instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int addrconf_ifid_arcnet(u8 *eui, struct net_device *dev)
{
/* XXX: inherit EUI-64 from other interface -- yoshfuji */
if (dev->addr_len != ARCNET_ALEN)
return -1;
memset(eui, 0, 7);
eui[7] = *(u8 *)dev->dev_addr;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStrip::SetDropArrow(
const base::Optional<BrowserRootView::DropIndex>& index) {
if (!index) {
controller_->OnDropIndexUpdate(-1, false);
drop_arrow_.reset();
return;
}
controller_->OnDropIndexUpdate(index->value, index->drop_before);
if (drop_arrow_ && (index == drop_arrow_->index))
return;
bool is_beneath;
gfx::Rect drop_bounds =
GetDropBounds(index->value, index->drop_before, &is_beneath);
if (!drop_arrow_) {
drop_arrow_ = std::make_unique<DropArrow>(*index, !is_beneath, GetWidget());
} else {
drop_arrow_->index = *index;
if (is_beneath == drop_arrow_->point_down) {
drop_arrow_->point_down = !is_beneath;
drop_arrow_->arrow_view->SetImage(
GetDropArrowImage(drop_arrow_->point_down));
}
}
drop_arrow_->arrow_window->SetBounds(drop_bounds);
drop_arrow_->arrow_window->Show();
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t StringSize(const uint8_t *start, uint8_t encoding) {
if (encoding == 0x00 || encoding == 0x03) {
return strlen((const char *)start) + 1;
}
size_t n = 0;
while (start[n] != '\0' || start[n + 1] != '\0') {
n += 2;
}
return n + 2;
}
Commit Message: better validation lengths of strings in ID3 tags
Validate lengths on strings in ID3 tags, particularly around 0.
Also added code to handle cases when we can't get memory for
copies of strings we want to extract from these tags.
Affects L/M/N/master, same patch for all of them.
Bug: 30744884
Change-Id: I2675a817a39f0927ec1f7e9f9c09f2e61020311e
Test: play mp3 file which caused a <0 length.
(cherry picked from commit d23c01546c4f82840a01a380def76ab6cae5d43f)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 157,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nfsd_reset_versions(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < NFSD_NRVERS; i++)
if (nfsd_vers(i, NFSD_TEST))
return;
for (i = 0; i < NFSD_NRVERS; i++)
if (i != 4)
nfsd_vers(i, NFSD_SET);
else {
int minor = 0;
while (nfsd_minorversion(minor, NFSD_SET) >= 0)
minor++;
}
}
Commit Message: nfsd: check for oversized NFSv2/v3 arguments
A client can append random data to the end of an NFSv2 or NFSv3 RPC call
without our complaining; we'll just stop parsing at the end of the
expected data and ignore the rest.
Encoded arguments and replies are stored together in an array of pages,
and if a call is too large it could leave inadequate space for the
reply. This is normally OK because NFS RPC's typically have either
short arguments and long replies (like READ) or long arguments and short
replies (like WRITE). But a client that sends an incorrectly long reply
can violate those assumptions. This was observed to cause crashes.
Also, several operations increment rq_next_page in the decode routine
before checking the argument size, which can leave rq_next_page pointing
well past the end of the page array, causing trouble later in
svc_free_pages.
So, following a suggestion from Neil Brown, add a central check to
enforce our expectation that no NFSv2/v3 call has both a large call and
a large reply.
As followup we may also want to rewrite the encoding routines to check
more carefully that they aren't running off the end of the page array.
We may also consider rejecting calls that have any extra garbage
appended. That would be safer, and within our rights by spec, but given
the age of our server and the NFS protocol, and the fact that we've
never enforced this before, we may need to balance that against the
possibility of breaking some oddball client.
Reported-by: Tuomas Haanpää <thaan@synopsys.com>
Reported-by: Ari Kauppi <ari@synopsys.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 67,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct page *get_sum_page(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, unsigned int segno)
{
return get_meta_page(sbi, GET_SUM_BLOCK(sbi, segno));
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 85,399 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Con_Close( void ) {
if ( !com_cl_running->integer ) {
return;
}
Field_Clear( &g_consoleField );
Con_ClearNotify ();
Key_SetCatcher( Key_GetCatcher( ) & ~KEYCATCH_CONSOLE );
con.finalFrac = 0; // none visible
con.displayFrac = 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,424 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf;
unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state,skip=0;
RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
/* init things to blank */
s->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
if (s->cert == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
return(-1);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
* already got and don't await it anymore, because
* Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
*/
if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
{
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
}
#endif
for (;;)
{
state=s->state;
switch (s->state)
{
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
s->renegotiate=1;
/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
s->server=1;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
if (s->init_buf == NULL)
{
if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf=buf;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_num=0;
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
{
/* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
* the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
*/
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
}
else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
{
/* Server attempting to renegotiate with
* client that doesn't support secure
* renegotiation.
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
else
{
/* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
* we will just send a HelloRequest */
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
s->shutdown=0;
ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num=0;
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
s->shutdown=0;
if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
{
ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
{
int al;
if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
{
/* callback indicates firther work to be done */
s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
goto end;
}
if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
/* This is not really an error but the only means to
for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
}
#endif
s->renegotiate = 2;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->hit)
{
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
}
#else
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
#endif
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
/* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
{
ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
else
{
skip = 1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
#else
}
else
skip=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* clear this, it may get reset by
* send_server_key_exchange */
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
)
/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
* even when forbidden by protocol specs
* (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
* be able to handle this) */
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
else
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
* RSA but we have a sign only certificate
*
* PSK: may send PSK identity hints
*
* For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
* message only if the cipher suite is either
* ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
* server certificate contains the server's
* public key for key exchange.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
* hint if provided */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
|| (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
#endif
|| (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
|| (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
)
)
)
)
{
ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
}
else
skip=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
/* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
* don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
* (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
* and in RFC 2246): */
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
/* ... except when the application insists on verification
* (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
/* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
/* With normal PSK Certificates and
* Certificate Requests are omitted */
|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
/* no cert request */
skip=1;
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
return -1;
}
else
{
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
#else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
/* This code originally checked to see if
* any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
* and then flushed. This caused problems
* as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
* fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
* as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
* still exist. So instead we just flush
* unconditionally.
*/
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
/* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (ret == 2)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
else {
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
{
ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
}
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (ret == 2)
{
/* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
* the client sends its ECDH pub key in
* a certificate, the CertificateVerify
* message is not sent.
* Also for GOST ciphersuites when
* the client uses its key from the certificate
* for key exchange.
*/
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
s->init_num = 0;
}
else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
if (!s->session->peer)
break;
/* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
* at this point and digest cached records.
*/
if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
return -1;
}
else
{
int offset=0;
int dgst_num;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* We need to get hashes here so if there is
* a client cert, it can be verified
* FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
* should be generalized. But it is next step
*/
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
return -1;
for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
{
int dgst_size;
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
if (dgst_size < 0)
{
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
offset+=dgst_size;
}
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
/* we should decide if we expected this one */
ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->init_num = 0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
#endif
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
{ ret= -1; goto end; }
ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
if (s->hit)
{
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
else
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf=NULL;
/* remove buffering on output */
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->init_num=0;
if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
{
s->renegotiate=0;
s->new_session=0;
ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
/* s->server=1; */
s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
}
ret = 1;
goto end;
/* break; */
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret= -1;
goto end;
/* break; */
}
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
{
if (s->debug)
{
if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
{
new_state=s->state;
s->state=state;
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
s->state=new_state;
}
}
skip=0;
}
end:
/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
s->in_handshake--;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 1 | 165,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fst_intr_te1_alarm(struct fst_card_info *card, struct fst_port_info *port)
{
u8 los;
u8 rra;
u8 ais;
los = FST_RDB(card, suStatus.lossOfSignal);
rra = FST_RDB(card, suStatus.receiveRemoteAlarm);
ais = FST_RDB(card, suStatus.alarmIndicationSignal);
if (los) {
/*
* Lost the link
*/
if (netif_carrier_ok(port_to_dev(port))) {
dbg(DBG_INTR, "Net carrier off\n");
netif_carrier_off(port_to_dev(port));
}
} else {
/*
* Link available
*/
if (!netif_carrier_ok(port_to_dev(port))) {
dbg(DBG_INTR, "Net carrier on\n");
netif_carrier_on(port_to_dev(port));
}
}
if (los)
dbg(DBG_INTR, "Assert LOS Alarm\n");
else
dbg(DBG_INTR, "De-assert LOS Alarm\n");
if (rra)
dbg(DBG_INTR, "Assert RRA Alarm\n");
else
dbg(DBG_INTR, "De-assert RRA Alarm\n");
if (ais)
dbg(DBG_INTR, "Assert AIS Alarm\n");
else
dbg(DBG_INTR, "De-assert AIS Alarm\n");
}
Commit Message: farsync: fix info leak in ioctl
The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 39,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHost::AddLayerShouldPushProperties(Layer* layer) {
layers_that_should_push_properties_.insert(layer);
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ext4_insert_dentry(struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de,
int buf_size,
const char *name, int namelen)
{
int nlen, rlen;
nlen = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len);
rlen = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, buf_size);
if (de->inode) {
struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de1 =
(struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)((char *)de + nlen);
de1->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(rlen - nlen, buf_size);
de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(nlen, buf_size);
de = de1;
}
de->file_type = EXT4_FT_UNKNOWN;
de->inode = cpu_to_le32(inode->i_ino);
ext4_set_de_type(inode->i_sb, de, inode->i_mode);
de->name_len = namelen;
memcpy(de->name, name, namelen);
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameHost* WebContentsImpl::GetFocusedFrameIncludingInnerWebContents() {
WebContentsImpl* contents = this;
FrameTreeNode* focused_node = contents->frame_tree_.GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_node)
return nullptr;
while (true) {
contents = contents->node_.GetInnerWebContentsInFrame(focused_node);
if (!contents)
return focused_node->current_frame_host();
focused_node = contents->frame_tree_.GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_node)
return contents->GetMainFrame();
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 144,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static CURLcode resolve_server(struct Curl_easy *data,
struct connectdata *conn,
bool *async)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
timediff_t timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
/*************************************************************
* Resolve the name of the server or proxy
*************************************************************/
if(conn->bits.reuse)
/* We're reusing the connection - no need to resolve anything, and
fix_hostname() was called already in create_conn() for the re-use
case. */
*async = FALSE;
else {
/* this is a fresh connect */
int rc;
struct Curl_dns_entry *hostaddr;
#ifdef USE_UNIX_SOCKETS
if(conn->unix_domain_socket) {
/* Unix domain sockets are local. The host gets ignored, just use the
* specified domain socket address. Do not cache "DNS entries". There is
* no DNS involved and we already have the filesystem path available */
const char *path = conn->unix_domain_socket;
hostaddr = calloc(1, sizeof(struct Curl_dns_entry));
if(!hostaddr)
result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
else {
bool longpath = FALSE;
hostaddr->addr = Curl_unix2addr(path, &longpath,
conn->abstract_unix_socket);
if(hostaddr->addr)
hostaddr->inuse++;
else {
/* Long paths are not supported for now */
if(longpath) {
failf(data, "Unix socket path too long: '%s'", path);
result = CURLE_COULDNT_RESOLVE_HOST;
}
else
result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
free(hostaddr);
hostaddr = NULL;
}
}
}
else
#endif
if(!conn->bits.proxy) {
struct hostname *connhost;
if(conn->bits.conn_to_host)
connhost = &conn->conn_to_host;
else
connhost = &conn->host;
/* If not connecting via a proxy, extract the port from the URL, if it is
* there, thus overriding any defaults that might have been set above. */
if(conn->bits.conn_to_port)
conn->port = conn->conn_to_port;
else
conn->port = conn->remote_port;
/* Resolve target host right on */
rc = Curl_resolv_timeout(conn, connhost->name, (int)conn->port,
&hostaddr, timeout_ms);
if(rc == CURLRESOLV_PENDING)
*async = TRUE;
else if(rc == CURLRESOLV_TIMEDOUT)
result = CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
else if(!hostaddr) {
failf(data, "Couldn't resolve host '%s'", connhost->dispname);
result = CURLE_COULDNT_RESOLVE_HOST;
/* don't return yet, we need to clean up the timeout first */
}
}
else {
/* This is a proxy that hasn't been resolved yet. */
struct hostname * const host = conn->bits.socksproxy ?
