instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int proc_id_map_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
put_user_ns(ns);
return seq_release(inode, file);
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 49,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ServiceWorkerContextCore::UnregisterProviderHostByClientID(
const std::string& client_uuid) {
DCHECK(ContainsKey(*provider_by_uuid_, client_uuid));
provider_by_uuid_->erase(client_uuid);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: image_transform_png_set_palette_to_rgb_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(that);
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 1 | 173,639 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MonitorRequestOnMainThread(
const net::test_server::HttpRequest& request) {
accumulated_requests_.push_back(request);
}
Commit Message: Abort navigations on 304 responses.
A recent change (https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1161479)
accidentally resulted in treating 304 responses as downloads. This CL
treats them as ERR_ABORTED instead. This doesn't exactly match old
behavior, which passed them on to the renderer, which then aborted them.
The new code results in correctly restoring the original URL in the
omnibox, and has a shiny new test to prevent future regressions.
Bug: 882270
Change-Id: Ic73dcce9e9596d43327b13acde03b4ed9bd0c82e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1252684
Commit-Queue: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595641}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,337 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageAlphaBlending (gdImagePtr im, int alphaBlendingArg)
{
im->alphaBlendingFlag = alphaBlendingArg;
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 73,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sockfs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
{
int err = simple_setattr(dentry, iattr);
if (!err && (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_UID)) {
struct socket *sock = SOCKET_I(d_inode(dentry));
sock->sk->sk_uid = iattr->ia_uid;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 67,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hci_sock_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct hci_dev *hdev;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
BT_DBG("sock %p sk %p", sock, sk);
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (msg->msg_flags & ~(MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_NOSIGNAL|MSG_ERRQUEUE))
return -EINVAL;
if (len < 4 || len > HCI_MAX_FRAME_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (hci_pi(sk)->channel) {
case HCI_CHANNEL_RAW:
break;
case HCI_CHANNEL_CONTROL:
err = mgmt_control(sk, msg, len);
goto done;
case HCI_CHANNEL_MONITOR:
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto done;
default:
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
hdev = hci_pi(sk)->hdev;
if (!hdev) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
if (!test_bit(HCI_UP, &hdev->flags)) {
err = -ENETDOWN;
goto done;
}
skb = bt_skb_send_alloc(sk, len, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (!skb)
goto done;
if (memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, len), msg->msg_iov, len)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto drop;
}
bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type = *((unsigned char *) skb->data);
skb_pull(skb, 1);
skb->dev = (void *) hdev;
if (bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type == HCI_COMMAND_PKT) {
u16 opcode = get_unaligned_le16(skb->data);
u16 ogf = hci_opcode_ogf(opcode);
u16 ocf = hci_opcode_ocf(opcode);
if (((ogf > HCI_SFLT_MAX_OGF) ||
!hci_test_bit(ocf & HCI_FLT_OCF_BITS,
&hci_sec_filter.ocf_mask[ogf])) &&
!capable(CAP_NET_RAW)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto drop;
}
if (test_bit(HCI_RAW, &hdev->flags) || (ogf == 0x3f)) {
skb_queue_tail(&hdev->raw_q, skb);
queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &hdev->tx_work);
} else {
skb_queue_tail(&hdev->cmd_q, skb);
queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &hdev->cmd_work);
}
} else {
if (!capable(CAP_NET_RAW)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto drop;
}
skb_queue_tail(&hdev->raw_q, skb);
queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &hdev->tx_work);
}
err = len;
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
goto done;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: HCI - Fix info leak in getsockopt(HCI_FILTER)
The HCI code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
hci_ufilter before copying it to userland -- that for leaking two
bytes kernel stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the
structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,135 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void encode_getfh(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct compound_hdr *hdr)
{
__be32 *p;
p = reserve_space(xdr, 4);
*p = cpu_to_be32(OP_GETFH);
hdr->nops++;
hdr->replen += decode_getfh_maxsz;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,363 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableOriginTrials(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetOriginTrialsEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 154,651 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ftrace_add_profile(struct ftrace_profile_stat *stat,
struct ftrace_profile *rec)
{
unsigned long key;
key = hash_long(rec->ip, ftrace_profile_bits);
hlist_add_head_rcu(&rec->node, &stat->hash[key]);
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 30,132 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
{
int prefix_len;
if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
prefix_len = KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN;
else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
prefix_len = KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN;
else
return -EINVAL;
if (!new_desc[prefix_len])
return -EINVAL;
if (orig_desc && strncmp(new_desc, orig_desc, prefix_len))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Event* Document::createEvent(ScriptState* script_state,
const String& event_type,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
Event* event = nullptr;
ExecutionContext* execution_context = ExecutionContext::From(script_state);
for (const auto& factory : EventFactories()) {
event = factory->Create(execution_context, event_type);
if (event) {
if (DeprecatedEqualIgnoringCase(event_type, "TouchEvent") &&
!OriginTrials::TouchEventFeatureDetectionEnabled(execution_context))
break;
return event;
}
}
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kNotSupportedError,
"The provided event type ('" + event_type + "') is invalid.");
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 144,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int send_special_udp(struct net_interface *interface, unsigned short port, const struct mt_packet *packet) {
unsigned char dstmac[ETH_ALEN];
if (use_raw_socket) {
memset(dstmac, 0xff, ETH_ALEN);
return net_send_udp(sockfd, interface, interface->mac_addr, dstmac, (const struct in_addr *)&interface->ipv4_addr, port, &destip, port, packet->data, packet->size);
} else {
/* Init SendTo struct */
struct sockaddr_in socket_address;
socket_address.sin_family = AF_INET;
socket_address.sin_port = htons(port);
socket_address.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_BROADCAST);
return sendto(interface->socketfd, packet->data, packet->size, 0, (struct sockaddr*)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address));
}
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #20 from eyalitki/master
2nd round security fixes from eyalitki
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 50,299 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PluginServiceImpl::RegisterInternalPlugin(
const webkit::WebPluginInfo& info,
bool add_at_beginning) {
plugin_list_->RegisterInternalPlugin(info, add_at_beginning);
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 116,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ass_shaper_free(ASS_Shaper *shaper)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_HARFBUZZ
ass_cache_done(shaper->metrics_cache);
free(shaper->features);
#endif
free(shaper->event_text);
free(shaper->ctypes);
free(shaper->emblevels);
free(shaper->cmap);
free(shaper);
}
Commit Message: shaper: fix reallocation
Update the variable that tracks the allocated size. This potentially
improves performance and avoid some side effects, which lead to
undefined behavior in some cases.
Fixes fuzzer test case id:000051,sig:11,sync:fuzzer3,src:004221.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 73,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gimp_assert_vectors (GimpImage *image,
const gchar *name,
GimpCoords coords[],
gsize coords_size,
gboolean visible)
{
GimpVectors *vectors = NULL;
GimpStroke *stroke = NULL;
GArray *control_points = NULL;
gboolean closed = FALSE;
gint i = 0;
vectors = gimp_image_get_vectors_by_name (image, name);
stroke = gimp_vectors_stroke_get_next (vectors, NULL);
g_assert (stroke != NULL);
control_points = gimp_stroke_control_points_get (stroke,
&closed);
g_assert (closed);
g_assert_cmpint (control_points->len,
==,
coords_size);
for (i = 0; i < control_points->len; i++)
{
g_assert_cmpint (coords[i].x,
==,
g_array_index (control_points,
GimpAnchor,
i).position.x);
g_assert_cmpint (coords[i].y,
==,
g_array_index (control_points,
GimpAnchor,
i).position.y);
}
g_assert (gimp_item_get_visible (GIMP_ITEM (vectors)) ? TRUE : FALSE ==
visible ? TRUE : FALSE);
}
Commit Message: Issue #1689: create unique temporary file with g_file_open_tmp().
Not sure this is really solving the issue reported, which is that
`g_get_tmp_dir()` uses environment variables (yet as g_file_open_tmp()
uses g_get_tmp_dir()…). But at least g_file_open_tmp() should create
unique temporary files, which prevents overriding existing files (which
is most likely the only real attack possible here, or at least the only
one I can think of unless some weird vulnerabilities exist in glib).
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 81,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LedNameCreate(unsigned ndx, ExprDef *name, bool virtual)
{
LedNameDef *def = malloc(sizeof(*def));
if (!def)
return NULL;
def->common.type = STMT_LED_NAME;
def->common.next = NULL;
def->merge = MERGE_DEFAULT;
def->ndx = ndx;
def->name = name;
def->virtual = virtual;
return def;
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: fix pointer value for FreeStmt
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 79,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DatabaseImpl::SetIndexKeys(
int64_t transaction_id,
int64_t object_store_id,
const IndexedDBKey& primary_key,
const std::vector<IndexedDBIndexKeys>& index_keys) {
idb_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&IDBThreadHelper::SetIndexKeys, base::Unretained(helper_),
transaction_id, object_store_id, primary_key, index_keys));
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 136,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnFrameHidden() {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (IsHidden())
video_locked_when_paused_when_hidden_ = true;
if (watch_time_reporter_)
watch_time_reporter_->OnHidden();
if (video_decode_stats_reporter_)
video_decode_stats_reporter_->OnHidden();
UpdateBackgroundVideoOptimizationState();
UpdatePlayState();
ScheduleIdlePauseTimer();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int stat_to_v9stat(V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsPath *name,
const struct stat *stbuf,
V9fsStat *v9stat)
{
int err;
const char *str;
memset(v9stat, 0, sizeof(*v9stat));
stat_to_qid(stbuf, &v9stat->qid);
v9stat->mode = stat_to_v9mode(stbuf);
v9stat->atime = stbuf->st_atime;
v9stat->mtime = stbuf->st_mtime;
v9stat->length = stbuf->st_size;
v9fs_string_null(&v9stat->uid);
v9fs_string_null(&v9stat->gid);
v9fs_string_null(&v9stat->muid);
v9stat->n_uid = stbuf->st_uid;
v9stat->n_gid = stbuf->st_gid;
v9stat->n_muid = 0;
v9fs_string_null(&v9stat->extension);
if (v9stat->mode & P9_STAT_MODE_SYMLINK) {
err = v9fs_co_readlink(pdu, name, &v9stat->extension);
if (err < 0) {
return err;
}
} else if (v9stat->mode & P9_STAT_MODE_DEVICE) {
v9fs_string_sprintf(&v9stat->extension, "%c %u %u",
S_ISCHR(stbuf->st_mode) ? 'c' : 'b',
major(stbuf->st_rdev), minor(stbuf->st_rdev));
} else if (S_ISDIR(stbuf->st_mode) || S_ISREG(stbuf->st_mode)) {
v9fs_string_sprintf(&v9stat->extension, "%s %lu",
"HARDLINKCOUNT", (unsigned long)stbuf->st_nlink);
}
str = strrchr(name->data, '/');
if (str) {
str += 1;
} else {
str = name->data;
}
v9fs_string_sprintf(&v9stat->name, "%s", str);
v9stat->size = 61 +
v9fs_string_size(&v9stat->name) +
v9fs_string_size(&v9stat->uid) +
v9fs_string_size(&v9stat->gid) +
v9fs_string_size(&v9stat->muid) +
v9fs_string_size(&v9stat->extension);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 8,718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void addReplyCommand(client *c, struct redisCommand *cmd) {
if (!cmd) {
addReply(c, shared.nullbulk);
} else {
/* We are adding: command name, arg count, flags, first, last, offset */
addReplyMultiBulkLen(c, 6);
addReplyBulkCString(c, cmd->name);
addReplyLongLong(c, cmd->arity);
int flagcount = 0;
void *flaglen = addDeferredMultiBulkLength(c);
flagcount += addReplyCommandFlag(c,cmd,CMD_WRITE, "write");
flagcount += addReplyCommandFlag(c,cmd,CMD_READONLY, "readonly");
flagcount += addReplyCommandFlag(c,cmd,CMD_DENYOOM, "denyoom");
flagcount += addReplyCommandFlag(c,cmd,CMD_ADMIN, "admin");
flagcount += addReplyCommandFlag(c,cmd,CMD_PUBSUB, "pubsub");
flagcount += addReplyCommandFlag(c,cmd,CMD_NOSCRIPT, "noscript");
flagcount += addReplyCommandFlag(c,cmd,CMD_RANDOM, "random");
flagcount += addReplyCommandFlag(c,cmd,CMD_SORT_FOR_SCRIPT,"sort_for_script");
flagcount += addReplyCommandFlag(c,cmd,CMD_LOADING, "loading");
flagcount += addReplyCommandFlag(c,cmd,CMD_STALE, "stale");
flagcount += addReplyCommandFlag(c,cmd,CMD_SKIP_MONITOR, "skip_monitor");
flagcount += addReplyCommandFlag(c,cmd,CMD_ASKING, "asking");
flagcount += addReplyCommandFlag(c,cmd,CMD_FAST, "fast");
if (cmd->getkeys_proc) {
addReplyStatus(c, "movablekeys");
flagcount += 1;
}
setDeferredMultiBulkLength(c, flaglen, flagcount);
addReplyLongLong(c, cmd->firstkey);
addReplyLongLong(c, cmd->lastkey);
addReplyLongLong(c, cmd->keystep);
}
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 69,993 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field *sf = &kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg];
vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && seg != VCPU_SREG_LDTR) {
vmx->rmode.segs[seg] = *var;
if (seg == VCPU_SREG_TR)
vmcs_write16(sf->selector, var->selector);
else if (var->s)
fix_rmode_seg(seg, &vmx->rmode.segs[seg]);
goto out;
}
vmcs_writel(sf->base, var->base);
vmcs_write32(sf->limit, var->limit);
vmcs_write16(sf->selector, var->selector);
/*
* Fix the "Accessed" bit in AR field of segment registers for older
* qemu binaries.
