instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RecordSuffixedMemoryMBHistogram(base::StringPiece name,
base::StringPiece suffix,
int sample_mb) {
std::string name_with_suffix;
name.CopyToString(&name_with_suffix);
suffix.AppendToString(&name_with_suffix);
base::UmaHistogramMemoryMB(name_with_suffix, sample_mb);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,810 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType LinearStretchImage(Image *image,
const double black_point,const double white_point,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define LinearStretchImageTag "LinearStretch/Image"
CacheView
*image_view;
double
*histogram,
intensity;
MagickBooleanType
status;
ssize_t
black,
white,
y;
/*
Allocate histogram and linear map.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
histogram=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxMap+1UL,sizeof(*histogram));
if (histogram == (double *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
/*
Form histogram.
*/
(void) memset(histogram,0,(MaxMap+1)*sizeof(*histogram));
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
intensity=GetPixelIntensity(image,p);
histogram[ScaleQuantumToMap(ClampToQuantum(intensity))]++;
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
/*
Find the histogram boundaries by locating the black and white point levels.
*/
intensity=0.0;
for (black=0; black < (ssize_t) MaxMap; black++)
{
intensity+=histogram[black];
if (intensity >= black_point)
break;
}
intensity=0.0;
for (white=(ssize_t) MaxMap; white != 0; white--)
{
intensity+=histogram[white];
if (intensity >= white_point)
break;
}
histogram=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(histogram);
status=LevelImage(image,(double) ScaleMapToQuantum((MagickRealType) black),
(double) ScaleMapToQuantum((MagickRealType) white),1.0,exception);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1611
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 89,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::vector<int> TabStripModel::GetIndicesClosedByCommand(
int index,
ContextMenuCommand id) const {
DCHECK(ContainsIndex(index));
DCHECK(id == CommandCloseTabsToRight || id == CommandCloseOtherTabs);
bool is_selected = IsTabSelected(index);
int start;
if (id == CommandCloseTabsToRight) {
if (is_selected) {
start = selection_model_.selected_indices()[
selection_model_.selected_indices().size() - 1] + 1;
} else {
start = index + 1;
}
} else {
start = 0;
}
std::vector<int> indices;
for (int i = count() - 1; i >= start; --i) {
if (i != index && !IsMiniTab(i) && (!is_selected || !IsTabSelected(i)))
indices.push_back(i);
}
return indices;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void delete_and_unsubscribe_port(struct snd_seq_client *client,
struct snd_seq_client_port *port,
struct snd_seq_subscribers *subs,
bool is_src, bool ack)
{
struct snd_seq_port_subs_info *grp;
struct list_head *list;
bool empty;
grp = is_src ? &port->c_src : &port->c_dest;
list = is_src ? &subs->src_list : &subs->dest_list;
down_write(&grp->list_mutex);
write_lock_irq(&grp->list_lock);
empty = list_empty(list);
if (!empty)
list_del_init(list);
grp->exclusive = 0;
write_unlock_irq(&grp->list_lock);
up_write(&grp->list_mutex);
if (!empty)
unsubscribe_port(client, port, grp, &subs->info, ack);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port
There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing. snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
__slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
__slab_free+0x204/0x310
kfree+0x15f/0x180
port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
[<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
[<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
[<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
[<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
.....
We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
letting the caller unref the object after use. Also, there is another
potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
and this is moved inside the lock.
This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <ycqzsy@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 60,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: side_get_n_unix_fds (ProxySide *side, int n_fds)
{
GList *res = NULL;
while (side->control_messages != NULL)
{
GSocketControlMessage *control_message = side->control_messages->data;
if (G_IS_UNIX_FD_MESSAGE (control_message))
{
GUnixFDMessage *fd_message = G_UNIX_FD_MESSAGE (control_message);
GUnixFDList *fd_list = g_unix_fd_message_get_fd_list (fd_message);
int len = g_unix_fd_list_get_length (fd_list);
/* I believe that socket control messages are never merged, and
the sender side sends only one unix-fd-list per message, so
at this point there should always be one full fd list
per requested number of fds */
if (len != n_fds)
{
g_warning ("Not right nr of fds in socket message");
return NULL;
}
side->control_messages = g_list_delete_link (side->control_messages, side->control_messages);
return g_list_append (NULL, control_message);
}
g_object_unref (control_message);
side->control_messages = g_list_delete_link (side->control_messages, side->control_messages);
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436 | 0 | 84,426 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::handleKeydownEvent(KeyboardEvent* event)
{
Document* document = element()->document();
RefPtr<RenderTheme> theme = document->page() ? document->page()->theme() : RenderTheme::defaultTheme();
if (m_pickerIndicatorIsVisible
&& ((event->keyIdentifier() == "Down" && event->getModifierState("Alt")) || (theme->shouldOpenPickerWithF4Key() && event->keyIdentifier() == "F4"))) {
if (m_pickerIndicatorElement)
m_pickerIndicatorElement->openPopup();
event->setDefaultHandled();
} else
forwardEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: format_time (int seconds)
{
int minutes;
int hours;
char *res;
if (seconds < 0)
{
/* Just to make sure... */
seconds = 0;
}
if (seconds < 60)
{
return g_strdup_printf (ngettext ("%'d second", "%'d seconds", (int) seconds), (int) seconds);
}
if (seconds < 60 * 60)
{
minutes = seconds / 60;
return g_strdup_printf (ngettext ("%'d minute", "%'d minutes", minutes), minutes);
}
hours = seconds / (60 * 60);
if (seconds < 60 * 60 * 4)
{
char *h, *m;
minutes = (seconds - hours * 60 * 60) / 60;
h = g_strdup_printf (ngettext ("%'d hour", "%'d hours", hours), hours);
m = g_strdup_printf (ngettext ("%'d minute", "%'d minutes", minutes), minutes);
res = g_strconcat (h, ", ", m, NULL);
g_free (h);
g_free (m);
return res;
}
return g_strdup_printf (ngettext ("approximately %'d hour",
"approximately %'d hours",
hours), hours);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,064 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QQuickWebViewPrivate::setNeedsDisplay()
{
Q_Q(QQuickWebView);
if (renderToOffscreenBuffer()) {
QImage dummyImage(1, 1, QImage::Format_ARGB32);
QPainter painter(&dummyImage);
q->page()->d->paint(&painter);
return;
}
q->page()->update();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 101,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int HttpProxyClientSocket::RestartWithAuth(const CompletionCallback& callback) {
DCHECK_EQ(STATE_NONE, next_state_);
DCHECK(user_callback_.is_null());
int rv = PrepareForAuthRestart();
if (rv != OK)
return rv;
rv = DoLoop(OK);
if (rv == ERR_IO_PENDING) {
if (!callback.is_null())
user_callback_ = callback;
}
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _zip_cdir_write(zip_t *za, const zip_filelist_t *filelist, zip_uint64_t survivors)
{
zip_uint64_t offset, size;
zip_string_t *comment;
zip_uint8_t buf[EOCDLEN + EOCD64LEN + EOCD64LOCLEN];
zip_buffer_t *buffer;
zip_int64_t off;
zip_uint64_t i;
bool is_zip64;
int ret;
if ((off = zip_source_tell_write(za->src)) < 0) {
_zip_error_set_from_source(&za->error, za->src);
return -1;
}
offset = (zip_uint64_t)off;
is_zip64 = false;
for (i=0; i<survivors; i++) {
zip_entry_t *entry = za->entry+filelist[i].idx;
if ((ret=_zip_dirent_write(za, entry->changes ? entry->changes : entry->orig, ZIP_FL_CENTRAL)) < 0)
return -1;
if (ret)
is_zip64 = true;
}
if ((off = zip_source_tell_write(za->src)) < 0) {
_zip_error_set_from_source(&za->error, za->src);
return -1;
}
size = (zip_uint64_t)off - offset;
if (offset > ZIP_UINT32_MAX || survivors > ZIP_UINT16_MAX)
is_zip64 = true;
if ((buffer = _zip_buffer_new(buf, sizeof(buf))) == NULL) {
zip_error_set(&za->error, ZIP_ER_MEMORY, 0);
return -1;
}
if (is_zip64) {
_zip_buffer_put(buffer, EOCD64_MAGIC, 4);
_zip_buffer_put_64(buffer, EOCD64LEN-12);
_zip_buffer_put_16(buffer, 45);
_zip_buffer_put_16(buffer, 45);
_zip_buffer_put_32(buffer, 0);
_zip_buffer_put_32(buffer, 0);
_zip_buffer_put_64(buffer, survivors);
_zip_buffer_put_64(buffer, survivors);
_zip_buffer_put_64(buffer, size);
_zip_buffer_put_64(buffer, offset);
_zip_buffer_put(buffer, EOCD64LOC_MAGIC, 4);
_zip_buffer_put_32(buffer, 0);
_zip_buffer_put_64(buffer, offset+size);
_zip_buffer_put_32(buffer, 1);
}
_zip_buffer_put(buffer, EOCD_MAGIC, 4);
_zip_buffer_put_32(buffer, 0);
_zip_buffer_put_16(buffer, (zip_uint16_t)(survivors >= ZIP_UINT16_MAX ? ZIP_UINT16_MAX : survivors));
_zip_buffer_put_16(buffer, (zip_uint16_t)(survivors >= ZIP_UINT16_MAX ? ZIP_UINT16_MAX : survivors));
_zip_buffer_put_32(buffer, size >= ZIP_UINT32_MAX ? ZIP_UINT32_MAX : (zip_uint32_t)size);
_zip_buffer_put_32(buffer, offset >= ZIP_UINT32_MAX ? ZIP_UINT32_MAX : (zip_uint32_t)offset);
comment = za->comment_changed ? za->comment_changes : za->comment_orig;
_zip_buffer_put_16(buffer, (zip_uint16_t)(comment ? comment->length : 0));
if (!_zip_buffer_ok(buffer)) {
zip_error_set(&za->error, ZIP_ER_INTERNAL, 0);
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
return -1;
}
if (_zip_write(za, _zip_buffer_data(buffer), _zip_buffer_offset(buffer)) < 0) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
return -1;
}
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
if (comment) {
if (_zip_write(za, comment->raw, comment->length) < 0) {
return -1;
}
}
return (zip_int64_t)size;
}
Commit Message: Fix double free().
Found by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter using AFL.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 62,646 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DiskCacheBackendTest::BackendEviction() {
const int kMaxSize = 200 * 1024;
const int kMaxEntryCount = 20;
const int kWriteSize = kMaxSize / kMaxEntryCount;
const int kWriteEntryCount = kMaxEntryCount * 2;
static_assert(kWriteEntryCount * kWriteSize > kMaxSize,
"must write more than MaxSize");
SetMaxSize(kMaxSize);
InitSparseCache(nullptr, nullptr);
scoped_refptr<net::IOBuffer> buffer(new net::IOBuffer(kWriteSize));
CacheTestFillBuffer(buffer->data(), kWriteSize, false);
std::string key_prefix("prefix");
for (int i = 0; i < kWriteEntryCount; ++i) {
AddDelay();
disk_cache::Entry* entry = NULL;
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry(key_prefix + base::IntToString(i), &entry), IsOk());
disk_cache::ScopedEntryPtr entry_closer(entry);
EXPECT_EQ(kWriteSize,
WriteData(entry, 1, 0, buffer.get(), kWriteSize, false));
}
int size = CalculateSizeOfAllEntries();
EXPECT_GT(kMaxSize, size);
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<NameNodeList> ContainerNode::getElementsByName(const AtomicString& elementName)
{
return ensureCachedCollection<NameNodeList>(NameNodeListType, elementName);
}
Commit Message: Fix an optimisation in ContainerNode::notifyNodeInsertedInternal
R=tkent@chromium.org
BUG=544020
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1420653003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#355240}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_read_dfla(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
AVStream *st;
int last, type, size, ret;
uint8_t buf[4];
if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1)
return 0;
st = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams-1];
if ((uint64_t)atom.size > (1<<30) || atom.size < 42)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
/* Check FlacSpecificBox version. */
if (avio_r8(pb) != 0)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avio_rb24(pb); /* Flags */
avio_read(pb, buf, sizeof(buf));
flac_parse_block_header(buf, &last, &type, &size);
if (type != FLAC_METADATA_TYPE_STREAMINFO || size != FLAC_STREAMINFO_SIZE) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "STREAMINFO must be first FLACMetadataBlock\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
ret = ff_get_extradata(c->fc, st->codecpar, pb, size);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (!last)
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "non-STREAMINFO FLACMetadataBlock(s) ignored\n");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_mov_rm_sreg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
if (ctxt->modrm_reg > VCPU_SREG_GS)
return emulate_ud(ctxt);
ctxt->dst.val = get_segment_selector(ctxt, ctxt->modrm_reg);
if (ctxt->dst.bytes == 4 && ctxt->dst.type == OP_MEM)
ctxt->dst.bytes = 2;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: SYSENTER emulation is broken
SYSENTER emulation is broken in several ways:
1. It misses the case of 16-bit code segments completely (CVE-2015-0239).
2. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS is checked in 64-bit mode incorrectly (bits 0 and 1 can
still be set without causing #GP).
3. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP and MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP are not masked in
legacy-mode.
4. There is some unneeded code.
Fix it.
Cc: stable@vger.linux.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 45,029 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_translate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_translation *tr)
{
unsigned long vaddr = tr->linear_address;
gpa_t gpa;
int idx;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
gpa = kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_system(vcpu, vaddr, NULL);
srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
tr->physical_address = gpa;
tr->valid = gpa != UNMAPPED_GVA;
tr->writeable = 1;
tr->usermode = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: wv_csp_discriminator(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset)
{
guint32 magic_1 = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset + 0);
guint16 magic_2 = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 4);
if (magic_1 == 0xFE050331 && magic_2 == 0x2e30)
{
/* FE 05 03 31 2E 30 --> WV-CSP 1.0 */
return &decode_wv_cspc_10;
}
else if (magic_1 == 0xC9050331 && magic_2 == 0x2e31)
{
/* C9 05 03 31 2E 31 --> WV-CSP 1.1 */
return &decode_wv_cspc_11;
}
else if (magic_1 == 0xC9080331 && magic_2 == 0x2e32)
{
/* C9 08 03 31 2E 32 --> WV-CSP 1.2 */
return &decode_wv_cspc_12;
}
else if ( magic_1 == 0xC90B0331 && magic_2 == 0x2E33)
{
/* C9 0B 03 31 2E 33 --> WV-CSP 1.3 */
return &decode_wv_cspc_13;
}
/* Default: WV-CSP 1.2 */
return &decode_wv_cspc_12;
}
Commit Message: WBXML: add a basic sanity check for offset overflow
This is a naive approach allowing to detact that something went wrong,
without the need to replace all proto_tree_add_text() calls as what was
done in master-2.0 branch.
Bug: 12408
Change-Id: Ia14905005e17ae322c2fc639ad5e491fa08b0108
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15310
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Pascal Quantin <pascal.quantin@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 51,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sc_get_driver(void)
{
if (iso_ops == NULL)
iso_ops = sc_get_iso7816_driver()->ops;
auth_ops = *iso_ops;
auth_ops.match_card = auth_match_card;
auth_ops.init = auth_init;
auth_ops.finish = auth_finish;
auth_ops.select_file = auth_select_file;
auth_ops.list_files = auth_list_files;
auth_ops.delete_file = auth_delete_file;
auth_ops.create_file = auth_create_file;
auth_ops.read_binary = auth_read_binary;
auth_ops.update_binary = auth_update_binary;
auth_ops.read_record = auth_read_record;
auth_ops.delete_record = auth_delete_record;
auth_ops.card_ctl = auth_card_ctl;
auth_ops.set_security_env = auth_set_security_env;
auth_ops.restore_security_env = auth_restore_security_env;
auth_ops.compute_signature = auth_compute_signature;
auth_ops.decipher = auth_decipher;
auth_ops.process_fci = auth_process_fci;
auth_ops.pin_cmd = auth_pin_cmd;
auth_ops.logout = auth_logout;
auth_ops.check_sw = auth_check_sw;
return &auth_drv;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,567 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AutofillManager::GetHost(const std::vector<AutofillProfile*>& profiles,
const std::vector<CreditCard*>& credit_cards,
RenderViewHost** host) const {
if (!IsAutofillEnabled())
return false;
if (profiles.empty() && credit_cards.empty())
return false;
*host = tab_contents()->render_view_host();
if (!*host)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add support for the "uploadrequired" attribute for Autofill query responses
BUG=84693
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutofillDownloadTest.QueryAndUploadTest
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6969090
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87729 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,461 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void unregister_sched_domain_sysctl(void)
{
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoTexParameterfv(
GLenum target, GLenum pname, const GLfloat* params) {
TextureManager::TextureInfo* info = GetTextureInfoForTarget(target);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glTexParameterfv", "unknown texture");
return;
}
if (!texture_manager()->SetParameter(
info, pname, static_cast<GLint>(params[0]))) {
SetGLErrorInvalidEnum("glTexParameterfv", pname, "pname");
return;
}
glTexParameterfv(target, pname, params);
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 103,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ff_h264_free_tables(H264Context *h, int free_rbsp)
{
int i;
H264Context *hx;
av_freep(&h->intra4x4_pred_mode);
av_freep(&h->chroma_pred_mode_table);
av_freep(&h->cbp_table);
av_freep(&h->mvd_table[0]);
av_freep(&h->mvd_table[1]);
av_freep(&h->direct_table);
av_freep(&h->non_zero_count);
av_freep(&h->slice_table_base);
h->slice_table = NULL;
av_freep(&h->list_counts);
av_freep(&h->mb2b_xy);
av_freep(&h->mb2br_xy);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->qscale_table_pool);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->mb_type_pool);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->motion_val_pool);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->ref_index_pool);
if (free_rbsp && h->DPB) {
for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_PICTURE_COUNT; i++)
ff_h264_unref_picture(h, &h->DPB[i]);
av_freep(&h->DPB);
} else if (h->DPB) {
for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_PICTURE_COUNT; i++)
h->DPB[i].needs_realloc = 1;
}
h->cur_pic_ptr = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_THREADS; i++) {
hx = h->thread_context[i];
if (!hx)
continue;
av_freep(&hx->top_borders[1]);
av_freep(&hx->top_borders[0]);
av_freep(&hx->bipred_scratchpad);
av_freep(&hx->edge_emu_buffer);
av_freep(&hx->dc_val_base);
av_freep(&hx->er.mb_index2xy);
av_freep(&hx->er.error_status_table);
av_freep(&hx->er.er_temp_buffer);
av_freep(&hx->er.mbintra_table);
av_freep(&hx->er.mbskip_table);
if (free_rbsp) {
av_freep(&hx->rbsp_buffer[1]);
av_freep(&hx->rbsp_buffer[0]);
hx->rbsp_buffer_size[0] = 0;
hx->rbsp_buffer_size[1] = 0;
}
if (i)
av_freep(&h->thread_context[i]);
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: Clear delayed_pic on deallocation
Fixes use of freed memory
Fixes: case5_av_frame_copy_props.mp4
Found-by: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@coredump.cx>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: | 1 | 166,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::ConnectWebContents(WebContents* wc) {
RenderFrameHostImpl* host =
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(wc->GetMainFrame());
DCHECK(host);
frame_tree_node_ = host->frame_tree_node();
WebContentsObserver::Observe(wc);
UpdateFrameHost(host);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,683 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadDCMImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ThrowDCMException(exception,message) \
{ \
if (info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) \
info.scale=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info.scale); \
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL) \
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data); \
if (graymap != (int *) NULL) \
graymap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(graymap); \
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL) \
bluemap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bluemap); \
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL) \
greenmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(greenmap); \
if (redmap != (int *) NULL) \
redmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(redmap); \
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL) \
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory( \
stream_info->offsets); \
if (stream_info != (DCMStreamInfo *) NULL) \
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info); \
ThrowReaderException((exception),(message)); \
}
char
explicit_vr[MagickPathExtent],
implicit_vr[MagickPathExtent],
magick[MagickPathExtent],
photometric[MagickPathExtent];
DCMInfo
info;
DCMStreamInfo
*stream_info;
Image
*image;
int
*bluemap,
datum,
*greenmap,
*graymap,
*redmap;
MagickBooleanType
explicit_file,
explicit_retry,
use_explicit;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
register unsigned char
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
colors,
height,
length,
number_scenes,
quantum,
status,
width;
ssize_t
count,
scene;
unsigned char
*data;
unsigned short
group,
element;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image->depth=8UL;
image->endian=LSBEndian;
/*
Read DCM preamble.
*/
(void) memset(&info,0,sizeof(info));
data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
graymap=(int *) NULL;
redmap=(int *) NULL;
greenmap=(int *) NULL;
bluemap=(int *) NULL;
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*stream_info));
if (stream_info == (DCMStreamInfo *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(stream_info,0,sizeof(*stream_info));
count=ReadBlob(image,128,(unsigned char *) magick);
if (count != 128)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) magick);
if ((count != 4) || (LocaleNCompare(magick,"DICM",4) != 0))
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,0L,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
/*
Read DCM Medical image.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(photometric,"MONOCHROME1 ",MagickPathExtent);
info.bits_allocated=8;
info.bytes_per_pixel=1;
info.depth=8;
info.mask=0xffff;
info.max_value=255UL;
info.samples_per_pixel=1;
info.signed_data=(~0UL);
info.rescale_slope=1.0;
data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
element=0;
explicit_vr[2]='\0';
explicit_file=MagickFalse;
colors=0;
redmap=(int *) NULL;
greenmap=(int *) NULL;
bluemap=(int *) NULL;
graymap=(int *) NULL;
height=0;
number_scenes=1;
use_explicit=MagickFalse;
explicit_retry = MagickFalse;
width=0;
while (TellBlob(image) < (MagickOffsetType) GetBlobSize(image))
{
for (group=0; (group != 0x7FE0) || (element != 0x0010) ; )
{
/*
Read a group.
*/
image->offset=(ssize_t) TellBlob(image);
group=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
element=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((group == 0xfffc) && (element == 0xfffc))
break;
if ((group != 0x0002) && (image->endian == MSBEndian))
{
group=(unsigned short) ((group << 8) | ((group >> 8) & 0xFF));
element=(unsigned short) ((element << 8) | ((element >> 8) & 0xFF));
}
quantum=0;
/*
Find corresponding VR for this group and element.
*/
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].group < 0xffff; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) &&
(element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
(void) CopyMagickString(implicit_vr,dicom_info[i].vr,MagickPathExtent);
count=ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) explicit_vr);
if (count != 2)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Check for "explicitness", but meta-file headers always explicit.
*/
if ((explicit_file == MagickFalse) && (group != 0x0002))
explicit_file=(isupper((unsigned char) *explicit_vr) != MagickFalse) &&
(isupper((unsigned char) *(explicit_vr+1)) != MagickFalse) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
use_explicit=((group == 0x0002) && (explicit_retry == MagickFalse)) ||
(explicit_file != MagickFalse) ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if ((use_explicit != MagickFalse) && (strncmp(implicit_vr,"xs",2) == 0))
(void) CopyMagickString(implicit_vr,explicit_vr,MagickPathExtent);
if ((use_explicit == MagickFalse) || (strncmp(implicit_vr,"!!",2) == 0))
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) -2,SEEK_CUR);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
quantum=4;
}
else
{
/*
Assume explicit type.
*/
quantum=2;
if ((strncmp(explicit_vr,"OB",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(explicit_vr,"UN",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(explicit_vr,"OW",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(explicit_vr,"SQ",2) == 0))
{
(void) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
quantum=4;
}
}
datum=0;
if (quantum == 4)
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
}
else
if (quantum == 2)
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedShort(image);
}
quantum=0;
length=1;
if (datum != 0)
{
if ((strncmp(implicit_vr,"OW",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"SS",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"US",2) == 0))
quantum=2;
else
if ((strncmp(implicit_vr,"FL",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"OF",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"SL",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"UL",2) == 0))
quantum=4;
else
if (strncmp(implicit_vr,"FD",2) == 0)
quantum=8;
else
quantum=1;
if (datum != ~0)
length=(size_t) datum/quantum;
else
{
/*
Sequence and item of undefined length.
