instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: checkDownloadList(void)
{
DownloadList *d;
struct stat st;
if (!FirstDL)
return FALSE;
for (d = FirstDL; d != NULL; d = d->next) {
if (d->running && !lstat(d->lock, &st))
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 84,469 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *addDeferredMultiBulkLength(client *c) {
/* Note that we install the write event here even if the object is not
* ready to be sent, since we are sure that before returning to the
* event loop setDeferredMultiBulkLength() will be called. */
if (prepareClientToWrite(c) != C_OK) return NULL;
listAddNodeTail(c->reply,createObject(OBJ_STRING,NULL));
return listLast(c->reply);
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 69,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void omx_vdec::extract_demux_addr_offsets(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *buf_hdr)
{
OMX_U32 bytes_to_parse = buf_hdr->nFilledLen;
OMX_U8 *buf = buf_hdr->pBuffer + buf_hdr->nOffset;
OMX_U32 index = 0;
m_demux_entries = 0;
while (index < bytes_to_parse) {
if ( ((buf[index] == 0x00) && (buf[index+1] == 0x00) &&
(buf[index+2] == 0x00) && (buf[index+3] == 0x01)) ||
((buf[index] == 0x00) && (buf[index+1] == 0x00) &&
(buf[index+2] == 0x01)) ) {
insert_demux_addr_offset(index);
if (buf[index+2] == 0x01) // 3 byte start code
index += 3;
else //4 byte start code
index += 4;
} else
index++;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Extracted (%u) demux entry offsets", (unsigned int)m_demux_entries);
return;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: apr_status_t h2_stream_write_data(h2_stream *stream,
const char *data, size_t len, int eos)
{
conn_rec *c = stream->session->c;
apr_status_t status = APR_SUCCESS;
apr_bucket_brigade *tmp;
ap_assert(stream);
if (!stream->input) {
return APR_EOF;
}
if (input_closed(stream) || !stream->request) {
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, c,
"h2_stream(%ld-%d): writing denied, closed=%d, eoh=%d",
stream->session->id, stream->id, input_closed(stream),
stream->request != NULL);
return APR_EINVAL;
}
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, c,
"h2_stream(%ld-%d): add %ld input bytes",
stream->session->id, stream->id, (long)len);
tmp = apr_brigade_create(stream->pool, c->bucket_alloc);
apr_brigade_write(tmp, NULL, NULL, data, len);
status = h2_beam_send(stream->input, tmp, APR_BLOCK_READ);
apr_brigade_destroy(tmp);
stream->in_data_frames++;
stream->in_data_octets += len;
if (eos) {
return h2_stream_close_input(stream);
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740
mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory.
Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <naveen.tiwari@asu.edu> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 48,718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlSAXParseFile(xmlSAXHandlerPtr sax, const char *filename,
int recovery) {
return(xmlSAXParseFileWithData(sax,filename,recovery,NULL));
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 59,541 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string16 ConfirmEmailDialogDelegate::GetTitle() {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_ONE_CLICK_SIGNIN_CONFIRM_EMAIL_DIALOG_TITLE);
}
Commit Message: During redirects in the one click sign in flow, check the current URL
instead of original URL to validate gaia http headers.
BUG=307159
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/77343002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@236563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 109,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void CopyPlane(size_t plane,
scoped_refptr<VideoFrame> video_frame,
const AVFrame* frame,
size_t source_height) {
DCHECK_EQ(video_frame->width() % 2, 0u);
const uint8* source = frame->data[plane];
const size_t source_stride = frame->linesize[plane];
uint8* dest = video_frame->data(plane);
const size_t dest_stride = video_frame->stride(plane);
size_t bytes_per_line = video_frame->width();
size_t copy_lines = std::min(video_frame->height(), source_height);
if (plane != VideoFrame::kYPlane) {
bytes_per_line /= 2;
if (video_frame->format() == VideoFrame::YV12) {
copy_lines = (copy_lines + 1) / 2;
}
}
bytes_per_line = std::min(bytes_per_line, source_stride);
for (size_t i = 0; i < copy_lines; ++i) {
memcpy(dest, source, bytes_per_line);
source += source_stride;
dest += dest_stride;
}
}
Commit Message: Don't forget the ffmpeg input buffer padding when allocating a codec's
extradata buffer.
BUG=82438
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7137002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 98,355 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fm10k_qv_enable(struct fm10k_q_vector *q_vector)
{
/* Enable auto-mask and clear the current mask */
u32 itr = FM10K_ITR_ENABLE;
/* Update Tx ITR */
fm10k_update_itr(&q_vector->tx);
/* Update Rx ITR */
fm10k_update_itr(&q_vector->rx);
/* Store Tx itr in timer slot 0 */
itr |= (q_vector->tx.itr & FM10K_ITR_MAX);
/* Shift Rx itr to timer slot 1 */
itr |= (q_vector->rx.itr & FM10K_ITR_MAX) << FM10K_ITR_INTERVAL1_SHIFT;
/* Write the final value to the ITR register */
writel(itr, q_vector->itr);
}
Commit Message: fm10k: Fix a potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 4378 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.0.0+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x95b/0x3200 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3573
Code: 00 0f 85 28 1e 00 00 48 81 c4 08 01 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 4c 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 24 00 00 49 81 7d 00 e0 de 03 a6 41 bc 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e3c07a40 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000080
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8881e3c07d98 R11: ffff8881c7f21f80 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007fce2252e700(0000) GS:ffff8881f2400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fffc7eb0228 CR3: 00000001e5bea002 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
lock_acquire+0xff/0x2c0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4211
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xdf/0x1050 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1072
drain_workqueue+0x24/0x3f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2934
destroy_workqueue+0x23/0x630 kernel/workqueue.c:4319
__do_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:1018 [inline]
__se_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:961 [inline]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x30c/0x480 kernel/module.c:961
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fce2252dc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fce2252e6bc
R13: 00000000004bcca9 R14: 00000000006f6b48 R15: 00000000ffffffff
If alloc_workqueue fails, it should return -ENOMEM, otherwise may
trigger this NULL pointer dereference while unloading drivers.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 0a38c17a21a0 ("fm10k: Remove create_workqueue")
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 87,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int fsync_node_pages(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct inode *inode,
struct writeback_control *wbc, bool atomic)
{
pgoff_t index, end;
pgoff_t last_idx = ULONG_MAX;
struct pagevec pvec;
int ret = 0;
struct page *last_page = NULL;
bool marked = false;
nid_t ino = inode->i_ino;
if (atomic) {
last_page = last_fsync_dnode(sbi, ino);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(last_page))
return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(last_page);
}
retry:
pagevec_init(&pvec, 0);
index = 0;
end = ULONG_MAX;
while (index <= end) {
int i, nr_pages;
nr_pages = pagevec_lookup_tag(&pvec, NODE_MAPPING(sbi), &index,
PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY,
min(end - index, (pgoff_t)PAGEVEC_SIZE-1) + 1);
if (nr_pages == 0)
break;
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
struct page *page = pvec.pages[i];
bool submitted = false;
if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) {
f2fs_put_page(last_page, 0);
pagevec_release(&pvec);
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
if (!IS_DNODE(page) || !is_cold_node(page))
continue;
if (ino_of_node(page) != ino)
continue;
lock_page(page);
if (unlikely(page->mapping != NODE_MAPPING(sbi))) {
continue_unlock:
unlock_page(page);
continue;
}
if (ino_of_node(page) != ino)
goto continue_unlock;
if (!PageDirty(page) && page != last_page) {
/* someone wrote it for us */
goto continue_unlock;
}
f2fs_wait_on_page_writeback(page, NODE, true);
BUG_ON(PageWriteback(page));
if (!atomic || page == last_page) {
set_fsync_mark(page, 1);
if (IS_INODE(page)) {
if (is_inode_flag_set(inode,
FI_DIRTY_INODE))
update_inode(inode, page);
set_dentry_mark(page,
need_dentry_mark(sbi, ino));
}
/* may be written by other thread */
if (!PageDirty(page))
set_page_dirty(page);
}
if (!clear_page_dirty_for_io(page))
goto continue_unlock;
ret = __write_node_page(page, atomic &&
page == last_page,
&submitted, wbc);
if (ret) {
unlock_page(page);
f2fs_put_page(last_page, 0);
break;
} else if (submitted) {
last_idx = page->index;
}
if (page == last_page) {
f2fs_put_page(page, 0);
marked = true;
break;
}
}
pagevec_release(&pvec);
cond_resched();
if (ret || marked)
break;
}
if (!ret && atomic && !marked) {
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_DEBUG,
"Retry to write fsync mark: ino=%u, idx=%lx",
ino, last_page->index);
lock_page(last_page);
f2fs_wait_on_page_writeback(last_page, NODE, true);
set_page_dirty(last_page);
unlock_page(last_page);
goto retry;
}
out:
if (last_idx != ULONG_MAX)
f2fs_submit_merged_bio_cond(sbi, NULL, ino, last_idx,
NODE, WRITE);
return ret ? -EIO: 0;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static spl_filesystem_object * spl_filesystem_object_create_info(spl_filesystem_object *source, char *file_path, int file_path_len, int use_copy, zend_class_entry *ce, zval *return_value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern;
zval *arg1;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
if (!file_path || !file_path_len) {
#if defined(PHP_WIN32)
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot create SplFileInfo for empty path");
if (file_path && !use_copy) {
efree(file_path);
}
#else
if (file_path && !use_copy) {
efree(file_path);
}
file_path_len = 1;
file_path = "/";
#endif
return NULL;
}
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_RuntimeException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
ce = ce ? ce : source->info_class;
zend_update_class_constants(ce TSRMLS_CC);
return_value->value.obj = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_OBJECT;
if (ce->constructor->common.scope != spl_ce_SplFileInfo) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(arg1, file_path, file_path_len, use_copy);
