instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_refptr<media::VideoDecoder> MediaStreamImpl::GetVideoDecoder(
const GURL& url,
media::MessageLoopFactory* message_loop_factory) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
WebKit::WebMediaStreamDescriptor descriptor(
WebKit::WebMediaStreamRegistry::lookupMediaStreamDescriptor(url));
if (descriptor.isNull())
return NULL; // This is not a valid stream.
WebKit::WebVector<WebKit::WebMediaStreamSource> source_vector;
descriptor.sources(source_vector);
std::string msm_label;
for (size_t i = 0; i < source_vector.size(); ++i) {
if (source_vector[i].type() == WebKit::WebMediaStreamSource::TypeVideo) {
msm_label = ExtractManagerStreamLabel(UTF16ToUTF8(source_vector[i].id()));
break;
}
}
if (msm_label.empty())
return NULL;
scoped_refptr<media::VideoDecoder> decoder;
if (media_stream_dispatcher_->IsStream(msm_label)) {
int video_session_id =
media_stream_dispatcher_->video_session_id(msm_label, 0);
media::VideoCapture::VideoCaptureCapability capability;
capability.width = kVideoCaptureWidth;
capability.height = kVideoCaptureHeight;
capability.max_fps = kVideoCaptureFramePerSecond;
capability.expected_capture_delay = 0;
capability.raw_type = media::VideoFrame::I420;
capability.interlaced = false;
decoder = new CaptureVideoDecoder(
message_loop_factory->GetMessageLoopProxy("CaptureVideoDecoderThread"),
video_session_id,
vc_manager_.get(),
capability);
} else {
if (!video_renderer_.get())
video_renderer_ = new talk_base::RefCountedObject<VideoRendererWrapper>();
if (video_renderer_->renderer()) {
if (peer_connection_handler_) {
peer_connection_handler_->SetVideoRenderer(
UTF16ToUTF8(descriptor.label()),
NULL);
}
video_renderer_->SetVideoDecoder(NULL);
}
RTCVideoDecoder* rtc_video_decoder = new RTCVideoDecoder(
message_loop_factory->GetMessageLoop("RtcVideoDecoderThread"),
url.spec());
decoder = rtc_video_decoder;
video_renderer_->SetVideoDecoder(rtc_video_decoder);
if (peer_connection_handler_) {
peer_connection_handler_->SetVideoRenderer(
UTF16ToUTF8(descriptor.label()),
video_renderer_);
}
}
return decoder;
}
Commit Message: Explicitly stopping thread in MediaStreamImpl dtor to avoid any racing issues.
This may solve the below bugs.
BUG=112408,111202
TEST=content_unittests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9307058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120222 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MarkingVisitor::RegisterBackingStoreCallback(void* backing_store,
MovingObjectCallback callback,
void* callback_data) {
if (marking_mode_ != kGlobalMarkingWithCompaction)
return;
Heap().RegisterMovingObjectCallback(
reinterpret_cast<MovableReference>(backing_store), callback,
callback_data);
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 153,834 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dissect_common_dl_synchronisation(packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, struct fp_info *p_fp_info)
{
guint16 cfn;
if (p_fp_info->channel != CHANNEL_PCH) {
/* CFN control */
cfn = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_cfn_control, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
}
else {
/* PCH CFN is 12 bits */
cfn = (tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset) >> 4);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_pch_cfn, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
/* 4 bits of padding follow... */
offset += 2;
}
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " CFN=%u", cfn);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: UMTS_FP: fix handling reserved C/T value
The spec puts the reserved value at 0xf but our internal table has 'unknown' at
0; since all the other values seem to be offset-by-one, just take the modulus
0xf to avoid running off the end of the table.
Bug: 12191
Change-Id: I83c8fb66797bbdee52a2246fb1eea6e37cbc7eb0
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15722
Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 51,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *d,
struct blkcipher_walk *w, struct priv *ctx,
void (*tw)(struct crypto_tfm *, u8 *, const u8 *),
void (*fn)(struct crypto_tfm *, u8 *, const u8 *))
{
int err;
unsigned int avail;
const int bs = XTS_BLOCK_SIZE;
struct sinfo s = {
.tfm = crypto_cipher_tfm(ctx->child),
.fn = fn
};
u8 *wsrc;
u8 *wdst;
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(d, w);
if (!w->nbytes)
return err;
s.t = (be128 *)w->iv;
avail = w->nbytes;
wsrc = w->src.virt.addr;
wdst = w->dst.virt.addr;
/* calculate first value of T */
tw(crypto_cipher_tfm(ctx->tweak), w->iv, w->iv);
goto first;
for (;;) {
do {
gf128mul_x_ble(s.t, s.t);
first:
xts_round(&s, wdst, wsrc);
wsrc += bs;
wdst += bs;
} while ((avail -= bs) >= bs);
err = blkcipher_walk_done(d, w, avail);
if (!w->nbytes)
break;
avail = w->nbytes;
wsrc = w->src.virt.addr;
wdst = w->dst.virt.addr;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppListSyncableService::ProcessExistingSyncItem(SyncItem* sync_item) {
if (sync_item->item_type ==
sync_pb::AppListSpecifics::TYPE_REMOVE_DEFAULT_APP) {
return;
}
VLOG(2) << "ProcessExistingSyncItem: " << sync_item->ToString();
AppListItem* app_item = model_->FindItem(sync_item->item_id);
DVLOG(2) << " AppItem: " << app_item->ToDebugString();
if (!app_item) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Item not found in model: " << sync_item->ToString();
return;
}
if (app_list::switches::IsFolderUIEnabled() &&
app_item->folder_id() != sync_item->parent_id &&
!AppIsOem(app_item->id())) {
VLOG(2) << " Moving Item To Folder: " << sync_item->parent_id;
model_->MoveItemToFolder(app_item, sync_item->parent_id);
}
UpdateAppItemFromSyncItem(sync_item, app_item);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,915 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didUpdateCurrentHistoryItem(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
render_view_->didUpdateCurrentHistoryItem(frame);
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,263 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlXPtrGetChildNo(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int indx) {
xmlNodePtr cur = NULL;
xmlXPathObjectPtr obj;
xmlNodeSetPtr oldset;
CHECK_TYPE(XPATH_NODESET);
obj = valuePop(ctxt);
oldset = obj->nodesetval;
if ((indx <= 0) || (oldset == NULL) || (oldset->nodeNr != 1)) {
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewNodeSet(NULL));
return;
}
cur = xmlXPtrGetNthChild(oldset->nodeTab[0], indx);
if (cur == NULL) {
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewNodeSet(NULL));
return;
}
oldset->nodeTab[0] = cur;
valuePush(ctxt, obj);
}
Commit Message: Fix XPointer bug.
BUG=125462
AUTHOR=asd@ut.ee
R=cevans@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10344022
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@135174 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 109,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 TestLifecycleUnit::GetTitle() const {
return base::string16();
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,177 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dns_str_to_dn_label(const char *str, int str_len, char *dn, int dn_len)
{
int i, offset;
if (dn_len < str_len + 1)
return -1;
/* First byte of dn will be used to store the length of the first
* label */
offset = 0;
for (i = 0; i < str_len; ++i) {
if (str[i] == '.') {
/* 2 or more consecutive dots is invalid */
if (i == offset)
return -1;
dn[offset] = (i - offset);
offset = i+1;
continue;
}
dn[i+1] = str[i];
}
dn[offset] = (i - offset - 1);
dn[i] = '\0';
return i;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: perf_addr_filter_new(struct perf_event *event, struct list_head *filters)
{
int node = cpu_to_node(event->cpu == -1 ? 0 : event->cpu);
struct perf_addr_filter *filter;
filter = kzalloc_node(sizeof(*filter), GFP_KERNEL, node);
if (!filter)
return NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&filter->entry);
list_add_tail(&filter->entry, filters);
return filter;
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 68,337 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::TrackDamageForAllSurfaces(
const LayerImplList& render_surface_layer_list) {
size_t render_surface_layer_list_size = render_surface_layer_list.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < render_surface_layer_list_size; ++i) {
size_t surface_index = render_surface_layer_list_size - 1 - i;
LayerImpl* render_surface_layer = render_surface_layer_list[surface_index];
RenderSurfaceImpl* render_surface =
render_surface_layer->GetRenderSurface();
DCHECK(render_surface);
render_surface->damage_tracker()->UpdateDamageTrackingState(
render_surface->layer_list(), render_surface,
render_surface->SurfacePropertyChangedOnlyFromDescendant(),
render_surface->content_rect(), render_surface->MaskLayer(),
render_surface->Filters());
}
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PositionWithAffinity RenderBlock::positionForPointWithInlineChildren(const LayoutPoint& pointInLogicalContents)
{
ASSERT(childrenInline());
if (!firstRootBox())
return createPositionWithAffinity(0, DOWNSTREAM);
bool linesAreFlipped = style()->isFlippedLinesWritingMode();
bool blocksAreFlipped = style()->isFlippedBlocksWritingMode();
InlineBox* closestBox = 0;
RootInlineBox* firstRootBoxWithChildren = 0;
RootInlineBox* lastRootBoxWithChildren = 0;
for (RootInlineBox* root = firstRootBox(); root; root = root->nextRootBox()) {
if (!root->firstLeafChild())
continue;
if (!firstRootBoxWithChildren)
firstRootBoxWithChildren = root;
if (!linesAreFlipped && root->isFirstAfterPageBreak() && (pointInLogicalContents.y() < root->lineTopWithLeading()
|| (blocksAreFlipped && pointInLogicalContents.y() == root->lineTopWithLeading())))
break;
lastRootBoxWithChildren = root;
if (pointInLogicalContents.y() < root->selectionBottom() || (blocksAreFlipped && pointInLogicalContents.y() == root->selectionBottom())) {
if (linesAreFlipped) {
RootInlineBox* nextRootBoxWithChildren = root->nextRootBox();
while (nextRootBoxWithChildren && !nextRootBoxWithChildren->firstLeafChild())
nextRootBoxWithChildren = nextRootBoxWithChildren->nextRootBox();
if (nextRootBoxWithChildren && nextRootBoxWithChildren->isFirstAfterPageBreak() && (pointInLogicalContents.y() > nextRootBoxWithChildren->lineTopWithLeading()
|| (!blocksAreFlipped && pointInLogicalContents.y() == nextRootBoxWithChildren->lineTopWithLeading())))
continue;
}
closestBox = root->closestLeafChildForLogicalLeftPosition(pointInLogicalContents.x());
if (closestBox)
break;
}
}
bool moveCaretToBoundary = document().frame()->editor().behavior().shouldMoveCaretToHorizontalBoundaryWhenPastTopOrBottom();
if (!moveCaretToBoundary && !closestBox && lastRootBoxWithChildren) {
closestBox = lastRootBoxWithChildren->closestLeafChildForLogicalLeftPosition(pointInLogicalContents.x());
}
if (closestBox) {
if (moveCaretToBoundary) {
LayoutUnit firstRootBoxWithChildrenTop = min<LayoutUnit>(firstRootBoxWithChildren->selectionTop(), firstRootBoxWithChildren->logicalTop());
if (pointInLogicalContents.y() < firstRootBoxWithChildrenTop
|| (blocksAreFlipped && pointInLogicalContents.y() == firstRootBoxWithChildrenTop)) {
InlineBox* box = firstRootBoxWithChildren->firstLeafChild();
if (box->isLineBreak()) {
if (InlineBox* newBox = box->nextLeafChildIgnoringLineBreak())
box = newBox;
}
return PositionWithAffinity(positionForBox(box, true), DOWNSTREAM);
}
}
LayoutPoint point(pointInLogicalContents.x(), closestBox->root().blockDirectionPointInLine());
if (!isHorizontalWritingMode())
point = point.transposedPoint();
if (closestBox->renderer().isReplaced())
return positionForPointRespectingEditingBoundaries(this, &toRenderBox(closestBox->renderer()), point);
return closestBox->renderer().positionForPoint(point);
}
if (lastRootBoxWithChildren) {
ASSERT(moveCaretToBoundary);
InlineBox* logicallyLastBox;
if (lastRootBoxWithChildren->getLogicalEndBoxWithNode(logicallyLastBox))
return PositionWithAffinity(positionForBox(logicallyLastBox, false), DOWNSTREAM);
}
return createPositionWithAffinity(0, DOWNSTREAM);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void snd_seq_queue_client_leave_cells(int client)
{
int i;
struct snd_seq_queue *q;
for (i = 0; i < SNDRV_SEQ_MAX_QUEUES; i++) {
if ((q = queueptr(i)) == NULL)
continue;
snd_seq_prioq_leave(q->tickq, client, 0);
snd_seq_prioq_leave(q->timeq, client, 0);
queuefree(q);
}
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix race at timer setup and close
ALSA sequencer code has an open race between the timer setup ioctl and
the close of the client. This was triggered by syzkaller fuzzer, and
a use-after-free was caught there as a result.
