instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void release_memory_resource(struct resource *res)
{
if (!res)
return;
release_resource(res);
kfree(res);
return;
}
Commit Message: mm/hotplug: correctly add new zone to all other nodes' zone lists
When online_pages() is called to add new memory to an empty zone, it
rebuilds all zone lists by calling build_all_zonelists(). But there's a
bug which prevents the new zone to be added to other nodes' zone lists.
online_pages() {
build_all_zonelists()
.....
node_set_state(zone_to_nid(zone), N_HIGH_MEMORY)
}
Here the node of the zone is put into N_HIGH_MEMORY state after calling
build_all_zonelists(), but build_all_zonelists() only adds zones from
nodes in N_HIGH_MEMORY state to the fallback zone lists.
build_all_zonelists()
->__build_all_zonelists()
->build_zonelists()
->find_next_best_node()
->for_each_node_state(n, N_HIGH_MEMORY)
So memory in the new zone will never be used by other nodes, and it may
cause strange behavor when system is under memory pressure. So put node
into N_HIGH_MEMORY state before calling build_all_zonelists().
Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Keping Chen <chenkeping@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jpc_bitstream_needalign(jpc_bitstream_t *bitstream)
{
if (bitstream->openmode_ & JPC_BITSTREAM_READ) {
/* The bit stream is open for reading. */
/* If there are any bits buffered for reading, or the
previous byte forced a stuffed bit, alignment is
required. */
if ((bitstream->cnt_ < 8 && bitstream->cnt_ > 0) ||
((bitstream->buf_ >> 8) & 0xff) == 0xff) {
return 1;
}
} else if (bitstream->openmode_ & JPC_BITSTREAM_WRITE) {
/* The bit stream is open for writing. */
/* If there are any bits buffered for writing, or the
previous byte forced a stuffed bit, alignment is
required. */
if ((bitstream->cnt_ < 8 && bitstream->cnt_ >= 0) ||
((bitstream->buf_ >> 8) & 0xff) == 0xff) {
return 1;
}
} else {
/* This should not happen. Famous last words, eh? :-) */
assert(0);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Changed the JPC bitstream code to more gracefully handle a request
for a larger sized integer than what can be handled (i.e., return
with an error instead of failing an assert).
CWE ID: | 0 | 72,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool is_skb_forwardable(const struct net_device *dev, const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
unsigned int len;
if (!(dev->flags & IFF_UP))
return false;
len = dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len + VLAN_HLEN;
if (skb->len <= len)
return true;
/* if TSO is enabled, we don't care about the length as the packet
* could be forwarded without being segmented before
*/
if (skb_is_gso(skb))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 93,393 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FakeRemoteGattDescriptor* FakeCentral::GetFakeRemoteGattDescriptor(
const std::string& peripheral_address,
const std::string& service_id,
const std::string& characteristic_id,
const std::string& descriptor_id) const {
FakeRemoteGattCharacteristic* fake_remote_gatt_characteristic =
GetFakeRemoteGattCharacteristic(peripheral_address, service_id,
characteristic_id);
if (fake_remote_gatt_characteristic == nullptr) {
return nullptr;
}
return static_cast<FakeRemoteGattDescriptor*>(
fake_remote_gatt_characteristic->GetDescriptor(descriptor_id));
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::MoveRangeSelectionExtent(const WebPoint& point) {
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "WebLocalFrameImpl::moveRangeSelectionExtent");
GetFrame()->GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
GetFrame()->Selection().MoveRangeSelectionExtent(
GetFrame()->View()->ViewportToContents(point));
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,357 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebGLRenderingContext::uniform4ivCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebGLRenderingContext.uniform4iv()");
return uniformHelperi(args, kUniform4v);
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AudioOutputDevice::AudioThreadCallback::Process(int pending_data) {
if (pending_data == kPauseMark) {
memset(shared_memory_.memory(), 0, memory_length_);
SetActualDataSizeInBytes(&shared_memory_, memory_length_, 0);
return;
}
int audio_delay_milliseconds = pending_data / bytes_per_ms_;
TRACE_EVENT0("audio", "AudioOutputDevice::FireRenderCallback");
size_t num_frames = audio_parameters_.frames_per_buffer();
if (input_bus_.get() && input_channels_ > 0) {
render_callback_->RenderIO(input_bus_.get(),
output_bus_.get(),
audio_delay_milliseconds);
} else {
num_frames = render_callback_->Render(output_bus_.get(),
audio_delay_milliseconds);
}
SetActualDataSizeInBytes(
&shared_memory_, memory_length_,
num_frames * sizeof(*output_bus_->channel(0)) * output_bus_->channels());
}
Commit Message: Revert r157378 as it caused WebRTC to dereference null pointers when restarting a call.
I've kept my unit test changes intact but disabled until I get a proper fix.
BUG=147499,150805
TBR=henrika
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/10946040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@157626 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 103,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gs_output_page(gs_gstate * pgs, int num_copies, int flush)
{
gx_device *dev = gs_currentdevice(pgs);
cmm_dev_profile_t *dev_profile;
int code;
/* for devices that hook 'fill_path' in order to pick up gs_gstate */
/* values such as dev_ht (such as tiffsep1), make a dummy call here */
/* to make sure that it has been called at least once */
code = gs_gsave(pgs);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (((code = gs_newpath(pgs)) < 0) ||
((code = gs_moveto(pgs, 0.0, 0.0)) < 0) ||
((code = gs_setgray(pgs, 0.0)) < 0) ||
((code = gs_fill(pgs)) < 0))
{
gs_grestore(pgs);
return code;
}
code = gs_grestore(pgs);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (dev->IgnoreNumCopies)
num_copies = 1;
if ((code = (*dev_proc(dev, output_page)) (dev, num_copies, flush)) < 0)
return code;
code = dev_proc(dev, get_profile)(dev, &(dev_profile));
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (dev_profile->graydetection && !dev_profile->pageneutralcolor) {
dev_profile->pageneutralcolor = true; /* start detecting again */
code = gsicc_mcm_begin_monitor(pgs->icc_link_cache, dev);
}
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 2,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OxideQQuickWebView::setBeforeUnloadDialog(
QQmlComponent* beforeUnloadDialog) {
Q_D(OxideQQuickWebView);
if (d->before_unload_dialog_ == beforeUnloadDialog) {
return;
}
d->before_unload_dialog_ = beforeUnloadDialog;
emit beforeUnloadDialogChanged();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_REQ_get_extensions(X509_REQ *req)
{
X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr;
ASN1_TYPE *ext = NULL;
int idx, *pnid;
const unsigned char *p;
if ((req == NULL) || (req->req_info == NULL) || !ext_nids)
return (NULL);
for (pnid = ext_nids; *pnid != NID_undef; pnid++) {
idx = X509_REQ_get_attr_by_NID(req, *pnid, -1);
if (idx == -1)
continue;
attr = X509_REQ_get_attr(req, idx);
if (attr->single)
ext = attr->value.single;
else if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(attr->value.set))
ext = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(attr->value.set, 0);
break;
}
if (!ext || (ext->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE))
return NULL;
p = ext->value.sequence->data;
return (STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *)
ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &p, ext->value.sequence->length,
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_EXTENSIONS));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,209 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void write_array(bytearray_t * bplist, node_t* node, hashtable_t* ref_table, uint8_t ref_size)
{
node_t* cur = NULL;
uint64_t i = 0;
uint64_t size = node_n_children(node);
uint8_t marker = BPLIST_ARRAY | (size < 15 ? size : 0xf);
byte_array_append(bplist, &marker, sizeof(uint8_t));
if (size >= 15) {
write_int(bplist, size);
}
for (i = 0, cur = node_first_child(node); cur && i < size; cur = node_next_sibling(cur), i++) {
uint64_t idx = *(uint64_t *) (hash_table_lookup(ref_table, cur));
idx = be64toh(idx);
byte_array_append(bplist, (uint8_t*)&idx + (sizeof(uint64_t) - ref_size), ref_size);
}
}
Commit Message: bplist: Fix data range check for string/data/dict/array nodes
Passing a size of 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF to parse_string_node() might result
in a memcpy with a size of -1, leading to undefined behavior.
This commit makes sure that the actual node data (which depends on the size)
is in the range start_of_object..start_of_object+size.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 68,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalWidthUsing(Length logicalWidth) const
{
switch (logicalWidth.type()) {
case Fixed:
return computeContentBoxLogicalWidth(logicalWidth.value());
case Percent: {
const LayoutUnit cw = isPositioned() ? containingBlockLogicalWidthForPositioned(toRenderBoxModelObject(container())) : containingBlockLogicalWidthForContent();
if (cw > 0)
return computeContentBoxLogicalWidth(logicalWidth.calcMinValue(cw));
}
default:
return intrinsicLogicalWidth();
}
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NO_INLINE bool jspeFunctionArguments(JsVar *funcVar) {
JSP_MATCH('(');
while (lex->tk!=')') {
if (funcVar) {
char buf[JSLEX_MAX_TOKEN_LENGTH+1];
buf[0] = '\xFF';
strcpy(&buf[1], jslGetTokenValueAsString(lex));
JsVar *param = jsvAddNamedChild(funcVar, 0, buf);
if (!param) { // out of memory
jspSetError(false);
return false;
}
jsvMakeFunctionParameter(param); // force this to be called a function parameter
jsvUnLock(param);
}
JSP_MATCH(LEX_ID);
if (lex->tk!=')') JSP_MATCH(',');
}
JSP_MATCH(')');
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug if using an undefined member of an object for for..in (fix #1437)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::execCommand(const String& commandName, bool, const String& value, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
if (!isHTMLDocument() && !isXHTMLDocument()) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(InvalidStateError, "execCommand is only supported on HTML documents.");
return false;
}
if (focusedElement() && isHTMLTextFormControlElement(*focusedElement()))
UseCounter::count(*this, UseCounter::ExecCommandOnInputOrTextarea);
if (m_isRunningExecCommand) {
String message = "We don't execute document.execCommand() this time, because it is called recursively.";
addConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::create(JSMessageSource, WarningMessageLevel, message));
return false;
}
TemporaryChange<bool> executeScope(m_isRunningExecCommand, true);
EventQueueScope eventQueueScope;
Editor::tidyUpHTMLStructure(*this);
Editor::Command editorCommand = command(this, commandName);
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(SparseHistogram, editorCommandHistogram, ("WebCore.Document.execCommand"));
editorCommandHistogram.sample(editorCommand.idForHistogram());
return editorCommand.execute(value);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: invoke_NPN_HasMethod(PluginInstance *plugin, NPObject *npobj, NPIdentifier methodName)
{
npw_return_val_if_fail(rpc_method_invoke_possible(g_rpc_connection), false);
int error = rpc_method_invoke(g_rpc_connection,
RPC_METHOD_NPN_HAS_METHOD,
RPC_TYPE_NPW_PLUGIN_INSTANCE, plugin,
RPC_TYPE_NP_OBJECT, npobj,
RPC_TYPE_NP_IDENTIFIER, &methodName,
RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR) {
npw_perror("NPN_HasMethod() invoke", error);
return false;
}
uint32_t ret;
error = rpc_method_wait_for_reply(g_rpc_connection,
RPC_TYPE_UINT32, &ret,
RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR) {
npw_perror("NPN_HasMethod() wait for reply", error);
return false;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,123 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: daemon_msg_err(SOCKET sockctrl, uint32 plen)
{
char errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE];
char remote_errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE];
if (plen >= PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE)
{
/*
* Message is too long; just read as much of it as we
* can into the buffer provided, and discard the rest.