*/
quantum=0;
length=0;
}
}
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Display Dicom info.
*/
if (use_explicit == MagickFalse)
explicit_vr[0]='\0';
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) &&
(element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"0x%04lX %4ld %s-%s (0x%04lx,0x%04lx)",
(unsigned long) image->offset,(long) length,implicit_vr,explicit_vr,
(unsigned long) group,(unsigned long) element);
if (dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout," %s",dicom_info[i].description);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,": ");
}
if ((group == 0x7FE0) && (element == 0x0010))
{
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"\n");
break;
}
/*
Allocate space and read an array.
*/
data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 1))
datum=ReadBlobByte(image);
else
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 2))
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedShort(image);
}
else
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 4))
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
}
else
if ((quantum != 0) && (length != 0))
{
if (length > (size_t) GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if (~length >= 1)
data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+1,quantum*
sizeof(*data));
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) quantum*length,data);
if (count != (ssize_t) (quantum*length))
{
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"count=%d quantum=%d "
"length=%d group=%d\n",(int) count,(int) quantum,(int)
length,(int) group);
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
data[length*quantum]='\0';
}
if ((((unsigned int) group << 16) | element) == 0xFFFEE0DD)
{
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
continue;
}
switch (group)
{
case 0x0002:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0010:
{
char
transfer_syntax[MagickPathExtent];
/*
Transfer Syntax.
*/
if ((datum == 0) && (explicit_retry == MagickFalse))
{
explicit_retry=MagickTrue;
(void) SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) 0,SEEK_SET);
group=0;
element=0;
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,
"Corrupted image - trying explicit format\n");
break;
}
*transfer_syntax='\0';
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(transfer_syntax,(char *) data,
MagickPathExtent);
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"transfer_syntax=%s\n",
(const char *) transfer_syntax);
if (strncmp(transfer_syntax,"1.2.840.10008.1.2",17) == 0)
{
int
subtype,
type;
type=1;
subtype=0;
if (strlen(transfer_syntax) > 17)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(transfer_syntax+17,".%d.%d",&type,
&subtype);
if (count < 1)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,
"ImproperImageHeader");
}
switch (type)
{
case 1:
{
image->endian=LSBEndian;
break;
}
case 2:
{
image->endian=MSBEndian;
break;
}
case 4:
{
if ((subtype >= 80) && (subtype <= 81))
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
else
if ((subtype >= 90) && (subtype <= 93))
image->compression=JPEG2000Compression;
else
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
break;
}
case 5:
{
image->compression=RLECompression;
break;
}
}
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
case 0x0028:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0002:
{
/*
Samples per pixel.
*/
info.samples_per_pixel=(size_t) datum;
if ((info.samples_per_pixel == 0) || (info.samples_per_pixel > 4))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
break;
}
case 0x0004:
{
/*
Photometric interpretation.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMin(length,MagickPathExtent-1); i++)
photometric[i]=(char) data[i];
photometric[i]='\0';
info.polarity=LocaleCompare(photometric,"MONOCHROME1 ") == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 0x0006:
{
/*
Planar configuration.
*/
if (datum == 1)
image->interlace=PlaneInterlace;
break;
}
case 0x0008:
{
/*
Number of frames.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
number_scenes=StringToUnsignedLong((char *) data);
break;
}
case 0x0010:
{
/*
Image rows.
*/
height=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x0011:
{
/*
Image columns.
*/
width=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x0100:
{
/*
Bits allocated.
*/
info.bits_allocated=(size_t) datum;
info.bytes_per_pixel=1;
if (datum > 8)
info.bytes_per_pixel=2;
info.depth=info.bits_allocated;
if ((info.depth == 0) || (info.depth > 32))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
info.max_value=(1UL << info.bits_allocated)-1;
image->depth=info.depth;
break;
}
case 0x0101:
{
/*
Bits stored.
*/
info.significant_bits=(size_t) datum;
info.bytes_per_pixel=1;
if (info.significant_bits > 8)
info.bytes_per_pixel=2;
info.depth=info.significant_bits;
if ((info.depth == 0) || (info.depth > 16))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
info.max_value=(1UL << info.significant_bits)-1;
info.mask=(size_t) GetQuantumRange(info.significant_bits);
image->depth=info.depth;
break;
}
case 0x0102:
{
/*
High bit.
*/
break;
}
case 0x0103:
{
/*
Pixel representation.
*/
info.signed_data=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x1050:
{
/*
Visible pixel range: center.
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
info.window_center=StringToDouble((char *) data,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
case 0x1051:
{
/*
Visible pixel range: width.
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
info.window_width=StringToDouble((char *) data,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
case 0x1052:
{
/*
Rescale intercept
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
info.rescale_intercept=StringToDouble((char *) data,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
case 0x1053:
{
/*
Rescale slope
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
info.rescale_slope=StringToDouble((char *) data,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
case 0x1200:
case 0x3006:
{
/*
Populate graymap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/info.bytes_per_pixel);
datum=(int) colors;
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
graymap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(graymap);
graymap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(colors,65536),
sizeof(*graymap));
if (graymap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(graymap,0,MagickMax(colors,65536)*
sizeof(*graymap));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
if (info.bytes_per_pixel == 1)
graymap[i]=(int) data[i];
else
graymap[i]=(int) ((short *) data)[i];
break;
}
case 0x1201:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate redmap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
redmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(redmap);
redmap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(colors,65536),
sizeof(*redmap));
if (redmap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(redmap,0,MagickMax(colors,65536)*
sizeof(*redmap));
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
redmap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
case 0x1202:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate greenmap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
greenmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(greenmap);
greenmap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(colors,65536),
sizeof(*greenmap));
if (greenmap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(greenmap,0,MagickMax(colors,65536)*
sizeof(*greenmap));
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
greenmap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
case 0x1203:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate bluemap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
bluemap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bluemap);
bluemap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(colors,65536),
sizeof(*bluemap));
if (bluemap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(bluemap,0,MagickMax(colors,65536)*
sizeof(*bluemap));
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
bluemap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
case 0x2050:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0020:
{
if ((data != (unsigned char *) NULL) &&
(strncmp((char *) data,"INVERSE",7) == 0))
info.polarity=MagickTrue;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
char
*attribute;
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) &&
(element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
if (dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL)
{
attribute=AcquireString("dcm:");
(void) ConcatenateString(&attribute,dicom_info[i].description);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMax(length,4); i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((i == (ssize_t) length) || (length > 4))
{
(void) SubstituteString(&attribute," ","");
(void) SetImageProperty(image,attribute,(char *) data,
exception);
}
attribute=DestroyString(attribute);
}
}
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
{
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%d\n",datum);
else
{
/*
Display group data.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMax(length,4); i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((i != (ssize_t) length) && (length <= 4))
{
ssize_t
j;
datum=0;
for (j=(ssize_t) length-1; j >= 0; j--)
datum=(256*datum+data[j]);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%d",datum);
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%c",data[i]);
else
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%c",'.');
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"\n");
}
}
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
}
if ((group == 0xfffc) && (element == 0xfffc))
{
Image
*last;
last=RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
if (last != (Image *) NULL)
last=DestroyImage(last);
break;
}
if ((width == 0) || (height == 0))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
if (info.signed_data == 0xffff)
info.signed_data=(size_t) (info.significant_bits == 16 ? 1 : 0);
if ((image->compression == JPEGCompression) ||
(image->compression == JPEG2000Compression))
{
Image
*images;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c;
/*
Read offset table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
(void) (((ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) |
ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (length > (size_t) GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
stream_info->offset_count=length >> 2;
if (stream_info->offset_count != 0)
{
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL)
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
stream_info->offsets);
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(
stream_info->offset_count,sizeof(*stream_info->offsets));
if (stream_info->offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
offset=TellBlob(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]+=offset;
}
/*
Handle non-native image formats.
*/
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
images=NewImageList();
for (scene=0; scene < (ssize_t) number_scenes; scene++)
{
char
filename[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*property;
FILE
*file;
Image
*jpeg_image;
int
unique_file;
unsigned int
tag;
tag=((unsigned int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) |
ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (tag == 0xFFFEE0DD)
break; /* sequence delimiter tag */
if (tag != 0xFFFEE000)
{
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
file=(FILE *) NULL;
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if (file == (FILE *) NULL)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,
"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile",filename);
break;
}
for (c=EOF; length != 0; length--)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
if (fputc(c,file) != c)
break;
}
(void) fclose(file);
if (c == EOF)
break;
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MagickPathExtent,
"jpeg:%s",filename);
if (image->compression == JPEG2000Compression)
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MagickPathExtent,
"j2k:%s",filename);
jpeg_image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
if (jpeg_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
ResetImagePropertyIterator(image);
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
while (property != (const char *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(jpeg_image,property,
GetImageProperty(image,property,exception),exception);
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
}
AppendImageToList(&images,jpeg_image);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
}
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL)
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info->offsets);
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info);
if (info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL)
info.scale=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info.scale);
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
graymap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(graymap);
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
bluemap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bluemap);
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
greenmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(greenmap);
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
redmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(redmap);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(images));
}
if (info.depth != (1UL*MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH))
{
QuantumAny
range;
/*
Compute pixel scaling table.
*/
length=(size_t) (GetQuantumRange(info.depth)+1);
if (length > (size_t) GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if (info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL)
info.scale=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info.scale);
info.scale=(Quantum *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(length,256),
sizeof(*info.scale));
if (info.scale == (Quantum *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(info.scale,0,MagickMax(length,256)*
sizeof(*info.scale));
range=GetQuantumRange(info.depth);
for (i=0; i <= (ssize_t) GetQuantumRange(info.depth); i++)
info.scale[i]=ScaleAnyToQuantum((size_t) i,range);
}
if (image->compression == RLECompression)
{
unsigned int
tag;
/*
Read RLE offset table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
{
int
c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
break;
}
tag=((unsigned int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) |
ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
(void) tag;
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (length > (size_t) GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
stream_info->offset_count=length >> 2;
if (stream_info->offset_count != 0)
{
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL)
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info->offsets);
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(
stream_info->offset_count,sizeof(*stream_info->offsets));
if (stream_info->offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
{
stream_info->offsets[i]=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
}
offset=TellBlob(image)+8;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]+=offset;
}
}
for (scene=0; scene < (ssize_t) number_scenes; scene++)
{
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
image->depth=info.depth;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
image->colorspace=RGBColorspace;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception);
if ((image->colormap == (PixelInfo *) NULL) &&
(info.samples_per_pixel == 1))
{
int
index;
size_t
one;
one=1;
if (colors == 0)
colors=one << info.depth;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=redmap[i];
if ((info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index >= 0) &&
(index <= (int) info.max_value))
index=(int) info.scale[index];
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) index;
}
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=greenmap[i];
if ((info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index >= 0) &&
(index <= (int) info.max_value))
index=(int) info.scale[index];
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) index;
}
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=bluemap[i];
if ((info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index >= 0) &&
(index <= (int) info.max_value))
index=(int) info.scale[index];
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) index;
}
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=graymap[i];
if ((info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index >= 0) &&
(index <= (int) info.max_value))
index=(int) info.scale[index];
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) index;
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) index;
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) index;
}
}
if (image->compression == RLECompression)
{
unsigned int
tag;
/*
Read RLE segment table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
{
int
c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
break;
}
tag=((unsigned int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) |
ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
stream_info->remaining=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if ((tag != 0xFFFEE000) || (stream_info->remaining <= 64) ||
(EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse))
{
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL)
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info->offsets);
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
stream_info->count=0;
stream_info->segment_count=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
for (i=0; i < 15; i++)
stream_info->segments[i]=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
stream_info->remaining-=64;
if (stream_info->segment_count > 1)
{
info.bytes_per_pixel=1;
info.depth=8;
if (stream_info->offset_count > 0)
(void) SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType)
stream_info->offsets[0]+stream_info->segments[0],SEEK_SET);
}
}
if ((info.samples_per_pixel > 1) && (image->interlace == PlaneInterlace))
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*q;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Convert Planar RGB DCM Medical image to pixel packets.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) info.samples_per_pixel; i++)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
switch ((int) i)
{
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)),q);
break;
}
case 1:
{
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)),q);
break;
}
case 2:
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)),q);
break;
}
case 3:
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)),q);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
}
else
{
const char
*option;
/*
Convert DCM Medical image to pixel packets.