&conn->socks_proxy.host : &conn->http_proxy.host;
/* resolve proxy */
rc = Curl_resolv_timeout(conn, host->name, (int)conn->port,
&hostaddr, timeout_ms);
if(rc == CURLRESOLV_PENDING)
*async = TRUE;
else if(rc == CURLRESOLV_TIMEDOUT)
result = CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
else if(!hostaddr) {
failf(data, "Couldn't resolve proxy '%s'", host->dispname);
result = CURLE_COULDNT_RESOLVE_PROXY;
/* don't return yet, we need to clean up the timeout first */
}
}
DEBUGASSERT(conn->dns_entry == NULL);
conn->dns_entry = hostaddr;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 77,811 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniform3uiv(
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
Vector<GLuint>& value,
GLuint src_offset,
GLuint src_length) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateUniformParameters("uniform3uiv", location, value.data(),
value.size(), 3, src_offset, src_length))
return;
ContextGL()->Uniform3uiv(
location->Location(),
(src_length ? src_length : (value.size() - src_offset)) / 3,
value.data() + src_offset);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int timer_load(Unit *u) {
Timer *t = TIMER(u);
int r;
assert(u);
assert(u->load_state == UNIT_STUB);
r = unit_load_fragment_and_dropin(u);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (u->load_state == UNIT_LOADED) {
if (set_isempty(u->dependencies[UNIT_TRIGGERS])) {
Unit *x;
r = unit_load_related_unit(u, ".service", &x);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = unit_add_two_dependencies(u, UNIT_BEFORE, UNIT_TRIGGERS, x, true);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
r = timer_setup_persistent(t);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = timer_add_default_dependencies(t);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
return timer_verify(t);
}
Commit Message: util-lib: use MODE_INVALID as invalid value for mode_t everywhere
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 96,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderViewImpl::~RenderViewImpl() {
DCHECK(!frame_widget_);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
date_time_picker_client_.reset();
#endif
#ifndef NDEBUG
ViewMap* views = g_view_map.Pointer();
for (ViewMap::iterator it = views->begin(); it != views->end(); ++it)
DCHECK_NE(this, it->second) << "Failed to call Close?";
RoutingIDViewMap* routing_id_views = g_routing_id_view_map.Pointer();
for (RoutingIDViewMap::iterator it = routing_id_views->begin();
it != routing_id_views->end(); ++it)
DCHECK_NE(this, it->second) << "Failed to call Close?";
#endif
idle_user_detector_.reset();
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.RenderViewGone();
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.OnDestruct();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,026 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::ProgressFling(base::TimeTicks current_time) {
if (input_router_)
input_router_->ProgressFling(current_time);
}
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int write_chunk(git_stream *io, const char *buffer, size_t len)
{
git_buf buf = GIT_BUF_INIT;
/* Chunk header */
git_buf_printf(&buf, "%" PRIxZ "\r\n", len);
if (git_buf_oom(&buf))
return -1;
if (git_stream_write(io, buf.ptr, buf.size, 0) < 0) {
git_buf_free(&buf);
return -1;
}
git_buf_free(&buf);
/* Chunk body */
if (len > 0 && git_stream_write(io, buffer, len, 0) < 0)
return -1;
/* Chunk footer */
if (git_stream_write(io, "\r\n", 2, 0) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: http: check certificate validity before clobbering the error variable
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 71,342 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int newque(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_params *params)
{
struct msg_queue *msq;
int id, retval;
key_t key = params->key;
int msgflg = params->flg;
msq = ipc_rcu_alloc(sizeof(*msq));
if (!msq)
return -ENOMEM;
msq->q_perm.mode = msgflg & S_IRWXUGO;
msq->q_perm.key = key;
msq->q_perm.security = NULL;
retval = security_msg_queue_alloc(msq);
if (retval) {
ipc_rcu_putref(msq, ipc_rcu_free);
return retval;
}
/* ipc_addid() locks msq upon success. */
id = ipc_addid(&msg_ids(ns), &msq->q_perm, ns->msg_ctlmni);
if (id < 0) {
ipc_rcu_putref(msq, msg_rcu_free);
return id;
}
msq->q_stime = msq->q_rtime = 0;
msq->q_ctime = get_seconds();
msq->q_cbytes = msq->q_qnum = 0;
msq->q_qbytes = ns->msg_ctlmnb;
msq->q_lspid = msq->q_lrpid = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&msq->q_messages);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&msq->q_receivers);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&msq->q_senders);
ipc_unlock_object(&msq->q_perm);
rcu_read_unlock();
return msq->q_perm.id;
}
Commit Message: Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid()
As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before
having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC
object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work,
that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen.
We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329:
"ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we
clearly forgot about msg and shm.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 166,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ImageResource::ShouldShowPlaceholder() const {
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::ClientPlaceholdersForServerLoFiEnabled() &&
(GetResourceRequest().GetPreviewsState() &
WebURLRequest::kServerLoFiOn)) {
return true;
}
switch (placeholder_option_) {
case PlaceholderOption::kShowAndReloadPlaceholderAlways:
case PlaceholderOption::kShowAndDoNotReloadPlaceholder:
return true;
case PlaceholderOption::kReloadPlaceholderOnDecodeError:
case PlaceholderOption::kDoNotReloadPlaceholder:
return false;
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 149,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncManager::DoneRefreshNigori(const base::Closure& done_callback,
bool is_ready) {
if (is_ready)
data_->RefreshEncryption();
done_callback.Run();
}
Commit Message: sync: remove Chrome OS specific logic to deal with flimflam shutdown / sync race.
No longer necessary as the ProfileSyncService now aborts sync network traffic on shutdown.
BUG=chromium-os:20841
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120912 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nfc_genl_data_exit(struct nfc_genl_data *genl_data)
{
mutex_destroy(&genl_data->genl_data_mutex);
}
Commit Message: nfc: Ensure presence of required attributes in the deactivate_target handler
Check that the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX attributes (in addition to
NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) are provided by the netlink client prior to
accessing them. This prevents potential unhandled NULL pointer dereference
exceptions which can be triggered by malicious user-mode programs,
if they omit one or both of these attributes.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,429 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mark_page_dirty(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
{
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
memslot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
mark_page_dirty_in_slot(memslot, gfn);
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 71,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
{
u64 old_efer = vcpu->arch.efer;
if (efer & efer_reserved_bits)
return 1;
if (is_paging(vcpu)
&& (vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME) != (efer & EFER_LME))
return 1;
if (efer & EFER_FFXSR) {
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *feat;
feat = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000001, 0);
if (!feat || !(feat->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_FXSR_OPT)))
return 1;
}
if (efer & EFER_SVME) {
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *feat;
feat = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000001, 0);
if (!feat || !(feat->ecx & bit(X86_FEATURE_SVM)))
return 1;
}
efer &= ~EFER_LMA;
efer |= vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LMA;
kvm_x86_ops->set_efer(vcpu, efer);
/* Update reserved bits */
if ((efer ^ old_efer) & EFER_NX)
kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME to use gfn_to_hva_cache functions (CVE-2013-1797)
There is a potential use after free issue with the handling of
MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME. If the guest specifies a GPA in a movable or removable
memory such as frame buffers then KVM might continue to write to that
address even after it's removed via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. KVM pins
the page in memory so it's unlikely to cause an issue, but if the user
space component re-purposes the memory previously used for the guest, then
the guest will be able to corrupt that memory.
Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,295 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vhost_scsi_close_session(struct se_session *se_sess)
{
return;
}
Commit Message: vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,072 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickSizeType ReadBlobLongLong(Image *image)
{
MagickSizeType
value;
register const unsigned char
*p;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
buffer[8];
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
*buffer='\0';
p=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,8,buffer,&count);
if (count != 8)
return(MagickULLConstant(0));
if (image->endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(MagickSizeType) (*p++);
value|=(MagickSizeType) (*p++) << 8;
value|=(MagickSizeType) (*p++) << 16;
value|=(MagickSizeType) (*p++) << 24;
value|=(MagickSizeType) (*p++) << 32;
value|=(MagickSizeType) (*p++) << 40;
value|=(MagickSizeType) (*p++) << 48;
value|=(MagickSizeType) (*p++) << 56;
return(value);
}
value=(MagickSizeType) (*p++) << 56;
value|=(MagickSizeType) (*p++) << 48;
value|=(MagickSizeType) (*p++) << 40;
value|=(MagickSizeType) (*p++) << 32;
value|=(MagickSizeType) (*p++) << 24;
value|=(MagickSizeType) (*p++) << 16;
value|=(MagickSizeType) (*p++) << 8;
value|=(MagickSizeType) (*p++);
return(value);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 88,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcRenderFreePicture (ClientPtr client)
{
PicturePtr pPicture;
REQUEST(xRenderFreePictureReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderFreePictureReq);
VERIFY_PICTURE (pPicture, stuff->picture, client, DixDestroyAccess);
FreeResource (stuff->picture, RT_NONE);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionContextMenuModel::GetAcceleratorForCommandId(
int command_id, ui::Accelerator* accelerator) {
return false;
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int chacha20_poly1305_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *inkey,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX *actx = aead_data(ctx);
if (!inkey && !iv)
return 1;
actx->len.aad = 0;
actx->len.text = 0;
actx->aad = 0;
actx->mac_inited = 0;
actx->tls_payload_length = NO_TLS_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
if (iv != NULL) {
unsigned char temp[CHACHA_CTR_SIZE] = { 0 };
/* pad on the left */
if (actx->nonce_len <= CHACHA_CTR_SIZE)
memcpy(temp + CHACHA_CTR_SIZE - actx->nonce_len, iv, actx->nonce_len);
chacha_init_key(ctx, inkey, temp, enc);
actx->nonce[0] = actx->key.counter[1];
actx->nonce[1] = actx->key.counter[2];
actx->nonce[2] = actx->key.counter[3];
} else {
chacha_init_key(ctx, inkey, NULL, enc);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 69,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AutofillDownloadManager::~AutofillDownloadManager() {
STLDeleteContainerPairFirstPointers(url_fetchers_.begin(),
url_fetchers_.end());
}
Commit Message: Add support for the "uploadrequired" attribute for Autofill query responses
BUG=84693
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutofillDownloadTest.QueryAndUploadTest
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6969090
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87729 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,441 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct smbXcli_session *smbXcli_session_create(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
{
struct smbXcli_session *session;
session = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct smbXcli_session);
if (session == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
session->smb2 = talloc_zero(session, struct smb2cli_session);
if (session->smb2 == NULL) {
talloc_free(session);
return NULL;
}
talloc_set_destructor(session, smbXcli_session_destructor);
DLIST_ADD_END(conn->sessions, session, struct smbXcli_session *);
session->conn = conn;
memcpy(session->smb2_channel.preauth_sha512,
conn->smb2.preauth_sha512,
sizeof(session->smb2_channel.preauth_sha512));
return session;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,492 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 cqspi_get_rd_sram_level(struct cqspi_st *cqspi)
{
u32 reg = readl(cqspi->iobase + CQSPI_REG_SDRAMLEVEL);
reg >>= CQSPI_REG_SDRAMLEVEL_RD_LSB;
return reg & CQSPI_REG_SDRAMLEVEL_RD_MASK;
}
Commit Message: mtd: spi-nor: Off by one in cqspi_setup_flash()
There are CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT elements in the ->f_pdata array so the >
should be >=.