This patch papers over it by adding a proper queue->timer_mutex lock
around the timer-related calls in the relevant code path.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 54,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_read_row(png_structp png_ptr, png_bytep row, png_bytep dsp_row)
{
PNG_CONST PNG_IDAT;
PNG_CONST int png_pass_dsp_mask[7] = {0xff, 0x0f, 0xff, 0x33, 0xff, 0x55,
0xff};
PNG_CONST int png_pass_mask[7] = {0x80, 0x08, 0x88, 0x22, 0xaa, 0x55, 0xff};
int ret;
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
png_debug2(1, "in png_read_row (row %lu, pass %d)",
png_ptr->row_number, png_ptr->pass);
if (!(png_ptr->flags & PNG_FLAG_ROW_INIT))
png_read_start_row(png_ptr);
if (png_ptr->row_number == 0 && png_ptr->pass == 0)
{
/* Check for transforms that have been set but were defined out */
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) && !defined(PNG_READ_INVERT_SUPPORTED)
if (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_INVERT_MONO)
png_warning(png_ptr, "PNG_READ_INVERT_SUPPORTED is not defined.");
#endif
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_FILLER_SUPPORTED) && !defined(PNG_READ_FILLER_SUPPORTED)
if (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_FILLER)
png_warning(png_ptr, "PNG_READ_FILLER_SUPPORTED is not defined.");
#endif
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_PACKSWAP_SUPPORTED) && \
!defined(PNG_READ_PACKSWAP_SUPPORTED)
if (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_PACKSWAP)
png_warning(png_ptr, "PNG_READ_PACKSWAP_SUPPORTED is not defined.");
#endif
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED) && !defined(PNG_READ_PACK_SUPPORTED)
if (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_PACK)
png_warning(png_ptr, "PNG_READ_PACK_SUPPORTED is not defined.");
#endif
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_SHIFT_SUPPORTED) && !defined(PNG_READ_SHIFT_SUPPORTED)
if (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_SHIFT)
png_warning(png_ptr, "PNG_READ_SHIFT_SUPPORTED is not defined.");
#endif
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_BGR_SUPPORTED) && !defined(PNG_READ_BGR_SUPPORTED)
if (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_BGR)
png_warning(png_ptr, "PNG_READ_BGR_SUPPORTED is not defined.");
#endif
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_SWAP_SUPPORTED) && !defined(PNG_READ_SWAP_SUPPORTED)
if (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_SWAP_BYTES)
png_warning(png_ptr, "PNG_READ_SWAP_SUPPORTED is not defined.");
#endif
}
#ifdef PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
/* If interlaced and we do not need a new row, combine row and return */
if (png_ptr->interlaced && (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_INTERLACE))
{
switch (png_ptr->pass)
{
case 0:
if (png_ptr->row_number & 0x07)
{
if (dsp_row != NULL)
png_combine_row(png_ptr, dsp_row,
png_pass_dsp_mask[png_ptr->pass]);
png_read_finish_row(png_ptr);
return;
}
break;
case 1:
if ((png_ptr->row_number & 0x07) || png_ptr->width < 5)
{
if (dsp_row != NULL)
png_combine_row(png_ptr, dsp_row,
png_pass_dsp_mask[png_ptr->pass]);
png_read_finish_row(png_ptr);
return;
}
break;
case 2:
if ((png_ptr->row_number & 0x07) != 4)
{
if (dsp_row != NULL && (png_ptr->row_number & 4))
png_combine_row(png_ptr, dsp_row,
png_pass_dsp_mask[png_ptr->pass]);
png_read_finish_row(png_ptr);
return;
}
break;
case 3:
if ((png_ptr->row_number & 3) || png_ptr->width < 3)
{
if (dsp_row != NULL)
png_combine_row(png_ptr, dsp_row,
png_pass_dsp_mask[png_ptr->pass]);
png_read_finish_row(png_ptr);
return;
}
break;
case 4:
if ((png_ptr->row_number & 3) != 2)
{
if (dsp_row != NULL && (png_ptr->row_number & 2))
png_combine_row(png_ptr, dsp_row,
png_pass_dsp_mask[png_ptr->pass]);
png_read_finish_row(png_ptr);
return;
}
break;
case 5:
if ((png_ptr->row_number & 1) || png_ptr->width < 2)
{
if (dsp_row != NULL)
png_combine_row(png_ptr, dsp_row,
png_pass_dsp_mask[png_ptr->pass]);
png_read_finish_row(png_ptr);
return;
}
break;
case 6:
if (!(png_ptr->row_number & 1))
{
png_read_finish_row(png_ptr);
return;
}
break;
}
}
#endif
if (!(png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IDAT))
png_error(png_ptr, "Invalid attempt to read row data");
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = png_ptr->row_buf;
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out =
(uInt)(PNG_ROWBYTES(png_ptr->pixel_depth,
png_ptr->iwidth) + 1);
do
{
if (!(png_ptr->zstream.avail_in))
{
while (!png_ptr->idat_size)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, 0);
png_ptr->idat_size = png_read_chunk_header(png_ptr);
if (png_memcmp(png_ptr->chunk_name, png_IDAT, 4))
png_error(png_ptr, "Not enough image data");
}
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = (uInt)png_ptr->zbuf_size;
png_ptr->zstream.next_in = png_ptr->zbuf;
if (png_ptr->zbuf_size > png_ptr->idat_size)
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = (uInt)png_ptr->idat_size;
png_crc_read(png_ptr, png_ptr->zbuf,
(png_size_t)png_ptr->zstream.avail_in);
png_ptr->idat_size -= png_ptr->zstream.avail_in;
}
ret = inflate(&png_ptr->zstream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
{
if (png_ptr->zstream.avail_out || png_ptr->zstream.avail_in ||
png_ptr->idat_size)
png_error(png_ptr, "Extra compressed data");
png_ptr->mode |= PNG_AFTER_IDAT;
png_ptr->flags |= PNG_FLAG_ZLIB_FINISHED;
break;
}
if (ret != Z_OK)
png_error(png_ptr, png_ptr->zstream.msg ? png_ptr->zstream.msg :
"Decompression error");
} while (png_ptr->zstream.avail_out);
png_ptr->row_info.color_type = png_ptr->color_type;
png_ptr->row_info.width = png_ptr->iwidth;
png_ptr->row_info.channels = png_ptr->channels;
png_ptr->row_info.bit_depth = png_ptr->bit_depth;
png_ptr->row_info.pixel_depth = png_ptr->pixel_depth;
png_ptr->row_info.rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(png_ptr->row_info.pixel_depth,
png_ptr->row_info.width);
if (png_ptr->row_buf[0])
png_read_filter_row(png_ptr, &(png_ptr->row_info),
png_ptr->row_buf + 1, png_ptr->prev_row + 1,
(int)(png_ptr->row_buf[0]));
png_memcpy_check(png_ptr, png_ptr->prev_row, png_ptr->row_buf,
png_ptr->rowbytes + 1);
#ifdef PNG_MNG_FEATURES_SUPPORTED
if ((png_ptr->mng_features_permitted & PNG_FLAG_MNG_FILTER_64) &&
(png_ptr->filter_type == PNG_INTRAPIXEL_DIFFERENCING))
{
/* Intrapixel differencing */
png_do_read_intrapixel(&(png_ptr->row_info), png_ptr->row_buf + 1);
}
#endif
if (png_ptr->transformations || (png_ptr->flags&PNG_FLAG_STRIP_ALPHA))
png_do_read_transformations(png_ptr);
#ifdef PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
/* Blow up interlaced rows to full size */
if (png_ptr->interlaced &&
(png_ptr->transformations & PNG_INTERLACE))
{
if (png_ptr->pass < 6)
/* Old interface (pre-1.0.9):
* png_do_read_interlace(&(png_ptr->row_info),
* png_ptr->row_buf + 1, png_ptr->pass, png_ptr->transformations);
*/
png_do_read_interlace(png_ptr);
if (dsp_row != NULL)
png_combine_row(png_ptr, dsp_row,
png_pass_dsp_mask[png_ptr->pass]);
if (row != NULL)
png_combine_row(png_ptr, row,
png_pass_mask[png_ptr->pass]);
}
else
#endif
{
if (row != NULL)
png_combine_row(png_ptr, row, 0xff);
if (dsp_row != NULL)
png_combine_row(png_ptr, dsp_row, 0xff);
}
png_read_finish_row(png_ptr);
if (png_ptr->read_row_fn != NULL)
(*(png_ptr->read_row_fn))(png_ptr, png_ptr->row_number, png_ptr->pass);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 172,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ft_lookup_glyph_renderer( FT_GlyphSlot slot )
{
FT_Face face = slot->face;
FT_Library library = FT_FACE_LIBRARY( face );
FT_Renderer result = library->cur_renderer;
if ( !result || result->glyph_format != slot->format )
result = FT_Lookup_Renderer( library, slot->format, 0 );
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::SetNeedsBeginFrameForFlingProgress() {
browser_fling_needs_begin_frame_ = true;
SetNeedsBeginFrame(true);
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,555 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderWidgetHostView::CreateViewForWidget(RenderWidgetHost* widget) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl* rwhi = RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(widget);
return new RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid(rwhi, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,737 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off,
const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len)
{
struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len);
if (!new_prog)
return NULL;
if (adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_prog->len, off, len))
return NULL;
return new_prog;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 59,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::logExceptionToConsole(const String& errorMessage, const String& sourceURL, int lineNumber, int columnNumber, PassRefPtr<ScriptCallStack> callStack)
{
internalAddMessage(JSMessageSource, ErrorMessageLevel, errorMessage, sourceURL, lineNumber, callStack, 0);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mmu_free_memory_caches(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
mmu_free_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_pte_list_desc_cache,
pte_list_desc_cache);
mmu_free_memory_cache_page(&vcpu->arch.mmu_page_cache);
mmu_free_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache,
mmu_page_header_cache);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs_commit_clear_lock(struct nfs_inode *nfsi)
{
clear_bit(NFS_INO_COMMIT, &nfsi->flags);
smp_mb__after_clear_bit();
wake_up_bit(&nfsi->flags, NFS_INO_COMMIT);
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 AuthenticatorBleVerifyingSheetModel::GetStepTitle() const {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBAUTHN_BLE_VERIFYING_TITLE);
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AP_DECLARE(apr_status_t) ap_rgetline_core(char **s, apr_size_t n,
apr_size_t *read, request_rec *r,
int fold, apr_bucket_brigade *bb)
{
apr_status_t rv;
apr_bucket *e;
apr_size_t bytes_handled = 0, current_alloc = 0;
char *pos, *last_char = *s;
int do_alloc = (*s == NULL), saw_eos = 0;
/*
* Initialize last_char as otherwise a random value will be compared
* against APR_ASCII_LF at the end of the loop if bb only contains
* zero-length buckets.
*/
if (last_char)
*last_char = '\0';
for (;;) {
apr_brigade_cleanup(bb);
rv = ap_get_brigade(r->proto_input_filters, bb, AP_MODE_GETLINE,
APR_BLOCK_READ, 0);
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return rv;
}
/* Something horribly wrong happened. Someone didn't block! */
if (APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(bb)) {
return APR_EGENERAL;
}
for (e = APR_BRIGADE_FIRST(bb);
e != APR_BRIGADE_SENTINEL(bb);
e = APR_BUCKET_NEXT(e))
{
const char *str;
apr_size_t len;
/* If we see an EOS, don't bother doing anything more. */
if (APR_BUCKET_IS_EOS(e)) {
saw_eos = 1;
break;
}
rv = apr_bucket_read(e, &str, &len, APR_BLOCK_READ);
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return rv;
}
if (len == 0) {
/* no use attempting a zero-byte alloc (hurts when
* using --with-efence --enable-pool-debug) or
* doing any of the other logic either
*/
continue;
}
/* Would this overrun our buffer? If so, we'll die. */
if (n < bytes_handled + len) {
*read = bytes_handled;
if (*s) {
/* ensure this string is NUL terminated */
if (bytes_handled > 0) {
(*s)[bytes_handled-1] = '\0';
}
else {
(*s)[0] = '\0';
}
}
return APR_ENOSPC;
}
/* Do we have to handle the allocation ourselves? */
if (do_alloc) {
/* We'll assume the common case where one bucket is enough. */
if (!*s) {
current_alloc = len;
*s = apr_palloc(r->pool, current_alloc);
}
else if (bytes_handled + len > current_alloc) {
/* Increase the buffer size */
apr_size_t new_size = current_alloc * 2;
char *new_buffer;
if (bytes_handled + len > new_size) {
new_size = (bytes_handled + len) * 2;
}
new_buffer = apr_palloc(r->pool, new_size);
/* Copy what we already had. */
memcpy(new_buffer, *s, bytes_handled);
current_alloc = new_size;
*s = new_buffer;
}
}
/* Just copy the rest of the data to the end of the old buffer. */
pos = *s + bytes_handled;
memcpy(pos, str, len);
last_char = pos + len - 1;
/* We've now processed that new data - update accordingly. */
bytes_handled += len;
}
/* If we got a full line of input, stop reading */
if (last_char && (*last_char == APR_ASCII_LF)) {
break;
}
}
/* Now NUL-terminate the string at the end of the line;
* if the last-but-one character is a CR, terminate there */
if (last_char > *s && last_char[-1] == APR_ASCII_CR) {
last_char--;
}
*last_char = '\0';
bytes_handled = last_char - *s;
/* If we're folding, we have more work to do.
*
* Note that if an EOS was seen, we know we can't have another line.
*/
if (fold && bytes_handled && !saw_eos) {
for (;;) {
const char *str;
apr_size_t len;
char c;
/* Clear the temp brigade for this filter read. */
apr_brigade_cleanup(bb);
/* We only care about the first byte. */
rv = ap_get_brigade(r->proto_input_filters, bb, AP_MODE_SPECULATIVE,
APR_BLOCK_READ, 1);
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return rv;
}
if (APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(bb)) {
break;
}
e = APR_BRIGADE_FIRST(bb);
/* If we see an EOS, don't bother doing anything more. */
if (APR_BUCKET_IS_EOS(e)) {
break;
}
rv = apr_bucket_read(e, &str, &len, APR_BLOCK_READ);
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
apr_brigade_cleanup(bb);
return rv;
}
/* Found one, so call ourselves again to get the next line.
*
* FIXME: If the folding line is completely blank, should we
* stop folding? Does that require also looking at the next
* char?
*/
/* When we call destroy, the buckets are deleted, so save that
* one character we need. This simplifies our execution paths
* at the cost of one character read.
*/
c = *str;
if (c == APR_ASCII_BLANK || c == APR_ASCII_TAB) {
/* Do we have enough space? We may be full now. */
if (bytes_handled >= n) {
*read = n;
/* ensure this string is terminated */
(*s)[n-1] = '\0';
return APR_ENOSPC;
}
else {
apr_size_t next_size, next_len;
char *tmp;
/* If we're doing the allocations for them, we have to
* give ourselves a NULL and copy it on return.
*/
if (do_alloc) {
tmp = NULL;
} else {
/* We're null terminated. */
tmp = last_char;
}
next_size = n - bytes_handled;
rv = ap_rgetline_core(&tmp, next_size,
&next_len, r, 0, bb);
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return rv;
}
if (do_alloc && next_len > 0) {
char *new_buffer;
apr_size_t new_size = bytes_handled + next_len + 1;
/* we need to alloc an extra byte for a null */
new_buffer = apr_palloc(r->pool, new_size);
/* Copy what we already had. */
memcpy(new_buffer, *s, bytes_handled);
/* copy the new line, including the trailing null */
memcpy(new_buffer + bytes_handled, tmp, next_len + 1);
*s = new_buffer;
}
last_char += next_len;
bytes_handled += next_len;
}
}
else { /* next character is not tab or space */
break;
}
}
}
*read = bytes_handled;
/* PR#43039: We shouldn't accept NULL bytes within the line */
if (strlen(*s) < bytes_handled) {
return APR_EINVAL;
}
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0253 (cve.mitre.org)
core: Fix a crash introduced in with ErrorDocument 400 pointing
to a local URL-path with the INCLUDES filter active, introduced
in 2.4.11. PR 57531. [Yann Ylavic]
Submitted By: ylavic
Committed By: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1664205 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: | 0 | 44,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void container_disk_unlock(struct lxc_container *c)
{
lxcunlock(c->slock);
lxcunlock(c->privlock);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1331: lxclock: use /run/lxc/lock rather than /run/lock/lxc
This prevents an unprivileged user to use LXC to create arbitrary file
on the filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mailimf_fws_word_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx, char ** result, int * p_missing_closing_quote)
{
size_t cur_token;
char * word;
int r;
int missing_closing_quote;
cur_token = * indx;
missing_closing_quote = 0;
r = mailimf_fws_atom_for_word_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &word, &missing_closing_quote);
if (r == MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE)
r = mailimf_fws_quoted_string_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &word);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR)
return r;
* result = word;
* indx = cur_token;
* p_missing_closing_quote = missing_closing_quote;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 66,195 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rdma_umap_priv_init(struct rdma_umap_priv *priv,
struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct ib_uverbs_file *ufile = vma->vm_file->private_data;
priv->vma = vma;
vma->vm_private_data = priv;
vma->vm_ops = &rdma_umap_ops;
mutex_lock(&ufile->umap_lock);
list_add(&priv->list, &ufile->umaps);
mutex_unlock(&ufile->umap_lock);
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: find_memory_area(struct usb_dev_state *ps, const struct usbdevfs_urb *uurb)
{
struct usb_memory *usbm = NULL, *iter;
unsigned long flags;
unsigned long uurb_start = (unsigned long)uurb->buffer;
spin_lock_irqsave(&ps->lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(iter, &ps->memory_list, memlist) {
if (uurb_start >= iter->vm_start &&
uurb_start < iter->vm_start + iter->size) {
if (uurb->buffer_length > iter->vm_start + iter->size -
uurb_start) {
usbm = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
} else {
usbm = iter;
usbm->urb_use_count++;
}
break;
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ps->lock, flags);
return usbm;
}
Commit Message: USB: usbfs: fix potential infoleak in devio
The stack object “ci” has a total size of 8 bytes. Its last 3 bytes
are padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked to userland
via “copy_to_user”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 53,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void HighEntropyMethodWithMeasureAsMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
impl->highEntropyMethodWithMeasureAs();
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SCTP_STATIC void sctp_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout)
{
struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct list_head *pos, *temp;
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("sctp_close(sk: 0x%p, timeout:%ld)\n", sk, timeout);
sctp_lock_sock(sk);
sk->sk_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK;
ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
/* Walk all associations on an endpoint. */
list_for_each_safe(pos, temp, &ep->asocs) {
asoc = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_association, asocs);
if (sctp_style(sk, TCP)) {
/* A closed association can still be in the list if
* it belongs to a TCP-style listening socket that is
* not yet accepted. If so, free it. If not, send an
* ABORT or SHUTDOWN based on the linger options.
