instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillManager::OnDidFillAutofillFormData(const FormData& form,
const TimeTicks timestamp) {
if (test_delegate_)
test_delegate_->DidFillFormData();
UpdatePendingForm(form);
FormStructure* form_structure = nullptr;
std::set<FormType> form_types;
if (FindCachedForm(form, &form_structure)) {
form_types = form_structure->GetFormTypes();
}
AutofillMetrics::LogUserHappinessMetric(
AutofillMetrics::USER_DID_AUTOFILL, form_types,
client_->GetSecurityLevelForUmaHistograms());
if (!user_did_autofill_) {
user_did_autofill_ = true;
AutofillMetrics::LogUserHappinessMetric(
AutofillMetrics::USER_DID_AUTOFILL_ONCE, form_types,
client_->GetSecurityLevelForUmaHistograms());
}
UpdateInitialInteractionTimestamp(timestamp);
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | 0 | 154,971 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RightAlignedView::ChildPreferredSizeChanged(View* child) {
Layout();
}
Commit Message: [cros] Allow media streaming for OOBE WebUI.
BUG=122764
TEST=Manual with --enable-html5-camera
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144899 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,451 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FilePath GetHomeDir() {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (base::chromeos::IsRunningOnChromeOS())
return FilePath("/home/chronos/user");
#endif
const char* home_dir = getenv("HOME");
if (home_dir && home_dir[0])
return FilePath(home_dir);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
DLOG(WARNING) << "OS_ANDROID: Home directory lookup not yet implemented.";
#else
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
home_dir = g_get_home_dir();
if (home_dir && home_dir[0])
return FilePath(home_dir);
#endif
FilePath rv;
if (file_util::GetTempDir(&rv))
return rv;
return FilePath("/tmp");
}
Commit Message: Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 115,394 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cqspi_write_reg(struct spi_nor *nor, u8 opcode, u8 *buf, int len)
{
int ret;
ret = cqspi_set_protocol(nor, 0);
if (!ret)
ret = cqspi_command_write(nor, opcode, buf, len);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mtd: spi-nor: Off by one in cqspi_setup_flash()
There are CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT elements in the ->f_pdata array so the >
should be >=.
Fixes: 140623410536 ('mtd: spi-nor: Add driver for Cadence Quad SPI Flash Controller')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Cyrille Pitchen <cyrille.pitchen@atmel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 93,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long nfs_inc_attr_generation_counter(void)
{
return atomic_long_inc_return(&nfs_attr_generation_counter);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPreviewContext::IsFinalPageRendered() const {
return static_cast<size_t>(current_page_index_) == pages_to_render_.size();
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const EVP_CIPHER * php_openssl_get_evp_cipher_from_algo(long algo) { /* {{{ */
switch (algo) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
case PHP_OPENSSL_CIPHER_RC2_40:
return EVP_rc2_40_cbc();
break;
case PHP_OPENSSL_CIPHER_RC2_64:
return EVP_rc2_64_cbc();
break;
case PHP_OPENSSL_CIPHER_RC2_128:
return EVP_rc2_cbc();
break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
case PHP_OPENSSL_CIPHER_DES:
return EVP_des_cbc();
break;
case PHP_OPENSSL_CIPHER_3DES:
return EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES
case PHP_OPENSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:
return EVP_aes_128_cbc();
break;
case PHP_OPENSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:
return EVP_aes_192_cbc();
break;
case PHP_OPENSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:
return EVP_aes_256_cbc();
break;
#endif
default:
return NULL;
break;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string ShellContentBrowserClient::GetDefaultDownloadName() {
return "download";
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::ShowContextMenu(RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
const ContextMenuParams& params) {
if (showing_context_menu_)
return;
ContextMenuParams context_menu_params(params);
if (delegate_ && delegate_->HandleContextMenu(context_menu_params))
return;
render_view_host_delegate_view_->ShowContextMenu(render_frame_host,
context_menu_params);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WallpaperManagerBase::CustomizedWallpaperRescaledFiles::path_rescaled_small()
const {
return path_rescaled_small_;
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 128,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentLoader::handledOnloadEvents()
{
m_wasOnloadHandled = true;
applicationCacheHost()->stopDeferringEvents();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,715 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStrip::RemoveTabAt(content::WebContents* contents,
int model_index,
bool was_active) {
const int model_count = GetModelCount();
const int tab_overlap = TabStyle::GetTabOverlap();
if (in_tab_close_ && model_count > 0 && model_index != model_count) {
int next_active_index = controller_->GetActiveIndex();
DCHECK(IsValidModelIndex(next_active_index));
if (model_index <= next_active_index) {
next_active_index++;
}
Tab* next_active_tab = tab_at(next_active_index);
Tab* tab_being_removed = tab_at(model_index);
int size_delta = tab_being_removed->width();
if (!tab_being_removed->data().pinned && was_active &&
GetActiveTabWidth() > GetInactiveTabWidth()) {
size_delta = next_active_tab->width();
}
available_width_for_tabs_ =
ideal_bounds(model_count).right() - size_delta + tab_overlap;
}
if (!touch_layout_)
PrepareForAnimation();
Tab* tab = tab_at(model_index);
tab->SetClosing(true);
int old_x = tabs_.ideal_bounds(model_index).x();
RemoveTabFromViewModel(model_index);
if (touch_layout_) {
touch_layout_->RemoveTab(model_index,
UpdateIdealBoundsForPinnedTabs(nullptr), old_x);
}
UpdateIdealBounds();
AnimateToIdealBounds();
gfx::Rect tab_bounds = tab->bounds();
tab_bounds.set_x((model_index > 0)
? (ideal_bounds(model_index - 1).right() - tab_overlap)
: 0);
tab_bounds.set_width(tab_overlap);
bounds_animator_.AnimateViewTo(
tab, tab_bounds, std::make_unique<RemoveTabDelegate>(this, tab));
if ((touch_layout_ || !in_tab_close_ || model_index == GetModelCount()) &&
TabDragController::IsAttachedTo(GetDragContext())) {
bounds_animator_.StopAnimatingView(new_tab_button_);
new_tab_button_->SetBoundsRect(new_tab_button_bounds_);
}
SwapLayoutIfNecessary();
UpdateAccessibleTabIndices();
UpdateHoverCard(nullptr, false);
for (TabStripObserver& observer : observers_)
observer.OnTabRemoved(model_index);
if (!drag_context_->IsMutating() && drag_context_->IsDraggingTab(contents))
EndDrag(END_DRAG_COMPLETE);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,765 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpeg_skip_variable2(Image *ifile, Image *ofile)
{
unsigned int length;
int c1,c2;
(void) ofile;
if ((c1 = ReadBlobByte(ifile)) == EOF) return M_EOI;
if ((c2 = ReadBlobByte(ifile)) == EOF) return M_EOI;
length = (((unsigned char) c1) << 8) + ((unsigned char) c2);
length -= 2;
while (length--)
if (ReadBlobByte(ifile) == EOF)
return M_EOI;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 91,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int PostScript_MetaHandler::FindPostScriptHint()
{
bool found = false;
IOBuffer ioBuf;
XMP_Uns8 ch;
XMP_IO* fileRef = this->parent->ioRef;
XMP_AbortProc abortProc = this->parent->abortProc;
void * abortArg = this->parent->abortArg;
const bool checkAbort = (abortProc != 0);
fileRef->Rewind();
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 4 ) ) return false;
XMP_Uns32 fileheader = GetUns32BE ( ioBuf.ptr );
if ( fileheader == 0xC5D0D3C6 ) {
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 30 ) ) return false;
XMP_Uns32 psOffset = GetUns32LE ( ioBuf.ptr+4 ); // PostScript offset.
XMP_Uns32 psLength = GetUns32LE ( ioBuf.ptr+8 ); // PostScript length.
MoveToOffset ( fileRef, psOffset, &ioBuf );
}
while ( true ) {
if ( checkAbort && abortProc(abortArg) ) {
XMP_Throw ( "PostScript_MetaHandler::FindPostScriptHint - User abort", kXMPErr_UserAbort );
}
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, kPSContainsXMPString.length() ) ) return kPSHint_NoMarker;
if ( CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr(kPSEndCommentString.c_str()), kPSEndCommentString.length() ) ) {
return kPSHint_NoMarker;
} else if ( ! CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr(kPSContainsXMPString.c_str()), kPSContainsXMPString.length() ) ) {
do {
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 1 ) ) return kPSHint_NoMarker;
ch = *ioBuf.ptr;
++ioBuf.ptr;
} while ( ! IsNewline ( ch ) );
} else {
ioBuf.ptr += kPSContainsXMPString.length();
int xmpHint = kPSHint_NoMain; // ! From here on, a failure means "no main", not "no marker".
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 1 ) ) return kPSHint_NoMain;
if ( ! IsSpaceOrTab ( *ioBuf.ptr ) ) return kPSHint_NoMain;
while ( true ) {
while ( true ) { // Skip leading spaces and tabs.
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 1 ) ) return kPSHint_NoMain;
if ( ! IsSpaceOrTab ( *ioBuf.ptr ) ) break;
++ioBuf.ptr;
}
if ( IsNewline ( *ioBuf.ptr ) ) return kPSHint_NoMain; // Reached the end of the ContainsXMP comment.
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 6 ) ) return kPSHint_NoMain;
if ( CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("NoMain"), 6 ) ) {
ioBuf.ptr += 6;
xmpHint = kPSHint_NoMain;
break;
} else if ( CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("MainFi"), 6 ) ) {
ioBuf.ptr += 6;
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 3 ) ) return kPSHint_NoMain;
if ( CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("rst"), 3 ) ) {
ioBuf.ptr += 3;
xmpHint = kPSHint_MainFirst;
}
break;
} else if ( CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("MainLa"), 6 ) ) {
ioBuf.ptr += 6;
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 2 ) ) return kPSHint_NoMain;
if ( CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("st"), 2 ) ) {
ioBuf.ptr += 2;
xmpHint = kPSHint_MainLast;
}
break;
} else {
while ( true ) { // Skip until whitespace.
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 1 ) ) return kPSHint_NoMain;
if ( IsWhitespace ( *ioBuf.ptr ) ) break;
++ioBuf.ptr;
}
}
} // Look for the main packet location option.