*/
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"dcm:display-range");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"reset") == 0)
info.window_width=0;
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"dcm:window");
if (option != (char *) NULL)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
flags=ParseGeometry(option,&geometry_info);
if (flags & RhoValue)
info.window_center=geometry_info.rho;
if (flags & SigmaValue)
info.window_width=geometry_info.sigma;
info.rescale=MagickTrue;
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"dcm:rescale");
if (option != (char *) NULL)
info.rescale=IsStringTrue(option);
if ((info.window_center != 0) && (info.window_width == 0))
info.window_width=info.window_center;
status=ReadDCMPixels(image,&info,stream_info,MagickTrue,exception);
if ((status != MagickFalse) && (stream_info->segment_count > 1))
{
if (stream_info->offset_count > 0)
(void) SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType)
stream_info->offsets[0]+stream_info->segments[1],SEEK_SET);
(void) ReadDCMPixels(image,&info,stream_info,MagickFalse,
exception);
}
}
if (SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (scene < (ssize_t) (number_scenes-1))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (TellBlob(image) < (MagickOffsetType) GetBlobSize(image))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
/*
Free resources.
*/
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL)
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info->offsets);
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info);
if (info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL)
info.scale=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info.scale);
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
graymap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(graymap);
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
bluemap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bluemap);
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
greenmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(greenmap);
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
redmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(redmap);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
return(image);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1269
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
uint32_t intr;
int irq = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr;
trace_kvm_inj_virq(irq);
++vcpu->stat.irq_injections;
if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
int inc_eip = 0;
if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft)
inc_eip = vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len;
if (kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, irq, inc_eip) != EMULATE_DONE)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
return;
}
intr = irq | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft) {
intr |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR;
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len);
} else
intr |= INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR;
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, intr);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vrend_hw_emit_streamout_targets(struct vrend_context *ctx, struct vrend_streamout_object *so_obj)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < so_obj->num_targets; i++) {
if (so_obj->so_targets[i]->buffer_offset || so_obj->so_targets[i]->buffer_size < so_obj->so_targets[i]->buffer->base.width0)
glBindBufferRange(GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_BUFFER, i, so_obj->so_targets[i]->buffer->id, so_obj->so_targets[i]->buffer_offset, so_obj->so_targets[i]->buffer_size);
else
glBindBufferBase(GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_BUFFER, i, so_obj->so_targets[i]->buffer->id);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 8,875 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::setBgColor(const AtomicString& value) {
if (!IsFrameSet())
SetBodyAttribute(bgcolorAttr, value);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 144,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xml_create_patchset_v2(xmlNode *source, xmlNode *target)
{
int lpc = 0;
GListPtr gIter = NULL;
xml_private_t *doc = NULL;
xmlNode *v = NULL;
xmlNode *version = NULL;
xmlNode *patchset = NULL;
const char *vfields[] = {
XML_ATTR_GENERATION_ADMIN,
XML_ATTR_GENERATION,
XML_ATTR_NUMUPDATES,
};
CRM_ASSERT(target);
if(xml_document_dirty(target) == FALSE) {
return NULL;
}
CRM_ASSERT(target->doc);
doc = target->doc->_private;
patchset = create_xml_node(NULL, XML_TAG_DIFF);
crm_xml_add_int(patchset, "format", 2);
version = create_xml_node(patchset, XML_DIFF_VERSION);
v = create_xml_node(version, XML_DIFF_VSOURCE);
for(lpc = 0; lpc < DIMOF(vfields); lpc++){
const char *value = crm_element_value(source, vfields[lpc]);
if(value == NULL) {
value = "1";
}
crm_xml_add(v, vfields[lpc], value);
}
v = create_xml_node(version, XML_DIFF_VTARGET);
for(lpc = 0; lpc < DIMOF(vfields); lpc++){
const char *value = crm_element_value(target, vfields[lpc]);
if(value == NULL) {
value = "1";
}
crm_xml_add(v, vfields[lpc], value);
}
for(gIter = doc->deleted_paths; gIter; gIter = gIter->next) {
xmlNode *change = create_xml_node(patchset, XML_DIFF_CHANGE);
crm_xml_add(change, XML_DIFF_OP, "delete");
crm_xml_add(change, XML_DIFF_PATH, gIter->data);
}
__xml_build_changes(target, patchset);
return patchset;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormControlElement::setNeedsValidityCheck() {
if (!m_validityIsDirty) {
m_validityIsDirty = true;
formOwnerSetNeedsValidityCheck();
fieldSetAncestorsSetNeedsValidityCheck(parentNode());
pseudoStateChanged(CSSSelector::PseudoValid);
pseudoStateChanged(CSSSelector::PseudoInvalid);
pseudoStateChanged(CSSSelector::PseudoInRange);
pseudoStateChanged(CSSSelector::PseudoOutOfRange);
}
if (isValidationMessageVisible()) {
updateVisibleValidationMessage();
}
}
Commit Message: Form validation: Do not show validation bubble if the page is invisible.
BUG=673163
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2572813003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#438476}
CWE ID: CWE-1021 | 0 | 139,993 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GesturePoint::GesturePoint()
: first_touch_time_(0.0),
last_touch_time_(0.0),
last_tap_time_(0.0),
velocity_calculator_(kBufferedPoints) {
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 171,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ext4_extent_block_csum_set(struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_extent_header *eh)
{
struct ext4_extent_tail *et;
if (!EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(inode->i_sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM))
return;
et = find_ext4_extent_tail(eh);
et->et_checksum = ext4_extent_block_csum(inode, eh);
}
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mpol_rebind_preferred(struct mempolicy *pol,
const nodemask_t *nodes)
{
nodemask_t tmp;
if (pol->flags & MPOL_F_STATIC_NODES) {
int node = first_node(pol->w.user_nodemask);
if (node_isset(node, *nodes)) {
pol->v.preferred_node = node;
pol->flags &= ~MPOL_F_LOCAL;
} else
pol->flags |= MPOL_F_LOCAL;
} else if (pol->flags & MPOL_F_RELATIVE_NODES) {
mpol_relative_nodemask(&tmp, &pol->w.user_nodemask, nodes);
pol->v.preferred_node = first_node(tmp);
} else if (!(pol->flags & MPOL_F_LOCAL)) {
pol->v.preferred_node = node_remap(pol->v.preferred_node,
pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed,
*nodes);
pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed = *nodes;
}
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy: fix use after free when calling get_mempolicy
I hit a use after free issue when executing trinity and repoduced it
with KASAN enabled. The related call trace is as follows.
BUG: KASan: use after free in SyS_get_mempolicy+0x3c8/0x960 at addr ffff8801f582d766
Read of size 2 by task syz-executor1/798
INFO: Allocated in mpol_new.part.2+0x74/0x160 age=3 cpu=1 pid=799
__slab_alloc+0x768/0x970
kmem_cache_alloc+0x2e7/0x450
mpol_new.part.2+0x74/0x160
mpol_new+0x66/0x80
SyS_mbind+0x267/0x9f0
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
INFO: Freed in __mpol_put+0x2b/0x40 age=4 cpu=1 pid=799
__slab_free+0x495/0x8e0
kmem_cache_free+0x2f3/0x4c0
__mpol_put+0x2b/0x40
SyS_mbind+0x383/0x9f0
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0009cb8dc0 objects=23 used=8 fp=0xffff8801f582de40 flags=0x200000000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff8801f582d760 @offset=5984 fp=0xffff8801f582d600
Bytes b4 ffff8801f582d750: ae 01 ff ff 00 00 00 00 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ........ZZZZZZZZ
Object ffff8801f582d760: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object ffff8801f582d770: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkk.
Redzone ffff8801f582d778: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........
Padding ffff8801f582d8b8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8801f582d600: fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8801f582d680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8801f582d700: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fc
!shared memory policy is not protected against parallel removal by other
thread which is normally protected by the mmap_sem. do_get_mempolicy,
however, drops the lock midway while we can still access it later.
Early premature up_read is a historical artifact from times when
put_user was called in this path see https://lwn.net/Articles/124754/
but that is gone since 8bccd85ffbaf ("[PATCH] Implement sys_* do_*
layering in the memory policy layer."). but when we have the the
current mempolicy ref count model. The issue was introduced
accordingly.
Fix the issue by removing the premature release.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1502950924-27521-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 83,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
if ((svm->vcpu.arch.hflags & (HF_NMI_MASK | HF_IRET_MASK))
== HF_NMI_MASK)
return; /* IRET will cause a vm exit */
/*
* Something prevents NMI from been injected. Single step over possible
* problem (IRET or exception injection or interrupt shadow)
*/
svm->nmi_singlestep = true;
svm->vmcb->save.rflags |= (X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_RF);
update_db_bp_intercept(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: svm: unconditionally intercept #DB
This is needed to avoid the possibility that the guest triggers
an infinite stream of #DB exceptions (CVE-2015-8104).
VMX is not affected: because it does not save DR6 in the VMCS,
it already intercepts #DB unconditionally.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 166,569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virDomainDefineXMLFlags(virConnectPtr conn, const char *xml, unsigned int flags)
{
VIR_DEBUG("conn=%p, xml=%s flags=%x", conn, NULLSTR(xml), flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckConnectReturn(conn, NULL);
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(xml, error);
if (conn->driver->domainDefineXMLFlags) {
virDomainPtr ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainDefineXMLFlags(conn, xml, flags);
if (!ret)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(conn);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 93,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebContentsImpl::IsWebContentsOnlyAccessibilityModeForTesting() const {
return accessibility_mode_ == kAccessibilityModeWebContentsOnly;
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetQuantumEndian(const Image *image,
QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const EndianType endian)
{
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickSignature);
quantum_info->endian=endian;
return(SetQuantumDepth(image,quantum_info,quantum_info->depth));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/110
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 96,173 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TextTrackCueList::TextTrackCueList() : first_invalid_index_(0) {}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,050 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintPreviewHandler::FileSelected(const FilePath& path,
int index, void* params) {
GetStickySettings()->StoreSavePath(path.DirName());
PrintPreviewUI* print_preview_ui = static_cast<PrintPreviewUI*>(
web_ui()->GetController());
print_preview_ui->web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction("fileSelectionCompleted");
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes> data;
print_preview_ui->GetPrintPreviewDataForIndex(
printing::COMPLETE_PREVIEW_DOCUMENT_INDEX, &data);
print_to_pdf_path_.reset(new FilePath(path));
PostPrintToPdfTask(data);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 105,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::ValidateNullableWebGLObject(
const char* function_name,
WebGLObject* object) {
if (isContextLost())
return false;
if (!object) {
return true;
}
return ValidateWebGLObject(function_name, object);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnWasHidden() {
RenderWidget::OnWasHidden();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
media_player_manager_->ReleaseMediaResources();
#endif
if (webview()) {
webview()->settings()->setMinimumTimerInterval(
webkit_glue::kBackgroundTabTimerInterval);
webview()->setVisibilityState(visibilityState(), false);
}
pepper_helper_->PageVisibilityChanged(false);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
std::set<WebPluginDelegateProxy*>::iterator plugin_it;
for (plugin_it = plugin_delegates_.begin();
plugin_it != plugin_delegates_.end(); ++plugin_it) {
(*plugin_it)->SetContainerVisibility(false);
}
#endif // OS_MACOSX
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void doWriteAesKey(const blink::WebCryptoKey& key)
{
ASSERT(key.algorithm().paramsType() == blink::WebCryptoKeyAlgorithmParamsTypeAes);
append(static_cast<uint8_t>(AesKeyTag));
doWriteAlgorithmId(key.algorithm().id());
ASSERT(!(key.algorithm().aesParams()->lengthBits() % 8));
doWriteUint32(key.algorithm().aesParams()->lengthBits() / 8);
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Curl_flush_cookies(struct SessionHandle *data, int cleanup)
{
if(data->set.str[STRING_COOKIEJAR]) {
if(data->change.cookielist) {
/* If there is a list of cookie files to read, do it first so that
we have all the told files read before we write the new jar.
