instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline freelist_idx_t get_free_obj(struct page *page, unsigned int idx)
{
return ((freelist_idx_t *)page->freelist)[idx];
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 68,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::NativeViewId RenderViewImpl::GetHostWindow() const {
return host_window();
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_provider_meter_id(const struct ofproto *ofproto, uint32_t of_meter_id)
{
if (of_meter_id && of_meter_id <= ofproto->meter_features.max_meters) {
const struct meter *meter = ofproto->meters[of_meter_id];
if (meter) {
return meter->provider_meter_id.uint32;
}
}
return UINT32_MAX;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hns_gmac_adjust_link(void *mac_drv, enum mac_speed speed,
u32 full_duplex)
{
struct mac_driver *drv = (struct mac_driver *)mac_drv;
dsaf_set_dev_bit(drv, GMAC_DUPLEX_TYPE_REG,
GMAC_DUPLEX_TYPE_B, !!full_duplex);
switch (speed) {
case MAC_SPEED_10:
dsaf_set_dev_field(
drv, GMAC_PORT_MODE_REG,
GMAC_PORT_MODE_M, GMAC_PORT_MODE_S, 0x6);
break;
case MAC_SPEED_100:
dsaf_set_dev_field(
drv, GMAC_PORT_MODE_REG,
GMAC_PORT_MODE_M, GMAC_PORT_MODE_S, 0x7);
break;
case MAC_SPEED_1000:
dsaf_set_dev_field(
drv, GMAC_PORT_MODE_REG,
GMAC_PORT_MODE_M, GMAC_PORT_MODE_S, 0x8);
break;
default:
dev_err(drv->dev,
"hns_gmac_adjust_link fail, speed%d mac%d\n",
speed, drv->mac_id);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 85,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ScriptResource::CanUseCacheValidator() const {
if (HasClientsOrObservers())
return false;
return Resource::CanUseCacheValidator();
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 149,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int json_object_iter_set_new(json_t *json, void *iter, json_t *value)
{
if(!json_is_object(json) || !iter || !value)
return -1;
hashtable_iter_set(iter, value);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 40,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static EAS_BOOL QueryGUID (const DLSID *pGUID, EAS_U32 *pValue)
{
/* assume false */
*pValue = 0;
if (EAS_HWMemCmp(&DLSID_GMInHardware, pGUID, sizeof(DLSID)) == 0)
{
*pValue = 0xffffffff;
return EAS_TRUE;
}
if (EAS_HWMemCmp(&DLSID_GSInHardware, pGUID, sizeof(DLSID)) == 0)
return EAS_TRUE;
if (EAS_HWMemCmp(&DLSID_XGInHardware, pGUID, sizeof(DLSID)) == 0)
return EAS_TRUE;
if (EAS_HWMemCmp(&DLSID_SupportsDLS1, pGUID, sizeof(DLSID)) == 0)
{
*pValue = 0xffffffff;
return EAS_TRUE;
}
if (EAS_HWMemCmp(&DLSID_SupportsDLS2, pGUID, sizeof(DLSID)) == 0)
return EAS_TRUE;
if (EAS_HWMemCmp(&DLSID_SampleMemorySize, pGUID, sizeof(DLSID)) == 0)
{
*pValue = MAX_DLS_MEMORY;
return EAS_TRUE;
}
if (EAS_HWMemCmp(&DLSID_ManufacturersID, pGUID, sizeof(DLSID)) == 0)
{
*pValue = 0x0000013A;
return EAS_TRUE;
}
if (EAS_HWMemCmp(&DLSID_ProductID, pGUID, sizeof(DLSID)) == 0)
{
*pValue = LIB_VERSION;
return EAS_TRUE;
}
if (EAS_HWMemCmp(&DLSID_SamplePlaybackRate, pGUID, sizeof(DLSID)) == 0)
{
*pValue = (EAS_U32) outputSampleRate;
return EAS_TRUE;
}
/* unrecognized DLSID */
return EAS_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: DLS parser: fix wave pool size check.