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&return_value, ce, &ce->constructor, "__construct", NULL, arg1);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg1);
} else {
spl_filesystem_info_set_filename(intern, file_path, file_path_len, use_copy TSRMLS_CC);
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return intern;
} /* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 167,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static NOINLINE int send_discover(uint32_t xid, uint32_t requested)
{
struct dhcp_packet packet;
/* Fill in: op, htype, hlen, cookie, chaddr fields,
* random xid field (we override it below),
* client-id option (unless -C), message type option:
*/
init_packet(&packet, DHCPDISCOVER);
packet.xid = xid;
if (requested)
udhcp_add_simple_option(&packet, DHCP_REQUESTED_IP, requested);
/* Add options: maxsize,
* optionally: hostname, fqdn, vendorclass,
* "param req" option according to -O, options specified with -x
*/
add_client_options(&packet);
bb_info_msg("Sending discover...");
return raw_bcast_from_client_config_ifindex(&packet);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::isTextFormControlMouseFocusable() const
{
return HTMLTextFormControlElement::isMouseFocusable();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void xhci_wakeup_endpoint(USBBus *bus, USBEndpoint *ep,
unsigned int stream)
{
XHCIState *xhci = container_of(bus, XHCIState, bus);
int slotid;
DPRINTF("%s\n", __func__);
slotid = ep->dev->addr;
if (slotid == 0 || !xhci->slots[slotid-1].enabled) {
DPRINTF("%s: oops, no slot for dev %d\n", __func__, ep->dev->addr);
return;
}
xhci_kick_ep(xhci, slotid, xhci_find_epid(ep), stream);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 5,763 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int read_normal_summaries(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, int type)
{
struct f2fs_checkpoint *ckpt = F2FS_CKPT(sbi);
struct f2fs_summary_block *sum;
struct curseg_info *curseg;
struct page *new;
unsigned short blk_off;
unsigned int segno = 0;
block_t blk_addr = 0;
/* get segment number and block addr */
if (IS_DATASEG(type)) {
segno = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_segno[type]);
blk_off = le16_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_blkoff[type -
CURSEG_HOT_DATA]);
if (__exist_node_summaries(sbi))
blk_addr = sum_blk_addr(sbi, NR_CURSEG_TYPE, type);
else
blk_addr = sum_blk_addr(sbi, NR_CURSEG_DATA_TYPE, type);
} else {
segno = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_node_segno[type -
CURSEG_HOT_NODE]);
blk_off = le16_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_node_blkoff[type -
CURSEG_HOT_NODE]);
if (__exist_node_summaries(sbi))
blk_addr = sum_blk_addr(sbi, NR_CURSEG_NODE_TYPE,
type - CURSEG_HOT_NODE);
else
blk_addr = GET_SUM_BLOCK(sbi, segno);
}
new = get_meta_page(sbi, blk_addr);
sum = (struct f2fs_summary_block *)page_address(new);
if (IS_NODESEG(type)) {
if (__exist_node_summaries(sbi)) {
struct f2fs_summary *ns = &sum->entries[0];
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sbi->blocks_per_seg; i++, ns++) {
ns->version = 0;
ns->ofs_in_node = 0;
}
} else {
int err;
err = restore_node_summary(sbi, segno, sum);
if (err) {
f2fs_put_page(new, 1);
return err;
}
}
}
/* set uncompleted segment to curseg */
curseg = CURSEG_I(sbi, type);
mutex_lock(&curseg->curseg_mutex);
/* update journal info */
down_write(&curseg->journal_rwsem);
memcpy(curseg->journal, &sum->journal, SUM_JOURNAL_SIZE);
up_write(&curseg->journal_rwsem);
memcpy(curseg->sum_blk->entries, sum->entries, SUM_ENTRY_SIZE);
memcpy(&curseg->sum_blk->footer, &sum->footer, SUM_FOOTER_SIZE);
curseg->next_segno = segno;
reset_curseg(sbi, type, 0);
curseg->alloc_type = ckpt->alloc_type[type];
curseg->next_blkoff = blk_off;
mutex_unlock(&curseg->curseg_mutex);
f2fs_put_page(new, 1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 85,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableMiddleClickAutoscroll(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetMiddleClickAutoscrollEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 154,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jsvGetChildren(const JsVar *v) {
int children = 0;
JsVarRef childref = jsvGetFirstChild(v);
while (childref) {
JsVar *child = jsvLock(childref);
children++;
childref = jsvGetNextSibling(child);
jsvUnLock(child);
}
return children;
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rds_rdma_pages(struct rds_iovec iov[], int nr_iovecs)
{
int tot_pages = 0;
unsigned int nr_pages;
unsigned int i;
/* figure out the number of pages in the vector */
for (i = 0; i < nr_iovecs; i++) {
nr_pages = rds_pages_in_vec(&iov[i]);
if (nr_pages == 0)
return -EINVAL;
tot_pages += nr_pages;
/*
* nr_pages for one entry is limited to (UINT_MAX>>PAGE_SHIFT)+1,
* so tot_pages cannot overflow without first going negative.
*/
if (tot_pages < 0)
return -EINVAL;
}
return tot_pages;
}
Commit Message: rds: Fix NULL pointer dereference in __rds_rdma_map
This is a fix for syzkaller719569, where memory registration was
attempted without any underlying transport being loaded.
Analysis of the case reveals that it is the setsockopt() RDS_GET_MR
(2) and RDS_GET_MR_FOR_DEST (7) that are vulnerable.
Here is an example stack trace when the bug is hit:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000c0
IP: __rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds]
PGD 2f93d03067 P4D 2f93d03067 PUD 2f93d02067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: bridge stp llc tun rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4
dns_resolver nfs fscache rds binfmt_misc sb_edac intel_powerclamp
coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul c rc32_pclmul
ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd
iTCO_wdt mei_me sg iTCO_vendor_support ipmi_si mei ipmi_devintf nfsd
shpchp pcspkr i2c_i801 ioatd ma ipmi_msghandler wmi lpc_ich mfd_core
auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2
mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper ixgbe syscopyarea ahci sysfillrect
sysimgblt libahci mdio fb_sys_fops ttm ptp libata sd_mod mlx4_core drm
crc32c_intel pps_core megaraid_sas i2c_core dca dm_mirror
dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
CPU: 48 PID: 45787 Comm: repro_set2 Not tainted 4.14.2-3.el7uek.x86_64 #2
Hardware name: Oracle Corporation ORACLE SERVER X5-2L/ASM,MOBO TRAY,2U, BIOS 31110000 03/03/2017
task: ffff882f9190db00 task.stack: ffffc9002b994000
RIP: 0010:__rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds]
RSP: 0018:ffffc9002b997df0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff882fa2182580 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc9002b997e40 RDI: ffff882fa2182580
RBP: ffffc9002b997e30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002
R10: ffff885fb29e3838 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff882fa2182580
R13: ffff882fa2182580 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000020000ffc
FS: 00007fbffa20b700(0000) GS:ffff882fbfb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 0000002f98a66006 CR4: 00000000001606e0
Call Trace:
rds_get_mr+0x56/0x80 [rds]
rds_setsockopt+0x172/0x340 [rds]
? __fget_light+0x25/0x60
? __fdget+0x13/0x20
SyS_setsockopt+0x80/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x67/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
RIP: 0033:0x7fbff9b117f9
RSP: 002b:00007fbffa20aed8 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000000c84a4 RCX: 00007fbff9b117f9
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000400000000114 RDI: 000000000000109b
RBP: 00007fbffa20af10 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: 00007fbff9dd7860
R10: 0000000020000ffc R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fbffa20b9c0 R14: 00007fbffa20b700 R15: 0000000000000021
Code: 41 56 41 55 49 89 fd 41 54 53 48 83 ec 18 8b 87 f0 02 00 00 48
89 55 d0 48 89 4d c8 85 c0 0f 84 2d 03 00 00 48 8b 87 00 03 00 00 <48>
83 b8 c0 00 00 00 00 0f 84 25 03 00 0 0 48 8b 06 48 8b 56 08
The fix is to check the existence of an underlying transport in
__rds_rdma_map().
Signed-off-by: Håkon Bugge <haakon.bugge@oracle.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 84,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NO_INLINE JsVar *jspePostfixExpression() {
JsVar *a;
if (lex->tk==LEX_PLUSPLUS || lex->tk==LEX_MINUSMINUS) {
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
a = jspePostfixExpression();
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
JsVar *one = jsvNewFromInteger(1);
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(a, one, op==LEX_PLUSPLUS ? '+' : '-');
jsvUnLock(one);
jsvReplaceWith(a, res);
jsvUnLock(res);
}
} else
a = jspeFactorFunctionCall();
return __jspePostfixExpression(a);
}
Commit Message: Fix stack overflow if interpreting a file full of '{' (fix #1448)
CWE ID: CWE-674 | 0 | 82,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __init hci_sock_init(void)
{
int err;
err = proto_register(&hci_sk_proto, 0);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = bt_sock_register(BTPROTO_HCI, &hci_sock_family_ops);
if (err < 0) {
BT_ERR("HCI socket registration failed");
goto error;
}
err = bt_procfs_init(&init_net, "hci", &hci_sk_list, NULL);
if (err < 0) {
BT_ERR("Failed to create HCI proc file");
bt_sock_unregister(BTPROTO_HCI);
goto error;
}
BT_INFO("HCI socket layer initialized");
return 0;
error:
proto_unregister(&hci_sk_proto);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key)
{
*pub_key = d->pub_key;
*priv_key = d->priv_key;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GetInputDevices(std::vector<std::string>* audio_ids,
std::vector<std::string>* video_ids) {
GURL url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("/media/getusermedia.html"));
NavigateToURL(shell(), url);
std::string devices_as_json = ExecuteJavascriptAndReturnResult(
"getSources()");
EXPECT_FALSE(devices_as_json.empty());
int error_code;
std::string error_message;
scoped_ptr<base::Value> value(
base::JSONReader::ReadAndReturnError(devices_as_json,
base::JSON_ALLOW_TRAILING_COMMAS,
&error_code,
&error_message));
ASSERT_TRUE(value.get() != NULL) << error_message;
EXPECT_EQ(value->GetType(), base::Value::TYPE_LIST);
base::ListValue* values;
ASSERT_TRUE(value->GetAsList(&values));
for (base::ListValue::iterator it = values->begin();
it != values->end(); ++it) {
const base::DictionaryValue* dict;
std::string kind;
std::string device_id;
ASSERT_TRUE((*it)->GetAsDictionary(&dict));
ASSERT_TRUE(dict->GetString("kind", &kind));
ASSERT_TRUE(dict->GetString("id", &device_id));
ASSERT_FALSE(device_id.empty());
EXPECT_TRUE(kind == "audio" || kind == "video");
if (kind == "audio") {
audio_ids->push_back(device_id);
} else if (kind == "video") {
video_ids->push_back(device_id);
}
}
ASSERT_FALSE(audio_ids->empty());
ASSERT_FALSE(video_ids->empty());
}
Commit Message: Add tests for closing a frame within the scope of a getusermedia callback.
