instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mktime_z (timezone_t tz, struct tm *tm)
{
if (!tz)
return timegm (tm);
else
{
timezone_t old_tz = set_tz (tz);
if (old_tz)
{
time_t t = mktime (tm);
#if HAVE_TM_ZONE || HAVE_TZNAME
time_t badtime = -1;
struct tm tm_1;
if ((t != badtime
|| (localtime_r (&t, &tm_1) && equal_tm (tm, &tm_1)))
&& !save_abbr (tz, tm))
t = badtime;
#endif
if (revert_tz (old_tz))
return t;
}
return -1;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ossl_init_thread_start(uint64_t opts)
{
struct thread_local_inits_st *locals;
if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL))
return 0;
locals = ossl_init_get_thread_local(1);
if (locals == NULL)
return 0;
if (opts & OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_ASYNC) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_thread_start: "
"marking thread for async\n");
#endif
locals->async = 1;
}
if (opts & OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_ERR_STATE) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_thread_start: "
"marking thread for err_state\n");
#endif
locals->err_state = 1;
}
if (opts & OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_thread_start: "
"marking thread for rand\n");
#endif
locals->rand = 1;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330 | 0 | 12,019 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xfrm_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct nlattr *attrs[XFRMA_MAX+1];
const struct xfrm_link *link;
int type, err;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (in_compat_syscall())
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
if (type > XFRM_MSG_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
type -= XFRM_MSG_BASE;
link = &xfrm_dispatch[type];
/* All operations require privileges, even GET */
if (!netlink_net_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if ((type == (XFRM_MSG_GETSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE) ||
type == (XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY - XFRM_MSG_BASE)) &&
(nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP)) {
if (link->dump == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
{
struct netlink_dump_control c = {
.dump = link->dump,
.done = link->done,
};
return netlink_dump_start(net->xfrm.nlsk, skb, nlh, &c);
}
}
err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, xfrm_msg_min[type], attrs,
link->nla_max ? : XFRMA_MAX,
link->nla_pol ? : xfrma_policy);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (link->doit == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
return link->doit(skb, nlh, attrs);
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE incoming ESN size harder
Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to
wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN
structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported
by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same.
CVE-2017-7184
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 67,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sp<MetaData> OggSource::getFormat() {
return mExtractor->mImpl->getFormat();
}
Commit Message: Fix memory leak in OggExtractor
Test: added a temporal log and run poc
Bug: 63581671
Change-Id: I436a08e54d5e831f9fbdb33c26d15397ce1fbeba
(cherry picked from commit 63079e7c8e12cda4eb124fbe565213d30b9ea34c)
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 162,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvm_guest_time_update(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
{
unsigned long flags, this_tsc_khz;
struct kvm_vcpu_arch *vcpu = &v->arch;
struct kvm_arch *ka = &v->kvm->arch;
s64 kernel_ns, max_kernel_ns;
u64 tsc_timestamp, host_tsc;
struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info guest_hv_clock;
u8 pvclock_flags;
bool use_master_clock;
kernel_ns = 0;
host_tsc = 0;
/*
* If the host uses TSC clock, then passthrough TSC as stable
* to the guest.
*/
spin_lock(&ka->pvclock_gtod_sync_lock);
use_master_clock = ka->use_master_clock;
if (use_master_clock) {
host_tsc = ka->master_cycle_now;
kernel_ns = ka->master_kernel_ns;
}
spin_unlock(&ka->pvclock_gtod_sync_lock);
/* Keep irq disabled to prevent changes to the clock */
local_irq_save(flags);
this_tsc_khz = __get_cpu_var(cpu_tsc_khz);
if (unlikely(this_tsc_khz == 0)) {
local_irq_restore(flags);
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, v);
return 1;
}
if (!use_master_clock) {
host_tsc = native_read_tsc();
kernel_ns = get_kernel_ns();
}
tsc_timestamp = kvm_x86_ops->read_l1_tsc(v, host_tsc);
/*
* We may have to catch up the TSC to match elapsed wall clock
* time for two reasons, even if kvmclock is used.
* 1) CPU could have been running below the maximum TSC rate
* 2) Broken TSC compensation resets the base at each VCPU
* entry to avoid unknown leaps of TSC even when running
* again on the same CPU. This may cause apparent elapsed
* time to disappear, and the guest to stand still or run
* very slowly.
*/
if (vcpu->tsc_catchup) {
u64 tsc = compute_guest_tsc(v, kernel_ns);
if (tsc > tsc_timestamp) {
adjust_tsc_offset_guest(v, tsc - tsc_timestamp);
tsc_timestamp = tsc;
}
}
local_irq_restore(flags);
if (!vcpu->pv_time_enabled)
return 0;
/*
* Time as measured by the TSC may go backwards when resetting the base
* tsc_timestamp. The reason for this is that the TSC resolution is
* higher than the resolution of the other clock scales. Thus, many
* possible measurments of the TSC correspond to one measurement of any
* other clock, and so a spread of values is possible. This is not a
* problem for the computation of the nanosecond clock; with TSC rates
* around 1GHZ, there can only be a few cycles which correspond to one
* nanosecond value, and any path through this code will inevitably
* take longer than that. However, with the kernel_ns value itself,
* the precision may be much lower, down to HZ granularity. If the
* first sampling of TSC against kernel_ns ends in the low part of the
* range, and the second in the high end of the range, we can get:
*
* (TSC - offset_low) * S + kns_old > (TSC - offset_high) * S + kns_new
*
* As the sampling errors potentially range in the thousands of cycles,
* it is possible such a time value has already been observed by the
* guest. To protect against this, we must compute the system time as
* observed by the guest and ensure the new system time is greater.
*/
max_kernel_ns = 0;
if (vcpu->hv_clock.tsc_timestamp) {
max_kernel_ns = vcpu->last_guest_tsc -
vcpu->hv_clock.tsc_timestamp;
max_kernel_ns = pvclock_scale_delta(max_kernel_ns,
vcpu->hv_clock.tsc_to_system_mul,
vcpu->hv_clock.tsc_shift);
max_kernel_ns += vcpu->last_kernel_ns;
}
if (unlikely(vcpu->hw_tsc_khz != this_tsc_khz)) {
kvm_get_time_scale(NSEC_PER_SEC / 1000, this_tsc_khz,
&vcpu->hv_clock.tsc_shift,
&vcpu->hv_clock.tsc_to_system_mul);
vcpu->hw_tsc_khz = this_tsc_khz;
}
/* with a master <monotonic time, tsc value> tuple,
* pvclock clock reads always increase at the (scaled) rate
* of guest TSC - no need to deal with sampling errors.
*/
if (!use_master_clock) {
if (max_kernel_ns > kernel_ns)
kernel_ns = max_kernel_ns;
}
/* With all the info we got, fill in the values */
vcpu->hv_clock.tsc_timestamp = tsc_timestamp;
vcpu->hv_clock.system_time = kernel_ns + v->kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset;
vcpu->last_kernel_ns = kernel_ns;
vcpu->last_guest_tsc = tsc_timestamp;
/*
* The interface expects us to write an even number signaling that the
* update is finished. Since the guest won't see the intermediate
* state, we just increase by 2 at the end.
*/
vcpu->hv_clock.version += 2;
if (unlikely(kvm_read_guest_cached(v->kvm, &vcpu->pv_time,
&guest_hv_clock, sizeof(guest_hv_clock))))
return 0;
/* retain PVCLOCK_GUEST_STOPPED if set in guest copy */
pvclock_flags = (guest_hv_clock.flags & PVCLOCK_GUEST_STOPPED);
if (vcpu->pvclock_set_guest_stopped_request) {
pvclock_flags |= PVCLOCK_GUEST_STOPPED;
vcpu->pvclock_set_guest_stopped_request = false;
}
/* If the host uses TSC clocksource, then it is stable */
if (use_master_clock)
pvclock_flags |= PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT;
vcpu->hv_clock.flags = pvclock_flags;
kvm_write_guest_cached(v->kvm, &vcpu->pv_time,
&vcpu->hv_clock,
sizeof(vcpu->hv_clock));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::dispatchVisibilityStateChangeEvent()
{
dispatchEvent(Event::create(EventTypeNames::webkitvisibilitychange));
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: processInternalEntity(XML_Parser parser, ENTITY *entity, XML_Bool betweenDecl) {
const char *textStart, *textEnd;
const char *next;
enum XML_Error result;
OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY *openEntity;
if (parser->m_freeInternalEntities) {
openEntity = parser->m_freeInternalEntities;
parser->m_freeInternalEntities = openEntity->next;
} else {
openEntity
= (OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY *)MALLOC(parser, sizeof(OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY));
if (! openEntity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
entity->open = XML_TRUE;
entity->processed = 0;
openEntity->next = parser->m_openInternalEntities;
parser->m_openInternalEntities = openEntity;
openEntity->entity = entity;
openEntity->startTagLevel = parser->m_tagLevel;
openEntity->betweenDecl = betweenDecl;
openEntity->internalEventPtr = NULL;
openEntity->internalEventEndPtr = NULL;
textStart = (char *)entity->textPtr;
textEnd = (char *)(entity->textPtr + entity->textLen);
/* Set a safe default value in case 'next' does not get set */
next = textStart;
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (entity->is_param) {
int tok
= XmlPrologTok(parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd, &next);
result = doProlog(parser, parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd,
tok, next, &next, XML_FALSE);
} else
#endif /* XML_DTD */
result = doContent(parser, parser->m_tagLevel, parser->m_internalEncoding,
textStart, textEnd, &next, XML_FALSE);
if (result == XML_ERROR_NONE) {
if (textEnd != next && parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_SUSPENDED) {
entity->processed = (int)(next - textStart);
parser->m_processor = internalEntityProcessor;
} else {
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_openInternalEntities = openEntity->next;
/* put openEntity back in list of free instances */
openEntity->next = parser->m_freeInternalEntities;
parser->m_freeInternalEntities = openEntity;
}
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 1 | 169,532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
unsigned long debugctlmsr, cr3, cr4;
/* Don't enter VMX if guest state is invalid, let the exit handler
start emulation until we arrive back to a valid state */
if (vmx->emulation_required)
return;
if (vmx->ple_window_dirty) {
vmx->ple_window_dirty = false;
vmcs_write32(PLE_WINDOW, vmx->ple_window);
}
if (vmx->nested.sync_shadow_vmcs) {
copy_vmcs12_to_shadow(vmx);
vmx->nested.sync_shadow_vmcs = false;
}
if (test_bit(VCPU_REGS_RSP, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_dirty))
vmcs_writel(GUEST_RSP, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP]);
if (test_bit(VCPU_REGS_RIP, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_dirty))
vmcs_writel(GUEST_RIP, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP]);
cr3 = __get_current_cr3_fast();
if (unlikely(cr3 != vmx->host_state.vmcs_host_cr3)) {
vmcs_writel(HOST_CR3, cr3);
vmx->host_state.vmcs_host_cr3 = cr3;
}
cr4 = cr4_read_shadow();
if (unlikely(cr4 != vmx->host_state.vmcs_host_cr4)) {
vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, cr4);
vmx->host_state.vmcs_host_cr4 = cr4;
}
/* When single-stepping over STI and MOV SS, we must clear the
* corresponding interruptibility bits in the guest state. Otherwise
* vmentry fails as it then expects bit 14 (BS) in pending debug
* exceptions being set, but that's not correct for the guest debugging
* case. */
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP)
vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE) &&
vcpu->arch.pkru != vmx->host_pkru)