* IA32 arch specifies that at the time of processor reset the
* "Accessed" bit in the AR field of segment registers is 1. And qemu
* is setting it to 0 in the userland code. This causes invalid guest
* state vmexit when "unrestricted guest" mode is turned on.
* Fix for this setup issue in cpu_reset is being pushed in the qemu
* tree. Newer qemu binaries with that qemu fix would not need this
* kvm hack.
*/
if (enable_unrestricted_guest && (seg != VCPU_SREG_LDTR))
var->type |= 0x1; /* Accessed */
vmcs_write32(sf->ar_bytes, vmx_segment_access_rights(var));
out:
vmx->emulation_required = emulation_required(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_read_trex(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
MOVTrackExt *trex;
if ((uint64_t)c->trex_count+1 >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(*c->trex_data))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
trex = av_realloc(c->trex_data, (c->trex_count+1)*sizeof(*c->trex_data));
if (!trex)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
c->fc->duration = AV_NOPTS_VALUE; // the duration from mvhd is not representing the whole file when fragments are used.
c->trex_data = trex;
trex = &c->trex_data[c->trex_count++];
avio_r8(pb); /* version */
avio_rb24(pb); /* flags */
trex->track_id = avio_rb32(pb);
trex->stsd_id = avio_rb32(pb);
trex->duration = avio_rb32(pb);
trex->size = avio_rb32(pb);
trex->flags = avio_rb32(pb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mov: reset dref_count on realloc to keep values consistent.
This fixes a potential crash.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsBool Type_CrdInfo_Write(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, void* Ptr, cmsUInt32Number nItems)
{
cmsMLU* mlu = (cmsMLU*) Ptr;
if (!WriteCountAndSting(self, io, mlu, "nm")) goto Error;
if (!WriteCountAndSting(self, io, mlu, "#0")) goto Error;
if (!WriteCountAndSting(self, io, mlu, "#1")) goto Error;
if (!WriteCountAndSting(self, io, mlu, "#2")) goto Error;
if (!WriteCountAndSting(self, io, mlu, "#3")) goto Error;
return TRUE;
Error:
return FALSE;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(nItems);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> OpenChannelToTab(const v8::Arguments& args) {
RenderView* renderview = bindings_utils::GetRenderViewForCurrentContext();
if (!renderview)
return v8::Undefined();
if (args.Length() >= 3 && args[0]->IsInt32() && args[1]->IsString() &&
args[2]->IsString()) {
int tab_id = args[0]->Int32Value();
std::string extension_id = *v8::String::Utf8Value(args[1]->ToString());
std::string channel_name = *v8::String::Utf8Value(args[2]->ToString());
int port_id = -1;
renderview->Send(new ExtensionHostMsg_OpenChannelToTab(
renderview->routing_id(), tab_id, extension_id, channel_name,
&port_id));
return v8::Integer::New(port_id);
}
return v8::Undefined();
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ColorChooserDialog::ColorChooserDialog(views::ColorChooserListener* listener,
SkColor initial_color,
gfx::NativeWindow owning_window)
: listener_(listener) {
DCHECK(listener_);
CopyCustomColors(g_custom_colors, custom_colors_);
ExecuteOpenParams execute_params(initial_color, BeginRun(owning_window),
owning_window);
execute_params.run_state.dialog_thread->message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ColorChooserDialog::ExecuteOpen, this, execute_params));
}
Commit Message: ColorChooserWin::End should act like the dialog has closed
This is only a problem on Windows.
When the page closes itself while the color chooser dialog is open,
ColorChooserDialog::DidCloseDialog was called after the listener has been destroyed.
ColorChooserWin::End() will not actually close the color chooser dialog (because we can't) but act like it did so we can do the necessary cleanup.
BUG=279263
R=jschuh@chromium.org, pkasting@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/23785003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@220639 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,476 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API int ModPlug_GetCurrentTempo(ModPlugFile* file)
{
if(!file) return 0;
return openmpt_module_get_current_tempo(file->mod);
}
Commit Message: [Fix] libmodplug: C API: Limit the length of strings copied to the output buffer of ModPlug_InstrumentName() and ModPlug_SampleName() to 32 bytes (including terminating null) as is done by original libmodplug. This avoids potential buffer overflows in software relying on this limit instead of querying the required buffer size beforehand. libopenmpt can return strings longer than 32 bytes here beacuse the internal limit of 32 bytes applies to strings encoded in arbitrary character encodings but the API returns them converted to UTF-8, which can be longer. (reported by Antonio Morales Maldonado of Semmle Security Research Team)
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@12127 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-120 | 0 | 87,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static double blendDoubles(double from, double to, double progress)
{
return from * (1 - progress) + to * progress;
}
Commit Message: [chromium] We should accelerate all transformations, except when we must blend matrices that cannot be decomposed.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95855
Reviewed by James Robinson.
Source/Platform:
WebTransformOperations are now able to report if they can successfully blend.
WebTransformationMatrix::blend now returns a bool if blending would fail.
* chromium/public/WebTransformOperations.h:
(WebTransformOperations):
* chromium/public/WebTransformationMatrix.h:
(WebTransformationMatrix):
Source/WebCore:
WebTransformOperations are now able to report if they can successfully blend.
WebTransformationMatrix::blend now returns a bool if blending would fail.
Unit tests:
AnimationTranslationUtilTest.createTransformAnimationWithNonDecomposableMatrix
AnimationTranslationUtilTest.createTransformAnimationWithNonInvertibleTransform
* platform/chromium/support/WebTransformOperations.cpp:
(WebKit::blendTransformOperations):
(WebKit::WebTransformOperations::blend):
(WebKit::WebTransformOperations::canBlendWith):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::WebTransformOperations::blendInternal):
* platform/chromium/support/WebTransformationMatrix.cpp:
(WebKit::WebTransformationMatrix::blend):
* platform/graphics/chromium/AnimationTranslationUtil.cpp:
(WebCore::WebTransformAnimationCurve):
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Added the following unit tests:
AnimationTranslationUtilTest.createTransformAnimationWithNonDecomposableMatrix
AnimationTranslationUtilTest.createTransformAnimationWithNonInvertibleTransform
* tests/AnimationTranslationUtilTest.cpp:
(WebKit::TEST):
(WebKit):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127868 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 108,168 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: find_xml_comment(xmlNode * root, xmlNode * search_comment)
{
xmlNode *a_child = NULL;
CRM_CHECK(search_comment->type == XML_COMMENT_NODE, return NULL);
for (a_child = __xml_first_child(root); a_child != NULL; a_child = __xml_next(a_child)) {
if (a_child->type != XML_COMMENT_NODE) {
continue;
}
if (safe_str_eq((const char *)a_child->content, (const char *)search_comment->content)) {
return a_child;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mptsas_scsi_init(PCIDevice *dev, Error **errp)
{
DeviceState *d = DEVICE(dev);
MPTSASState *s = MPT_SAS(dev);
dev->config[PCI_LATENCY_TIMER] = 0;
dev->config[PCI_INTERRUPT_PIN] = 0x01;
memory_region_init_io(&s->mmio_io, OBJECT(s), &mptsas_mmio_ops, s,
"mptsas-mmio", 0x4000);
memory_region_init_io(&s->port_io, OBJECT(s), &mptsas_port_ops, s,
"mptsas-io", 256);
memory_region_init_io(&s->diag_io, OBJECT(s), &mptsas_diag_ops, s,
"mptsas-diag", 0x10000);
if (s->msi_available &&
msi_init(dev, 0, 1, true, false) >= 0) {
s->msi_in_use = true;
}
pci_register_bar(dev, 0, PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_SPACE_IO, &s->port_io);
pci_register_bar(dev, 1, PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_SPACE_MEMORY |
PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_TYPE_32, &s->mmio_io);
pci_register_bar(dev, 2, PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_SPACE_MEMORY |
PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_TYPE_32, &s->diag_io);
if (!s->sas_addr) {
s->sas_addr = ((NAA_LOCALLY_ASSIGNED_ID << 24) |
IEEE_COMPANY_LOCALLY_ASSIGNED) << 36;
s->sas_addr |= (pci_bus_num(dev->bus) << 16);
s->sas_addr |= (PCI_SLOT(dev->devfn) << 8);
s->sas_addr |= PCI_FUNC(dev->devfn);
}
s->max_devices = MPTSAS_NUM_PORTS;
s->request_bh = qemu_bh_new(mptsas_fetch_requests, s);
QTAILQ_INIT(&s->pending);
scsi_bus_new(&s->bus, sizeof(s->bus), &dev->qdev, &mptsas_scsi_info, NULL);
if (!d->hotplugged) {
scsi_bus_legacy_handle_cmdline(&s->bus, errp);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IPC::Message* AutomationProviderBookmarkModelObserver::ReleaseReply() {
return reply_message_.release();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int alloc_rt_sched_group(struct task_group *tg, struct task_group *parent)
{
struct rt_rq *rt_rq;
struct sched_rt_entity *rt_se;
struct rq *rq;
int i;
tg->rt_rq = kzalloc(sizeof(rt_rq) * nr_cpu_ids, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tg->rt_rq)
goto err;
tg->rt_se = kzalloc(sizeof(rt_se) * nr_cpu_ids, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tg->rt_se)
goto err;
init_rt_bandwidth(&tg->rt_bandwidth,
ktime_to_ns(def_rt_bandwidth.rt_period), 0);
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
rq = cpu_rq(i);
rt_rq = kzalloc_node(sizeof(struct rt_rq),
GFP_KERNEL, cpu_to_node(i));
if (!rt_rq)
goto err;
rt_se = kzalloc_node(sizeof(struct sched_rt_entity),
GFP_KERNEL, cpu_to_node(i));
if (!rt_se)
goto err_free_rq;
init_tg_rt_entry(tg, rt_rq, rt_se, i, 0, parent->rt_se[i]);
}
return 1;
err_free_rq:
kfree(rt_rq);
err:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserChildProcessHostImpl::BindInterface(
const std::string& interface_name,
mojo::ScopedMessagePipeHandle interface_pipe) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
if (!child_connection_)
return;
child_connection_->BindInterface(interface_name, std::move(interface_pipe));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AddListItem(list_item_t **pfirst, LPVOID data)
{
list_item_t *new_item = malloc(sizeof(list_item_t));
if (new_item == NULL)
{
return ERROR_OUTOFMEMORY;
}
new_item->next = *pfirst;
new_item->data = data;
*pfirst = new_item;
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fix potential double-free() in Interactive Service (CVE-2018-9336)
Malformed input data on the service pipe towards the OpenVPN interactive
service (normally used by the OpenVPN GUI to request openvpn instances
from the service) can result in a double free() in the error handling code.
