instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u8 fm10k_tx_desc_flags(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 tx_flags)
{
/* set type for advanced descriptor with frame checksum insertion */
u32 desc_flags = 0;
/* set checksum offload bits */
desc_flags |= FM10K_SET_FLAG(tx_flags, FM10K_TX_FLAGS_CSUM,
FM10K_TXD_FLAG_CSUM);
return desc_flags;
}
Commit Message: fm10k: Fix a potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 4378 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.0.0+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x95b/0x3200 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3573
Code: 00 0f 85 28 1e 00 00 48 81 c4 08 01 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 4c 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 24 00 00 49 81 7d 00 e0 de 03 a6 41 bc 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e3c07a40 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000080
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8881e3c07d98 R11: ffff8881c7f21f80 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007fce2252e700(0000) GS:ffff8881f2400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fffc7eb0228 CR3: 00000001e5bea002 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
lock_acquire+0xff/0x2c0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4211
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xdf/0x1050 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1072
drain_workqueue+0x24/0x3f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2934
destroy_workqueue+0x23/0x630 kernel/workqueue.c:4319
__do_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:1018 [inline]
__se_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:961 [inline]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x30c/0x480 kernel/module.c:961
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fce2252dc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fce2252e6bc
R13: 00000000004bcca9 R14: 00000000006f6b48 R15: 00000000ffffffff
If alloc_workqueue fails, it should return -ENOMEM, otherwise may
trigger this NULL pointer dereference while unloading drivers.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 0a38c17a21a0 ("fm10k: Remove create_workqueue")
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 87,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ImageLoader::BypassMainWorldBehavior ShouldBypassMainWorldCSP(
ImageLoader* loader) {
DCHECK(loader);
DCHECK(loader->GetElement());
if (loader->GetElement()->GetDocument().GetFrame() &&
loader->GetElement()
->GetDocument()
.GetFrame()
->GetScriptController()
.ShouldBypassMainWorldCSP())
return ImageLoader::kBypassMainWorldCSP;
return ImageLoader::kDoNotBypassMainWorldCSP;
}
Commit Message: service worker: Disable interception when OBJECT/EMBED uses ImageLoader.
Per the specification, service worker should not intercept requests for
OBJECT/EMBED elements.
R=kinuko
Bug: 771933
Change-Id: Ia6da6107dc5c68aa2c2efffde14bd2c51251fbd4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927303
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538027}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool tracer_tracing_is_on(struct trace_array *tr)
{
if (tr->trace_buffer.buffer)
return ring_buffer_record_is_on(tr->trace_buffer.buffer);
return !tr->buffer_disabled;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExprAppendMultiKeysymList(ExprDef *expr, ExprDef *append)
{
unsigned nSyms = darray_size(expr->keysym_list.syms);
unsigned numEntries = darray_size(append->keysym_list.syms);
darray_append(expr->keysym_list.symsMapIndex, nSyms);
darray_append(expr->keysym_list.symsNumEntries, numEntries);
darray_concat(expr->keysym_list.syms, append->keysym_list.syms);
FreeStmt((ParseCommon *) &append);
return expr;
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: fix pointer value for FreeStmt
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 169,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void locationWithCallWithAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* proxyImp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
TestNode* imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->locationWithCallWith());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHrefCallWith(callingDOMWindow(info.GetIsolate()), enteredDOMWindow(info.GetIsolate()), cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 171,687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs_lookup_req(struct nfs_priv *npriv, struct nfs_fh *fh,
const char *filename, struct inode *inode)
{
struct nfs_inode *ninode = nfsi(inode);
uint32_t data[1024];
uint32_t *p;
int len;
struct packet *nfs_packet;
/*
* struct LOOKUP3args {
* diropargs3 what;
* };
*
* struct LOOKUP3resok {
* nfs_fh3 object;
* post_op_attr obj_attributes;
* post_op_attr dir_attributes;
* };
*
* struct LOOKUP3resfail {
* post_op_attr dir_attributes;
* };
*
* union LOOKUP3res switch (nfsstat3 status) {
* case NFS3_OK:
* LOOKUP3resok resok;
* default:
* LOOKUP3resfail resfail;
* };
*/
p = &(data[0]);
p = rpc_add_credentials(p);
/* what.dir */
p = nfs_add_fh3(p, fh);
/* what.name */
p = nfs_add_filename(p, strlen(filename), filename);
len = p - &(data[0]);
nfs_packet = rpc_req(npriv, PROG_NFS, NFSPROC3_LOOKUP, data, len);
if (IS_ERR(nfs_packet))
return PTR_ERR(nfs_packet);
p = (void *)nfs_packet->data + sizeof(struct rpc_reply) + 4;
ninode->fh.size = ntoh32(net_read_uint32(p++));
if (ninode->fh.size > NFS3_FHSIZE) {
debug("%s: file handle too big: %u\n", __func__,
ninode->fh.size);
return -EIO;
}
memcpy(ninode->fh.data, p, ninode->fh.size);
p += DIV_ROUND_UP(ninode->fh.size, 4);
nfs_read_post_op_attr(p, inode);
free(nfs_packet);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,342 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FT_GlyphSlot_Own_Bitmap( FT_GlyphSlot slot )
{
if ( slot && slot->format == FT_GLYPH_FORMAT_BITMAP &&
!( slot->internal->flags & FT_GLYPH_OWN_BITMAP ) )
{
FT_Bitmap bitmap;
FT_Error error;
FT_Bitmap_New( &bitmap );
error = FT_Bitmap_Copy( slot->library, &slot->bitmap, &bitmap );
if ( error )
return error;
slot->bitmap = bitmap;
slot->internal->flags |= FT_GLYPH_OWN_BITMAP;
}
return FT_Err_Ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_event_comm_output(struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_comm_event *comm_event)
{
struct perf_output_handle handle;
struct perf_sample_data sample;
int size = comm_event->event_id.header.size;
int ret;
perf_event_header__init_id(&comm_event->event_id.header, &sample, event);
ret = perf_output_begin(&handle, event,
comm_event->event_id.header.size, 0, 0);
if (ret)
goto out;
comm_event->event_id.pid = perf_event_pid(event, comm_event->task);
comm_event->event_id.tid = perf_event_tid(event, comm_event->task);
perf_output_put(&handle, comm_event->event_id);
__output_copy(&handle, comm_event->comm,
comm_event->comm_size);
perf_event__output_id_sample(event, &handle, &sample);
perf_output_end(&handle);
out:
comm_event->event_id.header.size = size;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 165,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int wc_ecc_get_curve_idx_from_name(const char* curveName)
{
int curve_idx;
word32 len;
if (curveName == NULL)
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
len = (word32)XSTRLEN(curveName);
for (curve_idx = 0; ecc_sets[curve_idx].size != 0; curve_idx++) {
if (ecc_sets[curve_idx].name &&
XSTRNCASECMP(ecc_sets[curve_idx].name, curveName, len) == 0) {
break;
}
}
if (ecc_sets[curve_idx].size == 0) {
WOLFSSL_MSG("ecc_set curve name not found");
return ECC_CURVE_INVALID;
}
return curve_idx;
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 81,889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void longLongAttrAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::longLongAttrAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct resv_map *vma_resv_map(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
VM_BUG_ON(!is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma));
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE))
return (struct resv_map *)(get_vma_private_data(vma) &
~HPAGE_RESV_MASK);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,775 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_send_XButtonEvent(rpc_message_t *message, XEvent *xevent)
{
int error;
if ((error = do_send_XAnyEvent(message, xevent)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, xevent->xbutton.root)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, xevent->xbutton.subwindow)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, xevent->xbutton.time)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_int32(message, xevent->xbutton.x)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_int32(message, xevent->xbutton.y)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_int32(message, xevent->xbutton.x_root)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_int32(message, xevent->xbutton.y_root)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, xevent->xbutton.state)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, xevent->xbutton.button)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_int32(message, xevent->xbutton.same_screen)) < 0)
return error;
return RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,007 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::SetDisjointValueSyncCHROMIUM() {
query_tracker_->SetDisjointSync(this);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::RestoreTextureUnitBindings(
unsigned unit) const {}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: display_error(png_structp pp, png_const_charp error)
{
struct display *dp = get_dp(pp);
display_log(dp, LIBPNG_ERROR, "%s", error);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int is_stack(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
/*
* We make no effort to guess what a given thread considers to be
* its "stack". It's not even well-defined for programs written
* languages like Go.
*/
return vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GesturePoint::~GesturePoint() {}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 108,736 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: raptor_rss_parse_chunk(raptor_parser* rdf_parser,
const unsigned char *s, size_t len,
int is_end)
{
raptor_rss_parser* rss_parser = (raptor_rss_parser*)rdf_parser->context;
if(rdf_parser->failed)
return 1;
raptor_sax2_parse_chunk(rss_parser->sax2, s, len, is_end);
if(!is_end)
return 0;
if(rdf_parser->failed)
return 1;
/* turn strings into URIs, move things around if needed */
if(raptor_rss_insert_identifiers(rdf_parser)) {
rdf_parser->failed = 1;
return 1;
}
/* add some new fields */
raptor_rss_uplift_items(rdf_parser);
/* find out what namespaces to declare and start them */
raptor_rss_start_namespaces(rdf_parser);
/* generate the triples */
raptor_rss_emit(rdf_parser);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 22,042 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void migrate_dead(unsigned int dead_cpu, struct task_struct *p)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(dead_cpu);
/* Must be exiting, otherwise would be on tasklist. */
BUG_ON(!p->exit_state);
/* Cannot have done final schedule yet: would have vanished. */
BUG_ON(p->state == TASK_DEAD);
get_task_struct(p);
/*
* Drop lock around migration; if someone else moves it,
* that's OK. No task can be added to this CPU, so iteration is
* fine.
*/
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&rq->lock);
move_task_off_dead_cpu(dead_cpu, p);
raw_spin_lock_irq(&rq->lock);
put_task_struct(p);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,480 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> InspectorEventDispatchEvent::Data(
const Event& event) {
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> value = TracedValue::Create();
value->SetString("type", event.type());
SetCallStack(value.get());
return value;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Con_MessageMode3_f (void) {
chat_playerNum = VM_Call( cgvm, CG_CROSSHAIR_PLAYER );
if ( chat_playerNum < 0 || chat_playerNum >= MAX_CLIENTS ) {
chat_playerNum = -1;
return;
}
chat_team = qfalse;
Field_Clear( &chatField );
chatField.widthInChars = 30;
Key_SetCatcher( Key_GetCatcher( ) ^ KEYCATCH_MESSAGE );
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
char *username,
u32 **sids,
u32 *nel)
{
struct context *fromcon, usercon;
u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
struct user_datum *user;
struct role_datum *role;
struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
int rc = 0, i, j;
*sids = NULL;
*nel = 0;
if (!ss_initialized)
goto out;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
context_init(&usercon);
rc = -EINVAL;
fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
if (!fromcon)
goto out_unlock;
rc = -EINVAL;
user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
if (!user)
goto out_unlock;
usercon.user = user->value;
rc = -ENOMEM;
mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!mysids)
goto out_unlock;
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
usercon.role = i + 1;
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
usercon.type = j + 1;
if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
continue;
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
if (mynel < maxnel) {
mysids[mynel++] = sid;
} else {
rc = -ENOMEM;
maxnel += SIDS_NEL;
mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!mysids2)
goto out_unlock;
memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
kfree(mysids);
mysids = mysids2;
mysids[mynel++] = sid;
}
}
}
rc = 0;
out_unlock:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
if (rc || !mynel) {
kfree(mysids);
goto out;
}
rc = -ENOMEM;
mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mysids2) {
kfree(mysids);
goto out;
}
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
struct av_decision dummy_avd;
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
&dummy_avd);
if (!rc)
mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
cond_resched();
}
rc = 0;
kfree(mysids);
*sids = mysids2;
*nel = j;
out:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlockFlow::setMustDiscardMarginAfter(bool value)
{
if (style()->marginAfterCollapse() == MDISCARD) {
ASSERT(value);
return;
}
if (!m_rareData && !value)
return;
if (!m_rareData)
m_rareData = adoptPtr(new RenderBlockFlowRareData(this));
m_rareData->m_discardMarginAfter = value;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,426 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ptrace_setregs(struct task_struct *child, void __user *uregs)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(child);
xtensa_gregset_t *gregset = uregs;
const unsigned long ps_mask = PS_CALLINC_MASK | PS_OWB_MASK;
unsigned long ps;
unsigned long wb;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uregs, sizeof(xtensa_gregset_t)))
return -EIO;
__get_user(regs->pc, &gregset->pc);
__get_user(ps, &gregset->ps);
__get_user(regs->lbeg, &gregset->lbeg);
__get_user(regs->lend, &gregset->lend);
__get_user(regs->lcount, &gregset->lcount);
__get_user(regs->windowstart, &gregset->windowstart);
__get_user(wb, &gregset->windowbase);
regs->ps = (regs->ps & ~ps_mask) | (ps & ps_mask) | (1 << PS_EXCM_BIT);
if (wb >= XCHAL_NUM_AREGS / 4)
return -EFAULT;
regs->windowbase = wb;
if (wb != 0 && __copy_from_user(regs->areg + XCHAL_NUM_AREGS - wb * 4,
gregset->a, wb * 16))
return -EFAULT;
if (__copy_from_user(regs->areg, gregset->a + wb*4, (WSBITS-wb) * 16))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xtensa: prevent arbitrary read in ptrace
Prevent an arbitrary kernel read. Check the user pointer with access_ok()
before copying data in.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/EIO/EFAULT/]
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Christian Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 26,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserInit::LaunchWithProfile::AddStartupURLs(
std::vector<GURL>* startup_urls) const {
if (!startup_urls->empty())
return;
if (browser_init_) {
if (!browser_init_->first_run_tabs_.empty()) {
std::vector<GURL>::iterator it = browser_init_->first_run_tabs_.begin();
while (it != browser_init_->first_run_tabs_.end()) {
if (it->host() == "new_tab_page") {
startup_urls->push_back(GURL(chrome::kChromeUINewTabURL));
} else if (it->host() == "welcome_page") {
startup_urls->push_back(GetWelcomePageURL());
} else {
startup_urls->push_back(*it);
}
++it;
}
browser_init_->first_run_tabs_.clear();
}
}
if (startup_urls->empty()) {
startup_urls->push_back(GURL()); // New tab page.
