instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void virtio_gpu_handle_cursor(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq)
{
VirtIOGPU *g = VIRTIO_GPU(vdev);
VirtQueueElement *elem;
size_t s;
struct virtio_gpu_update_cursor cursor_info;
if (!virtio_queue_ready(vq)) {
return;
}
for (;;) {
elem = virtqueue_pop(vq, sizeof(VirtQueueElement));
if (!elem) {
break;
}
s = iov_to_buf(elem->out_sg, elem->out_num, 0,
&cursor_info, sizeof(cursor_info));
if (s != sizeof(cursor_info)) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
"%s: cursor size incorrect %zu vs %zu\n",
__func__, s, sizeof(cursor_info));
} else {
update_cursor(g, &cursor_info);
}
virtqueue_push(vq, elem, 0);
virtio_notify(vdev, vq);
g_free(elem);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 6,249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static av_cold int cdxl_decode_init(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
CDXLVideoContext *c = avctx->priv_data;
c->new_video_size = 0;
c->avctx = avctx;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/cdxl: Check format for BGR24
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1427/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5020737339392000
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 63,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::IsPluginAllowedToUseDevChannelAPIs(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& url) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS) && BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
return ChromeContentBrowserClientPluginsPart::
IsPluginAllowedToUseDevChannelAPIs(browser_context, url,
allowed_dev_channel_origins_);
#else
return false;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint32_t num_requests() { return num_requests_; }
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reds_handle_other_links(RedLinkInfo *link)
{
RedChannel *channel;
RedClient *client = NULL;
SpiceLinkMess *link_mess;
RedsMigTargetClient *mig_client;
link_mess = link->link_mess;
if (reds->main_channel) {
client = main_channel_get_client_by_link_id(reds->main_channel,
link_mess->connection_id);
}
if (!client) {
reds_send_link_result(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_BAD_CONNECTION_ID);
reds_link_free(link);
return;
}
if (!(channel = reds_find_channel(link_mess->channel_type,
link_mess->channel_id))) {
reds_send_link_result(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_CHANNEL_NOT_AVAILABLE);
reds_link_free(link);
return;
}
reds_send_link_result(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_OK);
reds_info_new_channel(link, link_mess->connection_id);
reds_stream_remove_watch(link->stream);
mig_client = reds_mig_target_client_find(client);
/*
* In semi-seamless migration, we activate the channels only
* after migration is completed. Since, the session starts almost from
* scratch we don't mind if we skip some messages in between the src session end and
* dst session start.
* In seamless migration, in order to keep the continuousness of the session, and
* in order not to lose any data, we activate the target channels before
* migration completes, as soon as we receive SPICE_MSGC_MAIN_MIGRATE_DST_DO_SEAMLESS.
* If a channel connects before receiving SPICE_MSGC_MAIN_MIGRATE_DST_DO_SEAMLESS,
* reds_on_migrate_dst_set_seamless will take care of activating it */
if (red_client_during_migrate_at_target(client) && !reds->dst_do_seamless_migrate) {
spice_assert(mig_client);
reds_mig_target_client_add_pending_link(mig_client, link_mess, link->stream);
} else {
spice_assert(!mig_client);
reds_channel_do_link(channel, client, link_mess, link->stream);
free(link_mess);
}
link->stream = NULL;
link->link_mess = NULL;
reds_link_free(link);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct rt6_info *addrconf_get_prefix_route(const struct in6_addr *pfx,
int plen,
const struct net_device *dev,
u32 flags, u32 noflags)
{
struct fib6_node *fn;
struct rt6_info *rt = NULL;
struct fib6_table *table;
table = fib6_get_table(dev_net(dev), RT6_TABLE_PREFIX);
if (table == NULL)
return NULL;
read_lock_bh(&table->tb6_lock);
fn = fib6_locate(&table->tb6_root, pfx, plen, NULL, 0);
if (!fn)
goto out;
for (rt = fn->leaf; rt; rt = rt->dst.rt6_next) {
if (rt->dst.dev->ifindex != dev->ifindex)
continue;
if ((rt->rt6i_flags & flags) != flags)
continue;
if ((rt->rt6i_flags & noflags) != 0)
continue;
dst_hold(&rt->dst);
break;
}
out:
read_unlock_bh(&table->tb6_lock);
return rt;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,770 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void zrle_choose_palette_rle(VncState *vs, int w, int h,
VncPalette *palette, int bpp_out,
int runs, int single_pixels,
int zywrle_level,
bool *use_rle, bool *use_palette)
{
size_t estimated_bytes;
size_t plain_rle_bytes;
*use_palette = *use_rle = false;
estimated_bytes = w * h * (bpp_out / 8); /* start assuming raw */
if (bpp_out != 8) {
if (zywrle_level > 0 && !(zywrle_level & 0x80))
estimated_bytes >>= zywrle_level;
}
plain_rle_bytes = ((bpp_out / 8) + 1) * (runs + single_pixels);
if (plain_rle_bytes < estimated_bytes) {
*use_rle = true;
estimated_bytes = plain_rle_bytes;
}
if (palette_size(palette) < 128) {
int palette_rle_bytes;
palette_rle_bytes = (bpp_out / 8) * palette_size(palette);
palette_rle_bytes += 2 * runs + single_pixels;
if (palette_rle_bytes < estimated_bytes) {
*use_rle = true;
*use_palette = true;
estimated_bytes = palette_rle_bytes;
}
if (palette_size(palette) < 17) {
int packed_bytes;
packed_bytes = (bpp_out / 8) * palette_size(palette);
packed_bytes += w * h *
bits_per_packed_pixel[palette_size(palette)-1] / 8;
if (packed_bytes < estimated_bytes) {
*use_rle = false;
*use_palette = true;
estimated_bytes = packed_bytes;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 17,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_ext_zeroout(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_extent *ex)
{
int ret = -EIO;
struct bio *bio;
int blkbits, blocksize;
sector_t ee_pblock;
struct completion event;
unsigned int ee_len, len, done, offset;
blkbits = inode->i_blkbits;
blocksize = inode->i_sb->s_blocksize;
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
ee_pblock = ext_pblock(ex);
/* convert ee_pblock to 512 byte sectors */
ee_pblock = ee_pblock << (blkbits - 9);
while (ee_len > 0) {
if (ee_len > BIO_MAX_PAGES)
len = BIO_MAX_PAGES;
else
len = ee_len;
bio = bio_alloc(GFP_NOIO, len);
bio->bi_sector = ee_pblock;
bio->bi_bdev = inode->i_sb->s_bdev;
done = 0;
offset = 0;
while (done < len) {
ret = bio_add_page(bio, ZERO_PAGE(0),
blocksize, offset);
if (ret != blocksize) {
/*
* We can't add any more pages because of
* hardware limitations. Start a new bio.
*/
break;
}
done++;
offset += blocksize;
if (offset >= PAGE_CACHE_SIZE)
offset = 0;
}
init_completion(&event);
bio->bi_private = &event;
bio->bi_end_io = bi_complete;
submit_bio(WRITE, bio);
wait_for_completion(&event);
if (test_bit(BIO_UPTODATE, &bio->bi_flags))
ret = 0;
else {
ret = -EIO;
break;
}
bio_put(bio);
ee_len -= done;
ee_pblock += done << (blkbits - 9);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: aiptek_query(struct aiptek *aiptek, unsigned char command, unsigned char data)
{
const int sizeof_buf = 3 * sizeof(u8);
int ret;
u8 *buf;
buf = kmalloc(sizeof_buf, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
buf[0] = 2;
buf[1] = command;
buf[2] = data;
if (aiptek_command(aiptek, command, data) != 0) {
kfree(buf);
return -EIO;
}
msleep(aiptek->curSetting.programmableDelay);
if ((ret =
aiptek_get_report(aiptek, 3, 2, buf, sizeof_buf)) != sizeof_buf) {
dev_dbg(&aiptek->intf->dev,
"aiptek_query failed: returned 0x%02x 0x%02x 0x%02x\n",
buf[0], buf[1], buf[2]);
ret = -EIO;
} else {
ret = get_unaligned_le16(buf + 1);
}
kfree(buf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB
device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device
has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value
is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cdf_unpack_header(cdf_header_t *h, char *buf)
{
size_t i;
size_t len = 0;
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_magic);
CDF_UNPACKA(h->h_uuid);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_revision);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_version);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_byte_order);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_sec_size_p2);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_short_sec_size_p2);
CDF_UNPACKA(h->h_unused0);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_num_sectors_in_sat);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_secid_first_directory);
CDF_UNPACKA(h->h_unused1);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_min_size_standard_stream);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_secid_first_sector_in_short_sat);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_num_sectors_in_short_sat);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_secid_first_sector_in_master_sat);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_num_sectors_in_master_sat);
for (i = 0; i < __arraycount(h->h_master_sat); i++)
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_master_sat[i]);
}
Commit Message: Fix bounds checks again.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,949 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpClient::globus_gram_client_job_callback_register(const char * job_contact,
const int /* job_state_mask */,
const char * callback_contact,
int * job_status,
int * failure_code)
{
static const char* command = "GRAM_JOB_CALLBACK_REGISTER";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (!job_contact) job_contact=NULLSTRING;
if (!callback_contact) callback_contact=NULLSTRING;
std::string reqline;
char *esc1 = strdup( escapeGahpString(job_contact) );
char *esc2 = strdup( escapeGahpString(callback_contact) );
int x = sprintf(reqline,"%s %s",esc1,esc2);
free( esc1 );
free( esc2 );
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command,buf,normal_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command,buf);
if ( result ) {
if (result->argc != 4) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command);
}
int rc = atoi(result->argv[1]);
*failure_code = atoi(result->argv[2]);
if ( rc == 0 ) {
*job_status = atoi(result->argv[3]);
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,191 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string16 ExtensionInstallUI::Prompt::GetDialogTitle(
const Extension* extension) const {
if (type_ == INSTALL_PROMPT) {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(extension->is_app() ?