This usually only leads to a process crash (DoS by an unprivileged local
account) but since it could possibly lead to memory corruption if
happening while multiple other threads are active at the same time,
CVE-2018-9336 has been assigned to acknowledge this risk.
Fix by ensuring that sud->directory is set to NULL in GetStartUpData()
for all error cases (thus not being free()ed in FreeStartupData()).
Rewrite control flow to use explicit error label for error exit.
Discovered and reported by Jacob Baines <jbaines@tenable.com>.
CVE: 2018-9336
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Acked-by: Selva Nair <selva.nair@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20180414072617.25075-1-gert@greenie.muc.de>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&q=20180414072617.25075-1-gert@greenie.muc.de
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 83,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Maybe<int64_t> IndexOfValueImpl(Isolate* isolate,
Handle<JSObject> receiver,
Handle<Object> value,
uint32_t start_from, uint32_t length) {
return IndexOfValueSlowPath(isolate, receiver, value, start_from, length);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 163,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void* HTMLInputElement::preDispatchEventHandler(Event* event)
{
if (event->type() == eventNames().textInputEvent && m_inputType->shouldSubmitImplicitly(event)) {
event->stopPropagation();
return 0;
}
if (event->type() != eventNames().clickEvent)
return 0;
if (!event->isMouseEvent() || static_cast<MouseEvent*>(event)->button() != LeftButton)
return 0;
return m_inputType->willDispatchClick().leakPtr();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int i2c_type_bootmode(struct edgeport_serial *serial)
{
struct device *dev = &serial->serial->dev->dev;
int status;
u8 *data;
data = kmalloc(1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data) {
dev_err(dev, "%s - out of memory\n", __func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Try to read type 2 */
status = ti_vread_sync(serial->serial->dev, UMPC_MEMORY_READ,
DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_II, 0, data, 0x01);
if (status)
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - read 2 status error = %d\n", __func__, status);
else
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - read 2 data = 0x%x\n", __func__, *data);
if ((!status) && (*data == UMP5152 || *data == UMP3410)) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - ROM_TYPE_II\n", __func__);
serial->TI_I2C_Type = DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_II;
goto out;
}
/* Try to read type 3 */
status = ti_vread_sync(serial->serial->dev, UMPC_MEMORY_READ,
DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_III, 0, data, 0x01);
if (status)
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - read 3 status error = %d\n", __func__, status);
else
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - read 2 data = 0x%x\n", __func__, *data);
if ((!status) && (*data == UMP5152 || *data == UMP3410)) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - ROM_TYPE_III\n", __func__);
serial->TI_I2C_Type = DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_III;
goto out;
}
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - Unknown\n", __func__);
serial->TI_I2C_Type = DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_II;
status = -ENODEV;
out:
kfree(data);
return status;
}
Commit Message: USB: io_ti: Fix NULL dereference in chase_port()
The tty is NULL when the port is hanging up.
chase_port() needs to check for this.
This patch is intended for stable series.
The behavior was observed and tested in Linux 3.2 and 3.7.1.
Johan Hovold submitted a more elaborate patch for the mainline kernel.
[ 56.277883] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - nonzero read bulk status received: -84
[ 56.278811] usb 1-1: USB disconnect, device number 3
[ 56.278856] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - stopping read!
[ 56.279562] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8
[ 56.280536] IP: [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.281212] PGD 1dc1b067 PUD 1e0f7067 PMD 0
[ 56.282085] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 56.282744] Modules linked in:
[ 56.283512] CPU 1
[ 56.283512] Pid: 25, comm: khubd Not tainted 3.7.1 #1 innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox
[ 56.283512] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8144e62a>] [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP: 0018:ffff88001fa99ab0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 56.283512] RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: 00000000000001c8 RCX: 0000000000640064
[ 56.283512] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: ffff88001fa99b20 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] RBP: ffff88001fa99b20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff812fcb4c R12: ffff88001ddf53c0
[ 56.283512] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000001c8 R15: ffff88001e19b9f4
[ 56.283512] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8 CR3: 000000001dc51000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 56.283512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 56.283512] Process khubd (pid: 25, threadinfo ffff88001fa98000, task ffff88001fa94f80)
[ 56.283512] Stack:
[ 56.283512] 0000000000000046 00000000000001c8 ffffffff810578ec ffffffff812fcb4c
[ 56.283512] ffff88001e19b980 0000000000002710 ffffffff812ffe81 0000000000000001
[ 56.283512] ffff88001fa94f80 0000000000000202 ffffffff00000001 0000000000000296
[ 56.283512] Call Trace:
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810578ec>] ? add_wait_queue+0x12/0x3c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ffe81>] ? chase_port+0x84/0x2d6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81063f27>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x199/0x199
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81263a5c>] ? tty_ldisc_hangup+0x222/0x298
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81300171>] ? edge_close+0x64/0x129
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810612f7>] ? __wake_up+0x35/0x46
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8106135b>] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81264916>] ? tty_port_shutdown+0x39/0x44
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8125d38c>] ? __tty_hangup+0x307/0x351
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e6ddc>] ? usb_hcd_flush_endpoint+0xde/0xed
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144e625>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x14/0x35
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fd361>] ? usb_serial_disconnect+0x57/0xc2
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ea99b>] ? usb_unbind_interface+0x5c/0x131
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d738>] ? __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xd5
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d9cd>] ? device_release_driver+0x1a/0x25
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d393>] ? bus_remove_device+0xd2/0xe7
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128b7a3>] ? device_del+0x119/0x167
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e8d9d>] ? usb_disable_device+0x6a/0x180
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e2ae0>] ? usb_disconnect+0x81/0xe6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e4435>] ? hub_thread+0x577/0xe82
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144daa7>] ? __schedule+0x490/0x4be
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8105798f>] ? abort_exclusive_wait+0x79/0x79
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810570b4>] ? kthread+0x81/0x89
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8145387c>] ? ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] Code: 8b 7c 24 08 e8 17 0b c3 ff 48 8b 04 24 48 83 c4 10 c3 53 48 89 fb 41 50 e8 e0 0a c3 ff 48 89 04 24 e8 e7 0a c3 ff ba 00 00 01 00
<f0> 0f c1 13 48 8b 04 24 89 d1 c1 ea 10 66 39 d1 74 07 f3 90 66
[ 56.283512] RIP [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP <ffff88001fa99ab0>
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] ---[ end trace 49714df27e1679ce ]---
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Frisch <wfpub@roembden.net>
Cc: Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 33,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: multiply (mpn_t src1, mpn_t src2, mpn_t *dest)
{
const mp_limb_t *p1;
const mp_limb_t *p2;
size_t len1;
size_t len2;
if (src1.nlimbs <= src2.nlimbs)
{
len1 = src1.nlimbs;
p1 = src1.limbs;
len2 = src2.nlimbs;
p2 = src2.limbs;
}
else
{
len1 = src2.nlimbs;
p1 = src2.limbs;
len2 = src1.nlimbs;
p2 = src1.limbs;
}
/* Now 0 <= len1 <= len2. */
if (len1 == 0)
{
/* src1 or src2 is zero. */
dest->nlimbs = 0;
dest->limbs = (mp_limb_t *) malloc (1);
}
else
{
/* Here 1 <= len1 <= len2. */
size_t dlen;
mp_limb_t *dp;
size_t k, i, j;
dlen = len1 + len2;
dp = (mp_limb_t *) malloc (dlen * sizeof (mp_limb_t));
if (dp == NULL)
return NULL;
for (k = len2; k > 0; )
dp[--k] = 0;
for (i = 0; i < len1; i++)
{
mp_limb_t digit1 = p1[i];
mp_twolimb_t carry = 0;
for (j = 0; j < len2; j++)
{
mp_limb_t digit2 = p2[j];
carry += (mp_twolimb_t) digit1 * (mp_twolimb_t) digit2;
carry += dp[i + j];
dp[i + j] = (mp_limb_t) carry;
carry = carry >> GMP_LIMB_BITS;
}
dp[i + len2] = (mp_limb_t) carry;
}
/* Normalise. */
while (dlen > 0 && dp[dlen - 1] == 0)
dlen--;
dest->nlimbs = dlen;
dest->limbs = dp;
}
return dest->limbs;
}
Commit Message: vasnprintf: Fix heap memory overrun bug.
Reported by Ben Pfaff <blp@cs.stanford.edu> in
<https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-gnulib/2018-09/msg00107.html>.
* lib/vasnprintf.c (convert_to_decimal): Allocate one more byte of
memory.
* tests/test-vasnprintf.c (test_function): Add another test.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 76,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterVIFFImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("VIFF","VIFF","Khoros Visualization image");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadVIFFImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteVIFFImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsVIFF;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("VIFF","XV","Khoros Visualization image");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadVIFFImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteVIFFImage;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/129
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 71,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void trace_buffer_unlock_commit_regs(struct trace_array *tr,
struct ring_buffer *buffer,
struct ring_buffer_event *event,
unsigned long flags, int pc,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
__buffer_unlock_commit(buffer, event);
/*
* If regs is not set, then skip the necessary functions.
* Note, we can still get here via blktrace, wakeup tracer
* and mmiotrace, but that's ok if they lose a function or
* two. They are not that meaningful.