Fixes: 140623410536 ('mtd: spi-nor: Add driver for Cadence Quad SPI Flash Controller')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Cyrille Pitchen <cyrille.pitchen@atmel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 93,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __bnep_link_session(struct bnep_session *s)
{
list_add(&s->list, &bnep_session_list);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: bnep: bnep_add_connection() should verify that it's dealing with l2cap socket
same story as cmtp
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_event_task(struct task_struct *task,
struct perf_event_context *task_ctx,
int new)
{
struct perf_task_event task_event;
if (!atomic_read(&nr_comm_events) &&
!atomic_read(&nr_mmap_events) &&
!atomic_read(&nr_task_events))
return;
task_event = (struct perf_task_event){
.task = task,
.task_ctx = task_ctx,
.event_id = {
.header = {
.type = new ? PERF_RECORD_FORK : PERF_RECORD_EXIT,
.misc = 0,
.size = sizeof(task_event.event_id),
},
/* .pid */
/* .ppid */
/* .tid */
/* .ptid */
/* .time */
},
};
perf_iterate_sb(perf_event_task_output,
&task_event,
task_ctx);
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 68,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void perf_cgroup_sched_out(struct task_struct *task,
struct task_struct *next)
{
struct perf_cgroup *cgrp1;
struct perf_cgroup *cgrp2 = NULL;
/*
* we come here when we know perf_cgroup_events > 0
*/
cgrp1 = perf_cgroup_from_task(task);
/*
* next is NULL when called from perf_event_enable_on_exec()
* that will systematically cause a cgroup_switch()
*/
if (next)
cgrp2 = perf_cgroup_from_task(next);
/*
* only schedule out current cgroup events if we know
* that we are switching to a different cgroup. Otherwise,
* do no touch the cgroup events.
*/
if (cgrp1 != cgrp2)
perf_cgroup_switch(task, PERF_CGROUP_SWOUT);
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 31,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorNetworkAgent::DidSendWebSocketFrame(unsigned long identifier,
int op_code,
bool masked,
const char* payload,
size_t payload_length) {
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::WebSocketFrame> frame_object =
protocol::Network::WebSocketFrame::create()
.setOpcode(op_code)
.setMask(masked)
.setPayloadData(
String::FromUTF8WithLatin1Fallback(payload, payload_length))
.build();
GetFrontend()->webSocketFrameSent(IdentifiersFactory::RequestId(identifier),
MonotonicallyIncreasingTime(),
std::move(frame_object));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,496 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __tcp_alloc_md5sig_pool(void)
{
struct crypto_ahash *hash;
int cpu;
hash = crypto_alloc_ahash("md5", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(hash))
return;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
void *scratch = per_cpu(tcp_md5sig_pool, cpu).scratch;
struct ahash_request *req;
if (!scratch) {
scratch = kmalloc_node(sizeof(union tcp_md5sum_block) +
sizeof(struct tcphdr),
GFP_KERNEL,
cpu_to_node(cpu));
if (!scratch)
return;
per_cpu(tcp_md5sig_pool, cpu).scratch = scratch;
}
if (per_cpu(tcp_md5sig_pool, cpu).md5_req)
continue;
req = ahash_request_alloc(hash, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req)
return;
ahash_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
per_cpu(tcp_md5sig_pool, cpu).md5_req = req;
}
/* before setting tcp_md5sig_pool_populated, we must commit all writes
* to memory. See smp_rmb() in tcp_get_md5sig_pool()
*/
smp_wmb();
tcp_md5sig_pool_populated = true;
}
Commit Message: tcp: initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0
When tcp_disconnect() is called, inet_csk_delack_init() sets
icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss to 0.
This could potentially cause tcp_recvmsg() => tcp_cleanup_rbuf() =>
__tcp_select_window() call path to have division by 0 issue.
So this patch initializes rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 61,724 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_write_video_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVMuxContext *mov, MOVTrack *track)
{
int64_t pos = avio_tell(pb);
char compressor_name[32] = { 0 };
int avid = 0;
int uncompressed_ycbcr = ((track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_RAWVIDEO && track->par->format == AV_PIX_FMT_UYVY422)
|| (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_RAWVIDEO && track->par->format == AV_PIX_FMT_YUYV422)
|| track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_V308
|| track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_V408
|| track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_V410
|| track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_V210);
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* size */
if (mov->encryption_scheme != MOV_ENC_NONE) {
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "encv");
} else {
avio_wl32(pb, track->tag); // store it byteswapped
}
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* Reserved */
avio_wb16(pb, 0); /* Reserved */
avio_wb16(pb, 1); /* Data-reference index */
if (uncompressed_ycbcr) {
avio_wb16(pb, 2); /* Codec stream version */
} else {
avio_wb16(pb, 0); /* Codec stream version */
}
avio_wb16(pb, 0); /* Codec stream revision (=0) */
if (track->mode == MODE_MOV) {
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "FFMP"); /* Vendor */
if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_RAWVIDEO || uncompressed_ycbcr) {
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* Temporal Quality */
avio_wb32(pb, 0x400); /* Spatial Quality = lossless*/
} else {
avio_wb32(pb, 0x200); /* Temporal Quality = normal */
avio_wb32(pb, 0x200); /* Spatial Quality = normal */
}
} else {
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* Reserved */
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* Reserved */
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* Reserved */
}
avio_wb16(pb, track->par->width); /* Video width */
avio_wb16(pb, track->height); /* Video height */
avio_wb32(pb, 0x00480000); /* Horizontal resolution 72dpi */
avio_wb32(pb, 0x00480000); /* Vertical resolution 72dpi */
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* Data size (= 0) */
avio_wb16(pb, 1); /* Frame count (= 1) */
/* FIXME not sure, ISO 14496-1 draft where it shall be set to 0 */
find_compressor(compressor_name, 32, track);
avio_w8(pb, strlen(compressor_name));
avio_write(pb, compressor_name, 31);
if (track->mode == MODE_MOV &&
(track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_V410 || track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_V210))
avio_wb16(pb, 0x18);
else if (track->mode == MODE_MOV && track->par->bits_per_coded_sample)
avio_wb16(pb, track->par->bits_per_coded_sample |
(track->par->format == AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY8 ? 0x20 : 0));
else
avio_wb16(pb, 0x18); /* Reserved */
if (track->mode == MODE_MOV && track->par->format == AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8) {
int pal_size = 1 << track->par->bits_per_coded_sample;
int i;
avio_wb16(pb, 0); /* Color table ID */
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* Color table seed */
avio_wb16(pb, 0x8000); /* Color table flags */
avio_wb16(pb, pal_size - 1); /* Color table size (zero-relative) */
for (i = 0; i < pal_size; i++) {
uint32_t rgb = track->palette[i];
uint16_t r = (rgb >> 16) & 0xff;
uint16_t g = (rgb >> 8) & 0xff;
uint16_t b = rgb & 0xff;
avio_wb16(pb, 0);
avio_wb16(pb, (r << 8) | r);
avio_wb16(pb, (g << 8) | g);
avio_wb16(pb, (b << 8) | b);
}
} else
avio_wb16(pb, 0xffff); /* Reserved */
if (track->tag == MKTAG('m','p','4','v'))
mov_write_esds_tag(pb, track);
else if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H263)
mov_write_d263_tag(pb);
else if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_AVUI ||
track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_SVQ3) {
mov_write_extradata_tag(pb, track);
avio_wb32(pb, 0);
} else if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_DNXHD) {
mov_write_avid_tag(pb, track);
avid = 1;
} else if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC)
mov_write_hvcc_tag(pb, track);
else if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H264 && !TAG_IS_AVCI(track->tag)) {
mov_write_avcc_tag(pb, track);
if (track->mode == MODE_IPOD)
mov_write_uuid_tag_ipod(pb);
} else if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_VP9) {
mov_write_vpcc_tag(mov->fc, pb, track);
} else if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_VC1 && track->vos_len > 0)
mov_write_dvc1_tag(pb, track);
else if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_VP6F ||
track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_VP6A) {
/* Don't write any potential extradata here - the cropping
* is signalled via the normal width/height fields. */
} else if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_R10K) {
if (track->par->codec_tag == MKTAG('R','1','0','k'))
mov_write_dpxe_tag(pb, track);
} else if (track->vos_len > 0)
mov_write_glbl_tag(pb, track);
if (track->par->codec_id != AV_CODEC_ID_H264 &&
track->par->codec_id != AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4 &&
track->par->codec_id != AV_CODEC_ID_DNXHD) {
int field_order = track->par->field_order;
#if FF_API_LAVF_AVCTX
FF_DISABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
if (field_order != track->st->codec->field_order && track->st->codec->field_order != AV_FIELD_UNKNOWN)
field_order = track->st->codec->field_order;
FF_ENABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
#endif
if (field_order != AV_FIELD_UNKNOWN)
mov_write_fiel_tag(pb, track, field_order);
}
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_WRITE_GAMA) {
if (track->mode == MODE_MOV)
mov_write_gama_tag(pb, track, mov->gamma);
else
av_log(mov->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Not writing 'gama' atom. Format is not MOV.\n");
}
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_WRITE_COLR) {
if (track->mode == MODE_MOV || track->mode == MODE_MP4)
mov_write_colr_tag(pb, track);
else
av_log(mov->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Not writing 'colr' atom. Format is not MOV or MP4.\n");
}
if (track->mode == MODE_MP4 && mov->fc->strict_std_compliance <= FF_COMPLIANCE_UNOFFICIAL) {
AVStereo3D* stereo_3d = (AVStereo3D*) av_stream_get_side_data(track->st, AV_PKT_DATA_STEREO3D, NULL);
AVSphericalMapping* spherical_mapping = (AVSphericalMapping*)av_stream_get_side_data(track->st, AV_PKT_DATA_SPHERICAL, NULL);
if (stereo_3d)
mov_write_st3d_tag(pb, stereo_3d);
if (spherical_mapping)
mov_write_sv3d_tag(mov->fc, pb, spherical_mapping);
}
if (track->par->sample_aspect_ratio.den && track->par->sample_aspect_ratio.num) {
mov_write_pasp_tag(pb, track);
}
if (uncompressed_ycbcr){
mov_write_clap_tag(pb, track);
}
if (mov->encryption_scheme != MOV_ENC_NONE) {
ff_mov_cenc_write_sinf_tag(track, pb, mov->encryption_kid);
}
/* extra padding for avid stsd */
/* https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/QuickTime/QTFF/QTFFChap2/qtff2.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40000939-CH204-61112 */
if (avid)
avio_wb32(pb, 0);
return update_size(pb, pos);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 79,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long follow_hugetlb_page(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct page **pages, struct vm_area_struct **vmas,
unsigned long *position, unsigned long *nr_pages,
long i, unsigned int flags, int *nonblocking)
{
unsigned long pfn_offset;
unsigned long vaddr = *position;
unsigned long remainder = *nr_pages;
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(vma);
int err = -EFAULT;
while (vaddr < vma->vm_end && remainder) {
pte_t *pte;
spinlock_t *ptl = NULL;
int absent;
struct page *page;
/*
* If we have a pending SIGKILL, don't keep faulting pages and
* potentially allocating memory.
*/
if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
remainder = 0;
break;
}
/*
* Some archs (sparc64, sh*) have multiple pte_ts to
* each hugepage. We have to make sure we get the
* first, for the page indexing below to work.
*
* Note that page table lock is not held when pte is null.
*/
pte = huge_pte_offset(mm, vaddr & huge_page_mask(h),
huge_page_size(h));
if (pte)
ptl = huge_pte_lock(h, mm, pte);
absent = !pte || huge_pte_none(huge_ptep_get(pte));
/*
* When coredumping, it suits get_dump_page if we just return
* an error where there's an empty slot with no huge pagecache
* to back it. This way, we avoid allocating a hugepage, and
* the sparse dumpfile avoids allocating disk blocks, but its
* huge holes still show up with zeroes where they need to be.
*/
if (absent && (flags & FOLL_DUMP) &&
!hugetlbfs_pagecache_present(h, vma, vaddr)) {
if (pte)
spin_unlock(ptl);
remainder = 0;
break;
}
/*
* We need call hugetlb_fault for both hugepages under migration
* (in which case hugetlb_fault waits for the migration,) and
* hwpoisoned hugepages (in which case we need to prevent the
* caller from accessing to them.) In order to do this, we use
* here is_swap_pte instead of is_hugetlb_entry_migration and
* is_hugetlb_entry_hwpoisoned. This is because it simply covers
* both cases, and because we can't follow correct pages
* directly from any kind of swap entries.