*/
if (sctp_state(asoc, CLOSED)) {
sctp_unhash_established(asoc);
sctp_association_free(asoc);
continue;
}
}
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_LINGER) && !sk->sk_lingertime) {
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
chunk = sctp_make_abort_user(asoc, NULL, 0);
if (chunk)
sctp_primitive_ABORT(asoc, chunk);
} else
sctp_primitive_SHUTDOWN(asoc, NULL);
}
/* Clean up any skbs sitting on the receive queue. */
sctp_queue_purge_ulpevents(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
sctp_queue_purge_ulpevents(&sctp_sk(sk)->pd_lobby);
/* On a TCP-style socket, block for at most linger_time if set. */
if (sctp_style(sk, TCP) && timeout)
sctp_wait_for_close(sk, timeout);
/* This will run the backlog queue. */
sctp_release_sock(sk);
/* Supposedly, no process has access to the socket, but
* the net layers still may.
*/
sctp_local_bh_disable();
sctp_bh_lock_sock(sk);
/* Hold the sock, since sk_common_release() will put sock_put()
* and we have just a little more cleanup.
*/
sock_hold(sk);
sk_common_release(sk);
sctp_bh_unlock_sock(sk);
sctp_local_bh_enable();
sock_put(sk);
SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_DEC(sock);
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 34,996 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebURLLoaderImpl::didChangePriority(WebURLRequest::Priority new_priority) {
context_->DidChangePriority(new_priority);
}
Commit Message: Protect WebURLLoaderImpl::Context while receiving responses.
A client's didReceiveResponse can cancel a request; by protecting the
Context we avoid a use after free in this case.
Interestingly, we really had very good warning about this problem, see
https://codereview.chromium.org/11900002/ back in January.
R=darin
BUG=241139
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15738007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 113,075 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool tunnel_offload_supported(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev)
{
return (MLX5_CAP_ETH(dev, tunnel_stateless_vxlan) ||
MLX5_CAP_ETH(dev, tunnel_stateless_gre) ||
MLX5_CAP_ETH(dev, tunnel_stateless_geneve_rx));
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,212 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
key_match_func_t match,
bool no_state_check,
const struct cred *cred)
{
key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err;
/* we want to return -EAGAIN or -ENOKEY if any of the keyrings were
* searchable, but we failed to find a key or we found a negative key;
* otherwise we want to return a sample error (probably -EACCES) if
* none of the keyrings were searchable
*
* in terms of priority: success > -ENOKEY > -EAGAIN > other error
*/
key_ref = NULL;
ret = NULL;
err = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
/* search the thread keyring first */
if (cred->thread_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(cred->thread_keyring, 1),
cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
ret = key_ref;
break;
default:
err = key_ref;
break;
}
}
/* search the process keyring second */
if (cred->process_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(cred->process_keyring, 1),
cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
if (ret)
break;
case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
ret = key_ref;
break;
default:
err = key_ref;
break;
}
}
/* search the session keyring */
if (cred->session_keyring) {
rcu_read_lock();
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring), 1),
cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
if (ret)
break;
case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
ret = key_ref;
break;
default:
err = key_ref;
break;
}
}
/* or search the user-session keyring */
else if (cred->user->session_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(cred->user->session_keyring, 1),
cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
if (ret)
break;
case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
ret = key_ref;
break;
default:
err = key_ref;
break;
}
}
/* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */
key_ref = ret ? ret : err;
found:
return key_ref;
}
Commit Message: keys: fix race with concurrent install_user_keyrings()
This fixes CVE-2013-1792.
There is a race in install_user_keyrings() that can cause a NULL pointer
dereference when called concurrently for the same user if the uid and
uid-session keyrings are not yet created. It might be possible for an
unprivileged user to trigger this by calling keyctl() from userspace in
parallel immediately after logging in.
Assume that we have two threads both executing lookup_user_key(), both
looking for KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING.
THREAD A THREAD B
=============================== ===============================
==>call install_user_keyrings();
if (!cred->user->session_keyring)
==>call install_user_keyrings()
...
user->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;
if (user->uid_keyring)
return 0;
<==
key = cred->user->session_keyring [== NULL]
user->session_keyring = session_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage); [oops]
At the point thread A dereferences cred->user->session_keyring, thread B
hasn't updated user->session_keyring yet, but thread A assumes it is
populated because install_user_keyrings() returned ok.
The race window is really small but can be exploited if, for example,
thread B is interrupted or preempted after initializing uid_keyring, but
before doing setting session_keyring.
This couldn't be reproduced on a stock kernel. However, after placing
systemtap probe on 'user->session_keyring = session_keyring;' that
introduced some delay, the kernel could be crashed reliably.
Fix this by checking both pointers before deciding whether to return.
Alternatively, the test could be done away with entirely as it is checked
inside the mutex - but since the mutex is global, that may not be the best
way.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 33,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int btreeInitPage(MemPage *pPage){
assert( pPage->pBt!=0 );
assert( pPage->pBt->db!=0 );
assert( sqlite3_mutex_held(pPage->pBt->mutex) );
assert( pPage->pgno==sqlite3PagerPagenumber(pPage->pDbPage) );
assert( pPage == sqlite3PagerGetExtra(pPage->pDbPage) );
assert( pPage->aData == sqlite3PagerGetData(pPage->pDbPage) );
if( !pPage->isInit ){
int pc; /* Address of a freeblock within pPage->aData[] */
u8 hdr; /* Offset to beginning of page header */
u8 *data; /* Equal to pPage->aData */
BtShared *pBt; /* The main btree structure */
int usableSize; /* Amount of usable space on each page */
u16 cellOffset; /* Offset from start of page to first cell pointer */
int nFree; /* Number of unused bytes on the page */
int top; /* First byte of the cell content area */
int iCellFirst; /* First allowable cell or freeblock offset */
int iCellLast; /* Last possible cell or freeblock offset */
pBt = pPage->pBt;
hdr = pPage->hdrOffset;
data = pPage->aData;
/* EVIDENCE-OF: R-28594-02890 The one-byte flag at offset 0 indicating
** the b-tree page type. */
if( decodeFlags(pPage, data[hdr]) ) return SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT;
assert( pBt->pageSize>=512 && pBt->pageSize<=65536 );
pPage->maskPage = (u16)(pBt->pageSize - 1);
pPage->nOverflow = 0;
usableSize = pBt->usableSize;
pPage->cellOffset = cellOffset = hdr + 8 + pPage->childPtrSize;
pPage->aDataEnd = &data[usableSize];
pPage->aCellIdx = &data[cellOffset];
pPage->aDataOfst = &data[pPage->childPtrSize];
/* EVIDENCE-OF: R-58015-48175 The two-byte integer at offset 5 designates
** the start of the cell content area. A zero value for this integer is
** interpreted as 65536. */
top = get2byteNotZero(&data[hdr+5]);
/* EVIDENCE-OF: R-37002-32774 The two-byte integer at offset 3 gives the
** number of cells on the page. */
pPage->nCell = get2byte(&data[hdr+3]);
if( pPage->nCell>MX_CELL(pBt) ){
/* To many cells for a single page. The page must be corrupt */
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT;
}
testcase( pPage->nCell==MX_CELL(pBt) );
/* EVIDENCE-OF: R-24089-57979 If a page contains no cells (which is only
** possible for a root page of a table that contains no rows) then the
** offset to the cell content area will equal the page size minus the
** bytes of reserved space. */
assert( pPage->nCell>0 || top==usableSize || CORRUPT_DB );
/* A malformed database page might cause us to read past the end
** of page when parsing a cell.
**
** The following block of code checks early to see if a cell extends
** past the end of a page boundary and causes SQLITE_CORRUPT to be
** returned if it does.
*/
iCellFirst = cellOffset + 2*pPage->nCell;
iCellLast = usableSize - 4;
if( pBt->db->flags & SQLITE_CellSizeCk ){
int i; /* Index into the cell pointer array */
int sz; /* Size of a cell */
if( !pPage->leaf ) iCellLast--;
for(i=0; i<pPage->nCell; i++){
pc = get2byteAligned(&data[cellOffset+i*2]);
testcase( pc==iCellFirst );
testcase( pc==iCellLast );
if( pc<iCellFirst || pc>iCellLast ){
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT;
}
sz = pPage->xCellSize(pPage, &data[pc]);
testcase( pc+sz==usableSize );
if( pc+sz>usableSize ){
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT;
}
}
if( !pPage->leaf ) iCellLast++;
}
/* Compute the total free space on the page
** EVIDENCE-OF: R-23588-34450 The two-byte integer at offset 1 gives the
** start of the first freeblock on the page, or is zero if there are no
** freeblocks. */
pc = get2byte(&data[hdr+1]);
nFree = data[hdr+7] + top; /* Init nFree to non-freeblock free space */
if( pc>0 ){
u32 next, size;
if( pc<iCellFirst ){
/* EVIDENCE-OF: R-55530-52930 In a well-formed b-tree page, there will
** always be at least one cell before the first freeblock.
*/
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT;
}
while( 1 ){
if( pc>iCellLast ){
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT; /* Freeblock off the end of the page */
}
next = get2byte(&data[pc]);
size = get2byte(&data[pc+2]);
nFree = nFree + size;
if( next<=pc+size+3 ) break;
pc = next;
}
if( next>0 ){
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT; /* Freeblock not in ascending order */
}
if( pc+size>(unsigned int)usableSize ){
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT; /* Last freeblock extends past page end */
}
}
/* At this point, nFree contains the sum of the offset to the start
** of the cell-content area plus the number of free bytes within
** the cell-content area. If this is greater than the usable-size
** of the page, then the page must be corrupted. This check also
** serves to verify that the offset to the start of the cell-content
** area, according to the page header, lies within the page.
*/
if( nFree>usableSize ){
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT;
}
pPage->nFree = (u16)(nFree - iCellFirst);
pPage->isInit = 1;
}
return SQLITE_OK;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CNB::SetupLSO(virtio_net_hdr_basic *VirtioHeader, PVOID IpHeader, ULONG EthPayloadLength) const
{
PopulateIPLength(reinterpret_cast<IPv4Header*>(IpHeader), static_cast<USHORT>(EthPayloadLength));
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult packetReview;
packetReview = ParaNdis_CheckSumVerifyFlat(reinterpret_cast<IPv4Header*>(IpHeader), EthPayloadLength,
pcrIpChecksum | pcrFixIPChecksum | pcrTcpChecksum | pcrFixPHChecksum,
__FUNCTION__);
if (packetReview.xxpCheckSum == ppresPCSOK || packetReview.fixedXxpCS)
{
auto IpHeaderOffset = m_Context->Offload.ipHeaderOffset;
auto VHeader = static_cast<virtio_net_hdr_basic*>(VirtioHeader);
auto PriorityHdrLen = (m_ParentNBL->TCI() != 0) ? ETH_PRIORITY_HEADER_SIZE : 0;
VHeader->flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM;
VHeader->gso_type = packetReview.ipStatus == ppresIPV4 ? VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4 : VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6;
VHeader->hdr_len = (USHORT)(packetReview.XxpIpHeaderSize + IpHeaderOffset + PriorityHdrLen);
VHeader->gso_size = (USHORT)m_ParentNBL->MSS();
VHeader->csum_start = (USHORT)(m_ParentNBL->TCPHeaderOffset() + PriorityHdrLen);
VHeader->csum_offset = TCP_CHECKSUM_OFFSET;
}
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static av_always_inline int filter_fast_3320(APEPredictor *p,
const int decoded, const int filter,
const int delayA)
{
int32_t predictionA;
p->buf[delayA] = p->lastA[filter];
if (p->sample_pos < 3) {
p->lastA[filter] = decoded;
p->filterA[filter] = decoded;
return decoded;
}
predictionA = p->buf[delayA] * 2 - p->buf[delayA - 1];
p->lastA[filter] = decoded + (predictionA * p->coeffsA[filter][0] >> 9);
if ((decoded ^ predictionA) > 0)
p->coeffsA[filter][0]++;
else
p->coeffsA[filter][0]--;
p->filterA[filter] += p->lastA[filter];
return p->filterA[filter];
}
Commit Message: avcodec/apedec: Fix integer overflow
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: PoC.ape and others
Found-by: Bingchang, Liu@VARAS of IIE
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 63,413 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OneClickSigninSyncStarter::UntrustedSigninConfirmed(
StartSyncMode response) {
if (response == UNDO_SYNC) {
CancelSigninAndDelete();
} else {
if (response == CONFIGURE_SYNC_FIRST)
start_mode_ = response;
SigninManager* signin = SigninManagerFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
signin->CompletePendingSignin();
}
}
Commit Message: Display confirmation dialog for untrusted signins
BUG=252062
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17482002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@208520 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 171,246 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ftp_loop (struct url *u, char **local_file, int *dt, struct url *proxy,
bool recursive, bool glob)
{
ccon con; /* FTP connection */
uerr_t res;
*dt = 0;
xzero (con);
con.csock = -1;
con.st = ON_YOUR_OWN;
con.rs = ST_UNIX;
con.id = NULL;
con.proxy = proxy;
/* If the file name is empty, the user probably wants a directory
index. We'll provide one, properly HTML-ized. Unless
opt.htmlify is 0, of course. :-) */
if (!*u->file && !recursive)
{
struct fileinfo *f;
res = ftp_get_listing (u, &con, &f);
if (res == RETROK)
{
if (opt.htmlify && !opt.spider)
{
char *filename = (opt.output_document
? xstrdup (opt.output_document)
: (con.target ? xstrdup (con.target)
: url_file_name (u, NULL)));
res = ftp_index (filename, u, f);
if (res == FTPOK && opt.verbose)
{
if (!opt.output_document)
{
struct_stat st;
wgint sz;
if (stat (filename, &st) == 0)
sz = st.st_size;
else
sz = -1;
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Wrote HTML-ized index to %s [%s].\n"),
quote (filename), number_to_static_string (sz));
}
else
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Wrote HTML-ized index to %s.\n"),
quote (filename));
}
xfree (filename);
}
freefileinfo (f);
}
}
else
{
bool ispattern = false;
if (glob)
{
/* Treat the URL as a pattern if the file name part of the
URL path contains wildcards. (Don't check for u->file
because it is unescaped and therefore doesn't leave users
the option to escape literal '*' as %2A.) */
char *file_part = strrchr (u->path, '/');
if (!file_part)
file_part = u->path;
ispattern = has_wildcards_p (file_part);
}
if (ispattern || recursive || opt.timestamping || opt.preserve_perm)
{
/* ftp_retrieve_glob is a catch-all function that gets called
if we need globbing, time-stamping, recursion or preserve
permissions. Its third argument is just what we really need. */
res = ftp_retrieve_glob (u, &con,
ispattern ? GLOB_GLOBALL : GLOB_GETONE);
}
else
res = ftp_loop_internal (u, NULL, &con, local_file, false);
}
if (res == FTPOK)
res = RETROK;
if (res == RETROK)
*dt |= RETROKF;
/* If a connection was left, quench it. */
if (con.csock != -1)
fd_close (con.csock);
xfree (con.id);
xfree (con.target);
return res;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: connected_cell_parse(const relay_header_t *rh, const cell_t *cell,
tor_addr_t *addr_out, int *ttl_out)
{
uint32_t bytes;
const uint8_t *payload = cell->payload + RELAY_HEADER_SIZE;
tor_addr_make_unspec(addr_out);
*ttl_out = -1;
if (rh->length == 0)
return 0;
if (rh->length < 4)
return -1;
bytes = ntohl(get_uint32(payload));
/* If bytes is 0, this is maybe a v6 address. Otherwise it's a v4 address */
if (bytes != 0) {
/* v4 address */
tor_addr_from_ipv4h(addr_out, bytes);
if (rh->length >= 8) {
bytes = ntohl(get_uint32(payload + 4));
if (bytes <= INT32_MAX)
*ttl_out = bytes;
}
} else {
if (rh->length < 25) /* 4 bytes of 0s, 1 addr, 16 ipv4, 4 ttl. */
return -1;
if (get_uint8(payload + 4) != 6)
return -1;
tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(addr_out, (char*)(payload + 5));
bytes = ntohl(get_uint32(payload + 21));
if (bytes <= INT32_MAX)
*ttl_out = (int) bytes;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-005: Fix assertion failure in connection_edge_process_relay_cell
On an hidden service rendezvous circuit, a BEGIN_DIR could be sent
(maliciously) which would trigger a tor_assert() because
connection_edge_process_relay_cell() thought that the circuit is an
or_circuit_t but is an origin circuit in reality.