__write_pkru(vcpu->arch.pkru);
atomic_switch_perf_msrs(vmx);
debugctlmsr = get_debugctlmsr();
vmx_arm_hv_timer(vcpu);
vmx->__launched = vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched;
asm(
/* Store host registers */
"push %%" _ASM_DX "; push %%" _ASM_BP ";"
"push %%" _ASM_CX " \n\t" /* placeholder for guest rcx */
"push %%" _ASM_CX " \n\t"
"cmp %%" _ASM_SP ", %c[host_rsp](%0) \n\t"
"je 1f \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_SP ", %c[host_rsp](%0) \n\t"
__ex(ASM_VMX_VMWRITE_RSP_RDX) "\n\t"
"1: \n\t"
/* Reload cr2 if changed */
"mov %c[cr2](%0), %%" _ASM_AX " \n\t"
"mov %%cr2, %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
"cmp %%" _ASM_AX ", %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
"je 2f \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_AX", %%cr2 \n\t"
"2: \n\t"
/* Check if vmlaunch of vmresume is needed */
"cmpl $0, %c[launched](%0) \n\t"
/* Load guest registers. Don't clobber flags. */
"mov %c[rax](%0), %%" _ASM_AX " \n\t"
"mov %c[rbx](%0), %%" _ASM_BX " \n\t"
"mov %c[rdx](%0), %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
"mov %c[rsi](%0), %%" _ASM_SI " \n\t"
"mov %c[rdi](%0), %%" _ASM_DI " \n\t"
"mov %c[rbp](%0), %%" _ASM_BP " \n\t"
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
"mov %c[r8](%0), %%r8 \n\t"
"mov %c[r9](%0), %%r9 \n\t"
"mov %c[r10](%0), %%r10 \n\t"
"mov %c[r11](%0), %%r11 \n\t"
"mov %c[r12](%0), %%r12 \n\t"
"mov %c[r13](%0), %%r13 \n\t"
"mov %c[r14](%0), %%r14 \n\t"
"mov %c[r15](%0), %%r15 \n\t"
#endif
"mov %c[rcx](%0), %%" _ASM_CX " \n\t" /* kills %0 (ecx) */
/* Enter guest mode */
"jne 1f \n\t"
__ex(ASM_VMX_VMLAUNCH) "\n\t"
"jmp 2f \n\t"
"1: " __ex(ASM_VMX_VMRESUME) "\n\t"
"2: "
/* Save guest registers, load host registers, keep flags */
"mov %0, %c[wordsize](%%" _ASM_SP ") \n\t"
"pop %0 \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_AX ", %c[rax](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_BX ", %c[rbx](%0) \n\t"
__ASM_SIZE(pop) " %c[rcx](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_DX ", %c[rdx](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_SI ", %c[rsi](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_DI ", %c[rdi](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_BP ", %c[rbp](%0) \n\t"
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
"mov %%r8, %c[r8](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r9, %c[r9](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r10, %c[r10](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r11, %c[r11](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r12, %c[r12](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r13, %c[r13](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r14, %c[r14](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r15, %c[r15](%0) \n\t"
#endif
"mov %%cr2, %%" _ASM_AX " \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_AX ", %c[cr2](%0) \n\t"
"pop %%" _ASM_BP "; pop %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
"setbe %c[fail](%0) \n\t"
".pushsection .rodata \n\t"
".global vmx_return \n\t"
"vmx_return: " _ASM_PTR " 2b \n\t"
".popsection"
: : "c"(vmx), "d"((unsigned long)HOST_RSP),
[launched]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, __launched)),
[fail]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, fail)),
[host_rsp]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, host_rsp)),
[rax]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX])),
[rbx]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX])),
[rcx]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX])),
[rdx]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX])),
[rsi]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI])),
[rdi]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDI])),
[rbp]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBP])),
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
[r8]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R8])),
[r9]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R9])),
[r10]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R10])),
[r11]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R11])),
[r12]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R12])),
[r13]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R13])),
[r14]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R14])),
[r15]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R15])),
#endif
[cr2]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.cr2)),
[wordsize]"i"(sizeof(ulong))
: "cc", "memory"
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
, "rax", "rbx", "rdi", "rsi"
, "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11", "r12", "r13", "r14", "r15"
#else
, "eax", "ebx", "edi", "esi"
#endif
);
/* MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is zeroed on vmexit. Restore it if needed */
if (debugctlmsr)
update_debugctlmsr(debugctlmsr);
#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* The sysexit path does not restore ds/es, so we must set them to
* a reasonable value ourselves.
*
* We can't defer this to vmx_load_host_state() since that function
* may be executed in interrupt context, which saves and restore segments
* around it, nullifying its effect.
*/
loadsegment(ds, __USER_DS);
loadsegment(es, __USER_DS);
#endif
vcpu->arch.regs_avail = ~((1 << VCPU_REGS_RIP) | (1 << VCPU_REGS_RSP)
| (1 << VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS)
| (1 << VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR)
| (1 << VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS)
| (1 << VCPU_EXREG_CR3));
vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = 0;
vmx->idt_vectoring_info = vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD);
vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched = 1;
vmx->exit_reason = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON);
/*
* eager fpu is enabled if PKEY is supported and CR4 is switched
* back on host, so it is safe to read guest PKRU from current
* XSAVE.
*/
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE)) {
vcpu->arch.pkru = __read_pkru();
if (vcpu->arch.pkru != vmx->host_pkru)
__write_pkru(vmx->host_pkru);
}
/*
* the KVM_REQ_EVENT optimization bit is only on for one entry, and if
* we did not inject a still-pending event to L1 now because of
* nested_run_pending, we need to re-enable this bit.
*/
if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
vmx_complete_atomic_exit(vmx);
vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(vmx);
vmx_complete_interrupts(vmx);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 63,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void crypto_ccm_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq,
int err)
{
struct aead_request *req = areq->data;
struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx *pctx = crypto_ccm_reqctx(req);
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
unsigned int authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(aead);
unsigned int cryptlen = req->cryptlen - authsize;
if (!err) {
err = crypto_ccm_auth(req, req->dst, cryptlen);
if (!err && crypto_memneq(pctx->auth_tag, pctx->odata, authsize))
err = -EBADMSG;
}
aead_request_complete(req, err);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Camera3Device::RequestThread::clearRepeatingRequests(/*out*/int64_t *lastFrameNumber) {
Mutex::Autolock l(mRequestLock);
mRepeatingRequests.clear();
if (lastFrameNumber != NULL) {
*lastFrameNumber = mRepeatingLastFrameNumber;
}
mRepeatingLastFrameNumber = NO_IN_FLIGHT_REPEATING_FRAMES;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,029 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: poly_npoints(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
POLYGON *poly = PG_GETARG_POLYGON_P(0);
PG_RETURN_INT32(poly->npts);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 39,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int build_udp_headers(conn *c) {
int i;
unsigned char *hdr;
assert(c != NULL);
if (c->msgused > c->hdrsize) {
void *new_hdrbuf;
if (c->hdrbuf) {
new_hdrbuf = realloc(c->hdrbuf, c->msgused * 2 * UDP_HEADER_SIZE);
} else {
new_hdrbuf = malloc(c->msgused * 2 * UDP_HEADER_SIZE);
}
if (! new_hdrbuf) {
STATS_LOCK();
stats.malloc_fails++;
STATS_UNLOCK();
return -1;
}
c->hdrbuf = (unsigned char *)new_hdrbuf;
c->hdrsize = c->msgused * 2;
}
hdr = c->hdrbuf;
for (i = 0; i < c->msgused; i++) {
c->msglist[i].msg_iov[0].iov_base = (void*)hdr;
c->msglist[i].msg_iov[0].iov_len = UDP_HEADER_SIZE;
*hdr++ = c->request_id / 256;
*hdr++ = c->request_id % 256;
*hdr++ = i / 256;
*hdr++ = i % 256;
*hdr++ = c->msgused / 256;
*hdr++ = c->msgused % 256;
*hdr++ = 0;
*hdr++ = 0;
assert((void *) hdr == (caddr_t)c->msglist[i].msg_iov[0].iov_base + UDP_HEADER_SIZE);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 75,153 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::ExecuteCommand(int id) {
ExecuteCommandWithDisposition(id, CURRENT_TAB);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,195 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_xdr_dec_setclientid(struct rpc_rqst *req, __be32 *p,
struct nfs_client *clp)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr;
int status;
xdr_init_decode(&xdr, &req->rq_rcv_buf, p);
status = decode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr);
if (!status)
status = decode_setclientid(&xdr, clp);
if (!status)
status = nfs4_stat_to_errno(hdr.status);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,125 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data[0];
struct encrypted_key_payload *new_epayload;
char *buf;
char *new_master_desc = NULL;
const char *format = NULL;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
int ret = 0;
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
return -ENOKEY;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
return -EINVAL;
buf = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
buf[datalen] = 0;
memcpy(buf, prep->data, datalen);
ret = datablob_parse(buf, &format, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = valid_master_desc(new_master_desc, epayload->master_desc);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
new_epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, epayload->format,
new_master_desc, epayload->datalen);
if (IS_ERR(new_epayload)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(new_epayload);
goto out;
}
__ekey_init(new_epayload, epayload->format, new_master_desc,
epayload->datalen);
memcpy(new_epayload->iv, epayload->iv, ivsize);
memcpy(new_epayload->payload_data, epayload->payload_data,
epayload->payload_datalen);
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_epayload);
call_rcu(&epayload->rcu, encrypted_rcu_free);
out:
kzfree(buf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 167,694 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::TabDetachedAt(TabContentsWrapper* contents, int index) {
TabDetachedAtImpl(contents, index, DETACH_TYPE_DETACH);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void activityLoggedAttrSetter2AttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::activityLoggedAttrSetter2AttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderView::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
WebFrame* main_frame = webview() ? webview()->mainFrame() : NULL;
if (main_frame)
content::GetContentClient()->SetActiveURL(main_frame->document().url());
ObserverListBase<RenderViewObserver>::Iterator it(observers_);
RenderViewObserver* observer;
while ((observer = it.GetNext()) != NULL)
if (observer->OnMessageReceived(message))
return true;
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(RenderView, message)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Navigate, OnNavigate)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Stop, OnStop)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ReloadFrame, OnReloadFrame)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Undo, OnUndo)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Redo, OnRedo)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Cut, OnCut)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Copy, OnCopy)