*/
if (absent || is_swap_pte(huge_ptep_get(pte)) ||
((flags & FOLL_WRITE) &&
!huge_pte_write(huge_ptep_get(pte)))) {
vm_fault_t ret;
unsigned int fault_flags = 0;
if (pte)
spin_unlock(ptl);
if (flags & FOLL_WRITE)
fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
if (nonblocking)
fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY;
if (flags & FOLL_NOWAIT)
fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY |
FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT;
if (flags & FOLL_TRIED) {
VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(fault_flags &
FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY);
fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_TRIED;
}
ret = hugetlb_fault(mm, vma, vaddr, fault_flags);
if (ret & VM_FAULT_ERROR) {
err = vm_fault_to_errno(ret, flags);
remainder = 0;
break;
}
if (ret & VM_FAULT_RETRY) {
if (nonblocking &&
!(fault_flags & FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT))
*nonblocking = 0;
*nr_pages = 0;
/*
* VM_FAULT_RETRY must not return an
* error, it will return zero
* instead.
*
* No need to update "position" as the
* caller will not check it after
* *nr_pages is set to 0.
*/
return i;
}
continue;
}
pfn_offset = (vaddr & ~huge_page_mask(h)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
page = pte_page(huge_ptep_get(pte));
same_page:
if (pages) {
pages[i] = mem_map_offset(page, pfn_offset);
get_page(pages[i]);
}
if (vmas)
vmas[i] = vma;
vaddr += PAGE_SIZE;
++pfn_offset;
--remainder;
++i;
if (vaddr < vma->vm_end && remainder &&
pfn_offset < pages_per_huge_page(h)) {
/*
* We use pfn_offset to avoid touching the pageframes
* of this compound page.
*/
goto same_page;
}
spin_unlock(ptl);
}
*nr_pages = remainder;
/*
* setting position is actually required only if remainder is
* not zero but it's faster not to add a "if (remainder)"
* branch.
*/
*position = vaddr;
return i ? i : err;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 170,229 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
{
struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
*p++ = msg_hdr->type;
l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p);
l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p);
return p;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vrend_renderer_resource_attach_iov(int res_handle, struct iovec *iov,
int num_iovs)
{
struct vrend_resource *res;
res = vrend_resource_lookup(res_handle, 0);
if (!res)
return EINVAL;
if (res->iov)
return 0;
/* work out size and max resource size */
res->iov = iov;
res->num_iovs = num_iovs;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 8,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long long Chapters::Atom::GetUID() const
{
return m_uid;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dictSdsKeyCaseCompare(void *privdata, const void *key1,
const void *key2)
{
DICT_NOTUSED(privdata);
return strcasecmp(key1, key2) == 0;
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 70,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::resetMediaPlayerAndMediaSource() {
closeMediaSource();
{
AudioSourceProviderClientLockScope scope(*this);
clearMediaPlayerAndAudioSourceProviderClientWithoutLocking();
}
m_playingRemotely = false;
remoteRouteAvailabilityChanged(WebRemotePlaybackAvailability::Unknown);
if (m_audioSourceNode)
getAudioSourceProvider().setClient(m_audioSourceNode);
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 128,889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vcpu_pause(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
wait_queue_head_t *wq = kvm_arch_vcpu_wq(vcpu);
wait_event_interruptible(*wq, !vcpu->arch.pause);
}
Commit Message: ARM: KVM: prevent NULL pointer dereferences with KVM VCPU ioctl
Some ARM KVM VCPU ioctls require the vCPU to be properly initialized
with the KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT ioctl before being used with further
requests. KVM_RUN checks whether this initialization has been
done, but other ioctls do not.
Namely KVM_GET_REG_LIST will dereference an array with index -1
without initialization and thus leads to a kernel oops.
Fix this by adding checks before executing the ioctl handlers.
[ Removed superflous comment from static function - Christoffer ]
Changes from v1:
* moved check into a static function with a meaningful name
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@cs.columbia.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 28,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_val_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
int size)
{
if (size != 1) {
verbose("Unknown alignment. Only byte-sized access allowed in value access.\n");
return -EACCES;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged
The patch fixes two things at once:
1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to
the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0
as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is
off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on
this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged.
2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that
we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the
first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to
access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just
constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr().
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 65,052 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Range::maxStartOffset() const
{
if (!m_start.container())
return 0;
if (!m_start.container()->offsetInCharacters())
return m_start.container()->childNodeCount();
return m_start.container()->maxCharacterOffset();
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,257 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AudioOutputDevice::AudioThreadCallback::AudioThreadCallback(
const AudioParameters& audio_parameters,
int input_channels,
base::SharedMemoryHandle memory,
int memory_length,
AudioRendererSink::RenderCallback* render_callback)
: AudioDeviceThread::Callback(audio_parameters,
input_channels,
memory,
memory_length),
render_callback_(render_callback) {
}
Commit Message: Revert r157378 as it caused WebRTC to dereference null pointers when restarting a call.
I've kept my unit test changes intact but disabled until I get a proper fix.
BUG=147499,150805
TBR=henrika
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/10946040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@157626 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 103,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExternalProtocolHandler::SetBlockState(const std::string& scheme,
BlockState state,
Profile* profile) {
DCHECK_NE(state, BLOCK);
PrefService* profile_prefs = profile->GetPrefs();
if (profile_prefs) { // May be NULL during testing.
DictionaryPrefUpdate update_excluded_schemas_profile(
profile_prefs, prefs::kExcludedSchemes);
if (!update_excluded_schemas_profile->empty()) {
if (state == DONT_BLOCK)
update_excluded_schemas_profile->SetBoolean(scheme, false);
else
update_excluded_schemas_profile->Remove(scheme, nullptr);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Reland "Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL."
This is a reland of 2401e58572884b3561e4348d64f11ac74667ef02
Original change's description:
> Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL.
>
> Fixes bug introduced in r102449.
>
> Bug: 785809
> Change-Id: I9e6dd1031dd7e7b8d378b138ab151daefdc0c6dc
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/778747
> Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518848}
Bug: 785809
Change-Id: Ib8954584004ff5681654398db76d48cdf4437df7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/788551
Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519203}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cm_get_ack_delay(struct cm_device *cm_dev)
{
struct ib_device_attr attr;
if (ib_query_device(cm_dev->ib_device, &attr))
cm_dev->ack_delay = 0; /* acks will rely on packet life time */
else
cm_dev->ack_delay = attr.local_ca_ack_delay;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Parcel::Blob::Blob() :
mMapped(false), mData(NULL), mSize(0) {
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xdr_cprinc_arg(XDR *xdrs, cprinc_arg *objp)
{
if (!xdr_ui_4(xdrs, &objp->api_version)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!_xdr_kadm5_principal_ent_rec(xdrs, &objp->rec,
objp->api_version)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_long(xdrs, &objp->mask)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_nullstring(xdrs, &objp->passwd)) {
return (FALSE);
}
return (TRUE);
}
Commit Message: Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free
partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This
responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and
svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing
the results twice.
In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers
we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and
xdr_string().
ticket: 8056 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | 0 | 46,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int setup_ipv4_addr(struct lxc_list *ip, int ifindex)
{
struct lxc_list *iterator;
struct lxc_inetdev *inetdev;
int err;
lxc_list_for_each(iterator, ip) {
inetdev = iterator->elem;
err = lxc_ipv4_addr_add(ifindex, &inetdev->addr,
&inetdev->bcast, inetdev->prefix);
if (err) {
ERROR("failed to setup_ipv4_addr ifindex %d : %s",
ifindex, strerror(-err));
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptValue WebGLRenderingContextBase::GetBooleanParameter(
ScriptState* script_state,
GLenum pname) {
GLboolean value = 0;
if (!isContextLost())
ContextGL()->GetBooleanv(pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<bool>(value));
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ex_assign_manuf_info(struct domain_device *dev, void
*_mi_resp)
{
u8 *mi_resp = _mi_resp;
struct sas_rphy *rphy = dev->rphy;
struct sas_expander_device *edev = rphy_to_expander_device(rphy);
memcpy(edev->vendor_id, mi_resp + 12, SAS_EXPANDER_VENDOR_ID_LEN);
memcpy(edev->product_id, mi_resp + 20, SAS_EXPANDER_PRODUCT_ID_LEN);
memcpy(edev->product_rev, mi_resp + 36,
SAS_EXPANDER_PRODUCT_REV_LEN);
if (mi_resp[8] & 1) {
memcpy(edev->component_vendor_id, mi_resp + 40,
SAS_EXPANDER_COMPONENT_VENDOR_ID_LEN);
edev->component_id = mi_resp[48] << 8 | mi_resp[49];
edev->component_revision_id = mi_resp[50];
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: fix memory leak in sas_smp_get_phy_events()
We've got a memory leak with the following producer:
while true;
do cat /sys/class/sas_phy/phy-1:0:12/invalid_dword_count >/dev/null;
done
The buffer req is allocated and not freed after we return. Fix it.
Fixes: 2908d778ab3e ("[SCSI] aic94xx: new driver")
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: chenqilin <chenqilin2@huawei.com>
CC: chenxiang <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 83,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ShelfLayoutManager::AddObserver(Observer* observer) {
observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int CommandBufferProxyImpl::GetRouteID() const {
return route_id_;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Textfield::ImeEditingAllowed() const {
ui::TextInputType t = GetTextInputType();
return (t != ui::TEXT_INPUT_TYPE_NONE && t != ui::TEXT_INPUT_TYPE_PASSWORD);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DEFINE_INLINE_VIRTUAL_TRACE() { UnderlyingSource::trace(visitor); }
Commit Message: Remove blink::ReadableStream
This CL removes two stable runtime enabled flags
- ResponseConstructedWithReadableStream
- ResponseBodyWithV8ExtraStream
and related code including blink::ReadableStream.
BUG=613435
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2227403002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#411014}
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jsonb_extract_path(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
return get_jsonb_path_all(fcinfo, false);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool elementAffectsDirectionality(const Node* node)
{
return node->isHTMLElement() && (node->hasTagName(bdiTag) || toHTMLElement(node)->hasAttribute(dirAttr));
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPage::notifyFullScreenVideoExited(bool done)
{
UNUSED_PARAM(done);
#if ENABLE(VIDEO)
if (d->m_webSettings->fullScreenVideoCapable()) {
if (HTMLMediaElement* mediaElement = static_cast<HTMLMediaElement*>(d->m_fullscreenVideoNode.get()))
mediaElement->exitFullscreen();
} else {
#if ENABLE(FULLSCREEN_API)
if (Element* element = static_cast<Element*>(d->m_fullscreenVideoNode.get()))
element->document()->webkitCancelFullScreen();
#endif
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tcp_illinois_state(struct sock *sk, u8 new_state)
{
struct illinois *ca = inet_csk_ca(sk);
if (new_state == TCP_CA_Loss) {
ca->alpha = ALPHA_BASE;
ca->beta = BETA_BASE;
ca->rtt_low = 0;
ca->rtt_above = 0;
rtt_reset(sk);
}
}
Commit Message: net: fix divide by zero in tcp algorithm illinois
Reading TCP stats when using TCP Illinois congestion control algorithm
can cause a divide by zero kernel oops.
The division by zero occur in tcp_illinois_info() at:
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
where ca->cnt_rtt can become zero (when rtt_reset is called)
Steps to Reproduce:
1. Register tcp_illinois:
# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control=illinois
2. Monitor internal TCP information via command "ss -i"
# watch -d ss -i
3. Establish new TCP conn to machine
Either it fails at the initial conn, or else it needs to wait
for a loss or a reset.
This is only related to reading stats. The function avg_delay() also
performs the same divide, but is guarded with a (ca->cnt_rtt > 0) at its
calling point in update_params(). Thus, simply fix tcp_illinois_info().
Function tcp_illinois_info() / get_info() is called without
socket lock. Thus, eliminate any race condition on ca->cnt_rtt
by using a local stack variable. Simply reuse info.tcpv_rttcnt,
as its already set to ca->cnt_rtt.
Function avg_delay() is not affected by this race condition, as
its called with the socket lock.