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 1 ) ) return kPSHint_NoMain;
if ( ! IsWhitespace ( *ioBuf.ptr ) ) return kPSHint_NoMain;
return xmpHint;
} // Found "%ADO_ContainsXMP:".
} // Outer marker loop.
return kPSHint_NoMarker; // Should never reach here.
} // PostScript_MetaHandler::FindPostScriptHint
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 9,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ProfileDependencyManager::AddComponent(
ProfileKeyedBaseFactory* component) {
all_components_.push_back(component);
destruction_order_.clear();
}
Commit Message: DIAL (Discovery and Launch protocol) extension API skeleton.
This implements the skeleton for a new Chrome extension API for local device discovery. The API will first be restricted to whitelisted extensions only. The API will allow extensions to receive events from a DIAL service running within Chrome which notifies of devices being discovered on the local network.
Spec available here:
https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/14FI-VKWrsMG7pIy3trgM3ybnKS-o5TULkt8itiBNXlQ/edit
BUG=163288
TBR=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11444020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@172243 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,716 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char* ap_lua_binstrstr (const char * haystack, size_t hsize, const char* needle, size_t nsize)
{
size_t p;
if (haystack == NULL) return NULL;
if (needle == NULL) return NULL;
if (hsize < nsize) return NULL;
for (p = 0; p <= (hsize - nsize); ++p) {
if (memcmp(haystack + p, needle, nsize) == 0) {
return (char*) (haystack + p);
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 45,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool LegacySniffMPEG4(
const sp<DataSource> &source, String8 *mimeType, float *confidence) {
uint8_t header[8];
ssize_t n = source->readAt(4, header, sizeof(header));
if (n < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return false;
}
if (!memcmp(header, "ftyp3gp", 7) || !memcmp(header, "ftypmp42", 8)
|| !memcmp(header, "ftyp3gr6", 8) || !memcmp(header, "ftyp3gs6", 8)
|| !memcmp(header, "ftyp3ge6", 8) || !memcmp(header, "ftyp3gg6", 8)
|| !memcmp(header, "ftypisom", 8) || !memcmp(header, "ftypM4V ", 8)
|| !memcmp(header, "ftypM4A ", 8) || !memcmp(header, "ftypf4v ", 8)
|| !memcmp(header, "ftypkddi", 8) || !memcmp(header, "ftypM4VP", 8)) {
*mimeType = MEDIA_MIMETYPE_CONTAINER_MPEG4;
*confidence = 0.4;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor.cpp: handle chunk_size > SIZE_MAX
chunk_size is a uint64_t, so it can legitimately be bigger
than SIZE_MAX, which would cause the subtraction to underflow.
https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=182251
Bug: 23034759
Change-Id: Ic1637fb26bf6edb0feb1bcf2876fd370db1ed547
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,173 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline unsigned long size_inside_page(unsigned long start,
unsigned long size)
{
unsigned long sz;
sz = PAGE_SIZE - (start & (PAGE_SIZE - 1));
return min(sz, size);
}
Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 66,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t phar_dir_write(php_stream *stream, const char *buf, size_t count TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 180 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int truncate_partial_nodes(struct dnode_of_data *dn,
struct f2fs_inode *ri, int *offset, int depth)
{
struct page *pages[2];
nid_t nid[3];
nid_t child_nid;
int err = 0;
int i;
int idx = depth - 2;
nid[0] = le32_to_cpu(ri->i_nid[offset[0] - NODE_DIR1_BLOCK]);
if (!nid[0])
return 0;
/* get indirect nodes in the path */
for (i = 0; i < idx + 1; i++) {
/* reference count'll be increased */
pages[i] = get_node_page(F2FS_I_SB(dn->inode), nid[i]);
if (IS_ERR(pages[i])) {
err = PTR_ERR(pages[i]);
idx = i - 1;
goto fail;
}
nid[i + 1] = get_nid(pages[i], offset[i + 1], false);
}
ra_node_pages(pages[idx], offset[idx + 1], NIDS_PER_BLOCK);
/* free direct nodes linked to a partial indirect node */
for (i = offset[idx + 1]; i < NIDS_PER_BLOCK; i++) {
child_nid = get_nid(pages[idx], i, false);
if (!child_nid)
continue;
dn->nid = child_nid;
err = truncate_dnode(dn);
if (err < 0)
goto fail;
if (set_nid(pages[idx], i, 0, false))
dn->node_changed = true;
}
if (offset[idx + 1] == 0) {
dn->node_page = pages[idx];
dn->nid = nid[idx];
truncate_node(dn);
} else {
f2fs_put_page(pages[idx], 1);
}
offset[idx]++;
offset[idx + 1] = 0;
idx--;
fail:
for (i = idx; i >= 0; i--)
f2fs_put_page(pages[i], 1);
trace_f2fs_truncate_partial_nodes(dn->inode, nid, depth, err);
return err;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CameraClient::handleRawPicture(const sp<IMemory>& mem) {
disableMsgType(CAMERA_MSG_RAW_IMAGE);
ssize_t offset;
size_t size;
sp<IMemoryHeap> heap = mem->getMemory(&offset, &size);
sp<ICameraClient> c = mRemoteCallback;
mLock.unlock();
if (c != 0) {
c->dataCallback(CAMERA_MSG_RAW_IMAGE, mem, NULL);
}
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int DecodeGifImg(struct ngiflib_img * i) {
struct ngiflib_decode_context context;
long npix;
u8 * stackp;
u8 * stack_top;
u16 clr;
u16 eof;
u16 free;
u16 act_code = 0;
u16 old_code = 0;
u16 read_byt;
u16 ab_prfx[4096];
u8 ab_suffx[4096];
u8 ab_stack[4096];
u8 flags;
u8 casspecial = 0;
if(!i) return -1;
i->posX = GetWord(i->parent); /* offsetX */
i->posY = GetWord(i->parent); /* offsetY */
i->width = GetWord(i->parent); /* SizeX */
i->height = GetWord(i->parent); /* SizeY */
context.Xtogo = i->width;
context.curY = i->posY;
#ifdef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
#ifdef NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS
context.line_p.p8 = i->parent->frbuff.p8 + (u32)i->posY*i->parent->width;
context.frbuff_p.p8 = context.line_p.p8 + i->posX;
#else
context.frbuff_p.p8 = i->parent->frbuff.p8 + (u32)i->posY*i->parent->width + i->posX;
#endif /* NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS */
#else
if(i->parent->mode & NGIFLIB_MODE_INDEXED) {
#ifdef NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS
context.line_p.p8 = i->parent->frbuff.p8 + (u32)i->posY*i->parent->width;
context.frbuff_p.p8 = context.line_p.p8 + i->posX;
#else
context.frbuff_p.p8 = i->parent->frbuff.p8 + (u32)i->posY*i->parent->width + i->posX;
#endif /* NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS */
} else {
#ifdef NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS
context.line_p.p32 = i->parent->frbuff.p32 + (u32)i->posY*i->parent->width;
context.frbuff_p.p32 = context.line_p.p32 + i->posX;
#else
context.frbuff_p.p32 = i->parent->frbuff.p32 + (u32)i->posY*i->parent->width + i->posX;
#endif /* NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS */
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
npix = (long)i->width * i->height;
flags = GetByte(i->parent);
i->interlaced = (flags & 64) >> 6;
context.pass = i->interlaced ? 1 : 0;
i->sort_flag = (flags & 32) >> 5; /* is local palette sorted by color frequency ? */
i->localpalbits = (flags & 7) + 1;
if(flags&128) { /* palette locale */
int k;
int localpalsize = 1 << i->localpalbits;
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(i->parent && i->parent->log) fprintf(i->parent->log, "Local palette\n");
#endif /* !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE) */
i->palette = (struct ngiflib_rgb *)ngiflib_malloc(sizeof(struct ngiflib_rgb)*localpalsize);
for(k=0; k<localpalsize; k++) {
i->palette[k].r = GetByte(i->parent);
i->palette[k].g = GetByte(i->parent);
i->palette[k].b = GetByte(i->parent);
}
#ifdef NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS
if(i->parent->palette_cb) i->parent->palette_cb(i->parent, i->palette, localpalsize);
#endif /* NGIFLIB_ENABLE_CALLBACKS */
} else {
i->palette = i->parent->palette;
i->localpalbits = i->parent->imgbits;
}
i->ncolors = 1 << i->localpalbits;
i->imgbits = GetByte(i->parent); /* LZW Minimum Code Size */
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(i->parent && i->parent->log) {
if(i->interlaced) fprintf(i->parent->log, "interlaced ");
fprintf(i->parent->log, "img pos(%hu,%hu) size %hux%hu palbits=%hhu imgbits=%hhu ncolors=%hu\n",
i->posX, i->posY, i->width, i->height, i->localpalbits, i->imgbits, i->ncolors);
}
#endif /* !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE) */
if(i->imgbits==1) { /* fix for 1bit images ? */
i->imgbits = 2;
}
clr = 1 << i->imgbits;
eof = clr + 1;
free = clr + 2;
context.nbbit = i->imgbits + 1;
context.max = clr + clr - 1; /* (1 << context.nbbit) - 1 */
stackp = stack_top = ab_stack + 4096;
context.restbits = 0; /* initialise le "buffer" de lecture */
context.restbyte = 0; /* des codes LZW */
context.lbyte = 0;
for(;;) {
act_code = GetGifWord(i, &context);
if(act_code==eof) {
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(i->parent && i->parent->log) fprintf(i->parent->log, "End of image code\n");
#endif /* !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE) */
return 0;
}
if(npix==0) {
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(i->parent && i->parent->log) fprintf(i->parent->log, "assez de pixels, On se casse !\n");
#endif /* !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE) */
return 1;
}
if(act_code==clr) {
#if !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE)
if(i->parent && i->parent->log) fprintf(i->parent->log, "Code clear (free=%hu) npix=%ld\n", free, npix);
#endif /* !defined(NGIFLIB_NO_FILE) */
/* clear */
free = clr + 2;
context.nbbit = i->imgbits + 1;
context.max = clr + clr - 1; /* (1 << context.nbbit) - 1 */
act_code = GetGifWord(i, &context);
casspecial = (u8)act_code;
old_code = act_code;
WritePixel(i, &context, casspecial); npix--;
} else {
read_byt = act_code;
if(act_code >= free) { /* code pas encore dans alphabet */
/* printf("Code pas dans alphabet : %d>=%d push %d\n", act_code, free, casspecial); */
*(--stackp) = casspecial; /* dernier debut de chaine ! */
act_code = old_code;
}
/* printf("actcode=%d\n", act_code); */
while(act_code > clr) { /* code non concret */
/* fillstackloop empile les suffixes ! */
*(--stackp) = ab_suffx[act_code];
act_code = ab_prfx[act_code]; /* prefixe */
}
/* act_code est concret */
casspecial = (u8)act_code; /* dernier debut de chaine ! */
*(--stackp) = casspecial; /* push on stack */
WritePixels(i, &context, stackp, stack_top - stackp); /* unstack all pixels at once */
npix -= (stack_top - stackp);
stackp = stack_top;
/* putchar('\n'); */
if(free < 4096) { /* la taille du dico est 4096 max ! */
ab_prfx[free] = old_code;
ab_suffx[free] = (u8)act_code;
free++;
if((free > context.max) && (context.nbbit < 12)) {
context.nbbit++; /* 1 bit de plus pour les codes LZW */
context.max += context.max + 1;
}
}
old_code = read_byt;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: check GIF image position and dimensions
fixes #1
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 169,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fbFetch_a8b8g8r8 (const FbBits *bits, int x, int width, CARD32 *buffer, miIndexedPtr indexed)
{
const CARD32 *pixel = (CARD32 *)bits + x;
const CARD32 *end = pixel + width;
while (pixel < end) {
WRITE(buffer++, ((READ(pixel) & 0xff00ff00) |
((READ(pixel) >> 16) & 0xff) |
((READ(pixel) & 0xff) << 16)));
++pixel;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,447 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sock_wake_async(struct socket_wq *wq, int how, int band)
{
if (!wq || !wq->fasync_list)
return -1;
switch (how) {
case SOCK_WAKE_WAITD:
if (test_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &wq->flags))
break;
goto call_kill;
case SOCK_WAKE_SPACE:
if (!test_and_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &wq->flags))
break;
/* fall through */
case SOCK_WAKE_IO:
call_kill:
kill_fasync(&wq->fasync_list, SIGIO, band);
break;
case SOCK_WAKE_URG:
kill_fasync(&wq->fasync_list, SIGURG, band);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Fix use after free in the recvmmsg exit path
The syzkaller fuzzer hit the following use-after-free:
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8175ea0e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:295
[<ffffffff851cc31a>] __sys_recvmmsg+0x6fa/0x7f0 net/socket.c:2261
[< inline >] SYSC_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2281
[<ffffffff851cc57f>] SyS_recvmmsg+0x16f/0x180 net/socket.c:2270
[<ffffffff86332bb6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
And, as Dmitry rightly assessed, that is because we can drop the
reference and then touch it when the underlying recvmsg calls return
some packets and then hit an error, which will make recvmmsg to set
sock->sk->sk_err, oops, fix it.