Fixes #22494
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 69,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned int attrhash_key_make(void *p)
{
const struct attr *attr = (struct attr *)p;
uint32_t key = 0;
#define MIX(val) key = jhash_1word(val, key)
#define MIX3(a, b, c) key = jhash_3words((a), (b), (c), key)
MIX3(attr->origin, attr->nexthop.s_addr, attr->med);
MIX3(attr->local_pref, attr->aggregator_as,
attr->aggregator_addr.s_addr);
MIX3(attr->weight, attr->mp_nexthop_global_in.s_addr,
attr->originator_id.s_addr);
MIX3(attr->tag, attr->label, attr->label_index);
if (attr->aspath)
MIX(aspath_key_make(attr->aspath));
if (attr->community)
MIX(community_hash_make(attr->community));
if (attr->lcommunity)
MIX(lcommunity_hash_make(attr->lcommunity));
if (attr->ecommunity)
MIX(ecommunity_hash_make(attr->ecommunity));
if (attr->cluster)
MIX(cluster_hash_key_make(attr->cluster));
if (attr->transit)
MIX(transit_hash_key_make(attr->transit));
if (attr->encap_subtlvs)
MIX(encap_hash_key_make(attr->encap_subtlvs));
#if ENABLE_BGP_VNC
if (attr->vnc_subtlvs)
MIX(encap_hash_key_make(attr->vnc_subtlvs));
#endif
MIX(attr->mp_nexthop_len);
key = jhash(attr->mp_nexthop_global.s6_addr, IPV6_MAX_BYTELEN, key);
key = jhash(attr->mp_nexthop_local.s6_addr, IPV6_MAX_BYTELEN, key);
MIX(attr->nh_ifindex);
MIX(attr->nh_lla_ifindex);
return key;
}
Commit Message: bgpd: don't use BGP_ATTR_VNC(255) unless ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR is defined
Signed-off-by: Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 91,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vop_vringh_copy(struct vop_vdev *vdev, struct vringh_kiov *iov,
void __user *ubuf, size_t len, bool read, int vr_idx,
size_t *out_len)
{
int ret = 0;
size_t partlen, tot_len = 0;
while (len && iov->i < iov->used) {
struct kvec *kiov = &iov->iov[iov->i];
partlen = min(kiov->iov_len, len);
if (read)
ret = vop_virtio_copy_to_user(vdev, ubuf, partlen,
(u64)kiov->iov_base,
kiov->iov_len,
vr_idx);
else
ret = vop_virtio_copy_from_user(vdev, ubuf, partlen,
(u64)kiov->iov_base,
kiov->iov_len,
vr_idx);
if (ret) {
dev_err(vop_dev(vdev), "%s %d err %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__, ret);
break;
}
len -= partlen;
ubuf += partlen;
tot_len += partlen;
iov->consumed += partlen;
kiov->iov_len -= partlen;
kiov->iov_base += partlen;
if (!kiov->iov_len) {
/* Fix up old iov element then increment. */
kiov->iov_len = iov->consumed;
kiov->iov_base -= iov->consumed;
iov->consumed = 0;
iov->i++;
}
}
*out_len = tot_len;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: misc: mic: Fix for double fetch security bug in VOP driver
The MIC VOP driver does two successive reads from user space to read a
variable length data structure. Kernel memory corruption can result if
the data structure changes between the two reads. This patch disallows
the chance of this happening.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116651
Reported by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Dutt <sudeep.dutt@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashutosh Dixit <ashutosh.dixit@intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 51,504 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void jpc_poc_destroyparms(jpc_ms_t *ms)
{
jpc_poc_t *poc = &ms->parms.poc;
if (poc->pchgs) {
jas_free(poc->pchgs);
}
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,859 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: aura::Window* OpenToplevelTestWindow(bool modal) {
views::Widget* widget = views::Widget::CreateWindowWithContext(
new TestWindow(modal), CurrentContext());
widget->Show();
return widget->GetNativeView();
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nl80211_send_unprot_disassoc(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
struct net_device *netdev, const u8 *buf,
size_t len, gfp_t gfp)
{
nl80211_send_mlme_event(rdev, netdev, buf, len,
NL80211_CMD_UNPROT_DISASSOCIATE, gfp);
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ib_uverbs_release_ucq(struct ib_uverbs_file *file,
struct ib_uverbs_completion_event_file *ev_file,
struct ib_ucq_object *uobj)
{
struct ib_uverbs_event *evt, *tmp;
if (ev_file) {
spin_lock_irq(&ev_file->ev_queue.lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(evt, tmp, &uobj->comp_list, obj_list) {
list_del(&evt->list);
kfree(evt);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&ev_file->ev_queue.lock);
uverbs_uobject_put(&ev_file->uobj);
}
spin_lock_irq(&file->async_file->ev_queue.lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(evt, tmp, &uobj->async_list, obj_list) {
list_del(&evt->list);
kfree(evt);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&file->async_file->ev_queue.lock);
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,467 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit ProfilingClientBinder(content::BrowserChildProcessHost* host)
: ProfilingClientBinder() {
DCHECK(content::BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(content::BrowserThread::IO));
content::BindInterface(host->GetHost(), std::move(request_));
}
Commit Message: [Reland #1] Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
The original CL added a javatest and its dependencies to the apk_under_test.
This causes the dependencies to be stripped from the instrumentation_apk, which
causes issue. This CL updates the build configuration so that the javatest and
its dependencies are only added to the instrumentation_apk.
This is a reland of e0b4355f0651adb1ebc2c513dc4410471af712f5
Original change's description:
> Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
>
> This CL has three components:
> 1) The bulk of the logic in OOP HP was refactored into ProfilingTestDriver.
> 2) Adds a java instrumentation test, along with a JNI shim that forwards into
> ProfilingTestDriver.
> 3) Creates a new apk: chrome_public_apk_for_test that contains the same
> content as chrome_public_apk, as well as native files needed for (2).
> chrome_public_apk_test now targets chrome_public_apk_for_test instead of
> chrome_public_apk.
>
> Other ideas, discarded:
> * Originally, I attempted to make the browser_tests target runnable on
> Android. The primary problem is that native test harness cannot fork
> or spawn processes. This is difficult to solve.
>
> More details on each of the components:
> (1) ProfilingTestDriver
> * The TracingController test was migrated to use ProfilingTestDriver, but the
> write-to-file test was left as-is. The latter behavior will likely be phased
> out, but I'll clean that up in a future CL.
> * gtest isn't supported for Android instrumentation tests. ProfilingTestDriver
> has a single function RunTest that returns a 'bool' indicating success. On
> failure, the class uses LOG(ERROR) to print the nature of the error. This will
> cause the error to be printed out on browser_test error. On instrumentation
> test failure, the error will be forwarded to logcat, which is available on all
> infra bot test runs.
> (2) Instrumentation test
> * For now, I only added a single test for the "browser" mode. Furthermore, I'm
> only testing the start with command-line path.
> (3) New apk
> * libchromefortest is a new shared library that contains all content from
> libchrome, but also contains native sources for the JNI shim.
> * chrome_public_apk_for_test is a new apk that contains all content from
> chrome_public_apk, but uses a single shared library libchromefortest rather
> than libchrome. This also contains java sources for the JNI shim.
> * There is no way to just add a second shared library to chrome_public_apk
> that just contains the native sources from the JNI shim without causing ODR
> issues.
> * chrome_public_test_apk now has apk_under_test = chrome_public_apk_for_test.
> * There is no way to add native JNI sources as a shared library to
> chrome_public_test_apk without causing ODR issues.
>
> Finally, this CL drastically increases the timeout to wait for native
> initialization. The previous timeout was 2 *
> CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL, which flakily failed for this test.
> This suggests that this step/timeout is generally flaky. I increased the timeout
> to 20 * CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL.
>
> Bug: 753218
> Change-Id: Ic224b7314fff57f1770a4048aa5753f54e040b55
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/770148
> Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Brett Wilson <brettw@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517541}
Bug: 753218
TBR: brettw@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ic6aafb34c2467253f75cc85da48200d19f3bc9af
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/777697
Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517850}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 150,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vhost_dev_cleanup(struct vhost_dev *dev, bool locked)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < dev->nvqs; ++i) {
if (dev->vqs[i].kick && dev->vqs[i].handle_kick) {
vhost_poll_stop(&dev->vqs[i].poll);
vhost_poll_flush(&dev->vqs[i].poll);
}
/* Wait for all lower device DMAs done. */
if (dev->vqs[i].ubufs)
vhost_ubuf_put_and_wait(dev->vqs[i].ubufs);
/* Signal guest as appropriate. */
vhost_zerocopy_signal_used(&dev->vqs[i]);
if (dev->vqs[i].error_ctx)
eventfd_ctx_put(dev->vqs[i].error_ctx);
if (dev->vqs[i].error)
fput(dev->vqs[i].error);
if (dev->vqs[i].kick)
fput(dev->vqs[i].kick);
if (dev->vqs[i].call_ctx)
eventfd_ctx_put(dev->vqs[i].call_ctx);
if (dev->vqs[i].call)
fput(dev->vqs[i].call);
vhost_vq_reset(dev, dev->vqs + i);
}
vhost_dev_free_iovecs(dev);
if (dev->log_ctx)
eventfd_ctx_put(dev->log_ctx);
dev->log_ctx = NULL;
if (dev->log_file)
fput(dev->log_file);
dev->log_file = NULL;
/* No one will access memory at this point */
kfree(rcu_dereference_protected(dev->memory,
locked ==
lockdep_is_held(&dev->mutex)));
RCU_INIT_POINTER(dev->memory, NULL);
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&dev->work_list));
if (dev->worker) {
kthread_stop(dev->worker);
dev->worker = NULL;
}
if (dev->mm)
mmput(dev->mm);
dev->mm = NULL;
}
Commit Message: vhost: fix length for cross region descriptor
If a single descriptor crosses a region, the
second chunk length should be decremented
by size translated so far, instead it includes
the full descriptor length.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: wb_preq(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pkt_preq *preq, u_int len)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, " wb-preq:"));
if (len < sizeof(*preq) || !ND_TTEST(*preq))
return (-1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " need %u/%s:%u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&preq->pp_low),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &preq->pp_page.p_sid),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&preq->pp_page.p_uid)));
return (0);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13014/White Board: Do more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, print a truncation error if the packets are
truncated, rather than just, in effect, ignoring the result of the
routines that print particular packet types.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,371 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(MultipleIterator, next)
{
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern;
spl_SplObjectStorageElement *element;
zval *it;
intern = Z_SPLOBJSTORAGE_P(getThis());
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(&intern->storage, &intern->pos);
while ((element = zend_hash_get_current_data_ptr_ex(&intern->storage, &intern->pos)) != NULL && !EG(exception)) {
it = &element->obj;
zend_call_method_with_0_params(it, Z_OBJCE_P(it), &Z_OBJCE_P(it)->iterator_funcs.zf_next, "next", NULL);
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(&intern->storage, &intern->pos);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73257 and bug #73258 - SplObjectStorage unserialize allows use of non-object as key
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 73,687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewTest::SetUp() {
blink::initialize(blink_platform_impl_.Get());
content_client_.reset(CreateContentClient());
content_browser_client_.reset(CreateContentBrowserClient());
content_renderer_client_.reset(CreateContentRendererClient());
SetContentClient(content_client_.get());
SetBrowserClientForTesting(content_browser_client_.get());
SetRendererClientForTesting(content_renderer_client_.get());
if (!render_thread_)
render_thread_.reset(new MockRenderThread());
render_thread_->set_routing_id(kRouteId);
render_thread_->set_surface_id(kSurfaceId);
render_thread_->set_new_window_routing_id(kNewWindowRouteId);
render_thread_->set_new_frame_routing_id(kNewFrameRouteId);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
autorelease_pool_.reset(new base::mac::ScopedNSAutoreleasePool());
#endif
command_line_.reset(new base::CommandLine(base::CommandLine::NO_PROGRAM));
params_.reset(new MainFunctionParams(*command_line_));
platform_.reset(new RendererMainPlatformDelegate(*params_));
platform_->PlatformInitialize();
std::string flags("--expose-gc");
v8::V8::SetFlagsFromString(flags.c_str(), static_cast<int>(flags.size()));
RenderThreadImpl::RegisterSchemes();
if (!ui::ResourceBundle::HasSharedInstance())
ui::ResourceBundle::InitSharedInstanceWithLocale(
"en-US", NULL, ui::ResourceBundle::DO_NOT_LOAD_COMMON_RESOURCES);
compositor_deps_.reset(new FakeCompositorDependencies);
mock_process_.reset(new MockRenderProcess);
ViewMsg_New_Params view_params;
view_params.opener_frame_route_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
view_params.window_was_created_with_opener = false;
view_params.renderer_preferences = RendererPreferences();
view_params.web_preferences = WebPreferences();
view_params.view_id = kRouteId;
view_params.main_frame_routing_id = kMainFrameRouteId;
view_params.surface_id = kSurfaceId;
view_params.session_storage_namespace_id = kInvalidSessionStorageNamespaceId;
view_params.swapped_out = false;
view_params.replicated_frame_state = FrameReplicationState();
view_params.proxy_routing_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
view_params.hidden = false;
view_params.never_visible = false;
view_params.next_page_id = 1;
view_params.initial_size = *InitialSizeParams();
view_params.enable_auto_resize = false;
view_params.min_size = gfx::Size();
view_params.max_size = gfx::Size();
RenderViewImpl* view =
RenderViewImpl::Create(compositor_deps_.get(), view_params, false);
view_ = view;
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 171,695 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: encode_SET_IP_DSCP(const struct ofpact_dscp *dscp,
enum ofp_version ofp_version, struct ofpbuf *out)
{
if (ofp_version < OFP12_VERSION) {
put_OFPAT_SET_NW_TOS(out, ofp_version, dscp->dscp);
} else {
put_set_field(out, ofp_version, MFF_IP_DSCP_SHIFTED, dscp->dscp >> 2);
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long Block::Frame::Read(IMkvReader* pReader, unsigned char* buf) const
{
assert(pReader);
assert(buf);
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, len, buf);
return status;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,433 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct rtnl_link_stats64 *efx_net_stats(struct net_device *net_dev, struct rtnl_link_stats64 *stats)
{
struct efx_nic *efx = netdev_priv(net_dev);
struct efx_mac_stats *mac_stats = &efx->mac_stats;
spin_lock_bh(&efx->stats_lock);
efx->type->update_stats(efx);
spin_unlock_bh(&efx->stats_lock);
stats->rx_packets = mac_stats->rx_packets;
stats->tx_packets = mac_stats->tx_packets;
stats->rx_bytes = mac_stats->rx_bytes;
stats->tx_bytes = mac_stats->tx_bytes;
stats->rx_dropped = efx->n_rx_nodesc_drop_cnt;
stats->multicast = mac_stats->rx_multicast;
stats->collisions = mac_stats->tx_collision;
stats->rx_length_errors = (mac_stats->rx_gtjumbo +
mac_stats->rx_length_error);
stats->rx_crc_errors = mac_stats->rx_bad;
stats->rx_frame_errors = mac_stats->rx_align_error;
stats->rx_fifo_errors = mac_stats->rx_overflow;
stats->rx_missed_errors = mac_stats->rx_missed;
stats->tx_window_errors = mac_stats->tx_late_collision;
stats->rx_errors = (stats->rx_length_errors +
stats->rx_crc_errors +
stats->rx_frame_errors +
mac_stats->rx_symbol_error);
stats->tx_errors = (stats->tx_window_errors +
mac_stats->tx_bad);
return stats;
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,390 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static UINT32 drdynvc_read_variable_uint(wStream* s, int cbLen)
{
UINT32 val;
switch (cbLen)
{
case 0:
Stream_Read_UINT8(s, val);
break;
case 1:
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, val);
break;
default:
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, val);
break;
}
return val;
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID: | 0 | 74,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void handle_seekdir(FsContext *ctx, V9fsFidOpenState *fs, off_t off)
{
seekdir(fs->dir.stream, off);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 7,693 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void unfold_blk(struct block **blk)
{
struct unfold_elm *ue = NULL;
BUG_IF(*blk == NULL);
/* the progress bar */
ef_debug(1, "+");
do {
switch((*blk)->type) {
case BLK_INSTR:
/* insert the instruction as is */
SAFE_CALLOC(ue, 1, sizeof(struct unfold_elm));
memcpy(&ue->fop, (*blk)->un.ins, sizeof(struct filter_op));
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&unfolded_tree, ue, next);
break;
case BLK_IFBLK:
unfold_ifblk(blk);
break;
default:
BUG("undefined tree element");
break;
}
} while ((*blk = (*blk)->next));
}
Commit Message: Exit gracefully in case of corrupted filters (Closes issue #782)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,068 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(time)
{
RETURN_LONG((long)time(NULL));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MockInputMethod::MockInputMethod()
: untranslated_ime_message_called_(false),
text_input_type_changed_(false),
cancel_composition_called_(false) {
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,478 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NetworkChangeNotifierMac::Forwarder::Init() {
net_config_watcher_->SetInitialConnectionType();
}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 156,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_packet *packet = NULL;
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
struct sctp_chunk *shut;
packet = sctp_ootb_pkt_new(net, asoc, chunk);
if (packet) {
/* Make an SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE.