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_CopyToFindPboard, OnCopyToFindPboard)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Paste, OnPaste)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Replace, OnReplace)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Delete, OnDelete)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SelectAll, OnSelectAll)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_CopyImageAt, OnCopyImageAt)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ExecuteEditCommand, OnExecuteEditCommand)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Find, OnFind)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_StopFinding, OnStopFinding)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_FindReplyACK, OnFindReplyAck)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Zoom, OnZoom)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetZoomLevel, OnSetZoomLevel)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetZoomLevelForLoadingURL,
OnSetZoomLevelForLoadingURL)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetPageEncoding, OnSetPageEncoding)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ResetPageEncodingToDefault,
OnResetPageEncodingToDefault)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ScriptEvalRequest, OnScriptEvalRequest)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_CSSInsertRequest, OnCSSInsertRequest)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ReservePageIDRange, OnReservePageIDRange)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_TargetDragEnter, OnDragTargetDragEnter)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_TargetDragOver, OnDragTargetDragOver)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_TargetDragLeave, OnDragTargetDragLeave)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_TargetDrop, OnDragTargetDrop)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_SourceEndedOrMoved, OnDragSourceEndedOrMoved)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_SourceSystemDragEnded,
OnDragSourceSystemDragEnded)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_AllowBindings, OnAllowBindings)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetWebUIProperty, OnSetWebUIProperty)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetInitialFocus, OnSetInitialFocus)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ScrollFocusedEditableNodeIntoView,
OnScrollFocusedEditableNodeIntoView)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_UpdateTargetURL_ACK, OnUpdateTargetURLAck)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_UpdateWebPreferences, OnUpdateWebPreferences)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetAltErrorPageURL, OnSetAltErrorPageURL)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_InstallMissingPlugin, OnInstallMissingPlugin)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_EnumerateDirectoryResponse,
OnEnumerateDirectoryResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_RunFileChooserResponse, OnFileChooserResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ShouldClose, OnShouldClose)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SwapOut, OnSwapOut)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ClosePage, OnClosePage)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ThemeChanged, OnThemeChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_DisassociateFromPopupCount,
OnDisassociateFromPopupCount)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_MoveOrResizeStarted, OnMoveOrResizeStarted)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ClearFocusedNode, OnClearFocusedNode)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetBackground, OnSetBackground)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_EnablePreferredSizeChangedMode,
OnEnablePreferredSizeChangedMode)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_DisableScrollbarsForSmallWindows,
OnDisableScrollbarsForSmallWindows)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetRendererPrefs, OnSetRendererPrefs)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_MediaPlayerActionAt, OnMediaPlayerActionAt)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetActive, OnSetActive)
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetWindowVisibility, OnSetWindowVisibility)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_WindowFrameChanged, OnWindowFrameChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_PluginImeCompositionCompleted,
OnPluginImeCompositionCompleted)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetEditCommandsForNextKeyEvent,
OnSetEditCommandsForNextKeyEvent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_CustomContextMenuAction,
OnCustomContextMenuAction)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_EnableAccessibility, OnEnableAccessibility)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetAccessibilityFocus, OnSetAccessibilityFocus)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_AccessibilityDoDefaultAction,
OnAccessibilityDoDefaultAction)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_AccessibilityNotifications_ACK,
OnAccessibilityNotificationsAck)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_AsyncOpenFile_ACK, OnAsyncFileOpened)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_PpapiBrokerChannelCreated,
OnPpapiBrokerChannelCreated)
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SelectPopupMenuItem, OnSelectPopupMenuItem)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ContextMenuClosed, OnContextMenuClosed)
#if defined(ENABLE_FLAPPER_HACKS)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PepperMsg_ConnectTcpACK, OnConnectTcpACK)
#endif
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetInLiveResize, OnSetInLiveResize)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = RenderWidget::OnMessageReceived(message))
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Round_Super( EXEC_OP_ FT_F26Dot6 distance,
FT_F26Dot6 compensation )
{
FT_F26Dot6 val;
if ( distance >= 0 )
{
val = ( distance - CUR.phase + CUR.threshold + compensation ) &
-CUR.period;
if ( distance && val < 0 )
val = 0;
val += CUR.phase;
}
else
{
val = -( ( CUR.threshold - CUR.phase - distance + compensation ) &
-CUR.period );
if ( val > 0 )
val = 0;
val -= CUR.phase;
}
return val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,207 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool LayerTreeHost::IsVisible() const {
return visible_;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageStringUp (gdImagePtr im, gdFontPtr f,
int x, int y, unsigned char *s, int color)
{
int i;
int l;
l = strlen ((char *) s);
for (i = 0; (i < l); i++) {
gdImageCharUp (im, f, x, y, s[i], color);
y -= f->w;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 73,092 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStrip::DoLayout() {
last_layout_size_ = size();
StopAnimating(false);
SwapLayoutIfNecessary();
if (touch_layout_)
touch_layout_->SetWidth(GetTabAreaWidth());
UpdateIdealBounds();
views::ViewModelUtils::SetViewBoundsToIdealBounds(tabs_);
SetTabVisibility();
SchedulePaint();
bounds_animator_.StopAnimatingView(new_tab_button_);
new_tab_button_->SetBoundsRect(new_tab_button_bounds_);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::NeedsLayoutTreeUpdateForNode(const Node& node,
bool ignore_adjacent_style) const {
if (!node.CanParticipateInFlatTree())
return false;
if (!NeedsLayoutTreeUpdate())
return false;
if (!node.isConnected())
return false;
if (NeedsFullLayoutTreeUpdate() || node.NeedsStyleRecalc() ||
node.NeedsStyleInvalidation())
return true;
for (const ContainerNode* ancestor = LayoutTreeBuilderTraversal::Parent(node);
ancestor; ancestor = LayoutTreeBuilderTraversal::Parent(*ancestor)) {
if (ShadowRoot* root = ancestor->GetShadowRoot()) {
if (root->NeedsStyleRecalc() || root->NeedsStyleInvalidation() ||
root->NeedsAdjacentStyleRecalc()) {
return true;
}
}
if (ancestor->NeedsStyleRecalc() || ancestor->NeedsStyleInvalidation() ||
(ancestor->NeedsAdjacentStyleRecalc() && !ignore_adjacent_style)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void CL_SetServerInfo( serverInfo_t *server, const char *info, int ping ) {
if ( server ) {
if ( info ) {
server->clients = atoi( Info_ValueForKey( info, "clients" ) );
Q_strncpyz( server->hostName,Info_ValueForKey( info, "hostname" ), MAX_NAME_LENGTH );
Q_strncpyz( server->mapName, Info_ValueForKey( info, "mapname" ), MAX_NAME_LENGTH );
server->maxClients = atoi( Info_ValueForKey( info, "sv_maxclients" ) );
Q_strncpyz( server->game,Info_ValueForKey( info, "game" ), MAX_NAME_LENGTH );
server->gameType = atoi( Info_ValueForKey( info, "gametype" ) );
server->netType = atoi( Info_ValueForKey( info, "nettype" ) );
server->minPing = atoi( Info_ValueForKey( info, "minping" ) );
server->maxPing = atoi( Info_ValueForKey( info, "maxping" ) );
server->allowAnonymous = atoi( Info_ValueForKey( info, "sv_allowAnonymous" ) );
server->friendlyFire = atoi( Info_ValueForKey( info, "friendlyFire" ) ); // NERVE - SMF
server->maxlives = atoi( Info_ValueForKey( info, "maxlives" ) ); // NERVE - SMF
server->tourney = atoi( Info_ValueForKey( info, "tourney" ) ); // NERVE - SMF
server->punkbuster = atoi( Info_ValueForKey( info, "punkbuster" ) ); // DHM - Nerve
Q_strncpyz( server->gameName, Info_ValueForKey( info, "gamename" ), MAX_NAME_LENGTH ); // Arnout
server->antilag = atoi( Info_ValueForKey( info, "g_antilag" ) );
server->g_humanplayers = atoi( Info_ValueForKey( info, "g_humanplayers" ) );
server->g_needpass = atoi( Info_ValueForKey( info, "g_needpass" ) );
}
server->ping = ping;
}
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(strpos)
{
zval *needle;
zend_string *haystack;
char *found = NULL;
char needle_char[2];
zend_long offset = 0;
#ifndef FAST_ZPP
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "Sz|l", &haystack, &needle, &offset) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
#else
ZEND_PARSE_PARAMETERS_START(2, 3)
Z_PARAM_STR(haystack)
Z_PARAM_ZVAL(needle)
Z_PARAM_OPTIONAL
Z_PARAM_LONG(offset)
ZEND_PARSE_PARAMETERS_END();
#endif
if (offset < 0 || (size_t)offset > ZSTR_LEN(haystack)) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Offset not contained in string");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(needle) == IS_STRING) {
if (!Z_STRLEN_P(needle)) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Empty needle");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
found = (char*)php_memnstr(ZSTR_VAL(haystack) + offset,
Z_STRVAL_P(needle),
Z_STRLEN_P(needle),
ZSTR_VAL(haystack) + ZSTR_LEN(haystack));
} else {
if (php_needle_char(needle, needle_char) != SUCCESS) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
needle_char[1] = 0;
found = (char*)php_memnstr(ZSTR_VAL(haystack) + offset,
needle_char,
1,
ZSTR_VAL(haystack) + ZSTR_LEN(haystack));
}
if (found) {
RETURN_LONG(found - ZSTR_VAL(haystack));
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 14,621 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::ReplaceableReadonlyLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_replaceableReadonlyLongAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::ReplaceableReadonlyLongAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,114 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ih264d_unpack_chroma_coeff4x4_mb(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
dec_mb_info_t * ps_cur_mb_info)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_type = ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type;
UWORD16 ui2_chroma_csbp = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_chroma_csbp;
UWORD8 *pu1_inv_scan = ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan;
WORD16 *pi2_coeff_data = ps_dec->pi2_coeff_data;
WORD32 i;
WORD16 *pi2_dc_val_u = NULL;
WORD16 *pi2_dc_val_v = NULL;
PROFILE_DISABLE_UNPACK_CHROMA()
if((ps_cur_mb_info->u1_cbp >> 4) == CBPC_ALLZERO)
return;
/*
* Reserve the pointers to dc vals. The dc vals will be copied
* after unpacking of ac vals since memset to 0 inside.