BUG=472617, 474370
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1073783003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#324633}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void addContentAttrValuesToFeatures(const Vector<AtomicString>& contentAttrValues, RuleFeatureSet& features)
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < contentAttrValues.size(); ++i)
features.attrsInRules.add(contentAttrValues[i].impl());
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: logger_start_signal_cb (const void *pointer, void *data,
const char *signal, const char *type_data,
void *signal_data)
{
/* make C compiler happy */
(void) pointer;
(void) data;
(void) signal;
(void) type_data;
logger_start_buffer (signal_data, 1);
return WEECHAT_RC_OK;
}
Commit Message: logger: call strftime before replacing buffer local variables
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 60,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void makefixed()
{
unsigned low, size;
struct inflate_state state;
fixedtables(&state);
puts(" /* inffixed.h -- table for decoding fixed codes");
puts(" * Generated automatically by makefixed().");
puts(" */");
puts("");
puts(" /* WARNING: this file should *not* be used by applications.");
puts(" It is part of the implementation of this library and is");
puts(" subject to change. Applications should only use zlib.h.");
puts(" */");
puts("");
size = 1U << 9;
printf(" static const code lenfix[%u] = {", size);
low = 0;
for (;;) {
if ((low % 7) == 0) printf("\n ");
printf("{%u,%u,%d}", (low & 127) == 99 ? 64 : state.lencode[low].op,
state.lencode[low].bits, state.lencode[low].val);
if (++low == size) break;
putchar(',');
}
puts("\n };");
size = 1U << 5;
printf("\n static const code distfix[%u] = {", size);
low = 0;
for (;;) {
if ((low % 6) == 0) printf("\n ");
printf("{%u,%u,%d}", state.distcode[low].op, state.distcode[low].bits,
state.distcode[low].val);
if (++low == size) break;
putchar(',');
}
puts("\n };");
}
Commit Message: Avoid shifts of negative values inflateMark().
The C standard says that bit shifts of negative integers is
undefined. This casts to unsigned values to assure a known
result.
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 72,504 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MessageLoop::IsIdleForTesting() {
return incoming_task_queue_->IsIdleForTesting();
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void userns_put(struct ns_common *ns)
{
put_user_ns(to_user_ns(ns));
}
Commit Message: userns: also map extents in the reverse map to kernel IDs
The current logic first clones the extent array and sorts both copies, then
maps the lower IDs of the forward mapping into the lower namespace, but
doesn't map the lower IDs of the reverse mapping.
This means that code in a nested user namespace with >5 extents will see
incorrect IDs. It also breaks some access checks, like
inode_owner_or_capable() and privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(), so a process
can incorrectly appear to be capable relative to an inode.
To fix it, we have to make sure that the "lower_first" members of extents
in both arrays are translated; and we have to make sure that the reverse
map is sorted *after* the translation (since otherwise the translation can
break the sorting).
This is CVE-2018-18955.
Fixes: 6397fac4915a ("userns: bump idmap limits to 340")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Tested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 76,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<DateTimeChooserImpl> DateTimeChooserImpl::create(ChromeClientImpl* chromeClient, DateTimeChooserClient* client, const DateTimeChooserParameters& parameters)
{
return adoptRef(new DateTimeChooserImpl(chromeClient, client, parameters));
}
Commit Message: AX: Calendar Picker: Add AX labels to MonthPopupButton and CalendarNavigationButtons.
This CL adds no new tests. Will add tests after a Chromium change for
string resource.
BUG=123896
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/552163002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@181617 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 111,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: relay_digest_matches(crypto_digest_t *digest, cell_t *cell)
{
char received_integrity[4], calculated_integrity[4];
relay_header_t rh;
crypto_digest_t *backup_digest=NULL;
backup_digest = crypto_digest_dup(digest);
relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
memcpy(received_integrity, rh.integrity, 4);
memset(rh.integrity, 0, 4);
relay_header_pack(cell->payload, &rh);
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (char*) cell->payload, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
crypto_digest_get_digest(digest, calculated_integrity, 4);
if (tor_memneq(received_integrity, calculated_integrity, 4)) {
/* restore digest to its old form */
crypto_digest_assign(digest, backup_digest);
/* restore the relay header */
memcpy(rh.integrity, received_integrity, 4);
relay_header_pack(cell->payload, &rh);
crypto_digest_free(backup_digest);
return 0;
}
crypto_digest_free(backup_digest);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-005: Fix assertion failure in connection_edge_process_relay_cell
On an hidden service rendezvous circuit, a BEGIN_DIR could be sent
(maliciously) which would trigger a tor_assert() because
connection_edge_process_relay_cell() thought that the circuit is an
or_circuit_t but is an origin circuit in reality.
Fixes #22494
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 69,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void webkit_web_view_cut_clipboard(WebKitWebView* webView)
{
g_return_if_fail(WEBKIT_IS_WEB_VIEW(webView));
if (webkit_web_view_can_cut_clipboard(webView))
g_signal_emit(webView, webkit_web_view_signals[CUT_CLIPBOARD], 0);
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int packet_sendmsg_spkt(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_pkt *, saddr, msg->msg_name);
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
struct net_device *dev;
struct sockcm_cookie sockc;
__be16 proto = 0;
int err;
int extra_len = 0;
/*
* Get and verify the address.
*/
if (saddr) {
if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr))
return -EINVAL;
if (msg->msg_namelen == sizeof(struct sockaddr_pkt))
proto = saddr->spkt_protocol;
} else
return -ENOTCONN; /* SOCK_PACKET must be sent giving an address */
/*
* Find the device first to size check it
*/
saddr->spkt_device[sizeof(saddr->spkt_device) - 1] = 0;
retry:
rcu_read_lock();
dev = dev_get_by_name_rcu(sock_net(sk), saddr->spkt_device);
err = -ENODEV;
if (dev == NULL)
goto out_unlock;
err = -ENETDOWN;
if (!(dev->flags & IFF_UP))
goto out_unlock;
/*
* You may not queue a frame bigger than the mtu. This is the lowest level
* raw protocol and you must do your own fragmentation at this level.
*/
if (unlikely(sock_flag(sk, SOCK_NOFCS))) {
if (!netif_supports_nofcs(dev)) {
err = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
goto out_unlock;
}
extra_len = 4; /* We're doing our own CRC */
}
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (len > dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len + VLAN_HLEN + extra_len)
goto out_unlock;
if (!skb) {
size_t reserved = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev);
int tlen = dev->needed_tailroom;
unsigned int hhlen = dev->header_ops ? dev->hard_header_len : 0;
rcu_read_unlock();
skb = sock_wmalloc(sk, len + reserved + tlen, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOBUFS;
/* FIXME: Save some space for broken drivers that write a hard
* header at transmission time by themselves. PPP is the notable
* one here. This should really be fixed at the driver level.