Curl_cookie_loadfiles() LOCKS and UNLOCKS the share itself! */
Curl_cookie_loadfiles(data);
}
Curl_share_lock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_COOKIE, CURL_LOCK_ACCESS_SINGLE);
/* if we have a destination file for all the cookies to get dumped to */
if(cookie_output(data->cookies, data->set.str[STRING_COOKIEJAR]))
infof(data, "WARNING: failed to save cookies in %s\n",
data->set.str[STRING_COOKIEJAR]);
}
else {
if(cleanup && data->change.cookielist) {
/* since nothing is written, we can just free the list of cookie file
names */
curl_slist_free_all(data->change.cookielist); /* clean up list */
data->change.cookielist = NULL;
}
Curl_share_lock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_COOKIE, CURL_LOCK_ACCESS_SINGLE);
}
if(cleanup && (!data->share || (data->cookies != data->share->cookies))) {
Curl_cookie_cleanup(data->cookies);
}
Curl_share_unlock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_COOKIE);
}
Commit Message: cookie: fix tailmatching to prevent cross-domain leakage
Cookies set for 'example.com' could accidentaly also be sent by libcurl
to the 'bexample.com' (ie with a prefix to the first domain name).
This is a security vulnerabilty, CVE-2013-1944.
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20130412.html
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 32,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ui::MenuModel* AppResult::GetContextMenuModel() {
if (!context_menu_) {
context_menu_.reset(new AppContextMenu(
this, profile_, app_id_, controller_));
context_menu_->set_is_platform_app(is_platform_app_);
context_menu_->set_is_search_result(true);
}
return context_menu_->GetMenuModel();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: free_config_monitor(
config_tree *ptree
)
{
if (ptree->stats_dir) {
free(ptree->stats_dir);
ptree->stats_dir = NULL;
}
FREE_INT_FIFO(ptree->stats_list);
FREE_FILEGEN_FIFO(ptree->filegen_opts);
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::HasTouchEventHandlers(
bool need_touch_events) {
if (content_view_core_)
content_view_core_->HasTouchEventHandlers(need_touch_events);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Virtualizer_setParameter (EffectContext *pContext, void *pParam, void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int16_t strength;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
switch (param){
case VIRTUALIZER_PARAM_STRENGTH:
strength = *(int16_t *)pValue;
VirtualizerSetStrength(pContext, (int32_t)strength);
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Virtualizer_setParameter() invalid param %d", param);
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Virtualizer_setParameter */
Commit Message: fix possible overflow in effect wrappers.
Add checks on parameter size field in effect command handlers
to avoid overflow leading to invalid comparison with min allowed
size for command and reply buffers.
Bug: 26347509.
Change-Id: I20e6a9b6de8e5172b957caa1ac9410b9752efa4d
(cherry picked from commit ad1bd92a49d78df6bc6e75bee68c517c1326f3cf)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 161,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetUniformiv(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::GetUniformiv& c) {
GLuint program = c.program;
GLint location = c.location;
GLuint service_id;
GLenum result_type;
Error error;
void* result;
if (GetUniformSetup(
program, location, c.params_shm_id, c.params_shm_offset,
&error, &service_id, &result, &result_type)) {
glGetUniformiv(
service_id, location,
static_cast<gles2::GetUniformiv::Result*>(result)->GetData());
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void cmd_xbackup(const char *tag,
const char *mailbox,
const char *channel)
{
ptrarray_t list = PTRARRAY_INITIALIZER;
int i, r;
/* admins only please */
if (!imapd_userisadmin && !imapd_userisproxyadmin) {
r = IMAP_PERMISSION_DENIED;
goto done;
}
if (!config_getswitch(IMAPOPT_XBACKUP_ENABLED)) {
/* shouldn't get here, but just in case */
r = IMAP_PERMISSION_DENIED;
goto done;
}
mboxlist_findall(NULL, mailbox, 1, NULL, NULL, xbackup_addmbox, &list);
if (list.count) {
r = do_xbackup(channel, &list);
for (i = 0; i < list.count; i++) {
mbname_t *mbname = ptrarray_nth(&list, i);
if (mbname)
mbname_free(&mbname);
}
ptrarray_fini(&list);
}
else {
r = IMAP_MAILBOX_NONEXISTENT;
}
done:
imapd_check(NULL, 0);
if (r) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO %s\r\n", tag, error_message(r));
} else {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK %s\r\n", tag,
error_message(IMAP_OK_COMPLETED));
}
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,180 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *server_create_address_tag(const char *address)
{
const char *start, *end;
g_return_val_if_fail(address != NULL, NULL);
/* try to generate a reasonable server tag */
if (strchr(address, '.') == NULL) {
start = end = NULL;
} else if (g_ascii_strncasecmp(address, "irc", 3) == 0 ||
g_ascii_strncasecmp(address, "chat", 4) == 0) {
/* irc-2.cs.hut.fi -> hut, chat.bt.net -> bt */
end = strrchr(address, '.');
start = end-1;
while (start > address && *start != '.') start--;
} else {
/* efnet.cs.hut.fi -> efnet */
end = strchr(address, '.');
start = end;
}
if (start == end) start = address; else start++;
if (end == NULL) end = address + strlen(address);
return g_strndup(start, (int) (end-start));
}
Commit Message: Check if an SSL certificate matches the hostname of the server we are connecting to
git-svn-id: http://svn.irssi.org/repos/irssi/trunk@5104 dbcabf3a-b0e7-0310-adc4-f8d773084564
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ProfileSyncService::IsCryptographerReady(
const sync_api::BaseTransaction* trans) const {
return backend_.get() && backend_->IsCryptographerReady(trans);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 104,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SupportsSeparateFramebufferBinds() const {
return (feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_framebuffer_multisample ||
feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context());
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::CreateNewTarget(const GURL& url) {
if (!browser_)
return nullptr;
HeadlessBrowserContext* context = browser_->GetDefaultBrowserContext();
HeadlessWebContentsImpl* web_contents_impl = HeadlessWebContentsImpl::From(
context->CreateWebContentsBuilder()
.SetInitialURL(url)
.SetWindowSize(browser_->options()->window_size)
.Build());
return content::DevToolsAgentHost::GetOrCreateFor(
web_contents_impl->web_contents());
}
Commit Message: Remove some unused includes in headless/
Bug:
Change-Id: Icb5351bb6112fc89e36dab82c15f32887dab9217
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/720594
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Iris Uy <irisu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#509313}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 133,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void scheduler_ipi(void)
{
/*
* Fold TIF_NEED_RESCHED into the preempt_count; anybody setting
* TIF_NEED_RESCHED remotely (for the first time) will also send
* this IPI.
*/
preempt_fold_need_resched();
if (llist_empty(&this_rq()->wake_list) && !got_nohz_idle_kick())
return;
/*
* Not all reschedule IPI handlers call irq_enter/irq_exit, since
* traditionally all their work was done from the interrupt return
* path. Now that we actually do some work, we need to make sure
* we do call them.
*
* Some archs already do call them, luckily irq_enter/exit nest
* properly.
*
* Arguably we should visit all archs and update all handlers,
* however a fair share of IPIs are still resched only so this would
* somewhat pessimize the simple resched case.
*/
irq_enter();
sched_ttwu_pending();
/*
* Check if someone kicked us for doing the nohz idle load balance.
*/
if (unlikely(got_nohz_idle_kick())) {
this_rq()->idle_balance = 1;
raise_softirq_irqoff(SCHED_SOFTIRQ);
}
irq_exit();
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long long Block::GetTrackNumber() const
{
return m_track;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __might_fault(const char *file, int line)
{
/*
* Some code (nfs/sunrpc) uses socket ops on kernel memory while
* holding the mmap_sem, this is safe because kernel memory doesn't
* get paged out, therefore we'll never actually fault, and the
* below annotations will generate false positives.
*/
if (segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS))
return;
if (pagefault_disabled())
return;
__might_sleep(file, line, 0);
#if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP)
if (current->mm)
might_lock_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
#endif
}
Commit Message: mm: avoid setting up anonymous pages into file mapping
Reading page fault handler code I've noticed that under right
circumstances kernel would map anonymous pages into file mappings: if
the VMA doesn't have vm_ops->fault() and the VMA wasn't fully populated
on ->mmap(), kernel would handle page fault to not populated pte with
do_anonymous_page().
Let's change page fault handler to use do_anonymous_page() only on
anonymous VMA (->vm_ops == NULL) and make sure that the VMA is not
shared.