*/
if(CHECKBIT(ps_cur_mb_info->u1_yuv_dc_block_flag,1))
{
pi2_dc_val_u = (WORD16 *)ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = (void *)(pi2_dc_val_u + 4);
}
if(CHECKBIT(ps_cur_mb_info->u1_yuv_dc_block_flag,2))
{
pi2_dc_val_v = (WORD16 *)ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = (void *)(pi2_dc_val_v + 4);
}
if((ps_cur_mb_info->u1_cbp >> 4) == CBPC_NONZERO)
{
pi2_coeff_data = ps_dec->pi2_coeff_data;
ih264d_unpack_coeff4x4_8x8blk_chroma(ps_dec,
ps_cur_mb_info,
ui2_chroma_csbp,
pi2_coeff_data);
pi2_coeff_data += 64;
ui2_chroma_csbp = ui2_chroma_csbp >> 4;
ih264d_unpack_coeff4x4_8x8blk_chroma(ps_dec,
ps_cur_mb_info,
ui2_chroma_csbp,
pi2_coeff_data);
}
pi2_coeff_data = ps_dec->pi2_coeff_data;
if(pi2_dc_val_u != NULL)
{
pi2_coeff_data[0] = *pi2_dc_val_u++;
pi2_coeff_data[1 * 16] = *pi2_dc_val_u++;
pi2_coeff_data[2 * 16] = *pi2_dc_val_u++;
pi2_coeff_data[3 * 16] = *pi2_dc_val_u++;
}
else
{
pi2_coeff_data[0] = 0;
pi2_coeff_data[1 * 16] = 0;
pi2_coeff_data[2 * 16] = 0;
pi2_coeff_data[3 * 16] = 0;
}
pi2_coeff_data += 64;
if(pi2_dc_val_v != NULL)
{
pi2_coeff_data[0] = *pi2_dc_val_v++;
pi2_coeff_data[1 * 16] = *pi2_dc_val_v++;
pi2_coeff_data[2 * 16] = *pi2_dc_val_v++;
pi2_coeff_data[3 * 16] = *pi2_dc_val_v++;
}
else
{
pi2_coeff_data[0] = 0;
pi2_coeff_data[1 * 16] = 0;
pi2_coeff_data[2 * 16] = 0;
pi2_coeff_data[3 * 16] = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Fix for handling invalid intra mode
Bug: 28165659
Change-Id: I2291a287c27291695f4f3d6e753b6bbd7dfd9e42
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,387 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CreateWindowForRequest(const FrameLoadRequest& request,
LocalFrame& opener_frame,
NavigationPolicy policy) {
DCHECK(request.GetResourceRequest().RequestorOrigin() ||
(opener_frame.GetDocument() &&
opener_frame.GetDocument()->Url().IsEmpty()));
if (opener_frame.GetDocument()->PageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() !=
Document::kNoDismissal)
return;
if (opener_frame.GetDocument() &&
opener_frame.GetDocument()->IsSandboxed(kSandboxPopups))
return;
if (policy == kNavigationPolicyCurrentTab)
policy = kNavigationPolicyNewForegroundTab;
WebWindowFeatures features;
features.noopener = request.GetShouldSetOpener() == kNeverSetOpener;
bool created;
Frame* new_frame =
CreateWindowHelper(opener_frame, opener_frame, opener_frame, request,
features, policy, created);
if (!new_frame)
return;
if (request.GetShouldSendReferrer() == kMaybeSendReferrer) {
if (new_frame->IsLocalFrame())
ToLocalFrame(new_frame)->GetDocument()->SetReferrerPolicy(
opener_frame.GetDocument()->GetReferrerPolicy());
}
FrameLoadRequest new_request(nullptr, request.GetResourceRequest());
new_request.SetForm(request.Form());
if (new_frame->IsLocalFrame())
ToLocalFrame(new_frame)->Loader().StartNavigation(new_request);
}
Commit Message: Only allow downloading in response to real keyboard modifiers
BUG=848531
Change-Id: I97554c8d312243b55647f1376945aee32dbd95bf
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1082216
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564051}
CWE ID: | 0 | 154,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ppp_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct ppp_file *pf = file->private_data;
struct sk_buff *skb;
ssize_t ret;
if (!pf)
return -ENXIO;
ret = -ENOMEM;
skb = alloc_skb(count + pf->hdrlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb)
goto out;
skb_reserve(skb, pf->hdrlen);
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(skb_put(skb, count), buf, count)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto out;
}
skb_queue_tail(&pf->xq, skb);
switch (pf->kind) {
case INTERFACE:
ppp_xmit_process(PF_TO_PPP(pf));
break;
case CHANNEL:
ppp_channel_push(PF_TO_CHANNEL(pf));
break;
}
ret = count;
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ppp: take reference on channels netns
Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace.
Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their
userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they
can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from
under them.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at
addr ffff880064e217e0
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581
=============================================================================
BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906
[< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440
[< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469
[< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532
[< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574
[< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579
[< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597
[< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325
[< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360
[< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95
[< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150
[< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451
[< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274
[< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723
[< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832
[< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826
[< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631
[< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650
[< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805
[< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814
[< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341
[< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348
[< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448
[< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036
[< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170
[< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303
[< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000
flags=0x5fffc0000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200
CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300
ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054
ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654
[<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661
[< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138
[<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236
[< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293
[<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241
[<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000
[<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478
[<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744
[<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772
[<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901
[<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688
[<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115
[< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750
[<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123
[<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357
[<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550
[<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145
[<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880
[<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307
[< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113
[<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158
[<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712
[<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655
[<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165
[<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692
[< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099
[<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678
[< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807
[<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283
[<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282
[<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344
[<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 52,660 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL (const bson_t *a, const bson_t *b)
{
const uint8_t *data1 = bson_get_data (a);
const uint8_t *data2 = bson_get_data (b);
uint32_t i;
if (!bson_equal (a, b)) {
for (i = 0; i < BSON_MAX (a->len, b->len); i++) {
if (i >= a->len) {
printf ("a is too short len=%u\n", a->len);
abort ();
} else if (i >= b->len) {
printf ("b is too short len=%u\n", b->len);
abort ();
}
if (data1[i] != data2[i]) {
printf ("a[%u](0x%02x,%u) != b[%u](0x%02x,%u)\n",
i,
data1[i],
data1[i],
i,
data2[i],
data2[i]);
abort ();
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 77,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline pgprot_t __get_dma_pgprot(struct dma_attrs *attrs, pgprot_t prot)
{
prot = dma_get_attr(DMA_ATTR_WRITE_COMBINE, attrs) ?
pgprot_writecombine(prot) :
pgprot_dmacoherent(prot);
return prot;
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 58,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_dec_process_qcc(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_ms_t *ms)
{
jpc_qcc_t *qcc = &ms->parms.qcc;
jpc_dec_tile_t *tile;
if (JAS_CAST(int, qcc->compno) >= dec->numcomps) {
jas_eprintf("invalid component number in QCC marker segment\n");
return -1;
}
switch (dec->state) {
case JPC_MH:
jpc_dec_cp_setfromqcc(dec->cp, qcc);
break;
case JPC_TPH:
if (!(tile = dec->curtile)) {
return -1;
}
if (tile->partno > 0) {
return -1;
}
jpc_dec_cp_setfromqcc(tile->cp, qcc);
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 70,433 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetFakeTimeDeltaInHours(int hours) {
now_delta_ = base::TimeDelta::FromHours(hours);
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 113,547 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void security_md5_16_32_32(const BYTE* in0, const BYTE* in1, const BYTE* in2, BYTE* output)
{
CryptoMd5 md5;
md5 = crypto_md5_init();
crypto_md5_update(md5, in0, 16);
crypto_md5_update(md5, in1, 32);
crypto_md5_update(md5, in2, 32);
crypto_md5_final(md5, output);
}
Commit Message: security: add a NULL pointer check to fix a server crash.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 58,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionDevToolsInfoBarDelegate::~ExtensionDevToolsInfoBarDelegate() {}
Commit Message: Allow to specify elide behavior for confrim infobar message
Used in "<extension name> is debugging this browser" infobar.
Bug: 823194
Change-Id: Iff6627097c020cccca8f7cc3e21a803a41fd8f2c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1048064
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557245}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 154,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __net_exit void raw_exit_net(struct net *net)
{
proc_net_remove(net, "raw");
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,951 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int propagate_mnt(struct mount *dest_mnt, struct mountpoint *dest_mp,
struct mount *source_mnt, struct hlist_head *tree_list)
{
struct mount *m, *n;
int ret = 0;
/*
* we don't want to bother passing tons of arguments to
* propagate_one(); everything is serialized by namespace_sem,
* so globals will do just fine.
*/
user_ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns;
last_dest = dest_mnt;
first_source = source_mnt;
last_source = source_mnt;
mp = dest_mp;
list = tree_list;
dest_master = dest_mnt->mnt_master;
/* all peers of dest_mnt, except dest_mnt itself */
for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
/* all slave groups */
for (m = next_group(dest_mnt, dest_mnt); m;
m = next_group(m, dest_mnt)) {
/* everything in that slave group */
n = m;
do {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
n = next_peer(n);
} while (n != m);
}
out:
read_seqlock_excl(&mount_lock);
hlist_for_each_entry(n, tree_list, mnt_hash) {
m = n->mnt_parent;
if (m->mnt_master != dest_mnt->mnt_master)
CLEAR_MNT_MARK(m->mnt_master);
}
read_sequnlock_excl(&mount_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 50,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void destroy_flow_rule_vport_sq(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev,
struct mlx5_ib_sq *sq)
{
if (sq->flow_rule)
mlx5_del_flow_rules(sq->flow_rule);
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,096 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SVGImage::hasRelativeWidth() const
{
if (!m_page)
return false;
LocalFrame* frame = m_page->mainFrame();
SVGSVGElement* rootElement = toSVGDocument(frame->document())->rootElement();
if (!rootElement)
return false;
return rootElement->intrinsicWidth().isPercent();
}
Commit Message: Fix crash when resizing a view destroys the render tree
This is a simple fix for not holding a renderer across FrameView
resizes. Calling view->resize() can destroy renderers so this patch
updates SVGImage::setContainerSize to query the renderer after the
resize is complete. A similar issue does not exist for the dom tree
which is not destroyed.