Reported-and-Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Fixes: a2e2725541fa ("net: Introduce recvmmsg socket syscall")
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160122211644.GC2470@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 50,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tnepres_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
const u32 * const s = (const u32 * const)src;
u32 * const d = (u32 * const)dst;
u32 rs[4], rd[4];
rs[0] = swab32(s[3]);
rs[1] = swab32(s[2]);
rs[2] = swab32(s[1]);
rs[3] = swab32(s[0]);
serpent_encrypt(tfm, (u8 *)rd, (u8 *)rs);
d[0] = swab32(rd[3]);
d[1] = swab32(rd[2]);
d[2] = swab32(rd[1]);
d[3] = swab32(rd[0]);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeByteSshort(int16 value)
{
if ((value<0)||(value>0xFF))
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrRange);
else
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::CancelActiveAndPendingDialogs() {
if (dialog_manager_) {
dialog_manager_->CancelDialogs(this, /*reset_state=*/false);
}
if (browser_plugin_embedder_)
browser_plugin_embedder_->CancelGuestDialogs();
if (delegate_)
delegate_->HideValidationMessage(this);
}
Commit Message: If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 150,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TransportDIB* RenderProcessHostImpl::GetTransportDIB(
TransportDIB::Id dib_id) {
if (!TransportDIB::is_valid_id(dib_id))
return NULL;
const std::map<TransportDIB::Id, TransportDIB*>::iterator
i = cached_dibs_.find(dib_id);
if (i != cached_dibs_.end()) {
cached_dibs_cleaner_.Reset();
return i->second;
}
TransportDIB* dib = MapTransportDIB(dib_id);
if (!dib)
return NULL;
if (cached_dibs_.size() >= MAX_MAPPED_TRANSPORT_DIBS) {
std::map<TransportDIB::Id, TransportDIB*>::iterator smallest_iterator;
size_t smallest_size = std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max();
for (std::map<TransportDIB::Id, TransportDIB*>::iterator
i = cached_dibs_.begin(); i != cached_dibs_.end(); ++i) {
if (i->second->size() <= smallest_size) {
smallest_iterator = i;
smallest_size = i->second->size();
}
}
#if defined(USE_X11)
smallest_iterator->second->Detach();
#else
delete smallest_iterator->second;
#endif
cached_dibs_.erase(smallest_iterator);
}
cached_dibs_[dib_id] = dib;
cached_dibs_cleaner_.Reset();
return dib;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ASS_Style *handle_selective_style_overrides(ASS_Renderer *render_priv,
ASS_Style *rstyle)
{
ASS_Style *script = render_priv->track->styles +
render_priv->state.event->Style;
ASS_Style *user = &render_priv->user_override_style;
ASS_Style *new = &render_priv->state.override_style_temp_storage;
int explicit = event_has_hard_overrides(render_priv->state.event->Text) ||
render_priv->state.evt_type != EVENT_NORMAL;
int requested = render_priv->settings.selective_style_overrides;
double scale;
user->Name = "OverrideStyle"; // name insignificant
if (!rstyle)
rstyle = script;
*new = *rstyle;
render_priv->state.explicit = explicit;
render_priv->state.apply_font_scale =
!explicit || !(requested & ASS_OVERRIDE_BIT_SELECTIVE_FONT_SCALE);
if (explicit)
requested = 0;
if (requested & ASS_OVERRIDE_BIT_STYLE)
requested |= ASS_OVERRIDE_BIT_FONT_NAME |
ASS_OVERRIDE_BIT_FONT_SIZE_FIELDS |
ASS_OVERRIDE_BIT_COLORS |
ASS_OVERRIDE_BIT_BORDER |
ASS_OVERRIDE_BIT_ATTRIBUTES;
if (requested & ASS_OVERRIDE_FULL_STYLE)
*new = *user;
scale = render_priv->track->PlayResY / 288.0;
if (requested & ASS_OVERRIDE_BIT_FONT_SIZE_FIELDS) {
new->FontSize = user->FontSize * scale;
new->Spacing = user->Spacing * scale;
new->ScaleX = user->ScaleX;
new->ScaleY = user->ScaleY;
}
if (requested & ASS_OVERRIDE_BIT_FONT_NAME) {
new->FontName = user->FontName;
new->treat_fontname_as_pattern = user->treat_fontname_as_pattern;
}
if (requested & ASS_OVERRIDE_BIT_COLORS) {
new->PrimaryColour = user->PrimaryColour;
new->SecondaryColour = user->SecondaryColour;
new->OutlineColour = user->OutlineColour;
new->BackColour = user->BackColour;
}
if (requested & ASS_OVERRIDE_BIT_ATTRIBUTES) {
new->Bold = user->Bold;
new->Italic = user->Italic;
new->Underline = user->Underline;
new->StrikeOut = user->StrikeOut;
}
if (requested & ASS_OVERRIDE_BIT_BORDER) {
new->BorderStyle = user->BorderStyle;
new->Outline = user->Outline * scale;
new->Shadow = user->Shadow * scale;
}
if (requested & ASS_OVERRIDE_BIT_ALIGNMENT)
new->Alignment = user->Alignment;
if (requested & ASS_OVERRIDE_BIT_MARGINS) {
new->MarginL = user->MarginL;
new->MarginR = user->MarginR;
new->MarginV = user->MarginV;
}
if (!new->FontName)
new->FontName = rstyle->FontName;
render_priv->state.style = new;
render_priv->state.overrides = requested;
return new;
}
Commit Message: Fix line wrapping mode 0/3 bugs
This fixes two separate bugs:
a) Don't move a linebreak into the first symbol. This results in a empty
line at the front, which does not help to equalize line lengths at all.
b) When moving a linebreak into a symbol that already is a break, the
number of lines must be decremented. Otherwise, uninitialized memory
is possibly used for later layout operations.
Found by fuzzer test case
id:000085,sig:11,src:003377+003350,op:splice,rep:8.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 73,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothSocketListenFunction::OnCreateServiceError(
const std::string& message) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(work_thread_id());
Respond(Error(message));
}
Commit Message: chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <tbarzic@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 154,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InputDispatcher::TouchState::TouchState() :
down(false), split(false), deviceId(-1), source(0), displayId(-1) {
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 163,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vq2q(int queue_index)
{
return queue_index / 2;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeNetLog* IOThread::net_log() {
return net_log_;
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 113,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nvmet_fc_rcv_fcp_req(struct nvmet_fc_target_port *target_port,
struct nvmefc_tgt_fcp_req *fcpreq,
void *cmdiubuf, u32 cmdiubuf_len)
{
struct nvmet_fc_tgtport *tgtport = targetport_to_tgtport(target_port);
struct nvme_fc_cmd_iu *cmdiu = cmdiubuf;
struct nvmet_fc_tgt_queue *queue;
struct nvmet_fc_fcp_iod *fod;
struct nvmet_fc_defer_fcp_req *deferfcp;
unsigned long flags;
/* validate iu, so the connection id can be used to find the queue */
if ((cmdiubuf_len != sizeof(*cmdiu)) ||
(cmdiu->scsi_id != NVME_CMD_SCSI_ID) ||
(cmdiu->fc_id != NVME_CMD_FC_ID) ||
(be16_to_cpu(cmdiu->iu_len) != (sizeof(*cmdiu)/4)))
return -EIO;
queue = nvmet_fc_find_target_queue(tgtport,
be64_to_cpu(cmdiu->connection_id));
if (!queue)
return -ENOTCONN;
/*
* note: reference taken by find_target_queue
* After successful fod allocation, the fod will inherit the
* ownership of that reference and will remove the reference
* when the fod is freed.
