, new_dentry, flags);
}
if (error)
goto out;
if (!(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && target) {
if (is_dir)
target->i_flags |= S_DEAD;
dont_mount(new_dentry);
detach_mounts(new_dentry);
}
if (!(old_dir->i_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_RENAME_DOES_D_MOVE)) {
if (!(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE))
d_move(old_dentry, new_dentry);
else
d_exchange(old_dentry, new_dentry);
}
out:
if (!is_dir || (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE))
unlock_two_nondirectories(source, target);
else if (target)
mutex_unlock(&target->i_mutex);
dput(new_dentry);
if (!error) {
fsnotify_move(old_dir, new_dir, old_name, is_dir,
!(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) ? target : NULL, old_dentry);
if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
fsnotify_move(new_dir, old_dir, old_dentry->d_name.name,
new_is_dir, NULL, new_dentry);
}
}
fsnotify_oldname_free(old_name);
return error;
}
Commit Message: path_openat(): fix double fput()
path_openat() jumps to the wrong place after do_tmpfile() - it has
already done path_cleanup() (as part of path_lookupat() called by
do_tmpfile()), so doing that again can lead to double fput().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: | 0 | 42,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ip6_frag_mem(struct net *net)
{
return atomic_read(&net->ipv6.frags.mem);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: discard overlapping fragment
RFC5722 prohibits reassembling fragments when some data overlaps.
Bug spotted by Zhang Zuotao <zuotao.zhang@6wind.com>.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sec_hash_16(uint8 * out, uint8 * in, uint8 * salt1, uint8 * salt2)
{
RDSSL_MD5 md5;
rdssl_md5_init(&md5);
rdssl_md5_update(&md5, in, 16);
rdssl_md5_update(&md5, salt1, 32);
rdssl_md5_update(&md5, salt2, 32);
rdssl_md5_final(&md5, out);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 93,102 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XInsertModifiermapEntry(XModifierKeymap *map,
#if NeedWidePrototypes
unsigned int keycode,
#else
KeyCode keycode,
#endif
int modifier)
{
XModifierKeymap *newmap;
int i,
row = modifier * map->max_keypermod,
newrow,
lastrow;
for (i=0; i<map->max_keypermod; i++) {
if (map->modifiermap[ row+i ] == keycode)
return(map); /* already in the map */
if (map->modifiermap[ row+i ] == 0) {
map->modifiermap[ row+i ] = keycode;
return(map); /* we added it without stretching the map */
}
}
/* stretch the map */
if ((newmap = XNewModifiermap(map->max_keypermod+1)) == NULL)
return (XModifierKeymap *) NULL;
newrow = row = 0;
lastrow = newmap->max_keypermod * 8;
while (newrow < lastrow) {
for (i=0; i<map->max_keypermod; i++)
newmap->modifiermap[ newrow+i ] = map->modifiermap[ row+i ];
newmap->modifiermap[ newrow+i ] = 0;
row += map->max_keypermod;
newrow += newmap->max_keypermod;
}
(void) XFreeModifiermap(map);
newrow = newmap->max_keypermod * modifier + newmap->max_keypermod - 1;
newmap->modifiermap[ newrow ] = keycode;
return(newmap);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 8,322 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _dbus_write_socket (int fd,
const DBusString *buffer,
int start,
int len)
{
const char *data;
int bytes_written;
data = _dbus_string_get_const_data_len (buffer, start, len);
again:
_dbus_verbose ("send: len=%d fd=%d\n", len, fd);
bytes_written = send (fd, data, len, 0);
if (bytes_written == SOCKET_ERROR)
{
DBUS_SOCKET_SET_ERRNO();
_dbus_verbose ("send: failed: %s\n", _dbus_strerror_from_errno ());
bytes_written = -1;
}
else
_dbus_verbose ("send: = %d\n", bytes_written);
if (bytes_written < 0 && errno == EINTR)
goto again;
#if 0
if (bytes_written > 0)
_dbus_verbose_bytes_of_string (buffer, start, bytes_written);
#endif
return bytes_written;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ConnectionInfoPopupAndroid::SetCookieInfo(
const CookieInfoList& cookie_info_list) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
{
Key *prv;
int ret;
const char *alg;
alg = identity_sign_encode(id);
/* the agent supports this key */
if (id->agent_fd != -1)
return ssh_agent_sign(id->agent_fd, id->key, sigp, lenp,
data, datalen, alg, compat);
/*
* we have already loaded the private key or
* the private key is stored in external hardware
*/
if (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT))
return (sshkey_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg,
compat));
/* load the private key from the file */
if ((prv = load_identity_file(id)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
ret = sshkey_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, compat);
sshkey_free(prv);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 72,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int encode_setclientid(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct nfs4_setclientid *setclientid)
{
__be32 *p;
RESERVE_SPACE(4 + NFS4_VERIFIER_SIZE);
WRITE32(OP_SETCLIENTID);
WRITEMEM(setclientid->sc_verifier->data, NFS4_VERIFIER_SIZE);
encode_string(xdr, setclientid->sc_name_len, setclientid->sc_name);
RESERVE_SPACE(4);
WRITE32(setclientid->sc_prog);
encode_string(xdr, setclientid->sc_netid_len, setclientid->sc_netid);