BUG=344492
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/178043006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@168113 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool OnHostDomainPolicyUpdate(const std::string& host_domain) {
DCHECK(context_->network_task_runner()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!host_domain.empty() &&
!EndsWith(xmpp_login_, std::string("@") + host_domain, false)) {
Shutdown(kInvalidHostDomainExitCode);
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in CreateAuthenticatorFactory().
CreateAuthenticatorFactory() is called asynchronously, but it didn't handle
the case when it's called after host object is destroyed.
BUG=150644
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11090036
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161077 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::RepeatingCallback<void(Args...)> CreateSafeCallback(
SkiaOutputSurfaceDependency* dependency,
const base::RepeatingCallback<void(Args...)>& callback) {
DCHECK(dependency);
return base::BindRepeating(&PostAsyncTask<Args...>, dependency, callback);
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 135,955 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: e1000e_rx_use_ps_descriptor(E1000ECore *core)
{
return !e1000e_rx_use_legacy_descriptor(core) &&
(core->mac[RCTL] & E1000_RCTL_DTYP_PS);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 6,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::GetWindowSnapshot(const WindowSnapshotCallback& callback) {
int id = next_snapshot_id_++;
pending_snapshots_.insert(std::make_pair(id, callback));
Send(new ViewHostMsg_GetWindowSnapshot(routing_id_, id));
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,519 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ring_buffer_record_is_on(struct ring_buffer *buffer)
{
return !atomic_read(&buffer->record_disabled);
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataCache::UnpinOnUIThread(const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5,
const CacheOperationCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
base::PlatformFileError* error =
new base::PlatformFileError(base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK);
pool_->GetSequencedTaskRunner(sequence_token_)->PostTaskAndReply(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&GDataCache::Unpin,
base::Unretained(this),
resource_id,
md5,
GDataCache::FILE_OPERATION_MOVE,
error),
base::Bind(&GDataCache::OnUnpinned,
ui_weak_ptr_,
base::Owned(error),
resource_id,
md5,
callback));
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 105,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void napi_consume_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int budget)
{
if (unlikely(!skb))
return;
/* Zero budget indicate non-NAPI context called us, like netpoll */
if (unlikely(!budget)) {
dev_consume_skb_any(skb);
return;
}
if (likely(atomic_read(&skb->users) == 1))
smp_rmb();
else if (likely(!atomic_dec_and_test(&skb->users)))
return;
/* if reaching here SKB is ready to free */
trace_consume_skb(skb);
/* if SKB is a clone, don't handle this case */
if (skb->fclone != SKB_FCLONE_UNAVAILABLE) {
__kfree_skb(skb);
return;
}
_kfree_skb_defer(skb);
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 67,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DLSAddRef (S_DLS *pDLS)
{
if (pDLS)
pDLS->refCount++;
}
Commit Message: DLS parser: fix wave pool size check.
Bug: 21132860.
Change-Id: I8ae872ea2cc2e8fec5fa0b7815f0b6b31ce744ff
(cherry picked from commit 2d7f8e1be2241e48458f5d3cab5e90be2b07c699)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const MostVisitedURLList& urls() const { return urls_; }
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 147,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaControlVolumeSliderElement* MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::create(
MediaControls& mediaControls) {
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement* slider =
new MediaControlVolumeSliderElement(mediaControls);
slider->ensureUserAgentShadowRoot();
slider->setType(InputTypeNames::range);
slider->setAttribute(stepAttr, "any");
slider->setAttribute(maxAttr, "1");
slider->setShadowPseudoId(
AtomicString("-webkit-media-controls-volume-slider"));
return slider;
}
Commit Message: Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 126,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *columnTypeImpl(
NameContext *pNC,
#ifndef SQLITE_ENABLE_COLUMN_METADATA
Expr *pExpr
#else
Expr *pExpr,
const char **pzOrigDb,
const char **pzOrigTab,
const char **pzOrigCol
#endif
){
char const *zType = 0;
int j;
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_COLUMN_METADATA
char const *zOrigDb = 0;
char const *zOrigTab = 0;
char const *zOrigCol = 0;
#endif
assert( pExpr!=0 );
assert( pNC->pSrcList!=0 );
assert( pExpr->op!=TK_AGG_COLUMN ); /* This routine runes before aggregates
** are processed */
switch( pExpr->op ){
case TK_COLUMN: {
/* The expression is a column. Locate the table the column is being
** extracted from in NameContext.pSrcList. This table may be real
** database table or a subquery.
*/
Table *pTab = 0; /* Table structure column is extracted from */
Select *pS = 0; /* Select the column is extracted from */
int iCol = pExpr->iColumn; /* Index of column in pTab */
while( pNC && !pTab ){
SrcList *pTabList = pNC->pSrcList;
for(j=0;j<pTabList->nSrc && pTabList->a[j].iCursor!=pExpr->iTable;j++);
if( j<pTabList->nSrc ){
pTab = pTabList->a[j].pTab;
pS = pTabList->a[j].pSelect;
}else{
pNC = pNC->pNext;
}
}
if( pTab==0 ){
/* At one time, code such as "SELECT new.x" within a trigger would
** cause this condition to run. Since then, we have restructured how
** trigger code is generated and so this condition is no longer
** possible. However, it can still be true for statements like
** the following:
**
** CREATE TABLE t1(col INTEGER);
** SELECT (SELECT t1.col) FROM FROM t1;
**
** when columnType() is called on the expression "t1.col" in the
** sub-select. In this case, set the column type to NULL, even
** though it should really be "INTEGER".
**
** This is not a problem, as the column type of "t1.col" is never
** used. When columnType() is called on the expression
** "(SELECT t1.col)", the correct type is returned (see the TK_SELECT
** branch below. */
break;
}
assert( pTab && pExpr->y.pTab==pTab );
if( pS ){
/* The "table" is actually a sub-select or a view in the FROM clause
** of the SELECT statement. Return the declaration type and origin
** data for the result-set column of the sub-select.
*/
if( iCol>=0 && iCol<pS->pEList->nExpr ){
/* If iCol is less than zero, then the expression requests the
** rowid of the sub-select or view. This expression is legal (see
** test case misc2.2.2) - it always evaluates to NULL.
*/
NameContext sNC;
Expr *p = pS->pEList->a[iCol].pExpr;
sNC.pSrcList = pS->pSrc;
sNC.pNext = pNC;
sNC.pParse = pNC->pParse;
zType = columnType(&sNC, p,&zOrigDb,&zOrigTab,&zOrigCol);
}
}else{
/* A real table or a CTE table */
assert( !pS );
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_COLUMN_METADATA
if( iCol<0 ) iCol = pTab->iPKey;
assert( iCol==XN_ROWID || (iCol>=0 && iCol<pTab->nCol) );
if( iCol<0 ){
zType = "INTEGER";
zOrigCol = "rowid";
}else{
zOrigCol = pTab->aCol[iCol].zName;
zType = sqlite3ColumnType(&pTab->aCol[iCol],0);
}
zOrigTab = pTab->zName;
if( pNC->pParse && pTab->pSchema ){
int iDb = sqlite3SchemaToIndex(pNC->pParse->db, pTab->pSchema);
zOrigDb = pNC->pParse->db->aDb[iDb].zDbSName;
}
#else
assert( iCol==XN_ROWID || (iCol>=0 && iCol<pTab->nCol) );
if( iCol<0 ){
zType = "INTEGER";
}else{
zType = sqlite3ColumnType(&pTab->aCol[iCol],0);
}
#endif
}
break;