*/
ftrace_trace_stack(tr, buffer, flags, regs ? 0 : STACK_SKIP, pc, regs);
ftrace_trace_userstack(buffer, flags, pc);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,375 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Browser::CanOverscrollContent() const {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
bool allow_overscroll = ui::GetTouchScreensAvailability() ==
ui::TouchScreensAvailability::ENABLED;
#elif defined(USE_AURA)
bool allow_overscroll = true;
#else
bool allow_overscroll = false;
#endif
if (!allow_overscroll)
return false;
if (is_app() || is_devtools() || !is_type_tabbed())
return false;
return content::OverscrollConfig::GetHistoryNavigationMode() !=
content::OverscrollConfig::HistoryNavigationMode::kDisabled;
}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UpdateSyncItemFromSync(const sync_pb::AppListSpecifics& specifics,
AppListSyncableService::SyncItem* item) {
DCHECK_EQ(item->item_id, specifics.item_id());
item->item_type = specifics.item_type();
item->item_name = specifics.item_name();
item->parent_id = specifics.parent_id();
if (!specifics.item_ordinal().empty())
item->item_ordinal = syncer::StringOrdinal(specifics.item_ordinal());
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fz_default_output_intent(fz_context *ctx, const fz_default_colorspaces *default_cs)
{
if (default_cs)
return default_cs->oi;
else
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 358 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int http_parse_chunk_size(struct http_msg *msg)
{
const struct buffer *buf = msg->chn->buf;
const char *ptr = b_ptr(buf, msg->next);
const char *ptr_old = ptr;
const char *end = buf->data + buf->size;
const char *stop = bi_end(buf);
unsigned int chunk = 0;
/* The chunk size is in the following form, though we are only
* interested in the size and CRLF :
* 1*HEXDIGIT *WSP *[ ';' extensions ] CRLF
*/
while (1) {
int c;
if (ptr == stop)
return 0;
c = hex2i(*ptr);
if (c < 0) /* not a hex digit anymore */
break;
if (unlikely(++ptr >= end))
ptr = buf->data;
if (chunk & 0xF8000000) /* integer overflow will occur if result >= 2GB */
goto error;
chunk = (chunk << 4) + c;
}
/* empty size not allowed */
if (unlikely(ptr == ptr_old))
goto error;
while (http_is_spht[(unsigned char)*ptr]) {
if (++ptr >= end)
ptr = buf->data;
if (unlikely(ptr == stop))
return 0;
}
/* Up to there, we know that at least one byte is present at *ptr. Check
* for the end of chunk size.
*/
while (1) {
if (likely(HTTP_IS_CRLF(*ptr))) {
/* we now have a CR or an LF at ptr */
if (likely(*ptr == '\r')) {
if (++ptr >= end)
ptr = buf->data;
if (ptr == stop)
return 0;
}
if (*ptr != '\n')
goto error;
if (++ptr >= end)
ptr = buf->data;
/* done */
break;
}
else if (*ptr == ';') {
/* chunk extension, ends at next CRLF */
if (++ptr >= end)
ptr = buf->data;
if (ptr == stop)
return 0;
while (!HTTP_IS_CRLF(*ptr)) {
if (++ptr >= end)
ptr = buf->data;
if (ptr == stop)
return 0;
}
/* we have a CRLF now, loop above */
continue;
}
else
goto error;
}
/* OK we found our CRLF and now <ptr> points to the next byte,
* which may or may not be present. We save that into ->next,
* and the number of bytes parsed into msg->sol.
*/
msg->sol = ptr - ptr_old;
if (unlikely(ptr < ptr_old))
msg->sol += buf->size;
msg->next = buffer_count(buf, buf->p, ptr);
msg->chunk_len = chunk;
msg->body_len += chunk;
msg->msg_state = chunk ? HTTP_MSG_DATA : HTTP_MSG_TRAILERS;
return 1;
error:
msg->err_pos = buffer_count(buf, buf->p, ptr);
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 9,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int http_request_forward_body(struct session *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit)
{
struct http_txn *txn = &s->txn;
struct http_msg *msg = &s->txn.req;
if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY))
return 0;
if ((req->flags & (CF_READ_ERROR|CF_READ_TIMEOUT|CF_WRITE_ERROR|CF_WRITE_TIMEOUT)) ||
((req->flags & CF_SHUTW) && (req->to_forward || req->buf->o))) {
/* Output closed while we were sending data. We must abort and
* wake the other side up.
*/
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
http_resync_states(s);
return 1;
}
/* Note that we don't have to send 100-continue back because we don't
* need the data to complete our job, and it's up to the server to
* decide whether to return 100, 417 or anything else in return of
* an "Expect: 100-continue" header.
*/
if (msg->sov > 0) {
/* we have msg->sov which points to the first byte of message
* body, and req->buf.p still points to the beginning of the
* message. We forward the headers now, as we don't need them
* anymore, and we want to flush them.
*/
b_adv(req->buf, msg->sov);
msg->next -= msg->sov;
msg->sov = 0;
/* The previous analysers guarantee that the state is somewhere
* between MSG_BODY and the first MSG_DATA. So msg->sol and
* msg->next are always correct.
*/
if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE) {
if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE;
else
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_DATA;
}
}
/* Some post-connect processing might want us to refrain from starting to
* forward data. Currently, the only reason for this is "balance url_param"
* whichs need to parse/process the request after we've enabled forwarding.
*/
if (unlikely(msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_WAIT_CONN)) {
if (!(s->rep->flags & CF_READ_ATTACHED)) {
channel_auto_connect(req);
req->flags |= CF_WAKE_CONNECT;
goto missing_data;
}
msg->flags &= ~HTTP_MSGF_WAIT_CONN;
}
/* in most states, we should abort in case of early close */
channel_auto_close(req);
if (req->to_forward) {
/* We can't process the buffer's contents yet */
req->flags |= CF_WAKE_WRITE;
goto missing_data;
}
while (1) {
if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_DATA) {
/* must still forward */
/* we may have some pending data starting at req->buf->p */
if (msg->chunk_len > req->buf->i - msg->next) {
req->flags |= CF_WAKE_WRITE;
goto missing_data;
}
msg->next += msg->chunk_len;
msg->chunk_len = 0;
/* nothing left to forward */
if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_CRLF;
else
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_DONE;
}
else if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE) {
/* read the chunk size and assign it to ->chunk_len, then
* set ->next to point to the body and switch to DATA or
* TRAILERS state.
*/
int ret = http_parse_chunk_size(msg);
if (ret == 0)
goto missing_data;
else if (ret < 0) {
session_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
if (msg->err_pos >= 0)
http_capture_bad_message(&s->fe->invalid_req, s, msg, HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE, s->be);
goto return_bad_req;
}
/* otherwise we're in HTTP_MSG_DATA or HTTP_MSG_TRAILERS state */
}
else if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_CRLF) {
/* we want the CRLF after the data */
int ret = http_skip_chunk_crlf(msg);
if (ret == 0)
goto missing_data;
else if (ret < 0) {
session_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
if (msg->err_pos >= 0)
http_capture_bad_message(&s->fe->invalid_req, s, msg, HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_CRLF, s->be);
goto return_bad_req;
}
/* we're in MSG_CHUNK_SIZE now */
}
else if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_TRAILERS) {
int ret = http_forward_trailers(msg);
if (ret == 0)
goto missing_data;
else if (ret < 0) {
session_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
if (msg->err_pos >= 0)
http_capture_bad_message(&s->fe->invalid_req, s, msg, HTTP_MSG_TRAILERS, s->be);
goto return_bad_req;
}
/* we're in HTTP_MSG_DONE now */
}
else {
int old_state = msg->msg_state;
/* other states, DONE...TUNNEL */
/* we may have some pending data starting at req->buf->p
* such as last chunk of data or trailers.
*/
b_adv(req->buf, msg->next);
if (unlikely(!(s->rep->flags & CF_READ_ATTACHED)))
msg->sov -= msg->next;
msg->next = 0;
/* for keep-alive we don't want to forward closes on DONE */
if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_KAL ||
(txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_SCL)
channel_dont_close(req);
if (http_resync_states(s)) {
/* some state changes occurred, maybe the analyser
* was disabled too.
*/
if (unlikely(msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR)) {
if (req->flags & CF_SHUTW) {
/* request errors are most likely due to
* the server aborting the transfer.
*/
goto aborted_xfer;
}
if (msg->err_pos >= 0)
http_capture_bad_message(&s->fe->invalid_req, s, msg, old_state, s->be);
goto return_bad_req;
}
return 1;
}
/* If "option abortonclose" is set on the backend, we
* want to monitor the client's connection and forward
* any shutdown notification to the server, which will
* decide whether to close or to go on processing the
* request.
*/
if (s->be->options & PR_O_ABRT_CLOSE) {
channel_auto_read(req);
channel_auto_close(req);
}
else if (s->txn.meth == HTTP_METH_POST) {
/* POST requests may require to read extra CRLF
* sent by broken browsers and which could cause
* an RST to be sent upon close on some systems
* (eg: Linux).
*/
channel_auto_read(req);
}
return 0;
}
}
missing_data:
/* we may have some pending data starting at req->buf->p */
b_adv(req->buf, msg->next);
if (unlikely(!(s->rep->flags & CF_READ_ATTACHED)))
msg->sov -= msg->next + MIN(msg->chunk_len, req->buf->i);
msg->next = 0;
msg->chunk_len -= channel_forward(req, msg->chunk_len);
/* stop waiting for data if the input is closed before the end */
if (req->flags & CF_SHUTR) {
if (!(s->flags & SN_ERR_MASK))
s->flags |= SN_ERR_CLICL;
if (!(s->flags & SN_FINST_MASK)) {
if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ERROR)
s->flags |= SN_FINST_H;
else
s->flags |= SN_FINST_D;
}
s->fe->fe_counters.cli_aborts++;
s->be->be_counters.cli_aborts++;
if (objt_server(s->target))
objt_server(s->target)->counters.cli_aborts++;
goto return_bad_req_stats_ok;
}
/* waiting for the last bits to leave the buffer */
if (req->flags & CF_SHUTW)
goto aborted_xfer;
/* When TE: chunked is used, we need to get there again to parse remaining
* chunks even if the client has closed, so we don't want to set CF_DONTCLOSE.
*/
if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
channel_dont_close(req);
/* We know that more data are expected, but we couldn't send more that
* what we did. So we always set the CF_EXPECT_MORE flag so that the
* system knows it must not set a PUSH on this first part. Interactive
* modes are already handled by the stream sock layer. We must not do
* this in content-length mode because it could present the MSG_MORE
* flag with the last block of forwarded data, which would cause an
* additional delay to be observed by the receiver.