*/
spin_lock_irqsave(&queue->qlock, flags);
fod = nvmet_fc_alloc_fcp_iod(queue);
if (fod) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->qlock, flags);
fcpreq->nvmet_fc_private = fod;
fod->fcpreq = fcpreq;
memcpy(&fod->cmdiubuf, cmdiubuf, cmdiubuf_len);
nvmet_fc_queue_fcp_req(tgtport, queue, fcpreq);
return 0;
}
if (!tgtport->ops->defer_rcv) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->qlock, flags);
/* release the queue lookup reference */
nvmet_fc_tgt_q_put(queue);
return -ENOENT;
}
deferfcp = list_first_entry_or_null(&queue->avail_defer_list,
struct nvmet_fc_defer_fcp_req, req_list);
if (deferfcp) {
/* Just re-use one that was previously allocated */
list_del(&deferfcp->req_list);
} else {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->qlock, flags);
/* Now we need to dynamically allocate one */
deferfcp = kmalloc(sizeof(*deferfcp), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!deferfcp) {
/* release the queue lookup reference */
nvmet_fc_tgt_q_put(queue);
return -ENOMEM;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&queue->qlock, flags);
}
/* For now, use rspaddr / rsplen to save payload information */
fcpreq->rspaddr = cmdiubuf;
fcpreq->rsplen = cmdiubuf_len;
deferfcp->fcp_req = fcpreq;
/* defer processing till a fod becomes available */
list_add_tail(&deferfcp->req_list, &queue->pending_cmd_list);
/* NOTE: the queue lookup reference is still valid */
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->qlock, flags);
return -EOVERFLOW;
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 93,629 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fetch_uidl(char *line, void *data)
{
int i, index;
struct Context *ctx = (struct Context *) data;
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
char *endp = NULL;
errno = 0;
index = strtol(line, &endp, 10);
if (errno)
return -1;
while (*endp == ' ')
endp++;
memmove(line, endp, strlen(endp) + 1);
for (i = 0; i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
if (mutt_str_strcmp(line, ctx->hdrs[i]->data) == 0)
break;
if (i == ctx->msgcount)
{
mutt_debug(1, "new header %d %s\n", index, line);
if (i >= ctx->hdrmax)
mx_alloc_memory(ctx);
ctx->msgcount++;
ctx->hdrs[i] = mutt_header_new();
ctx->hdrs[i]->data = mutt_str_strdup(line);
}
else if (ctx->hdrs[i]->index != index - 1)
pop_data->clear_cache = true;
ctx->hdrs[i]->refno = index;
ctx->hdrs[i]->index = index - 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sanitise cache paths
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 79,478 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::uniform1i(const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
GLint x) {
if (isContextLost() || !location)
return;
if (location->Program() != current_program_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "uniform1i",
"location not for current program");
return;
}
ContextGL()->Uniform1i(location->Location(), x);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::OnAccessTokenAvailable(
const std::string& access_token) {
access_token_ = access_token;
if (!wildcard_username_.empty()) {
wildcard_login_checker_.reset(new WildcardLoginChecker());
wildcard_login_checker_->StartWithAccessToken(
access_token,
base::Bind(&OnWildcardCheckCompleted, wildcard_username_));
}
if (service() && service()->IsInitializationComplete() &&
client() && !client()->is_registered()) {
OnOAuth2PolicyTokenFetched(
access_token, GoogleServiceAuthError(GoogleServiceAuthError::NONE));
}
}
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 110,390 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TabStrip::OnMouseWheel(const ui::MouseWheelEvent& event) {
if ((!event.x_offset() && !event.IsShiftDown()) || tab_count() < 2 ||
!FindTabHitByPoint(event.location()))
return false;
accumulated_horizontal_scroll_ +=
(event.x_offset() ? event.x_offset() : event.y_offset());
int horizontal_offset =
accumulated_horizontal_scroll_ / ui::MouseWheelEvent::kWheelDelta;
if (!horizontal_offset)
return true;
accumulated_horizontal_scroll_ %= ui::MouseWheelEvent::kWheelDelta;
int new_active_index =
(controller_->GetActiveIndex() + horizontal_offset) % tab_count();
if (new_active_index < 0)
new_active_index += tab_count();
DCHECK(IsValidModelIndex(new_active_index));
controller_->SelectTab(new_active_index, event);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SWFShape_setLineStyle_internal(SWFShape shape, unsigned short width,
byte r, byte g, byte b, byte a)
{
int line;
if ( shape->isEnded )
return;
for ( line=0; line<shape->nLines; ++line )
{
if ( SWFLineStyle_equals(shape->lines[line], width, r, g, b, a, 0) )
break;
}
if ( line == shape->nLines )
line = SWFShape_addLineStyle(shape, width, r, g, b, a);
else
++line;
finishSetLine(shape, line, width);
}
Commit Message: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 89,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContentSearchCallback(MessageLoop* message_loop,
base::PlatformFileError error,
scoped_ptr<gdata::GDataDirectoryProto> dir_proto) {
ASSERT_EQ(base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK, error);
ASSERT_TRUE(dir_proto.get());
ASSERT_EQ(1, dir_proto->child_files_size());
EXPECT_EQ("file:2_file_resouce_id.SubDirectory File 1.txt",
dir_proto->child_files(0).gdata_entry().file_name());
ASSERT_EQ(1, dir_proto->child_directories_size());
EXPECT_EQ("folder:1_folder_resource_id.Directory 1",
dir_proto->child_directories(0).gdata_entry().file_name());
message_loop->Quit();
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SpoolAllPagesWithBoundariesForTesting(
WebCanvas* canvas,
const FloatSize& page_size_in_pixels) {
DispatchEventsForPrintingOnAllFrames();
if (!GetFrame()->GetDocument() ||
GetFrame()->GetDocument()->GetLayoutViewItem().IsNull())
return;
GetFrame()->View()->UpdateAllLifecyclePhasesExceptPaint();
if (!GetFrame()->GetDocument() ||
GetFrame()->GetDocument()->GetLayoutViewItem().IsNull())
return;
ComputePageRects(page_size_in_pixels);
const float page_width = page_size_in_pixels.Width();
size_t num_pages = PageRects().size();
int total_height = num_pages * (page_size_in_pixels.Height() + 1) - 1;
IntRect all_pages_rect(0, 0, page_width, total_height);
PaintRecordBuilder builder(all_pages_rect, &canvas->getMetaData());
GraphicsContext& context = builder.Context();
context.SetPrinting(true);
context.BeginRecording(all_pages_rect);
context.FillRect(FloatRect(0, 0, page_width, total_height), Color::kWhite);
int current_height = 0;
for (size_t page_index = 0; page_index < num_pages; page_index++) {
if (page_index > 0) {
context.Save();
context.SetStrokeColor(Color(0, 0, 255));
context.SetFillColor(Color(0, 0, 255));
context.DrawLine(IntPoint(0, current_height),
IntPoint(page_width, current_height));
context.Restore();
}
AffineTransform transform;
transform.Translate(0, current_height);
#if defined(OS_WIN) || defined(OS_MACOSX)
float scale = GetPageShrink(page_index);
transform.Scale(scale, scale);
#endif
context.Save();
context.ConcatCTM(transform);
SpoolPage(context, page_index, all_pages_rect);
context.Restore();
current_height += page_size_in_pixels.Height() + 1;
}
canvas->drawPicture(context.EndRecording());
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,417 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::didAddUserAgentShadowRoot(ShadowRoot*)
{
m_inputType->createShadowSubtree();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,888 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jsonb_array_elements(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
return elements_worker_jsonb(fcinfo, "jsonb_array_elements", false);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GBool ASCIIHexStream::isBinary(GBool last) {
return str->isBinary(gFalse);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void put_aio_ring_file(struct kioctx *ctx)
{
struct file *aio_ring_file = ctx->aio_ring_file;
if (aio_ring_file) {
truncate_setsize(aio_ring_file->f_inode, 0);
/* Prevent further access to the kioctx from migratepages */
spin_lock(&aio_ring_file->f_inode->i_mapping->private_lock);
aio_ring_file->f_inode->i_mapping->private_data = NULL;
ctx->aio_ring_file = NULL;
spin_unlock(&aio_ring_file->f_inode->i_mapping->private_lock);
fput(aio_ring_file);
}
}
Commit Message: aio: fix kernel memory disclosure in io_getevents() introduced in v3.10
A kernel memory disclosure was introduced in aio_read_events_ring() in v3.10
by commit a31ad380bed817aa25f8830ad23e1a0480fef797. The changes made to
aio_read_events_ring() failed to correctly limit the index into
ctx->ring_pages[], allowing an attacked to cause the subsequent kmap() of
an arbitrary page with a copy_to_user() to copy the contents into userspace.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2014-0206. Thanks to Mateusz and
Petr for disclosing this issue.