* The T bit will be set if the asoc is NULL.
*/
shut = sctp_make_shutdown_complete(asoc, chunk);
if (!shut) {
sctp_ootb_pkt_free(packet);
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
}
/* Reflect vtag if T-Bit is set */
if (sctp_test_T_bit(shut))
packet->vtag = ntohl(chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag);
/* Set the skb to the belonging sock for accounting. */
shut->skb->sk = ep->base.sk;
sctp_packet_append_chunk(packet, shut);
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SEND_PKT,
SCTP_PACKET(packet));
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS);
/* If the chunk length is invalid, we don't want to process
* the reset of the packet.
*/
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* We need to discard the rest of the packet to prevent
* potential bomming attacks from additional bundled chunks.
* This is documented in SCTP Threats ID.
*/
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 31,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __crc32c_intel_finup(u32 *crcp, const u8 *data, unsigned int len,
u8 *out)
{
*(__le32 *)out = ~cpu_to_le32(crc32c_intel_le_hw(*crcp, data, len));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::Resume() {
Send(new ChildProcessMsg_Resume());
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void macvlan_hash_del(struct macvlan_dev *vlan, bool sync)
{
hlist_del_rcu(&vlan->hlist);
if (sync)
synchronize_rcu();
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct cryptd_aead *cryptd_alloc_aead(const char *alg_name,
u32 type, u32 mask)
{
char cryptd_alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
struct crypto_aead *tfm;
if (snprintf(cryptd_alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"cryptd(%s)", alg_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
tfm = crypto_alloc_aead(cryptd_alg_name, type, mask);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return ERR_CAST(tfm);
if (tfm->base.__crt_alg->cra_module != THIS_MODULE) {
crypto_free_aead(tfm);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
return __cryptd_aead_cast(tfm);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BrowserInit::WasRestarted() {
static bool was_restarted = false;
static bool was_restarted_read = false;
if (!was_restarted_read) {
PrefService* pref_service = g_browser_process->local_state();
was_restarted = pref_service->GetBoolean(prefs::kWasRestarted);
pref_service->SetBoolean(prefs::kWasRestarted, false);
was_restarted_read = true;
}
return was_restarted;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,412 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct page *alloc_gigantic_page(int nid, unsigned int order)
{
unsigned long nr_pages = 1 << order;
unsigned long ret, pfn, flags;
struct zone *z;
z = NODE_DATA(nid)->node_zones;
for (; z - NODE_DATA(nid)->node_zones < MAX_NR_ZONES; z++) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&z->lock, flags);
pfn = ALIGN(z->zone_start_pfn, nr_pages);
while (zone_spans_last_pfn(z, pfn, nr_pages)) {
if (pfn_range_valid_gigantic(z, pfn, nr_pages)) {
/*
* We release the zone lock here because
* alloc_contig_range() will also lock the zone
* at some point. If there's an allocation
* spinning on this lock, it may win the race
* and cause alloc_contig_range() to fail...
*/
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&z->lock, flags);
ret = __alloc_gigantic_page(pfn, nr_pages);
if (!ret)
return pfn_to_page(pfn);
spin_lock_irqsave(&z->lock, flags);
}
pfn += nr_pages;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&z->lock, flags);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: remove superfluous page unlock in VM_SHARED case
huge_add_to_page_cache->add_to_page_cache implicitly unlocks the page
before returning in case of errors.
The error returned was -EEXIST by running UFFDIO_COPY on a non-hole
offset of a VM_SHARED hugetlbfs mapping. It was an userland bug that
triggered it and the kernel must cope with it returning -EEXIST from
ioctl(UFFDIO_COPY) as expected.
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageLocked(page))
kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:964!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 1 PID: 22582 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.11.11-300.fc26.x86_64 #1
RIP: unlock_page+0x4a/0x50
Call Trace:
hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte+0xc0/0x320
mcopy_atomic+0x96f/0xbe0
userfaultfd_ioctl+0x218/0xe90
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa5/0x600
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa9
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170802165145.22628-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Maxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexey Perevalov <a.perevalov@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 86,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int virtqueue_num_heads(VirtQueue *vq, unsigned int idx)
{
uint16_t num_heads = vring_avail_idx(vq) - idx;
/* Check it isn't doing very strange things with descriptor numbers. */
if (num_heads > vq->vring.num) {
error_report("Guest moved used index from %u to %u",
idx, vq->shadow_avail_idx);
exit(1);
}
/* On success, callers read a descriptor at vq->last_avail_idx.
* Make sure descriptor read does not bypass avail index read. */
if (num_heads) {
smp_rmb();
}
return num_heads;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: put_neg_hints(unsigned char **buf_out, gss_buffer_t input_token,
unsigned int buflen)
{
int ret;
/* if token length is 0, we do not want to send */
if (input_token->length == 0)
return (0);
if (input_token->length > buflen)
return (-1);
*(*buf_out)++ = SEQUENCE;
if ((ret = gssint_put_der_length(input_token->length, buf_out,
input_token->length)))
return (ret);
TWRITE_STR(*buf_out, input_token->value, input_token->length);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 36,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniform1fv(
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
const FlexibleFloat32ArrayView& v,
GLuint src_offset,
GLuint src_length) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateUniformParameters<WTF::Float32Array>("uniform1fv", location, v,
1, src_offset, src_length))
return;
ContextGL()->Uniform1fv(location->Location(),
src_length ? src_length : (v.length() - src_offset),
v.DataMaybeOnStack() + src_offset);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reparent_to_kthreadd(void)
{
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
ptrace_unlink(current);
/* Reparent to init */
current->real_parent = current->parent = kthreadd_task;
list_move_tail(¤t->sibling, ¤t->real_parent->children);
/* Set the exit signal to SIGCHLD so we signal init on exit */
current->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
if (task_nice(current) < 0)
set_user_nice(current, 0);
/* cpus_allowed? */
/* rt_priority? */
/* signals? */
memcpy(current->signal->rlim, init_task.signal->rlim,
sizeof(current->signal->rlim));
atomic_inc(&init_cred.usage);
commit_creds(&init_cred);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
}
Commit Message: block: Fix io_context leak after failure of clone with CLONE_IO
With CLONE_IO, parent's io_context->nr_tasks is incremented, but never
decremented whenever copy_process() fails afterwards, which prevents
exit_io_context() from calling IO schedulers exit functions.
Give a task_struct to exit_io_context(), and call exit_io_context() instead of
put_io_context() in copy_process() cleanup path.
Signed-off-by: Louis Rilling <louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 94,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
{
int i = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (i != 0)
return i;
}
#endif
if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
return i;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 6,226 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestPaintArtifact& TestPaintArtifact::ScrollHitTest(
DisplayItemClient& client,
scoped_refptr<const TransformPaintPropertyNode> scroll_offset) {
display_item_list_.AllocateAndConstruct<ScrollHitTestDisplayItem>(
client, DisplayItem::kScrollHitTest, std::move(scroll_offset));
return *this;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TEE_Result syscall_cryp_obj_reset(unsigned long obj)
{
TEE_Result res;
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
struct tee_obj *o;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_obj_get(to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx),
tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(obj), &o);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
if ((o->info.handleFlags & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_PERSISTENT) == 0) {
tee_obj_attr_clear(o);
o->info.keySize = 0;
o->info.objectUsage = TEE_USAGE_DEFAULT;
} else {
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
}
/* the object is no more initialized */
o->info.handleFlags &= ~TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vfio_pci_intx_unmask_handler(void *opaque, void *unused)
{
struct vfio_pci_device *vdev = opaque;
struct pci_dev *pdev = vdev->pdev;
unsigned long flags;
int ret = 0;
spin_lock_irqsave(&vdev->irqlock, flags);
/*
* Unmasking comes from ioctl or config, so again, have the
* physical bit follow the virtual even when not using INTx.
*/
if (unlikely(!is_intx(vdev))) {
if (vdev->pci_2_3)
pci_intx(pdev, 1);
} else if (vdev->ctx[0].masked && !vdev->virq_disabled) {
/*
* A pending interrupt here would immediately trigger,
* but we can avoid that overhead by just re-sending
* the interrupt to the user.
*/
if (vdev->pci_2_3) {
if (!pci_check_and_unmask_intx(pdev))
ret = 1;
} else
enable_irq(pdev->irq);
vdev->ctx[0].masked = (ret > 0);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&vdev->irqlock, flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 48,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int rxe_mem_copy(struct rxe_mem *mem, u64 iova, void *addr, int length,
enum copy_direction dir, u32 *crcp)
{
int err;
int bytes;
u8 *va;
struct rxe_map **map;
struct rxe_phys_buf *buf;
int m;
int i;
size_t offset;
u32 crc = crcp ? (*crcp) : 0;
if (length == 0)
return 0;
if (mem->type == RXE_MEM_TYPE_DMA) {
u8 *src, *dest;
src = (dir == to_mem_obj) ?
addr : ((void *)(uintptr_t)iova);
dest = (dir == to_mem_obj) ?
((void *)(uintptr_t)iova) : addr;
if (crcp)
*crcp = crc32_le(*crcp, src, length);
memcpy(dest, src, length);
return 0;
}
WARN_ON(!mem->map);
err = mem_check_range(mem, iova, length);
if (err) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto err1;
}
lookup_iova(mem, iova, &m, &i, &offset);
map = mem->map + m;
buf = map[0]->buf + i;
while (length > 0) {
u8 *src, *dest;
va = (u8 *)(uintptr_t)buf->addr + offset;
src = (dir == to_mem_obj) ? addr : va;
dest = (dir == to_mem_obj) ? va : addr;
bytes = buf->size - offset;
if (bytes > length)
bytes = length;
if (crcp)
crc = crc32_le(crc, src, bytes);
memcpy(dest, src, bytes);
length -= bytes;
addr += bytes;
offset = 0;
buf++;
i++;
if (i == RXE_BUF_PER_MAP) {
i = 0;
map++;
buf = map[0]->buf;
}
}
if (crcp)
*crcp = crc;
return 0;
err1:
return err;
}
Commit Message: IB/rxe: Fix mem_check_range integer overflow
Update the range check to avoid integer-overflow in edge case.
Resolves CVE 2016-8636.