PrefService* prefs = g_browser_process->local_state();
if (prefs->FindPreference(prefs::kShouldShowWelcomePage) &&
prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kShouldShowWelcomePage)) {
prefs->ClearPref(prefs::kShouldShowWelcomePage);
startup_urls->push_back(GetWelcomePageURL());
}
}
if (SyncPromoUI::ShouldShowSyncPromoAtStartup(profile_, is_first_run_)) {
SyncPromoUI::DidShowSyncPromoAtStartup(profile_);
GURL old_url = (*startup_urls)[0];
(*startup_urls)[0] =
SyncPromoUI::GetSyncPromoURL(GURL(chrome::kChromeUINewTabURL), true);
if (old_url.is_empty() &&
profile_->GetHomePage() == GURL(chrome::kChromeUINewTabURL)) {
old_url = GURL(chrome::kChromeUINewTabURL);
}
if (old_url != GURL(chrome::kChromeUINewTabURL))
startup_urls->insert(startup_urls->begin() + 1, old_url);
if (startup_urls->size() > 2) {
std::vector<GURL>::iterator it = std::find(
startup_urls->begin(), startup_urls->end(), GetWelcomePageURL());
if (it != startup_urls->end())
startup_urls->erase(it);
}
}
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,357 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_proc_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
struct iattr *sattr, dev_t rdev)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
struct nfs4_label l, *label = NULL;
int err;
label = nfs4_label_init_security(dir, dentry, sattr, &l);
sattr->ia_mode &= ~current_umask();
do {
err = _nfs4_proc_mknod(dir, dentry, sattr, label, rdev);
trace_nfs4_mknod(dir, &dentry->d_name, err);
err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(dir), err,
&exception);
} while (exception.retry);
nfs4_label_release_security(label);
return err;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void do_cgm_get(const char *name, const char *lxcpath, const char *filename, int outp, bool sendvalue)
{
char *controller, *key, *cgroup = NULL, *cglast;
int len = -1;
int ret;
nih_local char *result = NULL;
controller = alloca(strlen(filename)+1);
strcpy(controller, filename);
key = strchr(controller, '.');
if (!key) {
ret = write(outp, &len, sizeof(len));
if (ret != sizeof(len))
WARN("Failed to warn cgm_get of error; parent may hang");
exit(1);
}
*key = '\0';
if (!cgm_dbus_connect()) {
ERROR("Error connecting to cgroup manager");
ret = write(outp, &len, sizeof(len));
if (ret != sizeof(len))
WARN("Failed to warn cgm_get of error; parent may hang");
exit(1);
}
cgroup = try_get_abs_cgroup(name, lxcpath, controller);
if (!cgroup) {
cgm_dbus_disconnect();
ret = write(outp, &len, sizeof(len));
if (ret != sizeof(len))
WARN("Failed to warn cgm_get of error; parent may hang");
exit(1);
}
cglast = strrchr(cgroup, '/');
if (!cglast) {
cgm_dbus_disconnect();
free_abs_cgroup(cgroup);
ret = write(outp, &len, sizeof(len));
if (ret != sizeof(len))
WARN("Failed to warn cgm_get of error; parent may hang");
exit(1);
}
*cglast = '\0';
if (!lxc_cgmanager_enter(getpid(), controller, cgroup, abs_cgroup_supported())) {
ERROR("Failed to enter container cgroup %s:%s", controller, cgroup);
ret = write(outp, &len, sizeof(len));
if (ret != sizeof(len))
WARN("Failed to warn cgm_get of error; parent may hang");
cgm_dbus_disconnect();
free_abs_cgroup(cgroup);
exit(1);
}
if (cgmanager_get_value_sync(NULL, cgroup_manager, controller, cglast+1, filename, &result) != 0) {
NihError *nerr;
nerr = nih_error_get();
nih_free(nerr);
free_abs_cgroup(cgroup);
cgm_dbus_disconnect();
ret = write(outp, &len, sizeof(len));
if (ret != sizeof(len))
WARN("Failed to warn cgm_get of error; parent may hang");
exit(1);
}
free_abs_cgroup(cgroup);
cgm_dbus_disconnect();
len = strlen(result);
ret = write(outp, &len, sizeof(len));
if (ret != sizeof(len)) {
WARN("Failed to send length to parent");
exit(1);
}
if (!len || !sendvalue) {
exit(0);
}
ret = write(outp, result, len);
if (ret < 0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long usp,
unsigned long arg, struct task_struct *p)
{
struct pt_regs *childregs, *kregs;
extern void ret_from_fork(void);
extern void ret_from_kernel_thread(void);
void (*f)(void);
unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(p) + THREAD_SIZE;
/* Copy registers */
sp -= sizeof(struct pt_regs);
childregs = (struct pt_regs *) sp;
if (unlikely(p->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
struct thread_info *ti = (void *)task_stack_page(p);
memset(childregs, 0, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
childregs->gpr[1] = sp + sizeof(struct pt_regs);
childregs->gpr[14] = usp; /* function */
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
clear_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_32BIT);
childregs->softe = 1;
#endif
childregs->gpr[15] = arg;
p->thread.regs = NULL; /* no user register state */
ti->flags |= _TIF_RESTOREALL;
f = ret_from_kernel_thread;
} else {
struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs();
CHECK_FULL_REGS(regs);
*childregs = *regs;
if (usp)
childregs->gpr[1] = usp;
p->thread.regs = childregs;
childregs->gpr[3] = 0; /* Result from fork() */
if (clone_flags & CLONE_SETTLS) {
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
if (!is_32bit_task())
childregs->gpr[13] = childregs->gpr[6];
else
#endif
childregs->gpr[2] = childregs->gpr[6];
}
f = ret_from_fork;
}
sp -= STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD;
/*
* The way this works is that at some point in the future
* some task will call _switch to switch to the new task.
* That will pop off the stack frame created below and start
* the new task running at ret_from_fork. The new task will
* do some house keeping and then return from the fork or clone
* system call, using the stack frame created above.
*/
((unsigned long *)sp)[0] = 0;
sp -= sizeof(struct pt_regs);
kregs = (struct pt_regs *) sp;
sp -= STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD;
p->thread.ksp = sp;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC32
p->thread.ksp_limit = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(p) +
_ALIGN_UP(sizeof(struct thread_info), 16);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT
p->thread.ptrace_bps[0] = NULL;
#endif
p->thread.fp_save_area = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
p->thread.vr_save_area = NULL;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64
if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_SLB)) {
unsigned long sp_vsid;
unsigned long llp = mmu_psize_defs[mmu_linear_psize].sllp;
if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_1T_SEGMENT))
sp_vsid = get_kernel_vsid(sp, MMU_SEGSIZE_1T)
<< SLB_VSID_SHIFT_1T;
else
sp_vsid = get_kernel_vsid(sp, MMU_SEGSIZE_256M)
<< SLB_VSID_SHIFT;
sp_vsid |= SLB_VSID_KERNEL | llp;
p->thread.ksp_vsid = sp_vsid;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64 */
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_DSCR)) {
p->thread.dscr_inherit = current->thread.dscr_inherit;
p->thread.dscr = current->thread.dscr;
}
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_HAS_PPR))
p->thread.ppr = INIT_PPR;
#endif
/*
* The PPC64 ABI makes use of a TOC to contain function
* pointers. The function (ret_from_except) is actually a pointer
* to the TOC entry. The first entry is a pointer to the actual
* function.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
kregs->nip = *((unsigned long *)f);
#else
kregs->nip = (unsigned long)f;
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm *kvm, unsigned id)
{
struct page *page;
int r;
mutex_init(&vcpu->mutex);
vcpu->cpu = -1;
vcpu->kvm = kvm;
vcpu->vcpu_id = id;
vcpu->pid = NULL;
init_waitqueue_head(&vcpu->wq);
kvm_async_pf_vcpu_init(vcpu);
page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (!page) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
vcpu->run = page_address(page);
kvm_vcpu_set_in_spin_loop(vcpu, false);
kvm_vcpu_set_dy_eligible(vcpu, false);
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_init(vcpu);
if (r < 0)
goto fail_free_run;
return 0;
fail_free_run:
free_page((unsigned long)vcpu->run);
fail:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: perform an invalid memslot step for gpa base change
PPC must flush all translations before the new memory slot
is visible.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int srpt_build_cmd_rsp(struct srpt_rdma_ch *ch,
struct srpt_send_ioctx *ioctx, u64 tag,
int status)
{
struct srp_rsp *srp_rsp;
const u8 *sense_data;
int sense_data_len, max_sense_len;
/*
* The lowest bit of all SAM-3 status codes is zero (see also
* paragraph 5.3 in SAM-3).