This patch applies to v3.12+. A separate backport is needed for 3.10/3.11.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kmo@daterainc.com>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: | 0 | 39,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t Parcel::dataCapacity() const
{
return mDataCapacity;
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SessionService::SetWindowType(const SessionID& window_id,
Browser::Type type) {
if (!should_track_changes_for_browser_type(type))
return;
windows_tracking_.insert(window_id.id());
CommitPendingCloses();
has_open_trackable_browsers_ = true;
move_on_new_browser_ = true;
ScheduleCommand(
CreateSetWindowTypeCommand(window_id, WindowTypeForBrowserType(type)));
}
Commit Message: Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 108,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<WebUIImpl> WebContentsImpl::CreateWebUIForRenderFrameHost(
const GURL& url) {
return CreateWebUI(url, std::string());
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,655 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spnego_gss_wrap_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
int *conf_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_wrap_iov_length(minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
conf_state,
iov,
iov_count);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 36,784 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_floppy_geometry(int drive, int type, struct floppy_struct **g)
{
if (type)
*g = &floppy_type[type];
else {
if (lock_fdc(drive, false))
return -EINTR;
if (poll_drive(false, 0) == -EINTR)
return -EINTR;
process_fd_request();
*g = current_type[drive];
}
if (!*g)
return -ENODEV;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 39,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CIFSSMBSetEA(const int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, const char *fileName,
const char *ea_name, const void *ea_value,
const __u16 ea_value_len, const struct nls_table *nls_codepage,
int remap)
{
struct smb_com_transaction2_spi_req *pSMB = NULL;
struct smb_com_transaction2_spi_rsp *pSMBr = NULL;
struct fealist *parm_data;
int name_len;
int rc = 0;
int bytes_returned = 0;
__u16 params, param_offset, byte_count, offset, count;
cFYI(1, "In SetEA");
SetEARetry:
rc = smb_init(SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2, 15, tcon, (void **) &pSMB,
(void **) &pSMBr);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (pSMB->hdr.Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) {
name_len =
cifsConvertToUCS((__le16 *) pSMB->FileName, fileName,
PATH_MAX, nls_codepage, remap);
name_len++; /* trailing null */
name_len *= 2;
} else { /* BB improve the check for buffer overruns BB */
name_len = strnlen(fileName, PATH_MAX);
name_len++; /* trailing null */
strncpy(pSMB->FileName, fileName, name_len);
}
params = 6 + name_len;
/* done calculating parms using name_len of file name,
now use name_len to calculate length of ea name
we are going to create in the inode xattrs */
if (ea_name == NULL)
name_len = 0;
else
name_len = strnlen(ea_name, 255);
count = sizeof(*parm_data) + ea_value_len + name_len;
pSMB->MaxParameterCount = cpu_to_le16(2);
/* BB find max SMB PDU from sess */
pSMB->MaxDataCount = cpu_to_le16(1000);
pSMB->MaxSetupCount = 0;
pSMB->Reserved = 0;
pSMB->Flags = 0;
pSMB->Timeout = 0;
pSMB->Reserved2 = 0;
param_offset = offsetof(struct smb_com_transaction2_spi_req,
InformationLevel) - 4;
offset = param_offset + params;
pSMB->InformationLevel =
cpu_to_le16(SMB_SET_FILE_EA);
parm_data =
(struct fealist *) (((char *) &pSMB->hdr.Protocol) +
offset);
pSMB->ParameterOffset = cpu_to_le16(param_offset);
pSMB->DataOffset = cpu_to_le16(offset);
pSMB->SetupCount = 1;
pSMB->Reserved3 = 0;
pSMB->SubCommand = cpu_to_le16(TRANS2_SET_PATH_INFORMATION);
byte_count = 3 /* pad */ + params + count;
pSMB->DataCount = cpu_to_le16(count);
parm_data->list_len = cpu_to_le32(count);
parm_data->list[0].EA_flags = 0;
/* we checked above that name len is less than 255 */
parm_data->list[0].name_len = (__u8)name_len;
/* EA names are always ASCII */
if (ea_name)
strncpy(parm_data->list[0].name, ea_name, name_len);
parm_data->list[0].name[name_len] = 0;
parm_data->list[0].value_len = cpu_to_le16(ea_value_len);
/* caller ensures that ea_value_len is less than 64K but
we need to ensure that it fits within the smb */
/*BB add length check to see if it would fit in
negotiated SMB buffer size BB */
/* if (ea_value_len > buffer_size - 512 (enough for header)) */
if (ea_value_len)
memcpy(parm_data->list[0].name+name_len+1,
ea_value, ea_value_len);
pSMB->TotalDataCount = pSMB->DataCount;
pSMB->ParameterCount = cpu_to_le16(params);
pSMB->TotalParameterCount = pSMB->ParameterCount;
pSMB->Reserved4 = 0;
inc_rfc1001_len(pSMB, byte_count);
pSMB->ByteCount = cpu_to_le16(byte_count);
rc = SendReceive(xid, tcon->ses, (struct smb_hdr *) pSMB,
(struct smb_hdr *) pSMBr, &bytes_returned, 0);
if (rc)
cFYI(1, "SetPathInfo (EA) returned %d", rc);
cifs_buf_release(pSMB);
if (rc == -EAGAIN)
goto SetEARetry;
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix possible memory corruption in CIFSFindNext
The name_len variable in CIFSFindNext is a signed int that gets set to
the resume_name_len in the cifs_search_info. The resume_name_len however
is unsigned and for some infolevels is populated directly from a 32 bit
value sent by the server.
If the server sends a very large value for this, then that value could
look negative when converted to a signed int. That would make that
value pass the PATH_MAX check later in CIFSFindNext. The name_len would
then be used as a length value for a memcpy. It would then be treated
as unsigned again, and the memcpy scribbles over a ton of memory.
Fix this by making the name_len an unsigned value in CIFSFindNext.
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Darren Lavender <dcl@hppine99.gbr.hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct net_device *dev_get_by_index_rcu(struct net *net, int ifindex)
{
struct hlist_node *p;
struct net_device *dev;
struct hlist_head *head = dev_index_hash(net, ifindex);
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(dev, p, head, index_hlist)
if (dev->ifindex == ifindex)
return dev;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void release_bts_buffer(int cpu)
{
struct debug_store *ds = per_cpu(cpu_hw_events, cpu).ds;
if (!ds || !x86_pmu.bts)
return;
kfree((void *)(unsigned long)ds->bts_buffer_base);
ds->bts_buffer_base = 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,842 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HistogramBase* Histogram::FactoryTimeGet(const std::string& name,
TimeDelta minimum,
TimeDelta maximum,
uint32_t bucket_count,
int32_t flags) {
return FactoryGet(name, static_cast<Sample>(minimum.InMilliseconds()),
static_cast<Sample>(maximum.InMilliseconds()), bucket_count,
flags);
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 140,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLScriptRunner::executeScriptsWaitingForResources()
{
ASSERT(m_document);
ASSERT(hasScriptsWaitingForResources());
ASSERT(!isExecutingScript());
ASSERT(m_document->isScriptExecutionReady());
executeParsingBlockingScripts();
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(finfo_open)
{
long options = MAGIC_NONE;
char *file = NULL;
int file_len = 0;
struct php_fileinfo *finfo;
FILEINFO_DECLARE_INIT_OBJECT(object)
char resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN];
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|lp", &options, &file, &file_len) == FAILURE) {
FILEINFO_DESTROY_OBJECT(object);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (object) {
struct finfo_object *finfo_obj = (struct finfo_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
if (finfo_obj->ptr) {
magic_close(finfo_obj->ptr->magic);
efree(finfo_obj->ptr);
finfo_obj->ptr = NULL;
}
}
if (file_len == 0) {
file = NULL;
} else if (file && *file) { /* user specified file, perform open_basedir checks */
#if PHP_API_VERSION < 20100412
if ((PG(safe_mode) && (!php_checkuid(file, NULL, CHECKUID_CHECK_FILE_AND_DIR))) || php_check_open_basedir(file TSRMLS_CC)) {
#else
if (php_check_open_basedir(file TSRMLS_CC)) {
#endif
FILEINFO_DESTROY_OBJECT(object);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!expand_filepath_with_mode(file, resolved_path, NULL, 0, CWD_EXPAND TSRMLS_CC)) {
FILEINFO_DESTROY_OBJECT(object);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
file = resolved_path;
}
finfo = emalloc(sizeof(struct php_fileinfo));
finfo->options = options;
finfo->magic = magic_open(options);
if (finfo->magic == NULL) {
efree(finfo);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid mode '%ld'.", options);
FILEINFO_DESTROY_OBJECT(object);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (magic_load(finfo->magic, file) == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to load magic database at '%s'.", file);
magic_close(finfo->magic);
efree(finfo);
FILEINFO_DESTROY_OBJECT(object);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (object) {
FILEINFO_REGISTER_OBJECT(object, finfo);
} else {
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, finfo, le_fileinfo);
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto resource finfo_close(resource finfo)
Close fileinfo resource. */
PHP_FUNCTION(finfo_close)
{
struct php_fileinfo *finfo;
zval *zfinfo;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &zfinfo) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(finfo, struct php_fileinfo *, &zfinfo, -1, "file_info", le_fileinfo);
zend_list_delete(Z_RESVAL_P(zfinfo));
RETURN_TRUE;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool finfo_set_flags(resource finfo, int options)
Set libmagic configuration options. */
PHP_FUNCTION(finfo_set_flags)
{
long options;
struct php_fileinfo *finfo;
zval *zfinfo;
FILEINFO_DECLARE_INIT_OBJECT(object)
if (object) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &options) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
FILEINFO_FROM_OBJECT(finfo, object);
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rl", &zfinfo, &options) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(finfo, struct php_fileinfo *, &zfinfo, -1, "file_info", le_fileinfo);
}
FINFO_SET_OPTION(finfo->magic, options)
finfo->options = options;
RETURN_TRUE;
}
/* }}} */
#define FILEINFO_MODE_BUFFER 0
#define FILEINFO_MODE_STREAM 1
#define FILEINFO_MODE_FILE 2
static void _php_finfo_get_type(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int mode, int mimetype_emu) /* {{{ */
{
long options = 0;
char *ret_val = NULL, *buffer = NULL;
int buffer_len;
struct php_fileinfo *finfo = NULL;
zval *zfinfo, *zcontext = NULL;
zval *what;
char mime_directory[] = "directory";
struct magic_set *magic = NULL;
FILEINFO_DECLARE_INIT_OBJECT(object)
if (mimetype_emu) {
/* mime_content_type(..) emulation */
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "z", &what) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
switch (Z_TYPE_P(what)) {
case IS_STRING:
buffer = Z_STRVAL_P(what);
buffer_len = Z_STRLEN_P(what);
mode = FILEINFO_MODE_FILE;
break;
case IS_RESOURCE:
mode = FILEINFO_MODE_STREAM;
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Can only process string or stream arguments");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
magic = magic_open(MAGIC_MIME_TYPE);
if (magic_load(magic, NULL) == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to load magic database.");
goto common;
}
} else if (object) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|lr", &buffer, &buffer_len, &options, &zcontext) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
FILEINFO_FROM_OBJECT(finfo, object);
magic = finfo->magic;
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rs|lr", &zfinfo, &buffer, &buffer_len, &options, &zcontext) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(finfo, struct php_fileinfo *, &zfinfo, -1, "file_info", le_fileinfo);
magic = finfo->magic;
}
/* Set options for the current file/buffer. */
if (options) {
FINFO_SET_OPTION(magic, options)
}
switch (mode) {
case FILEINFO_MODE_BUFFER:
{