*/
if (sock_recv(sockctrl, remote_errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE - 1,
SOCK_RECEIVEALL_YES|SOCK_EOF_IS_ERROR, errbuf,
PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Read from client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
if (rpcapd_discard(sockctrl, plen - (PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE - 1)) == -1)
{
return -1;
}
/*
* Null-terminate it.
*/
remote_errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE - 1] = '\0';
}
else if (plen == 0)
{
/* Empty error string. */
remote_errbuf[0] = '\0';
}
else
{
if (sock_recv(sockctrl, remote_errbuf, plen,
SOCK_RECEIVEALL_YES|SOCK_EOF_IS_ERROR, errbuf,
PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Read from client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
/*
* Null-terminate it.
*/
remote_errbuf[plen] = '\0';
}
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Error from client: %s", remote_errbuf);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: In the open request, reject capture sources that are URLs.
You shouldn't be able to ask a server to open a remote device on some
*other* server; just open it yourself.
This addresses Include Security issue F13: [libpcap] Remote Packet
Capture Daemon Allows Opening Capture URLs.
CWE ID: CWE-918 | 0 | 88,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HevcParameterSets::write(size_t index, uint8_t* dest, size_t size) {
CHECK_LT(index, mNalUnits.size());
const sp<ABuffer>& nalUnit = mNalUnits[index];
if (size < nalUnit->size()) {
ALOGE("dest buffer size too small: %zu vs. %zu to be written",
size, nalUnit->size());
return false;
}
memcpy(dest, nalUnit->data(), nalUnit->size());
return true;
}
Commit Message: Validate lengths in HEVC metadata parsing
Add code to validate the size parameter passed to
HecvParameterSets::addNalUnit(). Previously vulnerable
to decrementing an unsigned past 0, yielding a huge result value.
Bug: 35467107
Test: ran POC, no crash, emitted new "bad length" log entry
Change-Id: Ia169b9edc1e0f7c5302e3c68aa90a54e8863d79e
(cherry picked from commit e0dcf097cc029d056926029a29419e1650cbdf1b)
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 162,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: store_tabletMouseMiddle(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t count)
{
struct aiptek *aiptek = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
int new_button = map_str_to_val(mouse_button_map, buf, count);
if (new_button == AIPTEK_INVALID_VALUE)
return -EINVAL;
aiptek->newSetting.mouseButtonMiddle = new_button;
return count;
}
Commit Message: Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB
device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device
has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value
is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,653 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sspi_ContextBufferAllocTableFree()
{
ContextBufferAllocTable.cEntries = ContextBufferAllocTable.cMaxEntries = 0;
free(ContextBufferAllocTable.entries);
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 58,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkService::~ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkService() {
chromeos::CrasAudioHandler::Get()->RemoveAudioObserver(this);
ArcSessionManager::Get()->RemoveObserver(this);
arc_bridge_service_->voice_interaction_framework()->RemoveObserver(this);
arc_bridge_service_->voice_interaction_framework()->SetHost(nullptr);
}
Commit Message: arc: add test for blocking incognito windows in screenshot
BUG=778852
TEST=ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkServiceUnittest.
CapturingScreenshotBlocksIncognitoWindows
Change-Id: I0bfa5a486759783d7c8926a309c6b5da9b02dcc6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914983
Commit-Queue: Muyuan Li <muyuanli@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Hector Chavez <lhchavez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536438}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 152,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned long target_load(int cpu, int type)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
unsigned long total = weighted_cpuload(rq);
if (type == 0 || !sched_feat(LB_BIAS))
return total;
return max(rq->cpu_load[type-1], total);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::NavigateToPendingEntry(ReloadType reload_type) {
needs_reload_ = false;
if (pending_entry_index_ != -1 &&
pending_entry_index_ == last_committed_entry_index_ &&
(entries_[pending_entry_index_]->restore_type() == RestoreType::NONE) &&
(entries_[pending_entry_index_]->GetTransitionType() &
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_FORWARD_BACK)) {
delegate_->Stop();
if (delegate_->GetInterstitialPage())
delegate_->GetInterstitialPage()->DontProceed();
DiscardNonCommittedEntries();
return;
}
if (delegate_->GetInterstitialPage()) {
static_cast<InterstitialPageImpl*>(delegate_->GetInterstitialPage())
->CancelForNavigation();
}
NavigationEntryImpl* last_navigation =
last_pending_entry_ ? last_pending_entry_ : GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (reload_type == ReloadType::NONE && last_navigation && pending_entry_ &&
ShouldTreatNavigationAsReload(pending_entry_) &&
!last_navigation->ssl_error() &&
last_transient_entry_index_ == -1 &&
pending_entry_->frame_tree_node_id() == -1 &&
pending_entry_->GetURL() == last_navigation->GetURL() &&
!pending_entry_->GetHasPostData() && !last_navigation->GetHasPostData() &&
last_navigation->GetVirtualURL() == pending_entry_->GetVirtualURL() &&
(pending_entry_->GetURL().SchemeIs(url::kDataScheme) &&
pending_entry_->GetBaseURLForDataURL().is_valid()
? pending_entry_->GetBaseURLForDataURL() ==
last_navigation->GetBaseURLForDataURL()
: true)) {
reload_type = ReloadType::NORMAL;
}
if (last_pending_entry_index_ == -1 && last_pending_entry_)
delete last_pending_entry_;
last_transient_entry_index_ = -1;
last_pending_entry_ = nullptr;
last_pending_entry_index_ = -1;
if (!pending_entry_) {
CHECK_NE(pending_entry_index_, -1);
pending_entry_ = entries_[pending_entry_index_].get();
}
if (IsRendererDebugURL(pending_entry_->GetURL())) {
if (!delegate_->GetRenderViewHost()->IsRenderViewLive() &&
!IsInitialNavigation()) {
DiscardNonCommittedEntries();
return;
}
}
CHECK(!in_navigate_to_pending_entry_);
in_navigate_to_pending_entry_ = true;
bool success = NavigateToPendingEntryInternal(reload_type);
in_navigate_to_pending_entry_ = false;
if (!success)
DiscardNonCommittedEntries();
}
Commit Message: Add DumpWithoutCrashing in RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage
This is intended to be reverted after investigating the linked bug.
BUG=688425
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2701523004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450900}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void setup_xaction_handlers(struct smi_info *smi_info)
{
setup_dell_poweredge_bt_xaction_handler(smi_info);
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 90,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool setimpord(ELFOBJ* eobj, ut32 ord, RBinImport *ptr) {
if (!eobj->imports_by_ord || ord >= eobj->imports_by_ord_size) {
return false;
}
if (eobj->imports_by_ord[ord]) {
free (eobj->imports_by_ord[ord]->name);
free (eobj->imports_by_ord[ord]);
}
eobj->imports_by_ord[ord] = r_mem_dup (ptr, sizeof (RBinImport));
eobj->imports_by_ord[ord]->name = strdup (ptr->name);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9904 - crash in r2_hoobr_r_read_le32 (over 9000 entrypoints) and read_le oobread (#9923)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void activityLoggingAccessForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
V8PerContextData* contextData = V8PerContextData::from(info.GetIsolate()->GetCurrentContext());
if (contextData && contextData->activityLogger()) {
v8::Handle<v8::Value> loggerArg[] = { jsValue };
contextData->activityLogger()->log("TestObjectPython.activityLoggingAccessForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute", 1, &loggerArg[0], "Setter");
}
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::activityLoggingAccessForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,088 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::SetContextVisibility(bool is_visible) {
if (!compositor_frame_sink_)
return;
auto* compositor_context = compositor_frame_sink_->context_provider();
if (compositor_context && is_visible != !!compositor_context_visibility_) {
if (is_visible) {
compositor_context_visibility_ =
compositor_context->CacheController()->ClientBecameVisible();
} else {
compositor_context->CacheController()->ClientBecameNotVisible(
std::move(compositor_context_visibility_));
}
}
auto* worker_context = compositor_frame_sink_->worker_context_provider();
if (worker_context && is_visible != !!worker_context_visibility_) {
ContextProvider::ScopedContextLock hold(worker_context);
if (is_visible) {
worker_context_visibility_ =
worker_context->CacheController()->ClientBecameVisible();
} else {
worker_context->CacheController()->ClientBecameNotVisible(
std::move(worker_context_visibility_));
}
}
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderBlock::createsBlockFormattingContext() const
{
return isInlineBlockOrInlineTable() || isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned() || hasOverflowClip() || (parent() && parent()->isFlexibleBoxIncludingDeprecated())
|| style()->specifiesColumns() || isRenderFlowThread() || isTableCell() || isTableCaption() || isFieldset() || isWritingModeRoot() || isDocumentElement() || style()->columnSpan();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,191 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: root_distance(peer_t *p)
{
/* The root synchronization distance is the maximum error due to
* all causes of the local clock relative to the primary server.
* It is defined as half the total delay plus total dispersion
* plus peer jitter.