*/
skb_reserve(skb, reserved);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
/* Try to align data part correctly */
if (hhlen) {
skb->data -= hhlen;
skb->tail -= hhlen;
if (len < hhlen)
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
}
err = memcpy_from_msg(skb_put(skb, len), msg, len);
if (err)
goto out_free;
goto retry;
}
if (!dev_validate_header(dev, skb->data, len)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
if (len > (dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len + extra_len) &&
!packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb)) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto out_unlock;
}
sockc.tsflags = sk->sk_tsflags;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
err = sock_cmsg_send(sk, msg, &sockc);
if (unlikely(err))
goto out_unlock;
}
skb->protocol = proto;
skb->dev = dev;
skb->priority = sk->sk_priority;
skb->mark = sk->sk_mark;
sock_tx_timestamp(sk, sockc.tsflags, &skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags);
if (unlikely(extra_len == 4))
skb->no_fcs = 1;
skb_probe_transport_header(skb, 0);
dev_queue_xmit(skb);
rcu_read_unlock();
return len;
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
out_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
Commit Message: packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init perf_event_init(void)
{
int ret;
idr_init(&pmu_idr);
perf_event_init_all_cpus();
init_srcu_struct(&pmus_srcu);
perf_pmu_register(&perf_swevent, "software", PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE);
perf_pmu_register(&perf_cpu_clock, NULL, -1);
perf_pmu_register(&perf_task_clock, NULL, -1);
perf_tp_register();
perf_cpu_notifier(perf_cpu_notify);
register_reboot_notifier(&perf_reboot_notifier);
ret = init_hw_breakpoint();
WARN(ret, "hw_breakpoint initialization failed with: %d", ret);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::Minimize() {
ReleaseCapture();
if (window_mapped_in_client_)
XIconifyWindow(xdisplay_, xwindow_, 0);
else
SetWMSpecState(true, gfx::GetAtom("_NET_WM_STATE_HIDDEN"), x11::None);
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 140,566 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorAgentRegistry::registerInDispatcher(InspectorBackendDispatcher* dispatcher)
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_agents.size(); i++)
m_agents[i]->registerInDispatcher(dispatcher);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API void zend_ts_hash_apply_with_argument(TsHashTable *ht, apply_func_arg_t apply_func, void *argument TSRMLS_DC)
{
begin_write(ht);
zend_hash_apply_with_argument(TS_HASH(ht), apply_func, argument TSRMLS_CC);
end_write(ht);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,441 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExecuteJavaScriptForTests(const std::string& js) {
base::RunLoop run_loop;
browser()
->tab_strip_model()
->GetActiveWebContents()
->GetMainFrame()
->ExecuteJavaScriptForTests(
base::ASCIIToUTF16(js),
base::BindOnce([](const base::Closure& quit_callback,
base::Value result) { quit_callback.Run(); },
run_loop.QuitClosure()));
run_loop.Run();
}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 138,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct cm_id_private * cm_acquire_mraed_id(struct cm_mra_msg *mra_msg)
{
switch (cm_mra_get_msg_mraed(mra_msg)) {
case CM_MSG_RESPONSE_REQ:
return cm_acquire_id(mra_msg->remote_comm_id, 0);
case CM_MSG_RESPONSE_REP:
case CM_MSG_RESPONSE_OTHER:
return cm_acquire_id(mra_msg->remote_comm_id,
mra_msg->local_comm_id);
default:
return NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoRenderbufferStorage(
GLenum target,
GLenum internalformat,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height) {
api()->glRenderbufferStorageEXTFn(target, internalformat, width, height);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct rpc_task *rpc_call_null(struct rpc_clnt *clnt, struct rpc_cred *cred, int flags)
{
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &rpcproc_null,
.rpc_cred = cred,
};
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = clnt,
.rpc_message = &msg,
.callback_ops = &rpc_default_ops,
.flags = flags,
};
return rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 34,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jspReplaceWith(JsVar *dst, JsVar *src) {
if (jsvIsArrayBufferName(dst)) {
size_t idx = (size_t)jsvGetInteger(dst);
JsVar *arrayBuffer = jsvLock(jsvGetFirstChild(dst));
jsvArrayBufferSet(arrayBuffer, idx, src);
jsvUnLock(arrayBuffer);
return;
}
if (!jsvIsName(dst)) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Unable to assign value to non-reference %t", dst);
return;
}
jsvSetValueOfName(dst, src);
/* If dst is flagged as a new child, it means that
* it was previously undefined, and we need to add it to
* the given object when it is set.
*/
if (jsvIsNewChild(dst)) {
JsVar *parent = jsvLock(jsvGetNextSibling(dst));
if (!jsvIsString(parent)) {
if (!jsvHasChildren(parent)) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Field or method \"%s\" does not already exist, and can't create it on %t", dst, parent);
} else {
jsvUnRef(parent);
jsvSetNextSibling(dst, 0);
jsvUnRef(parent);
jsvSetPrevSibling(dst, 0);
jsvAddName(parent, dst);
}
}
jsvUnLock(parent);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix stack overflow if void void void... is repeated many times (fix #1434)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Textfield::ShowImeIfNeeded() {
if (enabled() && !read_only())
GetInputMethod()->ShowImeIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,437 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_rfc3686_crypt(struct ablkcipher_request *req)
{
struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm = crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_rfc3686_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(tfm);
struct crypto_ablkcipher *child = ctx->child;
unsigned long align = crypto_ablkcipher_alignmask(tfm);
struct crypto_rfc3686_req_ctx *rctx =
(void *)PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)ablkcipher_request_ctx(req), align + 1);
struct ablkcipher_request *subreq = &rctx->subreq;
u8 *iv = rctx->iv;
/* set up counter block */
memcpy(iv, ctx->nonce, CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE);
memcpy(iv + CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE, req->info, CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE);
/* initialize counter portion of counter block */
*(__be32 *)(iv + CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE + CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE) =
cpu_to_be32(1);
ablkcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, child);
ablkcipher_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags,
req->base.complete, req->base.data);
ablkcipher_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->src, req->dst, req->nbytes,
iv);
return crypto_ablkcipher_encrypt(subreq);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int trace_die_handler(struct notifier_block *self,
unsigned long val,
void *data)
{
switch (val) {
case DIE_OOPS:
if (ftrace_dump_on_oops)
ftrace_dump(ftrace_dump_on_oops);
break;
default:
break;
}
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void prepend_response(h2_stream *stream, h2_headers *response)
{
conn_rec *c = stream->session->c;
apr_bucket *b;
prep_output(stream);
b = h2_bucket_headers_create(c->bucket_alloc, response);
APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_HEAD(stream->out_buffer, b);
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740
mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory.
Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <naveen.tiwari@asu.edu> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 48,724 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int megasas_generic_reset(struct scsi_cmnd *scmd)
{
int ret_val;
struct megasas_instance *instance;
instance = (struct megasas_instance *)scmd->device->host->hostdata;
scmd_printk(KERN_NOTICE, scmd, "megasas: RESET cmd=%x retries=%x\n",
scmd->cmnd[0], scmd->retries);
if (atomic_read(&instance->adprecovery) == MEGASAS_HW_CRITICAL_ERROR) {
dev_err(&instance->pdev->dev, "cannot recover from previous reset failures\n");
return FAILED;
}
ret_val = megasas_wait_for_outstanding(instance);
if (ret_val == SUCCESS)
dev_notice(&instance->pdev->dev, "reset successful\n");
else
dev_err(&instance->pdev->dev, "failed to do reset\n");
return ret_val;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,347 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OfflinePageModelImpl::DoDeleteCachedPagesByURLPredicate(
const UrlPredicate& predicate,
const DeletePageCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(is_loaded_);
std::vector<int64_t> offline_ids;
for (const auto& id_page_pair : offline_pages_) {
if (policy_controller_->IsRemovedOnCacheReset(
id_page_pair.second.client_id.name_space) &&
predicate.Run(id_page_pair.second.url)) {
offline_ids.push_back(id_page_pair.first);
}
}
DoDeletePagesByOfflineId(offline_ids, callback);
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 155,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dns_packet_is_reply_for(DnsPacket *p, const DnsResourceKey *key) {
int r;
assert(p);
assert(key);
/* Checks if the specified packet is a reply for the specified
* key and the specified key is the only one in the question
* section. */
if (DNS_PACKET_QR(p) != 1)
return 0;
/* Let's unpack the packet, if that hasn't happened yet. */
r = dns_packet_extract(p);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (p->question->n_keys != 1)
return 0;
return dns_resource_key_equal(p->question->keys[0], key);
}
Commit Message: resolved: bugfix of null pointer p->question dereferencing (#6020)
See https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/systemd/+bug/1621396
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 168,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tipc_tlv_sprintf(struct sk_buff *skb, const char *fmt, ...)