ret_val = (char *) magic_buffer(magic, buffer, buffer_len);
break;
}
case FILEINFO_MODE_STREAM:
{
php_stream *stream;
off_t streampos;
php_stream_from_zval_no_verify(stream, &what);
if (!stream) {
goto common;
}
streampos = php_stream_tell(stream); /* remember stream position for restoration */
php_stream_seek(stream, 0, SEEK_SET);
ret_val = (char *) magic_stream(magic, stream);
php_stream_seek(stream, streampos, SEEK_SET);
break;
}
case FILEINFO_MODE_FILE:
{
/* determine if the file is a local file or remote URL */
char *tmp2;
php_stream_wrapper *wrap;
php_stream_statbuf ssb;
if (buffer == NULL || !*buffer) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Empty filename or path");
RETVAL_FALSE;
goto clean;
}
wrap = php_stream_locate_url_wrapper(buffer, &tmp2, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
if (php_stream_stat_path_ex(buffer, 0, &ssb, context) == SUCCESS) {
if (ssb.sb.st_mode & S_IFDIR) {
ret_val = mime_directory;
goto common;
}
}
#endif
#if PHP_API_VERSION < 20100412
stream = php_stream_open_wrapper_ex(buffer, "rb", ENFORCE_SAFE_MODE | REPORT_ERRORS, NULL, context);
#else
stream = php_stream_open_wrapper_ex(buffer, "rb", REPORT_ERRORS, NULL, context);
#endif
if (!stream) {
RETVAL_FALSE;
goto clean;
}
if (php_stream_stat(stream, &ssb) == SUCCESS) {
if (ssb.sb.st_mode & S_IFDIR) {
ret_val = mime_directory;
} else {
ret_val = (char *)magic_stream(magic, stream);
}
}
php_stream_close(stream);
}
break;
}
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Can only process string or stream arguments");
}
common:
if (ret_val) {
RETVAL_STRING(ret_val, 1);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed identify data %d:%s", magic_errno(magic), magic_error(magic));
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
clean:
if (mimetype_emu) {
magic_close(magic);
}
/* Restore options */
if (options) {
FINFO_SET_OPTION(magic, finfo->options)
}
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 1 | 165,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSValue jsTestObjCachedAttribute2(ExecState* exec, JSValue slotBase, const Identifier&)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(slotBase));
UNUSED_PARAM(exec);
if (JSValue cachedValue = castedThis->m_cachedAttribute2.get())
return cachedValue;
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
JSValue result = impl->cachedAttribute2() ? impl->cachedAttribute2()->deserialize(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), 0) : jsNull();
castedThis->m_cachedAttribute2.set(exec->globalData(), castedThis, result);
return result;
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UsbGetUserSelectedDevicesFunction::~UsbGetUserSelectedDevicesFunction() {
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,439 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int runqueue_is_locked(int cpu)
{
return raw_spin_is_locked(&cpu_rq(cpu)->lock);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Element::parseAttributeName(QualifiedName& out, const AtomicString& namespaceURI, const AtomicString& qualifiedName, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
String prefix, localName;
if (!Document::parseQualifiedName(qualifiedName, prefix, localName, ec))
return false;
ASSERT(!ec);
QualifiedName qName(prefix, localName, namespaceURI);
if (!Document::hasValidNamespaceForAttributes(qName)) {
ec = NAMESPACE_ERR;
return false;
}
out = qName;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void InsertRow(Image *image,unsigned char *p,ssize_t y,int bpp,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
int
bit;
Quantum
index;
register Quantum
*q;
ssize_t
x;
switch (bpp)
{
case 1: /* Convert bitmap scanline. */
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
index=((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (ssize_t) (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
index=((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
break;
break;
}
case 2: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=4)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 6) & 0x3,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x3,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 2) & 0x3,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p) & 0x3,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if ((image->columns % 4) != 0)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 6) & 0x3,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
if ((image->columns % 4) >= 1)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x3,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
if ((image->columns % 4) >= 2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 2) & 0x3,
exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
break;
}
case 4: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x0f,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p) & 0x0f,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x0f,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
break;
}
case 8: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL) break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
case 24: /* Convert DirectColor scanline. */
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
break;
break;
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/120
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 73,567 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ar6000_set_multicast_list(struct net_device *dev)
{
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_ERR,("ar6000: Multicast filter not supported\n"));
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ConversionContext::PopState() {
DCHECK_EQ(nullptr, previous_transform_);
const auto& previous_state = state_stack_.back();
AppendRestore(previous_state.saved_count);
current_transform_ = previous_state.transform;
previous_transform_ = previous_state.previous_transform;
current_clip_ = previous_state.clip;
current_effect_ = previous_state.effect;
state_stack_.pop_back();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char *am_get_header_attr(request_rec *r, const char *h,
const char *v, const char *a)
{
const char *value;
const char *attr;
char *l1;
const char *attr_value = NULL;
/* Looking for
* header-value; item_name="item_value"\n
*/
if ((value = am_xstrtok(r, h, ";", &l1)) == NULL)
return NULL;
am_strip_blank(&value);
/* If a header value was provided, check it */
if ((v != NULL) && (strcasecmp(value, v) != 0))
return NULL;
/* If no attribute name is provided, return everything */
if (a == NULL)
return h;
while ((attr = am_xstrtok(r, NULL, ";", &l1)) != NULL) {
const char *attr_name = NULL;
char *l2;
am_strip_blank(&attr);
attr_name = am_xstrtok(r, attr, "=", &l2);
if ((attr_name != NULL) && (strcasecmp(attr_name, a) == 0)) {
if ((attr_value = am_xstrtok(r, NULL, "=", &l2)) != NULL)
am_strip_blank(&attr_value);
break;
}
}
/* Remove leading and trailing quotes */
if (attr_value != NULL) {
apr_size_t len;
len = strlen(attr_value);
if ((len > 1) && (attr_value[len - 1] == '\"'))
attr_value = apr_pstrndup(r->pool, attr_value, len - 1);
if (attr_value[0] == '\"')
attr_value++;
}
return attr_value;
}
Commit Message: Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes.
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 91,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ipmi_set_my_address(struct ipmi_user *user,
unsigned int channel,
unsigned char address)
{
int index, rv = 0;
user = acquire_ipmi_user(user, &index);
if (!user)
return -ENODEV;
if (channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS) {
rv = -EINVAL;
} else {
channel = array_index_nospec(channel, IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS);
user->intf->addrinfo[channel].address = address;
}
release_ipmi_user(user, index);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,290 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::RunCreateWindowCompleteCallback(
const CreateNewWindowCallback& callback,
mojom::CreateNewWindowReplyPtr reply,
int render_view_route_id,
int main_frame_route_id,
int main_frame_widget_route_id,
int cloned_session_storage_namespace_id) {
reply->route_id = render_view_route_id;
reply->main_frame_route_id = main_frame_route_id;
reply->main_frame_widget_route_id = main_frame_widget_route_id;
reply->cloned_session_storage_namespace_id =
cloned_session_storage_namespace_id;
callback.Run(std::move(reply));
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ScriptController::namedItemRemoved(HTMLDocument* doc, const AtomicString& name)
{
windowShell(mainThreadNormalWorld())->namedItemRemoved(doc, name);
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Size AutofillDialogViews::GetPreferredSize() const {
if (preferred_size_.IsEmpty())
preferred_size_ = CalculatePreferredSize(false);
return preferred_size_;
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 109,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ApiTestEnvironment::RunTest(const std::string& file_name,
const std::string& test_name) {
env()->RegisterTestFile("testBody", file_name);
base::RunLoop run_loop;
gin::ModuleRegistry::From(env()->context()->v8_context())->AddBuiltinModule(
env()->isolate(),
"testNatives",
TestNatives::Create(env()->isolate(), run_loop.QuitClosure()).ToV8());
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ApiTestEnvironment::RunTestInner, base::Unretained(this),
test_name, run_loop.QuitClosure()));
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&ApiTestEnvironment::RunPromisesAgain,
base::Unretained(this)));
run_loop.Run();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 133,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void set_dsa_write_depth_keep_stencil(void)
{
glDisable(GL_STENCIL_TEST);
glEnable(GL_DEPTH_TEST);
glDepthFunc(GL_ALWAYS);
glDepthMask(GL_TRUE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 9,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_mmu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
ASSERT(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.walk_mmu = &vcpu->arch.mmu;
vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa = INVALID_PAGE;
vcpu->arch.mmu.translate_gpa = translate_gpa;
vcpu->arch.nested_mmu.translate_gpa = translate_nested_gpa;
return alloc_mmu_pages(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool collectCandidateRuns(const UChar* normalizedBuffer,
size_t bufferLength, const Font* font, Vector<CandidateRun>* runs, bool isSpaceNormalize)
{
UTF16TextIterator iterator(normalizedBuffer, bufferLength);
UChar32 character;
unsigned startIndexOfCurrentRun = 0;
if (!iterator.consume(character))
return false;
const SimpleFontData* nextFontData = font->glyphDataForCharacter(character, false, isSpaceNormalize).fontData;
UErrorCode errorCode = U_ZERO_ERROR;
UScriptCode nextScript = uscript_getScript(character, &errorCode);
if (U_FAILURE(errorCode))
return false;
do {
const UChar* currentCharacterPosition = iterator.characters();
const SimpleFontData* currentFontData = nextFontData;
UScriptCode currentScript = nextScript;
UChar32 lastCharacter = character;
for (iterator.advance(); iterator.consume(character); iterator.advance()) {
if (Character::treatAsZeroWidthSpace(character))
continue;
if ((U_GET_GC_MASK(character) & U_GC_M_MASK)
&& currentFontData->canRenderCombiningCharacterSequence(
currentCharacterPosition,
iterator.glyphEnd() - currentCharacterPosition))
continue;
nextFontData = font->glyphDataForCharacter(character, false, isSpaceNormalize).fontData;
nextScript = uscript_getScript(character, &errorCode);
if (U_FAILURE(errorCode))
return false;
if (lastCharacter == zeroWidthJoiner)
currentFontData = nextFontData;
if ((nextFontData != currentFontData) || ((currentScript != nextScript) && (nextScript != USCRIPT_INHERITED) && (!uscript_hasScript(character, currentScript))))
break;
currentCharacterPosition = iterator.characters();
lastCharacter = character;
}
CandidateRun run = { character, startIndexOfCurrentRun, iterator.offset(), currentFontData, currentScript };
runs->append(run);
startIndexOfCurrentRun = iterator.offset();
} while (iterator.consume(character));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Always initialize |m_totalWidth| in HarfBuzzShaper::shape.