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 18,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCreateFromWebpCtx (gdIOCtx * infile)
{
int width, height;
uint8_t *filedata = NULL;
uint8_t *argb = NULL;
unsigned char *read, *temp;
size_t size = 0, n;
gdImagePtr im;
int x, y;
uint8_t *p;
do {
temp = gdRealloc(filedata, size+GD_WEBP_ALLOC_STEP);
if (temp) {
filedata = temp;
read = temp + size;
} else {
if (filedata) {
gdFree(filedata);
}
gd_error("WebP decode: realloc failed");
return NULL;
}
n = gdGetBuf(read, GD_WEBP_ALLOC_STEP, infile);
if (n>0 && n!=EOF) {
size += n;
}
} while (n>0 && n!=EOF);
if (WebPGetInfo(filedata,size, &width, &height) == 0) {
gd_error("gd-webp cannot get webp info");
gdFree(temp);
return NULL;
}
im = gdImageCreateTrueColor(width, height);
if (!im) {
gdFree(temp);
return NULL;
}
argb = WebPDecodeARGB(filedata, size, &width, &height);
if (!argb) {
gd_error("gd-webp cannot allocate temporary buffer");
gdFree(temp);
gdImageDestroy(im);
return NULL;
}
for (y = 0, p = argb; y < height; y++) {
for (x = 0; x < width; x++) {
register uint8_t a = gdAlphaMax - (*(p++) >> 1);
register uint8_t r = *(p++);
register uint8_t g = *(p++);
register uint8_t b = *(p++);
im->tpixels[y][x] = gdTrueColorAlpha(r, g, b, a);
}
}
/* do not use gdFree here, in case gdFree/alloc is mapped to something else than libc */
free(argb);
gdFree(temp);
im->saveAlphaFlag = 1;
return im;
}
Commit Message: Fix double-free in gdImageWebPtr()
The issue is that gdImageWebpCtx() (which is called by gdImageWebpPtr() and
the other WebP output functions to do the real work) does not return whether
it succeeded or failed, so this is not checked in gdImageWebpPtr() and the
function wrongly assumes everything is okay, which is not, in this case,
because there is a size limitation for WebP, namely that the width and
height must by less than 16383.
We can't change the signature of gdImageWebpCtx() for API compatibility
reasons, so we introduce the static helper _gdImageWebpCtx() which returns
success respective failure, so gdImageWebpPtr() and gdImageWebpPtrEx() can
check the return value. We leave it solely to libwebp for now to report
warnings regarding the failing write.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org.
CVE-2016-6912
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 73,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit Delegate(HeadlessWebContentsImpl* headless_web_contents)
: headless_web_contents_(headless_web_contents) {}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 126,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void raisesExceptionStringMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::raisesExceptionStringMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fib6_dump_table(struct fib6_table *table, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct fib6_walker_t *w;
int res;
w = (void *)cb->args[2];
w->root = &table->tb6_root;
if (cb->args[4] == 0) {
w->count = 0;
w->skip = 0;
read_lock_bh(&table->tb6_lock);
res = fib6_walk(w);
read_unlock_bh(&table->tb6_lock);
if (res > 0) {
cb->args[4] = 1;
cb->args[5] = w->root->fn_sernum;
}
} else {
if (cb->args[5] != w->root->fn_sernum) {
/* Begin at the root if the tree changed */
cb->args[5] = w->root->fn_sernum;
w->state = FWS_INIT;
w->node = w->root;
w->skip = w->count;
} else
w->skip = 0;
read_lock_bh(&table->tb6_lock);
res = fib6_walk_continue(w);
read_unlock_bh(&table->tb6_lock);
if (res <= 0) {
fib6_walker_unlink(w);
cb->args[4] = 0;
}
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: net: fib: fib6_add: fix potential NULL pointer dereference
When the kernel is compiled with CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES, and we return
with an error in fn = fib6_add_1(), then error codes are encoded into
the return pointer e.g. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT). In such an error case, we
write the error code into err and jump to out, hence enter the if(err)
condition. Now, if CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES is enabled, we check for:
if (pn != fn && pn->leaf == rt)
...
if (pn != fn && !pn->leaf && !(pn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO))
...
Since pn is NULL and fn is f.e. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT), then pn != fn
evaluates to true and causes a NULL-pointer dereference on further
checks on pn. Fix it, by setting both NULL in error case, so that
pn != fn already evaluates to false and no further dereference
takes place.
This was first correctly implemented in 4a287eba2 ("IPv6 routing,
NLM_F_* flag support: REPLACE and EXCL flags support, warn about
missing CREATE flag"), but the bug got later on introduced by
188c517a0 ("ipv6: return errno pointers consistently for fib6_add_1()").
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Lin Ming <mlin@ss.pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Matti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Matti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 28,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseRenderingContext2D::ClipInternal(const Path& path,
const String& winding_rule_string) {
PaintCanvas* c = DrawingCanvas();
if (!c) {
return;
}
if (!GetState().IsTransformInvertible()) {
return;
}
SkPath sk_path = path.GetSkPath();
sk_path.setFillType(ParseWinding(winding_rule_string));
ModifiableState().ClipPath(sk_path, clip_antialiasing_);
c->clipPath(sk_path, SkClipOp::kIntersect,
clip_antialiasing_ == kAntiAliased);
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 149,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mxf_read_partition_pack(void *arg, AVIOContext *pb, int tag, int size, UID uid, int64_t klv_offset)
{
MXFContext *mxf = arg;
MXFPartition *partition, *tmp_part;
UID op;
uint64_t footer_partition;
uint32_t nb_essence_containers;
if (mxf->partitions_count >= INT_MAX / 2)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
tmp_part = av_realloc_array(mxf->partitions, mxf->partitions_count + 1, sizeof(*mxf->partitions));
if (!tmp_part)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
mxf->partitions = tmp_part;
if (mxf->parsing_backward) {
/* insert the new partition pack in the middle
* this makes the entries in mxf->partitions sorted by offset */
memmove(&mxf->partitions[mxf->last_forward_partition+1],
&mxf->partitions[mxf->last_forward_partition],
(mxf->partitions_count - mxf->last_forward_partition)*sizeof(*mxf->partitions));
partition = mxf->current_partition = &mxf->partitions[mxf->last_forward_partition];
} else {
mxf->last_forward_partition++;
partition = mxf->current_partition = &mxf->partitions[mxf->partitions_count];
}
memset(partition, 0, sizeof(*partition));
mxf->partitions_count++;
partition->pack_length = avio_tell(pb) - klv_offset + size;
partition->pack_ofs = klv_offset;
switch(uid[13]) {
case 2:
partition->type = Header;
break;
case 3:
partition->type = BodyPartition;
break;
case 4:
partition->type = Footer;
break;
default:
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "unknown partition type %i\n", uid[13]);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
/* consider both footers to be closed (there is only Footer and CompleteFooter) */
partition->closed = partition->type == Footer || !(uid[14] & 1);
partition->complete = uid[14] > 2;
avio_skip(pb, 4);
partition->kag_size = avio_rb32(pb);
partition->this_partition = avio_rb64(pb);
partition->previous_partition = avio_rb64(pb);
footer_partition = avio_rb64(pb);
partition->header_byte_count = avio_rb64(pb);
partition->index_byte_count = avio_rb64(pb);
partition->index_sid = avio_rb32(pb);
partition->body_offset = avio_rb64(pb);
partition->body_sid = avio_rb32(pb);
if (avio_read(pb, op, sizeof(UID)) != sizeof(UID)) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Failed reading UID\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
nb_essence_containers = avio_rb32(pb);
if (partition->this_partition &&
partition->previous_partition == partition->this_partition) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"PreviousPartition equal to ThisPartition %"PRIx64"\n",
partition->previous_partition);
/* override with the actual previous partition offset */
if (!mxf->parsing_backward && mxf->last_forward_partition > 1) {
MXFPartition *prev =
mxf->partitions + mxf->last_forward_partition - 2;
partition->previous_partition = prev->this_partition;
}
/* if no previous body partition are found point to the header
* partition */
if (partition->previous_partition == partition->this_partition)
partition->previous_partition = 0;
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Overriding PreviousPartition with %"PRIx64"\n",
partition->previous_partition);
}
/* some files don't have FooterPartition set in every partition */
if (footer_partition) {
if (mxf->footer_partition && mxf->footer_partition != footer_partition) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"inconsistent FooterPartition value: %"PRIu64" != %"PRIu64"\n",
mxf->footer_partition, footer_partition);
} else {
mxf->footer_partition = footer_partition;
}
}
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_TRACE,
"PartitionPack: ThisPartition = 0x%"PRIX64
", PreviousPartition = 0x%"PRIX64", "
"FooterPartition = 0x%"PRIX64", IndexSID = %i, BodySID = %i\n",
partition->this_partition,
partition->previous_partition, footer_partition,
partition->index_sid, partition->body_sid);
/* sanity check PreviousPartition if set */
if (partition->previous_partition &&
mxf->run_in + partition->previous_partition >= klv_offset) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"PreviousPartition points to this partition or forward\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (op[12] == 1 && op[13] == 1) mxf->op = OP1a;
else if (op[12] == 1 && op[13] == 2) mxf->op = OP1b;
else if (op[12] == 1 && op[13] == 3) mxf->op = OP1c;
else if (op[12] == 2 && op[13] == 1) mxf->op = OP2a;
else if (op[12] == 2 && op[13] == 2) mxf->op = OP2b;
else if (op[12] == 2 && op[13] == 3) mxf->op = OP2c;
else if (op[12] == 3 && op[13] == 1) mxf->op = OP3a;
else if (op[12] == 3 && op[13] == 2) mxf->op = OP3b;
else if (op[12] == 3 && op[13] == 3) mxf->op = OP3c;
else if (op[12] == 64&& op[13] == 1) mxf->op = OPSONYOpt;
else if (op[12] == 0x10) {
/* SMPTE 390m: "There shall be exactly one essence container"
* The following block deals with files that violate this, namely:
* 2011_DCPTEST_24FPS.V.mxf - two ECs, OP1a
* abcdefghiv016f56415e.mxf - zero ECs, OPAtom, output by Avid AirSpeed */
if (nb_essence_containers != 1) {
MXFOP op = nb_essence_containers ? OP1a : OPAtom;
/* only nag once */
if (!mxf->op)
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"\"OPAtom\" with %"PRIu32" ECs - assuming %s\n",
nb_essence_containers,
op == OP1a ? "OP1a" : "OPAtom");
mxf->op = op;
} else
mxf->op = OPAtom;
} else {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "unknown operational pattern: %02xh %02xh - guessing OP1a\n", op[12], op[13]);
mxf->op = OP1a;
}
if (partition->kag_size <= 0 || partition->kag_size > (1 << 20)) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "invalid KAGSize %"PRId32" - guessing ",
partition->kag_size);
if (mxf->op == OPSONYOpt)
partition->kag_size = 512;
else
partition->kag_size = 1;
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "%"PRId32"\n", partition->kag_size);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix av_log context
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: mxf-crash-1c2e59bf07a34675bfb3ada5e1ec22fa9f38f923
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 74,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_attr3_leaf_list_int(
struct xfs_buf *bp,
struct xfs_attr_list_context *context)
{
struct attrlist_cursor_kern *cursor;
struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf;
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entries;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entry;
int retval;
int i;
trace_xfs_attr_list_leaf(context);
leaf = bp->b_addr;
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(&ichdr, leaf);
entries = xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf);
cursor = context->cursor;
cursor->initted = 1;
/*
* Re-find our place in the leaf block if this is a new syscall.
*/
if (context->resynch) {
entry = &entries[0];
for (i = 0; i < ichdr.count; entry++, i++) {
if (be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) == cursor->hashval) {
if (cursor->offset == context->dupcnt) {
context->dupcnt = 0;
break;
}
context->dupcnt++;
} else if (be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) >
cursor->hashval) {
context->dupcnt = 0;
break;
}
}
if (i == ichdr.count) {
trace_xfs_attr_list_notfound(context);
return 0;
}
} else {
entry = &entries[0];
i = 0;
}
context->resynch = 0;
/*
* We have found our place, start copying out the new attributes.