{
int n;
u16 len;
u32 rem;
char *buf;
struct tlv_desc *tlv;
va_list args;
rem = tipc_skb_tailroom(skb);
tlv = (struct tlv_desc *)skb->data;
len = TLV_GET_LEN(tlv);
buf = TLV_DATA(tlv) + len;
va_start(args, fmt);
n = vscnprintf(buf, rem, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
TLV_SET_LEN(tlv, n + len);
skb_put(skb, n);
return n;
}
Commit Message: tipc: fix an infoleak in tipc_nl_compat_link_dump
link_info.str is a char array of size 60. Memory after the NULL
byte is not initialized. Sending the whole object out can cause
a leak.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 52,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Polkit1Backend::~Polkit1Backend()
{
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-290 | 0 | 7,213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CParaNdisTX::CancelNBLs(PVOID CancelId)
{
auto CanceledNBLs = BuildCancelList(CancelId);
if (CanceledNBLs != nullptr)
{
NdisMSendNetBufferListsComplete(m_Context->MiniportHandle, CanceledNBLs, 0);
}
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 96,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t writeByteVectorInternalPtr(Parcel* parcel,
const std::unique_ptr<std::vector<T>>& val)
{
if (!val) {
return parcel->writeInt32(-1);
}
return writeByteVectorInternal(parcel, *val);
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 163,610 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int btsock_thread_post_cmd(int h, int type, const unsigned char* data, int size, uint32_t user_id)
{
if(h < 0 || h >= MAX_THREAD)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("invalid bt thread handle:%d", h);
return FALSE;
}
if(ts[h].cmd_fdw == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("cmd socket is not created. socket thread may not initialized");
return FALSE;
}
sock_cmd_t cmd = {CMD_USER_PRIVATE, 0, type, size, user_id};
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("post cmd type:%d, size:%d, h:%d, ", type, size, h);
sock_cmd_t* cmd_send = &cmd;
int size_send = sizeof(cmd);
if(data && size)
{
size_send = sizeof(cmd) + size;
cmd_send = (sock_cmd_t*)alloca(size_send);
if(cmd_send)
{
*cmd_send = cmd;
memcpy(cmd_send + 1, data, size);
}
else
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("alloca failed at h:%d, cmd type:%d, size:%d", h, type, size_send);
return FALSE;
}
}
return send(ts[h].cmd_fdw, cmd_send, size_send, 0) == size_send;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 173,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static HashTable *spl_array_get_properties(zval *object TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
HashTable *result;
if (intern->nApplyCount > 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_ERROR, "Nesting level too deep - recursive dependency?");
}
intern->nApplyCount++;
result = spl_array_get_hash_table(intern, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
intern->nApplyCount--;
return result;
} /* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,358 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppLauncherHandler::ExtensionUninstallCanceled() {
CleanupAfterUninstall();
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void umount_tree(struct mount *mnt, enum umount_tree_flags how)
{
LIST_HEAD(tmp_list);
struct mount *p;
if (how & UMOUNT_PROPAGATE)
propagate_mount_unlock(mnt);
/* Gather the mounts to umount */
for (p = mnt; p; p = next_mnt(p, mnt)) {
p->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_UMOUNT;
list_move(&p->mnt_list, &tmp_list);
}
/* Hide the mounts from mnt_mounts */
list_for_each_entry(p, &tmp_list, mnt_list) {
list_del_init(&p->mnt_child);
}
/* Add propogated mounts to the tmp_list */
if (how & UMOUNT_PROPAGATE)
propagate_umount(&tmp_list);
while (!list_empty(&tmp_list)) {
bool disconnect;
p = list_first_entry(&tmp_list, struct mount, mnt_list);
list_del_init(&p->mnt_expire);
list_del_init(&p->mnt_list);
__touch_mnt_namespace(p->mnt_ns);
p->mnt_ns = NULL;
if (how & UMOUNT_SYNC)
p->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT;
disconnect = disconnect_mount(p, how);
pin_insert_group(&p->mnt_umount, &p->mnt_parent->mnt,
disconnect ? &unmounted : NULL);
if (mnt_has_parent(p)) {
mnt_add_count(p->mnt_parent, -1);
if (!disconnect) {
/* Don't forget about p */
list_add_tail(&p->mnt_child, &p->mnt_parent->mnt_mounts);
} else {
umount_mnt(p);
}
}
change_mnt_propagation(p, MS_PRIVATE);
}
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 1 | 167,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool svm_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
return !!(svm->vcpu.arch.hflags & HF_NMI_MASK);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 37,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tm_spr_set(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
{
int ret;
/* Build tests */
BUILD_BUG_ON(TSO(tm_tfhar) + sizeof(u64) != TSO(tm_texasr));
BUILD_BUG_ON(TSO(tm_texasr) + sizeof(u64) != TSO(tm_tfiar));
BUILD_BUG_ON(TSO(tm_tfiar) + sizeof(u64) != TSO(ckpt_regs));
if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_TM))
return -ENODEV;
/* Flush the states */
flush_tmregs_to_thread(target);
flush_fp_to_thread(target);
flush_altivec_to_thread(target);
/* TFHAR register */
ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&target->thread.tm_tfhar, 0, sizeof(u64));
/* TEXASR register */
if (!ret)
ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&target->thread.tm_texasr, sizeof(u64),
2 * sizeof(u64));
/* TFIAR register */
if (!ret)
ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&target->thread.tm_tfiar,
2 * sizeof(u64), 3 * sizeof(u64));
return ret;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,832 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HttpNetworkTransactionTest::PreconnectErrorResendRequestTest(
const MockWrite* write_failure,
const MockRead* read_failure,
bool use_spdy) {
HttpRequestInfo request;
request.method = "GET";
request.url = GURL("https://www.foo.com/");
request.load_flags = 0;
CapturingNetLog net_log;
session_deps_.net_log = &net_log;
scoped_refptr<HttpNetworkSession> session(CreateSession(&session_deps_));
SSLSocketDataProvider ssl1(ASYNC, OK);
SSLSocketDataProvider ssl2(ASYNC, OK);
if (use_spdy) {
ssl1.SetNextProto(GetParam());
ssl2.SetNextProto(GetParam());
}
session_deps_.socket_factory->AddSSLSocketDataProvider(&ssl1);
session_deps_.socket_factory->AddSSLSocketDataProvider(&ssl2);
scoped_ptr<SpdyFrame> spdy_request(spdy_util_.ConstructSpdyGet(
request.url.spec().c_str(), false, 1, DEFAULT_PRIORITY));
scoped_ptr<SpdyFrame> spdy_response(
spdy_util_.ConstructSpdyGetSynReply(NULL, 0, 1));
scoped_ptr<SpdyFrame> spdy_data(
spdy_util_.ConstructSpdyBodyFrame(1, "hello", 5, true));
const char kHttpRequest[] = "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n"
"Host: www.foo.com\r\n"
"Connection: keep-alive\r\n\r\n";
const char kHttpResponse[] = "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: 5\r\n\r\n";
const char kHttpData[] = "hello";
std::vector<MockRead> data1_reads;
std::vector<MockWrite> data1_writes;
if (write_failure) {
ASSERT_FALSE(read_failure);
data1_writes.push_back(*write_failure);
data1_reads.push_back(MockRead(ASYNC, OK));
} else {
ASSERT_TRUE(read_failure);
if (use_spdy) {
data1_writes.push_back(CreateMockWrite(*spdy_request));
} else {
data1_writes.push_back(MockWrite(kHttpRequest));
}
data1_reads.push_back(*read_failure);
}
StaticSocketDataProvider data1(&data1_reads[0], data1_reads.size(),
&data1_writes[0], data1_writes.size());
session_deps_.socket_factory->AddSocketDataProvider(&data1);
std::vector<MockRead> data2_reads;
std::vector<MockWrite> data2_writes;
if (use_spdy) {
data2_writes.push_back(CreateMockWrite(*spdy_request, 0, ASYNC));
data2_reads.push_back(CreateMockRead(*spdy_response, 1, ASYNC));
data2_reads.push_back(CreateMockRead(*spdy_data, 2, ASYNC));
data2_reads.push_back(MockRead(ASYNC, OK, 3));
} else {
data2_writes.push_back(
MockWrite(ASYNC, kHttpRequest, strlen(kHttpRequest), 0));
data2_reads.push_back(
MockRead(ASYNC, kHttpResponse, strlen(kHttpResponse), 1));
data2_reads.push_back(MockRead(ASYNC, kHttpData, strlen(kHttpData), 2));
data2_reads.push_back(MockRead(ASYNC, OK, 3));
}
OrderedSocketData data2(&data2_reads[0], data2_reads.size(),
&data2_writes[0], data2_writes.size());
session_deps_.socket_factory->AddSocketDataProvider(&data2);
net::SSLConfig ssl_config;
session->ssl_config_service()->GetSSLConfig(&ssl_config);
session->GetNextProtos(&ssl_config.next_protos);
session->http_stream_factory()->PreconnectStreams(
1, request, DEFAULT_PRIORITY, ssl_config, ssl_config);
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
EXPECT_EQ(1, GetIdleSocketCountInSSLSocketPool(session.get()));
TestCompletionCallback callback;
scoped_ptr<HttpTransaction> trans(
new HttpNetworkTransaction(DEFAULT_PRIORITY, session.get()));
int rv = trans->Start(&request, callback.callback(), BoundNetLog());
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_IO_PENDING, rv);
rv = callback.WaitForResult();
EXPECT_EQ(OK, rv);
LoadTimingInfo load_timing_info;
EXPECT_TRUE(trans->GetLoadTimingInfo(&load_timing_info));
TestLoadTimingNotReused(
load_timing_info,
CONNECT_TIMING_HAS_DNS_TIMES|CONNECT_TIMING_HAS_SSL_TIMES);
const HttpResponseInfo* response = trans->GetResponseInfo();
ASSERT_TRUE(response != NULL);
EXPECT_TRUE(response->headers.get() != NULL);
EXPECT_EQ("HTTP/1.1 200 OK", response->headers->GetStatusLine());
std::string response_data;
rv = ReadTransaction(trans.get(), &response_data);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, rv);
EXPECT_EQ(kHttpData, response_data);
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct ucounts *find_ucounts(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid, struct hlist_head *hashent)
{
struct ucounts *ucounts;
hlist_for_each_entry(ucounts, hashent, node) {
if (uid_eq(ucounts->uid, uid) && (ucounts->ns == ns))
return ucounts;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ucount: Remove the atomicity from ucount->count
Always increment/decrement ucount->count under the ucounts_lock. The
increments are there already and moving the decrements there means the
locking logic of the code is simpler. This simplification in the
locking logic fixes a race between put_ucounts and get_ucounts that
could result in a use-after-free because the count could go zero then
be found by get_ucounts and then be freed by put_ucounts.