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALL_APP_PROMPT_TITLE :
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALL_EXTENSION_PROMPT_TITLE);
} else if (type_ == INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT) {
return l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
kTitleIds[type_], l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_SHORT_PRODUCT_NAME));
} else {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(kTitleIds[type_]);
}
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 170,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline unsigned int ReadProfileLong(const EndianType endian,
unsigned char *buffer)
{
unsigned int
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned int) ((buffer[3] << 24) | (buffer[2] << 16) |
(buffer[1] << 8 ) | (buffer[0]));
return((unsigned int) (value & 0xffffffff));
}
value=(unsigned int) ((buffer[0] << 24) | (buffer[1] << 16) |
(buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[3]);
return((unsigned int) (value & 0xffffffff));
}
Commit Message: Fixed SEGV reported in https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/130
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 73,538 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderBlockFlow::mustSeparateMarginBeforeForChild(const RenderBox* child) const
{
ASSERT(!child->selfNeedsLayout());
const RenderStyle* childStyle = child->style();
if (!child->isWritingModeRoot())
return childStyle->marginBeforeCollapse() == MSEPARATE;
if (child->isHorizontalWritingMode() == isHorizontalWritingMode())
return childStyle->marginAfterCollapse() == MSEPARATE;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void touch_nmi_watchdog(void)
{
if (watchdog_enabled) {
unsigned cpu;
for_each_present_cpu(cpu) {
if (per_cpu(watchdog_nmi_touch, cpu) != true)
per_cpu(watchdog_nmi_touch, cpu) = true;
}
}
touch_softlockup_watchdog();
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderMessageFilter::OnGetCPUUsage(int* cpu_usage) {
base::TimeTicks now = base::TimeTicks::Now();
int64 since_last_sample_ms = (now - cpu_usage_sample_time_).InMilliseconds();
if (since_last_sample_ms > kCPUUsageSampleIntervalMs) {
cpu_usage_sample_time_ = now;
cpu_usage_ = static_cast<int>(process_metrics_->GetCPUUsage());
}
*cpu_usage = cpu_usage_;
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 116,859 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ui::TouchStatus RootWindow::ProcessTouchEvent(Window* target,
TouchEvent* event) {
if (!target->IsVisible())
return ui::TOUCH_STATUS_UNKNOWN;
EventFilters filters;
if (target == this)
GetEventFiltersToNotify(target, &filters);
else
GetEventFiltersToNotify(target->parent(), &filters);
for (EventFilters::const_reverse_iterator it = filters.rbegin(),
rend = filters.rend();
it != rend; ++it) {
ui::TouchStatus status = (*it)->PreHandleTouchEvent(target, event);
if (status != ui::TOUCH_STATUS_UNKNOWN)
return status;
}
if (target->delegate())
return target->delegate()->OnTouchEvent(event);
return ui::TOUCH_STATUS_UNKNOWN;
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __blk_mq_tag_idle(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx)
{
struct blk_mq_tags *tags = hctx->tags;
if (!test_and_clear_bit(BLK_MQ_S_TAG_ACTIVE, &hctx->state))
return;
atomic_dec(&tags->active_queues);
blk_mq_tag_wakeup_all(tags, false);
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 86,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fix_rmode_seg(int seg, struct kvm_segment *save)
{
const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field *sf = &kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg];
struct kvm_segment var = *save;
var.dpl = 0x3;
if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS)
var.type = 0x3;
if (!emulate_invalid_guest_state) {
var.selector = var.base >> 4;
var.base = var.base & 0xffff0;
var.limit = 0xffff;
var.g = 0;
var.db = 0;
var.present = 1;
var.s = 1;
var.l = 0;
var.unusable = 0;
var.type = 0x3;
var.avl = 0;
if (save->base & 0xf)
printk_once(KERN_WARNING "kvm: segment base is not "
"paragraph aligned when entering "
"protected mode (seg=%d)", seg);
}
vmcs_write16(sf->selector, var.selector);
vmcs_write32(sf->base, var.base);
vmcs_write32(sf->limit, var.limit);
vmcs_write32(sf->ar_bytes, vmx_segment_access_rights(&var));
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::AddObserver(content::RenderProcessObserver* observer) {
observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: e1000e_ring_len(E1000ECore *core, const E1000E_RingInfo *r)
{
return core->mac[r->dlen];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 6,036 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct inode *iget5_locked(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long hashval,
int (*test)(struct inode *, void *),
int (*set)(struct inode *, void *), void *data)
{
struct inode *inode = ilookup5(sb, hashval, test, data);
if (!inode) {
struct inode *new = new_inode(sb);
if (new) {
inode = inode_insert5(new, hashval, test, set, data);
if (unlikely(inode != new))
iput(new);
}
}
return inode;
}
Commit Message: Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 79,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ScriptController::installFunctionsForPagePopup(Frame* frame, PagePopupClient* popupClient)
{
ASSERT(frame);
ASSERT(popupClient);
v8::HandleScope handleScope;
v8::Handle<v8::Context> context = V8Proxy::mainWorldContext(frame);
if (context.IsEmpty()) {
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return;
}
v8::Context::Scope scope(context);
DOMWindowPagePopup::install(frame->existingDOMWindow(), popupClient);
v8::Local<v8::FunctionTemplate> templ = v8::FunctionTemplate::New(setValueAndClosePopupCallback, V8DOMWindow::wrap(frame->existingDOMWindow()));
context->Global()->Set(v8::String::New("setValueAndClosePopup"), v8::Handle<v8::Function>(templ->GetFunction()));
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,702 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PixarLogClose(TIFF* tif)
{
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
/* In a really sneaky (and really incorrect, and untruthful, and
* troublesome, and error-prone) maneuver that completely goes against
* the spirit of TIFF, and breaks TIFF, on close, we covertly
* modify both bitspersample and sampleformat in the directory to
* indicate 8-bit linear. This way, the decode "just works" even for
* readers that don't know about PixarLog, or how to set
* the PIXARLOGDATFMT pseudo-tag.
*/
td->td_bitspersample = 8;
td->td_sampleformat = SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 48,298 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const WebEmStoredSession CWebServer::GetSession(const std::string & sessionId) {
WebEmStoredSession session;
if (sessionId.empty()) {
_log.Log(LOG_ERROR, "SessionStore : cannot get session without id.");
}
else {
std::vector<std::vector<std::string> > result;
result = m_sql.safe_query("SELECT SessionID, Username, AuthToken, ExpirationDate FROM UserSessions WHERE SessionID = '%q'",
sessionId.c_str());
if (!result.empty()) {
session.id = result[0][0].c_str();
session.username = base64_decode(result[0][1]);
session.auth_token = result[0][2].c_str();
std::string sExpirationDate = result[0][3];
time_t now = mytime(NULL);
struct tm tExpirationDate;
ParseSQLdatetime(session.expires, tExpirationDate, sExpirationDate);
}
}
return session;
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 91,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: isofs_hashi(const struct dentry *dentry, struct qstr *qstr)
{
return isofs_hashi_common(qstr, 0);
}
Commit Message: isofs: Fix unbounded recursion when processing relocated directories
We did not check relocated directory in any way when processing Rock
Ridge 'CL' tag. Thus a corrupted isofs image can possibly have a CL
entry pointing to another CL entry leading to possibly unbounded
recursion in kernel code and thus stack overflow or deadlocks (if there
is a loop created from CL entries).
Fix the problem by not allowing CL entry to point to a directory entry
with CL entry (such use makes no good sense anyway) and by checking
whether CL entry doesn't point to itself.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Chris Evans <cevans@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void etm_addr_filters_sync(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_addr_filters_head *head = perf_event_addr_filters(event);
unsigned long start, stop, *offs = event->addr_filters_offs;
struct etm_filters *filters = event->hw.addr_filters;
struct etm_filter *etm_filter;
struct perf_addr_filter *filter;
int i = 0;
list_for_each_entry(filter, &head->list, entry) {
start = filter->offset + offs[i];
stop = start + filter->size;
etm_filter = &filters->etm_filter[i];
if (filter->range == 1) {
etm_filter->start_addr = start;
etm_filter->stop_addr = stop;
etm_filter->type = ETM_ADDR_TYPE_RANGE;
} else {
if (filter->filter == 1) {
etm_filter->start_addr = start;
etm_filter->type = ETM_ADDR_TYPE_START;
} else {
etm_filter->stop_addr = stop;
etm_filter->type = ETM_ADDR_TYPE_STOP;
}
}
i++;
}
filters->nr_filters = i;
}
Commit Message: coresight: fix kernel panic caused by invalid CPU
Commit d52c9750f150 ("coresight: reset "enable_sink" flag when need be")
caused a kernel panic because of the using of an invalid value: after
'for_each_cpu(cpu, mask)', value of local variable 'cpu' become invalid,
causes following 'cpu_to_node' access invalid memory area.
This patch brings the deleted 'cpu = cpumask_first(mask)' back.
Panic log:
$ perf record -e cs_etm// ls
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffe801804af4f10
pgd = ffff8017ce031600
[fffe801804af4f10] *pgd=0000000000000000, *pud=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 33 PID: 1619 Comm: perf Not tainted 4.7.1+ #16
Hardware name: Huawei Taishan 2280 /CH05TEVBA, BIOS 1.10 11/24/2016
task: ffff8017cb0c8400 ti: ffff8017cb154000 task.ti: ffff8017cb154000
PC is at tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x60/0xd4
LR is at tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x44/0xd4
pc : [<ffff000008633df8>] lr : [<ffff000008633ddc>] pstate: 60000145
sp : ffff8017cb157b40
x29: ffff8017cb157b40 x28: 0000000000000000
...skip...
7a60: ffff000008c64dc8 0000000000000006 0000000000000253 ffffffffffffffff
7a80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff0000080872cc 0000000000000001
[<ffff000008633df8>] tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x60/0xd4
[<ffff000008632b9c>] etm_setup_aux+0x1dc/0x1e8
[<ffff00000816eed4>] rb_alloc_aux+0x2b0/0x338
[<ffff00000816a5e4>] perf_mmap+0x414/0x568
[<ffff0000081ab694>] mmap_region+0x324/0x544
[<ffff0000081abbe8>] do_mmap+0x334/0x3e0
[<ffff000008191150>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0xa4/0xc8
[<ffff0000081a9a30>] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0xb0/0x22c
[<ffff0000080872e4>] sys_mmap+0x18/0x28
[<ffff0000080843f0>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
Code: 912040a5 d0001c00 f873d821 911c6000 (b8656822)
---[ end trace 98933da8f92b0c9a ]---
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Cc: Xia Kaixu <xiakaixu@huawei.com>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d52c9750f150 ("coresight: reset "enable_sink" flag when need be")
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.10
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 83,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int len;
unsigned char *buf;
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
&(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||
s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH],
s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
dtls1_set_message_header(s, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0, len);
len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num = len;
s->init_off = 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 3)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
int intArg(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
const String& strArg(ustringToString(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).isEmpty() ? UString() : MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).toString(exec)->value(exec)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
TestObj* objArg(toTestObj(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 2, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
JSC::JSValue result = jsNumber(impl->intMethodWithArgs(intArg, strArg, objArg));
return JSValue::encode(result);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int predict_point(int x, int x0, int x1, int y0, int y1)
{
int dy = y1 - y0;
int adx = x1 - x0;
int err = abs(dy) * (x - x0);
int off = err / adx;
return dy < 0 ? y0 - off : y0 + off;
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 75,288 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int fanout_demux_rnd(struct packet_fanout *f,
struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int num)
{
return prandom_u32_max(num);
}
Commit Message: packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,164 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lock_encryption_data_unref (LockEncryptionData *data)
{
data->refcount--;
if (data->refcount == 0)
{
g_object_unref (data->luks_device);
g_object_unref (data->cleartext_device);
g_free (data);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void prb_retire_current_block(struct tpacket_kbdq_core *pkc,
struct packet_sock *po, unsigned int status)
{
struct tpacket_block_desc *pbd = GET_CURR_PBLOCK_DESC_FROM_CORE(pkc);
/* retire/close the current block */
if (likely(TP_STATUS_KERNEL == BLOCK_STATUS(pbd))) {
/*
* Plug the case where copy_bits() is in progress on
* cpu-0 and tpacket_rcv() got invoked on cpu-1, didn't
* have space to copy the pkt in the current block and
* called prb_retire_current_block()
*
* We don't need to worry about the TMO case because
* the timer-handler already handled this case.