Signed-off-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 73,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FLAC__bool read_subframe_(FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder, unsigned channel, unsigned bps, FLAC__bool do_full_decode)
{
FLAC__uint32 x;
FLAC__bool wasted_bits;
unsigned i;
if(!FLAC__bitreader_read_raw_uint32(decoder->private_->input, &x, 8)) /* MAGIC NUMBER */
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
wasted_bits = (x & 1);
x &= 0xfe;
if(wasted_bits) {
unsigned u;
if(!FLAC__bitreader_read_unary_unsigned(decoder->private_->input, &u))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
decoder->private_->frame.subframes[channel].wasted_bits = u+1;
bps -= decoder->private_->frame.subframes[channel].wasted_bits;
}
else
decoder->private_->frame.subframes[channel].wasted_bits = 0;
/*
* Lots of magic numbers here
*/
if(x & 0x80) {
send_error_to_client_(decoder, FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_ERROR_STATUS_LOST_SYNC);
decoder->protected_->state = FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_SEARCH_FOR_FRAME_SYNC;
return true;
}
else if(x == 0) {
if(!read_subframe_constant_(decoder, channel, bps, do_full_decode))
return false;
}
else if(x == 2) {
if(!read_subframe_verbatim_(decoder, channel, bps, do_full_decode))
return false;
}
else if(x < 16) {
send_error_to_client_(decoder, FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_ERROR_STATUS_UNPARSEABLE_STREAM);
decoder->protected_->state = FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_SEARCH_FOR_FRAME_SYNC;
return true;
}
else if(x <= 24) {
if(!read_subframe_fixed_(decoder, channel, bps, (x>>1)&7, do_full_decode))
return false;
if(decoder->protected_->state == FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_SEARCH_FOR_FRAME_SYNC) /* means bad sync or got corruption */
return true;
}
else if(x < 64) {
send_error_to_client_(decoder, FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_ERROR_STATUS_UNPARSEABLE_STREAM);
decoder->protected_->state = FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_SEARCH_FOR_FRAME_SYNC;
return true;
}
else {
if(!read_subframe_lpc_(decoder, channel, bps, ((x>>1)&31)+1, do_full_decode))
return false;
if(decoder->protected_->state == FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_SEARCH_FOR_FRAME_SYNC) /* means bad sync or got corruption */
return true;
}
if(wasted_bits && do_full_decode) {
x = decoder->private_->frame.subframes[channel].wasted_bits;
for(i = 0; i < decoder->private_->frame.header.blocksize; i++)
decoder->private_->output[channel][i] <<= x;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Avoid free-before-initialize vulnerability in heap
Bug: 27211885
Change-Id: Ib9c93bd9ffdde2a5f8d31a86f06e267dc9c152db
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 161,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::UnscopableLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_unscopableLongAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::UnscopableLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,288 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SkipConditionalExperiment(const Experiment& experiment) {
if (experiment.internal_name ==
std::string("enhanced-bookmarks-experiment")) {
CommandLine* command_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kEnhancedBookmarksExperiment))
return false;
return !IsEnhancedBookmarksExperimentEnabled();
}
if ((experiment.internal_name == std::string("manual-enhanced-bookmarks")) ||
(experiment.internal_name ==
std::string("manual-enhanced-bookmarks-optout"))) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,315 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ping_check_bind_addr(struct sock *sk, struct inet_sock *isk,
struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) {
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET) {
struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *) uaddr;
int chk_addr_ret;
if (addr_len < sizeof(*addr))
return -EINVAL;
if (addr->sin_family != AF_INET &&
!(addr->sin_family == AF_UNSPEC &&
addr->sin_addr.s_addr == htonl(INADDR_ANY)))
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
pr_debug("ping_check_bind_addr(sk=%p,addr=%pI4,port=%d)\n",
sk, &addr->sin_addr.s_addr, ntohs(addr->sin_port));
chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type(net, addr->sin_addr.s_addr);
if (addr->sin_addr.s_addr == htonl(INADDR_ANY))
chk_addr_ret = RTN_LOCAL;
if ((net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_nonlocal_bind == 0 &&
isk->freebind == 0 && isk->transparent == 0 &&
chk_addr_ret != RTN_LOCAL) ||
chk_addr_ret == RTN_MULTICAST ||
chk_addr_ret == RTN_BROADCAST)
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6) {
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) uaddr;
int addr_type, scoped, has_addr;
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
if (addr_len < sizeof(*addr))
return -EINVAL;
if (addr->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
pr_debug("ping_check_bind_addr(sk=%p,addr=%pI6c,port=%d)\n",
sk, addr->sin6_addr.s6_addr, ntohs(addr->sin6_port));
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&addr->sin6_addr);
scoped = __ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(addr_type);
if ((addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY &&
!(addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_UNICAST)) ||
(scoped && !addr->sin6_scope_id))
return -EINVAL;
rcu_read_lock();
if (addr->sin6_scope_id) {
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, addr->sin6_scope_id);
if (!dev) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return -ENODEV;
}
}
has_addr = pingv6_ops.ipv6_chk_addr(net, &addr->sin6_addr, dev,
scoped);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!(net->ipv6.sysctl.ip_nonlocal_bind ||
isk->freebind || isk->transparent || has_addr ||
addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_ANY))
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (scoped)
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = addr->sin6_scope_id;
#endif
} else {
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ping: implement proper locking
We got a report of yet another bug in ping
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/03/24/6
->disconnect() is not called with socket lock held.
Fix this by acquiring ping rwlock earlier.
Thanks to Daniel, Alexander and Andrey for letting us know this problem.
Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Daniel Jiang <danieljiang0415@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 69,394 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static_addresses_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
global_data->have_vrrp_config = true;
if (!strvec)
return;
alloc_value_block(alloc_saddress, vector_slot(strvec, 0));
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 75,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SQLRETURN SQLSetDescFieldW( SQLHDESC descriptor_handle,
SQLSMALLINT rec_number,
SQLSMALLINT field_identifier,
SQLPOINTER value,
SQLINTEGER buffer_length )
{
/*
* not quite sure how the descriptor can be
* allocated to a statement, all the documentation talks
* about state transitions on statement states, but the
* descriptor may be allocated with more than one statement
* at one time. Which one should I check ?
*/
DMHDESC descriptor = (DMHDESC) descriptor_handle;
SQLRETURN ret;
SQLCHAR s1[ 100 + LOG_MESSAGE_LEN ];
int isStrField = 0;
/*
* check descriptor
*/
if ( !__validate_desc( descriptor ))
{
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Error: SQL_INVALID_HANDLE" );
#ifdef WITH_HANDLE_REDIRECT
{
DMHDESC parent_desc;
parent_desc = find_parent_handle( descriptor, SQL_HANDLE_DESC );
if ( parent_desc ) {
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Info: found parent handle" );
if ( CHECK_SQLSETDESCFIELDW( parent_desc -> connection ))
{
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Info: calling redirected driver function" );
return SQLSETDESCFIELDW( parent_desc -> connection,
descriptor,
rec_number,
field_identifier,
value,
buffer_length );
}
}
}
#endif
return SQL_INVALID_HANDLE;
}
function_entry( descriptor );
if ( log_info.log_flag )
{
sprintf( descriptor -> msg, "\n\t\tEntry:\
\n\t\t\tDescriptor = %p\
\n\t\t\tRec Number = %d\
\n\t\t\tField Ident = %s\
\n\t\t\tValue = %p\
\n\t\t\tBuffer Length = %d",
descriptor,
rec_number,
__desc_attr_as_string( s1, field_identifier ),
value,
(int)buffer_length );
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
descriptor -> msg );
}
thread_protect( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor );
if ( descriptor -> connection -> state < STATE_C4 )
{
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Error: HY010" );
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_HY010, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
/*
* check status of statements associated with this descriptor
*/
if( __check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S8 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S9 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S10 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S11 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S12 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S13 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S14 ) ||
__check_stmt_from_desc( descriptor, STATE_S15 )) {
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Error: HY010" );
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_HY010, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
if ( rec_number < 0 )
{
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_07009, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
switch ( field_identifier )
{
/* Fixed-length fields: buffer_length is ignored */
case SQL_DESC_ALLOC_TYPE:
case SQL_DESC_ARRAY_SIZE:
case SQL_DESC_ARRAY_STATUS_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_BIND_OFFSET_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_BIND_TYPE:
case SQL_DESC_COUNT:
case SQL_DESC_ROWS_PROCESSED_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_AUTO_UNIQUE_VALUE:
case SQL_DESC_CASE_SENSITIVE:
case SQL_DESC_CONCISE_TYPE:
case SQL_DESC_DATA_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_DATETIME_INTERVAL_CODE:
case SQL_DESC_DATETIME_INTERVAL_PRECISION:
case SQL_DESC_DISPLAY_SIZE:
case SQL_DESC_FIXED_PREC_SCALE:
case SQL_DESC_INDICATOR_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_LENGTH:
case SQL_DESC_NULLABLE:
case SQL_DESC_NUM_PREC_RADIX:
case SQL_DESC_OCTET_LENGTH:
case SQL_DESC_OCTET_LENGTH_PTR:
case SQL_DESC_PARAMETER_TYPE:
case SQL_DESC_PRECISION:
case SQL_DESC_ROWVER:
case SQL_DESC_SCALE:
case SQL_DESC_SEARCHABLE:
case SQL_DESC_TYPE:
case SQL_DESC_UNNAMED:
case SQL_DESC_UNSIGNED:
case SQL_DESC_UPDATABLE:
isStrField = 0;
break;
/* Pointer to data: buffer_length must be valid */
case SQL_DESC_BASE_COLUMN_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_BASE_TABLE_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_CATALOG_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_LABEL:
case SQL_DESC_LITERAL_PREFIX:
case SQL_DESC_LITERAL_SUFFIX:
case SQL_DESC_LOCAL_TYPE_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_SCHEMA_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_TABLE_NAME:
case SQL_DESC_TYPE_NAME:
isStrField = 1;
break;
default:
isStrField = buffer_length != SQL_IS_POINTER && buffer_length != SQL_IS_INTEGER
&& buffer_length != SQL_IS_UINTEGER && buffer_length != SQL_IS_SMALLINT &&
buffer_length != SQL_IS_USMALLINT;
}
if ( isStrField && buffer_length < 0 && buffer_length != SQL_NTS)
{
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_HY090, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
if ( field_identifier == SQL_DESC_COUNT && (SQLINTEGER)value < 0 )
{
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_07009, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
if ( field_identifier == SQL_DESC_PARAMETER_TYPE && value != SQL_PARAM_INPUT
&& value != SQL_PARAM_OUTPUT && value != SQL_PARAM_INPUT_OUTPUT &&
value != SQL_PARAM_INPUT_OUTPUT_STREAM && value != SQL_PARAM_OUTPUT_STREAM )
{
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_HY105, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
if ( descriptor -> connection -> unicode_driver ||
CHECK_SQLSETDESCFIELDW( descriptor -> connection ))
{
if ( !CHECK_SQLSETDESCFIELDW( descriptor -> connection ))
{
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Error: IM001" );
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_IM001, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
ret = SQLSETDESCFIELDW( descriptor -> connection,
descriptor -> driver_desc,
rec_number,
field_identifier,
value,
buffer_length );
if ( log_info.log_flag )
{
sprintf( descriptor -> msg,
"\n\t\tExit:[%s]",
__get_return_status( ret, s1 ));
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
descriptor -> msg );
}
}
else
{
SQLCHAR *ascii_str = NULL;
if ( !CHECK_SQLSETDESCFIELD( descriptor -> connection ))
{
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
"Error: IM001" );
__post_internal_error( &descriptor -> error,
ERROR_IM001, NULL,
descriptor -> connection -> environment -> requested_version );
return function_return_nodrv( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, SQL_ERROR );
}
/*
* is it a char arg...
*/
switch ( field_identifier )
{
case SQL_DESC_NAME: /* This is the only R/W SQLCHAR* type */
ascii_str = (SQLCHAR*) unicode_to_ansi_alloc( value, buffer_length, descriptor -> connection, NULL );
value = ascii_str;
buffer_length = strlen((char*) ascii_str );
break;
default:
break;
}
ret = SQLSETDESCFIELD( descriptor -> connection,
descriptor -> driver_desc,
rec_number,
field_identifier,
value,
buffer_length );
if ( log_info.log_flag )
{
sprintf( descriptor -> msg,
"\n\t\tExit:[%s]",
__get_return_status( ret, s1 ));
dm_log_write( __FILE__,
__LINE__,
LOG_INFO,
LOG_INFO,
descriptor -> msg );
}
if ( ascii_str )
{
free( ascii_str );
}
}
return function_return( SQL_HANDLE_DESC, descriptor, ret );
}
Commit Message: New Pre Source
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 169,311 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NavigationPolicy EffectiveNavigationPolicy(NavigationPolicy policy,
const WebInputEvent* current_event,
const WebWindowFeatures& features) {
if (policy == kNavigationPolicyIgnore)
return GetNavigationPolicy(current_event, features);
if (policy == kNavigationPolicyNewBackgroundTab &&
GetNavigationPolicy(current_event, features) !=
kNavigationPolicyNewBackgroundTab &&
!UIEventWithKeyState::NewTabModifierSetFromIsolatedWorld()) {
return kNavigationPolicyNewForegroundTab;
}
return policy;
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void d_invalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
{
/*
* If it's already been dropped, return OK.
*/
spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
if (d_unhashed(dentry)) {
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
return;
}
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
/* Negative dentries can be dropped without further checks */
if (!dentry->d_inode) {
d_drop(dentry);
return;
}
for (;;) {
struct detach_data data;
data.mountpoint = NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&data.select.dispose);
data.select.start = dentry;
data.select.found = 0;
d_walk(dentry, &data, detach_and_collect, check_and_drop);
if (data.select.found)
shrink_dentry_list(&data.select.dispose);
if (data.mountpoint) {
detach_mounts(data.mountpoint);
dput(data.mountpoint);
}
if (!data.mountpoint && !data.select.found)
break;
cond_resched();
}
}
Commit Message: dcache: Handle escaped paths in prepend_path
A rename can result in a dentry that by walking up d_parent
will never reach it's mnt_root. For lack of a better term
I call this an escaped path.
prepend_path is called by four different functions __d_path,
d_absolute_path, d_path, and getcwd.
__d_path only wants to see paths are connected to the root it passes
in. So __d_path needs prepend_path to return an error.
d_absolute_path similarly wants to see paths that are connected to
some root. Escaped paths are not connected to any mnt_root so
d_absolute_path needs prepend_path to return an error greater
than 1. So escaped paths will be treated like paths on lazily
unmounted mounts.
getcwd needs to prepend "(unreachable)" so getcwd also needs
prepend_path to return an error.
d_path is the interesting hold out. d_path just wants to print
something, and does not care about the weird cases. Which raises
the question what should be printed?
Given that <escaped_path>/<anything> should result in -ENOENT I
believe it is desirable for escaped paths to be printed as empty
paths. As there are not really any meaninful path components when
considered from the perspective of a mount tree.