*/
if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
req->flags |= CF_EXPECT_MORE;
return 0;
return_bad_req: /* let's centralize all bad requests */
s->fe->fe_counters.failed_req++;
if (s->listener->counters)
s->listener->counters->failed_req++;
return_bad_req_stats_ok:
/* we may have some pending data starting at req->buf->p */
b_adv(req->buf, msg->next);
msg->next = 0;
txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
if (txn->status) {
/* Note: we don't send any error if some data were already sent */
stream_int_retnclose(req->prod, NULL);
} else {
txn->status = 400;
stream_int_retnclose(req->prod, http_error_message(s, HTTP_ERR_400));
}
req->analysers = 0;
s->rep->analysers = 0; /* we're in data phase, we want to abort both directions */
if (!(s->flags & SN_ERR_MASK))
s->flags |= SN_ERR_PRXCOND;
if (!(s->flags & SN_FINST_MASK)) {
if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ERROR)
s->flags |= SN_FINST_H;
else
s->flags |= SN_FINST_D;
}
return 0;
aborted_xfer:
txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
if (txn->status) {
/* Note: we don't send any error if some data were already sent */
stream_int_retnclose(req->prod, NULL);
} else {
txn->status = 502;
stream_int_retnclose(req->prod, http_error_message(s, HTTP_ERR_502));
}
req->analysers = 0;
s->rep->analysers = 0; /* we're in data phase, we want to abort both directions */
s->fe->fe_counters.srv_aborts++;
s->be->be_counters.srv_aborts++;
if (objt_server(s->target))
objt_server(s->target)->counters.srv_aborts++;
if (!(s->flags & SN_ERR_MASK))
s->flags |= SN_ERR_SRVCL;
if (!(s->flags & SN_FINST_MASK)) {
if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ERROR)
s->flags |= SN_FINST_H;
else
s->flags |= SN_FINST_D;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 164,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ~SiteInstanceTestBrowserClient() {
WebUIControllerFactory::UnregisterFactoryForTesting(&factory_);
}
Commit Message: Check for appropriate bindings in process-per-site mode.
BUG=174059
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12188025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@181386 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 116,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: default_opaque_literal_attr(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset,
const char *token _U_, guint8 codepage _U_, guint32 *length)
{
guint32 data_len = tvb_get_guintvar(tvb, offset, length);
char *str = wmem_strdup_printf(wmem_packet_scope(), "(%d bytes of opaque data)", data_len);
*length += data_len;
return str;
}
Commit Message: WBXML: add a basic sanity check for offset overflow
This is a naive approach allowing to detact that something went wrong,
without the need to replace all proto_tree_add_text() calls as what was
done in master-2.0 branch.
Bug: 12408
Change-Id: Ia14905005e17ae322c2fc639ad5e491fa08b0108
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15310
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Pascal Quantin <pascal.quantin@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 51,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameBuffer::Invalidate() {
id_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_buf_stale(
struct xfs_buf *bp)
{
ASSERT(xfs_buf_islocked(bp));
bp->b_flags |= XBF_STALE;
/*
* Clear the delwri status so that a delwri queue walker will not
* flush this buffer to disk now that it is stale. The delwri queue has
* a reference to the buffer, so this is safe to do.
*/
bp->b_flags &= ~_XBF_DELWRI_Q;
atomic_set(&(bp)->b_lru_ref, 0);
if (!list_empty(&bp->b_lru)) {
struct xfs_buftarg *btp = bp->b_target;
spin_lock(&btp->bt_lru_lock);
if (!list_empty(&bp->b_lru) &&
!(bp->b_lru_flags & _XBF_LRU_DISPOSE)) {
list_del_init(&bp->b_lru);
btp->bt_lru_nr--;
atomic_dec(&bp->b_hold);
}
spin_unlock(&btp->bt_lru_lock);
}
ASSERT(atomic_read(&bp->b_hold) >= 1);
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix _xfs_buf_find oops on blocks beyond the filesystem end
When _xfs_buf_find is passed an out of range address, it will fail
to find a relevant struct xfs_perag and oops with a null
dereference. This can happen when trying to walk a filesystem with a
metadata inode that has a partially corrupted extent map (i.e. the
block number returned is corrupt, but is otherwise intact) and we
try to read from the corrupted block address.
In this case, just fail the lookup. If it is readahead being issued,
it will simply not be done, but if it is real read that fails we
will get an error being reported. Ideally this case should result
in an EFSCORRUPTED error being reported, but we cannot return an
error through xfs_buf_read() or xfs_buf_get() so this lookup failure
may result in ENOMEM or EIO errors being reported instead.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabContents* Browser::OpenApplication(
Profile* profile,
const Extension* extension,
extension_misc::LaunchContainer container,
TabContents* existing_tab) {
TabContents* tab = NULL;
ExtensionPrefs* prefs = profile->GetExtensionService()->extension_prefs();
prefs->SetActiveBit(extension->id(), true);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Extensions.AppLaunchContainer", container, 100);
switch (container) {
case extension_misc::LAUNCH_WINDOW:
case extension_misc::LAUNCH_PANEL:
tab = Browser::OpenApplicationWindow(profile, extension, container,
GURL(), NULL);
break;
case extension_misc::LAUNCH_TAB: {
tab = Browser::OpenApplicationTab(profile, extension, existing_tab);
break;
}
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
return tab;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ImageCursors() {
LoadImageCursor(ui::kCursorNoDrop, IDR_AURA_CURSOR_NO_DROP);
LoadImageCursor(ui::kCursorCopy, IDR_AURA_CURSOR_COPY);
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,995 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perWorldBindingsTestInterfaceEmptyMethodOptionalBooleanArgMethodForMainWorld(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "perWorldBindingsTestInterfaceEmptyMethodOptionalBooleanArg", "TestInterfaceNode", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestInterfaceNode* impl = V8TestInterfaceNode::toImpl(info.Holder());
bool optionalBooleanArgument;
{
int numArgsPassed = info.Length();
while (numArgsPassed > 0) {
if (!info[numArgsPassed - 1]->IsUndefined())
break;
--numArgsPassed;
}
if (UNLIKELY(numArgsPassed <= 0)) {
v8SetReturnValueForMainWorld(info, impl->perWorldBindingsTestInterfaceEmptyMethodOptionalBooleanArg());
return;
}
optionalBooleanArgument = toBoolean(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exceptionState);
if (exceptionState.throwIfNeeded())
return;
}
v8SetReturnValueForMainWorld(info, impl->perWorldBindingsTestInterfaceEmptyMethodOptionalBooleanArg(optionalBooleanArgument));
}
Commit Message: binding: Removes unused code in templates/attributes.cpp.
Faking {{cpp_class}} and {{c8_class}} doesn't make sense.
Probably it made sense before the introduction of virtual
ScriptWrappable::wrap().
Checking the existence of window->document() doesn't seem
making sense to me, and CQ tests seem passing without the
check.
BUG=
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2268433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#413375}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 119,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool hasOneTextChild(ContainerNode* node)
{
return hasOneChild(node) && node->firstChild()->isTextNode();
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::badInputText() const
{
return validationMessageBadInputForDateTimeText();
}
Commit Message: Fix reentrance of BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::destroyShadowSubtree.
destroyShadowSubtree could dispatch 'blur' event unexpectedly because
element()->focused() had incorrect information. We make sure it has
correct information by checking if the UA shadow root contains the
focused element.
BUG=257353
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19067004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154086 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: event_fixture_teardown(struct EventFixture *ef, const void *data)
{
(void) data;
/* there should be no events left waiting */
assert_no_event(ef);
/* clean up the io channel we opened for uzbl */
GIOChannel *iochan = g_ptr_array_index(uzbl.comm.client_chan, 0);
remove_socket_from_array(iochan);
/* close the sockets so that nothing sticks around between tests */
close(ef->uzbl_sock);
close(ef->test_sock);
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: link_info_nautilus_link_read_callback (GObject *source_object,
GAsyncResult *res,
gpointer user_data)
{
LinkInfoReadState *state;
gsize file_size;
char *file_contents;
gboolean result;
NautilusDirectory *directory;
state = user_data;
if (state->directory == NULL)
{
/* Operation was cancelled. Bail out */
link_info_read_state_free (state);
return;
}
directory = nautilus_directory_ref (state->directory);
result = g_file_load_contents_finish (G_FILE (source_object),
res,
&file_contents, &file_size,
NULL, NULL);
state->directory->details->link_info_read_state = NULL;
async_job_end (state->directory, "link info");
link_info_got_data (state->directory, state->file, result, file_size, file_contents);
if (result)
{
g_free (file_contents);
}
link_info_read_state_free (state);
nautilus_directory_unref (directory);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: raptor_libxml_internalSubset(void* user_data, const xmlChar *name,
const xmlChar *ExternalID, const xmlChar *SystemID) {
raptor_sax2* sax2 = (raptor_sax2*)user_data;
libxml2_internalSubset(sax2->xc, name, ExternalID, SystemID);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 21,972 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static jas_image_cmpt_t *jas_image_cmpt_create(uint_fast32_t tlx,
uint_fast32_t tly, uint_fast32_t hstep, uint_fast32_t vstep,
uint_fast32_t width, uint_fast32_t height, uint_fast16_t depth, bool sgnd,
uint_fast32_t inmem)
{
jas_image_cmpt_t *cmpt;
size_t size;
if (!(cmpt = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_image_cmpt_t)))) {
goto error;
}
cmpt->type_ = JAS_IMAGE_CT_UNKNOWN;
cmpt->tlx_ = tlx;
cmpt->tly_ = tly;
cmpt->hstep_ = hstep;
cmpt->vstep_ = vstep;
cmpt->width_ = width;
cmpt->height_ = height;
cmpt->prec_ = depth;
cmpt->sgnd_ = sgnd;
cmpt->stream_ = 0;
cmpt->cps_ = (depth + 7) / 8;
if (!jas_safe_size_mul(cmpt->width_, cmpt->height_, &size) ||
!jas_safe_size_mul(size, cmpt->cps_, &size)) {
goto error;
}
cmpt->stream_ = (inmem) ? jas_stream_memopen(0, size) :
jas_stream_tmpfile();
if (!cmpt->stream_) {
goto error;
}
/* Zero the component data. This isn't necessary, but it is
convenient for debugging purposes. */
/* Note: conversion of size - 1 to long can overflow */
if (jas_stream_seek(cmpt->stream_, size - 1, SEEK_SET) < 0 ||
jas_stream_putc(cmpt->stream_, 0) == EOF ||
jas_stream_seek(cmpt->stream_, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
goto error;
}
return cmpt;
error:
if (cmpt) {
jas_image_cmpt_destroy(cmpt);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The component domains must be the same for the ICT/RCT in the JPC codec.
This was previously enforced with an assertion.
Now, it is handled in a more graceful manner.
CWE ID: | 0 | 73,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_io_bus_write_cookie(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_bus bus_idx,
gpa_t addr, int len, const void *val, long cookie)
{
struct kvm_io_bus *bus;
struct kvm_io_range range;
range = (struct kvm_io_range) {
.addr = addr,
.len = len,
};
bus = srcu_dereference(vcpu->kvm->buses[bus_idx], &vcpu->kvm->srcu);
if (!bus)
return -ENOMEM;
/* First try the device referenced by cookie. */
if ((cookie >= 0) && (cookie < bus->dev_count) &&
(kvm_io_bus_cmp(&range, &bus->range[cookie]) == 0))
if (!kvm_iodevice_write(vcpu, bus->range[cookie].dev, addr, len,
val))
return cookie;
/*
* cookie contained garbage; fall back to search and return the
* correct cookie value.
*/
return __kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, bus, &range, val);
}
Commit Message: kvm: fix kvm_ioctl_create_device() reference counting (CVE-2019-6974)
kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:
1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
reference
The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.
This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.
Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 91,572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int phar_mount_entry(phar_archive_data *phar, char *filename, int filename_len, char *path, int path_len) /* {{{ */
{
phar_entry_info entry = {0};
php_stream_statbuf ssb;
int is_phar;
const char *err;
if (phar_path_check(&path, &path_len, &err) > pcr_is_ok) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (path_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(path, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
/* no creating magic phar files by mounting them */
return FAILURE;
}
is_phar = (filename_len > 7 && !memcmp(filename, "phar://", 7));
entry.phar = phar;
entry.filename = estrndup(path, path_len);
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
phar_unixify_path_separators(entry.filename, path_len);
#endif
entry.filename_len = path_len;
if (is_phar) {
entry.tmp = estrndup(filename, filename_len);
} else {
entry.tmp = expand_filepath(filename, NULL);
if (!entry.tmp) {
entry.tmp = estrndup(filename, filename_len);
}
}
#if PHP_API_VERSION < 20100412
if (PG(safe_mode) && !is_phar && (!php_checkuid(entry.tmp, NULL, CHECKUID_CHECK_FILE_AND_DIR))) {
efree(entry.tmp);
efree(entry.filename);
return FAILURE;
}
#endif
filename = entry.tmp;
/* only check openbasedir for files, not for phar streams */
if (!is_phar && php_check_open_basedir(filename)) {
efree(entry.tmp);
efree(entry.filename);
return FAILURE;
}
entry.is_mounted = 1;
entry.is_crc_checked = 1;
entry.fp_type = PHAR_TMP;
if (SUCCESS != php_stream_stat_path(filename, &ssb)) {
efree(entry.tmp);
efree(entry.filename);
return FAILURE;
}
if (ssb.sb.st_mode & S_IFDIR) {
entry.is_dir = 1;
if (NULL == zend_hash_str_add_ptr(&phar->mounted_dirs, entry.filename, path_len, entry.filename)) {
/* directory already mounted */
efree(entry.tmp);
efree(entry.filename);
return FAILURE;
}
} else {
entry.is_dir = 0;
entry.uncompressed_filesize = entry.compressed_filesize = ssb.sb.st_size;
}
entry.flags = ssb.sb.st_mode;
if (NULL != zend_hash_str_add_mem(&phar->manifest, entry.filename, path_len, (void*)&entry, sizeof(phar_entry_info))) {
return SUCCESS;
}
efree(entry.tmp);
efree(entry.filename);
return FAILURE;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72928 - Out of bound when verify signature of zip phar in phar_parse_zipfile
(cherry picked from commit 19484ab77466f99c78fc0e677f7e03da0584d6a2)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxEditModel::AcceptTemporaryTextAsUserText() {
InternalSetUserText(UserTextFromDisplayText(view_->GetText()));
has_temporary_text_ = false;
if (user_input_in_progress_ || !in_revert_)
delegate_->OnInputStateChanged();
}
Commit Message: [OriginChip] Re-enable the chip as necessary when switching tabs.
BUG=369500
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/292493003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@271161 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 111,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct dentry *user_path_create(int dfd, const char __user *pathname,
struct path *path, unsigned int lookup_flags)
{
struct filename *tmp = getname(pathname);
struct dentry *res;
if (IS_ERR(tmp))
return ERR_CAST(tmp);
res = filename_create(dfd, tmp, path, lookup_flags);
putname(tmp);
return res;
}
Commit Message: path_openat(): fix double fput()
path_openat() jumps to the wrong place after do_tmpfile() - it has
already done path_cleanup() (as part of path_lookupat() called by
do_tmpfile()), so doing that again can lead to double fput().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: | 0 | 42,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: create_toolbar_button(Evas_Object *window, const char *icon_name)
{
Evas_Object *button = elm_button_add(window);
Evas_Object *icon = elm_icon_add(window);
elm_icon_standard_set(icon, icon_name);
evas_object_size_hint_max_set(icon, TOOL_BAR_ICON_SIZE, TOOL_BAR_ICON_SIZE);
evas_object_color_set(icon, 44, 44, 102, 128);
evas_object_show(icon);
elm_object_part_content_set(button, "icon", icon);
evas_object_size_hint_min_set(button, TOOL_BAR_BUTTON_SIZE, TOOL_BAR_BUTTON_SIZE);
return button;
}
Commit Message: [EFL][WK2] Add --window-size command line option to EFL MiniBrowser
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100942
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-11-05
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Added window-size (-s) command line option to EFL MiniBrowser.
* MiniBrowser/efl/main.c:
(window_create):
(parse_window_size):
(elm_main):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@133450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,605 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_encode_layoutget(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, __be32 nfserr,
struct nfsd4_layoutget *lgp)
{
struct xdr_stream *xdr = &resp->xdr;
const struct nfsd4_layout_ops *ops =
nfsd4_layout_ops[lgp->lg_layout_type];
__be32 *p;
dprintk("%s: err %d\n", __func__, nfserr);
if (nfserr)
goto out;
nfserr = nfserr_resource;
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 36 + sizeof(stateid_opaque_t));
if (!p)
goto out;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1); /* we always set return-on-close */
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(lgp->lg_sid.si_generation);
p = xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, &lgp->lg_sid.si_opaque,
sizeof(stateid_opaque_t));
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1); /* we always return a single layout */
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, lgp->lg_seg.offset);
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, lgp->lg_seg.length);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(lgp->lg_seg.iomode);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(lgp->lg_layout_type);
nfserr = ops->encode_layoutget(xdr, lgp);
out:
kfree(lgp->lg_content);
return nfserr;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 1 | 168,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_read_keys(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
uint32_t count;
uint32_t i;
if (atom.size < 8)
return 0;
avio_skip(pb, 4);
count = avio_rb32(pb);
if (count > UINT_MAX / sizeof(*c->meta_keys) - 1) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"The 'keys' atom with the invalid key count: %"PRIu32"\n", count);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
c->meta_keys_count = count + 1;
c->meta_keys = av_mallocz(c->meta_keys_count * sizeof(*c->meta_keys));
if (!c->meta_keys)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
for (i = 1; i <= count; ++i) {
uint32_t key_size = avio_rb32(pb);
uint32_t type = avio_rl32(pb);
if (key_size < 8) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"The key# %"PRIu32" in meta has invalid size:"
"%"PRIu32"\n", i, key_size);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
key_size -= 8;
if (type != MKTAG('m','d','t','a')) {
avio_skip(pb, key_size);
}
c->meta_keys[i] = av_mallocz(key_size + 1);
if (!c->meta_keys[i])
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
avio_read(pb, c->meta_keys[i], key_size);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaInterfaceProxy::CreateRenderer(
const std::string& audio_device_id,
media::mojom::RendererRequest request) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
GetMediaInterfaceFactory()->CreateRenderer(audio_device_id,
std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 127,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ipv6_generate_eui64(u8 *eui, struct net_device *dev)
{
switch (dev->type) {
case ARPHRD_ETHER:
case ARPHRD_FDDI:
return addrconf_ifid_eui48(eui, dev);
case ARPHRD_ARCNET:
return addrconf_ifid_arcnet(eui, dev);
case ARPHRD_INFINIBAND:
return addrconf_ifid_infiniband(eui, dev);
case ARPHRD_SIT:
return addrconf_ifid_sit(eui, dev);
case ARPHRD_IPGRE:
return addrconf_ifid_gre(eui, dev);
case ARPHRD_6LOWPAN:
case ARPHRD_IEEE802154:
return addrconf_ifid_eui64(eui, dev);
case ARPHRD_IEEE1394:
return addrconf_ifid_ieee1394(eui, dev);
case ARPHRD_TUNNEL6:
return addrconf_ifid_ip6tnl(eui, dev);
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BrowserViewRenderer::~BrowserViewRenderer() {
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResetMonitoredUrls() {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
monitored_urls_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MODRET auth_pass(cmd_rec *cmd) {
char *user = NULL;
int res = 0;
if (logged_in)
return PR_ERROR_MSG(cmd, R_503, _("You are already logged in"));
user = pr_table_get(session.notes, "mod_auth.orig-user", NULL);
if (!user) {
(void) pr_table_remove(session.notes, "mod_auth.orig-user", NULL);
(void) pr_table_remove(session.notes, "mod_auth.anon-passwd", NULL);
return PR_ERROR_MSG(cmd, R_503, _("Login with USER first"));
}
/* Clear any potentially cached directory config */
session.anon_config = NULL;
session.dir_config = NULL;
res = setup_env(cmd->tmp_pool, cmd, user, cmd->arg);
if (res == 1) {
config_rec *c = NULL;
c = add_config_param_set(&cmd->server->conf, "authenticated", 1, NULL);
c->argv[0] = pcalloc(c->pool, sizeof(unsigned char));
*((unsigned char *) c->argv[0]) = TRUE;
set_auth_check(NULL);
(void) pr_table_remove(session.notes, "mod_auth.anon-passwd", NULL);
if (session.sf_flags & SF_ANON) {
if (pr_table_add_dup(session.notes, "mod_auth.anon-passwd",
pr_fs_decode_path(cmd->server->pool, cmd->arg), 0) < 0) {
pr_log_debug(DEBUG3,
"error stashing anonymous password in session.notes: %s",
strerror(errno));
}
}
logged_in = 1;
return PR_HANDLED(cmd);
}
(void) pr_table_remove(session.notes, "mod_auth.anon-passwd", NULL);
if (res == 0) {
unsigned int max_logins, *max = NULL;
char *denymsg = NULL;
/* check for AccessDenyMsg */
if ((denymsg = get_param_ptr((session.anon_config ?
session.anon_config->subset : cmd->server->conf),
"AccessDenyMsg", FALSE)) != NULL) {
if (strstr(denymsg, "%u") != NULL) {
denymsg = sreplace(cmd->tmp_pool, denymsg, "%u", user, NULL);
}
}
max = get_param_ptr(main_server->conf, "MaxLoginAttempts", FALSE);
if (max != NULL) {
max_logins = *max;
} else {
max_logins = 3;
}
if (max_logins > 0 &&
++auth_tries >= max_logins) {
if (denymsg) {
pr_response_send(R_530, "%s", denymsg);
} else {
pr_response_send(R_530, "%s", _("Login incorrect."));
}
pr_log_auth(PR_LOG_NOTICE,
"Maximum login attempts (%u) exceeded, connection refused", max_logins);
/* Generate an event about this limit being exceeded. */
pr_event_generate("mod_auth.max-login-attempts", session.c);
pr_session_disconnect(&auth_module, PR_SESS_DISCONNECT_CONFIG_ACL,
"Denied by MaxLoginAttempts");
}
return PR_ERROR_MSG(cmd, R_530, denymsg ? denymsg : _("Login incorrect."));
}
return PR_HANDLED(cmd);
}
Commit Message: Backporting recursive handling of DefaultRoot path, when AllowChrootSymlinks
is off, to 1.3.5 branch.
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 95,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FakeVoiceInteractionFrameworkInstance* framework_instance() const {
return framework_instance_.get();
}
Commit Message: arc: add test for blocking incognito windows in screenshot
BUG=778852
TEST=ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkServiceUnittest.