A bug presumably this one was found by a combination of syzkaller and
KASAN. JongWhan Kim reported the syzkaller failure and Dmitry Vyukov
spotted the race in the code.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f6b2db1a3e8d ("userns: Make the count of user namespaces per user")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 67,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ivd_aligned_free(void *ctxt, void *buf) {
UNUSED(ctxt);
free(buf);
return;
}
Commit Message: SoftHEVC: Exit gracefully in case of decoder errors
Exit for error in allocation and unsupported resolutions
Bug: 28816956
Change-Id: Ieb830bedeb3a7431d1d21a024927df630f7eda1e
CWE ID: CWE-172 | 0 | 159,412 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeClientImpl::isPasswordGenerationEnabled() const
{
return m_webView->passwordGeneratorClient();
}
Commit Message: Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GahpReconfig()
{
int tmp_int;
logGahpIo = param_boolean( "GRIDMANAGER_GAHPCLIENT_DEBUG", true );
logGahpIoSize = param_integer( "GRIDMANAGER_GAHPCLIENT_DEBUG_SIZE", 0 );
useXMLClassads = param_boolean( "GAHP_USE_XML_CLASSADS", false );
tmp_int = param_integer( "GRIDMANAGER_MAX_PENDING_REQUESTS", 50 );
GahpServer *next_server = NULL;
GahpServer::GahpServersById.startIterations();
while ( GahpServer::GahpServersById.iterate( next_server ) != 0 ) {
next_server->max_pending_requests = tmp_int;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::ShouldOpenDownload(
DownloadItem* item, const content::DownloadOpenDelayedCallback& callback) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
if (download_crx_util::IsExtensionDownload(*item) &&
!extensions::WebstoreInstaller::GetAssociatedApproval(*item)) {
scoped_refptr<extensions::CrxInstaller> crx_installer =
download_crx_util::OpenChromeExtension(profile_, *item);
registrar_.Add(
this,
extensions::NOTIFICATION_CRX_INSTALLER_DONE,
content::Source<extensions::CrxInstaller>(crx_installer.get()));
crx_installers_[crx_installer.get()] = callback;
item->UpdateObservers();
return false;
}
#endif
return true;
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::NameAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_name_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::NameAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,880 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int opxor(RAsm *a, ut8 * data, const Opcode *op) {
if (op->operands_count < 2) {
return -1;
}
if (op->operands[0].type == 0x80 && op->operands[0].reg == X86R_UNDEFINED) {
return -1;
}
if (op->operands[1].type == 0x80 && op->operands[0].reg == X86R_UNDEFINED) {
return -1;
}
if (op->operands[1].type & OT_CONSTANT) {
if (op->operands[0].type & OT_GPREG &&
op->operands[0].type & OT_WORD) {
return process_16bit_group_1 (a, data, op, 0x30);
}
if (!is_al_reg (&op->operands[0])) {
return process_group_1 (a, data, op);
}
}
return process_1byte_op (a, data, op, 0x30);
}
Commit Message: Fix #12372 and #12373 - Crash in x86 assembler (#12380)
0 ,0,[bP-bL-bP-bL-bL-r-bL-bP-bL-bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
leA ,0,[bP-bL-bL-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
leA ,0,[bP-bL-r-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 75,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ContainerChunk::removeValue( XMP_Uns32 id )
{
valueMap* cm = &this->childmap;
valueMapIter iter = cm->find( id );
if( iter == cm->end() )
return false; //not found
ValueChunk* propChunk = iter->second;
chunkVect* cv = &this->children;
chunkVectIter cvIter;
for (cvIter = cv->begin(); cvIter != cv->end(); ++cvIter )
{
if ( (*cvIter)->id == id )
break; // found!
}
XMP_Validate( cvIter != cv->end(), "property not found in children vector", kXMPErr_InternalFailure );
cv->erase( cvIter );
cm->erase( iter );
delete propChunk;
return true; // found and removed
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,078 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vrend_destroy_streamout_object(struct vrend_streamout_object *obj)
{
int i;
list_del(&obj->head);
for (i = 0; i < obj->num_targets; i++)
vrend_so_target_reference(&obj->so_targets[i], NULL);
if (vrend_state.have_tf2)
glDeleteTransformFeedbacks(1, &obj->id);
FREE(obj);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 8,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void strstore(char **str, const char *newstr)
{
if(*str)
free(*str);
*str = strdup(newstr);
}
Commit Message: cookie: fix tailmatching to prevent cross-domain leakage
Cookies set for 'example.com' could accidentaly also be sent by libcurl
to the 'bexample.com' (ie with a prefix to the first domain name).
This is a security vulnerabilty, CVE-2013-1944.
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20130412.html
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 32,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
{
key_ref_t keyring_ref;
long ret;
keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
/* Root is permitted to invalidate certain special keyrings */
if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref))
goto error;
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR,
&key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref)->flags))
goto clear;
goto error_put;
}
goto error;
}
clear:
ret = keyring_clear(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref));
error_put:
key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
error:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between read and revoke
This fixes CVE-2015-7550.
There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke
happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's
semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key.
This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in
its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key
and doesn't check for a NULL pointer.
Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking
semaphore instead of before.
I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code.
This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller). Here's a cleaned up version:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <pthread.h>
void *thr0(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
keyctl_revoke(key);
return 0;
}
void *thr1(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
char buffer[16];
keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16);
return 0;
}
int main()
{
key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
pthread_t th[5];
pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_join(th[0], 0);
pthread_join(th[1], 0);
pthread_join(th[2], 0);
pthread_join(th[3], 0);
return 0;
}
Build as:
cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread
Run as:
while keyctl-race; do :; done
as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be
summarised as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7
[<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0
[<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 57,606 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void brcmf_convert_sta_flags(u32 fw_sta_flags, struct station_info *si)
{
struct nl80211_sta_flag_update *sfu;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "flags %08x\n", fw_sta_flags);
si->filled |= BIT(NL80211_STA_INFO_STA_FLAGS);
sfu = &si->sta_flags;
sfu->mask = BIT(NL80211_STA_FLAG_WME) |
BIT(NL80211_STA_FLAG_AUTHENTICATED) |
BIT(NL80211_STA_FLAG_ASSOCIATED) |
BIT(NL80211_STA_FLAG_AUTHORIZED);
if (fw_sta_flags & BRCMF_STA_WME)
sfu->set |= BIT(NL80211_STA_FLAG_WME);
if (fw_sta_flags & BRCMF_STA_AUTHE)
sfu->set |= BIT(NL80211_STA_FLAG_AUTHENTICATED);
if (fw_sta_flags & BRCMF_STA_ASSOC)
sfu->set |= BIT(NL80211_STA_FLAG_ASSOCIATED);
if (fw_sta_flags & BRCMF_STA_AUTHO)
sfu->set |= BIT(NL80211_STA_FLAG_AUTHORIZED);
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SendHandwritingStroke(const HandwritingStroke& stroke) {
if (stroke.size() < 2) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Empty stroke data or a single dot is passed.";
return;
}
IBusInputContext* context = GetInputContext(input_context_path_, ibus_);
if (!context) {
return;
}
const size_t raw_stroke_size = stroke.size() * 2;
scoped_array<double> raw_stroke(new double[raw_stroke_size]);
for (size_t n = 0; n < stroke.size(); ++n) {
raw_stroke[n * 2] = stroke[n].first; // x
raw_stroke[n * 2 + 1] = stroke[n].second; // y
}
ibus_input_context_process_hand_writing_event(
context, raw_stroke.get(), raw_stroke_size);
g_object_unref(context);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,546 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smp_fetch_base32(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
struct http_txn *txn;
struct hdr_ctx ctx;
unsigned int hash = 0;
char *ptr, *beg, *end;
int len;
CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST();
txn = smp->strm->txn;
ctx.idx = 0;
if (http_find_header2("Host", 4, txn->req.chn->buf->p, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) {
/* OK we have the header value in ctx.line+ctx.val for ctx.vlen bytes */
ptr = ctx.line + ctx.val;
len = ctx.vlen;
while (len--)
hash = *(ptr++) + (hash << 6) + (hash << 16) - hash;
}
/* now retrieve the path */
end = txn->req.chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u + txn->req.sl.rq.u_l;
beg = http_get_path(txn);
if (!beg)
beg = end;
for (ptr = beg; ptr < end && *ptr != '?'; ptr++);
if (beg < ptr && *beg == '/') {
while (beg < ptr)
hash = *(beg++) + (hash << 6) + (hash << 16) - hash;
}
hash = full_hash(hash);
smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT;
smp->data.u.sint = hash;
smp->flags = SMP_F_VOL_1ST;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_sigset_deactivate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (!vcpu->sigset_active)
return;
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, ¤t->real_blocked, NULL);
sigemptyset(¤t->real_blocked);
}
Commit Message: kvm: fix kvm_ioctl_create_device() reference counting (CVE-2019-6974)
kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:
1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
reference
The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.
This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.
Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 91,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_qf_name(struct super_block *sb, int qtype, substring_t *args)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
char *qname;
if (sb_any_quota_loaded(sb) &&
!sbi->s_qf_names[qtype]) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Cannot change journaled "
"quota options when quota turned on");
return 0;
}
qname = match_strdup(args);
if (!qname) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Not enough memory for storing quotafile name");
return 0;
}
if (sbi->s_qf_names[qtype] &&
strcmp(sbi->s_qf_names[qtype], qname)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"%s quota file already specified", QTYPE2NAME(qtype));
kfree(qname);
return 0;
}
sbi->s_qf_names[qtype] = qname;
if (strchr(sbi->s_qf_names[qtype], '/')) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"quotafile must be on filesystem root");
kfree(sbi->s_qf_names[qtype]);
sbi->s_qf_names[qtype] = NULL;
return 0;
}
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, QUOTA);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void free_xattr(stat_x *sxp)
{
if (!sxp->xattr)
return;
rsync_xal_free(sxp->xattr);
free(sxp->xattr);
sxp->xattr = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 1,429 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool unconditional(const struct ipt_ip *ip)
{
static const struct ipt_ip uncond;
return memcmp(ip, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
#undef FWINV
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: confFile(char *base)
{
return expandPath(Strnew_m_charp(w3m_conf_dir(), "/", base, NULL)->ptr);
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 84,554 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameLoader::StartNavigation(const FrameLoadRequest& passed_request,
WebFrameLoadType frame_load_type,
NavigationPolicy policy) {
CHECK(!passed_request.GetSubstituteData().IsValid());
CHECK(!IsBackForwardLoadType(frame_load_type));
DCHECK(passed_request.TriggeringEventInfo() !=
WebTriggeringEventInfo::kUnknown);
DCHECK(policy != kNavigationPolicyHandledByClient &&
policy != kNavigationPolicyHandledByClientForInitialHistory);
DCHECK(frame_->GetDocument());
if (HTMLFrameOwnerElement* element = frame_->DeprecatedLocalOwner())
element->CancelPendingLazyLoad();
if (in_stop_all_loaders_)
return;
FrameLoadRequest request(passed_request);
request.GetResourceRequest().SetHasUserGesture(
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation(frame_));
if (!PrepareRequestForThisFrame(request))
return;
Frame* target_frame = request.Form()
? nullptr
: frame_->FindFrameForNavigation(
AtomicString(request.FrameName()), *frame_,
request.GetResourceRequest().Url());
bool should_navigate_target_frame = policy == kNavigationPolicyCurrentTab;
if (target_frame && target_frame != frame_ && should_navigate_target_frame) {
if (target_frame->IsLocalFrame() &&
!ToLocalFrame(target_frame)->IsNavigationAllowed()) {
return;
}
bool was_in_same_page = target_frame->GetPage() == frame_->GetPage();
request.SetFrameName("_self");
target_frame->Navigate(request);
Page* page = target_frame->GetPage();
if (!was_in_same_page && page)
page->GetChromeClient().Focus(frame_);
return;
}
SetReferrerForFrameRequest(request);
if (!target_frame && !request.FrameName().IsEmpty()) {
if (policy == kNavigationPolicyDownload) {
Client()->DownloadURL(request.GetResourceRequest());
return; // Navigation/download will be handled by the client.