*/
WARN_ON(status & 1);
srp_rsp = ioctx->ioctx.buf;
BUG_ON(!srp_rsp);
sense_data = ioctx->sense_data;
sense_data_len = ioctx->cmd.scsi_sense_length;
WARN_ON(sense_data_len > sizeof(ioctx->sense_data));
memset(srp_rsp, 0, sizeof *srp_rsp);
srp_rsp->opcode = SRP_RSP;
srp_rsp->req_lim_delta =
cpu_to_be32(1 + atomic_xchg(&ch->req_lim_delta, 0));
srp_rsp->tag = tag;
srp_rsp->status = status;
if (sense_data_len) {
BUILD_BUG_ON(MIN_MAX_RSP_SIZE <= sizeof(*srp_rsp));
max_sense_len = ch->max_ti_iu_len - sizeof(*srp_rsp);
if (sense_data_len > max_sense_len) {
pr_warn("truncated sense data from %d to %d"
" bytes\n", sense_data_len, max_sense_len);
sense_data_len = max_sense_len;
}
srp_rsp->flags |= SRP_RSP_FLAG_SNSVALID;
srp_rsp->sense_data_len = cpu_to_be32(sense_data_len);
memcpy(srp_rsp + 1, sense_data, sense_data_len);
}
return sizeof(*srp_rsp) + sense_data_len;
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 50,626 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::UpdateToolbar(TabContents* contents,
bool should_restore_state) {
TRACE_EVENT0("ui::gtk", "BrowserWindowGtk::UpdateToolbar");
toolbar_->UpdateWebContents(contents->web_contents(), should_restore_state);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const ut8* r_bin_dwarf_parse_std_opcode(
const RBin *a, const ut8 *obuf, size_t len,
const RBinDwarfLNPHeader *hdr, RBinDwarfSMRegisters *regs,
ut8 opcode, FILE *f, int mode) {
const ut8* buf = obuf;
const ut8* buf_end = obuf + len;
ut64 addr = 0LL;
st64 sbuf;
ut8 adj_opcode;
ut64 op_advance;
ut16 operand;
RBinFile *binfile = a ? a->cur : NULL;
if (!binfile || !hdr || !regs || !obuf) {
return NULL;
}
switch (opcode) {
case DW_LNS_copy:
if (f) {
fprintf (f, "Copy\n");
}
if (binfile && binfile->sdb_addrinfo && hdr->file_names) {
int fnidx = regs->file - 1;
if (fnidx >= 0 && fnidx < hdr->file_names_count) {
add_sdb_addrline (binfile->sdb_addrinfo,
regs->address,
hdr->file_names[fnidx].name,
regs->line, f, mode);
}
}
regs->basic_block = DWARF_FALSE;
break;
case DW_LNS_advance_pc:
buf = r_uleb128 (buf, ST32_MAX, &addr);
regs->address += addr * hdr->min_inst_len;
if (f) {
fprintf (f, "Advance PC by %"PFMT64d" to 0x%"PFMT64x"\n",
addr * hdr->min_inst_len, regs->address);
}
break;
case DW_LNS_advance_line:
buf = r_leb128(buf, &sbuf);
regs->line += sbuf;
if (f) {
fprintf (f, "Advance line by %"PFMT64d", to %"PFMT64d"\n", sbuf, regs->line);
}
break;
case DW_LNS_set_file:
buf = r_uleb128 (buf, ST32_MAX, &addr);
if (f) {
fprintf (f, "Set file to %"PFMT64d"\n", addr);
}
regs->file = addr;
break;
case DW_LNS_set_column:
buf = r_uleb128 (buf, ST32_MAX, &addr);
if (f) {
fprintf (f, "Set column to %"PFMT64d"\n", addr);
}
regs->column = addr;
break;
case DW_LNS_negate_stmt:
regs->is_stmt = regs->is_stmt ? DWARF_FALSE : DWARF_TRUE;
if (f) {
fprintf (f, "Set is_stmt to %d\n", regs->is_stmt);
}
break;
case DW_LNS_set_basic_block:
if (f) {
fprintf (f, "set_basic_block\n");
}
regs->basic_block = DWARF_TRUE;
break;
case DW_LNS_const_add_pc:
adj_opcode = 255 - hdr->opcode_base;
if (hdr->line_range > 0) {
op_advance = adj_opcode / hdr->line_range;
} else {
op_advance = 0;
}
regs->address += op_advance;
if (f) {
fprintf (f, "Advance PC by constant %"PFMT64d" to 0x%"PFMT64x"\n",
op_advance, regs->address);
}
break;
case DW_LNS_fixed_advance_pc:
operand = READ (buf, ut16);
regs->address += operand;
if (f) {
fprintf (f,"Fixed advance pc to %"PFMT64d"\n", regs->address);
}
break;
case DW_LNS_set_prologue_end:
regs->prologue_end = ~0;
if (f) {
fprintf (f, "set_prologue_end\n");
}
break;
case DW_LNS_set_epilogue_begin:
regs->epilogue_begin = ~0;
if (f) {
fprintf (f, "set_epilogue_begin\n");
}
break;
case DW_LNS_set_isa:
buf = r_uleb128 (buf, ST32_MAX, &addr);
regs->isa = addr;
if (f) {
fprintf (f, "set_isa\n");
}
break;
default:
if (f) {
fprintf (f, "Unexpected opcode\n");
}
break;
}
return buf;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8813 - segfault in dwarf parser
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 59,718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bdt_le_test_mode(char *p)
{
int cmd;
unsigned char buf[3];
int arg1, arg2, arg3;
bdt_log("BT LE TEST MODE");
if (!bt_enabled) {
bdt_log("Bluetooth must be enabled for le_test to work.");
return;
}
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
cmd = get_int(&p, 0);
switch (cmd)
{
case 0x1: /* RX TEST */
arg1 = get_int(&p, -1);
if (arg1 < 0) bdt_log("%s Invalid arguments", __FUNCTION__);
buf[0] = arg1;
status = sBtInterface->le_test_mode(HCI_LE_RECEIVER_TEST_OPCODE, buf, 1);
break;
case 0x2: /* TX TEST */
arg1 = get_int(&p, -1);
arg2 = get_int(&p, -1);
arg3 = get_int(&p, -1);
if ((arg1 < 0) || (arg2 < 0) || (arg3 < 0))
bdt_log("%s Invalid arguments", __FUNCTION__);
buf[0] = arg1;
buf[1] = arg2;
buf[2] = arg3;
status = sBtInterface->le_test_mode(HCI_LE_TRANSMITTER_TEST_OPCODE, buf, 3);
break;
case 0x3: /* END TEST */
status = sBtInterface->le_test_mode(HCI_LE_END_TEST_OPCODE, buf, 0);
break;
default:
bdt_log("Unsupported command");
return;
break;
}
if (status != BT_STATUS_SUCCESS)
{
bdt_log("%s Test 0x%x Failed with status:0x%x", __FUNCTION__, cmd, status);
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 159,713 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void raw_icmp_error(struct sk_buff *skb, int protocol, u32 info)
{
int hash;
struct sock *raw_sk;
const struct iphdr *iph;
struct net *net;
hash = protocol & (RAW_HTABLE_SIZE - 1);
read_lock(&raw_v4_hashinfo.lock);
raw_sk = sk_head(&raw_v4_hashinfo.ht[hash]);
if (raw_sk != NULL) {
iph = (const struct iphdr *)skb->data;
net = dev_net(skb->dev);
while ((raw_sk = __raw_v4_lookup(net, raw_sk, protocol,
iph->daddr, iph->saddr,
skb->dev->ifindex)) != NULL) {
raw_err(raw_sk, skb, info);
raw_sk = sk_next(raw_sk);
iph = (const struct iphdr *)skb->data;
}
}
read_unlock(&raw_v4_hashinfo.lock);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __net_init diag_net_init(struct net *net)
{
struct netlink_kernel_cfg cfg = {
.input = sock_diag_rcv,
};
net->diag_nlsk = netlink_kernel_create(net, NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG, &cfg);
return net->diag_nlsk == NULL ? -ENOMEM : 0;
}
Commit Message: sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[]
Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY
with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of
sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this
condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening
doors for a privilege escalation.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int authorized_client(CLIENT *opts) {
const char *ERRMSG="Invalid entry '%s' in authfile '%s', so, refusing all connections.";
FILE *f ;
char line[LINELEN];
char *tmp;
struct in_addr addr;
struct in_addr client;
struct in_addr cltemp;
int len;
if ((f=fopen(opts->server->authname,"r"))==NULL) {
msg(LOG_INFO, "Can't open authorization file %s (%s).",
opts->server->authname, strerror(errno));
return 1 ;
}
inet_aton(opts->clientname, &client);
while (fgets(line,LINELEN,f)!=NULL) {
if((tmp=strchr(line, '/'))) {
if(strlen(line)<=tmp-line) {
msg(LOG_CRIT, ERRMSG, line, opts->server->authname);
return 0;
}
*(tmp++)=0;
if(!inet_aton(line,&addr)) {
msg(LOG_CRIT, ERRMSG, line, opts->server->authname);
return 0;
}
len=strtol(tmp, NULL, 0);
addr.s_addr>>=32-len;
addr.s_addr<<=32-len;
memcpy(&cltemp,&client,sizeof(client));
cltemp.s_addr>>=32-len;
cltemp.s_addr<<=32-len;
if(addr.s_addr == cltemp.s_addr) {
return 1;
}
}
if (strncmp(line,opts->clientname,strlen(opts->clientname))==0) {
fclose(f);
return 1;
}
}
fclose(f);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: nbd-server: handle modern-style negotiation in a child process
Previously, the modern style negotiation was carried out in the root
server (listener) process before forking the actual client handler. This
made it possible for a malfunctioning or evil client to terminate the
root process simply by querying a non-existent export or aborting in the
middle of the negotation process (caused SIGPIPE in the server).
This commit moves the negotiation process to the child to keep the root
process up and running no matter what happens during the negotiation.
See http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/message.php?msg_id=30410146
Signed-off-by: Tuomas Räsänen <tuomasjjrasanen@tjjr.fi>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 46,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidFinishDocumentLoad() {
TRACE_EVENT1("navigation,benchmark,rail",
"RenderFrameImpl::didFinishDocumentLoad", "id", routing_id_);
Send(new FrameHostMsg_DidFinishDocumentLoad(routing_id_));
{
SCOPED_UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMER("RenderFrameObservers.DidFinishDocumentLoad");
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidFinishDocumentLoad();
}
UpdateEncoding(frame_, frame_->View()->PageEncoding().Utf8());
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void record_and_restart(struct perf_event *event, unsigned long val,
struct pt_regs *regs, int nmi)
{
u64 period = event->hw.sample_period;
s64 prev, delta, left;
int record = 0;
if (event->hw.state & PERF_HES_STOPPED) {
write_pmc(event->hw.idx, 0);
return;
}
/* we don't have to worry about interrupts here */
prev = local64_read(&event->hw.prev_count);
delta = (val - prev) & 0xfffffffful;
local64_add(delta, &event->count);
/*
* See if the total period for this event has expired,
* and update for the next period.
*/
val = 0;
left = local64_read(&event->hw.period_left) - delta;
if (period) {
if (left <= 0) {
left += period;
if (left <= 0)
left = period;
record = 1;
event->hw.last_period = event->hw.sample_period;
}
if (left < 0x80000000LL)
val = 0x80000000LL - left;
}
write_pmc(event->hw.idx, val);
local64_set(&event->hw.prev_count, val);
local64_set(&event->hw.period_left, left);
perf_event_update_userpage(event);
/*
* Finally record data if requested.
*/
if (record) {
struct perf_sample_data data;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, ~0ULL);
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_ADDR)
perf_get_data_addr(regs, &data.addr);
if (perf_event_overflow(event, nmi, &data, regs))
power_pmu_stop(event, 0);
}
}
Commit Message: perf, powerpc: Handle events that raise an exception without overflowing
Events on POWER7 can roll back if a speculative event doesn't
eventually complete. Unfortunately in some rare cases they will
raise a performance monitor exception. We need to catch this to
ensure we reset the PMC. In all cases the PMC will be 256 or less
cycles from overflow.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # as far back as it applies cleanly
LKML-Reference: <20110309143842.6c22845e@kryten>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 22,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int au1100fb_drv_resume(struct platform_device *dev)
{
struct au1100fb_device *fbdev = platform_get_drvdata(dev);
if (!fbdev)
return 0;
memcpy(fbdev->regs, &fbregs, sizeof(struct au1100fb_regs));
/* Restart LCD clocking */
au_writel(sys_clksrc, SYS_CLKSRC);
/* Unblank the LCD */
au1100fb_fb_blank(VESA_NO_BLANKING, &fbdev->info);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,327 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::ValidateUniformMatrixParameters(
const char* function_name,
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
GLboolean transpose,
DOMFloat32Array* v,
GLsizei required_min_size,
GLuint src_offset,
GLuint src_length) {
if (!v) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "no array");
return false;
}
return ValidateUniformMatrixParameters(
function_name, location, transpose, v->DataMaybeShared(), v->length(),
required_min_size, src_offset, src_length);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const TemplateURL* ZeroSuggestProvider::GetTemplateURL(bool is_keyword) const {
DCHECK(!is_keyword);
return client()->GetTemplateURLService()->GetDefaultSearchProvider();
}
Commit Message: Provide experimental contextual suggestions when current URL comes from a google domain.
The counts for the Omnibox.ZeroSuggestRequests historgram are 35% smaller for groups that are running under the ZeroSuggestRedirectToChrome flag. Note that previous to this CL, a request was not made when the user was visiting an HTTPS page and the domain of the current was different from that of the service providing zero suggestions. This CL addresses this restrictions by making sure that requests are sent to the experimental service when Google is the default search engine AND the same request was validated to be sent to Google.
BUG=692471
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2915163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#476786}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,683 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *ndp_msg_payload(struct ndp_msg *msg)
{
return msg->buf;
}
Commit Message: libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <julien.bernard@viagenie.ca>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 53,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double ScriptProcessorHandler::TailTime() const {
return std::numeric_limits<double>::infinity();
}
Commit Message: Keep ScriptProcessorHandler alive across threads
When posting a task from the ScriptProcessorHandler::Process to fire a
process event, we need to keep the handler alive in case the
ScriptProcessorNode goes away (because it has no onaudioprocess
handler) and removes the its handler.
Bug: 765495
Test:
Change-Id: Ib4fa39d7b112c7051897700a1eff9f59a4a7a054
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/677137
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503629}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 150,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xt_jumpstack_alloc(struct xt_table_info *i)
{
unsigned int size;
int cpu;
size = sizeof(void **) * nr_cpu_ids;
if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
i->jumpstack = vzalloc(size);
else
i->jumpstack = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (i->jumpstack == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
/* ruleset without jumps -- no stack needed */
if (i->stacksize == 0)
return 0;
/* Jumpstack needs to be able to record two full callchains, one
* from the first rule set traversal, plus one table reentrancy
* via -j TEE without clobbering the callchain that brought us to
* TEE target.
*
* This is done by allocating two jumpstacks per cpu, on reentry
* the upper half of the stack is used.
*
* see the jumpstack setup in ipt_do_table() for more details.
*/
size = sizeof(void *) * i->stacksize * 2u;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
i->jumpstack[cpu] = vmalloc_node(size,
cpu_to_node(cpu));
else
i->jumpstack[cpu] = kmalloc_node(size,
GFP_KERNEL, cpu_to_node(cpu));
if (i->jumpstack[cpu] == NULL)
/*
* Freeing will be done later on by the callers. The
* chain is: xt_replace_table -> __do_replace ->
* do_replace -> xt_free_table_info.