For file mappings without vm_ops->fault() or shred VMA without vm_ops,
page fault on pte_none() entry would lead to SIGBUS.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 57,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct dentry *d_alloc_name(struct dentry *parent, const char *name)
{
struct qstr q;
q.name = name;
q.hash_len = hashlen_string(parent, name);
return d_alloc(parent, &q);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GenericMPEfree(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, void *Ptr)
{
cmsStageFree((cmsStage*) Ptr);
return;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(self);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,942 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned lodepng_info_copy(LodePNGInfo* dest, const LodePNGInfo* source)
{
lodepng_info_cleanup(dest);
*dest = *source;
lodepng_color_mode_init(&dest->color);
CERROR_TRY_RETURN(lodepng_color_mode_copy(&dest->color, &source->color));
#ifdef LODEPNG_COMPILE_ANCILLARY_CHUNKS
CERROR_TRY_RETURN(LodePNGText_copy(dest, source));
CERROR_TRY_RETURN(LodePNGIText_copy(dest, source));
LodePNGUnknownChunks_init(dest);
CERROR_TRY_RETURN(LodePNGUnknownChunks_copy(dest, source));
#endif /*LODEPNG_COMPILE_ANCILLARY_CHUNKS*/
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long long ns2usecs(u64 nsec)
{
nsec += 500;
do_div(nsec, 1000);
return nsec;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DrawingBuffer::MailboxReleasedGpu(RefPtr<ColorBuffer> color_buffer,
const gpu::SyncToken& sync_token,
bool lost_resource) {
if (color_buffer == front_color_buffer_)
front_color_buffer_ = nullptr;
color_buffer->receive_sync_token = sync_token;
if (destruction_in_progress_ || color_buffer->size != size_ ||
gl_->GetGraphicsResetStatusKHR() != GL_NO_ERROR || lost_resource ||
is_hidden_) {
return;
}
size_t cache_limit = 1;
if (ShouldUseChromiumImage())
cache_limit = 4;
while (recycled_color_buffer_queue_.size() >= cache_limit)
recycled_color_buffer_queue_.TakeLast();
recycled_color_buffer_queue_.push_front(color_buffer);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,949 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: auth_select_file(struct sc_card *card, const struct sc_path *in_path,
struct sc_file **file_out)
{
struct sc_path path;
struct sc_file *tmp_file = NULL;
size_t offs, ii;
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
assert(card != NULL && in_path != NULL);
memcpy(&path, in_path, sizeof(struct sc_path));
sc_log(card->ctx, "in_path; type=%d, path=%s, out %p",
in_path->type, sc_print_path(in_path), file_out);
sc_log(card->ctx, "current path; type=%d, path=%s",
auth_current_df->path.type, sc_print_path(&auth_current_df->path));
if (auth_current_ef)
sc_log(card->ctx, "current file; type=%d, path=%s",
auth_current_ef->path.type, sc_print_path(&auth_current_ef->path));
if (path.type == SC_PATH_TYPE_PARENT || path.type == SC_PATH_TYPE_FILE_ID) {
sc_file_free(auth_current_ef);
auth_current_ef = NULL;
rv = iso_ops->select_file(card, &path, &tmp_file);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "select file failed");
if (!tmp_file)
return SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND;
if (path.type == SC_PATH_TYPE_PARENT) {
memcpy(&tmp_file->path, &auth_current_df->path, sizeof(struct sc_path));
if (tmp_file->path.len > 2)
tmp_file->path.len -= 2;
sc_file_free(auth_current_df);
sc_file_dup(&auth_current_df, tmp_file);
}
else {
if (tmp_file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF) {
sc_concatenate_path(&tmp_file->path, &auth_current_df->path, &path);
sc_file_free(auth_current_df);
sc_file_dup(&auth_current_df, tmp_file);
}
else {
sc_file_free(auth_current_ef);
sc_file_dup(&auth_current_ef, tmp_file);
sc_concatenate_path(&auth_current_ef->path, &auth_current_df->path, &path);
}
}
if (file_out)
sc_file_dup(file_out, tmp_file);
sc_file_free(tmp_file);
}
else if (path.type == SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME) {
rv = iso_ops->select_file(card, &path, NULL);
if (rv) {
sc_file_free(auth_current_ef);
auth_current_ef = NULL;
}
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "select file failed");
}
else {
for (offs = 0; offs < path.len && offs < auth_current_df->path.len; offs += 2)
if (path.value[offs] != auth_current_df->path.value[offs] ||
path.value[offs + 1] != auth_current_df->path.value[offs + 1])
break;
sc_log(card->ctx, "offs %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u", offs);
if (offs && offs < auth_current_df->path.len) {
size_t deep = auth_current_df->path.len - offs;
sc_log(card->ctx, "deep %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
deep);
for (ii=0; ii<deep; ii+=2) {
struct sc_path tmp_path;
memcpy(&tmp_path, &auth_current_df->path, sizeof(struct sc_path));
tmp_path.type = SC_PATH_TYPE_PARENT;
rv = auth_select_file (card, &tmp_path, file_out);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "select file failed");
}
}
if (path.len - offs > 0) {
struct sc_path tmp_path;
memset(&tmp_path, 0, sizeof(struct sc_path));
tmp_path.type = SC_PATH_TYPE_FILE_ID;
tmp_path.len = 2;
for (ii=0; ii < path.len - offs; ii+=2) {
memcpy(tmp_path.value, path.value + offs + ii, 2);
rv = auth_select_file(card, &tmp_path, file_out);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "select file failed");
}
}
else if (path.len - offs == 0 && file_out) {
if (sc_compare_path(&path, &auth_current_df->path))
sc_file_dup(file_out, auth_current_df);
else if (auth_current_ef)
sc_file_dup(file_out, auth_current_ef);
else
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL, "No current EF");
}
}
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, 0);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 169,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: extern "C" int EffectRelease(effect_handle_t handle){
ALOGV("\n\tEffectRelease start %p", handle);
EffectContext * pContext = (EffectContext *)handle;
ALOGV("\tEffectRelease start handle: %p, context %p", handle, pContext->pBundledContext);
if (pContext == NULL){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : EffectRelease called with NULL pointer");
return -EINVAL;
}
SessionContext *pSessionContext = &GlobalSessionMemory[pContext->pBundledContext->SessionNo];
if(pContext->EffectType == LVM_BASS_BOOST) {
ALOGV("\tEffectRelease LVM_BASS_BOOST Clearing global intstantiated flag");
pSessionContext->bBassInstantiated = LVM_FALSE;
if(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountBb > 0){
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled--;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountBb = 0;
} else if(pContext->EffectType == LVM_VIRTUALIZER) {
ALOGV("\tEffectRelease LVM_VIRTUALIZER Clearing global intstantiated flag");
pSessionContext->bVirtualizerInstantiated = LVM_FALSE;
if(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountVirt > 0){
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled--;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountVirt = 0;
} else if(pContext->EffectType == LVM_EQUALIZER) {
ALOGV("\tEffectRelease LVM_EQUALIZER Clearing global intstantiated flag");
pSessionContext->bEqualizerInstantiated =LVM_FALSE;
if(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountEq > 0){
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled--;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountEq = 0;
} else if(pContext->EffectType == LVM_VOLUME) {
ALOGV("\tEffectRelease LVM_VOLUME Clearing global intstantiated flag");
pSessionContext->bVolumeInstantiated = LVM_FALSE;
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVolumeEnabled == LVM_TRUE){
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled--;
}
} else {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : EffectRelease : Unsupported effect\n\n\n\n\n\n\n");
}
Effect_setEnabled(pContext, LVM_FALSE);
if ((pSessionContext->bBassInstantiated == LVM_FALSE) &&
(pSessionContext->bVolumeInstantiated == LVM_FALSE) &&
(pSessionContext->bEqualizerInstantiated ==LVM_FALSE) &&
(pSessionContext->bVirtualizerInstantiated==LVM_FALSE))
{
#ifdef LVM_PCM
if (pContext->pBundledContext->PcmInPtr != NULL) {
fclose(pContext->pBundledContext->PcmInPtr);
pContext->pBundledContext->PcmInPtr = NULL;
}
if (pContext->pBundledContext->PcmOutPtr != NULL) {
fclose(pContext->pBundledContext->PcmOutPtr);
pContext->pBundledContext->PcmOutPtr = NULL;
}
#endif
for(int i=0; i<LVM_MAX_SESSIONS; i++){
if(SessionIndex[i] == pContext->pBundledContext->SessionId){
SessionIndex[i] = LVM_UNUSED_SESSION;
ALOGV("\tEffectRelease: Clearing SessionIndex SessionNo %d for SessionId %d\n",
i, pContext->pBundledContext->SessionId);
break;
}
}
ALOGV("\tEffectRelease: All effects are no longer instantiated\n");
pSessionContext->bBundledEffectsEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
pSessionContext->pBundledContext = LVM_NULL;
ALOGV("\tEffectRelease: Freeing LVM Bundle memory\n");
LvmEffect_free(pContext);
ALOGV("\tEffectRelease: Deleting LVM Bundle context %p\n", pContext->pBundledContext);
if (pContext->pBundledContext->workBuffer != NULL) {
free(pContext->pBundledContext->workBuffer);
}
delete pContext->pBundledContext;
pContext->pBundledContext = LVM_NULL;
}
delete pContext;
ALOGV("\tEffectRelease end\n");
return 0;
} /* end EffectRelease */
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SendTabToSelfInfoBar::CreateRenderInfoBar(JNIEnv* env) {
return Java_SendTabToSelfInfoBar_create(env);
}
Commit Message: [SendTabToSelf] Added logic to display an infobar for the feature.
This CL is one of many to come. It covers:
* Creation of the infobar from the SendTabToSelfInfoBarController
* Plumbed the call to create the infobar to the native code.
* Open the link when user taps on the link
In follow-up CLs, the following will be done:
* Instantiate the InfobarController in the ChromeActivity
* Listen for Model changes in the Controller
Bug: 949233,963193
Change-Id: I5df1359debb5f0f35c32c2df3b691bf9129cdeb8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1604406
Reviewed-by: Tommy Nyquist <nyquist@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mikel Astiz <mastiz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: sebsg <sebsg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Cohen <jeffreycohen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Jones <mdjones@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Tanya Gupta <tgupta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660854}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 142,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void print_var_int(const char *var, int val)
{
printf("%s=%d\n", var, val);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,890 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int zgfx_compress(ZGFX_CONTEXT* zgfx, const BYTE* pSrcData, UINT32 SrcSize, BYTE** ppDstData,
UINT32* pDstSize, UINT32* pFlags)
{
int status;
wStream* s = Stream_New(NULL, SrcSize);
status = zgfx_compress_to_stream(zgfx, s, pSrcData, SrcSize, pFlags);
(*ppDstData) = Stream_Buffer(s);
(*pDstSize) = Stream_GetPosition(s);
Stream_Free(s, FALSE);
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8785
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_decode_remove(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_remove *remove)
{
DECODE_HEAD;
READ_BUF(4);
remove->rm_namelen = be32_to_cpup(p++);
READ_BUF(remove->rm_namelen);
SAVEMEM(remove->rm_name, remove->rm_namelen);
if ((status = check_filename(remove->rm_name, remove->rm_namelen)))
return status;
DECODE_TAIL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,771 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: event_font_change( int delta )
{
int num_indices;
if ( status.font_index + delta >= handle->num_fonts ||
status.font_index + delta < 0 )
return;
status.font_index += delta;
FTDemo_Set_Current_Font( handle, handle->fonts[status.font_index] );
FTDemo_Set_Current_Charsize( handle, status.ptsize, status.res );
FTDemo_Update_Current_Flags( handle );
num_indices = handle->current_font->num_indices;
if ( status.Num >= num_indices )
status.Num = num_indices - 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,060 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void acpi_os_stall(u32 us)
{
while (us) {
u32 delay = 1000;
if (delay > us)
delay = us;
udelay(delay);
touch_nmi_watchdog();
us -= delay;
}
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 53,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_attr_get(
xfs_inode_t *ip,
const unsigned char *name,
unsigned char *value,
int *valuelenp,
int flags)
{
int error;
struct xfs_name xname;
uint lock_mode;
XFS_STATS_INC(xs_attr_get);
if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(ip->i_mount))
return(EIO);
error = xfs_attr_name_to_xname(&xname, name);
if (error)
return error;
lock_mode = xfs_ilock_attr_map_shared(ip);
error = xfs_attr_get_int(ip, &xname, value, valuelenp, flags);
xfs_iunlock(ip, lock_mode);
return(error);
}
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 44,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vc4_flush_caches(struct drm_device *dev)
{
struct vc4_dev *vc4 = to_vc4_dev(dev);
/* Flush the GPU L2 caches. These caches sit on top of system
* L3 (the 128kb or so shared with the CPU), and are
* non-allocating in the L3.
*/
V3D_WRITE(V3D_L2CACTL,
V3D_L2CACTL_L2CCLR);
V3D_WRITE(V3D_SLCACTL,
VC4_SET_FIELD(0xf, V3D_SLCACTL_T1CC) |
VC4_SET_FIELD(0xf, V3D_SLCACTL_T0CC) |
VC4_SET_FIELD(0xf, V3D_SLCACTL_UCC) |
VC4_SET_FIELD(0xf, V3D_SLCACTL_ICC));
}
Commit Message: drm/vc4: Return -EINVAL on the overflow checks failing.
By failing to set the errno, we'd continue on to trying to set up the
RCL, and then oops on trying to dereference the tile_bo that binning
validation should have set up.
Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Anholt <eric@anholt.net>
Fixes: d5b1a78a772f ("drm/vc4: Add support for drawing 3D frames.")