*/
return MAXD(MINDISP, p->lastpkt_rootdelay + p->lastpkt_delay) / 2
+ p->lastpkt_rootdisp
+ p->filter_dispersion
+ FREQ_TOLERANCE * (G.cur_time - p->lastpkt_recv_time)
+ p->filter_jitter;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mobility_opt_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const unsigned len)
{
unsigned i, optlen;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += optlen) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i]);
if (bp[i] == IP6MOPT_PAD1)
optlen = 1;
else {
if (i + 1 < len) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + 1]);
optlen = bp[i + 1] + 2;
}
else
goto trunc;
}
if (i + optlen > len)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + optlen]);
switch (bp[i]) {
case IP6MOPT_PAD1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(pad1)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_PADN:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_REFRESH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_REFRESH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: %u)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]) << 2));
break;
case IP6MOPT_ALTCOA:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_ALTCOA_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(altcoa: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(alt-CoA: %s)", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[i+2])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_NONCEID:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_NONCEID_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: ho=0x%04x co=0x%04x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+4])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_AUTH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_AUTH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth)"));
break;
default:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(sopt_type %u: trunc)", bp[i]));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(type-0x%02x: len=%u)", bp[i], bp[i + 1]));
break;
}
}
return 0;
trunc:
return 1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13009/IPv6 mobility: Add a bounds check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it:
Add a comment giving the RFC for IPv6 mobility headers.
Clean up some bounds checks to make it clearer what they're checking, by
matching the subsequent EXTRACT_ calls or memcpy.
For the binding update, if none of the flag bits are set, don't check
the individual flag bits.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int usb_hub_init(void)
{
if (usb_register(&hub_driver) < 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: can't register hub driver\n",
usbcore_name);
return -1;
}
/*
* The workqueue needs to be freezable to avoid interfering with
* USB-PERSIST port handover. Otherwise it might see that a full-speed
* device was gone before the EHCI controller had handed its port
* over to the companion full-speed controller.
*/
hub_wq = alloc_workqueue("usb_hub_wq", WQ_FREEZABLE, 0);
if (hub_wq)
return 0;
/* Fall through if kernel_thread failed */
usb_deregister(&hub_driver);
pr_err("%s: can't allocate workqueue for usb hub\n", usbcore_name);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vfat_cmp(const struct dentry *parent, const struct inode *pinode,
const struct dentry *dentry, const struct inode *inode,
unsigned int len, const char *str, const struct qstr *name)
{
unsigned int alen, blen;
/* A filename cannot end in '.' or we treat it like it has none */
alen = vfat_striptail_len(name);
blen = __vfat_striptail_len(len, str);
if (alen == blen) {
if (strncmp(name->name, str, alen) == 0)
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: NLS: improve UTF8 -> UTF16 string conversion routine
The utf8s_to_utf16s conversion routine needs to be improved. Unlike
its utf16s_to_utf8s sibling, it doesn't accept arguments specifying
the maximum length of the output buffer or the endianness of its
16-bit output.
This patch (as1501) adds the two missing arguments, and adjusts the
only two places in the kernel where the function is called. A
follow-on patch will add a third caller that does utilize the new
capabilities.
The two conversion routines are still annoyingly inconsistent in the
way they handle invalid byte combinations. But that's a subject for a
different patch.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
CC: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 33,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::PrepareBitmapCopyOutputResult(
const gfx::Size& dst_size_in_pixel,
const SkColorType color_type,
const base::Callback<void(bool, const SkBitmap&)>& callback,
scoped_ptr<cc::CopyOutputResult> result) {
if (color_type != kN32_SkColorType) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
callback.Run(false, SkBitmap());
return;
}
DCHECK(result->HasBitmap());
scoped_ptr<SkBitmap> source = result->TakeBitmap();
DCHECK(source);
SkBitmap bitmap = skia::ImageOperations::Resize(
*source,
skia::ImageOperations::RESIZE_BEST,
dst_size_in_pixel.width(),
dst_size_in_pixel.height());
callback.Run(true, bitmap);
}
Commit Message: repairs CopyFromCompositingSurface in HighDPI
This CL removes the DIP=>Pixel transform in
DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurface(), because said
transformation seems to be happening later in the copy logic
and is currently being applied twice.
BUG=397708
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/421293002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286414 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __nfs4_find_state_byowner(struct inode *inode, struct nfs4_state_owner *owner)
{
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(inode);
struct nfs4_state *state;
list_for_each_entry(state, &nfsi->open_states, inode_states) {
if (state->owner != owner)
continue;
if (atomic_inc_not_zero(&state->count))
return state;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DoReplaceStateWhilePending(Shell* shell,
const GURL& start_url,
const GURL& stalled_url,
const std::string& replace_state_filename) {
NavigationControllerImpl& controller =
static_cast<NavigationControllerImpl&>(
shell->web_contents()->GetController());
FrameTreeNode* root =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(shell->web_contents())->
GetFrameTree()->root();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell, start_url));
NavigationStallDelegate stall_delegate(stalled_url);
ResourceDispatcherHost::Get()->SetDelegate(&stall_delegate);
controller.LoadURL(
stalled_url, Referrer(), ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK, std::string());
NavigationEntryImpl* entry = controller.GetPendingEntry();
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, entry);
EXPECT_EQ(stalled_url, entry->GetURL());
{
FrameNavigateParamsCapturer capturer(root);
capturer.set_wait_for_load(false);
std::string script =
"history.replaceState({}, '', '" + replace_state_filename + "')";
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecuteScript(root, script));
capturer.Wait();
EXPECT_EQ(NAVIGATION_TYPE_EXISTING_PAGE, capturer.navigation_type());
EXPECT_TRUE(capturer.is_same_document());
}
ResourceDispatcherHost::Get()->SetDelegate(nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 150,401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _exsltDateAdd (exsltDateValPtr dt, exsltDateValPtr dur)
{
exsltDateValPtr ret;
long carry, tempdays, temp;
exsltDateValDatePtr r, d;
exsltDateValDurationPtr u;
if ((dt == NULL) || (dur == NULL))
return NULL;
ret = exsltDateCreateDate(dt->type);
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
r = &(ret->value.date);
d = &(dt->value.date);
u = &(dur->value.dur);
/* normalization */
if (d->mon == 0)
d->mon = 1;
/* normalize for time zone offset */
u->sec -= (d->tzo * 60); /* changed from + to - (bug 153000) */
d->tzo = 0;
/* normalization */
if (d->day == 0)
d->day = 1;
/* month */
carry = d->mon + u->mon;
r->mon = (unsigned int)MODULO_RANGE(carry, 1, 13);
carry = (long)FQUOTIENT_RANGE(carry, 1, 13);
/* year (may be modified later) */
r->year = d->year + carry;
if (r->year == 0) {
if (d->year > 0)
r->year--;
else
r->year++;
}
/* time zone */
r->tzo = d->tzo;
r->tz_flag = d->tz_flag;
/* seconds */
r->sec = d->sec + u->sec;
carry = (long)FQUOTIENT((long)r->sec, 60);
if (r->sec != 0.0) {
r->sec = MODULO(r->sec, 60.0);
}
/* minute */
carry += d->min;
r->min = (unsigned int)MODULO(carry, 60);
carry = (long)FQUOTIENT(carry, 60);
/* hours */
carry += d->hour;
r->hour = (unsigned int)MODULO(carry, 24);
carry = (long)FQUOTIENT(carry, 24);
/*
* days
* Note we use tempdays because the temporary values may need more
* than 5 bits
*/
if ((VALID_YEAR(r->year)) && (VALID_MONTH(r->mon)) &&
(d->day > MAX_DAYINMONTH(r->year, r->mon)))
tempdays = MAX_DAYINMONTH(r->year, r->mon);
else if (d->day < 1)
tempdays = 1;
else
tempdays = d->day;
tempdays += u->day + carry;
while (1) {
if (tempdays < 1) {
long tmon = (long)MODULO_RANGE((int)r->mon-1, 1, 13);
long tyr = r->year + (long)FQUOTIENT_RANGE((int)r->mon-1, 1, 13);
if (tyr == 0)
tyr--;
/*
* Coverity detected an overrun in daysInMonth
* of size 12 at position 12 with index variable "((r)->mon - 1)"
*/
if (tmon < 0)
tmon = 0;
if (tmon > 12)
tmon = 12;
tempdays += MAX_DAYINMONTH(tyr, tmon);
carry = -1;
} else if (tempdays > (long)MAX_DAYINMONTH(r->year, r->mon)) {
tempdays = tempdays - MAX_DAYINMONTH(r->year, r->mon);
carry = 1;
} else
break;
temp = r->mon + carry;
r->mon = (unsigned int)MODULO_RANGE(temp, 1, 13);
r->year = r->year + (long)FQUOTIENT_RANGE(temp, 1, 13);
if (r->year == 0) {
if (temp < 1)
r->year--;
else
r->year++;
}
}
r->day = tempdays;
/*
* adjust the date/time type to the date values
*/
if (ret->type != XS_DATETIME) {
if ((r->hour) || (r->min) || (r->sec))
ret->type = XS_DATETIME;
else if (ret->type != XS_DATE) {
if (r->day != 1)
ret->type = XS_DATE;
else if ((ret->type != XS_GYEARMONTH) && (r->mon != 1))
ret->type = XS_GYEARMONTH;
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_li_info_new(void)
{
struct ext4_lazy_init *eli = NULL;
eli = kzalloc(sizeof(*eli), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!eli)
return -ENOMEM;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&eli->li_request_list);
mutex_init(&eli->li_list_mtx);
eli->li_state |= EXT4_LAZYINIT_QUIT;
ext4_li_info = eli;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint32_t virtio_net_bad_features(VirtIODevice *vdev)
{
uint32_t features = 0;
/* Linux kernel 2.6.25. It understood MAC (as everyone must),
* but also these: */
features |= (1 << VIRTIO_NET_F_MAC);
features |= (1 << VIRTIO_NET_F_CSUM);
features |= (1 << VIRTIO_NET_F_HOST_TSO4);
features |= (1 << VIRTIO_NET_F_HOST_TSO6);
features |= (1 << VIRTIO_NET_F_HOST_ECN);
return features;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long copy_vsx_to_user(void __user *to,
struct task_struct *task)
{
u64 buf[ELF_NVSRHALFREG];
int i;
/* save FPR copy to local buffer then write to the thread_struct */
for (i = 0; i < ELF_NVSRHALFREG; i++)
buf[i] = task->thread.fp_state.fpr[i][TS_VSRLOWOFFSET];
return __copy_to_user(to, buf, ELF_NVSRHALFREG * sizeof(double));
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Block signal return setting invalid MSR state
Currently we allow both the MSR T and S bits to be set by userspace on
a signal return. Unfortunately this is a reserved configuration and
will cause a TM Bad Thing exception if attempted (via rfid).
This patch checks for this case in both the 32 and 64 bit signals
code. If both T and S are set, we mark the context as invalid.