*/
if (!(status & TP_STATUS_BLK_TMO)) {
while (atomic_read(&pkc->blk_fill_in_prog)) {
/* Waiting for skb_copy_bits to finish... */
cpu_relax();
}
}
prb_close_block(pkc, pbd, po, status);
return;
}
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cp2112_gpio_direction_output(struct gpio_chip *chip,
unsigned offset, int value)
{
struct cp2112_device *dev = gpiochip_get_data(chip);
struct hid_device *hdev = dev->hdev;
u8 *buf = dev->in_out_buffer;
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(hdev, CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG, buf,
CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG_LENGTH, HID_FEATURE_REPORT,
HID_REQ_GET_REPORT);
if (ret != CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG_LENGTH) {
hid_err(hdev, "error requesting GPIO config: %d\n", ret);
goto fail;
}
buf[1] |= 1 << offset;
buf[2] = gpio_push_pull;
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(hdev, CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG, buf,
CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG_LENGTH, HID_FEATURE_REPORT,
HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
if (ret < 0) {
hid_err(hdev, "error setting GPIO config: %d\n", ret);
goto fail;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
/*
* Set gpio value when output direction is already set,
* as specified in AN495, Rev. 0.2, cpt. 4.4
*/
cp2112_gpio_set(chip, offset, value);
return 0;
fail:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
return ret < 0 ? ret : -EIO;
}
Commit Message: HID: cp2112: fix sleep-while-atomic
A recent commit fixing DMA-buffers on stack added a shared transfer
buffer protected by a spinlock. This is broken as the USB HID request
callbacks can sleep. Fix this up by replacing the spinlock with a mutex.
Fixes: 1ffb3c40ffb5 ("HID: cp2112: make transfer buffers DMA capable")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.9
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 1 | 168,209 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool NeedsPerspective(const LayoutObject& object) {
return object.IsBox() && object.StyleRef().HasPerspective();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BOOLEAN UIPC_SendBuf(tUIPC_CH_ID ch_id, BT_HDR *p_msg)
{
UNUSED(p_msg);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("UIPC_SendBuf : ch_id %d NOT IMPLEMENTED", ch_id);
UIPC_LOCK();
/* currently not used */
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 159,052 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Part::slotCopyFiles()
{
m_model->filesToCopy = ArchiveModel::entryMap(filesForIndexes(addChildren(m_view->selectionModel()->selectedRows())));
qCDebug(ARK) << "Entries marked to copy:" << m_model->filesToCopy.values();
foreach (const QModelIndex &row, m_cutIndexes) {
m_view->dataChanged(row, row);
}
m_cutIndexes.clear();
m_model->filesToMove.clear();
updateActions();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 9,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void perf_output_sample(struct perf_output_handle *handle,
struct perf_event_header *header,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct perf_event *event)
{
u64 sample_type = data->type;
perf_output_put(handle, *header);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_IP)
perf_output_put(handle, data->ip);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_TID)
perf_output_put(handle, data->tid_entry);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_TIME)
perf_output_put(handle, data->time);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_ADDR)
perf_output_put(handle, data->addr);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_ID)
perf_output_put(handle, data->id);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_STREAM_ID)
perf_output_put(handle, data->stream_id);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CPU)
perf_output_put(handle, data->cpu_entry);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PERIOD)
perf_output_put(handle, data->period);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_READ)
perf_output_read(handle, event);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN) {
if (data->callchain) {
int size = 1;
if (data->callchain)
size += data->callchain->nr;
size *= sizeof(u64);
__output_copy(handle, data->callchain, size);
} else {
u64 nr = 0;
perf_output_put(handle, nr);
}
}
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW) {
if (data->raw) {
perf_output_put(handle, data->raw->size);
__output_copy(handle, data->raw->data,
data->raw->size);
} else {
struct {
u32 size;
u32 data;
} raw = {
.size = sizeof(u32),
.data = 0,
};
perf_output_put(handle, raw);
}
}
if (!event->attr.watermark) {
int wakeup_events = event->attr.wakeup_events;
if (wakeup_events) {
struct ring_buffer *rb = handle->rb;
int events = local_inc_return(&rb->events);
if (events >= wakeup_events) {
local_sub(wakeup_events, &rb->events);
local_inc(&rb->wakeup);
}
}
}
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_STACK) {
if (data->br_stack) {
size_t size;
size = data->br_stack->nr
* sizeof(struct perf_branch_entry);
perf_output_put(handle, data->br_stack->nr);
perf_output_copy(handle, data->br_stack->entries, size);
} else {
/*
* we always store at least the value of nr
*/
u64 nr = 0;
perf_output_put(handle, nr);
}
}
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER) {
u64 abi = data->regs_user.abi;
/*
* If there are no regs to dump, notice it through
* first u64 being zero (PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_ABI_NONE).
*/
perf_output_put(handle, abi);
if (abi) {
u64 mask = event->attr.sample_regs_user;
perf_output_sample_regs(handle,
data->regs_user.regs,
mask);
}
}
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER)
perf_output_sample_ustack(handle,
data->stack_user_size,
data->regs_user.regs);
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 31,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool XSSAuditor::EraseDangerousAttributesIfInjected(
const FilterTokenRequest& request) {
bool did_block_script = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < request.token.Attributes().size(); ++i) {
bool erase_attribute = false;
bool value_contains_java_script_url = false;
const HTMLToken::Attribute& attribute = request.token.Attributes().at(i);
if (IsNameOfInlineEventHandler(attribute.NameAsVector())) {
erase_attribute = IsContainedInRequest(
Canonicalize(SnippetFromAttribute(request, attribute),
kScriptLikeAttributeTruncation));
} else if (IsSemicolonSeparatedAttribute(attribute)) {
if (IsSemicolonSeparatedValueContainingJavaScriptURL(attribute.Value())) {
value_contains_java_script_url = true;
erase_attribute =
IsContainedInRequest(Canonicalize(
NameFromAttribute(request, attribute), kNoTruncation)) &&
IsContainedInRequest(
Canonicalize(SnippetFromAttribute(request, attribute),
kSemicolonSeparatedScriptLikeAttributeTruncation));
}
} else if (ProtocolIsJavaScript(
StripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(attribute.Value()))) {
value_contains_java_script_url = true;
erase_attribute = IsContainedInRequest(
Canonicalize(SnippetFromAttribute(request, attribute),
kScriptLikeAttributeTruncation));
}
if (!erase_attribute)
continue;
request.token.EraseValueOfAttribute(i);
if (value_contains_java_script_url)
request.token.AppendToAttributeValue(i, kSafeJavaScriptURL);
did_block_script = true;
}
return did_block_script;
}
Commit Message: Restrict the xss audit report URL to same origin
BUG=441275
R=tsepez@chromium.org,mkwst@chromium.org
Change-Id: I27bc8e251b9ad962c3b4fdebf084a2b9152f915d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768367
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516666}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 146,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int p4_next_cntr(int thread, unsigned long *used_mask,
struct p4_event_bind *bind)
{
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < P4_CNTR_LIMIT; i++) {
j = bind->cntr[thread][i];
if (j != -1 && !test_bit(j, used_mask))
return j;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcQueryPointer(ClientPtr client)
{
xQueryPointerReply rep;
WindowPtr pWin, t;
DeviceIntPtr mouse = PickPointer(client);
DeviceIntPtr keyboard;
SpritePtr pSprite;
int rc;
REQUEST(xResourceReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xResourceReq);
rc = dixLookupWindow(&pWin, stuff->id, client, DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
rc = XaceHook(XACE_DEVICE_ACCESS, client, mouse, DixReadAccess);
if (rc != Success && rc != BadAccess)
return rc;
keyboard = GetMaster(mouse, MASTER_KEYBOARD);
pSprite = mouse->spriteInfo->sprite;
if (mouse->valuator->motionHintWindow)
MaybeStopHint(mouse, client);
rep = (xQueryPointerReply) {
.type = X_Reply,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.length = 0,
.mask = event_get_corestate(mouse, keyboard),
.root = (GetCurrentRootWindow(mouse))->drawable.id,
.rootX = pSprite->hot.x,
.rootY = pSprite->hot.y,
.child = None
};
if (pSprite->hot.pScreen == pWin->drawable.pScreen) {
rep.sameScreen = xTrue;
rep.winX = pSprite->hot.x - pWin->drawable.x;
rep.winY = pSprite->hot.y - pWin->drawable.y;
for (t = pSprite->win; t; t = t->parent)
if (t->parent == pWin) {
rep.child = t->drawable.id;
break;
}
}
else {
rep.sameScreen = xFalse;
rep.winX = 0;
rep.winY = 0;
}
#ifdef PANORAMIX
if (!noPanoramiXExtension) {
rep.rootX += screenInfo.screens[0]->x;
rep.rootY += screenInfo.screens[0]->y;
if (stuff->id == rep.root) {
rep.winX += screenInfo.screens[0]->x;
rep.winY += screenInfo.screens[0]->y;
}
}
#endif
if (rc == BadAccess) {
rep.mask = 0;
rep.child = None;
rep.rootX = 0;
rep.rootY = 0;
rep.winX = 0;
rep.winY = 0;
}
WriteReplyToClient(client, sizeof(xQueryPointerReply), &rep);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool StartsHTMLOpenCommentAt(const String& string, size_t start) {
return (start + 3 < string.length() && string[start] == '<' &&
string[start + 1] == '!' && string[start + 2] == '-' &&
string[start + 3] == '-');
}
Commit Message: Restrict the xss audit report URL to same origin
BUG=441275
R=tsepez@chromium.org,mkwst@chromium.org
Change-Id: I27bc8e251b9ad962c3b4fdebf084a2b9152f915d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768367
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516666}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 147,020 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FreeContextBuffer_EnumerateSecurityPackages(void* contextBuffer)
{
int index;
UINT32 cPackages;
SecPkgInfoA* pPackageInfo = (SecPkgInfoA*) contextBuffer;
cPackages = sizeof(SecPkgInfoA_LIST) / sizeof(*(SecPkgInfoA_LIST));
for (index = 0; index < (int) cPackages; index++)
{
if (pPackageInfo[index].Name)
free(pPackageInfo[index].Name);
if (pPackageInfo[index].Comment)
free(pPackageInfo[index].Comment);
}
free(pPackageInfo);
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 58,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __init free_syscall_print_fmt(struct ftrace_event_call *call)
{
struct syscall_metadata *entry = call->data;
if (entry->enter_event == call)
kfree(call->print_fmt);
}
Commit Message: tracing/syscalls: Ignore numbers outside NR_syscalls' range
ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie
outside the range of NR_syscalls. If any of these are called while
syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will
occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers.