So tweak prepend_path to return an empty path with an new error
code of 3 when it encounters an escaped path.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 94,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GpuCommandBufferStub::has_surface_state() const {
return surface_state_ != NULL;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,914 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::scheduleStyleRecalc()
{
if (shouldDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent()) {
ownerElement()->setNeedsStyleRecalc();
ownerElement()->document().scheduleStyleRecalc();
return;
}
if (m_styleRecalcTimer.isActive())
return;
ASSERT(needsStyleRecalc() || childNeedsStyleRecalc() || childNeedsDistributionRecalc());
m_styleRecalcTimer.startOneShot(0);
InspectorInstrumentation::didScheduleStyleRecalculation(this);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,842 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void iput(struct inode *inode)
{
if (inode) {
BUG_ON(inode->i_state & I_CLEAR);
if (atomic_dec_and_lock(&inode->i_count, &inode->i_lock))
iput_final(inode);
}
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::PropagateBrowserCommandLineToRenderer(
const base::CommandLine& browser_cmd,
base::CommandLine* renderer_cmd) {
static const char* const kSwitchNames[] = {
switches::kAgcStartupMinVolume,
switches::kAecRefinedAdaptiveFilter,
switches::kAllowLoopbackInPeerConnection,
switches::kAndroidFontsPath,
switches::kAudioBufferSize,
switches::kBlinkSettings,
switches::kDefaultTileWidth,
switches::kDefaultTileHeight,
switches::kDisable2dCanvasImageChromium,
switches::kDisable3DAPIs,
switches::kDisableAcceleratedJpegDecoding,
switches::kDisableAcceleratedVideoDecode,
switches::kDisableBackgroundTimerThrottling,
switches::kDisableBlinkFeatures,
switches::kDisableBreakpad,
switches::kDisablePreferCompositingToLCDText,
switches::kDisableDatabases,
switches::kDisableDisplayList2dCanvas,
switches::kDisableDistanceFieldText,
switches::kDisableFileSystem,
switches::kDisableGestureRequirementForMediaPlayback,
switches::kDisableGestureRequirementForPresentation,
switches::kDisableGpuCompositing,
switches::kDisableGpuMemoryBufferVideoFrames,
switches::kDisableGpuVsync,
switches::kDisableLowResTiling,
switches::kDisableHistogramCustomizer,
switches::kDisableLCDText,
switches::kDisableLocalStorage,
switches::kDisableLogging,
switches::kDisableMediaSuspend,
switches::kDisableNotifications,
switches::kDisableOverlayScrollbar,
switches::kDisablePepper3DImageChromium,
switches::kDisablePermissionsAPI,
switches::kDisablePresentationAPI,
switches::kDisablePinch,
switches::kDisableRGBA4444Textures,
switches::kDisableRTCSmoothnessAlgorithm,
switches::kDisableSeccompFilterSandbox,
switches::kDisableSharedWorkers,
switches::kDisableSlimmingPaintInvalidation,
switches::kDisableSmoothScrolling,
switches::kDisableSpeechAPI,
switches::kDisableThreadedCompositing,
switches::kDisableThreadedScrolling,
switches::kDisableTouchAdjustment,
switches::kDisableTouchDragDrop,
switches::kDisableV8IdleTasks,
switches::kDisableWebGLImageChromium,
switches::kDomAutomationController,
switches::kEnableBlinkFeatures,
switches::kEnableBrowserSideNavigation,
switches::kEnableColorCorrectRenderingDefaultMode,
switches::kEnableDisplayList2dCanvas,
switches::kEnableDistanceFieldText,
switches::kEnableExperimentalCanvasFeatures,
switches::kEnableExperimentalWebPlatformFeatures,
switches::kEnableHeapProfiling,
switches::kEnableGPUClientLogging,
switches::kEnableGpuClientTracing,
switches::kEnableGpuMemoryBufferVideoFrames,
switches::kEnableGPUServiceLogging,
switches::kEnableLowResTiling,
switches::kEnableMediaSuspend,
switches::kEnableInbandTextTracks,
switches::kEnableLCDText,
switches::kEnableLogging,
switches::kEnableNetworkInformation,
switches::kEnableOverlayScrollbar,
switches::kEnablePinch,
switches::kEnablePluginPlaceholderTesting,
switches::kEnablePreciseMemoryInfo,
switches::kEnablePrintBrowser,
switches::kEnablePreferCompositingToLCDText,
switches::kEnableRGBA4444Textures,
switches::kEnableSkiaBenchmarking,
switches::kEnableSlimmingPaintV2,
switches::kEnableSlimmingPaintInvalidation,
switches::kEnableSmoothScrolling,
switches::kEnableStatsTable,
switches::kEnableThreadedCompositing,
switches::kEnableTouchDragDrop,
switches::kEnableUseZoomForDSF,
switches::kEnableViewport,
switches::kEnableVp9InMp4,
switches::kEnableVtune,
switches::kEnableWebFontsInterventionTrigger,
switches::kEnableWebFontsInterventionV2,
switches::kEnableWebGLDraftExtensions,
switches::kEnableWebGLImageChromium,
switches::kEnableWebVR,
switches::kExplicitlyAllowedPorts,
switches::kForceDeviceScaleFactor,
switches::kForceDisplayList2dCanvas,
switches::kForceGpuMemAvailableMb,
switches::kForceGpuRasterization,
switches::kEnableCanvas2dDynamicRenderingModeSwitching,
switches::kForceOverlayFullscreenVideo,
switches::kFullMemoryCrashReport,
switches::kInertVisualViewport,
switches::kIPCConnectionTimeout,
switches::kIsRunningInMash,
switches::kJavaScriptFlags,
switches::kLoggingLevel,
switches::kMainFrameResizesAreOrientationChanges,
switches::kMaxUntiledLayerWidth,
switches::kMaxUntiledLayerHeight,
switches::kMemoryMetrics,
switches::kMojoLocalStorage,
switches::kMSEAudioBufferSizeLimit,
switches::kMSEVideoBufferSizeLimit,
switches::kNoReferrers,
switches::kNoSandbox,
switches::kNoUseMusInRenderer,
switches::kOverridePluginPowerSaverForTesting,
switches::kPassiveListenersDefault,
switches::kPpapiInProcess,
switches::kProfilerTiming,
switches::kReducedReferrerGranularity,
switches::kReduceSecurityForTesting,
switches::kRegisterPepperPlugins,
switches::kRendererStartupDialog,
switches::kRootLayerScrolls,
switches::kShowPaintRects,
switches::kSitePerProcess,
switches::kStatsCollectionController,
switches::kTestType,
switches::kTopDocumentIsolation,
switches::kTouchEventFeatureDetection,
switches::kTouchTextSelectionStrategy,
switches::kTraceConfigFile,
switches::kTraceToConsole,
switches::kUseFakeUIForMediaStream,
switches::kUseGL,
switches::kUseGpuInTests,
switches::kUseMobileUserAgent,
switches::kV,
switches::kV8CacheStrategiesForCacheStorage,
switches::kVideoThreads,
switches::kVideoUnderflowThresholdMs,
switches::kVModule,
cc::switches::kCheckTilePriorityInversion,
cc::switches::kDisableCompositedAntialiasing,
cc::switches::kDisableThreadedAnimation,
cc::switches::kEnableColorCorrectRendering,
cc::switches::kEnableGpuBenchmarking,
cc::switches::kEnableLayerLists,
cc::switches::kEnableTileCompression,
cc::switches::kEnableTrueColorRendering,
cc::switches::kShowCompositedLayerBorders,
cc::switches::kShowFPSCounter,
cc::switches::kShowLayerAnimationBounds,
cc::switches::kShowPropertyChangedRects,
cc::switches::kShowScreenSpaceRects,
cc::switches::kShowSurfaceDamageRects,
cc::switches::kSlowDownRasterScaleFactor,
cc::switches::kBrowserControlsHideThreshold,
cc::switches::kBrowserControlsShowThreshold,
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
switches::kEnablePepperTesting,
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
switches::kDisableWebRtcHWDecoding,
switches::kDisableWebRtcHWEncoding,
switches::kEnableWebRtcStunOrigin,
switches::kEnforceWebRtcIPPermissionCheck,
switches::kForceWebRtcIPHandlingPolicy,
switches::kWebRtcMaxCaptureFramerate,
#endif
switches::kEnableLowEndDeviceMode,
switches::kDisableLowEndDeviceMode,
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
switches::kDisableMediaSessionAPI,
switches::kEnableContentIntentDetection,
switches::kRendererWaitForJavaDebugger,
#endif
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
switches::kEnableSandboxLogging,
#endif
#if defined(OS_WIN)
switches::kDisableWin32kLockDown,
switches::kEnableWin7WebRtcHWH264Decoding,
switches::kTrySupportedChannelLayouts,
switches::kTraceExportEventsToETW,
#endif
#if defined(USE_OZONE)
switches::kOzonePlatform,
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
switches::kDisableVaapiAcceleratedVideoEncode,
#endif
#if defined(ENABLE_IPC_FUZZER)
switches::kIpcDumpDirectory,
switches::kIpcFuzzerTestcase,
#endif
};
renderer_cmd->CopySwitchesFrom(browser_cmd, kSwitchNames,
arraysize(kSwitchNames));
BrowserChildProcessHostImpl::CopyFeatureAndFieldTrialFlags(renderer_cmd);
if (browser_cmd.HasSwitch(switches::kTraceStartup) &&
BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance()->is_tracing_startup_for_duration()) {
renderer_cmd->AppendSwitchASCII(
switches::kTraceStartup,
browser_cmd.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kTraceStartup));
}
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
if (!has_done_stun_trials &&
browser_cmd.HasSwitch(switches::kWebRtcStunProbeTrialParameter)) {
has_done_stun_trials = true;
renderer_cmd->AppendSwitchASCII(
switches::kWebRtcStunProbeTrialParameter,
browser_cmd.GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kWebRtcStunProbeTrialParameter));
}
#endif
if (GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord() &&
!browser_cmd.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableDatabases)) {
renderer_cmd->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableDatabases);
}
if (browser_cmd.HasSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren)) {
std::string value =
browser_cmd.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren);
if (value.empty() || value == switches::kRendererProcess) {
renderer_cmd->AppendSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebugger);
}
}
DCHECK(child_connection_);
renderer_cmd->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kPrimordialPipeToken,
child_connection_->service_token());
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(OFFICIAL_BUILD)
if (renderer_cmd->HasSwitch(switches::kRendererStartupDialog) &&
!renderer_cmd->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) {
renderer_cmd->AppendSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,296 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsValidStateForWindowsCreateFunction(
const windows::Create::Params::CreateData* create_data) {
if (!create_data)
return true;
bool has_bound = create_data->left || create_data->top ||
create_data->width || create_data->height;
bool is_panel = create_data->type == windows::CreateType::CREATE_TYPE_PANEL;
switch (create_data->state) {
case windows::WINDOW_STATE_MINIMIZED:
return !(create_data->focused && *create_data->focused) && !has_bound &&
!is_panel;
case windows::WINDOW_STATE_MAXIMIZED:
case windows::WINDOW_STATE_FULLSCREEN:
case windows::WINDOW_STATE_LOCKED_FULLSCREEN:
return !(create_data->focused && !*create_data->focused) && !has_bound &&
!is_panel;
case windows::WINDOW_STATE_NORMAL:
case windows::WINDOW_STATE_DOCKED:
case windows::WINDOW_STATE_NONE:
return true;
}
NOTREACHED();
return true;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fbCombineDisjointAtopU (CARD32 *dest, const CARD32 *src, int width)
{
fbCombineDisjointGeneralU (dest, src, width, CombineAAtop);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoUniformMatrix4x2fv(
GLint location,
GLsizei count,
GLboolean transpose,
const volatile GLfloat* value) {
api()->glUniformMatrix4x2fvFn(location, count, transpose,
const_cast<const GLfloat*>(value));
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fm_mgr_fe_cfg_query
(
IN p_fm_config_conx_hdlt hdl,
IN fm_mgr_action_t action,
OUT fe_config_t *info,
OUT fm_msg_ret_code_t *ret_code
)
{
p_hsm_com_client_hdl_t client_hdl;
if ( (client_hdl = get_mgr_hdl(hdl,FM_MGR_FE)) != NULL )
{
return fm_mgr_general_query(client_hdl,action,FM_DT_FE_CFG,sizeof(fe_config_t),info,ret_code);
}
return FM_CONF_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 96,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int handle_vm86_trap(struct kernel_vm86_regs *regs, long error_code, int trapno)
{
if (VMPI.is_vm86pus) {
if ((trapno == 3) || (trapno == 1)) {
KVM86->regs32->ax = VM86_TRAP + (trapno << 8);
/* setting this flag forces the code in entry_32.S to
call save_v86_state() and change the stack pointer
to KVM86->regs32 */
set_thread_flag(TIF_IRET);
return 0;
}
do_int(regs, trapno, (unsigned char __user *) (regs->pt.ss << 4), SP(regs));
return 0;
}
if (trapno != 1)
return 1; /* we let this handle by the calling routine */
current->thread.trap_no = trapno;
current->thread.error_code = error_code;
force_sig(SIGTRAP, current);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Rect Launcher::GetScreenBoundsOfItemIconForWindow(aura::Window* window) {
if (!delegate_.get())
return gfx::Rect();
LauncherID id = delegate_->GetIDByWindow(window);
gfx::Rect bounds(launcher_view_->GetIdealBoundsOfItemIcon(id));
if (bounds.IsEmpty())
return bounds;
gfx::Point screen_origin;
views::View::ConvertPointToScreen(launcher_view_, &screen_origin);
return gfx::Rect(screen_origin.x() + bounds.x(),
screen_origin.y() + bounds.y(),
bounds.width(),
bounds.height());
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::initialize(WKContextRef contextRef, WKPageGroupRef pageGroupRef)
{
QQuickWebViewPrivate::initialize(contextRef, pageGroupRef);
webPageProxy->setUseFixedLayout(true);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 101,724 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void init_request_info(fcgi_request *request TSRMLS_DC)
{
char *env_script_filename = CGI_GETENV("SCRIPT_FILENAME");
char *env_path_translated = CGI_GETENV("PATH_TRANSLATED");
char *script_path_translated = env_script_filename;
/* some broken servers do not have script_filename or argv0
* an example, IIS configured in some ways. then they do more
* broken stuff and set path_translated to the cgi script location */
if (!script_path_translated && env_path_translated) {
script_path_translated = env_path_translated;
}
/* initialize the defaults */
SG(request_info).path_translated = NULL;
SG(request_info).request_method = NULL;
SG(request_info).proto_num = 1000;
SG(request_info).query_string = NULL;
SG(request_info).request_uri = NULL;
SG(request_info).content_type = NULL;
SG(request_info).content_length = 0;
SG(sapi_headers).http_response_code = 200;
/* script_path_translated being set is a good indication that
* we are running in a cgi environment, since it is always
* null otherwise. otherwise, the filename
* of the script will be retreived later via argc/argv */
if (script_path_translated) {
const char *auth;
char *content_length = CGI_GETENV("CONTENT_LENGTH");
char *content_type = CGI_GETENV("CONTENT_TYPE");
char *env_path_info = CGI_GETENV("PATH_INFO");
char *env_script_name = CGI_GETENV("SCRIPT_NAME");
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
/* Hack for buggy IIS that sets incorrect PATH_INFO */
char *env_server_software = CGI_GETENV("SERVER_SOFTWARE");
if (env_server_software &&
env_script_name &&
env_path_info &&
strncmp(env_server_software, "Microsoft-IIS", sizeof("Microsoft-IIS")-1) == 0 &&
strncmp(env_path_info, env_script_name, strlen(env_script_name)) == 0
) {
env_path_info = CGI_PUTENV("ORIG_PATH_INFO", env_path_info);
env_path_info += strlen(env_script_name);
if (*env_path_info == 0) {
env_path_info = NULL;
}
env_path_info = CGI_PUTENV("PATH_INFO", env_path_info);
}
#endif
if (CGIG(fix_pathinfo)) {
struct stat st;
char *real_path = NULL;
char *env_redirect_url = CGI_GETENV("REDIRECT_URL");
char *env_document_root = CGI_GETENV("DOCUMENT_ROOT");
char *orig_path_translated = env_path_translated;
char *orig_path_info = env_path_info;
char *orig_script_name = env_script_name;
char *orig_script_filename = env_script_filename;
int script_path_translated_len;
if (!env_document_root && PG(doc_root)) {
env_document_root = CGI_PUTENV("DOCUMENT_ROOT", PG(doc_root));
/* fix docroot */
TRANSLATE_SLASHES(env_document_root);
}
if (env_path_translated != NULL && env_redirect_url != NULL &&
env_path_translated != script_path_translated &&
strcmp(env_path_translated, script_path_translated) != 0) {
/*
* pretty much apache specific. If we have a redirect_url
* then our script_filename and script_name point to the
* php executable
*/
script_path_translated = env_path_translated;
/* we correct SCRIPT_NAME now in case we don't have PATH_INFO */
env_script_name = env_redirect_url;
}
#ifdef __riscos__
/* Convert path to unix format*/
__riscosify_control |= __RISCOSIFY_DONT_CHECK_DIR;
script_path_translated = __unixify(script_path_translated, 0, NULL, 1, 0);
#endif
/*
* if the file doesn't exist, try to extract PATH_INFO out
* of it by stat'ing back through the '/'
* this fixes url's like /info.php/test
*/
if (script_path_translated &&
(script_path_translated_len = strlen(script_path_translated)) > 0 &&
(script_path_translated[script_path_translated_len-1] == '/' ||
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
script_path_translated[script_path_translated_len-1] == '\\' ||
#endif
(real_path = tsrm_realpath(script_path_translated, NULL TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL)
) {
char *pt = estrndup(script_path_translated, script_path_translated_len);
int len = script_path_translated_len;
char *ptr;
while ((ptr = strrchr(pt, '/')) || (ptr = strrchr(pt, '\\'))) {
*ptr = 0;
if (stat(pt, &st) == 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
/*
* okay, we found the base script!