CapturingScreenshotBlocksIncognitoWindows
Change-Id: I0bfa5a486759783d7c8926a309c6b5da9b02dcc6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914983
Commit-Queue: Muyuan Li <muyuanli@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Hector Chavez <lhchavez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536438}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 152,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *guess_shell(void) {
char *shell = NULL;
char *shells[] = {"/bin/bash", "/bin/csh", "/usr/bin/zsh", "/bin/sh", "/bin/ash", NULL };
int i = 0;
while (shells[i] != NULL) {
struct stat s;
if (stat(shells[i], &s) == 0 && access(shells[i], R_OK) == 0) {
shell = shells[i];
break;
}
i++;
}
return shell;
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: | 0 | 69,267 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void airspy_buf_queue(struct vb2_buffer *vb)
{
struct vb2_v4l2_buffer *vbuf = to_vb2_v4l2_buffer(vb);
struct airspy *s = vb2_get_drv_priv(vb->vb2_queue);
struct airspy_frame_buf *buf =
container_of(vbuf, struct airspy_frame_buf, vb);
unsigned long flags;
/* Check the device has not disconnected between prep and queuing */
if (unlikely(!s->udev)) {
vb2_buffer_done(&buf->vb.vb2_buf, VB2_BUF_STATE_ERROR);
return;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&s->queued_bufs_lock, flags);
list_add_tail(&buf->list, &s->queued_bufs);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->queued_bufs_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: media: fix airspy usb probe error path
Fix a memory leak on probe error of the airspy usb device driver.
The problem is triggered when more than 64 usb devices register with
v4l2 of type VFL_TYPE_SDR or VFL_TYPE_SUBDEV.
The memory leak is caused by the probe function of the airspy driver
mishandeling errors and not freeing the corresponding control structures
when an error occours registering the device to v4l2 core.
A badusb device can emulate 64 of these devices, and then through
continual emulated connect/disconnect of the 65th device, cause the
kernel to run out of RAM and crash the kernel, thus causing a local DOS
vulnerability.
Fixes CVE-2016-5400
Signed-off-by: James Patrick-Evans <james@jmp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 51,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API void ZEND_FASTCALL zend_array_destroy(HashTable *ht)
{
Bucket *p, *end;
IS_CONSISTENT(ht);
HT_ASSERT(GC_REFCOUNT(ht) <= 1);
/* break possible cycles */
GC_REMOVE_FROM_BUFFER(ht);
GC_TYPE_INFO(ht) = IS_NULL | (GC_WHITE << 16);
if (ht->nNumUsed) {
/* In some rare cases destructors of regular arrays may be changed */
if (UNEXPECTED(ht->pDestructor != ZVAL_PTR_DTOR)) {
zend_hash_destroy(ht);
goto free_ht;
}
p = ht->arData;
end = p + ht->nNumUsed;
SET_INCONSISTENT(HT_IS_DESTROYING);
if (ht->u.flags & (HASH_FLAG_PACKED|HASH_FLAG_STATIC_KEYS)) {
do {
i_zval_ptr_dtor(&p->val ZEND_FILE_LINE_CC);
} while (++p != end);
} else if (ht->nNumUsed == ht->nNumOfElements) {
do {
i_zval_ptr_dtor(&p->val ZEND_FILE_LINE_CC);
if (EXPECTED(p->key)) {
zend_string_release(p->key);
}
} while (++p != end);
} else {
do {
if (EXPECTED(Z_TYPE(p->val) != IS_UNDEF)) {
i_zval_ptr_dtor(&p->val ZEND_FILE_LINE_CC);
if (EXPECTED(p->key)) {
zend_string_release(p->key);
}
}
} while (++p != end);
}
zend_hash_iterators_remove(ht);
SET_INCONSISTENT(HT_DESTROYED);
} else if (EXPECTED(!(ht->u.flags & HASH_FLAG_INITIALIZED))) {
goto free_ht;
}
efree(HT_GET_DATA_ADDR(ht));
free_ht:
FREE_HASHTABLE(ht);
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 69,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _XcursorStdioFileRead (XcursorFile *file, unsigned char *buf, int len)
{
FILE *f = file->closure;
return fread (buf, 1, len, f);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 1,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void enable_kernel_fp(void)
{
WARN_ON(preemptible());
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
if (current->thread.regs && (current->thread.regs->msr & MSR_FP))
giveup_fpu_maybe_transactional(current);
else
giveup_fpu(NULL); /* just enables FP for kernel */
#else
giveup_fpu_maybe_transactional(last_task_used_math);
#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,620 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DownloadManagerImpl::ShouldOpenFileBasedOnExtension(
const base::FilePath& path) {
if (!delegate_)
return false;
return delegate_->ShouldOpenFileBasedOnExtension(path);
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool OmniboxViewViews::OnAfterPossibleChange(bool allow_keyword_ui_change) {
State new_state;
GetState(&new_state);
OmniboxView::StateChanges state_changes =
GetStateChanges(state_before_change_, new_state);
state_changes.text_differs =
state_changes.text_differs ||
(ime_composing_before_change_ != IsIMEComposing());
const bool something_changed = model()->OnAfterPossibleChange(
state_changes, allow_keyword_ui_change && !IsIMEComposing());
if (something_changed &&
(state_changes.text_differs || state_changes.keyword_differs))
TextChanged();
else if (state_changes.selection_differs)
EmphasizeURLComponents();
else if (delete_at_end_pressed_)
model()->OnChanged();
return something_changed;
}
Commit Message: Strip JavaScript schemas on Linux text drop
When dropping text onto the Omnibox, any leading JavaScript schemes
should be stripped to avoid a "self-XSS" attack. This stripping already
occurs in all cases except when plaintext is dropped on Linux. This CL
corrects that oversight.
Bug: 768910
Change-Id: I43af24ace4a13cf61d15a32eb9382dcdd498a062
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/685638
Reviewed-by: Justin Donnelly <jdonnelly@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#504695}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 150,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintPreviewMessageHandler::OnPrintPreviewCancelled(int document_cookie) {
StopWorker(document_cookie);
PrintPreviewUI* print_preview_ui = GetPrintPreviewUI();
if (!print_preview_ui)
return;
print_preview_ui->OnPrintPreviewCancelled();
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 126,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const unsigned char **buf, size_t len )
{
uint16_t tls_id;
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info;
/*
* We expect at least three bytes (see below)
*/
if( len < 3 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/*
* First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled
*/
if( *(*buf)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/*
* Next two bytes are the namedcurve value
*/
tls_id = *(*buf)++;
tls_id <<= 8;
tls_id |= *(*buf)++;
if( ( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( tls_id ) ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
return mbedtls_ecp_group_load( grp, curve_info->grp_id );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 96,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int megasas_probe_one(struct pci_dev *pdev,
const struct pci_device_id *id)
{
int rval, pos;
struct Scsi_Host *host;
struct megasas_instance *instance;
u16 control = 0;
switch (pdev->device) {
case PCI_DEVICE_ID_LSI_AERO_10E1:
case PCI_DEVICE_ID_LSI_AERO_10E5:
dev_info(&pdev->dev, "Adapter is in configurable secure mode\n");
break;
}
/* Reset MSI-X in the kdump kernel */
if (reset_devices) {
pos = pci_find_capability(pdev, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
if (pos) {
pci_read_config_word(pdev, pos + PCI_MSIX_FLAGS,
&control);
if (control & PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_ENABLE) {
dev_info(&pdev->dev, "resetting MSI-X\n");
pci_write_config_word(pdev,
pos + PCI_MSIX_FLAGS,
control &
~PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_ENABLE);
}
}
}
/*
* PCI prepping: enable device set bus mastering and dma mask
*/
rval = pci_enable_device_mem(pdev);
if (rval) {
return rval;
}
pci_set_master(pdev);
host = scsi_host_alloc(&megasas_template,
sizeof(struct megasas_instance));
if (!host) {
dev_printk(KERN_DEBUG, &pdev->dev, "scsi_host_alloc failed\n");
goto fail_alloc_instance;
}
instance = (struct megasas_instance *)host->hostdata;
memset(instance, 0, sizeof(*instance));
atomic_set(&instance->fw_reset_no_pci_access, 0);
/*
* Initialize PCI related and misc parameters
*/
instance->pdev = pdev;
instance->host = host;
instance->unique_id = pdev->bus->number << 8 | pdev->devfn;
instance->init_id = MEGASAS_DEFAULT_INIT_ID;
megasas_set_adapter_type(instance);
/*
* Initialize MFI Firmware
*/
if (megasas_init_fw(instance))
goto fail_init_mfi;
if (instance->requestorId) {
if (instance->PlasmaFW111) {
instance->vf_affiliation_111 =
dma_alloc_coherent(&pdev->dev,
sizeof(struct MR_LD_VF_AFFILIATION_111),
&instance->vf_affiliation_111_h,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!instance->vf_affiliation_111)
dev_warn(&pdev->dev, "Can't allocate "
"memory for VF affiliation buffer\n");
} else {
instance->vf_affiliation =
dma_alloc_coherent(&pdev->dev,
(MAX_LOGICAL_DRIVES + 1) *
sizeof(struct MR_LD_VF_AFFILIATION),
&instance->vf_affiliation_h,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!instance->vf_affiliation)
dev_warn(&pdev->dev, "Can't allocate "
"memory for VF affiliation buffer\n");
}
}
/*
* Store instance in PCI softstate
*/
pci_set_drvdata(pdev, instance);
/*
* Add this controller to megasas_mgmt_info structure so that it
* can be exported to management applications
*/
megasas_mgmt_info.count++;
megasas_mgmt_info.instance[megasas_mgmt_info.max_index] = instance;
megasas_mgmt_info.max_index++;
/*
* Register with SCSI mid-layer
*/
if (megasas_io_attach(instance))
goto fail_io_attach;
instance->unload = 0;
/*
* Trigger SCSI to scan our drives
*/
if (!instance->enable_fw_dev_list ||
(instance->host_device_list_buf->count > 0))
scsi_scan_host(host);
/*
* Initiate AEN (Asynchronous Event Notification)
*/
if (megasas_start_aen(instance)) {
dev_printk(KERN_DEBUG, &pdev->dev, "start aen failed\n");
goto fail_start_aen;
}
/* Get current SR-IOV LD/VF affiliation */
if (instance->requestorId)
megasas_get_ld_vf_affiliation(instance, 1);
return 0;
fail_start_aen:
fail_io_attach:
megasas_mgmt_info.count--;
megasas_mgmt_info.max_index--;
megasas_mgmt_info.instance[megasas_mgmt_info.max_index] = NULL;
instance->instancet->disable_intr(instance);
megasas_destroy_irqs(instance);
if (instance->adapter_type != MFI_SERIES)
megasas_release_fusion(instance);
else
megasas_release_mfi(instance);
if (instance->msix_vectors)
pci_free_irq_vectors(instance->pdev);
fail_init_mfi:
scsi_host_put(host);
fail_alloc_instance:
pci_disable_device(pdev);
return -ENODEV;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,390 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorPageAgent::DidResizeMainFrame() {
if (!inspected_frames_->Root()->IsMainFrame())
return;
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
PageLayoutInvalidated(true);
#endif
GetFrontend()->frameResized();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: htmlParseAttValue(htmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *ret = NULL;
if (CUR == '"') {
NEXT;
ret = htmlParseHTMLAttribute(ctxt, '"');
if (CUR != '"') {
htmlParseErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
"AttValue: \" expected\n", NULL, NULL);
} else
NEXT;
} else if (CUR == '\'') {
NEXT;
ret = htmlParseHTMLAttribute(ctxt, '\'');
if (CUR != '\'') {
htmlParseErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
"AttValue: ' expected\n", NULL, NULL);
} else
NEXT;
} else {
/*
* That's an HTMLism, the attribute value may not be quoted
*/
ret = htmlParseHTMLAttribute(ctxt, 0);
if (ret == NULL) {
htmlParseErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_WITHOUT_VALUE,
"AttValue: no value found\n", NULL, NULL);
}
}
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 150,800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void StyleResolver::matchAuthorRulesForShadowHost(Element* element, ElementRuleCollector& collector, bool includeEmptyRules, Vector<ScopedStyleResolver*, 8>& resolvers, Vector<ScopedStyleResolver*, 8>& resolversInShadowTree)
{
collector.clearMatchedRules();
collector.matchedResult().ranges.lastAuthorRule = collector.matchedResult().matchedProperties.size() - 1;
CascadeScope cascadeScope = 0;