# trace-cmd record -e raw_syscalls:* true && trace-cmd report
...
true-653 [000] 384.675777: sys_enter: NR 192 (0, 1000, 3, 4000022, ffffffff, 0)
true-653 [000] 384.675812: sys_exit: NR 192 = 1995915264
true-653 [000] 384.675971: sys_enter: NR 983045 (76f74480, 76f74000, 76f74b28, 76f74480, 76f76f74, 1)
true-653 [000] 384.675988: sys_exit: NR 983045 = 0
...
# trace-cmd record -e syscalls:* true
[ 17.289329] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address aaaaaace
[ 17.289590] pgd = 9e71c000
[ 17.289696] [aaaaaace] *pgd=00000000
[ 17.289985] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[ 17.290169] Modules linked in:
[ 17.290391] CPU: 0 PID: 704 Comm: true Not tainted 3.18.0-rc2+ #21
[ 17.290585] task: 9f4dab00 ti: 9e710000 task.ti: 9e710000
[ 17.290747] PC is at ftrace_syscall_enter+0x48/0x1f8
[ 17.290866] LR is at syscall_trace_enter+0x124/0x184
Fix this by ignoring out-of-NR_syscalls-bounds syscall numbers.
Commit cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
added the check for less than zero, but it should have also checked
for greater than NR_syscalls.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/1414620418-29472-1-git-send-email-rabin@rab.in
Fixes: cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.33+
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Extension::HasEffectiveAccessToAllHosts(
const URLPatternSet& effective_host_permissions,
const std::set<std::string>& api_permissions) {
const URLPatternList patterns = effective_host_permissions.patterns();
for (URLPatternList::const_iterator host = patterns.begin();
host != patterns.end(); ++host) {
if (host->match_all_urls() ||
(host->match_subdomains() && host->host().empty()))
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Prevent extensions from defining homepages with schemes other than valid web extents.
BUG=84402
TEST=ExtensionManifestTest.ParseHomepageURLs
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7089014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87722 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ThreadHeap::PrepareForSweep() {
DCHECK(thread_state_->InAtomicMarkingPause());
DCHECK(thread_state_->CheckThread());
for (int i = 0; i < BlinkGC::kNumberOfArenas; i++)
arenas_[i]->PrepareForSweep();
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 153,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_file_output (const struct url *u, struct http_stat *hs,
struct response *resp, char *hdrval, size_t hdrsize)
{
/* Determine the local filename if needed. Notice that if -O is used
* hstat.local_file is set by http_loop to the argument of -O. */
if (!hs->local_file)
{
char *local_file = NULL;
/* Honor Content-Disposition whether possible. */
if (!opt.content_disposition
|| !resp_header_copy (resp, "Content-Disposition",
hdrval, hdrsize)
|| !parse_content_disposition (hdrval, &local_file))
{
/* The Content-Disposition header is missing or broken.
* Choose unique file name according to given URL. */
hs->local_file = url_file_name (u, NULL);
}
else
{
DEBUGP (("Parsed filename from Content-Disposition: %s\n",
local_file));
hs->local_file = url_file_name (u, local_file);
}
xfree (local_file);
}
hs->temporary = opt.delete_after || opt.spider || !acceptable (hs->local_file);
if (hs->temporary)
{
char *tmp = aprintf ("%s.tmp", hs->local_file);
xfree (hs->local_file);
hs->local_file = tmp;
}
/* TODO: perform this check only once. */
if (!hs->existence_checked && file_exists_p (hs->local_file, NULL))
{
if (opt.noclobber && !opt.output_document)
{
/* If opt.noclobber is turned on and file already exists, do not
retrieve the file. But if the output_document was given, then this
test was already done and the file didn't exist. Hence the !opt.output_document */
return RETRUNNEEDED;
}
else if (!ALLOW_CLOBBER)
{
char *unique = unique_name (hs->local_file, true);
if (unique != hs->local_file)
xfree (hs->local_file);
hs->local_file = unique;
}
}
hs->existence_checked = true;
/* Support timestamping */
if (opt.timestamping && !hs->timestamp_checked)
{
uerr_t timestamp_err = set_file_timestamp (hs);
if (timestamp_err != RETROK)
return timestamp_err;
}
return RETROK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabStrip::DropArrow::DropArrow(const BrowserRootView::DropIndex& index,
bool point_down,
views::Widget* context)
: index(index), point_down(point_down) {
arrow_view = new views::ImageView;
arrow_view->SetImage(GetDropArrowImage(point_down));
arrow_window = new views::Widget;
views::Widget::InitParams params(views::Widget::InitParams::TYPE_POPUP);
params.keep_on_top = true;
params.opacity = views::Widget::InitParams::TRANSLUCENT_WINDOW;
params.accept_events = false;
params.bounds = gfx::Rect(g_drop_indicator_width, g_drop_indicator_height);
params.context = context->GetNativeWindow();
arrow_window->Init(params);
arrow_window->SetContentsView(arrow_view);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStripModel::SetOpenerOfWebContentsAt(int index,
WebContents* opener) {
DCHECK(ContainsIndex(index));
DCHECK(opener);
contents_data_[index]->opener = opener;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CloseDownEvents(void)
{
FreeEventList(InputEventList, GetMaximumEventsNum());
InputEventList = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoConsumeTextureCHROMIUM(GLenum target,
const GLbyte* data) {
TRACE_EVENT2("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::DoConsumeTextureCHROMIUM",
"context", logger_.GetLogPrefix(),
"mailbox[0]", static_cast<unsigned char>(data[0]));
const Mailbox& mailbox = *reinterpret_cast<const Mailbox*>(data);
DLOG_IF(ERROR, !mailbox.Verify()) << "ConsumeTextureCHROMIUM was passed a "
"mailbox that was not generated by "
"GenMailboxCHROMIUM.";
scoped_refptr<TextureRef> texture_ref =
texture_manager()->GetTextureInfoForTargetUnlessDefault(&state_, target);
if (!texture_ref.get()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glConsumeTextureCHROMIUM",
"unknown texture for target");
return;
}
GLuint client_id = texture_ref->client_id();
if (!client_id) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glConsumeTextureCHROMIUM", "unknown texture for target");
return;
}
Texture* texture = group_->mailbox_manager()->ConsumeTexture(target, mailbox);
if (!texture) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glConsumeTextureCHROMIUM", "invalid mailbox name");
return;
}
if (texture->target() != target) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glConsumeTextureCHROMIUM", "invalid target");
return;
}
DeleteTexturesHelper(1, &client_id);
texture_ref = texture_manager()->Consume(client_id, texture);
glBindTexture(target, texture_ref->service_id());
TextureUnit& unit = state_.texture_units[state_.active_texture_unit];
unit.bind_target = target;
switch (target) {
case GL_TEXTURE_2D:
unit.bound_texture_2d = texture_ref;
break;
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP:
unit.bound_texture_cube_map = texture_ref;
break;
case GL_TEXTURE_EXTERNAL_OES:
unit.bound_texture_external_oes = texture_ref;
break;
case GL_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB:
unit.bound_texture_rectangle_arb = texture_ref;
break;
default:
NOTREACHED(); // Validation should prevent us getting here.
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,797 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cassign(JF, js_Ast *exp)
{
js_Ast *lhs = exp->a;
js_Ast *rhs = exp->b;
switch (lhs->type) {
case EXP_IDENTIFIER:
cexp(J, F, rhs);
emitlocal(J, F, OP_SETLOCAL, OP_SETVAR, lhs);
break;
case EXP_INDEX:
cexp(J, F, lhs->a);
cexp(J, F, lhs->b);
cexp(J, F, rhs);
emit(J, F, OP_SETPROP);
break;
case EXP_MEMBER:
cexp(J, F, lhs->a);
cexp(J, F, rhs);
emitstring(J, F, OP_SETPROP_S, lhs->b->string);
break;
default:
jsC_error(J, lhs, "invalid l-value in assignment");
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 7,898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ccid3_hc_rx_init(struct ccid *ccid, struct sock *sk)
{
struct ccid3_hc_rx_sock *hc = ccid_priv(ccid);
hc->rx_state = TFRC_RSTATE_NO_DATA;
tfrc_lh_init(&hc->rx_li_hist);
return tfrc_rx_hist_alloc(&hc->rx_hist);
}
Commit Message: dccp: fix info leak via getsockopt(DCCP_SOCKOPT_CCID_TX_INFO)
The CCID3 code fails to initialize the trailing padding bytes of struct
tfrc_tx_info added for alignment on 64 bit architectures. It that for
potentially leaks four bytes kernel stack via the getsockopt() syscall.
Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the
info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,150 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickPrivate Quantum *GetAuthenticPixelCacheNexus(Image *image,const ssize_t x,
const ssize_t y,const size_t columns,const size_t rows,NexusInfo *nexus_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheInfo
*magick_restrict cache_info;
Quantum
*magick_restrict pixels;
/*
Transfer pixels from the cache.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
pixels=QueueAuthenticPixelCacheNexus(image,x,y,columns,rows,MagickTrue,
nexus_info,exception);
if (pixels == (Quantum *) NULL)
return((Quantum *) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (nexus_info->authentic_pixel_cache != MagickFalse)
return(pixels);
if (ReadPixelCachePixels(cache_info,nexus_info,exception) == MagickFalse)
return((Quantum *) NULL);
if (cache_info->metacontent_extent != 0)
if (ReadPixelCacheMetacontent(cache_info,nexus_info,exception) == MagickFalse)
return((Quantum *) NULL);
return(pixels);
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,775 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void truncate_huge_page(struct page *page)
{
cancel_dirty_page(page, /* No IO accounting for huge pages? */0);
ClearPageUptodate(page);
delete_from_page_cache(page);
}
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <abarry@cray.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::logCrossFramePropertyAccess(WebFrame* frame,
WebFrame* target,
bool cross_origin,
const WebString& property_name,
unsigned long long event_id) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
RenderViewObserver,
observers_,
LogCrossFramePropertyAccess(
frame, target, cross_origin, property_name, event_id));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionService::SetBackgroundPageReady(const Extension* extension) {
DCHECK(!extension->background_url().is_empty());
extension_runtime_data_[extension->id()].background_page_ready = true;
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NotificationType::EXTENSION_BACKGROUND_PAGE_READY,
Source<const Extension>(extension),
NotificationService::NoDetails());
}
Commit Message: Unrevert: Show the install dialog for the initial load of an unpacked extension
with plugins.