} else if (should_navigate_target_frame) {
request.GetResourceRequest().SetFrameType(
network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType::kAuxiliary);
CreateWindowForRequest(request, *frame_);
return; // Navigation will be handled by the new frame/window.
}
}
if (!frame_->IsNavigationAllowed() ||
frame_->GetDocument()->PageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() !=
Document::kNoDismissal) {
return;
}
const KURL& url = request.GetResourceRequest().Url();
if (frame_load_type == WebFrameLoadType::kStandard)
frame_load_type = DetermineFrameLoadType(request);
bool same_document_navigation =
policy == kNavigationPolicyCurrentTab &&
ShouldPerformFragmentNavigation(request.Form(),
request.GetResourceRequest().HttpMethod(),
frame_load_type, url);
if (same_document_navigation) {
CommitSameDocumentNavigation(
request.GetResourceRequest().Url(), frame_load_type, nullptr,
request.ClientRedirect(), request.OriginDocument(),
request.TriggeringEventInfo() != WebTriggeringEventInfo::kNotFromEvent);
return;
}
StartLoad(request, frame_load_type, policy, nullptr,
true /* check_with_client */);
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const aura::Window* GetSelectedWindow() {
WindowSelector* ws = window_selector();
WindowSelectorItem* item =
ws->grid_list_[ws->selected_grid_index_]->SelectedWindow();
if (!item)
return nullptr;
return item->GetWindow();
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,210 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::DelayedResize(const gfx::Size& size_in_pixels) {
OnHostResizedInPixels(size_in_pixels);
ResetWindowRegion();
delayed_resize_task_.Cancel();
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 140,518 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool JSTestObj::getOwnPropertySlot(JSCell* cell, ExecState* exec, const Identifier& propertyName, PropertySlot& slot)
{
JSTestObj* thisObject = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(cell);
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(thisObject, &s_info);
return getStaticValueSlot<JSTestObj, Base>(exec, &JSTestObjTable, thisObject, propertyName, slot);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool nested_cpu_has2(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, u32 bit)
{
return (vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control &
CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS) &&
(vmcs12->secondary_vm_exec_control & bit);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int remove_bond(const bt_bdaddr_t *bd_addr)
{
/* sanity check */
if (interface_ready() == FALSE)
return BT_STATUS_NOT_READY;
return btif_dm_remove_bond(bd_addr);
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 173,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs4_state_shutdown(void)
{
destroy_workqueue(laundry_wq);
nfsd4_destroy_callback_queue();
cleanup_callback_cred();
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: php_apache_sapi_read_cookies(TSRMLS_D)
{
php_struct *ctx = SG(server_context);
const char *http_cookie;
http_cookie = apr_table_get(ctx->r->headers_in, "cookie");
/* The SAPI interface should use 'const char *' */
return (char *) http_cookie;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int create_raw_packet_qp_tir(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev,
struct mlx5_ib_rq *rq, u32 tdn,
bool tunnel_offload_en)
{
u32 *in;
void *tirc;
int inlen;
int err;
inlen = MLX5_ST_SZ_BYTES(create_tir_in);
in = kvzalloc(inlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!in)
return -ENOMEM;
tirc = MLX5_ADDR_OF(create_tir_in, in, ctx);
MLX5_SET(tirc, tirc, disp_type, MLX5_TIRC_DISP_TYPE_DIRECT);
MLX5_SET(tirc, tirc, inline_rqn, rq->base.mqp.qpn);
MLX5_SET(tirc, tirc, transport_domain, tdn);
if (tunnel_offload_en)
MLX5_SET(tirc, tirc, tunneled_offload_en, 1);
if (dev->rep)
MLX5_SET(tirc, tirc, self_lb_block,
MLX5_TIRC_SELF_LB_BLOCK_BLOCK_UNICAST_);
err = mlx5_core_create_tir(dev->mdev, in, inlen, &rq->tirn);
kvfree(in);
return err;
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: filesystem_check_completed_cb (DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
Device *device,
gboolean job_was_cancelled,
int status,
const char *stderr,
const char *stdout,
gpointer user_data)
{
if (WIFEXITED (status) && !job_was_cancelled)
{
int rc;
gboolean fs_is_clean;
fs_is_clean = FALSE;
rc = WEXITSTATUS (status);
if ((rc == 0) || (((rc & 1) != 0) && ((rc & 4) == 0)))
{
fs_is_clean = TRUE;
}
dbus_g_method_return (context, fs_is_clean);
}
else
{
if (job_was_cancelled)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_CANCELLED, "Job was cancelled");
}
else
{
throw_error (context,
ERROR_FAILED,
"Error fsck'ing: fsck exited with exit code %d: %s",
WEXITSTATUS (status),
stderr);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,692 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserCommandController::AddInterstitialObservers(WebContents* contents) {
interstitial_observers_.push_back(new InterstitialObserver(this, contents));
}
Commit Message: mac: Do not let synthetic events toggle "Allow JavaScript From AppleEvents"
Bug: 891697
Change-Id: I49eb77963515637df739c9d2ce83530d4e21cf15
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1308771
Reviewed-by: Elly Fong-Jones <ellyjones@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604268}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 153,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RegisterDumpProvider(
MemoryDumpProvider* mdp,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner) {
RegisterDumpProvider(mdp, task_runner, MemoryDumpProvider::Options());
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 150,122 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: build_node(XML_Parser parser, int src_node, XML_Content *dest,
XML_Content **contpos, XML_Char **strpos) {
DTD *const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */
dest->type = dtd->scaffold[src_node].type;
dest->quant = dtd->scaffold[src_node].quant;
if (dest->type == XML_CTYPE_NAME) {
const XML_Char *src;
dest->name = *strpos;
src = dtd->scaffold[src_node].name;
for (;;) {
*(*strpos)++ = *src;
if (! *src)
break;
src++;
}
dest->numchildren = 0;
dest->children = NULL;
} else {
unsigned int i;
int cn;
dest->numchildren = dtd->scaffold[src_node].childcnt;
dest->children = *contpos;
*contpos += dest->numchildren;
for (i = 0, cn = dtd->scaffold[src_node].firstchild; i < dest->numchildren;
i++, cn = dtd->scaffold[cn].nextsib) {
build_node(parser, cn, &(dest->children[i]), contpos, strpos);
}
dest->name = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 88,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int apply_to_pte_range(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmd,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
pte_fn_t fn, void *data)
{
pte_t *pte;
int err;
pgtable_t token;
spinlock_t *uninitialized_var(ptl);
pte = (mm == &init_mm) ?
pte_alloc_kernel(pmd, addr) :
pte_alloc_map_lock(mm, pmd, addr, &ptl);
if (!pte)
return -ENOMEM;
BUG_ON(pmd_huge(*pmd));
arch_enter_lazy_mmu_mode();
token = pmd_pgtable(*pmd);
do {
err = fn(pte++, token, addr, data);
if (err)
break;
} while (addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
arch_leave_lazy_mmu_mode();
if (mm != &init_mm)
pte_unmap_unlock(pte-1, ptl);
return err;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_map_blocks(
struct inode *inode,
loff_t offset,
struct xfs_bmbt_irec *imap,
int type)
{
struct xfs_inode *ip = XFS_I(inode);
struct xfs_mount *mp = ip->i_mount;
ssize_t count = 1 << inode->i_blkbits;
xfs_fileoff_t offset_fsb, end_fsb;
int error = 0;
int bmapi_flags = XFS_BMAPI_ENTIRE;
int nimaps = 1;
if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(mp))
return -EIO;
ASSERT(type != XFS_IO_COW);
if (type == XFS_IO_UNWRITTEN)
bmapi_flags |= XFS_BMAPI_IGSTATE;
xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_ILOCK_SHARED);
ASSERT(ip->i_d.di_format != XFS_DINODE_FMT_BTREE ||
(ip->i_df.if_flags & XFS_IFEXTENTS));
ASSERT(offset <= mp->m_super->s_maxbytes);
if (offset + count > mp->m_super->s_maxbytes)
count = mp->m_super->s_maxbytes - offset;
end_fsb = XFS_B_TO_FSB(mp, (xfs_ufsize_t)offset + count);
offset_fsb = XFS_B_TO_FSBT(mp, offset);
error = xfs_bmapi_read(ip, offset_fsb, end_fsb - offset_fsb,
imap, &nimaps, bmapi_flags);
/*
* Truncate an overwrite extent if there's a pending CoW
* reservation before the end of this extent. This forces us
* to come back to writepage to take care of the CoW.