}
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_SUBQUERY
case TK_SELECT: {
/* The expression is a sub-select. Return the declaration type and
** origin info for the single column in the result set of the SELECT
** statement.
*/
NameContext sNC;
Select *pS = pExpr->x.pSelect;
Expr *p = pS->pEList->a[0].pExpr;
assert( ExprHasProperty(pExpr, EP_xIsSelect) );
sNC.pSrcList = pS->pSrc;
sNC.pNext = pNC;
sNC.pParse = pNC->pParse;
zType = columnType(&sNC, p, &zOrigDb, &zOrigTab, &zOrigCol);
break;
}
#endif
}
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_COLUMN_METADATA
if( pzOrigDb ){
assert( pzOrigTab && pzOrigCol );
*pzOrigDb = zOrigDb;
*pzOrigTab = zOrigTab;
*pzOrigCol = zOrigCol;
}
#endif
return zType;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 151,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cine_read_probe(AVProbeData *p)
{
int HeaderSize;
if (p->buf[0] == 'C' && p->buf[1] == 'I' && // Type
(HeaderSize = AV_RL16(p->buf + 2)) >= 0x2C && // HeaderSize
AV_RL16(p->buf + 4) <= CC_UNINT && // Compression
AV_RL16(p->buf + 6) <= 1 && // Version
AV_RL32(p->buf + 20) && // ImageCount
AV_RL32(p->buf + 24) >= HeaderSize && // OffImageHeader
AV_RL32(p->buf + 28) >= HeaderSize && // OffSetup
AV_RL32(p->buf + 32) >= HeaderSize) // OffImageOffsets
return AVPROBE_SCORE_MAX;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/cinedec: Fix DoS due to lack of eof check
Fixes: loop.cine
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tag_tree_zero(Jpeg2000TgtNode *t, int w, int h)
{
int i, siz = tag_tree_size(w, h);
for (i = 0; i < siz; i++) {
t[i].val = 0;
t[i].vis = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: jpeg2000: fix dereferencing invalid pointers
Found-by: Laurent Butti <laurentb@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,076 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gpgsm_assuan_simple_command (assuan_context_t ctx, char *cmd,
engine_status_handler_t status_fnc,
void *status_fnc_value)
{
gpg_error_t err;
char *line;
size_t linelen;
err = assuan_write_line (ctx, cmd);
if (err)
return err;
do
{
err = assuan_read_line (ctx, &line, &linelen);
if (err)
return err;
if (*line == '#' || !linelen)
continue;
if (linelen >= 2
&& line[0] == 'O' && line[1] == 'K'
&& (line[2] == '\0' || line[2] == ' '))
return 0;
else if (linelen >= 4
&& line[0] == 'E' && line[1] == 'R' && line[2] == 'R'
&& line[3] == ' ')
err = atoi (&line[4]);
else if (linelen >= 2
&& line[0] == 'S' && line[1] == ' ')
{
char *rest;
gpgme_status_code_t r;
rest = strchr (line + 2, ' ');
if (!rest)
rest = line + linelen; /* set to an empty string */
else
*(rest++) = 0;
r = _gpgme_parse_status (line + 2);
if (r >= 0 && status_fnc)
err = status_fnc (status_fnc_value, r, rest);
else
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
else
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
while (!err);
return err;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_io_alloc(mrb_state *mrb)
{
struct mrb_io *fptr;
fptr = (struct mrb_io *)mrb_malloc(mrb, sizeof(struct mrb_io));
fptr->fd = -1;
fptr->fd2 = -1;
fptr->pid = 0;
fptr->readable = 0;
fptr->writable = 0;
fptr->sync = 0;
fptr->is_socket = 0;
return fptr;
}
Commit Message: Fix `use after free in File#initilialize_copy`; fix #4001
The bug and the fix were reported by https://hackerone.com/pnoltof
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 83,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vm_insert_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
struct page *page)
{
if (addr < vma->vm_start || addr >= vma->vm_end)
return -EFAULT;
if (!page_count(page))
return -EINVAL;
vma->vm_flags |= VM_INSERTPAGE;
return insert_page(vma, addr, page, vma->vm_page_prot);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rb_event_set_padding(struct ring_buffer_event *event)
{
/* padding has a NULL time_delta */
event->type_len = RINGBUF_TYPE_PADDING;
event->time_delta = 0;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void xt_table_unlock(struct xt_table *table)
{
mutex_unlock(&xt[table->af].mutex);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: extract_task_done (GObject *source_object,
GAsyncResult *res,
gpointer user_data)
{
ExtractJob *extract_job;
extract_job = user_data;
if (extract_job->done_callback)
{
extract_job->done_callback (extract_job->output_files,
extract_job->done_callback_data);
}
g_list_free_full (extract_job->source_files, g_object_unref);
g_list_free_full (extract_job->output_files, g_object_unref);
g_object_unref (extract_job->destination_directory);
finalize_common ((CommonJob *) extract_job);
nautilus_file_changes_consume_changes (TRUE);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ClientControlledShellSurface::SetShadowBounds(const gfx::Rect& bounds) {
TRACE_EVENT1("exo", "ClientControlledShellSurface::SetShadowBounds", "bounds",
bounds.ToString());
auto shadow_bounds =
bounds.IsEmpty() ? base::nullopt : base::make_optional(bounds);
if (shadow_bounds_ != shadow_bounds) {
shadow_bounds_ = shadow_bounds;
shadow_bounds_changed_ = true;
}
}
Commit Message: Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 137,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool InputHandler::isTrailingSingleCharacter(span_t* span, unsigned stringLength, unsigned composingTextLength)
{
if (composingTextLength != stringLength - 1)
return false;
if (!span)
return false;
if (span->start == span->end) {
if (span->start == stringLength - 1)
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int f2fs_quota_on_mount(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, int type)
{
return dquot_quota_on_mount(sbi->sb, sbi->s_qf_names[type],
sbi->s_jquota_fmt, type);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 86,051 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PlatformSensorProviderAndroid::CreateAbsoluteOrientationQuaternionSensor(
JNIEnv* env,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
const CreateSensorCallback& callback) {
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> sensor = Java_PlatformSensorProvider_createSensor(
env, j_object_,
static_cast<jint>(mojom::SensorType::ABSOLUTE_ORIENTATION_QUATERNION));
if (sensor.obj()) {
auto concrete_sensor = base::MakeRefCounted<PlatformSensorAndroid>(
mojom::SensorType::ABSOLUTE_ORIENTATION_QUATERNION, std::move(mapping),
this, sensor);
callback.Run(concrete_sensor);
} else {
auto sensor_fusion_algorithm =
std::make_unique<OrientationQuaternionFusionAlgorithmUsingEulerAngles>(
true /* absolute */);
PlatformSensorFusion::Create(std::move(mapping), this,
std::move(sensor_fusion_algorithm), callback);
}
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 1 | 172,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const hci_t *hci_layer_get_test_interface(
const allocator_t *buffer_allocator_interface,
const hci_hal_t *hal_interface,
const btsnoop_t *btsnoop_interface,
const hci_inject_t *hci_inject_interface,
const packet_fragmenter_t *packet_fragmenter_interface,
const vendor_t *vendor_interface,
const low_power_manager_t *low_power_manager_interface) {
buffer_allocator = buffer_allocator_interface;
hal = hal_interface;
btsnoop = btsnoop_interface;
hci_inject = hci_inject_interface;
packet_fragmenter = packet_fragmenter_interface;
vendor = vendor_interface;
low_power_manager = low_power_manager_interface;
init_layer_interface();
return &interface;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,966 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _exsltDateParseGYear (exsltDateValDatePtr dt, const xmlChar **str)
{
const xmlChar *cur = *str, *firstChar;
int isneg = 0, digcnt = 0;
if (((*cur < '0') || (*cur > '9')) &&
(*cur != '-') && (*cur != '+'))
return -1;
if (*cur == '-') {
isneg = 1;
cur++;
}
firstChar = cur;
while ((*cur >= '0') && (*cur <= '9')) {
dt->year = dt->year * 10 + (*cur - '0');
cur++;
digcnt++;
}
/* year must be at least 4 digits (CCYY); over 4
* digits cannot have a leading zero. */
if ((digcnt < 4) || ((digcnt > 4) && (*firstChar == '0')))
return 1;
if (isneg)
dt->year = - dt->year;
if (!VALID_YEAR(dt->year))
return 2;
*str = cur;
#ifdef DEBUG_EXSLT_DATE
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Parsed year %04i\n", dt->year);
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int treo_attach(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
struct usb_serial_port *swap_port;
/* Only do this endpoint hack for the Handspring devices with
* interrupt in endpoints, which for now are the Treo devices. */
if (!((le16_to_cpu(serial->dev->descriptor.idVendor)
== HANDSPRING_VENDOR_ID) ||
(le16_to_cpu(serial->dev->descriptor.idVendor)
== KYOCERA_VENDOR_ID)) ||
(serial->num_interrupt_in == 0))
return 0;
/*
* It appears that Treos and Kyoceras want to use the
* 1st bulk in endpoint to communicate with the 2nd bulk out endpoint,
* so let's swap the 1st and 2nd bulk in and interrupt endpoints.
* Note that swapping the bulk out endpoints would break lots of
* apps that want to communicate on the second port.
*/
#define COPY_PORT(dest, src) \
do { \
int i; \
\
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(src->read_urbs); ++i) { \
dest->read_urbs[i] = src->read_urbs[i]; \
dest->read_urbs[i]->context = dest; \
dest->bulk_in_buffers[i] = src->bulk_in_buffers[i]; \
} \
dest->read_urb = src->read_urb; \
dest->bulk_in_endpointAddress = src->bulk_in_endpointAddress;\
dest->bulk_in_buffer = src->bulk_in_buffer; \
dest->bulk_in_size = src->bulk_in_size; \
dest->interrupt_in_urb = src->interrupt_in_urb; \
dest->interrupt_in_urb->context = dest; \
dest->interrupt_in_endpointAddress = \
src->interrupt_in_endpointAddress;\
dest->interrupt_in_buffer = src->interrupt_in_buffer; \
} while (0);
swap_port = kmalloc(sizeof(*swap_port), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!swap_port)
return -ENOMEM;
COPY_PORT(swap_port, serial->port[0]);
COPY_PORT(serial->port[0], serial->port[1]);
COPY_PORT(serial->port[1], swap_port);
kfree(swap_port);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: visor: fix null-deref at probe
Fix null-pointer dereference at probe should a (malicious) Treo device
lack the expected endpoints.
Specifically, the Treo port-setup hack was dereferencing the bulk-in and
interrupt-in urbs without first making sure they had been allocated by
core.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: | 1 | 167,390 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebSocketJob::OnReceivedData(
SocketStream* socket, const char* data, int len) {
DCHECK_NE(INITIALIZED, state_);
if (state_ == CLOSED)
return;
if (state_ == CONNECTING) {
OnReceivedHandshakeResponse(socket, data, len);
return;
}
DCHECK(state_ == OPEN || state_ == CLOSING);
std::string received_data;
receive_frame_handler_->AppendData(data, len);
while (receive_frame_handler_->UpdateCurrentBuffer(false) > 0) {
received_data +=
std::string(receive_frame_handler_->GetCurrentBuffer()->data(),
receive_frame_handler_->GetCurrentBufferSize());
receive_frame_handler_->ReleaseCurrentBuffer();
}
if (delegate_ && !received_data.empty())
delegate_->OnReceivedData(
socket, received_data.data(), received_data.size());
}
Commit Message: Use ScopedRunnableMethodFactory in WebSocketJob
Don't post SendPending if it is already posted.