First landing broke some browser tests.
BUG=83273
TEST=in the extensions managmenet page, with developer mode enabled, Load an unpacked extension on an extension with NPAPI plugins. You should get an install dialog.
TBR=mihaip
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87738 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void restore_phys_nics_to_netns(int netnsfd, struct lxc_conf *conf)
{
int i, ret, oldfd;
char path[MAXPATHLEN];
if (netnsfd < 0)
return;
ret = snprintf(path, MAXPATHLEN, "/proc/self/ns/net");
if (ret < 0 || ret >= MAXPATHLEN) {
WARN("Failed to open monitor netns fd");
return;
}
if ((oldfd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
SYSERROR("Failed to open monitor netns fd");
return;
}
if (setns(netnsfd, 0) != 0) {
SYSERROR("Failed to enter container netns to reset nics");
close(oldfd);
return;
}
for (i=0; i<conf->num_savednics; i++) {
struct saved_nic *s = &conf->saved_nics[i];
if (lxc_netdev_move_by_index(s->ifindex, 1, NULL))
WARN("Error moving nic index:%d back to host netns",
s->ifindex);
}
if (setns(oldfd, 0) != 0)
SYSERROR("Failed to re-enter monitor's netns");
close(oldfd);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tt_cmap4_next( TT_CMap4 cmap )
{
FT_UInt charcode;
if ( cmap->cur_charcode >= 0xFFFFUL )
goto Fail;
charcode = (FT_UInt)cmap->cur_charcode + 1;
if ( charcode < cmap->cur_start )
charcode = cmap->cur_start;
for ( ;; )
{
FT_Byte* values = cmap->cur_values;
FT_UInt end = cmap->cur_end;
FT_Int delta = cmap->cur_delta;
if ( charcode <= end )
{
if ( values )
{
FT_Byte* p = values + 2 * ( charcode - cmap->cur_start );
do
{
FT_UInt gindex = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( gindex != 0 )
{
gindex = (FT_UInt)( ( gindex + delta ) & 0xFFFFU );
if ( gindex != 0 )
{
cmap->cur_charcode = charcode;
cmap->cur_gindex = gindex;
return;
}
}
} while ( ++charcode <= end );
}
else
{
do
{
FT_UInt gindex = (FT_UInt)( ( charcode + delta ) & 0xFFFFU );
if ( gindex != 0 )
{
cmap->cur_charcode = charcode;
cmap->cur_gindex = gindex;
return;
}
} while ( ++charcode <= end );
}
}
/* we need to find another range */
if ( tt_cmap4_set_range( cmap, cmap->cur_range + 1 ) < 0 )
break;
if ( charcode < cmap->cur_start )
charcode = cmap->cur_start;
}
Fail:
cmap->cur_charcode = (FT_UInt32)0xFFFFFFFFUL;
cmap->cur_gindex = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 6,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: enum print_line_t trace_handle_return(struct trace_seq *s)
{
return trace_seq_has_overflowed(s) ?
TRACE_TYPE_PARTIAL_LINE : TRACE_TYPE_HANDLED;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int virtnet_restore(struct virtio_device *vdev)
{
struct virtnet_info *vi = vdev->priv;
int err, i;
err = init_vqs(vi);
if (err)
return err;
virtio_device_ready(vdev);
if (netif_running(vi->dev)) {
for (i = 0; i < vi->curr_queue_pairs; i++)
if (!try_fill_recv(vi, &vi->rq[i], GFP_KERNEL))
schedule_delayed_work(&vi->refill, 0);
for (i = 0; i < vi->max_queue_pairs; i++)
virtnet_napi_enable(&vi->rq[i]);
}
netif_device_attach(vi->dev);
rtnl_lock();
virtnet_set_queues(vi, vi->curr_queue_pairs);
rtnl_unlock();
err = register_hotcpu_notifier(&vi->nb);
if (err)
return err;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: virtio-net: drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST
virtio declares support for NETIF_F_FRAGLIST, but assumes
that there are at most MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2 fragments which isn't
always true with a fraglist.
A longer fraglist in the skb will make the call to skb_to_sgvec overflow
the sg array, leading to memory corruption.
Drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST so we only get what we can handle.
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rds_tcp_set_unloading(void)
{
atomic_set(&rds_tcp_unloading, 1);
}
Commit Message: net: rds: force to destroy connection if t_sock is NULL in rds_tcp_kill_sock().
When it is to cleanup net namespace, rds_tcp_exit_net() will call
rds_tcp_kill_sock(), if t_sock is NULL, it will not call
rds_conn_destroy(), rds_conn_path_destroy() and rds_tcp_conn_free() to free
connection, and the worker cp_conn_w is not stopped, afterwards the net is freed in
net_drop_ns(); While cp_conn_w rds_connect_worker() will call rds_tcp_conn_path_connect()
and reference 'net' which has already been freed.
In rds_tcp_conn_path_connect(), rds_tcp_set_callbacks() will set t_sock = sock before
sock->ops->connect, but if connect() is failed, it will call
rds_tcp_restore_callbacks() and set t_sock = NULL, if connect is always
failed, rds_connect_worker() will try to reconnect all the time, so
rds_tcp_kill_sock() will never to cancel worker cp_conn_w and free the
connections.
Therefore, the condition !tc->t_sock is not needed if it is going to do
cleanup_net->rds_tcp_exit_net->rds_tcp_kill_sock, because tc->t_sock is always
NULL, and there is on other path to cancel cp_conn_w and free
connection. So this patch is to fix this.
rds_tcp_kill_sock():
...
if (net != c_net || !tc->t_sock)
...
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in inet_create+0xbcc/0xd28
net/ipv4/af_inet.c:340
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8003496a4684 by task kworker/u8:4/3721
CPU: 3 PID: 3721 Comm: kworker/u8:4 Not tainted 5.1.0 #11
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Workqueue: krdsd rds_connect_worker
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3c0 arch/arm64/kernel/time.c:53
show_stack+0x28/0x38 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:152
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x120/0x188 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x68/0x278 mm/kasan/report.c:253
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x21c/0x348 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load4_noabort+0x30/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:429
inet_create+0xbcc/0xd28 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:340
__sock_create+0x4f8/0x770 net/socket.c:1276
sock_create_kern+0x50/0x68 net/socket.c:1322
rds_tcp_conn_path_connect+0x2b4/0x690 net/rds/tcp_connect.c:114
rds_connect_worker+0x108/0x1d0 net/rds/threads.c:175
process_one_work+0x6e8/0x1700 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x3b0/0xdd0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x2f0/0x378 kernel/kthread.c:255
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1117
Allocated by task 687:
save_stack mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 [inline]
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0x180 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
kasan_slab_alloc+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:444 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2705 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2713 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x14c/0x388 mm/slub.c:2718
kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:697 [inline]
net_alloc net/core/net_namespace.c:384 [inline]
copy_net_ns+0xc4/0x2d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:424
create_new_namespaces+0x300/0x658 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xa0/0x198 kernel/nsproxy.c:206
ksys_unshare+0x340/0x628 kernel/fork.c:2577
__do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2645 [inline]
__se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2643 [inline]
__arm64_sys_unshare+0x38/0x58 kernel/fork.c:2643
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:47 [inline]
el0_svc_common+0x168/0x390 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:83
el0_svc_handler+0x60/0xd0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:129
el0_svc+0x8/0xc arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:960
Freed by task 264:
save_stack mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 [inline]
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x114/0x220 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1370 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1397 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2952 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0xb8/0x3a8 mm/slub.c:2968
net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:400 [inline]
net_drop_ns.part.6+0x78/0x90 net/core/net_namespace.c:407
net_drop_ns net/core/net_namespace.c:406 [inline]
cleanup_net+0x53c/0x6d8 net/core/net_namespace.c:569
process_one_work+0x6e8/0x1700 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x3b0/0xdd0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x2f0/0x378 kernel/kthread.c:255
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1117
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8003496a3f80
which belongs to the cache net_namespace of size 7872
The buggy address is located 1796 bytes inside of
7872-byte region [ffff8003496a3f80, ffff8003496a5e40)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffff7e000d25a800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff80036ce4b000
index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0xffffe0000008100(slab|head)
raw: 0ffffe0000008100 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff80036ce4b000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080040004 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8003496a4580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8003496a4600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8003496a4680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8003496a4700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8003496a4780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 467fa15356ac("RDS-TCP: Support multiple RDS-TCP listen endpoints, one per netns.")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,198 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void add_child(struct rev_info *revs, struct commit *parent, struct commit *child)
{
struct commit_list *l = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*l));
l->item = child;
l->next = add_decoration(&revs->children, &parent->object, l);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: find_cert(krb5_context context, struct krb5_pk_identity *id,
hx509_query *q, hx509_cert *cert)
{
struct certfind cf[4] = {
{ "MobileMe EKU", NULL },
{ "PKINIT EKU", NULL },
{ "MS EKU", NULL },
{ "any (or no)", NULL }
};
int ret = HX509_CERT_NOT_FOUND;
size_t i, start = 1;
unsigned oids[] = { 1, 2, 840, 113635, 100, 3, 2, 1 };
const heim_oid mobileMe = { sizeof(oids)/sizeof(oids[0]), oids };
if (id->flags & PKINIT_BTMM)
start = 0;
cf[0].oid = &mobileMe;
cf[1].oid = &asn1_oid_id_pkekuoid;
cf[2].oid = &asn1_oid_id_pkinit_ms_eku;
cf[3].oid = NULL;
for (i = start; i < sizeof(cf)/sizeof(cf[0]); i++) {
ret = hx509_query_match_eku(q, cf[i].oid);
if (ret) {
pk_copy_error(context, context->hx509ctx, ret,
"Failed setting %s OID", cf[i].type);
return ret;
}
ret = hx509_certs_find(context->hx509ctx, id->certs, q, cert);
if (ret == 0)
break;
pk_copy_error(context, context->hx509ctx, ret,
"Failed finding certificate with %s OID", cf[i].type);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auritor.com>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
CWE ID: CWE-320 | 0 | 89,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys)
{
while (!list_empty(keys)) {
struct key *key =
list_entry(keys->next, struct key, graveyard_link);
list_del(&key->graveyard_link);
kdebug("- %u", key->serial);
key_check(key);
/* Throw away the key data if the key is instantiated */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags) &&
!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags) &&
key->type->destroy)
key->type->destroy(key);
security_key_free(key);
/* deal with the user's key tracking and quota */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
key->user->qnkeys--;
key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
}
atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
key_user_put(key->user);
kfree(key->description);
memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(*key));
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
}
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 167,695 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderBox::offsetLeft() const
{
return adjustedPositionRelativeToOffsetParent(topLeftLocation()).x();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ucma_set_event_context(struct ucma_context *ctx,
struct rdma_cm_event *event,
struct ucma_event *uevent)
{
uevent->ctx = ctx;
switch (event->event) {
case RDMA_CM_EVENT_MULTICAST_JOIN:
case RDMA_CM_EVENT_MULTICAST_ERROR:
uevent->mc = (struct ucma_multicast *)
event->param.ud.private_data;
uevent->resp.uid = uevent->mc->uid;
uevent->resp.id = uevent->mc->id;
break;
default:
uevent->resp.uid = ctx->uid;
uevent->resp.id = ctx->id;
break;
}
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationURLLoaderImpl::OnComplete(
const network::URLLoaderCompletionStatus& status) {
if (status.error_code == net::OK)
return;
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END2("navigation", "Navigation timeToResponseStarted", this,
"&NavigationURLLoaderImpl", this, "success", false);
delegate_->OnRequestFailed(status);
}
Commit Message: Abort navigations on 304 responses.