Found using a syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 56,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long VideoTrack::Parse(Segment* pSegment, const Info& info,
long long element_start, long long element_size,
VideoTrack*& pResult) {
if (pResult)
return -1;
if (info.type != Track::kVideo)
return -1;
long long width = 0;
long long height = 0;
long long display_width = 0;
long long display_height = 0;
long long display_unit = 0;
long long stereo_mode = 0;
double rate = 0.0;
IMkvReader* const pReader = pSegment->m_pReader;
const Settings& s = info.settings;
assert(s.start >= 0);
assert(s.size >= 0);
long long pos = s.start;
assert(pos >= 0);
const long long stop = pos + s.size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x30) { // pixel width
width = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (width <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x3A) { // pixel height
height = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (height <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x14B0) { // display width
display_width = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (display_width <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x14BA) { // display height
display_height = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (display_height <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x14B2) { // display unit
display_unit = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (display_unit < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x13B8) { // stereo mode
stereo_mode = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (stereo_mode < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x0383E3) { // frame rate
const long status = UnserializeFloat(pReader, pos, size, rate);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (rate <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (pos != stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
VideoTrack* const pTrack =
new (std::nothrow) VideoTrack(pSegment, element_start, element_size);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return -1; // generic error
const int status = info.Copy(pTrack->m_info);
if (status) { // error
delete pTrack;
return status;
}
pTrack->m_width = width;
pTrack->m_height = height;
pTrack->m_display_width = display_width;
pTrack->m_display_height = display_height;
pTrack->m_display_unit = display_unit;
pTrack->m_stereo_mode = stereo_mode;
pTrack->m_rate = rate;
pResult = pTrack;
return 0; // success
}
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 164,276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadFileManager::CancelDownload(DownloadId global_id) {
VLOG(20) << __FUNCTION__ << "()" << " id = " << global_id;
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
DownloadFileMap::iterator it = downloads_.find(global_id);
if (it == downloads_.end())
return;
DownloadFile* download_file = it->second;
VLOG(20) << __FUNCTION__ << "()"
<< " download_file = " << download_file->DebugString();
download_file->Cancel();
EraseDownload(global_id);
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
{
__u32 tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
if (r->pull && r->entropy_count < nbytes * 8 &&
r->entropy_count < r->poolinfo->POOLBITS) {
/* If we're limited, always leave two wakeup worth's BITS */
int rsvd = r->limit ? 0 : random_read_wakeup_thresh/4;
int bytes = nbytes;
/* pull at least as many as BYTES as wakeup BITS */
bytes = max_t(int, bytes, random_read_wakeup_thresh / 8);
/* but never more than the buffer size */
bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(tmp));
DEBUG_ENT("going to reseed %s with %d bits "
"(%d of %d requested)\n",
r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8, r->entropy_count);
bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes,
random_read_wakeup_thresh / 8, rsvd);
mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes);
credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8);
}
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int qib_sdma_get_inflight(struct qib_user_sdma_queue *pq,
u32 __user *inflightp)
{
const u32 val = qib_user_sdma_inflight_counter(pq);
if (put_user(val, inflightp))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionInstalledBubbleGtk::BubbleClosing(BubbleGtk* bubble,
bool closed_by_escape) {
if (extension_ && type_ == PAGE_ACTION) {
BrowserWindowGtk* browser_window =
BrowserWindowGtk::GetBrowserWindowForNativeWindow(
browser_->window()->GetNativeHandle());
LocationBarViewGtk* location_bar_view =
browser_window->GetToolbar()->GetLocationBarView();
location_bar_view->SetPreviewEnabledPageAction(extension_->page_action(),
false); // preview_enabled
}
MessageLoopForUI::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ExtensionInstalledBubbleGtk::Close, this));
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderViewImpl::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
WebFrame* main_frame = webview() ? webview()->mainFrame() : NULL;
if (main_frame)
GetContentClient()->SetActiveURL(main_frame->document().url());
ObserverListBase<RenderViewObserver>::Iterator it(observers_);
RenderViewObserver* observer;
while ((observer = it.GetNext()) != NULL)
if (observer->OnMessageReceived(message))
return true;
bool handled = true;
bool msg_is_ok = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_EX(RenderViewImpl, message, msg_is_ok)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Navigate, OnNavigate)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Stop, OnStop)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ReloadFrame, OnReloadFrame)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Undo, OnUndo)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Redo, OnRedo)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Cut, OnCut)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Copy, OnCopy)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Paste, OnPaste)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_PasteAndMatchStyle, OnPasteAndMatchStyle)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Replace, OnReplace)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ReplaceMisspelling, OnReplaceMisspelling)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Delete, OnDelete)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetName, OnSetName)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SelectAll, OnSelectAll)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Unselect, OnUnselect)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetEditableSelectionOffsets,
OnSetEditableSelectionOffsets)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetCompositionFromExistingText,
OnSetCompositionFromExistingText)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ExtendSelectionAndDelete,
OnExtendSelectionAndDelete)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SelectRange, OnSelectRange)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_MoveCaret, OnMoveCaret)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_CopyImageAt, OnCopyImageAt)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ExecuteEditCommand, OnExecuteEditCommand)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Find, OnFind)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_StopFinding, OnStopFinding)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_Zoom, OnZoom)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetZoomLevel, OnSetZoomLevel)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ZoomFactor, OnZoomFactor)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetZoomLevelForLoadingURL,
OnSetZoomLevelForLoadingURL)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetPageEncoding, OnSetPageEncoding)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ResetPageEncodingToDefault,
OnResetPageEncodingToDefault)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ScriptEvalRequest, OnScriptEvalRequest)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_PostMessageEvent, OnPostMessageEvent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_CSSInsertRequest, OnCSSInsertRequest)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_TargetDragEnter, OnDragTargetDragEnter)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_TargetDragOver, OnDragTargetDragOver)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_TargetDragLeave, OnDragTargetDragLeave)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_TargetDrop, OnDragTargetDrop)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_SourceEndedOrMoved, OnDragSourceEndedOrMoved)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragMsg_SourceSystemDragEnded,
OnDragSourceSystemDragEnded)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_AllowBindings, OnAllowBindings)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetInitialFocus, OnSetInitialFocus)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ScrollFocusedEditableNodeIntoRect,
OnScrollFocusedEditableNodeIntoRect)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_UpdateTargetURL_ACK, OnUpdateTargetURLAck)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_UpdateWebPreferences, OnUpdateWebPreferences)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_TimezoneChange, OnUpdateTimezone)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetAltErrorPageURL, OnSetAltErrorPageURL)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_EnumerateDirectoryResponse,
OnEnumerateDirectoryResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_RunFileChooserResponse, OnFileChooserResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ShouldClose, OnShouldClose)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SwapOut, OnSwapOut)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ClosePage, OnClosePage)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ThemeChanged, OnThemeChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_DisassociateFromPopupCount,
OnDisassociateFromPopupCount)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_MoveOrResizeStarted, OnMoveOrResizeStarted)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ClearFocusedNode, OnClearFocusedNode)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetBackground, OnSetBackground)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_EnablePreferredSizeChangedMode,
OnEnablePreferredSizeChangedMode)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_EnableAutoResize, OnEnableAutoResize)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_DisableAutoResize, OnDisableAutoResize)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_DisableScrollbarsForSmallWindows,
OnDisableScrollbarsForSmallWindows)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetRendererPrefs, OnSetRendererPrefs)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_MediaPlayerActionAt, OnMediaPlayerActionAt)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_OrientationChangeEvent,
OnOrientationChangeEvent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_PluginActionAt, OnPluginActionAt)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetActive, OnSetActive)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetNavigationStartTime,
OnSetNavigationStartTime)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetEditCommandsForNextKeyEvent,
OnSetEditCommandsForNextKeyEvent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_CustomContextMenuAction,
OnCustomContextMenuAction)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_AsyncOpenFile_ACK, OnAsyncFileOpened)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_PpapiBrokerChannelCreated,
OnPpapiBrokerChannelCreated)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_PpapiBrokerPermissionResult,
OnPpapiBrokerPermissionResult)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_GetAllSavableResourceLinksForCurrentPage,
OnGetAllSavableResourceLinksForCurrentPage)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(
ViewMsg_GetSerializedHtmlDataForCurrentPageWithLocalLinks,
OnGetSerializedHtmlDataForCurrentPageWithLocalLinks)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ContextMenuClosed, OnContextMenuClosed)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetHistoryLengthAndPrune,
OnSetHistoryLengthAndPrune)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_EnableViewSourceMode, OnEnableViewSourceMode)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(JavaBridgeMsg_Init, OnJavaBridgeInit)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetAccessibilityMode, OnSetAccessibilityMode)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_DisownOpener, OnDisownOpener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_UpdateFrameTree, OnUpdatedFrameTree)
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ActivateNearestFindResult,
OnActivateNearestFindResult)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_FindMatchRects, OnFindMatchRects)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SelectPopupMenuItems, OnSelectPopupMenuItems)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ViewMsg_SynchronousFind, OnSynchronousFind)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_UndoScrollFocusedEditableNodeIntoView,
OnUndoScrollFocusedEditableNodeIntoRect)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_EnableHidingTopControls,
OnEnableHidingTopControls)
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_CopyToFindPboard, OnCopyToFindPboard)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_PluginImeCompositionCompleted,
OnPluginImeCompositionCompleted)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SelectPopupMenuItem, OnSelectPopupMenuItem)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetInLiveResize, OnSetInLiveResize)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetWindowVisibility, OnSetWindowVisibility)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_WindowFrameChanged, OnWindowFrameChanged)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_ReleaseDisambiguationPopupDIB,
OnReleaseDisambiguationPopupDIB)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_WindowSnapshotCompleted,
OnWindowSnapshotCompleted)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = RenderWidget::OnMessageReceived(message))
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
if (!msg_is_ok) {
CHECK(false) << "Unable to deserialize message in RenderViewImpl.";
}
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int walk_page_buffers( handle_t *handle,
struct buffer_head *head,
unsigned from,
unsigned to,
int *partial,
int (*fn)( handle_t *handle,
struct buffer_head *bh))
{
struct buffer_head *bh;
unsigned block_start, block_end;
unsigned blocksize = head->b_size;
int err, ret = 0;
struct buffer_head *next;
for ( bh = head, block_start = 0;
ret == 0 && (bh != head || !block_start);
block_start = block_end, bh = next)
{
next = bh->b_this_page;
block_end = block_start + blocksize;
if (block_end <= from || block_start >= to) {
if (partial && !buffer_uptodate(bh))
*partial = 1;
continue;
}
err = (*fn)(handle, bh);
if (!ret)
ret = err;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block()
ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block() when reading file in
DIRECT mode to prevent concurrent access to extent tree with
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), which may cause BUGON in the following
situation:
read file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A'
vfs_read
__vfs_read
ocfs2_file_read_iter
generic_file_read_iter
ocfs2_direct_IO
__blockdev_direct_IO
do_blockdev_direct_IO
do_direct_IO
get_more_blocks
ocfs2_get_block
ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks
ocfs2_get_clusters
ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache()
ocfs2_search_extent_list
return the index of record which
contains the v_cluster, that is
v_cluster > rec[i]->e_cpos.