BUG=89795
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7488007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93599 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 98,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebGL2RenderingContextBase::ValidateAndUpdateBufferBindTarget(
const char* function_name,
GLenum target,
WebGLBuffer* buffer) {
if (!ValidateBufferTarget(function_name, target))
return false;
if (buffer &&
!ValidateBufferTargetCompatibility(function_name, target, buffer))
return false;
switch (target) {
case GL_ARRAY_BUFFER:
bound_array_buffer_ = buffer;
break;
case GL_COPY_READ_BUFFER:
bound_copy_read_buffer_ = buffer;
break;
case GL_COPY_WRITE_BUFFER:
bound_copy_write_buffer_ = buffer;
break;
case GL_ELEMENT_ARRAY_BUFFER:
bound_vertex_array_object_->SetElementArrayBuffer(buffer);
break;
case GL_PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER:
bound_pixel_pack_buffer_ = buffer;
break;
case GL_PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER:
bound_pixel_unpack_buffer_ = buffer;
break;
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_BUFFER:
bound_transform_feedback_buffer_ = buffer;
break;
case GL_UNIFORM_BUFFER:
bound_uniform_buffer_ = buffer;
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
if (buffer && !buffer->GetInitialTarget())
buffer->SetInitialTarget(target);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 153,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void didSucceed()
{
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mp4s_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_MPEGSampleEntryBox *ptr = (GF_MPEGSampleEntryBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
gf_isom_sample_entry_predestroy((GF_SampleEntryBox *)s);
if (ptr->esd) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)ptr->esd);
if (ptr->slc) gf_odf_desc_del((GF_Descriptor *)ptr->slc);
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport unsigned int ReadBlobLSBLong(Image *image)
{
register const unsigned char
*p;
register unsigned int
value;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
buffer[4];
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
*buffer='\0';
p=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,4,buffer,&count);
if (count != 4)
return(0U);
value=(unsigned int) (*p++);
value|=(unsigned int) (*p++) << 8;
value|=(unsigned int) (*p++) << 16;
value|=(unsigned int) (*p++) << 24;
return(value);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 88,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hls_probe(AVProbeData *p)
{
/* Require #EXTM3U at the start, and either one of the ones below
* somewhere for a proper match. */
if (strncmp(p->buf, "#EXTM3U", 7))
return 0;
if (strstr(p->buf, "#EXT-X-STREAM-INF:") ||
strstr(p->buf, "#EXT-X-TARGETDURATION:") ||
strstr(p->buf, "#EXT-X-MEDIA-SEQUENCE:"))
return AVPROBE_SCORE_MAX;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <lingjiujianke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 61,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int usb_audio_resume(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
return __usb_audio_resume(intf, false);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Check out-of-bounds access by corrupted buffer descriptor
When a USB-audio device receives a maliciously adjusted or corrupted
buffer descriptor, the USB-audio driver may access an out-of-bounce
value at its parser. This was detected by syzkaller, something like:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usb_audio_probe+0x27b2/0x2ab0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006b83a9e8 by task kworker/0:1/24
CPU: 0 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc1-42251-gebb2c2437d80 #224
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x22f/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
snd_usb_create_streams sound/usb/card.c:248
usb_audio_probe+0x27b2/0x2ab0 sound/usb/card.c:605
usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_set_configuration+0x104e/0x1870 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1932
generic_probe+0x73/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:174
usb_probe_device+0xaf/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_new_device+0x7b8/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2457
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
process_one_work+0xc7f/0x1db0 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
kthread+0x3a1/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
This patch adds the checks of out-of-bounce accesses at appropriate
places and bails out when it goes out of the given buffer.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 59,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSTestEventTargetConstructor::JSTestEventTargetConstructor(Structure* structure, JSDOMGlobalObject* globalObject)
: DOMConstructorObject(structure, globalObject)
{
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,094 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderWidgetHostViewAura::GetSelectionRange(gfx::Range* range) const {
if (!text_input_manager_ || !GetFocusedWidget())
return false;
const TextInputManager::TextSelection* selection =
text_input_manager_->GetTextSelection(GetFocusedWidget()->GetView());
if (!selection)
return false;
range->set_start(selection->range().start());
range->set_end(selection->range().end());
return true;
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1(void)
{
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 12,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: camera_metadata_t* copy_camera_metadata(void *dst, size_t dst_size,
const camera_metadata_t *src) {
size_t memory_needed = get_camera_metadata_compact_size(src);
if (dst == NULL) return NULL;
if (dst_size < memory_needed) return NULL;
camera_metadata_t *metadata =
place_camera_metadata(dst, dst_size, src->entry_count, src->data_count);
metadata->flags = src->flags;
metadata->entry_count = src->entry_count;
metadata->data_count = src->data_count;
memcpy(get_entries(metadata), get_entries(src),
sizeof(camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t[metadata->entry_count]));
memcpy(get_data(metadata), get_data(src),
sizeof(uint8_t[metadata->data_count]));
assert(validate_camera_metadata_structure(metadata, NULL) == OK);
return metadata;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Prevent data size overflow
Add a function to check overflow when calculating metadata
data size.
Bug: 30741779
Change-Id: I6405fe608567a4f4113674050f826f305ecae030
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,922 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadPSDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
has_merged_image,
skip_layers;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickSizeType
length;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PSDInfo
psd_info;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
*data;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read image header.
*/
image->endian=MSBEndian;
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) psd_info.signature);
psd_info.version=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(psd_info.signature,"8BPS",4) != 0) ||
((psd_info.version != 1) && (psd_info.version != 2)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
(void) ReadBlob(image,6,psd_info.reserved);
psd_info.channels=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (psd_info.channels > MaxPSDChannels)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"MaximumChannelsExceeded");
psd_info.rows=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
psd_info.columns=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if ((psd_info.version == 1) && ((psd_info.rows > 30000) ||
(psd_info.columns > 30000)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
psd_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((psd_info.depth != 1) && (psd_info.depth != 8) && (psd_info.depth != 16))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
psd_info.mode=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Image is %.20g x %.20g with channels=%.20g, depth=%.20g, mode=%s",
(double) psd_info.columns,(double) psd_info.rows,(double)
psd_info.channels,(double) psd_info.depth,ModeToString((PSDImageType)
psd_info.mode));
/*
Initialize image.
*/
image->depth=psd_info.depth;
image->columns=psd_info.columns;
image->rows=psd_info.rows;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (psd_info.mode == LabMode)
SetImageColorspace(image,LabColorspace,exception);
if (psd_info.mode == CMYKMode)
{
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace,exception);
image->alpha_trait=psd_info.channels > 4 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
}
else if ((psd_info.mode == BitmapMode) || (psd_info.mode == GrayscaleMode) ||
(psd_info.mode == DuotoneMode))
{
status=AcquireImageColormap(image,psd_info.depth != 16 ? 256 : 65536,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Image colormap allocated");
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
image->alpha_trait=psd_info.channels > 1 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
}
else
image->alpha_trait=psd_info.channels > 3 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
/*
Read PSD raster colormap only present for indexed and duotone images.
*/
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (length != 0)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading colormap");
if (psd_info.mode == DuotoneMode)
{
/*
Duotone image data; the format of this data is undocumented.
*/
data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) length,
sizeof(*data));
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length,data);
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
}
else
{
size_t
number_colors;
/*
Read PSD raster colormap.
*/
number_colors=length/3;
if (number_colors > 65536)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,number_colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->alpha_trait=UndefinedPixelTrait;
}
}
has_merged_image=MagickTrue;
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (length != 0)
{
unsigned char
*blocks;
/*
Image resources block.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading image resource blocks - %.20g bytes",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length));
blocks=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) length,
sizeof(*blocks));
if (blocks == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length,blocks);
if ((count != (ssize_t) length) ||
(LocaleNCompare((char *) blocks,"8BIM",4) != 0))
{
blocks=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blocks);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
ParseImageResourceBlocks(image,blocks,(size_t) length,&has_merged_image,
exception);
blocks=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blocks);
}
/*
Layer and mask block.
*/
length=GetPSDSize(&psd_info,image);
if (length == 8)
{
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
}
offset=TellBlob(image);
skip_layers=MagickFalse;
if ((image_info->number_scenes == 1) && (image_info->scene == 0) &&
(has_merged_image != MagickFalse))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" read composite only");
skip_layers=MagickTrue;
}
if (length == 0)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image has no layers");
}
else
{
if (ReadPSDLayers(image,image_info,&psd_info,skip_layers,exception) !=
MagickTrue)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Skip the rest of the layer and mask information.
*/
SeekBlob(image,offset+length,SEEK_SET);
}
/*
If we are only "pinging" the image, then we're done - so return.
*/
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/*
Read the precombined layer, present for PSD < 4 compatibility.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading the precombined layer");
if ((has_merged_image != MagickFalse) || (GetImageListLength(image) == 1))
has_merged_image=(MagickBooleanType) ReadPSDMergedImage(image_info,image,
&psd_info,exception);
if ((has_merged_image == MagickFalse) && (GetImageListLength(image) == 1) &&
(length != 0))
{
SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_SET);
status=ReadPSDLayers(image,image_info,&psd_info,MagickFalse,exception);
if (status != MagickTrue)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
}
if ((has_merged_image == MagickFalse) && (GetImageListLength(image) > 1))
{
Image
*merged;
SetImageAlphaChannel(image,TransparentAlphaChannel,exception);
image->background_color.alpha=TransparentAlpha;
image->background_color.alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
merged=MergeImageLayers(image,FlattenLayer,exception);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,merged);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: Added check for bit depth 1.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 170,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LocalSiteCharacteristicsWebContentsObserverTest() {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeature(
features::kSiteCharacteristicsDatabase);
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 1 | 172,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: person_set_spriteset(person_t* person, spriteset_t* spriteset)
{
spriteset_t* old_spriteset;
old_spriteset = person->sprite;
person->sprite = spriteset_ref(spriteset);
person->anim_frames = spriteset_frame_delay(person->sprite, person->direction, 0);
person->frame = 0;
spriteset_unref(old_spriteset);
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 75,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Reader(const uint8_t* buffer, int length, const WebBlobInfoArray* blobInfo, BlobDataHandleMap& blobDataHandles, ScriptState* scriptState)
: m_scriptState(scriptState)
, m_buffer(buffer)
, m_length(length)
, m_position(0)
, m_version(0)
, m_blobInfo(blobInfo)
, m_blobDataHandles(blobDataHandles)
{
ASSERT(!(reinterpret_cast<size_t>(buffer) & 1));
ASSERT(length >= 0);
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,420 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit HeaderFlattener(int load_flags)
: load_flags_(load_flags),
has_accept_header_(false) {
}
Commit Message: Protect WebURLLoaderImpl::Context while receiving responses.
A client's didReceiveResponse can cancel a request; by protecting the
Context we avoid a use after free in this case.
Interestingly, we really had very good warning about this problem, see
https://codereview.chromium.org/11900002/ back in January.