A recent change (https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1161479)
accidentally resulted in treating 304 responses as downloads. This CL
treats them as ERR_ABORTED instead. This doesn't exactly match old
behavior, which passed them on to the renderer, which then aborted them.
The new code results in correctly restoring the original URL in the
omnibox, and has a shiny new test to prevent future regressions.
Bug: 882270
Change-Id: Ic73dcce9e9596d43327b13acde03b4ed9bd0c82e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1252684
Commit-Queue: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595641}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_encode_secinfo(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, __be32 nfserr,
struct nfsd4_secinfo *secinfo)
{
struct xdr_stream *xdr = &resp->xdr;
return nfsd4_do_encode_secinfo(xdr, nfserr, secinfo->si_exp);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void openpic_gcr_write(OpenPICState *opp, uint64_t val)
{
bool mpic_proxy = false;
if (val & GCR_RESET) {
openpic_reset(DEVICE(opp));
return;
}
opp->gcr &= ~opp->mpic_mode_mask;
opp->gcr |= val & opp->mpic_mode_mask;
/* Set external proxy mode */
if ((val & opp->mpic_mode_mask) == GCR_MODE_PROXY) {
mpic_proxy = true;
}
ppce500_set_mpic_proxy(mpic_proxy);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,683 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PagePopupBlackBerry* WebPage::popup()
{
return d->m_selectPopup;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _nfs4_getdevicelist(struct nfs_server *server,
const struct nfs_fh *fh,
struct pnfs_devicelist *devlist)
{
struct nfs4_getdevicelist_args args = {
.fh = fh,
.layoutclass = server->pnfs_curr_ld->id,
};
struct nfs4_getdevicelist_res res = {
.devlist = devlist,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_GETDEVICELIST],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
int status;
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
status = nfs4_call_sync(server->client, server, &msg, &args.seq_args,
&res.seq_res, 0);
dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, status);
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<ui::LayerTreeOwner> CreateLayerTreeForSnapshot(
aura::Window* root_window) {
LayerSet blocked_layers;
for (auto* browser : *BrowserList::GetInstance()) {
if (browser->profile()->IsOffTheRecord())
blocked_layers.insert(browser->window()->GetNativeWindow()->layer());
}
LayerSet excluded_layers;
if (chromeos::GetAshConfig() != ash::Config::MASH) {
aura::Window* overlay_container = ash::Shell::GetContainer(
root_window, ash::kShellWindowId_OverlayContainer);
if (overlay_container != nullptr)
excluded_layers.insert(overlay_container->layer());
}
auto layer_tree_owner = ::wm::RecreateLayersWithClosure(
root_window, base::BindRepeating(
[](LayerSet blocked_layers, LayerSet excluded_layers,
ui::LayerOwner* owner) -> std::unique_ptr<ui::Layer> {
if (blocked_layers.count(owner->layer()->parent()))
return nullptr;
if (blocked_layers.count(owner->layer())) {
auto layer = std::make_unique<ui::Layer>(
ui::LayerType::LAYER_SOLID_COLOR);
layer->SetBounds(owner->layer()->bounds());
layer->SetColor(SK_ColorBLACK);
return layer;
}
if (excluded_layers.count(owner->layer()))
return nullptr;
return owner->RecreateLayer();
},
std::move(blocked_layers), std::move(excluded_layers)));
DCHECK(layer_tree_owner);
auto* root_layer = layer_tree_owner->root();
root_layer->SetTransform(gfx::Transform());
root_window->layer()->Add(root_layer);
root_window->layer()->StackAtBottom(root_layer);
return layer_tree_owner;
}
Commit Message: arc: add test for blocking incognito windows in screenshot
BUG=778852
TEST=ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkServiceUnittest.
CapturingScreenshotBlocksIncognitoWindows
Change-Id: I0bfa5a486759783d7c8926a309c6b5da9b02dcc6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914983
Commit-Queue: Muyuan Li <muyuanli@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Hector Chavez <lhchavez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536438}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 152,295 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_da_reada_buf(
struct xfs_trans *trans,
struct xfs_inode *dp,
xfs_dablk_t bno,
xfs_daddr_t mappedbno,
int whichfork,
const struct xfs_buf_ops *ops)
{
struct xfs_buf_map map;
struct xfs_buf_map *mapp;
int nmap;
int error;
mapp = ↦
nmap = 1;
error = xfs_dabuf_map(trans, dp, bno, mappedbno, whichfork,
&mapp, &nmap);
if (error) {
/* mapping a hole is not an error, but we don't continue */
if (error == -1)
error = 0;
goto out_free;
}
mappedbno = mapp[0].bm_bn;
xfs_buf_readahead_map(dp->i_mount->m_ddev_targp, mapp, nmap, ops);
out_free:
if (mapp != &map)
kmem_free(mapp);
if (error)
return -1;
return mappedbno;
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix directory hash ordering bug
Commit f5ea1100 ("xfs: add CRCs to dir2/da node blocks") introduced
in 3.10 incorrectly converted the btree hash index array pointer in
xfs_da3_fixhashpath(). It resulted in the the current hash always
being compared against the first entry in the btree rather than the
current block index into the btree block's hash entry array. As a
result, it was comparing the wrong hashes, and so could misorder the
entries in the btree.
For most cases, this doesn't cause any problems as it requires hash
collisions to expose the ordering problem. However, when there are
hash collisions within a directory there is a very good probability
that the entries will be ordered incorrectly and that actually
matters when duplicate hashes are placed into or removed from the
btree block hash entry array.
This bug results in an on-disk directory corruption and that results
in directory verifier functions throwing corruption warnings into
the logs. While no data or directory entries are lost, access to
them may be compromised, and attempts to remove entries from a
directory that has suffered from this corruption may result in a
filesystem shutdown. xfs_repair will fix the directory hash
ordering without data loss occuring.
[dchinner: wrote useful a commit message]
cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void nf_bridge_push_encap_header(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
unsigned int len = nf_bridge_encap_header_len(skb);
skb_push(skb, len);
skb->network_header -= len;
}
Commit Message: bridge: reset IPCB in br_parse_ip_options
Commit 462fb2af9788a82 (bridge : Sanitize skb before it enters the IP
stack), missed one IPCB init before calling ip_options_compile()
Thanks to Scot Doyle for his tests and bug reports.
Reported-by: Scot Doyle <lkml@scotdoyle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Hiroaki SHIMODA <shimoda.hiroaki@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Bandan Das <bandan.das@stratus.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Cc: Jan Lübbe <jluebbe@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 34,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mdiobus_register_device(struct mdio_device *mdiodev)
{
int err;
if (mdiodev->bus->mdio_map[mdiodev->addr])
return -EBUSY;
if (mdiodev->flags & MDIO_DEVICE_FLAG_PHY) {
err = mdiobus_register_gpiod(mdiodev);
if (err)
return err;
}
mdiodev->bus->mdio_map[mdiodev->addr] = mdiodev;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mdio_bus: Fix use-after-free on device_register fails
KASAN has found use-after-free in fixed_mdio_bus_init,
commit 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call
put_device on device_register() failure") call put_device()
while device_register() fails,give up the last reference
to the device and allow mdiobus_release to be executed
,kfreeing the bus. However in most drives, mdiobus_free
be called to free the bus while mdiobus_register fails.
use-after-free occurs when access bus again, this patch
revert it to let mdiobus_free free the bus.