encode_string(xdr, setclientid->sc_uaddr_len, setclientid->sc_uaddr);
RESERVE_SPACE(4);
WRITE32(setclientid->sc_cb_ident);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,089 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int subsadd_cb(void *rock, const char *key, size_t keylen,
const char *val __attribute__((unused)),
size_t vallen __attribute__((unused)))
{
strarray_t *list = (strarray_t *)rock;
strarray_appendm(list, xstrndup(key, keylen));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::IncrementNumberOfCanvases() {
num_canvases_++;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlockFlow::setLogicalLeftForChild(RenderBox* child, LayoutUnit logicalLeft, ApplyLayoutDeltaMode applyDelta)
{
if (isHorizontalWritingMode()) {
if (applyDelta == ApplyLayoutDelta && !RuntimeEnabledFeatures::repaintAfterLayoutEnabled())
view()->addLayoutDelta(LayoutSize(child->x() - logicalLeft, 0));
child->setX(logicalLeft);
} else {
if (applyDelta == ApplyLayoutDelta && !RuntimeEnabledFeatures::repaintAfterLayoutEnabled())
view()->addLayoutDelta(LayoutSize(0, child->y() - logicalLeft));
child->setY(logicalLeft);
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned offset_il_node(struct mempolicy *pol,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long n)
{
unsigned nnodes = nodes_weight(pol->v.nodes);
unsigned target;
int i;
int nid;
if (!nnodes)
return numa_node_id();
target = (unsigned int)n % nnodes;
nid = first_node(pol->v.nodes);
for (i = 0; i < target; i++)
nid = next_node(nid, pol->v.nodes);
return nid;
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy.c: fix error handling in set_mempolicy and mbind.
In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the
bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak
sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 67,198 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virDomainPinIOThread(virDomainPtr domain,
unsigned int iothread_id,
unsigned char *cpumap,
int maplen,
unsigned int flags)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "iothread_id=%u, cpumap=%p, maplen=%d",
iothread_id, cpumap, maplen);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
conn = domain->conn;
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(cpumap, error);
virCheckPositiveArgGoto(maplen, error);
if (conn->driver->domainPinIOThread) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainPinIOThread(domain, iothread_id,
cpumap, maplen, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 93,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t aio_run_iocb(struct kiocb *req, unsigned opcode,
char __user *buf, size_t len, bool compat)
{
struct file *file = req->ki_filp;
ssize_t ret;
unsigned long nr_segs;
int rw;
fmode_t mode;
aio_rw_op *rw_op;
rw_iter_op *iter_op;
struct iovec inline_vecs[UIO_FASTIOV], *iovec = inline_vecs;
struct iov_iter iter;
switch (opcode) {
case IOCB_CMD_PREAD:
case IOCB_CMD_PREADV:
mode = FMODE_READ;
rw = READ;
rw_op = file->f_op->aio_read;
iter_op = file->f_op->read_iter;
goto rw_common;
case IOCB_CMD_PWRITE:
case IOCB_CMD_PWRITEV:
mode = FMODE_WRITE;
rw = WRITE;
rw_op = file->f_op->aio_write;
iter_op = file->f_op->write_iter;
goto rw_common;
rw_common:
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & mode)))
return -EBADF;
if (!rw_op && !iter_op)
return -EINVAL;
if (opcode == IOCB_CMD_PREADV || opcode == IOCB_CMD_PWRITEV)
ret = aio_setup_vectored_rw(req, rw, buf, &nr_segs,
&len, &iovec, compat);
else
ret = aio_setup_single_vector(req, rw, buf, &nr_segs,
len, iovec);
if (!ret)
ret = rw_verify_area(rw, file, &req->ki_pos, len);
if (ret < 0) {
if (iovec != inline_vecs)
kfree(iovec);
return ret;
}
len = ret;
/* XXX: move/kill - rw_verify_area()? */
/* This matches the pread()/pwrite() logic */
if (req->ki_pos < 0) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (rw == WRITE)
file_start_write(file);
if (iter_op) {
iov_iter_init(&iter, rw, iovec, nr_segs, len);
ret = iter_op(req, &iter);
} else {
ret = rw_op(req, iovec, nr_segs, req->ki_pos);
}
if (rw == WRITE)
file_end_write(file);
break;
case IOCB_CMD_FDSYNC:
if (!file->f_op->aio_fsync)
return -EINVAL;
ret = file->f_op->aio_fsync(req, 1);
break;
case IOCB_CMD_FSYNC:
if (!file->f_op->aio_fsync)
return -EINVAL;
ret = file->f_op->aio_fsync(req, 0);
break;
default:
pr_debug("EINVAL: no operation provided\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (iovec != inline_vecs)
kfree(iovec);
if (ret != -EIOCBQUEUED) {
/*
* There's no easy way to restart the syscall since other AIO's
* may be already running. Just fail this IO with EINTR.
*/
if (unlikely(ret == -ERESTARTSYS || ret == -ERESTARTNOINTR ||
ret == -ERESTARTNOHAND ||
ret == -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK))
ret = -EINTR;
aio_complete(req, ret, 0);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: aio: lift iov_iter_init() into aio_setup_..._rw()
the only non-trivial detail is that we do it before rw_verify_area(),
so we'd better cap the length ourselves in aio_setup_single_rw()
case (for vectored case rw_copy_check_uvector() will do that for us).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: | 1 | 170,001 |
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