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_mark_extent_written
ocfs2_change_extent_flag
ocfs2_split_extent
...
--> modify the rec[i]->e_cpos, resulting
in v_cluster < rec[i]->e_cpos.
BUG_ON(v_cluster < le32_to_cpu(rec->e_cpos))
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v3]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Fixes: c15471f79506 ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mpage_release_unused_pages(struct mpage_da_data *mpd,
bool invalidate)
{
int nr_pages, i;
pgoff_t index, end;
struct pagevec pvec;
struct inode *inode = mpd->inode;
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
/* This is necessary when next_page == 0. */
if (mpd->first_page >= mpd->next_page)
return;
index = mpd->first_page;
end = mpd->next_page - 1;
if (invalidate) {
ext4_lblk_t start, last;
start = index << (PAGE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
last = end << (PAGE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
ext4_es_remove_extent(inode, start, last - start + 1);
}
pagevec_init(&pvec, 0);
while (index <= end) {
nr_pages = pagevec_lookup(&pvec, mapping, index, PAGEVEC_SIZE);
if (nr_pages == 0)
break;
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
struct page *page = pvec.pages[i];
if (page->index > end)
break;
BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));
BUG_ON(PageWriteback(page));
if (invalidate) {
block_invalidatepage(page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
ClearPageUptodate(page);
}
unlock_page(page);
}
index = pvec.pages[nr_pages - 1]->index + 1;
pagevec_release(&pvec);
}
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix data exposure after a crash
Huang has reported that in his powerfail testing he is seeing stale
block contents in some of recently allocated blocks although he mounts
ext4 in data=ordered mode. After some investigation I have found out
that indeed when delayed allocation is used, we don't add inode to
transaction's list of inodes needing flushing before commit. Originally
we were doing that but commit f3b59291a69d removed the logic with a
flawed argument that it is not needed.
The problem is that although for delayed allocated blocks we write their
contents immediately after allocating them, there is no guarantee that
the IO scheduler or device doesn't reorder things and thus transaction
allocating blocks and attaching them to inode can reach stable storage
before actual block contents. Actually whenever we attach freshly
allocated blocks to inode using a written extent, we should add inode to
transaction's ordered inode list to make sure we properly wait for block
contents to be written before committing the transaction. So that is
what we do in this patch. This also handles other cases where stale data
exposure was possible - like filling hole via mmap in
data=ordered,nodelalloc mode.
The only exception to the above rule are extending direct IO writes where
blkdev_direct_IO() waits for IO to complete before increasing i_size and
thus stale data exposure is not possible. For now we don't complicate
the code with optimizing this special case since the overhead is pretty
low. In case this is observed to be a performance problem we can always
handle it using a special flag to ext4_map_blocks().
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f3b59291a69d0b734be1fc8be489fef2dd846d3d
Reported-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Tested-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 67,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::OnSignedExchangeReceived(
FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node,
base::Optional<const base::UnguessableToken> devtools_navigation_token,
const GURL& outer_request_url,
const network::ResourceResponseHead& outer_response,
const base::Optional<SignedExchangeEnvelope>& envelope,
const scoped_refptr<net::X509Certificate>& certificate,
const base::Optional<net::SSLInfo>& ssl_info,
const std::vector<SignedExchangeError>& errors) {
DispatchToAgents(frame_tree_node,
&protocol::NetworkHandler::OnSignedExchangeReceived,
devtools_navigation_token, outer_request_url, outer_response,
envelope, certificate, ssl_info, errors);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MockOverscrollController* MockOverscrollController::Create(
RenderWidgetHostView* rwhv) {
std::unique_ptr<MockOverscrollControllerImpl> mock =
std::make_unique<MockOverscrollControllerImpl>();
MockOverscrollController* raw_mock = mock.get();
RenderWidgetHostViewAura* rwhva =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewAura*>(rwhv);
rwhva->SetOverscrollControllerForTesting(std::move(mock));
return raw_mock;
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static parse_buffer *buffer_skip_whitespace(parse_buffer * const buffer)
{
if ((buffer == NULL) || (buffer->content == NULL))
{
return NULL;
}
while (can_access_at_index(buffer, 0) && (buffer_at_offset(buffer)[0] <= 32))
{
buffer->offset++;
}
if (buffer->offset == buffer->length)
{
buffer->offset--;
}
return buffer;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 87,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void LimitedToOnlyOneAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V0CustomElementProcessingStack::CallbackDeliveryScope delivery_scope;
V8StringResource<> cpp_value = v8_value;
if (!cpp_value.Prepare())
return;
impl->setAttribute(html_names::kLimitedtoonlyoneattributeAttr, cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestCase& InGuestMode() {
guest_mode = IN_GUEST_MODE;
return *this;
}
Commit Message: [Files app] Fix open new window command
Change background page |launcher| namesspace to use var instead of const
to be accessible in the foreground page.
Test: --gtest_filter="KeyboardOperations/FilesAppBrowserTest.Test/keyboardOpenNewWindow*"
Bug: 933302
Change-Id: I6e8cec2fd96034d8376fb247743adf1818c00adf
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1477469
Commit-Queue: Luciano Pacheco <lucmult@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Noel Gordon <noel@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Luciano Pacheco <lucmult@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Gordon <noel@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#633486}
CWE ID: | 0 | 130,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void floppy_shutdown(struct work_struct *arg)
{
unsigned long flags;
if (initialized)
show_floppy();
cancel_activity();
flags = claim_dma_lock();
fd_disable_dma();
release_dma_lock(flags);
/* avoid dma going to a random drive after shutdown */
if (initialized)
DPRINT("floppy timeout called\n");
FDCS->reset = 1;
if (cont) {
cont->done(0);
cont->redo(); /* this will recall reset when needed */
} else {
pr_info("no cont in shutdown!\n");
process_fd_request();
}
is_alive(__func__, "");
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 39,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsTabFrozen(content::WebContents* content) {
const LifecycleUnitState state =
static_cast<TabLifecycleUnitSource::TabLifecycleUnit*>(
TabLifecycleUnitExternal::FromWebContents(content))
->GetState();
return state == LifecycleUnitState::PENDING_FREEZE ||
state == LifecycleUnitState::FROZEN;
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int inet_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
sock_rps_record_flow(sk);
/* We may need to bind the socket. */
if (!inet_sk(sk)->inet_num && !sk->sk_prot->no_autobind &&
inet_autobind(sk))
return -EAGAIN;
return sk->sk_prot->sendmsg(sk, msg, size);
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 41,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<HTMLCollection> Document::forms()
{
return ensureCachedCollection(DocForms);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,734 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ASN1_template_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
{
ASN1_TLC c;
asn1_tlc_clear_nc(&c);
return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, tt, 0, &c);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 3,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ExecuteMoveParagraphForward(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
frame.Selection().Modify(SelectionModifyAlteration::kMove,
SelectionModifyDirection::kForward,
TextGranularity::kParagraph, SetSelectionBy::kUser);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ContextualSearchFieldTrial::IsNowOnTapBarIntegrationEnabled() {
return GetBooleanParam(
switches::kEnableContextualSearchNowOnTapBarIntegration,
&is_now_on_tap_bar_integration_enabled_cached_,
&is_now_on_tap_bar_integration_enabled_);
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnSerializeAsMHTML(
const FrameMsg_SerializeAsMHTML_Params& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("page-serialization", "RenderFrameImpl::OnSerializeAsMHTML");
base::TimeTicks start_time = base::TimeTicks::Now();
base::File file = IPC::PlatformFileForTransitToFile(params.destination_file);
const WebString mhtml_boundary =
WebString::FromUTF8(params.mhtml_boundary_marker);
DCHECK(!mhtml_boundary.IsEmpty());
std::vector<WebThreadSafeData> mhtml_contents;
std::set<std::string> serialized_resources_uri_digests;
MHTMLPartsGenerationDelegate delegate(params,
&serialized_resources_uri_digests);
MhtmlSaveStatus save_status = MhtmlSaveStatus::SUCCESS;
bool has_some_data = false;
if (IsMainFrame()) {
TRACE_EVENT0("page-serialization",
"RenderFrameImpl::OnSerializeAsMHTML header");
mhtml_contents.emplace_back(WebFrameSerializer::GenerateMHTMLHeader(
mhtml_boundary, GetWebFrame(), &delegate));
if (mhtml_contents.back().IsEmpty())
save_status = MhtmlSaveStatus::FRAME_SERIALIZATION_FORBIDDEN;
else
has_some_data = true;
}
if (save_status == MhtmlSaveStatus::SUCCESS) {
TRACE_EVENT0("page-serialization",
"RenderFrameImpl::OnSerializeAsMHTML parts serialization");
mhtml_contents.emplace_back(WebFrameSerializer::GenerateMHTMLParts(
mhtml_boundary, GetWebFrame(), &delegate));
has_some_data |= !mhtml_contents.back().IsEmpty();
}
base::TimeDelta main_thread_use_time = base::TimeTicks::Now() - start_time;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES(
"PageSerialization.MhtmlGeneration.RendererMainThreadTime.SingleFrame",
main_thread_use_time);
if (save_status == MhtmlSaveStatus::SUCCESS && has_some_data) {
base::PostTaskAndReplyWithResult(
RenderThreadImpl::current()->GetFileThreadTaskRunner().get(), FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&WriteMHTMLToDisk, base::Passed(&mhtml_contents),
base::Passed(&file)),
base::Bind(&RenderFrameImpl::OnWriteMHTMLToDiskComplete,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), params.job_id,
base::Passed(&serialized_resources_uri_digests),
main_thread_use_time));
} else {
file.Close();
OnWriteMHTMLToDiskComplete(params.job_id, serialized_resources_uri_digests,
main_thread_use_time, save_status);
}
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameView::addWidgetToUpdate(RenderEmbeddedObject& object)
{
ASSERT(isInPerformLayout());
Node* node = object.node();
ASSERT(node);
if (isHTMLObjectElement(*node) || isHTMLEmbedElement(*node))