KASAN report details as below:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881dc824d78 by task syz-executor.0/3524
CPU: 1 PID: 3524 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x65/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x283/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f6215c19c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f6215c19c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f6215c1a6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
Allocated by task 3524:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:496
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:740 [inline]
mdiobus_alloc_size+0x54/0x1b0 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:143
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x163/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 3524:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:458
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1409 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1436 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2986 [inline]
kfree+0xe1/0x270 mm/slub.c:3938
device_release+0x78/0x200 drivers/base/core.c:919
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:662 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:691 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:67 [inline]
kobject_put+0x146/0x240 lib/kobject.c:708
put_device+0x1c/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:2060
__mdiobus_register+0x483/0x560 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:382
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x26b/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881dc824c80
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 248 bytes inside of
2048-byte region [ffff8881dc824c80, ffff8881dc825480)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0007720800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881f6c02800 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x2fffc0000010200(slab|head)
raw: 02fffc0000010200 0000000000000000 0000000500000001 ffff8881f6c02800
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8881dc824c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8881dc824c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8881dc824d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8881dc824d80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8881dc824e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call put_device on device_register() failure")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 89,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gs_to_exit_with_code(const gs_memory_t *mem, int exit_status, int code)
{
return gs_main_finit(get_minst_from_memory(mem), exit_status, code);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 2,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NO_INLINE JsVar *jspGetBuiltinPrototype(JsVar *obj) {
if (jsvIsArray(obj)) {
JsVar *v = jspFindPrototypeFor("Array");
if (v) return v;
}
if (jsvIsObject(obj) || jsvIsArray(obj)) {
JsVar *v = jspFindPrototypeFor("Object");
if (v==obj) { // don't return ourselves
jsvUnLock(v);
v = 0;
}
return v;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix stack overflow if interpreting a file full of '{' (fix #1448)
CWE ID: CWE-674 | 0 | 82,340 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int CLASS foveon_fixed (void *ptr, int size, const char *name)
{
void *dp;
unsigned dim[3];
dp = foveon_camf_matrix (dim, name);
if (!dp) return 0;
memcpy (ptr, dp, size*4);
free (dp);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 43,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint8_t* output() const {
return output_ + BorderTop() * kOuterBlockSize + BorderLeft();
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API void object_properties_init(zend_object *object, zend_class_entry *class_type) /* {{{ */
{
int i;
if (class_type->default_properties_count) {
object->properties_table = emalloc(sizeof(zval*) * class_type->default_properties_count);
for (i = 0; i < class_type->default_properties_count; i++) {
object->properties_table[i] = class_type->default_properties_table[i];
if (class_type->default_properties_table[i]) {
#if ZTS
ALLOC_ZVAL( object->properties_table[i]);
MAKE_COPY_ZVAL(&class_type->default_properties_table[i], object->properties_table[i]);
#else
Z_ADDREF_P(object->properties_table[i]);
#endif
}
}
object->properties = NULL;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void server_connect_failed(SERVER_REC *server, const char *msg)
{
g_return_if_fail(IS_SERVER(server));
lookup_servers = g_slist_remove(lookup_servers, server);
signal_emit("server connect failed", 2, server, msg);
if (server->connect_tag != -1) {
g_source_remove(server->connect_tag);
server->connect_tag = -1;
}
if (server->handle != NULL) {
net_sendbuffer_destroy(server->handle, TRUE);
server->handle = NULL;
}
if (server->connect_pipe[0] != NULL) {
g_io_channel_close(server->connect_pipe[0]);
g_io_channel_unref(server->connect_pipe[0]);
g_io_channel_close(server->connect_pipe[1]);
g_io_channel_unref(server->connect_pipe[1]);
server->connect_pipe[0] = NULL;
server->connect_pipe[1] = NULL;
}
server_unref(server);
}
Commit Message: Check if an SSL certificate matches the hostname of the server we are connecting to
git-svn-id: http://svn.irssi.org/repos/irssi/trunk@5104 dbcabf3a-b0e7-0310-adc4-f8d773084564
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void callWithScriptStateLongMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
ScriptState* currentState = ScriptState::current();
if (!currentState)
return;
ScriptState& state = *currentState;
int result = imp->callWithScriptStateLongMethod(&state);
if (state.hadException()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> exception = state.exception();
state.clearException();
throwError(exception, info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, result);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,184 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PlatformFont* PlatformFont::CreateFromNameAndSize(const std::string& font_name,
int font_size) {
TRACE_EVENT0("fonts", "PlatformFont::CreateFromNameAndSize");
return new PlatformFontSkia(font_name, font_size);
}
Commit Message: Take default system font size from PlatformFont
The default font returned by Skia should take the initial size from the
default value kDefaultBaseFontSize specified in PlatformFont.
R=robliao@chromium.org, asvitkine@chromium.org
CC=benck@google.com
Bug: 944227
Change-Id: I6b230b80c349abbe5968edb3cebdd6e89db4c4a6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1642738
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Etienne Bergeron <etienneb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#666299}
CWE ID: CWE-862 | 0 | 155,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sp<IMediaPlayer> MediaPlayerService::create(const sp<IMediaPlayerClient>& client,
audio_session_t audioSessionId)
{
pid_t pid = IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingPid();
int32_t connId = android_atomic_inc(&mNextConnId);
sp<Client> c = new Client(
this, pid, connId, client, audioSessionId,
IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingUid());
ALOGV("Create new client(%d) from pid %d, uid %d, ", connId, pid,
IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingUid());
wp<Client> w = c;
{
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
mClients.add(w);
}
return c;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,972 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileAPIMessageFilter::OnChannelClosing() {
BrowserMessageFilter::OnChannelClosing();
for (base::hash_set<std::string>::const_iterator iter = blob_urls_.begin();
iter != blob_urls_.end(); ++iter) {
blob_storage_context_->controller()->RemoveBlob(GURL(*iter));
}
if (!open_filesystem_urls_.empty()) {
DLOG(INFO)
<< "File API: Renderer process shut down before NotifyCloseFile"
<< " for " << open_filesystem_urls_.size() << " files opened in PPAPI";
}
for (std::multiset<GURL>::const_iterator iter =
open_filesystem_urls_.begin();
iter != open_filesystem_urls_.end(); ++iter) {
FileSystemURL url(*iter);
FileSystemOperation* operation = context_->CreateFileSystemOperation(
url, NULL);
if (operation)
operation->NotifyCloseFile(url);
}
}
Commit Message: File permission fix: now we selectively grant read permission for Sandboxed files
We also need to check the read permission and call GrantReadFile() for
sandboxed files for CreateSnapshotFile().
BUG=162114
TEST=manual
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11280231
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@170181 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 119,020 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: g_NPN_GetProperty(NPP instance, NPObject *npobj, NPIdentifier propertyName,
NPVariant *result)
{
if (!thread_check()) {
npw_printf("WARNING: NPN_GetProperty not called from the main thread\n");
return false;
}
if (instance == NULL)
return false;
PluginInstance *plugin = PLUGIN_INSTANCE(instance);
if (plugin == NULL)
return false;
if (!npobj || !npobj->_class || !npobj->_class->getProperty)
return false;
D(bugiI("NPN_GetProperty instance=%p, npobj=%p, propertyName=%p\n", instance, npobj, propertyName));
npw_plugin_instance_ref(plugin);
bool ret = invoke_NPN_GetProperty(plugin, npobj, propertyName, result);
npw_plugin_instance_unref(plugin);
gchar *result_str = string_of_NPVariant(result);
D(bugiD("NPN_GetProperty return: %d (%s)\n", ret, result_str));
g_free(result_str);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,042 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::ContentsMouseEvent(
WebContents* source, const gfx::Point& location, bool motion) {
if (!GetStatusBubble())
return;
if (source == chrome::GetActiveWebContents(this)) {
GetStatusBubble()->MouseMoved(location, !motion);
if (!motion)
GetStatusBubble()->SetURL(GURL(), std::string());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,754 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::SetValueFromRenderer(const String& value) {
DCHECK_NE(type(), InputTypeNames::file);
TextControlElement::SetSuggestedValue(String());
DCHECK(value == input_type_->SanitizeUserInputValue(value) ||
input_type_->SanitizeUserInputValue(value).IsEmpty());
DCHECK(!value.IsNull());
SetValueBeforeFirstUserEditIfNotSet();
non_attribute_value_ = value;
has_dirty_value_ = true;
needs_to_update_view_value_ = false;
CheckIfValueWasReverted(value);
if (!IsTextField())
DispatchInputEvent();
NotifyFormStateChanged();
SetNeedsValidityCheck();
SetAutofilled(false);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_read_enda(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
AVStream *st;
int little_endian;
if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1)
return 0;
st = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams-1];
little_endian = avio_rb16(pb) & 0xFF;
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_TRACE, "enda %d\n", little_endian);
if (little_endian == 1) {
switch (st->codecpar->codec_id) {
case AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_S24BE:
st->codecpar->codec_id = AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_S24LE;
break;
case AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_S32BE:
st->codecpar->codec_id = AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_S32LE;
break;
case AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_F32BE:
st->codecpar->codec_id = AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_F32LE;
break;
case AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_F64BE:
st->codecpar->codec_id = AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_F64LE;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,433 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct rmap_item *alloc_rmap_item(void)
{
struct rmap_item *rmap_item;
rmap_item = kmem_cache_zalloc(rmap_item_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (rmap_item)
ksm_rmap_items++;
return rmap_item;
}
Commit Message: ksm: fix NULL pointer dereference in scan_get_next_rmap_item()
Andrea Righi reported a case where an exiting task can race against
ksmd::scan_get_next_rmap_item (http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/6/1/742) easily
triggering a NULL pointer dereference in ksmd.
ksm_scan.mm_slot == &ksm_mm_head with only one registered mm
CPU 1 (__ksm_exit) CPU 2 (scan_get_next_rmap_item)
list_empty() is false
lock slot == &ksm_mm_head
list_del(slot->mm_list)
(list now empty)
unlock
lock
slot = list_entry(slot->mm_list.next)
(list is empty, so slot is still ksm_mm_head)
unlock
slot->mm == NULL ... Oops
Close this race by revalidating that the new slot is not simply the list
head again.