*/
return -ENOMEM;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,422 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bin_read_key(conn *c, enum bin_substates next_substate, int extra) {
assert(c);
c->substate = next_substate;
c->rlbytes = c->keylen + extra;
/* Ok... do we have room for the extras and the key in the input buffer? */
ptrdiff_t offset = c->rcurr + sizeof(protocol_binary_request_header) - c->rbuf;
if (c->rlbytes > c->rsize - offset) {
size_t nsize = c->rsize;
size_t size = c->rlbytes + sizeof(protocol_binary_request_header);
while (size > nsize) {
nsize *= 2;
}
if (nsize != c->rsize) {
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: Need to grow buffer from %lu to %lu\n",
c->sfd, (unsigned long)c->rsize, (unsigned long)nsize);
}
char *newm = realloc(c->rbuf, nsize);
if (newm == NULL) {
if (settings.verbose) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: Failed to grow buffer.. closing connection\n",
c->sfd);
}
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
return;
}
c->rbuf= newm;
/* rcurr should point to the same offset in the packet */
c->rcurr = c->rbuf + offset - sizeof(protocol_binary_request_header);
c->rsize = nsize;
}
if (c->rbuf != c->rcurr) {
memmove(c->rbuf, c->rcurr, c->rbytes);
c->rcurr = c->rbuf;
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: Repack input buffer\n", c->sfd);
}
}
}
/* preserve the header in the buffer.. */
c->ritem = c->rcurr + sizeof(protocol_binary_request_header);
conn_set_state(c, conn_nread);
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_wbinvd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
kvm_emulate_wbinvd(vcpu);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 42,675 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SVGLayoutSupport::intersectPaintInvalidationRectWithResources(const LayoutObject* layoutObject, FloatRect& paintInvalidationRect)
{
ASSERT(layoutObject);
SVGResources* resources = SVGResourcesCache::cachedResourcesForLayoutObject(layoutObject);
if (!resources)
return;
if (LayoutSVGResourceFilter* filter = resources->filter())
paintInvalidationRect = filter->resourceBoundingBox(layoutObject);
if (LayoutSVGResourceClipper* clipper = resources->clipper())
paintInvalidationRect.intersect(clipper->resourceBoundingBox(layoutObject));
if (LayoutSVGResourceMasker* masker = resources->masker())
paintInvalidationRect.intersect(masker->resourceBoundingBox(layoutObject));
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID: | 0 | 121,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseRenderingContext2D::setLineJoin(const String& s) {
LineJoin join;
if (!ParseLineJoin(s, join))
return;
if (GetState().GetLineJoin() == join)
return;
ModifiableState().SetLineJoin(join);
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 149,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init init(void)
{
if (!force && is_blacklisted_cpu()) {
printk(KERN_INFO
"blowfish-x86_64: performance on this CPU "
"would be suboptimal: disabling "
"blowfish-x86_64.\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
return crypto_register_algs(bf_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(bf_algs));
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,842 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bt_status_t btif_storage_remove_ble_bonding_keys(bt_bdaddr_t *remote_bd_addr)
{
bdstr_t bdstr;
bdaddr_to_string(remote_bd_addr, bdstr, sizeof(bdstr));
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG(" %s in bd addr:%s",__FUNCTION__, bdstr);
int ret = 1;
if(btif_config_exist(bdstr, "LE_KEY_PENC"))
ret &= btif_config_remove(bdstr, "LE_KEY_PENC");
if(btif_config_exist(bdstr, "LE_KEY_PID"))
ret &= btif_config_remove(bdstr, "LE_KEY_PID");
if(btif_config_exist(bdstr, "LE_KEY_PCSRK"))
ret &= btif_config_remove(bdstr, "LE_KEY_PCSRK");
if(btif_config_exist(bdstr, "LE_KEY_LENC"))
ret &= btif_config_remove(bdstr, "LE_KEY_LENC");
if(btif_config_exist(bdstr, "LE_KEY_LCSRK"))
ret &= btif_config_remove(bdstr, "LE_KEY_LCSRK");
btif_config_save();
return ret ? BT_STATUS_SUCCESS : BT_STATUS_FAIL;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 159,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int filter_pred_strloc(struct filter_pred *pred, void *event)
{
u32 str_item = *(u32 *)(event + pred->offset);
int str_loc = str_item & 0xffff;
int str_len = str_item >> 16;
char *addr = (char *)(event + str_loc);
int cmp, match;
cmp = pred->regex.match(addr, &pred->regex, str_len);
match = cmp ^ pred->not;
return match;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info_t *decoder_info,int size,int yposY,int xposY,int sub)
{
int width = decoder_info->width;
int height = decoder_info->height;
stream_t *stream = decoder_info->stream;
frame_type_t frame_type = decoder_info->frame_info.frame_type;
int split_flag = 0;
if (yposY >= height || xposY >= width)
return;
int decode_this_size = (yposY + size <= height) && (xposY + size <= width);
int decode_rectangular_size = !decode_this_size && frame_type != I_FRAME;
int bit_start = stream->bitcnt;
int mode = MODE_SKIP;
block_context_t block_context;
TEMPLATE(find_block_contexts)(yposY, xposY, height, width, size, decoder_info->deblock_data, &block_context, decoder_info->use_block_contexts);
decoder_info->block_context = &block_context;
split_flag = decode_super_mode(decoder_info,size,decode_this_size);
mode = decoder_info->mode;
/* Read delta_qp and set block-level qp */
if (size == (1<<decoder_info->log2_sb_size) && (split_flag || mode != MODE_SKIP) && decoder_info->max_delta_qp > 0) {
/* Read delta_qp */
int delta_qp = read_delta_qp(stream);
int prev_qp;
if (yposY == 0 && xposY == 0)
prev_qp = decoder_info->frame_info.qp;
else
prev_qp = decoder_info->frame_info.qpb;
decoder_info->frame_info.qpb = prev_qp + delta_qp;
}
decoder_info->bit_count.super_mode[decoder_info->bit_count.stat_frame_type] += (stream->bitcnt - bit_start);
if (split_flag){
int new_size = size/2;
TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+0*new_size,xposY+0*new_size,sub);
TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+1*new_size,xposY+0*new_size,sub);
TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+0*new_size,xposY+1*new_size,sub);
TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+1*new_size,xposY+1*new_size,sub);
}
else if (decode_this_size || decode_rectangular_size){
decode_block(decoder_info,size,yposY,xposY,sub);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix possible stack overflows in decoder for illegal bit streams
Fixes CVE-2018-0429
A vulnerability in the Thor decoder (available at:
https://github.com/cisco/thor) could allow an authenticated, local
attacker to cause segmentation faults and stack overflows when using a
non-conformant Thor bitstream as input.
The vulnerability is due to lack of input validation when parsing the
bitstream. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a
stack overflow and potentially inject and execute arbitrary code.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 169,366 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void lppTransposer (HANDLE_SBR_LPP_TRANS hLppTrans, /*!< Handle of lpp transposer */
QMF_SCALE_FACTOR *sbrScaleFactor, /*!< Scaling factors */
FIXP_DBL **qmfBufferReal, /*!< Pointer to pointer to real part of subband samples (source) */
FIXP_DBL *degreeAlias, /*!< Vector for results of aliasing estimation */
FIXP_DBL **qmfBufferImag, /*!< Pointer to pointer to imaginary part of subband samples (source) */
const int useLP,
const int timeStep, /*!< Time step of envelope */
const int firstSlotOffs, /*!< Start position in time */
const int lastSlotOffs, /*!< Number of overlap-slots into next frame */
const int nInvfBands, /*!< Number of bands for inverse filtering */
INVF_MODE *sbr_invf_mode, /*!< Current inverse filtering modes */
INVF_MODE *sbr_invf_mode_prev /*!< Previous inverse filtering modes */
)
{
INT bwIndex[MAX_NUM_PATCHES];
FIXP_DBL bwVector[MAX_NUM_PATCHES]; /*!< pole moving factors */
int i;
int loBand, start, stop;
TRANSPOSER_SETTINGS *pSettings = hLppTrans->pSettings;
PATCH_PARAM *patchParam = pSettings->patchParam;
int patch;
FIXP_SGL alphar[LPC_ORDER], a0r, a1r;
FIXP_SGL alphai[LPC_ORDER], a0i=0, a1i=0;
FIXP_SGL bw = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
int autoCorrLength;
FIXP_DBL k1, k1_below=0, k1_below2=0;
ACORR_COEFS ac;
int startSample;
int stopSample;
int stopSampleClear;
int comLowBandScale;
int ovLowBandShift;
int lowBandShift;
/* int ovHighBandShift;*/
int targetStopBand;
alphai[0] = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
alphai[1] = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
startSample = firstSlotOffs * timeStep;
stopSample = pSettings->nCols + lastSlotOffs * timeStep;
inverseFilteringLevelEmphasis(hLppTrans, nInvfBands, sbr_invf_mode, sbr_invf_mode_prev, bwVector);
stopSampleClear = stopSample;
autoCorrLength = pSettings->nCols + pSettings->overlap;
/* Set upper subbands to zero:
This is required in case that the patches do not cover the complete highband
(because the last patch would be too short).
Possible optimization: Clearing bands up to usb would be sufficient here. */
targetStopBand = patchParam[pSettings->noOfPatches-1].targetStartBand
+ patchParam[pSettings->noOfPatches-1].numBandsInPatch;
int memSize = ((64) - targetStopBand) * sizeof(FIXP_DBL);
if (!useLP) {
for (i = startSample; i < stopSampleClear; i++) {
FDKmemclear(&qmfBufferReal[i][targetStopBand], memSize);
FDKmemclear(&qmfBufferImag[i][targetStopBand], memSize);
}
} else
for (i = startSample; i < stopSampleClear; i++) {
FDKmemclear(&qmfBufferReal[i][targetStopBand], memSize);
}
/* init bwIndex for each patch */
FDKmemclear(bwIndex, pSettings->noOfPatches*sizeof(INT));
/*
Calc common low band scale factor
*/
comLowBandScale = fixMin(sbrScaleFactor->ov_lb_scale,sbrScaleFactor->lb_scale);
ovLowBandShift = sbrScaleFactor->ov_lb_scale - comLowBandScale;
lowBandShift = sbrScaleFactor->lb_scale - comLowBandScale;
/* ovHighBandShift = firstSlotOffs == 0 ? ovLowBandShift:0;*/
/* outer loop over bands to do analysis only once for each band */
if (!useLP) {
start = pSettings->lbStartPatching;
stop = pSettings->lbStopPatching;
} else
{
start = fixMax(1, pSettings->lbStartPatching - 2);
stop = patchParam[0].targetStartBand;
}
for ( loBand = start; loBand < stop; loBand++ ) {
FIXP_DBL lowBandReal[(((1024)/(32))+(6))+LPC_ORDER];
FIXP_DBL *plowBandReal = lowBandReal;
FIXP_DBL **pqmfBufferReal = qmfBufferReal;
FIXP_DBL lowBandImag[(((1024)/(32))+(6))+LPC_ORDER];
FIXP_DBL *plowBandImag = lowBandImag;
FIXP_DBL **pqmfBufferImag = qmfBufferImag;
int resetLPCCoeffs=0;
int dynamicScale = DFRACT_BITS-1-LPC_SCALE_FACTOR;
int acDetScale = 0; /* scaling of autocorrelation determinant */
for(i=0;i<LPC_ORDER;i++){
*plowBandReal++ = hLppTrans->lpcFilterStatesReal[i][loBand];
if (!useLP)
*plowBandImag++ = hLppTrans->lpcFilterStatesImag[i][loBand];
}
/*
Take old slope length qmf slot source values out of (overlap)qmf buffer
*/
if (!useLP) {
for(i=0;i<pSettings->nCols+pSettings->overlap;i++){
*plowBandReal++ = (*pqmfBufferReal++)[loBand];
*plowBandImag++ = (*pqmfBufferImag++)[loBand];
}
} else
{
/* pSettings->overlap is always even */
FDK_ASSERT((pSettings->overlap & 1) == 0);
for(i=0;i<((pSettings->overlap+pSettings->nCols)>>1);i++) {
*plowBandReal++ = (*pqmfBufferReal++)[loBand];
*plowBandReal++ = (*pqmfBufferReal++)[loBand];
}
if (pSettings->nCols & 1) {
*plowBandReal++ = (*pqmfBufferReal++)[loBand];
}
}
/*
Determine dynamic scaling value.
*/
dynamicScale = fixMin(dynamicScale, getScalefactor(lowBandReal, LPC_ORDER+pSettings->overlap) + ovLowBandShift);
dynamicScale = fixMin(dynamicScale, getScalefactor(&lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+pSettings->overlap], pSettings->nCols) + lowBandShift);
if (!useLP) {
dynamicScale = fixMin(dynamicScale, getScalefactor(lowBandImag, LPC_ORDER+pSettings->overlap) + ovLowBandShift);
dynamicScale = fixMin(dynamicScale, getScalefactor(&lowBandImag[LPC_ORDER+pSettings->overlap], pSettings->nCols) + lowBandShift);
}
dynamicScale = fixMax(0, dynamicScale-1); /* one additional bit headroom to prevent -1.0 */
/*
Scale temporal QMF buffer.