toHTMLPlugInElement(node)->setNeedsWidgetUpdate(true);
m_widgetUpdateSet.add(&object);
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 119,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DOMWindow* DOMWindow::self() const {
if (!GetFrame())
return nullptr;
return GetFrame()->DomWindow();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void skip_mem_dump(void)
{
skip_mem_check_final = true;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,113 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void release_tty(struct tty_struct *tty, int idx)
{
/* This should always be true but check for the moment */
WARN_ON(tty->index != idx);
WARN_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&tty_mutex));
if (tty->ops->shutdown)
tty->ops->shutdown(tty);
tty_free_termios(tty);
tty_driver_remove_tty(tty->driver, tty);
tty->port->itty = NULL;
if (tty->link)
tty->link->port->itty = NULL;
tty_buffer_cancel_work(tty->port);
tty_kref_put(tty->link);
tty_kref_put(tty);
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 55,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport size_t GetQuantumExtent(const Image *image,
const QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const QuantumType quantum_type)
{
size_t
extent,
packet_size;
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
packet_size=1;
switch (quantum_type)
{
case GrayAlphaQuantum: packet_size=2; break;
case IndexAlphaQuantum: packet_size=2; break;
case RGBQuantum: packet_size=3; break;
case BGRQuantum: packet_size=3; break;
case RGBAQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case RGBOQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case BGRAQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case CMYKQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case CMYKAQuantum: packet_size=5; break;
default: break;
}
extent=MagickMax(image->columns,image->rows);
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
return((size_t) (packet_size*extent*((quantum_info->depth+7)/8)));
return((size_t) ((packet_size*extent*quantum_info->depth+7)/8));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/126
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 168,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WandExport MagickBooleanType MagickCommandGenesis(ImageInfo *image_info,
MagickCommand command,int argc,char **argv,char **metadata,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
client_name[MaxTextExtent],
*option;
double
duration,
serial;
MagickBooleanType
concurrent,
regard_warnings,
status;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
iterations,
number_threads;
ssize_t
n;
(void) setlocale(LC_ALL,"");
(void) setlocale(LC_NUMERIC,"C");
GetPathComponent(argv[0],TailPath,client_name);
(void) SetClientName(client_name);
concurrent=MagickFalse;
duration=(-1.0);
iterations=1;
status=MagickTrue;
regard_warnings=MagickFalse;
for (i=1; i < (ssize_t) (argc-1); i++)
{
option=argv[i];
if ((strlen(option) == 1) || ((*option != '-') && (*option != '+')))
continue;
if (LocaleCompare("-bench",option) == 0)
iterations=StringToUnsignedLong(argv[++i]);
if (LocaleCompare("-concurrent",option) == 0)
concurrent=MagickTrue;
if (LocaleCompare("-debug",option) == 0)
(void) SetLogEventMask(argv[++i]);
if (LocaleCompare("-distribute-cache",option) == 0)
{
DistributePixelCacheServer(StringToInteger(argv[++i]),exception);
exit(0);
}
if (LocaleCompare("-duration",option) == 0)
duration=StringToDouble(argv[++i],(char **) NULL);
if (LocaleCompare("-regard-warnings",option) == 0)
regard_warnings=MagickTrue;
}
if (iterations == 1)
{
char
*text;
text=(char *) NULL;
status=command(image_info,argc,argv,&text,exception);
if (exception->severity != UndefinedException)
{
if ((exception->severity > ErrorException) ||
(regard_warnings != MagickFalse))
status=MagickFalse;
CatchException(exception);
}
if (text != (char *) NULL)
{
if (metadata != (char **) NULL)
(void) ConcatenateString(&(*metadata),text);
text=DestroyString(text);
}
return(status);
}
number_threads=GetOpenMPMaximumThreads();
serial=0.0;
for (n=1; n <= (ssize_t) number_threads; n++)
{
double
e,
parallel,
user_time;
TimerInfo
*timer;
(void) SetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource,(MagickSizeType) n);
timer=AcquireTimerInfo();
if (concurrent == MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) iterations; i++)
{
char
*text;
text=(char *) NULL;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
if (duration > 0)
{
if (GetElapsedTime(timer) > duration)
continue;
(void) ContinueTimer(timer);
}
status=command(image_info,argc,argv,&text,exception);
if (exception->severity != UndefinedException)
{
if ((exception->severity > ErrorException) ||
(regard_warnings != MagickFalse))
status=MagickFalse;
CatchException(exception);
}
if (text != (char *) NULL)
{
if (metadata != (char **) NULL)
(void) ConcatenateString(&(*metadata),text);
text=DestroyString(text);
}
}
}
else
{
SetOpenMPNested(1);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
# pragma omp parallel for shared(status)
#endif
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) iterations; i++)
{
char
*text;
text=(char *) NULL;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
if (duration > 0)
{
if (GetElapsedTime(timer) > duration)
continue;
(void) ContinueTimer(timer);
}
status=command(image_info,argc,argv,&text,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
# pragma omp critical (MagickCore_MagickCommandGenesis)
#endif
{
if (exception->severity != UndefinedException)
{
if ((exception->severity > ErrorException) ||
(regard_warnings != MagickFalse))
status=MagickFalse;
CatchException(exception);
}
if (text != (char *) NULL)
{
if (metadata != (char **) NULL)
(void) ConcatenateString(&(*metadata),text);
text=DestroyString(text);
}
}
}
}
user_time=GetUserTime(timer);
parallel=GetElapsedTime(timer);
e=1.0;
if (n == 1)
serial=parallel;
else
e=((1.0/(1.0/((serial/(serial+parallel))+(1.0-(serial/(serial+parallel)))/
(double) n)))-(1.0/(double) n))/(1.0-1.0/(double) n);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stderr,
" Performance[%.20g]: %.20gi %0.3fips %0.6fe %0.6fu %lu:%02lu.%03lu\n",
(double) n,(double) iterations,(double) iterations/parallel,e,user_time,
(unsigned long) (parallel/60.0),(unsigned long) floor(fmod(parallel,
60.0)),(unsigned long) (1000.0*(parallel-floor(parallel))+0.5));
timer=DestroyTimerInfo(timer);
}
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1623
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 96,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CheckDirCount(TIFF* tif, TIFFDirEntry* dir, uint32 count)
{
if ((uint64)count > dir->tdir_count) {
const TIFFField* fip = TIFFFieldWithTag(tif, dir->tdir_tag);
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata, tif->tif_name,
"incorrect count for field \"%s\" (" TIFF_UINT64_FORMAT ", expecting %u); tag ignored",
fip ? fip->field_name : "unknown tagname",
dir->tdir_count, count);
return (0);
} else if ((uint64)count < dir->tdir_count) {
const TIFFField* fip = TIFFFieldWithTag(tif, dir->tdir_tag);
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata, tif->tif_name,
"incorrect count for field \"%s\" (" TIFF_UINT64_FORMAT ", expecting %u); tag trimmed",
fip ? fip->field_name : "unknown tagname",
dir->tdir_count, count);
dir->tdir_count = count;
return (1);
}
return (1);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,122 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void checkSecurityForNodeVoidMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::checkSecurityForNodeVoidMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,195 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *_time_stamp_to_str(ut32 timeStamp) {
#ifdef _MSC_VER
time_t rawtime;
struct tm *tminfo;
rawtime = (time_t)timeStamp;
tminfo = localtime (&rawtime);
return r_str_trim (strdup (asctime (tminfo)));
#else
struct my_timezone {
int tz_minuteswest; /* minutes west of Greenwich */
int tz_dsttime; /* type of DST correction */
} tz;
struct timeval tv;
int gmtoff;
time_t ts = (time_t) timeStamp;
gettimeofday (&tv, (void*) &tz);
gmtoff = (int) (tz.tz_minuteswest * 60); // in seconds
ts += (time_t)gmtoff;
return r_str_trim (strdup (ctime (&ts)));
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in pe
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DECL_PIOCTL(PNoop)
{
AFS_STATCNT(PNoop);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 14,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int SWFInput_stream_eof(SWFInput input)
{
return ((input->offset >= input->length) ? feof((FILE *)input->data) : 0);
}
Commit Message: Fix left shift of a negative value in SWFInput_readSBits. Check for number before before left-shifting by (number-1).
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 89,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: megasas_build_dcdb(struct megasas_instance *instance, struct scsi_cmnd *scp,
struct megasas_cmd *cmd)
{
u32 is_logical;
u32 device_id;
u16 flags = 0;
struct megasas_pthru_frame *pthru;
is_logical = MEGASAS_IS_LOGICAL(scp->device);
device_id = MEGASAS_DEV_INDEX(scp);
pthru = (struct megasas_pthru_frame *)cmd->frame;
if (scp->sc_data_direction == DMA_TO_DEVICE)
flags = MFI_FRAME_DIR_WRITE;
else if (scp->sc_data_direction == DMA_FROM_DEVICE)
flags = MFI_FRAME_DIR_READ;
else if (scp->sc_data_direction == DMA_NONE)
flags = MFI_FRAME_DIR_NONE;
if (instance->flag_ieee == 1) {
flags |= MFI_FRAME_IEEE;
}
/*
* Prepare the DCDB frame
*/
pthru->cmd = (is_logical) ? MFI_CMD_LD_SCSI_IO : MFI_CMD_PD_SCSI_IO;
pthru->cmd_status = 0x0;
pthru->scsi_status = 0x0;
pthru->target_id = device_id;
pthru->lun = scp->device->lun;
pthru->cdb_len = scp->cmd_len;
pthru->timeout = 0;
pthru->pad_0 = 0;
pthru->flags = cpu_to_le16(flags);
pthru->data_xfer_len = cpu_to_le32(scsi_bufflen(scp));
memcpy(pthru->cdb, scp->cmnd, scp->cmd_len);
/*
* If the command is for the tape device, set the
* pthru timeout to the os layer timeout value.
*/
if (scp->device->type == TYPE_TAPE) {
if ((scp->request->timeout / HZ) > 0xFFFF)
pthru->timeout = cpu_to_le16(0xFFFF);
else
pthru->timeout = cpu_to_le16(scp->request->timeout / HZ);
}
/*
* Construct SGL
*/
if (instance->flag_ieee == 1) {
pthru->flags |= cpu_to_le16(MFI_FRAME_SGL64);
pthru->sge_count = megasas_make_sgl_skinny(instance, scp,
&pthru->sgl);
} else if (IS_DMA64) {
pthru->flags |= cpu_to_le16(MFI_FRAME_SGL64);
pthru->sge_count = megasas_make_sgl64(instance, scp,
&pthru->sgl);
} else
pthru->sge_count = megasas_make_sgl32(instance, scp,
&pthru->sgl);
if (pthru->sge_count > instance->max_num_sge) {
dev_err(&instance->pdev->dev, "DCDB too many SGE NUM=%x\n",
pthru->sge_count);
return 0;
}
/*
* Sense info specific
*/
pthru->sense_len = SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE;
pthru->sense_buf_phys_addr_hi =
cpu_to_le32(upper_32_bits(cmd->sense_phys_addr));
pthru->sense_buf_phys_addr_lo =
cpu_to_le32(lower_32_bits(cmd->sense_phys_addr));
/*
* Compute the total number of frames this command consumes. FW uses
* this number to pull sufficient number of frames from host memory.