Andrea's test case:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define BUFSIZE getpagesize()
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
void *ptr;
if (posix_memalign(&ptr, getpagesize(), BUFSIZE) < 0) {
perror("posix_memalign");
exit(1);
}
if (madvise(ptr, BUFSIZE, MADV_MERGEABLE) < 0) {
perror("madvise");
exit(1);
}
*(char *)NULL = 0;
return 0;
}
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PrintJobWorker::PostTask(const tracked_objects::Location& from_here,
const base::Closure& task) {
if (task_runner_.get())
return task_runner_->PostTask(from_here, task);
return false;
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::CanCreateWindow(
RenderFrameHost* opener,
const GURL& opener_url,
const GURL& opener_top_level_frame_url,
const url::Origin& source_origin,
content::mojom::WindowContainerType container_type,
const GURL& target_url,
const content::Referrer& referrer,
const std::string& frame_name,
WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
const blink::mojom::WindowFeatures& features,
bool user_gesture,
bool opener_suppressed,
bool* no_javascript_access) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(opener);
content::WebContents* web_contents =
content::WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(opener);
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
DCHECK(profile);
*no_javascript_access = false;
if (container_type == content::mojom::WindowContainerType::BACKGROUND) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
auto* process_map = extensions::ProcessMap::Get(profile);
auto* registry = extensions::ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile);
if (!URLHasExtensionBackgroundPermission(process_map, registry, opener_url,
opener->GetProcess()->GetID())) {
return false;
}
const Extension* extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetExtensionOrAppByURL(opener_url);
if (extension && !extensions::BackgroundInfo::AllowJSAccess(extension))
*no_javascript_access = true;
#endif
return true;
}
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
if (extensions::WebViewRendererState::GetInstance()->IsGuest(
opener->GetProcess()->GetID())) {
return true;
}
if (target_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme)) {
auto* registry = extensions::ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile);
const Extension* extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetExtensionOrAppByURL(target_url);
if (extension && extension->is_platform_app()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(
"Extensions.AppLoadedInTab",
ClassifyAppLoadedInTabSource(opener_url, extension),
APP_LOADED_IN_TAB_SOURCE_MAX);
return false;
}
}
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
HostContentSettingsMap* content_settings =
HostContentSettingsMapFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
if (FlashDownloadInterception::ShouldStopFlashDownloadAction(
content_settings, opener_top_level_frame_url, target_url,
user_gesture)) {
FlashDownloadInterception::InterceptFlashDownloadNavigation(
web_contents, opener_top_level_frame_url);
return false;
}
#endif
if (auto* prerender_contents =
prerender::PrerenderContents::FromWebContents(web_contents)) {
prerender_contents->Destroy(prerender::FINAL_STATUS_CREATE_NEW_WINDOW);
return false;
}
BlockedWindowParams blocked_params(target_url, source_origin, referrer,
frame_name, disposition, features,
user_gesture, opener_suppressed);
NavigateParams nav_params = blocked_params.CreateNavigateParams(web_contents);
if (MaybeBlockPopup(web_contents, opener_top_level_frame_url, &nav_params,
nullptr /*=open_url_params*/,
blocked_params.features())) {
return false;
}
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
auto* single_tab_mode_helper =
SingleTabModeTabHelper::FromWebContents(web_contents);
if (single_tab_mode_helper &&
single_tab_mode_helper->block_all_new_windows()) {
TabModelList::HandlePopupNavigation(&nav_params);
return false;
}
#endif
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium::didChangeReadyState(WebKit::WebRTCPeerConnectionHandlerClient::ReadyState state)
{
m_client->didChangeReadyState(static_cast<RTCPeerConnectionHandlerClient::ReadyState>(state));
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MarginInfo::MarginInfo(LayoutBlockFlow* blockFlow, LayoutUnit beforeBorderPadding, LayoutUnit afterBorderPadding)
: m_canCollapseMarginAfterWithLastChild(true)
, m_atBeforeSideOfBlock(true)
, m_atAfterSideOfBlock(false)
, m_hasMarginBeforeQuirk(false)
, m_hasMarginAfterQuirk(false)
, m_determinedMarginBeforeQuirk(false)
, m_discardMargin(false)
, m_lastChildIsSelfCollapsingBlockWithClearance(false)
{
const ComputedStyle& blockStyle = blockFlow->styleRef();
ASSERT(blockFlow->isLayoutView() || blockFlow->parent());
m_canCollapseWithChildren = !blockFlow->createsNewFormattingContext() && !blockFlow->isLayoutFlowThread() && !blockFlow->isLayoutView();
m_canCollapseMarginBeforeWithChildren = m_canCollapseWithChildren && !beforeBorderPadding && blockStyle.marginBeforeCollapse() != MSEPARATE;
m_canCollapseMarginAfterWithChildren = m_canCollapseWithChildren && !afterBorderPadding
&& (blockStyle.logicalHeight().isAuto() && !blockStyle.logicalHeight().value()) && blockStyle.marginAfterCollapse() != MSEPARATE;
m_quirkContainer = blockFlow->isTableCell() || blockFlow->isBody();
m_discardMargin = m_canCollapseMarginBeforeWithChildren && blockFlow->mustDiscardMarginBefore();
m_positiveMargin = (m_canCollapseMarginBeforeWithChildren && !blockFlow->mustDiscardMarginBefore()) ? blockFlow->maxPositiveMarginBefore() : LayoutUnit();
m_negativeMargin = (m_canCollapseMarginBeforeWithChildren && !blockFlow->mustDiscardMarginBefore()) ? blockFlow->maxNegativeMarginBefore() : LayoutUnit();
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 122,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool decode_vlv_request(void *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB in, void *_out)
{
void **out = (void **)_out;
DATA_BLOB assertion_value, context_id;
struct asn1_data *data = asn1_init(mem_ctx);
struct ldb_vlv_req_control *lvrc;
if (!data) return false;
if (!asn1_load(data, in)) {
return false;
}
lvrc = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_vlv_req_control);
if (!lvrc) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_Integer(data, &(lvrc->beforeCount))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_Integer(data, &(lvrc->afterCount))) {
return false;
}
if (asn1_peek_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(0))) {
lvrc->type = 0;
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(0))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_Integer(data, &(lvrc->match.byOffset.offset))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_Integer(data, &(lvrc->match.byOffset.contentCount))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) { /*SEQUENCE*/
return false;
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) { /*CONTEXT*/
return false;
}
} else {
lvrc->type = 1;
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(1))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_OctetString(data, mem_ctx, &assertion_value)) {
return false;
}
lvrc->match.gtOrEq.value_len = assertion_value.length;
if (lvrc->match.gtOrEq.value_len) {
lvrc->match.gtOrEq.value = talloc_memdup(lvrc, assertion_value.data, assertion_value.length);
if (!(lvrc->match.gtOrEq.value)) {
return false;
}
} else {
lvrc->match.gtOrEq.value = NULL;
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) { /*CONTEXT*/
return false;
}
}
if (asn1_peek_tag(data, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) {
if (!asn1_read_OctetString(data, mem_ctx, &context_id)) {
return false;
}
lvrc->ctxid_len = context_id.length;
if (lvrc->ctxid_len) {
lvrc->contextId = talloc_memdup(lvrc, context_id.data, context_id.length);
if (!(lvrc->contextId)) {
return false;
}
} else {
lvrc->contextId = NULL;
}
} else {
lvrc->contextId = NULL;
lvrc->ctxid_len = 0;
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
*out = lvrc;
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_SHZ( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
TT_GlyphZoneRec zp;
FT_UShort refp;
FT_F26Dot6 dx,
dy;
FT_UShort limit, i;
if ( BOUNDS( args[0], 2 ) )
{
if ( exc->pedantic_hinting )
exc->error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Reference );
return;
}
if ( Compute_Point_Displacement( exc, &dx, &dy, &zp, &refp ) )
return;
/* XXX: UNDOCUMENTED! SHZ doesn't move the phantom points. */
/* Twilight zone has no real contours, so use `n_points'. */
/* Normal zone's `n_points' includes phantoms, so must */
/* use end of last contour. */
if ( exc->GS.gep2 == 0 )
limit = (FT_UShort)exc->zp2.n_points;
else if ( exc->GS.gep2 == 1 && exc->zp2.n_contours > 0 )
limit = (FT_UShort)( exc->zp2.contours[exc->zp2.n_contours - 1] + 1 );
else
limit = 0;
/* XXX: UNDOCUMENTED! SHZ doesn't touch the points */
for ( i = 0; i < limit; i++ )
{
if ( zp.cur != exc->zp2.cur || refp != i )
Move_Zp2_Point( exc, i, dx, dy, FALSE );
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CompositingRecursionData(RenderLayer* compAncestor, RenderLayer* mostRecentCompositedLayer, bool testOverlap)
: m_compositingAncestor(compAncestor)
, m_mostRecentCompositedLayer(mostRecentCompositedLayer)
, m_subtreeIsCompositing(false)
, m_hasUnisolatedCompositedBlendingDescendant(false)
, m_testingOverlap(testOverlap)
#ifndef NDEBUG
, m_depth(0)
#endif
{
}
Commit Message: Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 113,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EstimateStripByteCounts(TIFF* tif, TIFFDirEntry* dir, uint16 dircount)
{
static const char module[] = "EstimateStripByteCounts";
TIFFDirEntry *dp;
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
uint32 strip;
/* Do not try to load stripbytecount as we will compute it */
if( !_TIFFFillStrilesInternal( tif, 0 ) )
return -1;
if (td->td_stripbytecount)
_TIFFfree(td->td_stripbytecount);
td->td_stripbytecount = (uint64*)
_TIFFCheckMalloc(tif, td->td_nstrips, sizeof (uint64),
"for \"StripByteCounts\" array");
if( td->td_stripbytecount == NULL )
return -1;
if (td->td_compression != COMPRESSION_NONE) {
uint64 space;
uint64 filesize;
uint16 n;
filesize = TIFFGetFileSize(tif);
if (!(tif->tif_flags&TIFF_BIGTIFF))
space=sizeof(TIFFHeaderClassic)+2+dircount*12+4;
else
space=sizeof(TIFFHeaderBig)+8+dircount*20+8;
/* calculate amount of space used by indirect values */
for (dp = dir, n = dircount; n > 0; n--, dp++)
{
uint32 typewidth;
uint64 datasize;
typewidth = TIFFDataWidth((TIFFDataType) dp->tdir_type);
if (typewidth == 0) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Cannot determine size of unknown tag type %d",
dp->tdir_type);
return -1;
}
datasize=(uint64)typewidth*dp->tdir_count;
if (!(tif->tif_flags&TIFF_BIGTIFF))
{
if (datasize<=4)
datasize=0;
}
else
{
if (datasize<=8)
datasize=0;
}
space+=datasize;
}
space = filesize - space;
if (td->td_planarconfig == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE)
space /= td->td_samplesperpixel;
for (strip = 0; strip < td->td_nstrips; strip++)
td->td_stripbytecount[strip] = space;
/*
* This gross hack handles the case were the offset to
* the last strip is past the place where we think the strip
* should begin. Since a strip of data must be contiguous,
* it's safe to assume that we've overestimated the amount
* of data in the strip and trim this number back accordingly.
*/
strip--;
if (td->td_stripoffset[strip]+td->td_stripbytecount[strip] > filesize)
td->td_stripbytecount[strip] = filesize - td->td_stripoffset[strip];
} else if (isTiled(tif)) {
uint64 bytespertile = TIFFTileSize64(tif);
for (strip = 0; strip < td->td_nstrips; strip++)
td->td_stripbytecount[strip] = bytespertile;
} else {
uint64 rowbytes = TIFFScanlineSize64(tif);
uint32 rowsperstrip = td->td_imagelength/td->td_stripsperimage;
for (strip = 0; strip < td->td_nstrips; strip++)
td->td_stripbytecount[strip] = rowbytes * rowsperstrip;
}
TIFFSetFieldBit(tif, FIELD_STRIPBYTECOUNTS);
if (!TIFFFieldSet(tif, FIELD_ROWSPERSTRIP))
td->td_rowsperstrip = td->td_imagelength;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,123 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fbFetch_b2g3r3 (const FbBits *bits, int x, int width, CARD32 *buffer, miIndexedPtr indexed)
{
const CARD8 *pixel = (const CARD8 *)bits + x;
const CARD8 *end = pixel + width;
while (pixel < end) {
CARD32 p = READ(pixel++);
CARD32 r,g,b;
b = (((p & 0xc0) ) |
((p & 0xc0) >> 2) |
((p & 0xc0) >> 4) |
((p & 0xc0) >> 6));
g = ((p & 0x38) | ((p & 0x38) >> 3) | ((p & 0x30) << 2)) << 8;
r = (((p & 0x07) ) |
((p & 0x07) << 3) |
((p & 0x06) << 6)) << 16;
WRITE(buffer++, (0xff000000 | r | g | b));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,449 |
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