*/
if (nimaps && type == XFS_IO_OVERWRITE)
xfs_reflink_trim_irec_to_next_cow(ip, offset_fsb, imap);
xfs_iunlock(ip, XFS_ILOCK_SHARED);
if (error)
return error;
if (type == XFS_IO_DELALLOC &&
(!nimaps || isnullstartblock(imap->br_startblock))) {
error = xfs_iomap_write_allocate(ip, XFS_DATA_FORK, offset,
imap);
if (!error)
trace_xfs_map_blocks_alloc(ip, offset, count, type, imap);
return error;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
if (type == XFS_IO_UNWRITTEN) {
ASSERT(nimaps);
ASSERT(imap->br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK);
ASSERT(imap->br_startblock != DELAYSTARTBLOCK);
}
#endif
if (nimaps)
trace_xfs_map_blocks_found(ip, offset, count, type, imap);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfs: don't BUG() on mixed direct and mapped I/O
We've had reports of generic/095 causing XFS to BUG() in
__xfs_get_blocks() due to the existence of delalloc blocks on a
direct I/O read. generic/095 issues a mix of various types of I/O,
including direct and memory mapped I/O to a single file. This is
clearly not supported behavior and is known to lead to such
problems. E.g., the lack of exclusion between the direct I/O and
write fault paths means that a write fault can allocate delalloc
blocks in a region of a file that was previously a hole after the
direct read has attempted to flush/inval the file range, but before
it actually reads the block mapping. In turn, the direct read
discovers a delalloc extent and cannot proceed.
While the appropriate solution here is to not mix direct and memory
mapped I/O to the same regions of the same file, the current
BUG_ON() behavior is probably overkill as it can crash the entire
system. Instead, localize the failure to the I/O in question by
returning an error for a direct I/O that cannot be handled safely
due to delalloc blocks. Be careful to allow the case of a direct
write to post-eof delalloc blocks. This can occur due to speculative
preallocation and is safe as post-eof blocks are not accompanied by
dirty pages in pagecache (conversely, preallocation within eof must
have been zeroed, and thus dirtied, before the inode size could have
been increased beyond said blocks).
Finally, provide an additional warning if a direct I/O write occurs
while the file is memory mapped. This may not catch all problematic
scenarios, but provides a hint that some known-to-be-problematic I/O
methods are in use.
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 93,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction BluetoothSocketCreateFunction::Run() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(work_thread_id());
auto params = bluetooth_socket::Create::Params::Create(*args_);
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params.get());
BluetoothApiSocket* socket = new BluetoothApiSocket(extension_id());
bluetooth_socket::SocketProperties* properties = params->properties.get();
if (properties)
SetSocketProperties(socket, properties);
bluetooth_socket::CreateInfo create_info;
create_info.socket_id = AddSocket(socket);
return RespondNow(
ArgumentList(bluetooth_socket::Create::Results::Create(create_info)));
}
Commit Message: chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <tbarzic@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 154,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd_dispatch(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *statp)
{
struct svc_procedure *proc;
kxdrproc_t xdr;
__be32 nfserr;
__be32 *nfserrp;
dprintk("nfsd_dispatch: vers %d proc %d\n",
rqstp->rq_vers, rqstp->rq_proc);
proc = rqstp->rq_procinfo;
/*
* Give the xdr decoder a chance to change this if it wants
* (necessary in the NFSv4.0 compound case)
*/
rqstp->rq_cachetype = proc->pc_cachetype;
/* Decode arguments */
xdr = proc->pc_decode;
if (xdr && !xdr(rqstp, (__be32*)rqstp->rq_arg.head[0].iov_base,
rqstp->rq_argp)) {
dprintk("nfsd: failed to decode arguments!\n");
*statp = rpc_garbage_args;
return 1;
}
/* Check whether we have this call in the cache. */
switch (nfsd_cache_lookup(rqstp)) {
case RC_DROPIT:
return 0;
case RC_REPLY:
return 1;
case RC_DOIT:;
/* do it */
}
/* need to grab the location to store the status, as
* nfsv4 does some encoding while processing
*/
nfserrp = rqstp->rq_res.head[0].iov_base
+ rqstp->rq_res.head[0].iov_len;
rqstp->rq_res.head[0].iov_len += sizeof(__be32);
/* Now call the procedure handler, and encode NFS status. */
nfserr = proc->pc_func(rqstp, rqstp->rq_argp, rqstp->rq_resp);
nfserr = map_new_errors(rqstp->rq_vers, nfserr);
if (nfserr == nfserr_dropit || test_bit(RQ_DROPME, &rqstp->rq_flags)) {
dprintk("nfsd: Dropping request; may be revisited later\n");
nfsd_cache_update(rqstp, RC_NOCACHE, NULL);
return 0;
}
if (rqstp->rq_proc != 0)
*nfserrp++ = nfserr;
/* Encode result.
* For NFSv2, additional info is never returned in case of an error.
*/
if (!(nfserr && rqstp->rq_vers == 2)) {
xdr = proc->pc_encode;
if (xdr && !xdr(rqstp, nfserrp,
rqstp->rq_resp)) {
/* Failed to encode result. Release cache entry */
dprintk("nfsd: failed to encode result!\n");
nfsd_cache_update(rqstp, RC_NOCACHE, NULL);
*statp = rpc_system_err;
return 1;
}
}
/* Store reply in cache. */
nfsd_cache_update(rqstp, rqstp->rq_cachetype, statp + 1);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: nfsd: check for oversized NFSv2/v3 arguments
A client can append random data to the end of an NFSv2 or NFSv3 RPC call
without our complaining; we'll just stop parsing at the end of the
expected data and ignore the rest.
Encoded arguments and replies are stored together in an array of pages,
and if a call is too large it could leave inadequate space for the
reply. This is normally OK because NFS RPC's typically have either
short arguments and long replies (like READ) or long arguments and short
replies (like WRITE). But a client that sends an incorrectly long reply
can violate those assumptions. This was observed to cause crashes.
Also, several operations increment rq_next_page in the decode routine
before checking the argument size, which can leave rq_next_page pointing
well past the end of the page array, causing trouble later in
svc_free_pages.
So, following a suggestion from Neil Brown, add a central check to
enforce our expectation that no NFSv2/v3 call has both a large call and
a large reply.
As followup we may also want to rewrite the encoding routines to check
more carefully that they aren't running off the end of the page array.
We may also consider rejecting calls that have any extra garbage
appended. That would be safer, and within our rights by spec, but given
the age of our server and the NFS protocol, and the fact that we've
never enforced this before, we may need to balance that against the
possibility of breaking some oddball client.
Reported-by: Tuomas Haanpää <thaan@synopsys.com>
Reported-by: Ari Kauppi <ari@synopsys.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 168,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::mediaQueryAffectingValueChanged()
{
m_evaluateMediaQueriesOnStyleRecalc = true;
styleEngine().clearMediaQueryRuleSetStyleSheets();
InspectorInstrumentation::mediaQueryResultChanged(this);
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int RenderBlock::lastLineBoxBaseline(LineDirectionMode lineDirection) const
{
if (isWritingModeRoot() && !isRubyRun())
return -1;
if (childrenInline()) {
if (!firstLineBox() && hasLineIfEmpty()) {
const FontMetrics& fontMetrics = firstLineStyle()->fontMetrics();
return fontMetrics.ascent()
+ (lineHeight(true, lineDirection, PositionOfInteriorLineBoxes) - fontMetrics.height()) / 2
+ (lineDirection == HorizontalLine ? borderTop() + paddingTop() : borderRight() + paddingRight());
}
if (lastLineBox())
return lastLineBox()->logicalTop() + style(lastLineBox() == firstLineBox())->fontMetrics().ascent(lastRootBox()->baselineType());
return -1;
} else {
bool haveNormalFlowChild = false;
for (RenderBox* curr = lastChildBox(); curr; curr = curr->previousSiblingBox()) {
if (!curr->isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned()) {
haveNormalFlowChild = true;
int result = curr->inlineBlockBaseline(lineDirection);
if (result != -1)
return curr->logicalTop() + result; // Translate to our coordinate space.
}
}
if (!haveNormalFlowChild && hasLineIfEmpty()) {
const FontMetrics& fontMetrics = firstLineStyle()->fontMetrics();
return fontMetrics.ascent()
+ (lineHeight(true, lineDirection, PositionOfInteriorLineBoxes) - fontMetrics.height()) / 2
+ (lineDirection == HorizontalLine ? borderTop() + paddingTop() : borderRight() + paddingRight());
}
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: frobnicate_signal_handler_2 (DBusGProxy *proxy,
int val,
void *user_data)
{
n_times_frobnicate_received_2 += 1;
g_assert (val == 42);
g_print ("Got Frobnicate signal (again)\n");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 11,322 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoPixelStorei(GLenum pname,
GLint param) {
api()->glPixelStoreiFn(pname, param);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void sctp_copy_descendant(struct sock *sk_to,
const struct sock *sk_from)
{
int ancestor_size = sizeof(struct inet_sock) +
sizeof(struct sctp_sock) -
offsetof(struct sctp_sock, auto_asconf_list);
if (sk_from->sk_family == PF_INET6)
ancestor_size += sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo);
__inet_sk_copy_descendant(sk_to, sk_from, ancestor_size);
}
Commit Message: sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <chunwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 60,651 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool QueryManager::EndQuery(Query* query, base::subtle::Atomic32 submit_count) {
DCHECK(query);
if (!RemovePendingQuery(query)) {
return false;
}
return query->End(submit_count);
}
Commit Message: Add bounds validation to AsyncPixelTransfersCompletedQuery::End
BUG=351852
R=jbauman@chromium.org, jorgelo@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/198253002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@256723 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,450 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline uint32_t get_buf_entry(struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx, uint32_t offset)
{
return ctx->ds->buf[ctx->ds->buf_offset + offset];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 9,083 |
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