*/
cmd->frame_count = megasas_get_frame_count(instance, pthru->sge_count,
PTHRU_FRAME);
return cmd->frame_count;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NTSTATUS DriverAddDevice (PDRIVER_OBJECT driverObject, PDEVICE_OBJECT pdo)
{
#if defined(DEBUG) || defined (DEBUG_TRACE)
char nameInfoBuffer[128];
POBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION nameInfo = (POBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION) nameInfoBuffer;
ULONG nameInfoSize;
Dump ("AddDevice pdo=%p type=%x name=%ws\n", pdo, pdo->DeviceType, NT_SUCCESS (ObQueryNameString (pdo, nameInfo, sizeof (nameInfoBuffer), &nameInfoSize)) ? nameInfo->Name.Buffer : L"?");
#endif
if (VolumeClassFilterRegistered && BootArgsValid && BootArgs.HiddenSystemPartitionStart != 0)
{
PWSTR interfaceLinks = NULL;
if (NT_SUCCESS (IoGetDeviceInterfaces (&GUID_DEVINTERFACE_VOLUME, pdo, DEVICE_INTERFACE_INCLUDE_NONACTIVE, &interfaceLinks)) && interfaceLinks)
{
if (interfaceLinks[0] != UNICODE_NULL)
{
Dump ("Volume pdo=%p interface=%ws\n", pdo, interfaceLinks);
ExFreePool (interfaceLinks);
return VolumeFilterAddDevice (driverObject, pdo);
}
ExFreePool (interfaceLinks);
}
}
return DriveFilterAddDevice (driverObject, pdo);
}
Commit Message: Windows: fix low severity vulnerability in driver that allowed reading 3 bytes of kernel stack memory (with a rare possibility of 25 additional bytes). Reported by Tim Harrison.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 87,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int logi_dj_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
struct hid_report *report, u8 *data,
int size)
{
struct dj_receiver_dev *djrcv_dev = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
struct dj_report *dj_report = (struct dj_report *) data;
unsigned long flags;
bool report_processed = false;
dbg_hid("%s, size:%d\n", __func__, size);
/* Here we receive all data coming from iface 2, there are 4 cases:
*
* 1) Data should continue its normal processing i.e. data does not
* come from the DJ collection, in which case we do nothing and
* return 0, so hid-core can continue normal processing (will forward
* to associated hidraw device)
*
* 2) Data is from DJ collection, and is intended for this driver i. e.
* data contains arrival, departure, etc notifications, in which case
* we queue them for delayed processing by the work queue. We return 1
* to hid-core as no further processing is required from it.
*
* 3) Data is from DJ collection, and informs a connection change,
* if the change means rf link loss, then we must send a null report
* to the upper layer to discard potentially pressed keys that may be
* repeated forever by the input layer. Return 1 to hid-core as no
* further processing is required.
*
* 4) Data is from DJ collection and is an actual input event from
* a paired DJ device in which case we forward it to the correct hid
* device (via hid_input_report() ) and return 1 so hid-core does not do
* anything else with it.
*/
spin_lock_irqsave(&djrcv_dev->lock, flags);
if (dj_report->report_id == REPORT_ID_DJ_SHORT) {
switch (dj_report->report_type) {
case REPORT_TYPE_NOTIF_DEVICE_PAIRED:
case REPORT_TYPE_NOTIF_DEVICE_UNPAIRED:
logi_dj_recv_queue_notification(djrcv_dev, dj_report);
break;
case REPORT_TYPE_NOTIF_CONNECTION_STATUS:
if (dj_report->report_params[CONNECTION_STATUS_PARAM_STATUS] ==
STATUS_LINKLOSS) {
logi_dj_recv_forward_null_report(djrcv_dev, dj_report);
}
break;
default:
logi_dj_recv_forward_report(djrcv_dev, dj_report);
}
report_processed = true;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&djrcv_dev->lock, flags);
return report_processed;
}
Commit Message: HID: logitech: perform bounds checking on device_id early enough
device_index is a char type and the size of paired_dj_deivces is 7
elements, therefore proper bounds checking has to be applied to
device_index before it is used.
We are currently performing the bounds checking in
logi_dj_recv_add_djhid_device(), which is too late, as malicious device
could send REPORT_TYPE_NOTIF_DEVICE_UNPAIRED early enough and trigger the
problem in one of the report forwarding functions called from
logi_dj_raw_event().
Fix this by performing the check at the earliest possible ocasion in
logi_dj_raw_event().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 166,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ReportAboutFlagsHistogramFeatures(const std::string& uma_histogram_name,
const std::set<std::string>&features) {
for (const std::string& feature : features) {
int uma_id = GetSwitchUMAId(feature);
DVLOG(1) << "ReportAboutFlagsHistogram(): histogram='" << uma_histogram_name
<< "' '" << feature << "', uma_id=" << uma_id;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY(uma_histogram_name, uma_id);
}
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ToHistogramSample(AutofillMetrics::CardUploadDecisionMetric metric) {
for (int sample = 0; sample < metric + 1; ++sample)
if (metric & (1 << sample))
return sample;
NOTREACHED();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ProfilingProcessHost::SetRendererSamplingAlwaysProfileForTest() {
always_sample_for_tests_ = true;
}
Commit Message: [Reland #1] Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
The original CL added a javatest and its dependencies to the apk_under_test.
This causes the dependencies to be stripped from the instrumentation_apk, which
causes issue. This CL updates the build configuration so that the javatest and
its dependencies are only added to the instrumentation_apk.
This is a reland of e0b4355f0651adb1ebc2c513dc4410471af712f5
Original change's description:
> Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
>
> This CL has three components:
> 1) The bulk of the logic in OOP HP was refactored into ProfilingTestDriver.
> 2) Adds a java instrumentation test, along with a JNI shim that forwards into
> ProfilingTestDriver.
> 3) Creates a new apk: chrome_public_apk_for_test that contains the same
> content as chrome_public_apk, as well as native files needed for (2).
> chrome_public_apk_test now targets chrome_public_apk_for_test instead of
> chrome_public_apk.
>
> Other ideas, discarded:
> * Originally, I attempted to make the browser_tests target runnable on
> Android. The primary problem is that native test harness cannot fork
> or spawn processes. This is difficult to solve.
>
> More details on each of the components:
> (1) ProfilingTestDriver
> * The TracingController test was migrated to use ProfilingTestDriver, but the
> write-to-file test was left as-is. The latter behavior will likely be phased
> out, but I'll clean that up in a future CL.
> * gtest isn't supported for Android instrumentation tests. ProfilingTestDriver
> has a single function RunTest that returns a 'bool' indicating success. On
> failure, the class uses LOG(ERROR) to print the nature of the error. This will
> cause the error to be printed out on browser_test error. On instrumentation
> test failure, the error will be forwarded to logcat, which is available on all
> infra bot test runs.
> (2) Instrumentation test
> * For now, I only added a single test for the "browser" mode. Furthermore, I'm
> only testing the start with command-line path.
> (3) New apk
> * libchromefortest is a new shared library that contains all content from
> libchrome, but also contains native sources for the JNI shim.
> * chrome_public_apk_for_test is a new apk that contains all content from
> chrome_public_apk, but uses a single shared library libchromefortest rather
> than libchrome. This also contains java sources for the JNI shim.
> * There is no way to just add a second shared library to chrome_public_apk
> that just contains the native sources from the JNI shim without causing ODR
> issues.
> * chrome_public_test_apk now has apk_under_test = chrome_public_apk_for_test.
> * There is no way to add native JNI sources as a shared library to
> chrome_public_test_apk without causing ODR issues.
>
> Finally, this CL drastically increases the timeout to wait for native
> initialization. The previous timeout was 2 *
> CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL, which flakily failed for this test.
> This suggests that this step/timeout is generally flaky. I increased the timeout
> to 20 * CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL.
>
> Bug: 753218
> Change-Id: Ic224b7314fff57f1770a4048aa5753f54e040b55
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/770148
> Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Brett Wilson <brettw@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517541}
Bug: 753218
TBR: brettw@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ic6aafb34c2467253f75cc85da48200d19f3bc9af
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/777697
Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517850}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 150,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoundChannel::stop_l()
{
if (doStop_l()) {
mSoundPool->done_l(this);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE SoundPool: add lock for findSample access from SoundPoolThread
Sample decoding still occurs in SoundPoolThread
without holding the SoundPool lock.
Bug: 25781119
Change-Id: I11fde005aa9cf5438e0390a0d2dfe0ec1dd282e8
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CCThreadProxy::drawLayersOnCCThread()
{
TRACE_EVENT("CCThreadProxy::drawLayersOnCCThread", this, 0);
ASSERT(isImplThread());
ASSERT(m_layerTreeHostImpl);
m_layerTreeHostImpl->drawLayers();
ASSERT(!m_layerTreeHostImpl->isContextLost());
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GDataFile::GDataFile(GDataDirectory* parent, GDataRootDirectory* root)
: GDataEntry(parent, root),
kind_(DocumentEntry::UNKNOWN),
is_hosted_document_(false) {
file_info_.is_directory = false;
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mcryptd_create_hash(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb,
struct mcryptd_queue *queue)
{
struct hashd_instance_ctx *ctx;
struct ahash_instance *inst;
struct hash_alg_common *halg;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
u32 type = 0;
u32 mask = 0;
int err;
mcryptd_check_internal(tb, &type, &mask);
halg = ahash_attr_alg(tb[1], type, mask);
if (IS_ERR(halg))
return PTR_ERR(halg);
alg = &halg->base;
pr_debug("crypto: mcryptd hash alg: %s\n", alg->cra_name);
inst = mcryptd_alloc_instance(alg, ahash_instance_headroom(),
sizeof(*ctx));
err = PTR_ERR(inst);
if (IS_ERR(inst))
goto out_put_alg;
ctx = ahash_instance_ctx(inst);
ctx->queue = queue;
err = crypto_init_ahash_spawn(&ctx->spawn, halg,
ahash_crypto_instance(inst));
if (err)
goto out_free_inst;
type = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
if (alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL)
type |= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL;
inst->alg.halg.base.cra_flags = type;
inst->alg.halg.digestsize = halg->digestsize;
inst->alg.halg.statesize = halg->statesize;
inst->alg.halg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct mcryptd_hash_ctx);
inst->alg.halg.base.cra_init = mcryptd_hash_init_tfm;
inst->alg.halg.base.cra_exit = mcryptd_hash_exit_tfm;
inst->alg.init = mcryptd_hash_init_enqueue;
inst->alg.update = mcryptd_hash_update_enqueue;
inst->alg.final = mcryptd_hash_final_enqueue;
inst->alg.finup = mcryptd_hash_finup_enqueue;
inst->alg.export = mcryptd_hash_export;
inst->alg.import = mcryptd_hash_import;
inst->alg.setkey = mcryptd_hash_setkey;
inst->alg.digest = mcryptd_hash_digest_enqueue;
err = ahash_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
if (err) {
crypto_drop_ahash(&ctx->spawn);
out_free_inst:
kfree(inst);
}
out_put_alg:
crypto_mod_put(alg);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: mcryptd - Check mcryptd algorithm compatibility
Algorithms not compatible with mcryptd could be spawned by mcryptd
with a direct crypto_alloc_tfm invocation using a "mcryptd(alg)" name
construct. This causes mcryptd to crash the kernel if an arbitrary
"alg" is incompatible and not intended to be used with mcryptd. It is
an issue if AF_ALG tries to spawn mcryptd(alg) to expose it externally.