* work out how many chars we had to strip off;
* then we can modify PATH_INFO
* accordingly
*
* we now have the makings of
* PATH_INFO=/test
* SCRIPT_FILENAME=/docroot/info.php
*
* we now need to figure out what docroot is.
* if DOCUMENT_ROOT is set, this is easy, otherwise,
* we have to play the game of hide and seek to figure
* out what SCRIPT_NAME should be
*/
int slen = len - strlen(pt);
int pilen = env_path_info ? strlen(env_path_info) : 0;
char *path_info = env_path_info ? env_path_info + pilen - slen : NULL;
if (orig_path_info != path_info) {
if (orig_path_info) {
char old;
CGI_PUTENV("ORIG_PATH_INFO", orig_path_info);
old = path_info[0];
path_info[0] = 0;
if (!orig_script_name ||
strcmp(orig_script_name, env_path_info) != 0) {
if (orig_script_name) {
CGI_PUTENV("ORIG_SCRIPT_NAME", orig_script_name);
}
SG(request_info).request_uri = CGI_PUTENV("SCRIPT_NAME", env_path_info);
} else {
SG(request_info).request_uri = orig_script_name;
}
path_info[0] = old;
}
env_path_info = CGI_PUTENV("PATH_INFO", path_info);
}
if (!orig_script_filename ||
strcmp(orig_script_filename, pt) != 0) {
if (orig_script_filename) {
CGI_PUTENV("ORIG_SCRIPT_FILENAME", orig_script_filename);
}
script_path_translated = CGI_PUTENV("SCRIPT_FILENAME", pt);
}
TRANSLATE_SLASHES(pt);
/* figure out docroot
* SCRIPT_FILENAME minus SCRIPT_NAME
*/
if (env_document_root) {
int l = strlen(env_document_root);
int path_translated_len = 0;
char *path_translated = NULL;
if (l && env_document_root[l - 1] == '/') {
--l;
}
/* we have docroot, so we should have:
* DOCUMENT_ROOT=/docroot
* SCRIPT_FILENAME=/docroot/info.php
*/
/* PATH_TRANSLATED = DOCUMENT_ROOT + PATH_INFO */
path_translated_len = l + (env_path_info ? strlen(env_path_info) : 0);
path_translated = (char *) emalloc(path_translated_len + 1);
memcpy(path_translated, env_document_root, l);
if (env_path_info) {
memcpy(path_translated + l, env_path_info, (path_translated_len - l));
}
path_translated[path_translated_len] = '\0';
if (orig_path_translated) {
CGI_PUTENV("ORIG_PATH_TRANSLATED", orig_path_translated);
}
env_path_translated = CGI_PUTENV("PATH_TRANSLATED", path_translated);
efree(path_translated);
} else if ( env_script_name &&
strstr(pt, env_script_name)
) {
/* PATH_TRANSLATED = PATH_TRANSLATED - SCRIPT_NAME + PATH_INFO */
int ptlen = strlen(pt) - strlen(env_script_name);
int path_translated_len = ptlen + (env_path_info ? strlen(env_path_info) : 0);
char *path_translated = NULL;
path_translated = (char *) emalloc(path_translated_len + 1);
memcpy(path_translated, pt, ptlen);
if (env_path_info) {
memcpy(path_translated + ptlen, env_path_info, path_translated_len - ptlen);
}
path_translated[path_translated_len] = '\0';
if (orig_path_translated) {
CGI_PUTENV("ORIG_PATH_TRANSLATED", orig_path_translated);
}
env_path_translated = CGI_PUTENV("PATH_TRANSLATED", path_translated);
efree(path_translated);
}
break;
}
}
if (!ptr) {
/*
* if we stripped out all the '/' and still didn't find
* a valid path... we will fail, badly. of course we would
* have failed anyway... we output 'no input file' now.
*/
if (orig_script_filename) {
CGI_PUTENV("ORIG_SCRIPT_FILENAME", orig_script_filename);
}
script_path_translated = CGI_PUTENV("SCRIPT_FILENAME", NULL);
SG(sapi_headers).http_response_code = 404;
}
if (!SG(request_info).request_uri) {
if (!orig_script_name ||
strcmp(orig_script_name, env_script_name) != 0) {
if (orig_script_name) {
CGI_PUTENV("ORIG_SCRIPT_NAME", orig_script_name);
}
SG(request_info).request_uri = CGI_PUTENV("SCRIPT_NAME", env_script_name);
} else {
SG(request_info).request_uri = orig_script_name;
}
}
if (pt) {
efree(pt);
}
} else {
/* make sure path_info/translated are empty */
if (!orig_script_filename ||
(script_path_translated != orig_script_filename &&
strcmp(script_path_translated, orig_script_filename) != 0)) {
if (orig_script_filename) {
CGI_PUTENV("ORIG_SCRIPT_FILENAME", orig_script_filename);
}
script_path_translated = CGI_PUTENV("SCRIPT_FILENAME", script_path_translated);
}
if (env_redirect_url) {
if (orig_path_info) {
CGI_PUTENV("ORIG_PATH_INFO", orig_path_info);
CGI_PUTENV("PATH_INFO", NULL);
}
if (orig_path_translated) {
CGI_PUTENV("ORIG_PATH_TRANSLATED", orig_path_translated);
CGI_PUTENV("PATH_TRANSLATED", NULL);
}
}
if (env_script_name != orig_script_name) {
if (orig_script_name) {
CGI_PUTENV("ORIG_SCRIPT_NAME", orig_script_name);
}
SG(request_info).request_uri = CGI_PUTENV("SCRIPT_NAME", env_script_name);
} else {
SG(request_info).request_uri = env_script_name;
}
free(real_path);
}
} else {
/* pre 4.3 behaviour, shouldn't be used but provides BC */
if (env_path_info) {
SG(request_info).request_uri = env_path_info;
} else {
SG(request_info).request_uri = env_script_name;
}
if (!CGIG(discard_path) && env_path_translated) {
script_path_translated = env_path_translated;
}
}
if (is_valid_path(script_path_translated)) {
SG(request_info).path_translated = estrdup(script_path_translated);
}
SG(request_info).request_method = CGI_GETENV("REQUEST_METHOD");
/* FIXME - Work out proto_num here */
SG(request_info).query_string = CGI_GETENV("QUERY_STRING");
SG(request_info).content_type = (content_type ? content_type : "" );
SG(request_info).content_length = (content_length ? atol(content_length) : 0);
/* The CGI RFC allows servers to pass on unvalidated Authorization data */
auth = CGI_GETENV("HTTP_AUTHORIZATION");
php_handle_auth_data(auth TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ppp_find_unit(struct ppp_net *pn, int unit)
{
return unit_find(&pn->units_idr, unit);
}
Commit Message: ppp: take reference on channels netns
Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace.
Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their
userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they
can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from
under them.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at
addr ffff880064e217e0
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581
=============================================================================
BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906
[< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440
[< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469
[< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532
[< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574
[< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579
[< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597
[< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325
[< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360
[< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95
[< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150
[< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451
[< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274
[< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723
[< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832
[< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826
[< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631
[< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650
[< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805
[< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814
[< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341
[< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348
[< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448
[< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036
[< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170
[< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303
[< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000
flags=0x5fffc0000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200
CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300
ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054
ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654
[<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661
[< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138
[<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236
[< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293
[<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241
[<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000
[<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478
[<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744
[<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772
[<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901
[<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688
[<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115
[< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750
[<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123
[<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357
[<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550
[<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145
[<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880
[<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307
[< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113
[<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158
[<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712
[<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655
[<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165
[<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692
[< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099
[<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678
[< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807
[<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283
[<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282
[<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344
[<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 52,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int propagate_mnt(struct mount *dest_mnt, struct mountpoint *dest_mp,
struct mount *source_mnt, struct hlist_head *tree_list)
{
struct mount *m, *n;
int ret = 0;
/*
* we don't want to bother passing tons of arguments to
* propagate_one(); everything is serialized by namespace_sem,
* so globals will do just fine.
*/
user_ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns;
last_dest = dest_mnt;
last_source = source_mnt;
mp = dest_mp;
list = tree_list;
dest_master = dest_mnt->mnt_master;
/* all peers of dest_mnt, except dest_mnt itself */
for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
/* all slave groups */
for (m = next_group(dest_mnt, dest_mnt); m;
m = next_group(m, dest_mnt)) {
/* everything in that slave group */
n = m;
do {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
n = next_peer(n);
} while (n != m);
}
out:
read_seqlock_excl(&mount_lock);
hlist_for_each_entry(n, tree_list, mnt_hash) {
m = n->mnt_parent;
if (m->mnt_master != dest_mnt->mnt_master)
CLEAR_MNT_MARK(m->mnt_master);
}
read_sequnlock_excl(&mount_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: propogate_mnt: Handle the first propogated copy being a slave
When the first propgated copy was a slave the following oops would result:
> BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
> IP: [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0
> PGD bacd4067 PUD bac66067 PMD 0
> Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
> Modules linked in:
> CPU: 1 PID: 824 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.6.0-rc5userns+ #1523
> Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007
> task: ffff8800bb0a8000 ti: ffff8800bac3c000 task.ti: ffff8800bac3c000
> RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811fba4e>] [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0
> RSP: 0018:ffff8800bac3fd38 EFLAGS: 00010283
> RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8800bb77ec00 RCX: 0000000000000010
> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8800bb58c000 RDI: ffff8800bb58c480
> RBP: ffff8800bac3fd48 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000001ca1 R11: 0000000000001c9d R12: 0000000000000000
> R13: ffff8800ba713800 R14: ffff8800bac3fda0 R15: ffff8800bb77ec00
> FS: 00007f3c0cd9b7e0(0000) GS:ffff8800bfb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 00000000bb79d000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
> Stack:
> ffff8800bb77ec00 0000000000000000 ffff8800bac3fd88 ffffffff811fbf85
> ffff8800bac3fd98 ffff8800bb77f080 ffff8800ba713800 ffff8800bb262b40
> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8800bac3fdd8 ffffffff811f1da0
> Call Trace:
> [<ffffffff811fbf85>] propagate_mnt+0x105/0x140
> [<ffffffff811f1da0>] attach_recursive_mnt+0x120/0x1e0
> [<ffffffff811f1ec3>] graft_tree+0x63/0x70
> [<ffffffff811f1f6b>] do_add_mount+0x9b/0x100
> [<ffffffff811f2c1a>] do_mount+0x2aa/0xdf0
> [<ffffffff8117efbe>] ? strndup_user+0x4e/0x70
> [<ffffffff811f3a45>] SyS_mount+0x75/0xc0
> [<ffffffff8100242b>] do_syscall_64+0x4b/0xa0
> [<ffffffff81988f3c>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
> Code: 00 00 75 ec 48 89 0d 02 22 22 01 8b 89 10 01 00 00 48 89 05 fd 21 22 01 39 8e 10 01 00 00 0f 84 e0 00 00 00 48 8b 80 d8 00 00 00 <48> 8b 50 10 48 89 05 df 21 22 01 48 89 15 d0 21 22 01 8b 53 30
> RIP [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0
> RSP <ffff8800bac3fd38>
> CR2: 0000000000000010
> ---[ end trace 2725ecd95164f217 ]---
This oops happens with the namespace_sem held and can be triggered by
non-root users. An all around not pleasant experience.
To avoid this scenario when finding the appropriate source mount to
copy stop the walk up the mnt_master chain when the first source mount
is encountered.
Further rewrite the walk up the last_source mnt_master chain so that
it is clear what is going on.
The reason why the first source mount is special is that it it's
mnt_parent is not a mount in the dest_mnt propagation tree, and as
such termination conditions based up on the dest_mnt mount propgation
tree do not make sense.
To avoid other kinds of confusion last_dest is not changed when
computing last_source. last_dest is only used once in propagate_one
and that is above the point of the code being modified, so changing
the global variable is meaningless and confusing.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
fixes: f2ebb3a921c1ca1e2ddd9242e95a1989a50c4c68 ("smarter propagate_mnt()")
Reported-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: | 1 | 167,233 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int changeTempStorage(Parse *pParse, const char *zStorageType){
int ts = getTempStore(zStorageType);
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db;
if( db->temp_store==ts ) return SQLITE_OK;
if( invalidateTempStorage( pParse ) != SQLITE_OK ){
return SQLITE_ERROR;
}
db->temp_store = (u8)ts;
return SQLITE_OK;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IDAT_list_size(struct IDAT_list *list, unsigned int length)
/* Return the size in bytes of an IDAT_list of the given length. */
{
if (list != NULL)
length = list->length;
return sizeof *list - sizeof list->lengths +
length * sizeof list->lengths[0];
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AirPDcapGetSaAddress(
const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *frame,
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
{
#ifdef _DEBUG
#define MSGBUF_LEN 255
CHAR msgbuf[MSGBUF_LEN];
#endif
if ((AIRPDCAP_TYPE(frame->fc[0])==AIRPDCAP_TYPE_DATA) &&
(AIRPDCAP_DS_BITS(frame->fc[1]) == 0) &&
(memcmp(frame->addr2, frame->addr3, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN) != 0) &&
(memcmp(frame->addr1, frame->addr3, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN) != 0)) {
/* DATA frame with fromDS=0 ToDS=0 and neither RA or SA is BSSID
=> TDLS traffic. Use highest MAC address for bssid */
if (memcmp(frame->addr1, frame->addr2, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN) < 0) {
memcpy(id->sta, frame->addr1, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
memcpy(id->bssid, frame->addr2, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
} else {
memcpy(id->sta, frame->addr2, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
memcpy(id->bssid, frame->addr1, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
}
} else {
const UCHAR *addr;
/* Normal Case: SA between STA and AP */
if ((addr = AirPDcapGetBssidAddress(frame)) != NULL) {
memcpy(id->bssid, addr, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
} else {
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
}
if ((addr = AirPDcapGetStaAddress(frame)) != NULL) {
memcpy(id->sta, addr, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
} else {
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
}
}
#ifdef _DEBUG
g_snprintf(msgbuf, MSGBUF_LEN, "BSSID_MAC: %02X.%02X.%02X.%02X.%02X.%02X\t",
id->bssid[0],id->bssid[1],id->bssid[2],id->bssid[3],id->bssid[4],id->bssid[5]);
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapGetSaAddress", msgbuf, AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
g_snprintf(msgbuf, MSGBUF_LEN, "STA_MAC: %02X.%02X.%02X.%02X.%02X.%02X\t",
id->sta[0],id->sta[1],id->sta[2],id->sta[3],id->sta[4],id->sta[5]);
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapGetSaAddress", msgbuf, AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
#endif
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Sanity check eapol_len in AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey
Bug: 12175
Change-Id: Iaf977ba48f8668bf8095800a115ff9a3472dd893
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15326
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
Tested-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 51,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLCanvasElement::RegisterRenderingContextFactory(
std::unique_ptr<CanvasRenderingContextFactory> rendering_context_factory) {
CanvasRenderingContext::ContextType type =
rendering_context_factory->GetContextType();
DCHECK_LE(type, CanvasRenderingContext::kMaxValue);
DCHECK(!RenderingContextFactories()[type]);
RenderingContextFactories()[type] = std::move(rendering_context_factory);
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,109 |
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