CascadeOrder cascadeOrder = 0;
bool applyAuthorStyles = applyAuthorStylesOf(element);
for (int j = resolversInShadowTree.size() - 1; j >= 0; --j)
resolversInShadowTree.at(j)->collectMatchingAuthorRules(collector, includeEmptyRules, applyAuthorStyles, cascadeScope, cascadeOrder++);
if (resolvers.isEmpty() || resolvers.first()->treeScope() != element->treeScope())
++cascadeScope;
cascadeOrder += resolvers.size();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < resolvers.size(); ++i)
resolvers.at(i)->collectMatchingAuthorRules(collector, includeEmptyRules, applyAuthorStyles, cascadeScope++, --cascadeOrder);
collectTreeBoundaryCrossingRules(element, collector, includeEmptyRules);
collector.sortAndTransferMatchedRules();
if (!resolvers.isEmpty())
matchHostRules(element, resolvers.first(), collector, includeEmptyRules);
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,978 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType IsXBM(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
if (length < 7)
return(MagickFalse);
if (memcmp(magick,"#define",7) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/712
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<BlobDataHandle> getOrCreateBlobDataHandle(const String& uuid, const String& type, long long size = -1)
{
BlobDataHandleMap::const_iterator it = m_blobDataHandles.find(uuid);
if (it != m_blobDataHandles.end()) {
return it->value;
}
return BlobDataHandle::create(uuid, type, size);
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,484 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
int size, ent_count;
int __user *p = (int __user *)arg;
int retval;
switch (cmd) {
case RNDGETENTCNT:
/* inherently racy, no point locking */
if (put_user(input_pool.entropy_count, p))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case RNDADDTOENTCNT:
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (get_user(ent_count, p))
return -EFAULT;
credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, ent_count);
return 0;
case RNDADDENTROPY:
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (get_user(ent_count, p++))
return -EFAULT;
if (ent_count < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(size, p++))
return -EFAULT;
retval = write_pool(&input_pool, (const char __user *)p,
size);
if (retval < 0)
return retval;
credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, ent_count);
return 0;
case RNDZAPENTCNT:
case RNDCLEARPOOL:
/* Clear the entropy pool counters. */
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
rand_initialize();
return 0;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsAutofillWarningEntry(int frontend_id) {
return frontend_id == POPUP_ITEM_ID_INSECURE_CONTEXT_PAYMENT_DISABLED_MESSAGE;
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const net::EmbeddedTestServer& direct() { return direct_; }
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 144,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_timer_user_tselect(struct file *file,
struct snd_timer_select __user *_tselect)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
struct snd_timer_select tselect;
char str[32];
int err = 0;
tu = file->private_data;
mutex_lock(&tu->tread_sem);
if (tu->timeri) {
snd_timer_close(tu->timeri);
tu->timeri = NULL;
}
if (copy_from_user(&tselect, _tselect, sizeof(tselect))) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto __err;
}
sprintf(str, "application %i", current->pid);
if (tselect.id.dev_class != SNDRV_TIMER_CLASS_SLAVE)
tselect.id.dev_sclass = SNDRV_TIMER_SCLASS_APPLICATION;
err = snd_timer_open(&tu->timeri, str, &tselect.id, current->pid);
if (err < 0)
goto __err;
kfree(tu->queue);
tu->queue = NULL;
kfree(tu->tqueue);
tu->tqueue = NULL;
if (tu->tread) {
tu->tqueue = kmalloc(tu->queue_size * sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (tu->tqueue == NULL)
err = -ENOMEM;
} else {
tu->queue = kmalloc(tu->queue_size * sizeof(struct snd_timer_read),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (tu->queue == NULL)
err = -ENOMEM;
}
if (err < 0) {
snd_timer_close(tu->timeri);
tu->timeri = NULL;
} else {
tu->timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_FAST;
tu->timeri->callback = tu->tread
? snd_timer_user_tinterrupt : snd_timer_user_interrupt;
tu->timeri->ccallback = snd_timer_user_ccallback;
tu->timeri->callback_data = (void *)tu;
}
__err:
mutex_unlock(&tu->tread_sem);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix race among timer ioctls
ALSA timer ioctls have an open race and this may lead to a
use-after-free of timer instance object. A simplistic fix is to make
each ioctl exclusive. We have already tread_sem for controlling the
tread, and extend this as a global mutex to be applied to each ioctl.
The downside is, of course, the worse concurrency. But these ioctls
aren't to be parallel accessible, in anyway, so it should be fine to
serialize there.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 167,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void set_noreply_maybe(conn *c, token_t *tokens, size_t ntokens)
{
int noreply_index = ntokens - 2;
/*
NOTE: this function is not the first place where we are going to
send the reply. We could send it instead from process_command()
if the request line has wrong number of tokens. However parsing
malformed line for "noreply" option is not reliable anyway, so
it can't be helped.
*/
if (tokens[noreply_index].value
&& strcmp(tokens[noreply_index].value, "noreply") == 0) {
c->noreply = true;
}
}
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 94,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cypress_write_int_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = urb->context;
struct cypress_private *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
struct device *dev = &urb->dev->dev;
int status = urb->status;
switch (status) {
case 0:
/* success */
break;
case -ECONNRESET:
case -ENOENT:
case -ESHUTDOWN:
/* this urb is terminated, clean up */
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - urb shutting down with status: %d\n",
__func__, status);
priv->write_urb_in_use = 0;
return;
case -EPIPE:
/* Cannot call usb_clear_halt while in_interrupt */
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
dev_err(dev, "%s - unexpected nonzero write status received: %d\n",
__func__, status);
cypress_set_dead(port);
break;
}
priv->write_urb_in_use = 0;
/* send any buffered data */
cypress_send(port);
}
Commit Message: USB: cypress_m8: add endpoint sanity check
An attack using missing endpoints exists.
CVE-2016-3137
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofproto_port_set_rstp(struct ofproto *ofproto, ofp_port_t ofp_port,
const struct ofproto_port_rstp_settings *s)
{
struct ofport *ofport = ofproto_get_port(ofproto, ofp_port);
if (!ofport) {
VLOG_WARN("%s: cannot configure RSTP on nonexistent port %"PRIu32,
ofproto->name, ofp_port);
return ENODEV;
}
if (!ofproto->ofproto_class->set_rstp_port) {
return EOPNOTSUPP;
}
ofproto->ofproto_class->set_rstp_port(ofport, s);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,367 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QuotaManager::DidInitializeTemporaryOriginsInfo(bool success) {
DidDatabaseWork(success);
if (success)
StartEviction();
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 102,174 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void inet6_ifa_finish_destroy(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp)
{
WARN_ON(!hlist_unhashed(&ifp->addr_lst));
#ifdef NET_REFCNT_DEBUG
pr_debug("%s\n", __func__);
#endif
in6_dev_put(ifp->idev);
if (cancel_delayed_work(&ifp->dad_work))
pr_notice("delayed DAD work was pending while freeing ifa=%p\n",
ifp);
if (ifp->state != INET6_IFADDR_STATE_DEAD) {
pr_warn("Freeing alive inet6 address %p\n", ifp);
return;
}
ip6_rt_put(ifp->rt);
kfree_rcu(ifp, rcu);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iakerb_gss_export_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t interprocess_token)
{
OM_uint32 maj;
iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
/* We don't currently support exporting partially established contexts. */
if (!ctx->established)
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
maj = krb5_gss_export_sec_context(minor_status, &ctx->gssc,
interprocess_token);
if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
iakerb_release_context(ctx);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
return maj;
}
Commit Message: Fix IAKERB context export/import [CVE-2015-2698]
The patches for CVE-2015-2696 contained a regression in the newly
added IAKERB iakerb_gss_export_sec_context() function, which could
cause it to corrupt memory. Fix the regression by properly
dereferencing the context_handle pointer before casting it.
Also, the patches did not implement an IAKERB gss_import_sec_context()
function, under the erroneous belief that an exported IAKERB context
would be tagged as a krb5 context. Implement it now to allow IAKERB
contexts to be successfully exported and imported after establishment.
CVE-2015-2698:
In any MIT krb5 release with the patches for CVE-2015-2696 applied, an
application which calls gss_export_sec_context() may experience memory
corruption if the context was established using the IAKERB mechanism.
Historically, some vulnerabilities of this nature can be translated
into remote code execution, though the necessary exploits must be
tailored to the individual application and are usually quite
complicated.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8273 (new)
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 166,640 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mcryptd_hash_digest_enqueue(struct ahash_request *req)
{
return mcryptd_hash_enqueue(req, mcryptd_hash_digest);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint32_t tee_mmu_user_get_cache_attr(struct user_ta_ctx *utc, void *va)
{
uint32_t attr;
if (tee_mmu_user_va2pa_attr(utc, va, NULL, &attr) != TEE_SUCCESS)
panic("cannot get attr");
return (attr >> TEE_MATTR_CACHE_SHIFT) & TEE_MATTR_CACHE_MASK;
}
Commit Message: core: tee_mmu_check_access_rights() check all pages
Prior to this patch tee_mmu_check_access_rights() checks an address in
each page of a supplied range. If both the start and length of that
range is unaligned the last page in the range is sometimes not checked.
With this patch the first address of each page in the range is checked
to simplify the logic of checking each page and the range and also to
cover the last page under all circumstances.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0005: "tee_mmu_check_access_rights does not check
final page of TA buffer"
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 86,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniformBlockBinding(
WebGLProgram* program,
GLuint uniform_block_index,
GLuint uniform_block_binding) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateWebGLObject("uniformBlockBinding", program))
return;
if (!ValidateUniformBlockIndex("uniformBlockBinding", program,
uniform_block_index))
return;
ContextGL()->UniformBlockBinding(ObjectOrZero(program), uniform_block_index,
uniform_block_binding);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_dinode_calc_crc(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
struct xfs_dinode *dip)
{
uint32_t crc;
if (dip->di_version < 3)
return;
ASSERT(xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&mp->m_sb));
crc = xfs_start_cksum_update((char *)dip, mp->m_sb.sb_inodesize,
XFS_DINODE_CRC_OFF);
dip->di_crc = xfs_end_cksum(crc);
}
Commit Message: xfs: More robust inode extent count validation
When the inode is in extent format, it can't have more extents that
fit in the inode fork. We don't currenty check this, and so this
corruption goes unnoticed by the inode verifiers. This can lead to
crashes operating on invalid in-memory structures.
Attempts to access such a inode will now error out in the verifier
rather than allowing modification operations to proceed.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: fix a typedef, add some braces and breaks to shut up compiler warnings]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 79,893 |
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