*/
scaleValues(&lowBandReal[0], LPC_ORDER+pSettings->overlap, dynamicScale-ovLowBandShift);
scaleValues(&lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+pSettings->overlap], pSettings->nCols, dynamicScale-lowBandShift);
if (!useLP) {
scaleValues(&lowBandImag[0], LPC_ORDER+pSettings->overlap, dynamicScale-ovLowBandShift);
scaleValues(&lowBandImag[LPC_ORDER+pSettings->overlap], pSettings->nCols, dynamicScale-lowBandShift);
}
if (!useLP) {
acDetScale += autoCorr2nd_cplx(&ac, lowBandReal+LPC_ORDER, lowBandImag+LPC_ORDER, autoCorrLength);
}
else
{
acDetScale += autoCorr2nd_real(&ac, lowBandReal+LPC_ORDER, autoCorrLength);
}
/* Examine dynamic of determinant in autocorrelation. */
acDetScale += 2*(comLowBandScale + dynamicScale);
acDetScale *= 2; /* two times reflection coefficent scaling */
acDetScale += ac.det_scale; /* ac scaling of determinant */
/* In case of determinant < 10^-38, resetLPCCoeffs=1 has to be enforced. */
if (acDetScale>126 ) {
resetLPCCoeffs = 1;
}
alphar[1] = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
if (!useLP)
alphai[1] = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
if (ac.det != FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f)) {
FIXP_DBL tmp,absTmp,absDet;
absDet = fixp_abs(ac.det);
if (!useLP) {
tmp = ( fMultDiv2(ac.r01r,ac.r12r) >> (LPC_SCALE_FACTOR-1) ) -
( (fMultDiv2(ac.r01i,ac.r12i) + fMultDiv2(ac.r02r,ac.r11r)) >> (LPC_SCALE_FACTOR-1) );
} else
{
tmp = ( fMultDiv2(ac.r01r,ac.r12r) >> (LPC_SCALE_FACTOR-1) ) -
( fMultDiv2(ac.r02r,ac.r11r) >> (LPC_SCALE_FACTOR-1) );
}
absTmp = fixp_abs(tmp);
/*
Quick check: is first filter coeff >= 1(4)
*/
{
INT scale;
FIXP_DBL result = fDivNorm(absTmp, absDet, &scale);
scale = scale+ac.det_scale;
if ( (scale > 0) && (result >= (FIXP_DBL)MAXVAL_DBL>>scale) ) {
resetLPCCoeffs = 1;
}
else {
alphar[1] = FX_DBL2FX_SGL(scaleValue(result,scale));
if((tmp<FL2FX_DBL(0.0f)) ^ (ac.det<FL2FX_DBL(0.0f))) {
alphar[1] = -alphar[1];
}
}
}
if (!useLP)
{
tmp = ( fMultDiv2(ac.r01i,ac.r12r) >> (LPC_SCALE_FACTOR-1) ) +
( (fMultDiv2(ac.r01r,ac.r12i) - (FIXP_DBL)fMultDiv2(ac.r02i,ac.r11r)) >> (LPC_SCALE_FACTOR-1) ) ;
absTmp = fixp_abs(tmp);
/*
Quick check: is second filter coeff >= 1(4)
*/
{
INT scale;
FIXP_DBL result = fDivNorm(absTmp, absDet, &scale);
scale = scale+ac.det_scale;
if ( (scale > 0) && (result >= /*FL2FXCONST_DBL(1.f)*/ (FIXP_DBL)MAXVAL_DBL>>scale) ) {
resetLPCCoeffs = 1;
}
else {
alphai[1] = FX_DBL2FX_SGL(scaleValue(result,scale));
if((tmp<FL2FX_DBL(0.0f)) ^ (ac.det<FL2FX_DBL(0.0f))) {
alphai[1] = -alphai[1];
}
}
}
}
}
alphar[0] = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
if (!useLP)
alphai[0] = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
if ( ac.r11r != FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f) ) {
/* ac.r11r is always >=0 */
FIXP_DBL tmp,absTmp;
if (!useLP) {
tmp = (ac.r01r>>(LPC_SCALE_FACTOR+1)) +
(fMultDiv2(alphar[1],ac.r12r) + fMultDiv2(alphai[1],ac.r12i));
} else
{
if(ac.r01r>=FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f))
tmp = (ac.r01r>>(LPC_SCALE_FACTOR+1)) + fMultDiv2(alphar[1],ac.r12r);
else
tmp = -((-ac.r01r)>>(LPC_SCALE_FACTOR+1)) + fMultDiv2(alphar[1],ac.r12r);
}
absTmp = fixp_abs(tmp);
/*
Quick check: is first filter coeff >= 1(4)
*/
if (absTmp >= (ac.r11r>>1)) {
resetLPCCoeffs=1;
}
else {
INT scale;
FIXP_DBL result = fDivNorm(absTmp, fixp_abs(ac.r11r), &scale);
alphar[0] = FX_DBL2FX_SGL(scaleValue(result,scale+1));
if((tmp>FL2FX_DBL(0.0f)) ^ (ac.r11r<FL2FX_DBL(0.0f)))
alphar[0] = -alphar[0];
}
if (!useLP)
{
tmp = (ac.r01i>>(LPC_SCALE_FACTOR+1)) +
(fMultDiv2(alphai[1],ac.r12r) - fMultDiv2(alphar[1],ac.r12i));
absTmp = fixp_abs(tmp);
/*
Quick check: is second filter coeff >= 1(4)
*/
if (absTmp >= (ac.r11r>>1)) {
resetLPCCoeffs=1;
}
else {
INT scale;
FIXP_DBL result = fDivNorm(absTmp, fixp_abs(ac.r11r), &scale);
alphai[0] = FX_DBL2FX_SGL(scaleValue(result,scale+1));
if((tmp>FL2FX_DBL(0.0f)) ^ (ac.r11r<FL2FX_DBL(0.0f)))
alphai[0] = -alphai[0];
}
}
}
if (!useLP)
{
/* Now check the quadratic criteria */
if( (fMultDiv2(alphar[0],alphar[0]) + fMultDiv2(alphai[0],alphai[0])) >= FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.5f) )
resetLPCCoeffs=1;
if( (fMultDiv2(alphar[1],alphar[1]) + fMultDiv2(alphai[1],alphai[1])) >= FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.5f) )
resetLPCCoeffs=1;
}
if(resetLPCCoeffs){
alphar[0] = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
alphar[1] = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
if (!useLP)
{
alphai[0] = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
alphai[1] = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
}
}
if (useLP)
{
/* Aliasing detection */
if(ac.r11r==FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f)) {
k1 = FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f);
}
else {
if ( fixp_abs(ac.r01r) >= fixp_abs(ac.r11r) ) {
if ( fMultDiv2(ac.r01r,ac.r11r) < FL2FX_DBL(0.0f)) {
k1 = (FIXP_DBL)MAXVAL_DBL /*FL2FXCONST_SGL(1.0f)*/;
}else {
/* Since this value is squared later, it must not ever become -1.0f. */
k1 = (FIXP_DBL)(MINVAL_DBL+1) /*FL2FXCONST_SGL(-1.0f)*/;
}
}
else {
INT scale;
FIXP_DBL result = fDivNorm(fixp_abs(ac.r01r), fixp_abs(ac.r11r), &scale);
k1 = scaleValue(result,scale);
if(!((ac.r01r<FL2FX_DBL(0.0f)) ^ (ac.r11r<FL2FX_DBL(0.0f)))) {
k1 = -k1;
}
}
}
if(loBand > 1){
/* Check if the gain should be locked */
FIXP_DBL deg = /*FL2FXCONST_DBL(1.0f)*/ (FIXP_DBL)MAXVAL_DBL - fPow2(k1_below);
degreeAlias[loBand] = FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f);
if (((loBand & 1) == 0) && (k1 < FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f))){
if (k1_below < FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f)) { /* 2-Ch Aliasing Detection */
degreeAlias[loBand] = (FIXP_DBL)MAXVAL_DBL /*FL2FXCONST_DBL(1.0f)*/;
if ( k1_below2 > FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f) ) { /* 3-Ch Aliasing Detection */
degreeAlias[loBand-1] = deg;
}
}
else if ( k1_below2 > FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f) ) { /* 3-Ch Aliasing Detection */
degreeAlias[loBand] = deg;
}
}
if (((loBand & 1) == 1) && (k1 > FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f))){
if (k1_below > FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f)) { /* 2-CH Aliasing Detection */
degreeAlias[loBand] = (FIXP_DBL)MAXVAL_DBL /*FL2FXCONST_DBL(1.0f)*/;
if ( k1_below2 < FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f) ) { /* 3-CH Aliasing Detection */
degreeAlias[loBand-1] = deg;
}
}
else if ( k1_below2 < FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f) ) { /* 3-CH Aliasing Detection */
degreeAlias[loBand] = deg;
}
}
}
/* remember k1 values of the 2 QMF channels below the current channel */
k1_below2 = k1_below;
k1_below = k1;
}
patch = 0;
while ( patch < pSettings->noOfPatches ) { /* inner loop over every patch */
int hiBand = loBand + patchParam[patch].targetBandOffs;
if ( loBand < patchParam[patch].sourceStartBand
|| loBand >= patchParam[patch].sourceStopBand
) {
/* Lowband not in current patch - proceed */
patch++;
continue;
}
FDK_ASSERT( hiBand < (64) );
/* bwIndex[patch] is already initialized with value from previous band inside this patch */
while (hiBand >= pSettings->bwBorders[bwIndex[patch]])
bwIndex[patch]++;
/*
Filter Step 2: add the left slope with the current filter to the buffer
pure source values are already in there
*/
bw = FX_DBL2FX_SGL(bwVector[bwIndex[patch]]);
a0r = FX_DBL2FX_SGL(fMult(bw,alphar[0])); /* Apply current bandwidth expansion factor */
if (!useLP)
a0i = FX_DBL2FX_SGL(fMult(bw,alphai[0]));
bw = FX_DBL2FX_SGL(fPow2(bw));
a1r = FX_DBL2FX_SGL(fMult(bw,alphar[1]));
if (!useLP)
a1i = FX_DBL2FX_SGL(fMult(bw,alphai[1]));
/*
Filter Step 3: insert the middle part which won't be windowed
*/
if ( bw <= FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f) ) {
if (!useLP) {
int descale = fixMin(DFRACT_BITS-1, (LPC_SCALE_FACTOR+dynamicScale));
for(i = startSample; i < stopSample; i++ ) {
qmfBufferReal[i][hiBand] = lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+i]>>descale;
qmfBufferImag[i][hiBand] = lowBandImag[LPC_ORDER+i]>>descale;
}
} else
{
int descale = fixMin(DFRACT_BITS-1, (LPC_SCALE_FACTOR+dynamicScale));
for(i = startSample; i < stopSample; i++ ) {
qmfBufferReal[i][hiBand] = lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+i]>>descale;
}
}
}
else { /* bw <= 0 */
if (!useLP) {
int descale = fixMin(DFRACT_BITS-1, (LPC_SCALE_FACTOR+dynamicScale));
#ifdef FUNCTION_LPPTRANSPOSER_func1
lppTransposer_func1(lowBandReal+LPC_ORDER+startSample,lowBandImag+LPC_ORDER+startSample,
qmfBufferReal+startSample,qmfBufferImag+startSample,
stopSample-startSample, (int) hiBand,
dynamicScale,descale,
a0r, a0i, a1r, a1i);
#else
for(i = startSample; i < stopSample; i++ ) {
FIXP_DBL accu1, accu2;
accu1 = (fMultDiv2(a0r,lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+i-1]) - fMultDiv2(a0i,lowBandImag[LPC_ORDER+i-1]) +
fMultDiv2(a1r,lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+i-2]) - fMultDiv2(a1i,lowBandImag[LPC_ORDER+i-2]))>>dynamicScale;
accu2 = (fMultDiv2(a0i,lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+i-1]) + fMultDiv2(a0r,lowBandImag[LPC_ORDER+i-1]) +
fMultDiv2(a1i,lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+i-2]) + fMultDiv2(a1r,lowBandImag[LPC_ORDER+i-2]))>>dynamicScale;
qmfBufferReal[i][hiBand] = (lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+i]>>descale) + (accu1<<1);
qmfBufferImag[i][hiBand] = (lowBandImag[LPC_ORDER+i]>>descale) + (accu2<<1);
}
#endif
} else
{
int descale = fixMin(DFRACT_BITS-1, (LPC_SCALE_FACTOR+dynamicScale));
FDK_ASSERT(dynamicScale >= 0);
for(i = startSample; i < stopSample; i++ ) {
FIXP_DBL accu1;
accu1 = (fMultDiv2(a0r,lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+i-1]) + fMultDiv2(a1r,lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+i-2]))>>dynamicScale;
qmfBufferReal[i][hiBand] = (lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+i]>>descale) + (accu1<<1);
}
}
} /* bw <= 0 */
patch++;
} /* inner loop over patches */
/*
* store the unmodified filter coefficients if there is
* an overlapping envelope
*****************************************************************/
} /* outer loop over bands (loBand) */
if (useLP)
{
for ( loBand = pSettings->lbStartPatching; loBand < pSettings->lbStopPatching; loBand++ ) {
patch = 0;
while ( patch < pSettings->noOfPatches ) {
UCHAR hiBand = loBand + patchParam[patch].targetBandOffs;
if ( loBand < patchParam[patch].sourceStartBand
|| loBand >= patchParam[patch].sourceStopBand
|| hiBand >= (64) /* Highband out of range (biterror) */
) {
/* Lowband not in current patch or highband out of range (might be caused by biterrors)- proceed */
patch++;
continue;
}
if(hiBand != patchParam[patch].targetStartBand)
degreeAlias[hiBand] = degreeAlias[loBand];
patch++;
}
}/* end for loop */
}
for (i = 0; i < nInvfBands; i++ ) {
hLppTrans->bwVectorOld[i] = bwVector[i];
}
/*
set high band scale factor
*/
sbrScaleFactor->hb_scale = comLowBandScale-(LPC_SCALE_FACTOR);
}
Commit Message: Fix out of bound memory access in lppTransposer
In TRANSPOSER_SETTINGS, initialize the whole bwBorders array to a
reasonable value to guarantee correct termination in while loop
in lppTransposer function. This fixes the reported bug.