R=darin
BUG=241139
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15738007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 113,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mpeg4_decode_partition_b(MpegEncContext *s, int mb_count)
{
int mb_num = 0;
static const int8_t quant_tab[4] = { -1, -2, 1, 2 };
s->mb_x = s->resync_mb_x;
s->first_slice_line = 1;
for (s->mb_y = s->resync_mb_y; mb_num < mb_count; s->mb_y++) {
ff_init_block_index(s);
for (; mb_num < mb_count && s->mb_x < s->mb_width; s->mb_x++) {
const int xy = s->mb_x + s->mb_y * s->mb_stride;
mb_num++;
ff_update_block_index(s);
if (s->mb_x == s->resync_mb_x && s->mb_y == s->resync_mb_y + 1)
s->first_slice_line = 0;
if (s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I) {
int ac_pred = get_bits1(&s->gb);
int cbpy = get_vlc2(&s->gb, ff_h263_cbpy_vlc.table, CBPY_VLC_BITS, 1);
if (cbpy < 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"cbpy corrupted at %d %d\n", s->mb_x, s->mb_y);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
s->cbp_table[xy] |= cbpy << 2;
s->current_picture.mb_type[xy] |= ac_pred * MB_TYPE_ACPRED;
} else { /* P || S_TYPE */
if (IS_INTRA(s->current_picture.mb_type[xy])) {
int i;
int dir = 0;
int ac_pred = get_bits1(&s->gb);
int cbpy = get_vlc2(&s->gb, ff_h263_cbpy_vlc.table, CBPY_VLC_BITS, 1);
if (cbpy < 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"I cbpy corrupted at %d %d\n", s->mb_x, s->mb_y);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (s->cbp_table[xy] & 8)
ff_set_qscale(s, s->qscale + quant_tab[get_bits(&s->gb, 2)]);
s->current_picture.qscale_table[xy] = s->qscale;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int dc_pred_dir;
int dc = mpeg4_decode_dc(s, i, &dc_pred_dir);
if (dc < 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"DC corrupted at %d %d\n", s->mb_x, s->mb_y);
return dc;
}
dir <<= 1;
if (dc_pred_dir)
dir |= 1;
}
s->cbp_table[xy] &= 3; // remove dquant
s->cbp_table[xy] |= cbpy << 2;
s->current_picture.mb_type[xy] |= ac_pred * MB_TYPE_ACPRED;
s->pred_dir_table[xy] = dir;
} else if (IS_SKIP(s->current_picture.mb_type[xy])) {
s->current_picture.qscale_table[xy] = s->qscale;
s->cbp_table[xy] = 0;
} else {
int cbpy = get_vlc2(&s->gb, ff_h263_cbpy_vlc.table, CBPY_VLC_BITS, 1);
if (cbpy < 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"P cbpy corrupted at %d %d\n", s->mb_x, s->mb_y);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (s->cbp_table[xy] & 8)
ff_set_qscale(s, s->qscale + quant_tab[get_bits(&s->gb, 2)]);
s->current_picture.qscale_table[xy] = s->qscale;
s->cbp_table[xy] &= 3; // remove dquant
s->cbp_table[xy] |= (cbpy ^ 0xf) << 2;
}
}
}
if (mb_num >= mb_count)
return 0;
s->mb_x = 0;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check for bitstream end in read_quant_matrix_ext()
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: asff-crash-0e53d0dc491dfdd507530b66562812fbd4c36678
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 74,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void i6300esb_timer_expired(void *vp)
{
I6300State *d = vp;
i6300esb_debug("stage %d\n", d->stage);
if (d->stage == 1) {
/* What to do at the end of stage 1? */
switch (d->int_type) {
case INT_TYPE_IRQ:
fprintf(stderr, "i6300esb_timer_expired: I would send APIC 1 INT 10 here if I knew how (XXX)\n");
break;
case INT_TYPE_SMI:
fprintf(stderr, "i6300esb_timer_expired: I would send SMI here if I knew how (XXX)\n");
break;
}
/* Start the second stage. */
i6300esb_restart_timer(d, 2);
} else {
/* Second stage expired, reboot for real. */
if (d->reboot_enabled) {
d->previous_reboot_flag = 1;
watchdog_perform_action(); /* This reboots, exits, etc */
i6300esb_reset(&d->dev.qdev);
}
/* In "free running mode" we start stage 1 again. */
if (d->free_run)
i6300esb_restart_timer(d, 1);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 13,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EAS_I16 ConvertDelay (EAS_I32 timeCents)
{
EAS_I32 temp;
if (timeCents == ZERO_TIME_IN_CENTS)
return 0;
/* divide time by secs per frame to get number of frames */
temp = timeCents - dlsRateConvert;
/* convert from time cents to 10-bit fraction */
temp = FMUL_15x15(temp, TIME_CENTS_TO_LOG2);
/* convert to frame count */
temp = EAS_LogToLinear16(temp - (15 << 10));
if (temp < SYNTH_FULL_SCALE_EG1_GAIN)
return (EAS_I16) temp;
return SYNTH_FULL_SCALE_EG1_GAIN;
}
Commit Message: DLS parser: fix wave pool size check.
Bug: 21132860.
Change-Id: I8ae872ea2cc2e8fec5fa0b7815f0b6b31ce744ff
(cherry picked from commit 2d7f8e1be2241e48458f5d3cab5e90be2b07c699)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,504 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_9_2_prm_shutdown(
struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
int disposition;
/* From 9.2 Shutdown of an Association
* Upon receipt of the SHUTDOWN primitive from its upper
* layer, the endpoint enters SHUTDOWN-PENDING state and
* remains there until all outstanding data has been
* acknowledged by its peer. The endpoint accepts no new data
* from its upper layer, but retransmits data to the far end
* if necessary to fill gaps.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE,
SCTP_STATE(SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING));
disposition = SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
if (sctp_outq_is_empty(&asoc->outqueue)) {
disposition = sctp_sf_do_9_2_start_shutdown(net, ep, asoc, type,
arg, commands);
}
return disposition;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 31,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_fninit(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
if (ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) & (X86_CR0_TS | X86_CR0_EM))
return emulate_nm(ctxt);
ctxt->ops->get_fpu(ctxt);
asm volatile("fninit");
ctxt->ops->put_fpu(ctxt);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CmdBufferImageTransportFactory::CmdBufferImageTransportFactory() {
WebKit::WebGraphicsContext3D::Attributes attrs;
attrs.shareResources = true;
GpuChannelHostFactory* factory = BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::instance();
GURL url("chrome://gpu/ImageTransportFactoryAndroid");
base::WeakPtr<WebGraphicsContext3DSwapBuffersClient> swap_client;
context_.reset(new WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl(0, // offscreen
url,
factory,
swap_client));
context_->Initialize(
attrs,
false,
CAUSE_FOR_GPU_LAUNCH_WEBGRAPHICSCONTEXT3DCOMMANDBUFFERIMPL_INITIALIZE);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,497 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int start_voice_call(struct audio_device *adev)
{
struct audio_usecase *uc_info;
ALOGV("%s: enter", __func__);
uc_info = (struct audio_usecase *)calloc(1, sizeof(struct audio_usecase));
uc_info->id = USECASE_VOICE_CALL;
uc_info->type = VOICE_CALL;
uc_info->stream = (struct audio_stream *)adev->primary_output;
uc_info->devices = adev->primary_output->devices;
uc_info->in_snd_device = SND_DEVICE_NONE;
uc_info->out_snd_device = SND_DEVICE_NONE;
uc_select_pcm_devices(uc_info);
list_add_tail(&adev->usecase_list, &uc_info->adev_list_node);
select_devices(adev, USECASE_VOICE_CALL);
/* TODO: implement voice call start */
/* set cached volume */
set_voice_volume_l(adev, adev->voice_volume);
adev->in_call = true;
ALOGV("%s: exit", __func__);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::VoidMethodOptionalStringArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodOptionalStringArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodOptionalStringArgMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API zval* ZEND_FASTCALL _zend_hash_add(HashTable *ht, zend_string *key, zval *pData ZEND_FILE_LINE_DC)
{
return _zend_hash_add_or_update_i(ht, key, pData, HASH_ADD ZEND_FILE_LINE_RELAY_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 69,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: zflushpage(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
return gs_flushpage(igs);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t Parcel::objectsCount() const
{
return mObjectsSize;
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void snd_usb_stream_disconnect(struct snd_usb_stream *as)
{
int idx;
struct snd_usb_substream *subs;
for (idx = 0; idx < 2; idx++) {
subs = &as->substream[idx];
if (!subs->num_formats)
continue;
subs->interface = -1;
subs->data_endpoint = NULL;
subs->sync_endpoint = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Check out-of-bounds access by corrupted buffer descriptor
When a USB-audio device receives a maliciously adjusted or corrupted
buffer descriptor, the USB-audio driver may access an out-of-bounce
value at its parser. This was detected by syzkaller, something like:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usb_audio_probe+0x27b2/0x2ab0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006b83a9e8 by task kworker/0:1/24
CPU: 0 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc1-42251-gebb2c2437d80 #224
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x22f/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
snd_usb_create_streams sound/usb/card.c:248
usb_audio_probe+0x27b2/0x2ab0 sound/usb/card.c:605
usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_set_configuration+0x104e/0x1870 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1932
generic_probe+0x73/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:174
usb_probe_device+0xaf/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_new_device+0x7b8/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2457
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
process_one_work+0xc7f/0x1db0 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
kthread+0x3a1/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
This patch adds the checks of out-of-bounce accesses at appropriate
places and bails out when it goes out of the given buffer.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 59,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string RenderThreadImpl::HistogramCustomizer::HostToCustomHistogramSuffix(
const std::string& host) {
if (host == "mail.google.com")
return ".gmail";
if (host == "docs.google.com" || host == "drive.google.com")
return ".docs";
if (host == "plus.google.com")
return ".plus";
if (host == "inbox.google.com")
return ".inbox";
if (host == "calendar.google.com")
return ".calendar";
if (host == "www.youtube.com")
return ".youtube";
if (IsAlexaTop10NonGoogleSite(host))
return ".top10";
return std::string();
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vmxnet3_on_tx_done_update_stats(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx,
Vmxnet3PktStatus status)
{
size_t tot_len = vmxnet_tx_pkt_get_total_len(s->tx_pkt);
struct UPT1_TxStats *stats = &s->txq_descr[qidx].txq_stats;
switch (status) {
case VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_OK:
switch (vmxnet_tx_pkt_get_packet_type(s->tx_pkt)) {
case ETH_PKT_BCAST:
stats->bcastPktsTxOK++;
stats->bcastBytesTxOK += tot_len;
break;
case ETH_PKT_MCAST:
stats->mcastPktsTxOK++;
stats->mcastBytesTxOK += tot_len;
break;
case ETH_PKT_UCAST:
stats->ucastPktsTxOK++;
stats->ucastBytesTxOK += tot_len;
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
}
if (s->offload_mode == VMXNET3_OM_TSO) {
/*
* According to VMWARE headers this statistic is a number
* of packets after segmentation but since we don't have
* this information in QEMU model, the best we can do is to
* provide number of non-segmented packets
*/
stats->TSOPktsTxOK++;
stats->TSOBytesTxOK += tot_len;
}
break;
case VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_DISCARD:
stats->pktsTxDiscard++;
break;
case VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_ERROR:
stats->pktsTxError++;
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,326 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLMediaElement::stoppedDueToErrors() const {
if (m_readyState >= kHaveMetadata && m_error) {
TimeRanges* seekableRanges = seekable();
if (!seekableRanges->contain(currentTime()))
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 128,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillDialogViews::UpdateErrorBubble() {
if (!delegate_->ShouldShowErrorBubble())
HideErrorBubble();
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 110,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormElement::submitFromJavaScript() {
Submit(nullptr, nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 152,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~SystemURLRequestContext() {
#if defined(USE_NSS) || defined(OS_IOS)
net::SetURLRequestContextForNSSHttpIO(NULL);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 113,536 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillDialogViews::StyledLabelLinkClicked(const gfx::Range& range,
int event_flags) {
delegate_->LegalDocumentLinkClicked(range);
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 110,055 |
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