R=leviw@chromium.org
BUG=476647
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1108663003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@194541 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int gfs2_lock(struct file *file, int cmd, struct file_lock *fl)
{
struct gfs2_inode *ip = GFS2_I(file->f_mapping->host);
struct gfs2_sbd *sdp = GFS2_SB(file->f_mapping->host);
struct lm_lockstruct *ls = &sdp->sd_lockstruct;
if (!(fl->fl_flags & FL_POSIX))
return -ENOLCK;
if (__mandatory_lock(&ip->i_inode) && fl->fl_type != F_UNLCK)
return -ENOLCK;
if (cmd == F_CANCELLK) {
/* Hack: */
cmd = F_SETLK;
fl->fl_type = F_UNLCK;
}
if (unlikely(test_bit(SDF_SHUTDOWN, &sdp->sd_flags)))
return -EIO;
if (IS_GETLK(cmd))
return dlm_posix_get(ls->ls_dlm, ip->i_no_addr, file, fl);
else if (fl->fl_type == F_UNLCK)
return dlm_posix_unlock(ls->ls_dlm, ip->i_no_addr, file, fl);
else
return dlm_posix_lock(ls->ls_dlm, ip->i_no_addr, file, cmd, fl);
}
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 34,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double visible_fraction() const { return visible_fraction_; }
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,191 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, char *buf, u_int buflen)
{
const u_char *rd;
const u_char *vpn_ip;
ND_TCHECK(pptr[0]);
/* if the NLRI is not predefined length, quit.*/
if (*pptr != MDT_VPN_NLRI_LEN * 8)
return -1;
pptr++;
/* RD */
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], 8);
rd = pptr;
pptr+=8;
/* IPv4 address */
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
vpn_ip = pptr;
pptr+=sizeof(struct in_addr);
/* MDT Group Address */
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
snprintf(buf, buflen, "RD: %s, VPN IP Address: %s, MC Group Address: %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, rd), ipaddr_string(ndo, vpn_ip), ipaddr_string(ndo, pptr));
return MDT_VPN_NLRI_LEN + 1;
trunc:
return -2;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13053/BGP: fix VPN route target bounds checks
decode_rt_routing_info() didn't check bounds before fetching 4 octets of
the origin AS field and could over-read the input buffer, put it right.
It also fetched the varying number of octets of the route target field
from 4 octets lower than the correct offset, put it right.
It also used the same temporary buffer explicitly through as_printf()
and implicitly through bgp_vpn_rd_print() so the end result of snprintf()
was not what was originally intended.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DictionaryValue* GetUpdatesMessageToValue(
const sync_pb::GetUpdatesMessage& proto) {
DictionaryValue* value = new DictionaryValue();
SET(caller_info, GetUpdatesCallerInfoToValue);
SET_BOOL(fetch_folders);
SET_INT32(batch_size);
SET_REP(from_progress_marker, DataTypeProgressMarkerToValue);
SET_BOOL(streaming);
SET_BOOL(create_mobile_bookmarks_folder);
return value;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FS_Shutdown( qboolean closemfp ) {
searchpath_t *p, *next;
int i;
for ( i = 0; i < MAX_FILE_HANDLES; i++ ) {
if ( fsh[i].fileSize ) {
FS_FCloseFile( i );
}
}
for ( p = fs_searchpaths ; p ; p = next ) {
next = p->next;
if(p->pack)
FS_FreePak(p->pack);
if (p->dir)
Z_Free(p->dir);
Z_Free(p);
}
fs_searchpaths = NULL;
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "path" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "dir" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "fdir" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "touchFile" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "which" );
#ifdef FS_MISSING
if ( closemfp ) {
fclose( missingFiles );
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SetVendorRelease(int release)
{
VendorRelease = release;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 15,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ContentSecurityPolicy::allowConnectToSource(
const KURL& url,
RedirectStatus redirectStatus,
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reportingPolicy) const {
return isAllowedByAll<&CSPDirectiveList::allowConnectToSource>(
m_policies, url, redirectStatus, reportingPolicy);
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 136,724 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpClient::condor_job_hold(const char *schedd_name, PROC_ID job_id,
const char *reason)
{
static const char* command = "CONDOR_JOB_HOLD";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (!schedd_name) schedd_name=NULLSTRING;
if (!reason) reason=NULLSTRING;
std::string reqline;
char *esc1 = strdup( escapeGahpString(schedd_name) );
char *esc2 = strdup( escapeGahpString(reason) );
int x = sprintf(reqline, "%s %d.%d %s", esc1, job_id.cluster, job_id.proc,
esc2);
free(esc1);
free(esc2);
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command,buf,deleg_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command,buf);
if ( result ) {
if (result->argc != 3) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command);
}
int rc = 1;
if ( result->argv[1][0] == 'S' ) {
rc = 0;
}
if ( strcasecmp(result->argv[2], NULLSTRING) ) {
error_string = result->argv[2];
} else {
error_string = "";
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void create_tap_read_thread(int tap_fd)
{
if (pan_pth < 0)
pan_pth = btsock_thread_create(btpan_tap_fd_signaled, NULL);
if (pan_pth >= 0)
btsock_thread_add_fd(pan_pth, tap_fd, 0, SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD, 0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Run(scoped_refptr<base::MessageLoopProxy> relay_proxy,
const base::Callback<void(T1, T2, T3, T4)>& callback,
T1 arg1,
T2 arg2,
T3 arg3,
T4 arg4) {
if (callback.is_null())
return;
RunTaskOnThread(relay_proxy, base::Bind(callback, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,040 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rfcomm_tty_flush_buffer(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct rfcomm_dev *dev = (struct rfcomm_dev *) tty->driver_data;
BT_DBG("tty %p dev %p", tty, dev);
if (!dev || !dev->dlc)
return;
skb_queue_purge(&dev->dlc->tx_queue);
tty_wakeup(tty);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in ioctl(RFCOMMGETDEVLIST)
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
rfcomm_dev_list_req inserted for alignment before copying it to
userland. Additionally there are two padding bytes in each instance of
struct rfcomm_dev_info. The ioctl() that for disclosures two bytes plus
dev_num times two bytes uninitialized kernel heap memory.
Allocate the memory using kzalloc() to fix this issue.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 94,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DetachOffloadGPU(ScreenPtr slave)
{
assert(slave->isGPU);
xorg_list_del(&slave->offload_head);
slave->current_master = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 14,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabMutedReason GetTabAudioMutedReason(content::WebContents* contents) {
LastMuteMetadata::CreateForWebContents(contents); // Ensures metadata exists.
LastMuteMetadata* const metadata =
LastMuteMetadata::FromWebContents(contents);
if (GetTabAlertStateForContents(contents) == TabAlertState::TAB_CAPTURING) {
metadata->reason = TabMutedReason::MEDIA_CAPTURE;
metadata->extension_id.clear();
}
return metadata->reason;
}
Commit Message: Fix nullptr crash in IsSiteMuted
This CL adds a nullptr check in IsSiteMuted to prevent a crash on Mac.
Bug: 797647
Change-Id: Ic36f0fb39f2dbdf49d2bec9e548a4a6e339dc9a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/848245
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuri Wiitala <miu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Tommy Steimel <steimel@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#526825}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,903 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long long TestWebKitPlatformSupport::databaseGetFileSize(
const WebKit::WebString& vfs_file_name) {
return SimpleDatabaseSystem::GetInstance()->GetFileSize(vfs_file_name);
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: psf_use_rsrc (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int on_off)
{
if (on_off)
{ if (psf->file.handle != psf->rsrc.handle)
{ psf->file.hsaved = psf->file.handle ;
psf->file.handle = psf->rsrc.handle ;
} ;
}
else if (psf->file.handle == psf->rsrc.handle)
psf->file.handle = psf->file.hsaved ;
return ;
} /* psf_use_rsrc */
Commit Message: src/file_io.c : Prevent potential divide-by-zero.
Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/92
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 45,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int security_mls_enabled(void)
{
return policydb.mls_enabled;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_mod_included_modules(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
mrb_value result;
struct RClass *c = mrb_class_ptr(self);
struct RClass *origin = c;
MRB_CLASS_ORIGIN(origin);
result = mrb_ary_new(mrb);
while (c) {
if (c != origin && c->tt == MRB_TT_ICLASS) {
if (c->c->tt == MRB_TT_MODULE) {
mrb_ary_push(mrb, result, mrb_obj_value(c->c));
}
}
c = c->super;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 82,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gboolean key_value_ok(gchar *key, gchar *value)
{
char *i;
/* check key, it has to be valid filename and will end up in the
* bugzilla */
for (i = key; *i != 0; i++)
{
if (!isalpha(*i) && (*i != '-') && (*i != '_') && (*i != ' '))
return FALSE;
}
/* check value of 'basename', it has to be valid non-hidden directory
* name */
if (strcmp(key, "basename") == 0
|| strcmp(key, FILENAME_TYPE) == 0
)
{
if (!is_correct_filename(value))
{
error_msg("Value of '%s' ('%s') is not a valid directory name",
key, value);
return FALSE;
}
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: make the dump directories owned by root by default
It was discovered that the abrt event scripts create a user-readable
copy of a sosreport file in abrt problem directories, and include
excerpts of /var/log/messages selected by the user-controlled process
name, leading to an information disclosure.
This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security.