But such algorithms must be used internally and not be exposed.
We added a check to enforce that only internal algorithms are allowed
with mcryptd at the time mcryptd is spawning an algorithm.
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=148063683310477&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 168,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kvm_deassign_ioeventfd_idx(struct kvm *kvm, enum kvm_bus bus_idx,
struct kvm_ioeventfd *args)
{
struct _ioeventfd *p, *tmp;
struct eventfd_ctx *eventfd;
struct kvm_io_bus *bus;
int ret = -ENOENT;
eventfd = eventfd_ctx_fdget(args->fd);
if (IS_ERR(eventfd))
return PTR_ERR(eventfd);
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(p, tmp, &kvm->ioeventfds, list) {
bool wildcard = !(args->flags & KVM_IOEVENTFD_FLAG_DATAMATCH);
if (p->bus_idx != bus_idx ||
p->eventfd != eventfd ||
p->addr != args->addr ||
p->length != args->len ||
p->wildcard != wildcard)
continue;
if (!p->wildcard && p->datamatch != args->datamatch)
continue;
kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, bus_idx, &p->dev);
bus = kvm_get_bus(kvm, bus_idx);
if (bus)
bus->ioeventfd_count--;
ioeventfd_release(p);
ret = 0;
break;
}
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
eventfd_ctx_put(eventfd);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Don't accept obviously wrong gsi values via KVM_IRQFD
We cannot add routes for gsi values >= KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES -- see
kvm_set_irq_routing(). Hence, there is no sense in accepting them
via KVM_IRQFD. Prevent them from entering the system in the first
place.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 58,893 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototype::getOwnPropertySlot(JSCell* cell, ExecState* exec, const Identifier& propertyName, PropertySlot& slot)
{
JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototype* thisObject = jsCast<JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototype*>(cell);
return getStaticFunctionSlot<JSObject>(exec, &JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeTable, thisObject, propertyName, slot);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,390 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void EntrySync::trace(Visitor* visitor)
{
EntryBase::trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 115,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::InvalidateMojoConnection() {
registry_.reset();
frame_.reset();
frame_bindings_control_.reset();
frame_host_associated_binding_.Close();
navigation_control_.reset();
mojo_image_downloader_.reset();
geolocation_service_.reset();
sensor_provider_proxy_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::DisabledAttributeChanged() {
TextControlElement::DisabledAttributeChanged();
input_type_view_->DisabledAttributeChanged();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::OnMediaNotification(int64 player_cookie,
bool has_video,
bool has_audio,
bool is_playing) {
if (is_playing) {
scoped_ptr<PowerSaveBlocker> blocker;
if (has_video) {
blocker = PowerSaveBlocker::Create(
PowerSaveBlocker::kPowerSaveBlockPreventDisplaySleep,
"Playing video");
} else if (has_audio) {
blocker = PowerSaveBlocker::Create(
PowerSaveBlocker::kPowerSaveBlockPreventAppSuspension,
"Playing audio");
}
if (blocker)
power_save_blockers_[player_cookie] = blocker.release();
} else {
delete power_save_blockers_[player_cookie];
power_save_blockers_.erase(player_cookie);
}
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,248 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spannable_string_t* WebPage::textBeforeCursor(int32_t length, int32_t flags)
{
return d->m_inputHandler->textBeforeCursor(length, flags);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RedirectHostsToTestData(const char* const urls[], size_t size) {
net::URLRequestFilter* filter = net::URLRequestFilter::GetInstance();
base::FilePath base_path;
GetTestDataDirectory(&base_path);
for (size_t i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
const GURL url(urls[i]);
EXPECT_TRUE(url.is_valid());
filter->AddUrlInterceptor(
url, URLRequestMockHTTPJob::CreateInterceptor(base_path));
}
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const ash::NonClientFrameViewAsh* ClientControlledShellSurface::GetFrameView()
const {
return static_cast<const ash::NonClientFrameViewAsh*>(
widget_->non_client_view()->frame_view());
}
Commit Message: Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 137,683 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::ClearScheduleDCLayerState() {
dc_layer_shared_state_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 145,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: oldgnu_get_sparse_info (struct tar_sparse_file *file)
{
size_t i;
union block *h = current_header;
int ext_p;
enum oldgnu_add_status rc;
file->stat_info->sparse_map_avail = 0;
for (i = 0; i < SPARSES_IN_OLDGNU_HEADER; i++)
{
rc = oldgnu_add_sparse (file, &h->oldgnu_header.sp[i]);
if (rc != add_ok)
break;
}
for (ext_p = h->oldgnu_header.isextended;
rc == add_ok && ext_p; ext_p = h->sparse_header.isextended)
{
h = find_next_block ();
if (!h)
{
ERROR ((0, 0, _("Unexpected EOF in archive")));
return false;
}
set_next_block_after (h);
for (i = 0; i < SPARSES_IN_SPARSE_HEADER && rc == add_ok; i++)
rc = oldgnu_add_sparse (file, &h->sparse_header.sp[i]);
}
if (rc == add_fail)
{
ERROR ((0, 0, _("%s: invalid sparse archive member"),
file->stat_info->orig_file_name));
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 5,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltFreeExtElement(xsltExtElementPtr ext)
{
if (ext == NULL)
return;
xmlFree(ext);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lsi_dma_ti64bit(LSIState *s)
{
if ((s->ccntl1 & LSI_CCNTL1_EN64TIBMV) == LSI_CCNTL1_EN64TIBMV)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 3,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int add_bound_rdev(struct md_rdev *rdev)
{
struct mddev *mddev = rdev->mddev;
int err = 0;
if (!mddev->pers->hot_remove_disk) {
/* If there is hot_add_disk but no hot_remove_disk
* then added disks for geometry changes,
* and should be added immediately.
*/
super_types[mddev->major_version].
validate_super(mddev, rdev);
err = mddev->pers->hot_add_disk(mddev, rdev);
if (err) {
unbind_rdev_from_array(rdev);
export_rdev(rdev);
return err;
}
}
sysfs_notify_dirent_safe(rdev->sysfs_state);
set_bit(MD_CHANGE_DEVS, &mddev->flags);
if (mddev->degraded)
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RECOVER, &mddev->recovery);
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_NEEDED, &mddev->recovery);
md_new_event(mddev);
md_wakeup_thread(mddev->thread);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,357 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static CURLcode findprotocol(struct Curl_easy *data,
struct connectdata *conn,
const char *protostr)
{
const struct Curl_handler *p = Curl_builtin_scheme(protostr);
if(p && /* Protocol found in table. Check if allowed */
(data->set.allowed_protocols & p->protocol)) {
/* it is allowed for "normal" request, now do an extra check if this is
the result of a redirect */
if(data->state.this_is_a_follow &&
!(data->set.redir_protocols & p->protocol))
/* nope, get out */
;
else {
/* Perform setup complement if some. */
conn->handler = conn->given = p;
/* 'port' and 'remote_port' are set in setup_connection_internals() */
return CURLE_OK;
}
}
/* The protocol was not found in the table, but we don't have to assign it
to anything since it is already assigned to a dummy-struct in the
create_conn() function when the connectdata struct is allocated. */
failf(data, "Protocol \"%s\" not supported or disabled in " LIBCURL_NAME,
protostr);
return CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
}
Commit Message: Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 77,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didChangeLoadProgress(double load_progress) {
render_view_->FrameDidChangeLoadProgress(frame_, load_progress);
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,235 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Textfield::SetColor(SkColor value) {
GetRenderText()->SetColor(value);
cursor_view_.layer()->SetColor(value);
SchedulePaint();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,417 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: encode_DEC_TTL(const struct ofpact_cnt_ids *dec_ttl,
enum ofp_version ofp_version, struct ofpbuf *out)
{
if (dec_ttl->ofpact.raw == NXAST_RAW_DEC_TTL_CNT_IDS
|| dec_ttl->n_controllers != 1
|| dec_ttl->cnt_ids[0] != 0) {
struct nx_action_cnt_ids *nac_ids = put_NXAST_DEC_TTL_CNT_IDS(out);
int ids_len = ROUND_UP(2 * dec_ttl->n_controllers, OFP_ACTION_ALIGN);
ovs_be16 *ids;
size_t i;
nac_ids->len = htons(ntohs(nac_ids->len) + ids_len);
nac_ids->n_controllers = htons(dec_ttl->n_controllers);
ids = ofpbuf_put_zeros(out, ids_len);
for (i = 0; i < dec_ttl->n_controllers; i++) {
ids[i] = htons(dec_ttl->cnt_ids[i]);
}
} else {
put_OFPAT_DEC_NW_TTL(out, ofp_version);
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(MultipleIterator, __construct)
{
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern;
zend_long flags = MIT_NEED_ALL|MIT_KEYS_NUMERIC;
if (zend_parse_parameters_throw(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "|l", &flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern = Z_SPLOBJSTORAGE_P(getThis());
intern->flags = flags;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73257 and bug #73258 - SplObjectStorage unserialize allows use of non-object as key
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 73,682 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WeakPtr<Document> Document::contextDocument()
{
if (m_contextDocument)
return m_contextDocument;
if (m_frame)
return m_weakFactory.createWeakPtr();
return WeakPtr<Document>(0);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,648 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.