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 68,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int AXLayoutObject::index(const VisiblePosition& position) const {
if (position.isNull() || !isTextControl())
return -1;
if (layoutObjectContainsPosition(m_layoutObject, position.deepEquivalent()))
return indexForVisiblePosition(position);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport void MSBOrderLong(unsigned char *buffer,const size_t length)
{
int
c;
register unsigned char
*p,
*q;
assert(buffer != (unsigned char *) NULL);
q=buffer+length;
while (buffer < q)
{
p=buffer+3;
c=(int) (*p);
*p=(*buffer);
*buffer++=(unsigned char) c;
p=buffer+1;
c=(int) (*p);
*p=(*buffer);
*buffer++=(unsigned char) c;
buffer+=2;
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 88,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OxideQQuickWebView::setPopupMenu(QQmlComponent* popupMenu) {
Q_D(OxideQQuickWebView);
if (d->contents_view_->popupMenu() == popupMenu) {
return;
}
d->contents_view_->setPopupMenu(popupMenu);
emit popupMenuChanged();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int unix_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
{
int err;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
struct pid *old_pid = NULL;
const struct cred *old_cred = NULL;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM && sock->type != SOCK_SEQPACKET)
goto out; /* Only stream/seqpacket sockets accept */
err = -EINVAL;
if (!u->addr)
goto out; /* No listens on an unbound socket */
unix_state_lock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE && sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN)
goto out_unlock;
if (backlog > sk->sk_max_ack_backlog)
wake_up_interruptible_all(&u->peer_wait);
sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = backlog;
sk->sk_state = TCP_LISTEN;
/* set credentials so connect can copy them */
init_peercred(sk);
err = 0;
out_unlock:
unix_state_unlock(sk);
put_pid(old_pid);
if (old_cred)
put_cred(old_cred);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 19,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct dentry *tracing_dentry_percpu(struct trace_array *tr, int cpu)
{
struct dentry *d_tracer;
if (tr->percpu_dir)
return tr->percpu_dir;
d_tracer = tracing_get_dentry(tr);
if (IS_ERR(d_tracer))
return NULL;
tr->percpu_dir = tracefs_create_dir("per_cpu", d_tracer);
WARN_ONCE(!tr->percpu_dir,
"Could not create tracefs directory 'per_cpu/%d'\n", cpu);
return tr->percpu_dir;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BluetoothAllowedDevices& WebBluetoothServiceImpl::allowed_devices() {
StoragePartitionImpl* partition = static_cast<StoragePartitionImpl*>(
BrowserContext::GetDefaultStoragePartition(
web_contents()->GetBrowserContext()));
scoped_refptr<BluetoothAllowedDevicesMap> allowed_devices_map =
partition->GetBluetoothAllowedDevicesMap();
return allowed_devices_map->GetOrCreateAllowedDevices(GetOrigin());
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,160 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fbFetchSolid(PicturePtr pict, int x, int y, int width, CARD32 *buffer, CARD32 *mask, CARD32 maskBits)
{
FbBits *bits;
FbStride stride;
int bpp;
int xoff, yoff;
CARD32 color;
CARD32 *end;
fetchPixelProc fetch = fetchPixelProcForPicture(pict);
miIndexedPtr indexed = (miIndexedPtr) pict->pFormat->index.devPrivate;
fbGetDrawable (pict->pDrawable, bits, stride, bpp, xoff, yoff);
bits += yoff*stride + (xoff*bpp >> FB_SHIFT);
color = fetch(bits, 0, indexed);
end = buffer + width;
while (buffer < end)
WRITE(buffer++, color);
fbFinishAccess (pict->pDrawable);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,433 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TestWebKitPlatformSupport::canAccelerate2dCanvas() {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka;
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key *dest_keyring = *_dest_keyring, *authkey;
kenter("%p", dest_keyring);
/* find the appropriate keyring */
if (dest_keyring) {
/* the caller supplied one */
key_get(dest_keyring);
} else {
/* use a default keyring; falling through the cases until we
* find one that we actually have */
switch (cred->jit_keyring) {
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
if (cred->request_key_auth) {
authkey = cred->request_key_auth;
down_read(&authkey->sem);
rka = authkey->payload.data[0];
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
&authkey->flags))
dest_keyring =
key_get(rka->dest_keyring);
up_read(&authkey->sem);
if (dest_keyring)
break;
}
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
dest_keyring = key_get(cred->thread_keyring);
if (dest_keyring)
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
dest_keyring = key_get(cred->process_keyring);
if (dest_keyring)
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:
rcu_read_lock();
dest_keyring = key_get(
rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring));
rcu_read_unlock();
if (dest_keyring)
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
dest_keyring =
key_get(cred->user->session_keyring);
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:
dest_keyring = key_get(cred->user->uid_keyring);
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:
default:
BUG();
}
}
*_dest_keyring = dest_keyring;
kleave(" [dk %d]", key_serial(dest_keyring));
return;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,280 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: search_set_from_hostname(struct evdns_base *base) {
char hostname[HOST_NAME_MAX + 1], *domainname;
ASSERT_LOCKED(base);
search_postfix_clear(base);
if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname))) return;
domainname = strchr(hostname, '.');
if (!domainname) return;
search_postfix_add(base, domainname);
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderBox::computeIntrinsicLogicalContentHeightUsing(Length logicalHeightLength, LayoutUnit intrinsicContentHeight, LayoutUnit borderAndPadding) const
{
if (logicalHeightLength.isMinContent() || logicalHeightLength.isMaxContent() || logicalHeightLength.isFitContent()) {
if (isReplaced())
return intrinsicSize().height();
if (m_intrinsicContentLogicalHeight != -1)
return m_intrinsicContentLogicalHeight;
return intrinsicContentHeight;
}
if (logicalHeightLength.isFillAvailable())
return containingBlock()->availableLogicalHeight(ExcludeMarginBorderPadding) - borderAndPadding;
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,484 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void unsignedLongLongSequenceAttrAttrSetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, v8::Local<v8::Value> value, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.unsignedLongLongSequenceAttr._set");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
Vector<unsigned long long> v = toNativeArray<unsigned long long>(value);
imp->setUnsignedLongLongSequenceAttr(v);
return;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaStreamManager::FinalizeGenerateStream(const std::string& label,
DeviceRequest* request) {
DVLOG(1) << "FinalizeGenerateStream label " << label;
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DCHECK(request->generate_stream_cb);
MediaStreamDevices audio_devices, video_devices;
for (const MediaStreamDevice& device : request->devices) {
if (IsAudioInputMediaType(device.type))
audio_devices.push_back(device);
else if (IsVideoMediaType(device.type))
video_devices.push_back(device);
else
NOTREACHED();
}
std::move(request->generate_stream_cb)
.Run(MEDIA_DEVICE_OK, label, audio_devices, video_devices);
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mailimf_month_name_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx, int * result)
{
size_t cur_token;
int month;
int guessed_month;
int r;
cur_token = * indx;
guessed_month = guess_month(message, length, cur_token);
if (guessed_month == -1)
return MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE;
r = mailimf_token_case_insensitive_parse(message, length,
&cur_token,
month_names[guessed_month - 1].str);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR)
return r;
month = guessed_month;
* result = month;
* indx = cur_token;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 66,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderFlexibleBox::crossAxisScrollbarExtent() const
{
return isHorizontalFlow() ? horizontalScrollbarHeight() : verticalScrollbarWidth();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *pkt, const void *data, int len)
{
pkt->length += len;
ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length);
memcpy(pkt->data + pkt->length - len, data, len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rdp_in_colour(STREAM s, uint32 * colour)
{
uint32 i;
in_uint8(s, i);
*colour = i;
in_uint8(s, i);
*colour |= i << 8;
in_uint8(s, i);
*colour |= i << 16;
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: acc_ctx_hints(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *ctx,
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred,
gss_buffer_t *mechListMIC,
OM_uint32 *negState,
send_token_flag *return_token)
{
OM_uint32 tmpmin, ret;
gss_OID_set supported_mechSet;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = NULL;
*mechListMIC = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
supported_mechSet = GSS_C_NO_OID_SET;
*return_token = NO_TOKEN_SEND;
*negState = REJECT;
*minor_status = 0;
/* A hint request must be the first token received. */
if (*ctx != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
ret = get_negotiable_mechs(minor_status, spcred, GSS_C_ACCEPT,
&supported_mechSet);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
ret = make_NegHints(minor_status, spcred, mechListMIC);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
sc = create_spnego_ctx();
if (sc == NULL) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
if (put_mech_set(supported_mechSet, &sc->DER_mechTypes) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
sc->internal_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
*negState = ACCEPT_INCOMPLETE;
*return_token = INIT_TOKEN_SEND;
sc->firstpass = 1;
*ctx = (gss_ctx_id_t)sc;
sc = NULL;
ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
cleanup:
release_spnego_ctx(&sc);
gss_release_oid_set(&tmpmin, &supported_mechSet);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 36,695 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport void *GetBlobStreamData(const Image *image)
{
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
return(image->blob->data);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,640 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ceph_x_invalidate_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
int peer_type)
{
struct ceph_x_ticket_handler *th;
th = get_ticket_handler(ac, peer_type);
if (!IS_ERR(th))
memset(&th->validity, 0, sizeof(th->validity));
}
Commit Message: libceph: do not hard code max auth ticket len
We hard code cephx auth ticket buffer size to 256 bytes. This isn't
enough for any moderate setups and, in case tickets themselves are not
encrypted, leads to buffer overflows (ceph_x_decrypt() errors out, but
ceph_decode_copy() doesn't - it's just a memcpy() wrapper). Since the
buffer is allocated dynamically anyway, allocated it a bit later, at
the point where we know how much is going to be needed.
Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8979
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 36,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int shash_ahash_finup(struct ahash_request *req, struct shash_desc *desc)
{
struct crypto_hash_walk walk;
int nbytes;
nbytes = crypto_hash_walk_first(req, &walk);
if (!nbytes)
return crypto_shash_final(desc, req->result);
do {
nbytes = crypto_hash_walk_last(&walk) ?
crypto_shash_finup(desc, walk.data, nbytes,
req->result) :
crypto_shash_update(desc, walk.data, nbytes);
nbytes = crypto_hash_walk_done(&walk, nbytes);
} while (nbytes > 0);
return nbytes;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void impeg2d_format_convert(dec_state_t *ps_dec,
pic_buf_t *ps_src_pic,
iv_yuv_buf_t *ps_disp_frm_buf,
UWORD32 u4_start_row, UWORD32 u4_num_rows)
{
UWORD8 *pu1_src_y,*pu1_src_u,*pu1_src_v;
UWORD8 *pu1_dst_y,*pu1_dst_u,*pu1_dst_v;
if((NULL == ps_src_pic) || (NULL == ps_src_pic->pu1_y) || (0 == u4_num_rows))
return;
pu1_src_y = ps_src_pic->pu1_y + (u4_start_row * ps_dec->u2_frame_width);
pu1_src_u = ps_src_pic->pu1_u + ((u4_start_row >> 1) * (ps_dec->u2_frame_width >> 1));
pu1_src_v = ps_src_pic->pu1_v + ((u4_start_row >> 1) *(ps_dec->u2_frame_width >> 1));
pu1_dst_y = (UWORD8 *)ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_y_buf + (u4_start_row * ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride);
pu1_dst_u = (UWORD8 *)ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_u_buf +((u4_start_row >> 1)*(ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride >> 1));
pu1_dst_v = (UWORD8 *)ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_v_buf +((u4_start_row >> 1)*(ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride >> 1));
if (IV_YUV_420P == ps_dec->i4_chromaFormat)
{
ps_dec->pf_copy_yuv420p_buf(pu1_src_y, pu1_src_u, pu1_src_v, pu1_dst_y,
pu1_dst_u, pu1_dst_v,
ps_dec->u2_frame_width,
u4_num_rows,
ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride,
(ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride >> 1),
(ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride >> 1),
ps_dec->u2_frame_width,
(ps_dec->u2_frame_width >> 1),
(ps_dec->u2_frame_width >> 1));
}
else if (IV_YUV_422ILE == ps_dec->i4_chromaFormat)
{
void *pv_yuv422i;
UWORD32 u2_height,u2_width,u2_stride_y,u2_stride_u,u2_stride_v;
UWORD32 u2_stride_yuv422i;
pv_yuv422i = (UWORD8 *)ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_y_buf + ((ps_dec->u2_vertical_size)*(ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride));
u2_height = u4_num_rows;
u2_width = ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size;
u2_stride_y = ps_dec->u2_frame_width;
u2_stride_u = u2_stride_y >> 1;
u2_stride_v = u2_stride_u;
u2_stride_yuv422i = (0 == ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride) ? ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size : ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride;
ps_dec->pf_fmt_conv_yuv420p_to_yuv422ile(pu1_src_y,
pu1_src_u,
pu1_src_v,
pv_yuv422i,
u2_width,
u2_height,
u2_stride_y,
u2_stride_u,
u2_stride_v,
u2_stride_yuv422i);
}
else if((ps_dec->i4_chromaFormat == IV_YUV_420SP_UV) ||
(ps_dec->i4_chromaFormat == IV_YUV_420SP_VU))
{
UWORD32 dest_inc_Y=0,dest_inc_UV=0;
WORD32 convert_uv_only;
pu1_dst_u = (UWORD8 *)ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_u_buf +((u4_start_row >> 1)*(ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride));
dest_inc_Y = ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride;
dest_inc_UV = ((ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride + 1) >> 1) << 1;
convert_uv_only = 0;
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf)
convert_uv_only = 1;
if(ps_dec->i4_chromaFormat == IV_YUV_420SP_UV)
{
ps_dec->pf_fmt_conv_yuv420p_to_yuv420sp_uv(pu1_src_y,
pu1_src_u,
pu1_src_v,
pu1_dst_y,
pu1_dst_u,
u4_num_rows,
ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size,
ps_dec->u2_frame_width,
ps_dec->u2_frame_width >> 1,
ps_dec->u2_frame_width >> 1,
dest_inc_Y,
dest_inc_UV,
convert_uv_only);
}
else
{
ps_dec->pf_fmt_conv_yuv420p_to_yuv420sp_vu(pu1_src_y,
pu1_src_u,
pu1_src_v,
pu1_dst_y,
pu1_dst_u,
u4_num_rows,
ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size,
ps_dec->u2_frame_width,
ps_dec->u2_frame_width >> 1,
ps_dec->u2_frame_width >> 1,
dest_inc_Y,
dest_inc_UV,
convert_uv_only);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 161,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _close_pgsql_link(zend_rsrc_list_entry *rsrc TSRMLS_DC)
{
PGconn *link = (PGconn *)rsrc->ptr;
PGresult *res;
while ((res = PQgetResult(link))) {
PQclear(res);
}
PQfinish(link);
PGG(num_links)--;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,771 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vp8_mc_luma(VP8Context *s, VP8ThreadData *td, uint8_t *dst,
ThreadFrame *ref, const VP56mv *mv,
int x_off, int y_off, int block_w, int block_h,
int width, int height, ptrdiff_t linesize,
vp8_mc_func mc_func[3][3])
{
uint8_t *src = ref->f->data[0];
if (AV_RN32A(mv)) {
ptrdiff_t src_linesize = linesize;
int mx = (mv->x * 2) & 7, mx_idx = subpel_idx[0][mx];
int my = (mv->y * 2) & 7, my_idx = subpel_idx[0][my];
x_off += mv->x >> 2;
y_off += mv->y >> 2;
ff_thread_await_progress(ref, (3 + y_off + block_h + subpel_idx[2][my]) >> 4, 0);
src += y_off * linesize + x_off;
if (x_off < mx_idx || x_off >= width - block_w - subpel_idx[2][mx] ||
y_off < my_idx || y_off >= height - block_h - subpel_idx[2][my]) {
s->vdsp.emulated_edge_mc(td->edge_emu_buffer,
src - my_idx * linesize - mx_idx,
EDGE_EMU_LINESIZE, linesize,
block_w + subpel_idx[1][mx],
block_h + subpel_idx[1][my],
x_off - mx_idx, y_off - my_idx,
width, height);
src = td->edge_emu_buffer + mx_idx + EDGE_EMU_LINESIZE * my_idx;
src_linesize = EDGE_EMU_LINESIZE;
}
mc_func[my_idx][mx_idx](dst, linesize, src, src_linesize, block_h, mx, my);
} else {
ff_thread_await_progress(ref, (3 + y_off + block_h) >> 4, 0);
mc_func[0][0](dst, linesize, src + y_off * linesize + x_off,
linesize, block_h, 0, 0);
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 64,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sco_sock_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sco_pinfo *pi = sco_pi(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECT2 &&
test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags)) {
sco_conn_defer_accept(pi->conn->hcon, pi->setting);
sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG;
release_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
release_sock(sk);
return bt_sock_recvmsg(sock, msg, len, flags);
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Validate socket address length in sco_sock_bind().