For completeness:
- clear the whole bwIndex array instead of noOfPatches entries only.
- abort criterion in while loop to prevent potential
infinite loop, and limit bwIndex[patch] to a valid range.
Test: see bug for malicious content, decoded with "stagefright -s -a"
Bug: 65280786
Change-Id: I16ed2e1c0f1601926239a652ca20a91284151843
(cherry picked from commit 6d3dd40e204bf550abcfa589bd9615df8778e118)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 174,113 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err ctts_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
u32 i;
GF_CompositionOffsetBox *ptr = (GF_CompositionOffsetBox *)s;
e = gf_isom_full_box_write(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->nb_entries);
for (i=0; i<ptr->nb_entries; i++ ) {
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->entries[i].sampleCount);
if (ptr->version) {
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->entries[i].decodingOffset, 32);
} else {
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, (u32) ptr->entries[i].decodingOffset);
}
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderWidgetHostImpl::~RenderWidgetHostImpl() {
SetView(NULL);
BackingStoreManager::RemoveBackingStore(this);
GpuSurfaceTracker::Get()->RemoveSurface(surface_id_);
surface_id_ = 0;
process_->Release(routing_id_);
if (delegate_)
delegate_->RenderWidgetDeleted(this);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::TryToSetupDecodeOnSeparateThread(
const base::WeakPtr<Client>& decode_client,
const scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner>& decode_task_runner) {
return false;
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 148,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_pages_isolated_cb(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages,
void *data)
{
int ret;
long offlined = *(long *)data;
ret = test_pages_isolated(start_pfn, start_pfn + nr_pages);
offlined = nr_pages;
if (!ret)
*(long *)data += offlined;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm/hotplug: correctly add new zone to all other nodes' zone lists
When online_pages() is called to add new memory to an empty zone, it
rebuilds all zone lists by calling build_all_zonelists(). But there's a
bug which prevents the new zone to be added to other nodes' zone lists.
online_pages() {
build_all_zonelists()
.....
node_set_state(zone_to_nid(zone), N_HIGH_MEMORY)
}
Here the node of the zone is put into N_HIGH_MEMORY state after calling
build_all_zonelists(), but build_all_zonelists() only adds zones from
nodes in N_HIGH_MEMORY state to the fallback zone lists.
build_all_zonelists()
->__build_all_zonelists()
->build_zonelists()
->find_next_best_node()
->for_each_node_state(n, N_HIGH_MEMORY)
So memory in the new zone will never be used by other nodes, and it may
cause strange behavor when system is under memory pressure. So put node
into N_HIGH_MEMORY state before calling build_all_zonelists().
Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Keping Chen <chenkeping@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FrameIsValid(const SkBitmap& frame_bitmap) {
return !frame_bitmap.isNull() && !frame_bitmap.empty() &&
frame_bitmap.colorType() == kN32_SkColorType;
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 146,655 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline pending_ring_idx_t pending_index(unsigned i)
{
return i & (MAX_PENDING_REQS-1);
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _get_user_env(batch_job_launch_msg_t *req)
{
struct passwd pwd, *pwd_ptr = NULL;
char pwd_buf[PW_BUF_SIZE];
char **new_env;
int i;
static time_t config_update = 0;
static bool no_env_cache = false;
if (config_update != conf->last_update) {
char *sched_params = slurm_get_sched_params();
no_env_cache = (sched_params &&
strstr(sched_params, "no_env_cache"));
xfree(sched_params);
config_update = conf->last_update;
}
for (i=0; i<req->envc; i++) {
if (xstrcmp(req->environment[i], "SLURM_GET_USER_ENV=1") == 0)
break;
}
if (i >= req->envc)
return 0; /* don't need to load env */
if (slurm_getpwuid_r(req->uid, &pwd, pwd_buf, PW_BUF_SIZE, &pwd_ptr)
|| (pwd_ptr == NULL)) {
error("%s: getpwuid_r(%u):%m", __func__, req->uid);
return -1;
}
verbose("%s: get env for user %s here", __func__, pwd.pw_name);
/* Permit up to 120 second delay before using cache file */
new_env = env_array_user_default(pwd.pw_name, 120, 0, no_env_cache);
if (! new_env) {
error("%s: Unable to get user's local environment%s",
__func__, no_env_cache ?
"" : ", running only with passed environment");
return -1;
}
env_array_merge(&new_env,
(const char **) req->environment);
env_array_free(req->environment);
req->environment = new_env;
req->envc = envcount(new_env);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 72,078 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AudioHandler::AdjustVolumeByPercent(double adjust_by_percent) {
const double old_volume_db = mixer_->GetVolumeDb();
const double old_percent = VolumeDbToPercent(old_volume_db);
SetVolumePercent(old_percent + adjust_by_percent);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,244 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int cdrom_open(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi, struct block_device *bdev,
fmode_t mode)
{
int ret;
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "entering cdrom_open\n");
/* if this was a O_NONBLOCK open and we should honor the flags,
* do a quick open without drive/disc integrity checks. */
cdi->use_count++;
if ((mode & FMODE_NDELAY) && (cdi->options & CDO_USE_FFLAGS)) {
ret = cdi->ops->open(cdi, 1);
} else {
ret = open_for_data(cdi);
if (ret)
goto err;
cdrom_mmc3_profile(cdi);
if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
ret = -EROFS;
if (cdrom_open_write(cdi))
goto err_release;
if (!CDROM_CAN(CDC_RAM))
goto err_release;
ret = 0;
cdi->media_written = 0;
}
}
if (ret)
goto err;
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "Use count for \"/dev/%s\" now %d\n",
cdi->name, cdi->use_count);
return 0;
err_release:
if (CDROM_CAN(CDC_LOCK) && cdi->options & CDO_LOCK) {
cdi->ops->lock_door(cdi, 0);
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "door unlocked\n");
}
cdi->ops->release(cdi);
err:
cdi->use_count--;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 76,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ping_getfrag(void *from, char *to,
int offset, int fraglen, int odd, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct pingfakehdr *pfh = (struct pingfakehdr *)from;
if (offset == 0) {
if (fraglen < sizeof(struct icmphdr))
BUG();
if (csum_partial_copy_fromiovecend(to + sizeof(struct icmphdr),
pfh->iov, 0, fraglen - sizeof(struct icmphdr),
&pfh->wcheck))
return -EFAULT;
} else if (offset < sizeof(struct icmphdr)) {
BUG();
} else {
if (csum_partial_copy_fromiovecend
(to, pfh->iov, offset - sizeof(struct icmphdr),
fraglen, &pfh->wcheck))
return -EFAULT;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
/* For IPv6, checksum each skb as we go along, as expected by
* icmpv6_push_pending_frames. For IPv4, accumulate the checksum in
* wcheck, it will be finalized in ping_v4_push_pending_frames.
*/
if (pfh->family == AF_INET6) {
skb->csum = pfh->wcheck;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
pfh->wcheck = 0;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ping: prevent NULL pointer dereference on write to msg_name
A plain read() on a socket does set msg->msg_name to NULL. So check for
NULL pointer first.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionFunctionDispatcher::Delegate::GetExtensionWindowController()
const {
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 114,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int qeth_set_access_ctrl_online(struct qeth_card *card, int fallback)
{
int rc = 0;
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 4, "setactlo");
if ((card->info.type == QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSD ||
card->info.type == QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSX) &&
qeth_adp_supported(card, IPA_SETADP_SET_ACCESS_CONTROL)) {
rc = qeth_setadpparms_set_access_ctrl(card,
card->options.isolation, fallback);
if (rc) {
QETH_DBF_MESSAGE(3,
"IPA(SET_ACCESS_CTRL,%s,%d) sent failed\n",
card->gdev->dev.kobj.name,
rc);
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
} else if (card->options.isolation != ISOLATION_MODE_NONE) {
card->options.isolation = ISOLATION_MODE_NONE;
dev_err(&card->gdev->dev, "Adapter does not "
"support QDIO data connection isolation\n");
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,632 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const SeekHead::Entry* SeekHead::GetEntry(int idx) const
{
if (idx < 0)
return 0;
if (idx >= m_entry_count)
return 0;
return m_entries + idx;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xscale2pmu_write_pmnc(u32 val)
{
/* bits 4-23 are write-as-0, 24-31 are write ignored */
val &= 0xf;
asm volatile("mcr p14, 0, %0, c0, c1, 0" : : "r" (val));
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,308 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_writepage(struct page *page,
struct writeback_control *wbc)
{
int ret = 0;
loff_t size;
unsigned int len;
struct buffer_head *page_bufs;
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
trace_ext4_writepage(inode, page);
size = i_size_read(inode);
if (page->index == size >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT)
len = size & ~PAGE_CACHE_MASK;
else
len = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
if (page_has_buffers(page)) {
page_bufs = page_buffers(page);
if (walk_page_buffers(NULL, page_bufs, 0, len, NULL,
ext4_bh_delay_or_unwritten)) {
/*
* We don't want to do block allocation
* So redirty the page and return
* We may reach here when we do a journal commit
* via journal_submit_inode_data_buffers.
* If we don't have mapping block we just ignore
* them. We can also reach here via shrink_page_list
*/
redirty_page_for_writepage(wbc, page);
unlock_page(page);
return 0;
}
} else {
/*
* The test for page_has_buffers() is subtle:
* We know the page is dirty but it lost buffers. That means
* that at some moment in time after write_begin()/write_end()
* has been called all buffers have been clean and thus they
* must have been written at least once. So they are all
* mapped and we can happily proceed with mapping them
* and writing the page.
*
* Try to initialize the buffer_heads and check whether
* all are mapped and non delay. We don't want to
* do block allocation here.
*/
ret = block_prepare_write(page, 0, len,
noalloc_get_block_write);
if (!ret) {
page_bufs = page_buffers(page);
/* check whether all are mapped and non delay */
if (walk_page_buffers(NULL, page_bufs, 0, len, NULL,
ext4_bh_delay_or_unwritten)) {
redirty_page_for_writepage(wbc, page);
unlock_page(page);
return 0;
}
} else {
/*
* We can't do block allocation here
* so just redity the page and unlock
* and return
*/
redirty_page_for_writepage(wbc, page);
unlock_page(page);
return 0;
}
/* now mark the buffer_heads as dirty and uptodate */
block_commit_write(page, 0, len);
}
if (PageChecked(page) && ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
/*
* It's mmapped pagecache. Add buffers and journal it. There
* doesn't seem much point in redirtying the page here.