*/
retval = 0;
for (; i < ichdr.count; entry++, i++) {
if (be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) != cursor->hashval) {
cursor->hashval = be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval);
cursor->offset = 0;
}
if (entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE)
continue; /* skip incomplete entries */
if (entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) {
xfs_attr_leaf_name_local_t *name_loc =
xfs_attr3_leaf_name_local(leaf, i);
retval = context->put_listent(context,
entry->flags,
name_loc->nameval,
(int)name_loc->namelen,
be16_to_cpu(name_loc->valuelen),
&name_loc->nameval[name_loc->namelen]);
if (retval)
return retval;
} else {
xfs_attr_leaf_name_remote_t *name_rmt =
xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, i);
int valuelen = be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valuelen);
if (context->put_value) {
xfs_da_args_t args;
memset((char *)&args, 0, sizeof(args));
args.dp = context->dp;
args.whichfork = XFS_ATTR_FORK;
args.valuelen = valuelen;
args.value = kmem_alloc(valuelen, KM_SLEEP | KM_NOFS);
args.rmtblkno = be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valueblk);
args.rmtblkcnt = xfs_attr3_rmt_blocks(
args.dp->i_mount, valuelen);
retval = xfs_attr_rmtval_get(&args);
if (retval)
return retval;
retval = context->put_listent(context,
entry->flags,
name_rmt->name,
(int)name_rmt->namelen,
valuelen,
args.value);
kmem_free(args.value);
} else {
retval = context->put_listent(context,
entry->flags,
name_rmt->name,
(int)name_rmt->namelen,
valuelen,
NULL);
}
if (retval)
return retval;
}
if (context->seen_enough)
break;
cursor->offset++;
}
trace_xfs_attr_list_leaf_end(context);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 1 | 166,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLenum GLES2DecoderImpl::GetBoundFramebufferDepthFormat(
GLenum target) {
DCHECK(target == GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER || target == GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER ||
target == GL_FRAMEBUFFER);
Framebuffer* framebuffer = GetFramebufferInfoForTarget(target);
if (framebuffer) {
return framebuffer->GetDepthFormat();
} else { // Back buffer.
if (offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get()) {
return offscreen_target_depth_format_;
}
if (back_buffer_has_depth_)
return GL_DEPTH;
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *state_name(h2_session_state state)
{
if (state >= (sizeof(StateNames)/sizeof(StateNames[0]))) {
return "unknown";
}
return StateNames[state];
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740
mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory.
Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <naveen.tiwari@asu.edu> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 48,685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rds_ib_sub_signaled(struct rds_ib_connection *ic, int nr)
{
if ((atomic_sub_return(nr, &ic->i_signaled_sends) == 0) &&
waitqueue_active(&rds_ib_ring_empty_wait))
wake_up(&rds_ib_ring_empty_wait);
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&ic->i_signaled_sends) < 0);
}
Commit Message: rds: prevent BUG_ON triggering on congestion map updates
Recently had this bug halt reported to me:
kernel BUG at net/rds/send.c:329!
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
SMP NR_CPUS=1024 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in: rds sunrpc ipv6 dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log ibmveth sg
ext4 jbd2 mbcache sd_mod crc_t10dif ibmvscsic scsi_transport_srp scsi_tgt
dm_mod [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan]
NIP: d000000003ca68f4 LR: d000000003ca67fc CTR: d000000003ca8770
REGS: c000000175cab980 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (2.6.32-118.el6.ppc64)
MSR: 8000000000029032 <EE,ME,CE,IR,DR> CR: 44000022 XER: 00000000
TASK = c00000017586ec90[1896] 'krdsd' THREAD: c000000175ca8000 CPU: 0
GPR00: 0000000000000150 c000000175cabc00 d000000003cb7340 0000000000002030
GPR04: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000030 0000000000000000 0000000000000030
GPR08: 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 c0000001756b1e30 0000000000010000
GPR12: d000000003caac90 c000000000fa2500 c0000001742b2858 c0000001742b2a00
GPR16: c0000001742b2a08 c0000001742b2820 0000000000000001 0000000000000001
GPR20: 0000000000000040 c0000001742b2814 c000000175cabc70 0800000000000000
GPR24: 0000000000000004 0200000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000001742b2860
GPR28: 0000000000000000 c0000001756b1c80 d000000003cb68e8 c0000001742b27b8
NIP [d000000003ca68f4] .rds_send_xmit+0x4c4/0x8a0 [rds]
LR [d000000003ca67fc] .rds_send_xmit+0x3cc/0x8a0 [rds]
Call Trace:
[c000000175cabc00] [d000000003ca67fc] .rds_send_xmit+0x3cc/0x8a0 [rds]
(unreliable)
[c000000175cabd30] [d000000003ca7e64] .rds_send_worker+0x54/0x100 [rds]
[c000000175cabdb0] [c0000000000b475c] .worker_thread+0x1dc/0x3c0
[c000000175cabed0] [c0000000000baa9c] .kthread+0xbc/0xd0
[c000000175cabf90] [c000000000032114] .kernel_thread+0x54/0x70
Instruction dump:
4bfffd50 60000000 60000000 39080001 935f004c f91f0040 41820024 813d017c
7d094a78 7d290074 7929d182 394a0020 <0b090000> 40e2ff68 4bffffa4 39200000
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Call Trace:
[c000000175cab560] [c000000000012e04] .show_stack+0x74/0x1c0 (unreliable)
[c000000175cab610] [c0000000005a365c] .panic+0x80/0x1b4
[c000000175cab6a0] [c00000000002fbcc] .die+0x21c/0x2a0
[c000000175cab750] [c000000000030000] ._exception+0x110/0x220
[c000000175cab910] [c000000000004b9c] program_check_common+0x11c/0x180
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,772 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::FrameDidStopLoading(WebFrame* frame) {
if (frames_in_progress_ == 0)
return;
frames_in_progress_--;
if (frames_in_progress_ == 0) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidStopLoading();
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init set_ftrace_filter(char *str)
{
strncpy(ftrace_filter_buf, str, FTRACE_FILTER_SIZE);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 30,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: e1000e_process_snap_option(E1000ECore *core, uint32_t cmd_and_length)
{
if (cmd_and_length & E1000_TXD_CMD_SNAP) {
trace_e1000e_wrn_no_snap_support();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 6,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::writeCString(const char* str)
{
return write(str, strlen(str)+1);
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::ShowUpdateChromeDialog() {
UpdateRecommendedMessageBox::Show(GetWidget()->GetNativeWindow());
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: copy_shmid_from_user(struct shmid64_ds *out, void __user *buf, int version)
{
switch(version) {
case IPC_64:
if (copy_from_user(out, buf, sizeof(*out)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case IPC_OLD:
{
struct shmid_ds tbuf_old;
if (copy_from_user(&tbuf_old, buf, sizeof(tbuf_old)))
return -EFAULT;
out->shm_perm.uid = tbuf_old.shm_perm.uid;
out->shm_perm.gid = tbuf_old.shm_perm.gid;
out->shm_perm.mode = tbuf_old.shm_perm.mode;
return 0;
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Commit Message: ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races
When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).
Here's the race before this patch:
TASK 1 TASK 2
------ ------
shm_rmid()
ipc_lock_object()
shmctl()
shp = shm_obtain_object_check()
shm_destroy()
shum_unlock()
fput(shp->shm_file)
ipc_lock_object()
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
<OOPS>
The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock. fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2. I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu
This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
ipc_object_lock().
Example workloads, which each trigger oops...
Workload 1:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shm_rmid $id &
shmlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
_raw_spin_lock
shmem_lock
SyS_shmctl
Workload 2:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmat $id 4096 &
shm_rmid $id &
wait
done
The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
touch_atime
shmem_mmap
shm_mmap
mmap_region
do_mmap_pgoff
do_shmat
SyS_shmat
Workload 3:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmlock $id
shm_rmid $id &
shmunlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode. The
first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
a get_file() and queued this fput():
locks_remove_flock
__fput
____fput
task_work_run
do_notify_resume
int_signal
Fixes: c2c737a0461e ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10.17+ 3.11.6+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebKitTestController::OnCloseRemainingWindows() {
DevToolsAgentHost::DetachAllClients();
std::vector<Shell*> open_windows(Shell::windows());
Shell* devtools_shell = devtools_frontend_ ?
devtools_frontend_->frontend_shell() : NULL;
for (size_t i = 0; i < open_windows.size(); ++i) {
if (open_windows[i] != main_window_ && open_windows[i] != devtools_shell)
open_windows[i]->Close();
}
base::MessageLoop::current()->RunUntilIdle();
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ib_ucm_send_apr(struct ib_ucm_file *file,
const char __user *inbuf,
int in_len, int out_len)
{
return ib_ucm_send_info(file, inbuf, in_len, (void *)ib_send_cm_apr);
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,807 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gfn_t kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, int index)
{
if (!sp->role.direct)
return sp->gfns[index];
return sp->gfn + (index << ((sp->role.level - 1) * PT64_LEVEL_BITS));
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static NO_INLINE JsVar *jspGetNamedFieldInParents(JsVar *object, const char* name, bool returnName) {
JsVar * child = jspeiFindChildFromStringInParents(object, name);
/* Check for builtins via separate function
* This way we save on RAM for built-ins because everything comes out of program code */
if (!child) {
child = jswFindBuiltInFunction(object, name);
}
/* We didn't get here if we found a child in the object itself, so
* if we're here then we probably have the wrong name - so for example
* with `a.b = c;` could end up setting `a.prototype.b` (bug #360)
*
* Also we might have got a built-in, which wouldn't have a name on it
* anyway - so in both cases, strip the name if it is there, and create
* a new name.
*/
if (child && returnName) {
child = jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(child);
JsVar *nameVar = jsvNewFromString(name);
JsVar *newChild = jsvCreateNewChild(object, nameVar, child);
jsvUnLock2(nameVar, child);
child = newChild;
}
if (!child) {
if (jsvIsFunction(object) && strcmp(name, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR)==0) {
JsVar *proto = jsvNewObject();
jsvObjectSetChild(proto, JSPARSE_CONSTRUCTOR_VAR, object);
child = jsvAddNamedChild(object, proto, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR);
jspEnsureIsPrototype(object, child);
jsvUnLock(proto);
} else if (strcmp(name, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR)==0) {
const char *objName = jswGetBasicObjectName(object);
if (objName) {
child = jspNewPrototype(objName);
}
}
}
return child;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug if using an undefined member of an object for for..in (fix #1437)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_basic_inout(void)
{
return (((u64)vmcs_config.basic_cap << 32) & VMX_BASIC_INOUT);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_sampled_guard_by_bridge_addr(guard_selection_t *gs,
const tor_addr_port_t *addrport)
{
if (! gs)
return NULL;
if (BUG(!addrport))
return NULL;
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->sampled_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, g) {
if (g->bridge_addr && tor_addr_port_eq(addrport, g->bridge_addr))
return g;
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(g);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 69,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PaymentHandlerWebFlowViewController::CreateHeaderContentView() {
const GURL origin = web_contents()
? web_contents()->GetVisibleURL().GetOrigin()
: target_.GetOrigin();
std::unique_ptr<views::Background> background = GetHeaderBackground();
return std::make_unique<ReadOnlyOriginView>(
GetPaymentHandlerDialogTitle(web_contents(), https_prefix_), origin,
state()->selected_instrument()->icon_image_skia(),
background->get_color(), this);
}
Commit Message: [Payment Handler] Don't wait for response from closed payment app.
Before this patch, tapping the back button on top of the payment handler
window on desktop would not affect the |response_helper_|, which would
continue waiting for a response from the payment app. The service worker
of the closed payment app could timeout after 5 minutes and invoke the
|response_helper_|. Depending on what else the user did afterwards, in
the best case scenario, the payment sheet would display a "Transaction
failed" error message. In the worst case scenario, the
|response_helper_| would be used after free.
This patch clears the |response_helper_| in the PaymentRequestState and
in the ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument after the payment app is closed.
After this patch, the cancelled payment app does not show "Transaction
failed" and does not use memory after it was freed.