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 57,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void StyleResolver::matchAuthorRules(Element* element, ElementRuleCollector& collector, bool includeEmptyRules)
{
if (m_styleTree.hasOnlyScopedResolverForDocument()) {
m_styleTree.scopedStyleResolverForDocument()->matchAuthorRules(collector, includeEmptyRules, applyAuthorStylesOf(element));
collector.clearMatchedRules();
collector.matchedResult().ranges.lastAuthorRule = collector.matchedResult().matchedProperties.size() - 1;
collectTreeBoundaryCrossingRules(element, collector, includeEmptyRules);
collector.sortAndTransferMatchedRules();
return;
}
Vector<ScopedStyleResolver*, 8> resolvers;
m_styleTree.resolveScopedStyles(element, resolvers);
Vector<ScopedStyleResolver*, 8> resolversInShadowTree;
m_styleTree.collectScopedResolversForHostedShadowTrees(element, resolversInShadowTree);
if (!resolversInShadowTree.isEmpty()) {
matchAuthorRulesForShadowHost(element, collector, includeEmptyRules, resolvers, resolversInShadowTree);
return;
}
if (resolvers.isEmpty())
return;
bool applyAuthorStyles = applyAuthorStylesOf(element);
CascadeScope cascadeScope = 0;
CascadeOrder cascadeOrder = resolvers.size();
collector.clearMatchedRules();
collector.matchedResult().ranges.lastAuthorRule = collector.matchedResult().matchedProperties.size() - 1;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < resolvers.size(); ++i, --cascadeOrder) {
ScopedStyleResolver* resolver = resolvers.at(i);
resolver->collectMatchingAuthorRules(collector, includeEmptyRules, applyAuthorStyles, cascadeScope++, resolver->treeScope() == element->treeScope() && resolver->scopingNode().isShadowRoot() ? 0 : cascadeOrder);
}
collectTreeBoundaryCrossingRules(element, collector, includeEmptyRules);
collector.sortAndTransferMatchedRules();
matchHostRules(element, resolvers.first(), collector, includeEmptyRules);
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void alignment_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int fixed = 0;
/* we don't implement logging of alignment exceptions */
if (!(current->thread.align_ctl & PR_UNALIGN_SIGBUS))
fixed = fix_alignment(regs);
if (fixed == 1) {
regs->nip += 4; /* skip over emulated instruction */
emulate_single_step(regs);
return;
}
/* Operand address was bad */
if (fixed == -EFAULT) {
if (user_mode(regs))
_exception(SIGSEGV, regs, SEGV_ACCERR, regs->dar);
else
/* Search exception table */
bad_page_fault(regs, regs->dar, SIGSEGV);
return;
}
_exception(SIGBUS, regs, BUS_ADRALN, regs->dar);
}
Commit Message: [POWERPC] Never panic when taking altivec exceptions from userspace
At the moment we rely on a cpu feature bit or a firmware property to
detect altivec. If we dont have either of these and the cpu does in fact
support altivec we can cause a panic from userspace.
It seems safer to always send a signal if we manage to get an 0xf20
exception from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 74,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: zip_read_data_none(struct archive_read *a, const void **_buff,
size_t *size, int64_t *offset)
{
struct zip *zip;
const char *buff;
ssize_t bytes_avail;
int r;
(void)offset; /* UNUSED */
zip = (struct zip *)(a->format->data);
if (zip->entry->zip_flags & ZIP_LENGTH_AT_END) {
const char *p;
ssize_t grabbing_bytes = 24;
if (zip->hctx_valid)
grabbing_bytes += AUTH_CODE_SIZE;
/* Grab at least 24 bytes. */
buff = __archive_read_ahead(a, grabbing_bytes, &bytes_avail);
if (bytes_avail < grabbing_bytes) {
/* Zip archives have end-of-archive markers
that are longer than this, so a failure to get at
least 24 bytes really does indicate a truncated
file. */
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Truncated ZIP file data");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* Check for a complete PK\007\010 signature, followed
* by the correct 4-byte CRC. */
p = buff;
if (zip->hctx_valid)
p += AUTH_CODE_SIZE;
if (p[0] == 'P' && p[1] == 'K'
&& p[2] == '\007' && p[3] == '\010'
&& (archive_le32dec(p + 4) == zip->entry_crc32
|| zip->ignore_crc32
|| (zip->hctx_valid
&& zip->entry->aes_extra.vendor == AES_VENDOR_AE_2))) {
if (zip->entry->flags & LA_USED_ZIP64) {
uint64_t compressed, uncompressed;
zip->entry->crc32 = archive_le32dec(p + 4);
compressed = archive_le64dec(p + 8);
uncompressed = archive_le64dec(p + 16);
if (compressed > INT64_MAX || uncompressed > INT64_MAX) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Overflow of 64-bit file sizes");
return ARCHIVE_FAILED;
}
zip->entry->compressed_size = compressed;
zip->entry->uncompressed_size = uncompressed;
zip->unconsumed = 24;
} else {
zip->entry->crc32 = archive_le32dec(p + 4);
zip->entry->compressed_size =
archive_le32dec(p + 8);
zip->entry->uncompressed_size =
archive_le32dec(p + 12);
zip->unconsumed = 16;
}
if (zip->hctx_valid) {
r = check_authentication_code(a, buff);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
}
zip->end_of_entry = 1;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
/* If not at EOF, ensure we consume at least one byte. */
++p;
/* Scan forward until we see where a PK\007\010 signature
* might be. */
/* Return bytes up until that point. On the next call,
* the code above will verify the data descriptor. */
while (p < buff + bytes_avail - 4) {
if (p[3] == 'P') { p += 3; }
else if (p[3] == 'K') { p += 2; }
else if (p[3] == '\007') { p += 1; }
else if (p[3] == '\010' && p[2] == '\007'
&& p[1] == 'K' && p[0] == 'P') {
if (zip->hctx_valid)
p -= AUTH_CODE_SIZE;
break;
} else { p += 4; }
}
bytes_avail = p - buff;
} else {
if (zip->entry_bytes_remaining == 0) {
zip->end_of_entry = 1;
if (zip->hctx_valid) {
r = check_authentication_code(a, NULL);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
/* Grab a bunch of bytes. */
buff = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1, &bytes_avail);
if (bytes_avail <= 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Truncated ZIP file data");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (bytes_avail > zip->entry_bytes_remaining)
bytes_avail = (ssize_t)zip->entry_bytes_remaining;
}
if (zip->tctx_valid || zip->cctx_valid) {
size_t dec_size = bytes_avail;
if (dec_size > zip->decrypted_buffer_size)
dec_size = zip->decrypted_buffer_size;
if (zip->tctx_valid) {
trad_enc_decrypt_update(&zip->tctx,
(const uint8_t *)buff, dec_size,
zip->decrypted_buffer, dec_size);
} else {
size_t dsize = dec_size;
archive_hmac_sha1_update(&zip->hctx,
(const uint8_t *)buff, dec_size);
archive_decrypto_aes_ctr_update(&zip->cctx,
(const uint8_t *)buff, dec_size,
zip->decrypted_buffer, &dsize);
}
bytes_avail = dec_size;
buff = (const char *)zip->decrypted_buffer;
}
*size = bytes_avail;
zip->entry_bytes_remaining -= bytes_avail;
zip->entry_uncompressed_bytes_read += bytes_avail;
zip->entry_compressed_bytes_read += bytes_avail;
zip->unconsumed += bytes_avail;
*_buff = buff;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Fix typo in preprocessor macro in archive_read_format_zip_cleanup()
Frees lzma_stream on cleanup()
Fixes #1165
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 90,636 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SupervisedUserService::MustRemainDisabled(
const Extension* extension,
extensions::disable_reason::DisableReason* reason,
base::string16* error) const {
DCHECK(ProfileIsSupervised());
ExtensionState state = GetExtensionState(*extension);
bool must_remain_disabled = state == ExtensionState::REQUIRE_APPROVAL;
if (must_remain_disabled) {
if (error)
*error = GetExtensionsLockedMessage();
ExtensionPrefs* extension_prefs = ExtensionPrefs::Get(profile_);
if (extension_prefs->HasDisableReason(
extension->id(),
extensions::disable_reason::DISABLE_PERMISSIONS_INCREASE)) {
if (reason)
*reason = extensions::disable_reason::DISABLE_PERMISSIONS_INCREASE;
return true;
}
if (reason)
*reason = extensions::disable_reason::DISABLE_CUSTODIAN_APPROVAL_REQUIRED;
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
supervised_users::kSupervisedUserInitiatedExtensionInstall)) {
if (!extension_prefs->HasDisableReason(
extension->id(), extensions::disable_reason::
DISABLE_CUSTODIAN_APPROVAL_REQUIRED)) {
SupervisedUserService* supervised_user_service =
SupervisedUserServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
supervised_user_service->AddExtensionInstallRequest(
extension->id(), extension->version());
}
}
}
return must_remain_disabled;
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,102 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PDO_API void php_pdo_stmt_delref(pdo_stmt_t *stmt TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (--stmt->refcount == 0) {
free_statement(stmt TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 72,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderBlockFlow::~RenderBlockFlow()
{
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,436 |
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