*/
ClearPageChecked(page);
return __ext4_journalled_writepage(page, len);
}
if (test_opt(inode->i_sb, NOBH) && ext4_should_writeback_data(inode))
ret = nobh_writepage(page, noalloc_get_block_write, wbc);
else
ret = block_write_full_page(page, noalloc_get_block_write,
wbc);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 1 | 167,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int hostap_set_string(struct net_device *dev, int rid, const char *val)
{
struct hostap_interface *iface;
char buf[MAX_SSID_LEN + 2];
int len;
iface = netdev_priv(dev);
len = strlen(val);
if (len > MAX_SSID_LEN)
return -1;
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
buf[0] = len; /* little endian 16 bit word */
memcpy(buf + 2, val, len);
return iface->local->func->set_rid(dev, rid, &buf, MAX_SSID_LEN + 2);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE6(recvfrom, int, fd, void __user *, ubuf, size_t, size,
unsigned int, flags, struct sockaddr __user *, addr,
int __user *, addr_len)
{
return __sys_recvfrom(fd, ubuf, size, flags, addr, addr_len);
}
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 82,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: archive_read_format_lha_options(struct archive_read *a,
const char *key, const char *val)
{
struct lha *lha;
int ret = ARCHIVE_FAILED;
lha = (struct lha *)(a->format->data);
if (strcmp(key, "hdrcharset") == 0) {
if (val == NULL || val[0] == 0)
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"lha: hdrcharset option needs a character-set name");
else {
lha->opt_sconv =
archive_string_conversion_from_charset(
&a->archive, val, 0);
if (lha->opt_sconv != NULL)
ret = ARCHIVE_OK;
else
ret = ARCHIVE_FATAL;
}
return (ret);
}
/* Note: The "warn" return is just to inform the options
* supervisor that we didn't handle it. It will generate
* a suitable error if no one used this option. */
return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
Commit Message: Fail with negative lha->compsize in lha_read_file_header_1()
Fixes a heap buffer overflow reported in Secunia SA74169
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::NotifyInputBufferRead(int input_buffer_id) {
if (client_)
client_->NotifyEndOfBitstreamBuffer(input_buffer_id);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnUnregisterProtocolHandler(RenderFrameHostImpl* source,
const std::string& protocol,
const GURL& url,
bool user_gesture) {
if (!delegate_)
return;
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* policy =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
if (policy->IsPseudoScheme(protocol))
return;
delegate_->UnregisterProtocolHandler(this, protocol, url, user_gesture);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int raw6_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
seq_puts(seq, IPV6_SEQ_DGRAM_HEADER);
} else {
struct sock *sp = v;
__u16 srcp = inet_sk(sp)->inet_num;
ip6_dgram_sock_seq_show(seq, v, srcp, 0,
raw_seq_private(seq)->bucket);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 40,194 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long ContentEncoding::ParseContentEncodingEntry(long long start, long long size,
IMkvReader* pReader) {
assert(pReader);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
int compression_count = 0;
int encryption_count = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x1034) // ContentCompression ID
++compression_count;
if (id == 0x1035) // ContentEncryption ID
++encryption_count;
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
if (compression_count <= 0 && encryption_count <= 0)
return -1;
if (compression_count > 0) {
compression_entries_ =
new (std::nothrow) ContentCompression* [compression_count];
if (!compression_entries_)
return -1;
compression_entries_end_ = compression_entries_;
}
if (encryption_count > 0) {
encryption_entries_ =
new (std::nothrow) ContentEncryption* [encryption_count];
if (!encryption_entries_) {
delete[] compression_entries_;
return -1;
}
encryption_entries_end_ = encryption_entries_;
}
pos = start;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x1031) {
encoding_order_ = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
} else if (id == 0x1032) {
encoding_scope_ = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (encoding_scope_ < 1)
return -1;
} else if (id == 0x1033) {
encoding_type_ = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
} else if (id == 0x1034) {
ContentCompression* const compression =
new (std::nothrow) ContentCompression();
if (!compression)
return -1;
status = ParseCompressionEntry(pos, size, pReader, compression);
if (status) {
delete compression;
return status;
}
*compression_entries_end_++ = compression;
} else if (id == 0x1035) {
ContentEncryption* const encryption =
new (std::nothrow) ContentEncryption();
if (!encryption)
return -1;
status = ParseEncryptionEntry(pos, size, pReader, encryption);
if (status) {
delete encryption;
return status;
}
*encryption_entries_end_++ = encryption;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 173,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void scsi_cancel_io(SCSIRequest *req)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskReq, req, req);
DPRINTF("Cancel tag=0x%x\n", req->tag);
if (r->req.aiocb) {
bdrv_aio_cancel(r->req.aiocb);
}
r->req.aiocb = NULL;
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 41,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int TIFFCloseBlob(thandle_t image)
{
(void) CloseBlob((Image *) image);
return(0);
}
Commit Message: https://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=31161
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 69,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int sctp_v4_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sctp_transport *transport)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(skb->sk);
pr_debug("%s: skb:%p, len:%d, src:%pI4, dst:%pI4\n", __func__, skb,
skb->len, &transport->fl.u.ip4.saddr, &transport->fl.u.ip4.daddr);
inet->pmtudisc = transport->param_flags & SPP_PMTUD_ENABLE ?
IP_PMTUDISC_DO : IP_PMTUDISC_DONT;
SCTP_INC_STATS(sock_net(&inet->sk), SCTP_MIB_OUTSCTPPACKS);
return ip_queue_xmit(&inet->sk, skb, &transport->fl);
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 42,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_Disconnect( qboolean showMainMenu ) {
if ( !com_cl_running || !com_cl_running->integer ) {
return;
}
Cvar_Set("r_uiFullScreen", "1");
if ( clc.demorecording ) {
CL_StopRecord_f ();
}
if (clc.download) {
FS_FCloseFile( clc.download );
clc.download = 0;
}
*clc.downloadTempName = *clc.downloadName = 0;
Cvar_Set( "cl_downloadName", "" );
#ifdef USE_MUMBLE
if (cl_useMumble->integer && mumble_islinked()) {
Com_Printf("Mumble: Unlinking from Mumble application\n");
mumble_unlink();
}
#endif
#ifdef USE_VOIP
if (cl_voipSend->integer) {
int tmp = cl_voipUseVAD->integer;
cl_voipUseVAD->integer = 0; // disable this for a moment.
clc.voipOutgoingDataSize = 0; // dump any pending VoIP transmission.
Cvar_Set("cl_voipSend", "0");
CL_CaptureVoip(); // clean up any state...
cl_voipUseVAD->integer = tmp;
}
if (clc.voipCodecInitialized) {
int i;
opus_encoder_destroy(clc.opusEncoder);
for (i = 0; i < MAX_CLIENTS; i++) {
opus_decoder_destroy(clc.opusDecoder[i]);
}
clc.voipCodecInitialized = qfalse;
}
Cmd_RemoveCommand ("voip");
#endif
if ( clc.demofile ) {
FS_FCloseFile( clc.demofile );
clc.demofile = 0;
}
if ( uivm && showMainMenu ) {
VM_Call( uivm, UI_SET_ACTIVE_MENU, UIMENU_NONE );
}
SCR_StopCinematic ();
S_ClearSoundBuffer();
if ( clc.state >= CA_CONNECTED ) {
CL_AddReliableCommand("disconnect", qtrue);
CL_WritePacket();
CL_WritePacket();
CL_WritePacket();
}
FS_PureServerSetLoadedPaks("", "");
FS_PureServerSetReferencedPaks( "", "" );
CL_ClearState ();
Com_Memset( &clc, 0, sizeof( clc ) );
clc.state = CA_DISCONNECTED;
Cvar_Set( "sv_cheats", "1" );
cl_connectedToPureServer = qfalse;
#ifdef USE_VOIP
clc.voipEnabled = qfalse;
#endif
if( CL_VideoRecording( ) ) {
SCR_UpdateScreen( );
CL_CloseAVI( );
}
CL_UpdateGUID( NULL, 0 );
if(!noGameRestart)
CL_OldGame();
else
noGameRestart = qfalse;
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDiscardBackbufferCHROMIUM(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
if (surface_->DeferDraws())
return error::kDeferCommandUntilLater;
if (!surface_->SetBackbufferAllocation(false))
return error::kLostContext;
backbuffer_needs_clear_bits_ |= GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT;
backbuffer_needs_clear_bits_ |= GL_DEPTH_BUFFER_BIT;
backbuffer_needs_clear_bits_ |= GL_STENCIL_BUFFER_BIT;
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_peer_addr_info(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_paddrinfo pinfo;
struct sctp_transport *transport;
int retval = 0;
if (len != sizeof(pinfo)) {
retval = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (copy_from_user(&pinfo, optval, sizeof(pinfo))) {
retval = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
transport = sctp_addr_id2transport(sk, &pinfo.spinfo_address,
pinfo.spinfo_assoc_id);
if (!transport)
return -EINVAL;
pinfo.spinfo_assoc_id = sctp_assoc2id(transport->asoc);
pinfo.spinfo_state = transport->state;
pinfo.spinfo_cwnd = transport->cwnd;
pinfo.spinfo_srtt = transport->srtt;
pinfo.spinfo_rto = jiffies_to_msecs(transport->rto);
pinfo.spinfo_mtu = transport->pathmtu;
if (pinfo.spinfo_state == SCTP_UNKNOWN)
pinfo.spinfo_state = SCTP_ACTIVE;
if (put_user(len, optlen)) {
retval = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
if (copy_to_user(optval, &pinfo, len)) {
retval = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
out:
return (retval);
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 35,019 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CURLcode Curl_uc_to_curlcode(CURLUcode uc)
{
switch(uc) {
default:
return CURLE_URL_MALFORMAT;
case CURLUE_UNSUPPORTED_SCHEME:
return CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
case CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY:
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
case CURLUE_USER_NOT_ALLOWED:
return CURLE_LOGIN_DENIED;
}
}
Commit Message: Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 77,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __d_move(struct dentry *dentry, struct dentry *target,
bool exchange)
{
struct inode *dir = NULL;
unsigned n;
if (!dentry->d_inode)
printk(KERN_WARNING "VFS: moving negative dcache entry\n");
BUG_ON(d_ancestor(dentry, target));
BUG_ON(d_ancestor(target, dentry));
dentry_lock_for_move(dentry, target);
if (unlikely(d_in_lookup(target))) {
dir = target->d_parent->d_inode;
n = start_dir_add(dir);
__d_lookup_done(target);
}
write_seqcount_begin(&dentry->d_seq);
write_seqcount_begin_nested(&target->d_seq, DENTRY_D_LOCK_NESTED);
/* unhash both */
/* __d_drop does write_seqcount_barrier, but they're OK to nest. */
__d_drop(dentry);
__d_drop(target);
/* Switch the names.. */
if (exchange)
swap_names(dentry, target);
else
copy_name(dentry, target);
/* rehash in new place(s) */
__d_rehash(dentry);
if (exchange)
__d_rehash(target);
/* ... and switch them in the tree */
if (IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
/* splicing a tree */
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_RCUACCESS;
dentry->d_parent = target->d_parent;
target->d_parent = target;
list_del_init(&target->d_child);
list_move(&dentry->d_child, &dentry->d_parent->d_subdirs);
} else {
/* swapping two dentries */
swap(dentry->d_parent, target->d_parent);
list_move(&target->d_child, &target->d_parent->d_subdirs);
list_move(&dentry->d_child, &dentry->d_parent->d_subdirs);
if (exchange)
fsnotify_update_flags(target);
fsnotify_update_flags(dentry);
}
write_seqcount_end(&target->d_seq);
write_seqcount_end(&dentry->d_seq);
if (dir)
end_dir_add(dir, n);
dentry_unlock_for_move(dentry, target);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: box_send(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
BOX *box = PG_GETARG_BOX_P(0);
StringInfoData buf;
pq_begintypsend(&buf);
pq_sendfloat8(&buf, box->high.x);
pq_sendfloat8(&buf, box->high.y);
pq_sendfloat8(&buf, box->low.x);
pq_sendfloat8(&buf, box->low.y);
PG_RETURN_BYTEA_P(pq_endtypsend(&buf));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void nfs4_exclusive_attrset(struct nfs4_opendata *opendata, struct iattr *sattr)
{
if ((opendata->o_res.attrset[1] & FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_ACCESS) &&
!(sattr->ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME_SET))
sattr->ia_valid |= ATTR_ATIME;
if ((opendata->o_res.attrset[1] & FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_MODIFY) &&
!(sattr->ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME_SET))
sattr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MTIME;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,904 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DownloadInterruptReason ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::BeginDownload(
scoped_ptr<net::URLRequest> request,
const Referrer& referrer,
bool is_content_initiated,
ResourceContext* context,
int child_id,
int render_view_route_id,
int render_frame_route_id,
bool prefer_cache,
bool do_not_prompt_for_login,
scoped_ptr<DownloadSaveInfo> save_info,
uint32_t download_id,
const DownloadStartedCallback& started_callback) {
if (is_shutdown_)
return CallbackAndReturn(started_callback,
DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_USER_SHUTDOWN);
const GURL& url = request->original_url();
char url_buf[128];
base::strlcpy(url_buf, url.spec().c_str(), arraysize(url_buf));
base::debug::Alias(url_buf);
CHECK(ContainsKey(active_resource_contexts_, context));
SetReferrerForRequest(request.get(), referrer);
int extra_load_flags = net::LOAD_NORMAL;
if (prefer_cache) {
if (request->get_upload() != NULL)
extra_load_flags |= net::LOAD_ONLY_FROM_CACHE;
else
extra_load_flags |= net::LOAD_PREFERRING_CACHE;
} else {
extra_load_flags |= net::LOAD_DISABLE_CACHE;
}
request->SetLoadFlags(request->load_flags() | extra_load_flags);
request->set_first_party_url_policy(
net::URLRequest::UPDATE_FIRST_PARTY_URL_ON_REDIRECT);
if (!ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->
CanRequestURL(child_id, url)) {
VLOG(1) << "Denied unauthorized download request for "
<< url.possibly_invalid_spec();
return CallbackAndReturn(started_callback,
DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NETWORK_INVALID_REQUEST);
}
request_id_--;
const net::URLRequestContext* request_context = context->GetRequestContext();
if (!request_context->job_factory()->IsHandledURL(url)) {
VLOG(1) << "Download request for unsupported protocol: "
<< url.possibly_invalid_spec();
return CallbackAndReturn(started_callback,
DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NETWORK_INVALID_REQUEST);
}
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* extra_info =
CreateRequestInfo(child_id, render_view_route_id,
render_frame_route_id, true, context);
extra_info->set_do_not_prompt_for_login(do_not_prompt_for_login);
extra_info->AssociateWithRequest(request.get()); // Request takes ownership.
if (request->url().SchemeIs(url::kBlobScheme)) {
ChromeBlobStorageContext* blob_context =
GetChromeBlobStorageContextForResourceContext(context);
storage::BlobProtocolHandler::SetRequestedBlobDataHandle(
request.get(),
blob_context->context()->GetBlobDataFromPublicURL(request->url()));
}
scoped_ptr<ResourceHandler> handler(CreateResourceHandlerForDownload(
request.get(), is_content_initiated, true, download_id,
std::move(save_info), started_callback));
BeginRequestInternal(std::move(request), std::move(handler));
return DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NONE;
}
Commit Message: Block a compromised renderer from reusing request ids.