Bug: 956597
Change-Id: I64134b911a4f8c154cb56d537a8243a68a806394
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1588682
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654995}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 151,113 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
WORD32 num_mb_skip,
UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num,
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc,
WORD32 prev_slice_err)
{
WORD32 i2_cur_mb_addr;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbsNby2;
UWORD32 u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
UWORD32 i2_mb_skip_run;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs_next, u1_end_of_row;
const UWORD32 i2_pic_wdin_mbs = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
UWORD32 u1_slice_end;
UWORD32 u1_tfr_n_mb;
UWORD32 u1_decode_nmb;
dec_bit_stream_t * const ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
deblk_mb_t *ps_cur_deblk_mb;
dec_mb_info_t *ps_cur_mb_info;
parse_pmbarams_t *ps_parse_mb_data;
UWORD32 u1_inter_mb_type;
UWORD32 u1_deblk_mb_type;
UWORD16 u2_total_mbs_coded;
UWORD32 u1_mbaff = ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
parse_part_params_t *ps_part_info;
WORD32 ret;
if(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return 0;
}
ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_long_term_reference_flag = 0;
if(prev_slice_err == 1)
{
/* first slice - missing/header corruption */
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
if(!ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec, u1_is_idr_slice,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num);
ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc.u2_frame_num =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
}
{
WORD32 i, j, poc = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = 0;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaff;
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_bp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_bp;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_pic != NULL)
poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc + 2;
j = 0;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAMS; i++)
if(ps_dec->ps_pps[i].u1_is_valid == TRUE)
j = i;
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = 1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = 1;
ret = ih264d_start_of_pic(ps_dec, poc, ps_cur_poc,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&ps_dec->ps_pps[j]);
if(ret != OK)
{
return ret;
}
}
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0][0]->u1_pic_buf_id = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec,
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
/* If error code is non-zero then there is no buffer available for display,
hence avoid format conversion */
if(0 != ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
}
else
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created == 0)
{
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_decode_picture_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 1;
}
if((ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3) &&
((ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0) || ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
&& (ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created == 0))
{
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_recon_deblk_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 1;
}
}
}
}
else
{
dec_slice_struct_t *ps_parse_cur_slice;
ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf + ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
if(ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done
&& ps_parse_cur_slice == ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice)
{
u1_num_mbs = ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs - 1;
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info - 1;
}
else
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info
+ ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_prev_nmb - 1;
}
}
ps_dec->u2_mby = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mby;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity =
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity;
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_prev_mb_parse_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr--;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst -= SUB_BLK_SIZE;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
if (ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == P_SLICE
|| ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
}
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next)
&& (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = 1;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 1;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
return 0;
}
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
}
else
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf
+ ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
}
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations to new slice */
/******************************************************/
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
num_entries = MAX_FRAMES;
if((1 >= ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_num_ref_frames) &&
(0 == ps_dec->i4_display_delay))
{
num_entries = 1;
}
num_entries = ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
if(BASE_PROFILE_IDC != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_profile_idc)
{
num_entries *= 2;
}
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_buf;
pu1_buf += size * ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = (volatile void **)pu1_buf;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded << u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded << u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->pv_tu_coeff_data_start = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations specific to P slice */
/******************************************************/
u1_inter_mb_type = P_MB;
u1_deblk_mb_type = D_INTER_MB;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb = ih264d_mv_pred_ref_tfr_nby2_pmb;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
/******************************************************/
/* Parsing / decoding the slice */
/******************************************************/
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 2;
ps_dec->u1_qp = ps_slice->u1_slice_qp;
ih264d_update_qp(ps_dec, 0);
u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
u1_num_mbs = u1_mb_idx;
u1_slice_end = 0;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 0;
u1_decode_nmb = 0;
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
i2_cur_mb_addr = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
i2_mb_skip_run = num_mb_skip;
while(!u1_slice_end)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_type;
if(i2_cur_mb_addr > ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr)
break;
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_Mux = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_pmbair = (u1_num_mbs >> u1_mbaff);
ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = 0;
/* Storing Default partition info */
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_num_part = 1;
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_isI_mb = 0;
/**************************************************************/
/* Get the required information for decoding of MB */
/**************************************************************/
/* mb_x, mb_y, neighbor availablity, */
if (u1_mbaff)
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_mbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
else
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_nonmbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
/* Set the deblocking parameters for this MB */
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0)
{
ih264d_set_deblocking_parameters(ps_cur_deblk_mb, ps_slice,
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity,
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag);
}
/* Set appropriate flags in ps_cur_mb_info and ps_dec */
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_dec->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type = MB_SKIP;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_mc_mode = PRED_16x16;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_cbp = 0;
/* Storing Skip partition info */
ps_part_info = ps_dec->ps_part;
ps_part_info->u1_is_direct = PART_DIRECT_16x16;
ps_part_info->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->ps_part++;
/* Update Nnzs */
ih264d_update_nnz_for_skipmb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, CAVLC);
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = u1_inter_mb_type;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type |= u1_deblk_mb_type;
i2_mb_skip_run--;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = ps_dec->u1_qp;
if (u1_mbaff)
{
ih264d_update_mbaff_left_nnz(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info);
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Get next Macroblock address */
/**************************************************************/
i2_cur_mb_addr++;
u1_num_mbs++;
u1_num_mbsNby2++;
ps_parse_mb_data++;
/****************************************************************/
/* Check for End Of Row and other flags that determine when to */
/* do DMA setup for N/2-Mb, Decode for N-Mb, and Transfer for */
/* N-Mb */
/****************************************************************/
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next) && (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = !i2_mb_skip_run;
u1_tfr_n_mb = (u1_num_mbs == ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp) || u1_end_of_row
|| u1_slice_end;
u1_decode_nmb = u1_tfr_n_mb || u1_slice_end;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(u1_decode_nmb)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbs_next,
u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
if(u1_tfr_n_mb)
u1_num_mbs = 0;
u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice = i2_cur_mb_addr
- ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Mbs in slice: %d\n", ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice);
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
/* incremented here only if first slice is inserted */
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 0)
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix slice params for interlaced video
Bug: 28165661
Change-Id: I912a86bd78ebf0617fd2bc6eb2b5a61afc17bf53
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 173,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Microtask::performingCheckpoint(v8::Isolate* isolate)
{
return V8PerIsolateData::from(isolate)->performingMicrotaskCheckpoint();
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bt_status_t btif_set_adapter_property(const bt_property_t *property)
{
btif_storage_req_t req;
bt_status_t status = BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
int storage_req_id = BTIF_CORE_STORAGE_NOTIFY_STATUS; /* default */
char bd_name[BTM_MAX_LOC_BD_NAME_LEN +1];
UINT16 name_len = 0;
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("btif_set_adapter_property type: %d, len %d, 0x%x",
property->type, property->len, property->val);
if (!btif_is_enabled())
return BT_STATUS_NOT_READY;
switch(property->type)
{
case BT_PROPERTY_BDNAME:
{
name_len = property->len > BTM_MAX_LOC_BD_NAME_LEN ? BTM_MAX_LOC_BD_NAME_LEN:
property->len;
memcpy(bd_name,property->val, name_len);
bd_name[name_len] = '\0';
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("set property name : %s", (char *)bd_name);
BTA_DmSetDeviceName((char *)bd_name);
storage_req_id = BTIF_CORE_STORAGE_ADAPTER_WRITE;
}
break;
case BT_PROPERTY_ADAPTER_SCAN_MODE:
{
bt_scan_mode_t mode = *(bt_scan_mode_t*)property->val;
tBTA_DM_DISC disc_mode;
tBTA_DM_CONN conn_mode;
switch(mode)
{
case BT_SCAN_MODE_NONE:
disc_mode = BTA_DM_NON_DISC;
conn_mode = BTA_DM_NON_CONN;
break;
case BT_SCAN_MODE_CONNECTABLE:
disc_mode = BTA_DM_NON_DISC;
conn_mode = BTA_DM_CONN;
break;
case BT_SCAN_MODE_CONNECTABLE_DISCOVERABLE:
disc_mode = BTA_DM_GENERAL_DISC;
conn_mode = BTA_DM_CONN;
break;
default:
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("invalid scan mode (0x%x)", mode);
return BT_STATUS_PARM_INVALID;
}
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("set property scan mode : %x", mode);
BTA_DmSetVisibility(disc_mode, conn_mode, BTA_DM_IGNORE, BTA_DM_IGNORE);
storage_req_id = BTIF_CORE_STORAGE_ADAPTER_WRITE;
}
break;
case BT_PROPERTY_ADAPTER_DISCOVERY_TIMEOUT:
{
/* Nothing to do beside store the value in NV. Java
will change the SCAN_MODE property after setting timeout,
if required */
storage_req_id = BTIF_CORE_STORAGE_ADAPTER_WRITE;
}
break;
case BT_PROPERTY_BDADDR:
case BT_PROPERTY_UUIDS:
case BT_PROPERTY_ADAPTER_BONDED_DEVICES:
case BT_PROPERTY_REMOTE_FRIENDLY_NAME:
/* no write support through HAL, these properties are only populated from BTA events */
status = BT_STATUS_FAIL;
break;
default:
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("btif_get_adapter_property : invalid type %d",
property->type);
status = BT_STATUS_FAIL;
break;
}
if (storage_req_id != BTIF_CORE_STORAGE_NO_ACTION)
{
/* pass on to storage for updating local database */
memset(&(req.write_req.bd_addr), 0, sizeof(bt_bdaddr_t));
memcpy(&(req.write_req.prop), property, sizeof(bt_property_t));
return btif_transfer_context(execute_storage_request,
storage_req_id,
(char*)&req,
sizeof(btif_storage_req_t)+property->len,
btif_in_storage_request_copy_cb);
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline LineContribType *_gdContributionsCalc(unsigned int line_size, unsigned int src_size, double scale_d, const interpolation_method pFilter)
{
double width_d;
double scale_f_d = 1.0;
const double filter_width_d = DEFAULT_BOX_RADIUS;
int windows_size;
unsigned int u;
LineContribType *res;
if (scale_d < 1.0) {
width_d = filter_width_d / scale_d;
scale_f_d = scale_d;
} else {
width_d= filter_width_d;
}
windows_size = 2 * (int)ceil(width_d) + 1;
res = _gdContributionsAlloc(line_size, windows_size);
for (u = 0; u < line_size; u++) {
const double dCenter = (double)u / scale_d;
/* get the significant edge points affecting the pixel */
register int iLeft = MAX(0, (int)floor (dCenter - width_d));
int iRight = MIN((int)ceil(dCenter + width_d), (int)src_size - 1);
double dTotalWeight = 0.0;
int iSrc;
res->ContribRow[u].Left = iLeft;
res->ContribRow[u].Right = iRight;
/* Cut edge points to fit in filter window in case of spill-off */
if (iRight - iLeft + 1 > windows_size) {
if (iLeft < ((int)src_size - 1 / 2)) {
iLeft++;
} else {
iRight--;
}
}
for (iSrc = iLeft; iSrc <= iRight; iSrc++) {
dTotalWeight += (res->ContribRow[u].Weights[iSrc-iLeft] = scale_f_d * (*pFilter)(scale_f_d * (dCenter - (double)iSrc)));
}
if (dTotalWeight < 0.0) {
_gdContributionsFree(res);
return NULL;
}
if (dTotalWeight > 0.0) {
for (iSrc = iLeft; iSrc <= iRight; iSrc++) {
res->ContribRow[u].Weights[iSrc-iLeft] /= dTotalWeight;
}
}
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fixed memory overrun bug in gdImageScaleTwoPass
_gdContributionsCalc would compute a window size and then adjust
the left and right positions of the window to make a window within
that size. However, it was storing the values in the struct *before*
it made the adjustment. This change fixes that.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _nfs4_do_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct rpc_cred *cred,
struct nfs_fattr *fattr, struct iattr *sattr,
struct nfs4_state *state)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(inode);
struct nfs_setattrargs arg = {
.fh = NFS_FH(inode),
.iap = sattr,
.server = server,
.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask,
};
struct nfs_setattrres res = {
.fattr = fattr,
.server = server,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_SETATTR],
.rpc_argp = &arg,
.rpc_resp = &res,
.rpc_cred = cred,
};
unsigned long timestamp = jiffies;
int status;
nfs_fattr_init(fattr);
if (state != NULL) {
nfs4_select_rw_stateid(&arg.stateid, state, FMODE_WRITE,
current->files, current->tgid);
} else if (nfs4_copy_delegation_stateid(&arg.stateid, inode,
FMODE_WRITE)) {
/* Use that stateid */
} else
nfs4_stateid_copy(&arg.stateid, &zero_stateid);
status = nfs4_call_sync(server->client, server, &msg, &arg.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 1);
if (status == 0 && state != NULL)
renew_lease(server, timestamp);
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,811 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: server_inline (server *serv, char *line, int len)
{
char *utf_line_allocated = NULL;
/* Checks whether we're set to use UTF-8 charset */
if (serv->using_irc || /* 1. using CP1252/UTF-8 Hybrid */
(serv->encoding == NULL && prefs.utf8_locale) || /* OR 2. using system default->UTF-8 */
(serv->encoding != NULL && /* OR 3. explicitly set to UTF-8 */
(g_ascii_strcasecmp (serv->encoding, "UTF8") == 0 ||
g_ascii_strcasecmp (serv->encoding, "UTF-8") == 0)))
{
/* The user has the UTF-8 charset set, either via /charset
command or from his UTF-8 locale. Thus, we first try the
UTF-8 charset, and if we fail to convert, we assume
it to be ISO-8859-1 (see text_validate). */
utf_line_allocated = text_validate (&line, &len);
} else
{
/* Since the user has an explicit charset set, either
via /charset command or from his non-UTF8 locale,
we don't fallback to ISO-8859-1 and instead try to remove
errnoeous octets till the string is convertable in the
said charset. */
const char *encoding = NULL;
if (serv->encoding != NULL)
encoding = serv->encoding;
else
g_get_charset (&encoding);
if (encoding != NULL)
{
char *conv_line; /* holds a copy of the original string */
int conv_len; /* tells g_convert how much of line to convert */
gsize utf_len;
gsize read_len;
GError *err;
gboolean retry;
conv_line = g_malloc (len + 1);
memcpy (conv_line, line, len);
conv_line[len] = 0;
conv_len = len;
/* if CP1255, convert it with the NUL terminator.