Related: #1212868
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 96,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hfs_fsstat(TSK_FS_INFO * fs, FILE * hFile)
{
HFS_INFO *hfs = (HFS_INFO *) fs;
hfs_plus_vh *sb = hfs->fs;
time_t mac_time;
TSK_INUM_T inode;
char timeBuf[128];
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr, "hfs_fstat: called\n");
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "FILE SYSTEM INFORMATION\n");
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "--------------------------------------------\n");
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "File System Type: ");
if (tsk_getu16(fs->endian, hfs->fs->signature) == HFS_VH_SIG_HFSPLUS)
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "HFS+\n");
else if (tsk_getu16(fs->endian, hfs->fs->signature) == HFS_VH_SIG_HFSX)
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "HFSX\n");
else
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Unknown\n");
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "File System Version: ");
switch (tsk_getu16(fs->endian, hfs->fs->version)) {
case 4:
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "HFS+\n");
break;
case 5:
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "HFSX\n");
break;
default:
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Unknown (%" PRIu16 ")\n",
tsk_getu16(fs->endian, hfs->fs->version));
break;
}
if (tsk_getu16(fs->endian, hfs->fs->signature) == HFS_VH_SIG_HFSX) {
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Case Sensitive: %s\n",
hfs->is_case_sensitive ? "yes" : "no");
}
if (hfs->hfs_wrapper_offset > 0) {
tsk_fprintf(hFile,
"File system is embedded in an HFS wrapper at offset %" PRIuOFF
"\n", hfs->hfs_wrapper_offset);
}
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "\nVolume Name: ");
if (print_inode_name(hFile, fs, HFS_ROOT_INUM))
return 1;
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "\n");
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Volume Identifier: %08" PRIx32 "%08" PRIx32 "\n",
tsk_getu32(fs->endian, sb->finder_info[HFS_VH_FI_ID1]),
tsk_getu32(fs->endian, sb->finder_info[HFS_VH_FI_ID2]));
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "\nLast Mounted By: ");
if (tsk_getu32(fs->endian, sb->last_mnt_ver) == HFS_VH_MVER_HFSPLUS)
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Mac OS X\n");
else if (tsk_getu32(fs->endian, sb->last_mnt_ver) == HFS_VH_MVER_HFSJ)
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Mac OS X, Journaled\n");
else if (tsk_getu32(fs->endian, sb->last_mnt_ver) == HFS_VH_MVER_FSK)
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "failed journal replay\n");
else if (tsk_getu32(fs->endian, sb->last_mnt_ver) == HFS_VH_MVER_FSCK)
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "fsck_hfs\n");
else if (tsk_getu32(fs->endian, sb->last_mnt_ver) == HFS_VH_MVER_OS89)
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Mac OS 8.1 - 9.2.2\n");
else
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Unknown (%" PRIx32 "\n",
tsk_getu32(fs->endian, sb->last_mnt_ver));
/* State of the file system */
if ((tsk_getu32(fs->endian, hfs->fs->attr) & HFS_VH_ATTR_UNMOUNTED)
&& (!(tsk_getu32(fs->endian,
hfs->fs->attr) & HFS_VH_ATTR_INCONSISTENT)))
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Volume Unmounted Properly\n");
else
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Volume Unmounted Improperly\n");
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Mount Count: %" PRIu32 "\n",
tsk_getu32(fs->endian, sb->write_cnt));
mac_time =
hfs_convert_2_unix_time(tsk_getu32(fs->endian, hfs->fs->cr_date));
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "\nCreation Date: \t%s\n",
tsk_fs_time_to_str(mktime(gmtime(&mac_time)), timeBuf));
mac_time =
hfs_convert_2_unix_time(tsk_getu32(fs->endian, hfs->fs->m_date));
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Last Written Date: \t%s\n",
tsk_fs_time_to_str(mac_time, timeBuf));
mac_time =
hfs_convert_2_unix_time(tsk_getu32(fs->endian,
hfs->fs->bkup_date));
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Last Backup Date: \t%s\n",
tsk_fs_time_to_str(mac_time, timeBuf));
mac_time =
hfs_convert_2_unix_time(tsk_getu32(fs->endian, hfs->fs->chk_date));
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Last Checked Date: \t%s\n",
tsk_fs_time_to_str(mac_time, timeBuf));
if (tsk_getu32(fs->endian, hfs->fs->attr) & HFS_VH_ATTR_SOFTWARE_LOCK)
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Software write protect enabled\n");
/* Print journal information */
if (tsk_getu32(fs->endian, sb->attr) & HFS_VH_ATTR_JOURNALED) {
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "\nJournal Info Block: %" PRIu32 "\n",
tsk_getu32(fs->endian, sb->jinfo_blk));
}
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "\nMETADATA INFORMATION\n");
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "--------------------------------------------\n");
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Range: %" PRIuINUM " - %" PRIuINUM "\n",
fs->first_inum, fs->last_inum);
inode = tsk_getu32(fs->endian, sb->finder_info[HFS_VH_FI_BOOT]);
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Bootable Folder ID: %" PRIuINUM, inode);
if (inode > 0)
print_inode_file(hFile, fs, inode);
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "\n");
inode = tsk_getu32(fs->endian, sb->finder_info[HFS_VH_FI_START]);
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Startup App ID: %" PRIuINUM, inode);
if (inode > 0)
print_inode_file(hFile, fs, inode);
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "\n");
inode = tsk_getu32(fs->endian, sb->finder_info[HFS_VH_FI_OPEN]);
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Startup Open Folder ID: %" PRIuINUM, inode);
if (inode > 0)
print_inode_file(hFile, fs, inode);
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "\n");
inode = tsk_getu32(fs->endian, sb->finder_info[HFS_VH_FI_BOOT9]);
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Mac OS 8/9 Blessed System Folder ID: %" PRIuINUM,
inode);
if (inode > 0)
print_inode_file(hFile, fs, inode);
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "\n");
inode = tsk_getu32(fs->endian, sb->finder_info[HFS_VH_FI_BOOTX]);
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Mac OS X Blessed System Folder ID: %" PRIuINUM,
inode);
if (inode > 0)
print_inode_file(hFile, fs, inode);
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "\n");
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Number of files: %" PRIu32 "\n",
tsk_getu32(fs->endian, sb->file_cnt));
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Number of folders: %" PRIu32 "\n",
tsk_getu32(fs->endian, sb->fldr_cnt));
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "\nCONTENT INFORMATION\n");
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "--------------------------------------------\n");
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Block Range: %" PRIuDADDR " - %" PRIuDADDR "\n",
fs->first_block, fs->last_block);
if (fs->last_block != fs->last_block_act)
tsk_fprintf(hFile,
"Total Range in Image: %" PRIuDADDR " - %" PRIuDADDR "\n",
fs->first_block, fs->last_block_act);
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Allocation Block Size: %u\n", fs->block_size);
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Number of Free Blocks: %" PRIu32 "\n",
tsk_getu32(fs->endian, sb->free_blks));
if (tsk_getu32(fs->endian, hfs->fs->attr) & HFS_VH_ATTR_BADBLOCKS)
tsk_fprintf(hFile, "Volume has bad blocks\n");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 75,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int clear_count() const { return clear_count_; }
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 154,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: docprint(const char *opts)
{
size_t i;
int comma;
char *sp, *p;
p = strstr(opts, "%o");
if (p == NULL) {
fprintf(stdout, "%s", opts);
return;
}
for (sp = p - 1; sp > opts && *sp == ' '; sp--)
continue;
fprintf(stdout, "%.*s", (int)(p - opts), opts);
comma = 0;
for (i = 0; i < __arraycount(nv); i++) {
fprintf(stdout, "%s%s", comma++ ? ", " : "", nv[i].name);
if (i && i % 5 == 0) {
fprintf(stdout, ",\n%*s", (int)(p - sp - 1), "");
comma = 0;
}
}
fprintf(stdout, "%s", opts + (p - opts) + 2);
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 45,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *kvm_run)
{
struct fpu *fpu = ¤t->thread.fpu;
int r;
sigset_t sigsaved;
fpu__activate_curr(fpu);
if (vcpu->sigset_active)
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &vcpu->sigset, &sigsaved);
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_UNINITIALIZED)) {
kvm_vcpu_block(vcpu);
kvm_apic_accept_events(vcpu);
clear_bit(KVM_REQ_UNHALT, &vcpu->requests);
r = -EAGAIN;
goto out;
}
/* re-sync apic's tpr */
if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)) {
if (kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, kvm_run->cr8) != 0) {
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io)) {
int (*cui)(struct kvm_vcpu *) = vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io;
vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = NULL;
r = cui(vcpu);
if (r <= 0)
goto out;
} else
WARN_ON(vcpu->arch.pio.count || vcpu->mmio_needed);
r = vcpu_run(vcpu);
out:
post_kvm_run_save(vcpu);
if (vcpu->sigset_active)
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigsaved, NULL);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FrameView::scheduleAnimation()
{
if (HostWindow* window = hostWindow()) {
window->scheduleAnimation();
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 119,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int QQuickWebViewExperimental::schemeDelegates_Count(QDeclarativeListProperty<QQuickUrlSchemeDelegate>* property)
{
return property->object->children().count();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 101,769 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FLAC_API FLAC__bool FLAC__stream_decoder_process_until_end_of_stream(FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder)
{
FLAC__bool dummy;
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder);
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder->protected_);
while(1) {
switch(decoder->protected_->state) {
case FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_SEARCH_FOR_METADATA:
if(!find_metadata_(decoder))
return false; /* above function sets the status for us */
break;
case FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_READ_METADATA:
if(!read_metadata_(decoder))
return false; /* above function sets the status for us */
break;
case FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_SEARCH_FOR_FRAME_SYNC:
if(!frame_sync_(decoder))
return true; /* above function sets the status for us */
break;
case FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_READ_FRAME:
if(!read_frame_(decoder, &dummy, /*do_full_decode=*/true))
return false; /* above function sets the status for us */
break;
case FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_END_OF_STREAM:
case FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_ABORTED:
return true;
default:
FLAC__ASSERT(0);
return false;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid free-before-initialize vulnerability in heap
Bug: 27211885
Change-Id: Ib9c93bd9ffdde2a5f8d31a86f06e267dc9c152db
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 161,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: is_invalid_entry (struct fileinfo *f)
{
struct fileinfo *cur = f;
char *f_name = f->name;
/* If the node we're currently checking has a duplicate later, we eliminate
* the current node and leave the next one intact. */
while (cur->next)
{
cur = cur->next;
if (strcmp(f_name, cur->name) == 0)
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int TabStyleViews::GetMinimumActiveWidth() {
return TabCloseButton::GetWidth() + GetContentsHorizontalInsetSize() * 2;
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostQt::setVisibleContentsRectForPanning(const IntRect& rect, const FloatPoint& trajectoryVector)
{
m_visibleContentsRect = rect;
toWebGraphicsLayer(m_nonCompositedContentLayer.get())->setVisibleContentRectTrajectoryVector(trajectoryVector);
scheduleLayerFlush();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 101,859 |
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