BUG=578882
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1608573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#372547}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 132,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int unix_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sock *tsk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM && sock->type != SOCK_SEQPACKET)
goto out;
err = -EINVAL;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN)
goto out;
/* If socket state is TCP_LISTEN it cannot change (for now...),
* so that no locks are necessary.
*/
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, 0, flags&O_NONBLOCK, &err);
if (!skb) {
/* This means receive shutdown. */
if (err == 0)
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
tsk = skb->sk;
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
wake_up_interruptible(&unix_sk(sk)->peer_wait);
/* attach accepted sock to socket */
unix_state_lock(tsk);
newsock->state = SS_CONNECTED;
sock_graft(tsk, newsock);
unix_state_unlock(tsk);
return 0;
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 19,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestRenderFrame::SetEditableSelectionOffsets(int start, int end) {
GetFrameInputHandler()->SetEditableSelectionOffsets(start, end);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int handle_rt_signal32(struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *oldset,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct rt_sigframe __user *rt_sf;
struct mcontext __user *frame;
struct mcontext __user *tm_frame = NULL;
void __user *addr;
unsigned long newsp = 0;
int sigret;
unsigned long tramp;
/* Set up Signal Frame */
/* Put a Real Time Context onto stack */
rt_sf = get_sigframe(ksig, get_tm_stackpointer(regs), sizeof(*rt_sf), 1);
addr = rt_sf;
if (unlikely(rt_sf == NULL))
goto badframe;
/* Put the siginfo & fill in most of the ucontext */
if (copy_siginfo_to_user(&rt_sf->info, &ksig->info)
|| __put_user(0, &rt_sf->uc.uc_flags)
|| __save_altstack(&rt_sf->uc.uc_stack, regs->gpr[1])
|| __put_user(to_user_ptr(&rt_sf->uc.uc_mcontext),
&rt_sf->uc.uc_regs)
|| put_sigset_t(&rt_sf->uc.uc_sigmask, oldset))
goto badframe;
/* Save user registers on the stack */
frame = &rt_sf->uc.uc_mcontext;
addr = frame;
if (vdso32_rt_sigtramp && current->mm->context.vdso_base) {
sigret = 0;
tramp = current->mm->context.vdso_base + vdso32_rt_sigtramp;
} else {
sigret = __NR_rt_sigreturn;
tramp = (unsigned long) frame->tramp;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
tm_frame = &rt_sf->uc_transact.uc_mcontext;
if (MSR_TM_ACTIVE(regs->msr)) {
if (__put_user((unsigned long)&rt_sf->uc_transact,
&rt_sf->uc.uc_link) ||
__put_user((unsigned long)tm_frame,
&rt_sf->uc_transact.uc_regs))
goto badframe;
if (save_tm_user_regs(regs, frame, tm_frame, sigret))
goto badframe;
}
else
#endif
{
if (__put_user(0, &rt_sf->uc.uc_link))
goto badframe;
if (save_user_regs(regs, frame, tm_frame, sigret, 1))
goto badframe;
}
regs->link = tramp;
current->thread.fp_state.fpscr = 0; /* turn off all fp exceptions */
/* create a stack frame for the caller of the handler */
newsp = ((unsigned long)rt_sf) - (__SIGNAL_FRAMESIZE + 16);
addr = (void __user *)regs->gpr[1];
if (put_user(regs->gpr[1], (u32 __user *)newsp))
goto badframe;
/* Fill registers for signal handler */
regs->gpr[1] = newsp;
regs->gpr[3] = ksig->sig;
regs->gpr[4] = (unsigned long) &rt_sf->info;
regs->gpr[5] = (unsigned long) &rt_sf->uc;
regs->gpr[6] = (unsigned long) rt_sf;
regs->nip = (unsigned long) ksig->ka.sa.sa_handler;
/* enter the signal handler in native-endian mode */
regs->msr &= ~MSR_LE;
regs->msr |= (MSR_KERNEL & MSR_LE);
return 0;
badframe:
if (show_unhandled_signals)
printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
"%s[%d]: bad frame in handle_rt_signal32: "
"%p nip %08lx lr %08lx\n",
current->comm, current->pid,
addr, regs->nip, regs->link);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Block signal return setting invalid MSR state
Currently we allow both the MSR T and S bits to be set by userspace on
a signal return. Unfortunately this is a reserved configuration and
will cause a TM Bad Thing exception if attempted (via rfid).
This patch checks for this case in both the 32 and 64 bit signals
code. If both T and S are set, we mark the context as invalid.
Found using a syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 56,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::UnscopableRuntimeEnabledLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_unscopableRuntimeEnabledLongAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::UnscopableRuntimeEnabledLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,296 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int f_midi_do_transmit(struct f_midi *midi, struct usb_ep *ep)
{
struct usb_request *req = NULL;
unsigned int len, i;
bool active = false;
int err;
/*
* We peek the request in order to reuse it if it fails to enqueue on
* its endpoint
*/
len = kfifo_peek(&midi->in_req_fifo, &req);
if (len != 1) {
ERROR(midi, "%s: Couldn't get usb request\n", __func__);
return -1;
}
/*
* If buffer overrun, then we ignore this transmission.
* IMPORTANT: This will cause the user-space rawmidi device to block
* until a) usb requests have been completed or b) snd_rawmidi_write()
* times out.
*/
if (req->length > 0)
return 0;
for (i = midi->in_last_port; i < midi->in_ports; ++i) {
struct gmidi_in_port *port = midi->in_ports_array + i;
struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream = port->substream;
if (!port->active || !substream)
continue;
while (req->length + 3 < midi->buflen) {
uint8_t b;
if (snd_rawmidi_transmit(substream, &b, 1) != 1) {
port->active = 0;
break;
}
f_midi_transmit_byte(req, port, b);
}
active = !!port->active;
if (active)
break;
}
midi->in_last_port = active ? i : 0;
if (req->length <= 0)
goto done;
err = usb_ep_queue(ep, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (err < 0) {
ERROR(midi, "%s failed to queue req: %d\n",
midi->in_ep->name, err);
req->length = 0; /* Re-use request next time. */
} else {
/* Upon success, put request at the back of the queue. */
kfifo_skip(&midi->in_req_fifo);
kfifo_put(&midi->in_req_fifo, req);
}
done:
return active;
}
Commit Message: USB: gadget: f_midi: fixing a possible double-free in f_midi
It looks like there is a possibility of a double-free vulnerability on an
error path of the f_midi_set_alt function in the f_midi driver. If the
path is feasible then free_ep_req gets called twice:
req->complete = f_midi_complete;
err = usb_ep_queue(midi->out_ep, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=> ...
usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_midi_complete (CALLBACK)
(inside f_midi_complete, for various cases of status)
free_ep_req(ep, req); // first kfree
if (err) {
ERROR(midi, "%s: couldn't enqueue request: %d\n",
midi->out_ep->name, err);
free_ep_req(midi->out_ep, req); // second kfree
return err;
}
The double-free possibility was introduced with commit ad0d1a058eac
("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests").
Found by MOXCAFE tool.
Signed-off-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Fixes: ad0d1a058eac ("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests")
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 91,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProfileImplIOData::Handle::GetExtensionsRequestContextGetter() const {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
LazyInitialize();
if (!extensions_request_context_getter_) {
extensions_request_context_getter_ =
ChromeURLRequestContextGetter::CreateOriginalForExtensions(
profile_, io_data_);
}
return extensions_request_context_getter_;
}
Commit Message: Give the media context an ftp job factory; prevent a browser crash.
BUG=112983
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121378 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 108,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ps_sd_destroy(ps_mm *data, ps_sd *sd)
{
php_uint32 slot;
slot = ps_sd_hash(sd->key, strlen(sd->key)) & data->hash_max;
if (data->hash[slot] == sd) {
data->hash[slot] = sd->next;
} else {
ps_sd *prev;
/* There must be some entry before the one we want to delete */
for (prev = data->hash[slot]; prev->next != sd; prev = prev->next);
prev->next = sd->next;
}
data->hash_cnt--;
if (sd->data) {
mm_free(data->mm, sd->data);
}
mm_free(data->mm, sd);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,233 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asmlinkage long sys_set_tid_address(int __user *tidptr)
{
current->clear_child_tid = tidptr;
return task_pid_vnr(current);
}
Commit Message: Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Alex Efros <powerman@powerman.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 22,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cpl_closeall ()
{
struct cpelement *cpe;
for (cpe = coproc_list.head; cpe; cpe = cpe->next)
coproc_close (cpe->coproc);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,316 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void perf_event_fork(struct task_struct *task)
{
perf_event_task(task, NULL, 1);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,080 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_inode_buf_verify(
struct xfs_buf *bp,
bool readahead)
{
struct xfs_mount *mp = bp->b_target->bt_mount;
xfs_agnumber_t agno;
int i;
int ni;
/*
* Validate the magic number and version of every inode in the buffer
*/
agno = xfs_daddr_to_agno(mp, XFS_BUF_ADDR(bp));
ni = XFS_BB_TO_FSB(mp, bp->b_length) * mp->m_sb.sb_inopblock;
for (i = 0; i < ni; i++) {
int di_ok;
xfs_dinode_t *dip;
xfs_agino_t unlinked_ino;
dip = xfs_buf_offset(bp, (i << mp->m_sb.sb_inodelog));
unlinked_ino = be32_to_cpu(dip->di_next_unlinked);
di_ok = dip->di_magic == cpu_to_be16(XFS_DINODE_MAGIC) &&
xfs_dinode_good_version(mp, dip->di_version) &&
(unlinked_ino == NULLAGINO ||
xfs_verify_agino(mp, agno, unlinked_ino));
if (unlikely(XFS_TEST_ERROR(!di_ok, mp,
XFS_ERRTAG_ITOBP_INOTOBP))) {
if (readahead) {
bp->b_flags &= ~XBF_DONE;
xfs_buf_ioerror(bp, -EIO);
return;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
xfs_alert(mp,
"bad inode magic/vsn daddr %lld #%d (magic=%x)",
(unsigned long long)bp->b_bn, i,
be16_to_cpu(dip->di_magic));
#endif
xfs_buf_verifier_error(bp, -EFSCORRUPTED,
__func__, dip, sizeof(*dip),
NULL);
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message: xfs: More robust inode extent count validation
When the inode is in extent format, it can't have more extents that
fit in the inode fork. We don't currenty check this, and so this
corruption goes unnoticed by the inode verifiers. This can lead to
crashes operating on invalid in-memory structures.
Attempts to access such a inode will now error out in the verifier
rather than allowing modification operations to proceed.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: fix a typedef, add some braces and breaks to shut up compiler warnings]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 79,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct page *alloc_huge_page_nodemask(struct hstate *h, int preferred_nid,
nodemask_t *nmask)
{
gfp_t gfp_mask = htlb_alloc_mask(h);
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
if (h->free_huge_pages - h->resv_huge_pages > 0) {
struct page *page;
page = dequeue_huge_page_nodemask(h, gfp_mask, preferred_nid, nmask);
if (page) {
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
return page;
}
}
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
return alloc_migrate_huge_page(h, gfp_mask, preferred_nid, nmask);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FloatRect EffectPaintPropertyNode::MapRect(const FloatRect& input_rect) const {
FloatRect rect = input_rect;
rect.MoveBy(-state_.paint_offset);
FloatRect result = state_.filter.MapRect(rect);
result.MoveBy(state_.paint_offset);
return result;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ip_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (!(inet_sk(sk)->cmsg_flags & IP_CMSG_PKTINFO))
skb_dst_drop(skb);
return sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,936 |
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