Works around SF bug #1122089 */
if (serv->using_cp1255)
conv_len++;
do
{
err = NULL;
retry = FALSE;
utf_line_allocated = g_convert_with_fallback (conv_line, conv_len, "UTF-8", encoding, "?", &read_len, &utf_len, &err);
if (err != NULL)
{
if (err->code == G_CONVERT_ERROR_ILLEGAL_SEQUENCE && conv_len > (read_len + 1))
{
/* Make our best bet by removing the erroneous char.
This will work for casual 8-bit strings with non-standard chars. */
memmove (conv_line + read_len, conv_line + read_len + 1, conv_len - read_len -1);
conv_len--;
retry = TRUE;
}
g_error_free (err);
}
} while (retry);
g_free (conv_line);
/* If any conversion has occured at all. Conversion might fail
due to errors other than invalid sequences, e.g. unknown charset. */
if (utf_line_allocated != NULL)
{
line = utf_line_allocated;
len = utf_len;
if (serv->using_cp1255 && len > 0)
len--;
}
else
{
/* If all fails, treat as UTF-8 with fallback to ISO-8859-1. */
utf_line_allocated = text_validate (&line, &len);
}
}
}
fe_add_rawlog (serv, line, len, FALSE);
/* let proto-irc.c handle it */
serv->p_inline (serv, line, len);
if (utf_line_allocated != NULL) /* only if a special copy was allocated */
g_free (utf_line_allocated);
}
Commit Message: ssl: Validate hostnames
Closes #524
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 58,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void cred_to_ucred(struct pid *pid, const struct cred *cred,
struct ucred *ucred)
{
ucred->pid = pid_vnr(pid);
ucred->uid = ucred->gid = -1;
if (cred) {
struct user_namespace *current_ns = current_user_ns();
ucred->uid = user_ns_map_uid(current_ns, cred, cred->euid);
ucred->gid = user_ns_map_gid(current_ns, cred, cred->egid);
}
}
Commit Message: net: cleanups in sock_setsockopt()
Use min_t()/max_t() macros, reformat two comments, use !!test_bit() to
match !!sock_flag()
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 58,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void LongLongMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8SetReturnValue(info, static_cast<double>(impl->longLongMethod()));
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: activate_activation_uris_ready_callback (GList *files_ignore,
gpointer callback_data)
{
ActivateParameters *parameters = callback_data;
GList *l, *next, *files;
NautilusFile *file;
LaunchLocation *location;
parameters->files_handle = NULL;
for (l = parameters->locations; l != NULL; l = next)
{
location = l->data;
file = location->file;
next = l->next;
if (file_was_cancelled (file))
{
launch_location_free (location);
parameters->locations = g_list_delete_link (parameters->locations, l);
continue;
}
if (nautilus_file_is_broken_symbolic_link (file))
{
launch_location_free (location);
parameters->locations = g_list_delete_link (parameters->locations, l);
pause_activation_timed_cancel (parameters);
report_broken_symbolic_link (parameters->parent_window, file);
unpause_activation_timed_cancel (parameters);
continue;
}
if (nautilus_file_get_file_type (file) == G_FILE_TYPE_MOUNTABLE &&
!nautilus_file_has_activation_uri (file))
{
/* Don't launch these... There is nothing we
* can do */
launch_location_free (location);
parameters->locations = g_list_delete_link (parameters->locations, l);
continue;
}
}
if (parameters->locations == NULL)
{
activation_parameters_free (parameters);
return;
}
/* Convert the files to the actual activation uri files */
for (l = parameters->locations; l != NULL; l = l->next)
{
char *uri;
location = l->data;
/* We want the file for the activation URI since we care
* about the attributes for that, not for the original file.
*/
uri = nautilus_file_get_activation_uri (location->file);
if (uri != NULL)
{
launch_location_update_from_uri (location, uri);
}
g_free (uri);
}
/* get the parameters for the actual files */
files = get_file_list_for_launch_locations (parameters->locations);
nautilus_file_list_call_when_ready
(files,
nautilus_mime_actions_get_required_file_attributes (),
¶meters->files_handle,
activate_callback, parameters);
nautilus_file_list_free (files);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,158 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __btrfs_prealloc_file_range(struct inode *inode, int mode,
u64 start, u64 num_bytes, u64 min_size,
loff_t actual_len, u64 *alloc_hint,
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans)
{
struct extent_map_tree *em_tree = &BTRFS_I(inode)->extent_tree;
struct extent_map *em;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct btrfs_key ins;
u64 cur_offset = start;
u64 i_size;
int ret = 0;
bool own_trans = true;
if (trans)
own_trans = false;
while (num_bytes > 0) {
if (own_trans) {
trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 3);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
break;
}
}
ret = btrfs_reserve_extent(trans, root, num_bytes, min_size,
0, *alloc_hint, &ins, 1);
if (ret) {
if (own_trans)
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
break;
}
ret = insert_reserved_file_extent(trans, inode,
cur_offset, ins.objectid,
ins.offset, ins.offset,
ins.offset, 0, 0, 0,
BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_PREALLOC);
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
if (own_trans)
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
break;
}
btrfs_drop_extent_cache(inode, cur_offset,
cur_offset + ins.offset -1, 0);
em = alloc_extent_map();
if (!em) {
set_bit(BTRFS_INODE_NEEDS_FULL_SYNC,
&BTRFS_I(inode)->runtime_flags);
goto next;
}
em->start = cur_offset;
em->orig_start = cur_offset;
em->len = ins.offset;
em->block_start = ins.objectid;
em->block_len = ins.offset;
em->orig_block_len = ins.offset;
em->bdev = root->fs_info->fs_devices->latest_bdev;
set_bit(EXTENT_FLAG_PREALLOC, &em->flags);
em->generation = trans->transid;
while (1) {
write_lock(&em_tree->lock);
ret = add_extent_mapping(em_tree, em);
if (!ret)
list_move(&em->list,
&em_tree->modified_extents);
write_unlock(&em_tree->lock);
if (ret != -EEXIST)
break;
btrfs_drop_extent_cache(inode, cur_offset,
cur_offset + ins.offset - 1,
0);
}
free_extent_map(em);
next:
num_bytes -= ins.offset;
cur_offset += ins.offset;
*alloc_hint = ins.objectid + ins.offset;
inode_inc_iversion(inode);
inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
BTRFS_I(inode)->flags |= BTRFS_INODE_PREALLOC;
if (!(mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE) &&
(actual_len > inode->i_size) &&
(cur_offset > inode->i_size)) {
if (cur_offset > actual_len)
i_size = actual_len;
else
i_size = cur_offset;
i_size_write(inode, i_size);
btrfs_ordered_update_i_size(inode, i_size, NULL);
}
ret = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, inode);
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
if (own_trans)
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
break;
}
if (own_trans)
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void staticLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, TestObjectPython::staticLongAttribute());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CommandBufferProxy* GpuChannelHost::CreateViewCommandBuffer(
int32 surface_id,
CommandBufferProxy* share_group,
const std::string& allowed_extensions,
const std::vector<int32>& attribs,
const GURL& active_url,
gfx::GpuPreference gpu_preference) {
#if defined(ENABLE_GPU)
AutoLock lock(context_lock_);
if (!channel_.get())
return NULL;
GPUCreateCommandBufferConfig init_params;
init_params.share_group_id =
share_group ? share_group->GetRouteID() : MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
init_params.allowed_extensions = allowed_extensions;
init_params.attribs = attribs;
init_params.active_url = active_url;
init_params.gpu_preference = gpu_preference;
int32 route_id = factory_->CreateViewCommandBuffer(surface_id, init_params);
if (route_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE)
return NULL;
CommandBufferProxyImpl* command_buffer =
new CommandBufferProxyImpl(this, route_id);
AddRoute(route_id, command_buffer->AsWeakPtr());
proxies_[route_id] = command_buffer;
return command_buffer;
#else
return NULL;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,753 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ImportBGRQuantum(const Image *image,QuantumInfo *quantum_info,
const MagickSizeType number_pixels,const unsigned char *magick_restrict p,
Quantum *magick_restrict q,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
bit;
unsigned int
pixel;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
switch (quantum_info->depth)
{
case 8:
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 10:
{
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 22) & 0x3ff,range),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 12) & 0x3ff,range),
q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 2) & 0x3ff,range),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
if (quantum_info->quantum == 32U)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumLongPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumLongPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumLongPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 12:
{
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
{
unsigned short
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) (3*number_pixels-1); x+=2)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
switch (x % 3)
{
default:
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (pixel >> 4),
range),q);
break;
}
case 1:
{
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (pixel >> 4),
range),q);
break;
}
case 2:
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (pixel >> 4),
range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
break;
}
}
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
switch ((x+1) % 3)
{
default:
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (pixel >> 4),
range),q);
break;
}
case 1:
{
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (pixel >> 4),
range),q);
break;
}
case 2:
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (pixel >> 4),
range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
break;
}
}
p+=quantum_info->pad;
}
for (bit=0; bit < (ssize_t) (3*number_pixels % 2); bit++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
switch ((x+bit) % 3)
{
default:
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (pixel >> 4),
range),q);
break;
}
case 1:
{
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (pixel >> 4),
range),q);
break;
}
case 2:
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (pixel >> 4),
range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
break;
}
}
p+=quantum_info->pad;
}
if (bit != 0)
p++;
break;
}
if (quantum_info->quantum == 32U)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumLongPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumLongPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumLongPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
pixel;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
unsigned int
pixel;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
float
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 64:
{
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
double
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
default:
{
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/129
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 71,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cdrom_update_settings(void)
{
struct cdrom_device_info *cdi;
mutex_lock(&cdrom_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(cdi, &cdrom_list, list) {
if (autoclose && CDROM_CAN(CDC_CLOSE_TRAY))
cdi->options |= CDO_AUTO_CLOSE;
else if (!autoclose)
cdi->options &= ~CDO_AUTO_CLOSE;
if (autoeject && CDROM_CAN(CDC_OPEN_TRAY))
cdi->options |= CDO_AUTO_EJECT;
else if (!autoeject)
cdi->options &= ~CDO_AUTO_EJECT;
if (lockdoor && CDROM_CAN(CDC_LOCK))
cdi->options |= CDO_LOCK;
else if (!lockdoor)
cdi->options &= ~CDO_LOCK;
if (check_media_type)
cdi->options |= CDO_CHECK_TYPE;
else
cdi->options &= ~CDO_CHECK_TYPE;
}
mutex_unlock(&cdrom_mutex);
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 76,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int ext4_ext_space_root_idx(struct inode *inode, int check)
{
int size;
size = sizeof(EXT4_I(inode)->i_data);
size -= sizeof(struct ext4_extent_header);
size /= sizeof(struct ext4_extent_idx);
#ifdef AGGRESSIVE_TEST
if (!check && size > 4)
size = 4;
#endif
return size;
}
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,582 |
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