Bug: 21132860.
Change-Id: I8ae872ea2cc2e8fec5fa0b7815f0b6b31ce744ff
(cherry picked from commit 2d7f8e1be2241e48458f5d3cab5e90be2b07c699)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_fetch_func_prepare(pdo_stmt_t *stmt TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zend_fcall_info * fci = &stmt->fetch.cls.fci;
zend_fcall_info_cache * fcc = &stmt->fetch.cls.fcc;
if (!make_callable_ex(stmt, stmt->fetch.func.function, fci, fcc, stmt->column_count TSRMLS_CC)) {
return 0;
} else {
stmt->fetch.func.values = safe_emalloc(sizeof(zval*), stmt->column_count, 0);
return 1;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 72,416 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: float ComputeRedirectConfidence(const predictors::RedirectStat& redirect) {
return (redirect.number_of_hits() + 0.0) /
(redirect.number_of_hits() + redirect.number_of_misses());
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 136,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PaintChunk Chunk(const PropertyTreeState& state) {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(FakeDisplayItemClient, fake_client, ());
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(
base::Optional<PaintChunk::Id>, id,
(PaintChunk::Id(fake_client, DisplayItem::kDrawingFirst)));
PaintChunk chunk(0, 0, *id, state);
return chunk;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,490 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BackendImpl::OpenFollowingEntryFromList(
Rankings::List list,
CacheRankingsBlock** from_entry,
scoped_refptr<EntryImpl>* next_entry) {
if (disabled_)
return false;
if (!new_eviction_ && Rankings::NO_USE != list)
return false;
Rankings::ScopedRankingsBlock rankings(&rankings_, *from_entry);
CacheRankingsBlock* next_block = rankings_.GetNext(rankings.get(), list);
Rankings::ScopedRankingsBlock next(&rankings_, next_block);
*from_entry = NULL;
*next_entry = GetEnumeratedEntry(next.get(), list);
if (!*next_entry)
return false;
*from_entry = next.release();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionRegistry::RemoveDisabled(const std::string& id) {
return disabled_extensions_.Remove(id);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GetPreferredBookmarkDropOperation(int source_operations, int operations) {
int common_ops = (source_operations & operations);
if (!common_ops)
return ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_NONE;
if (ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_COPY & common_ops)
return ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_COPY;
if (ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_LINK & common_ops)
return ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_LINK;
if (ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_MOVE & common_ops)
return ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_MOVE;
return ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_NONE;
}
Commit Message: Prevent interpretating userinfo as url scheme when editing bookmarks
Chrome's Edit Bookmark dialog formats urls for display such that a
url of http://javascript:scripttext@host.com is later converted to a
javascript url scheme, allowing persistence of a script injection
attack within the user's bookmarks.
This fix prevents such misinterpretations by always showing the
scheme when a userinfo component is present within the url.
BUG=639126
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2368593002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#422467}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
char *name;
struct nlattr *link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX + 1];
struct nlattr *prop[TIPC_NLA_PROP_MAX + 1];
struct nlattr *stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MAX + 1];
int err;
if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_LINK])
return -EINVAL;
err = nla_parse_nested(link, TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX, attrs[TIPC_NLA_LINK],
NULL);
if (err)
return err;
if (!link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_PROP])
return -EINVAL;
err = nla_parse_nested(prop, TIPC_NLA_PROP_MAX,
link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_PROP], NULL);
if (err)
return err;
if (!link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_STATS])
return -EINVAL;
err = nla_parse_nested(stats, TIPC_NLA_STATS_MAX,
link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_STATS], NULL);
if (err)
return err;
name = (char *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
if (strcmp(name, nla_data(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME])) != 0)
return 0;
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, "\nLink <%s>\n",
nla_data(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME]));
if (link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_BROADCAST]) {
__fill_bc_link_stat(msg, prop, stats);
return 0;
}
if (link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_ACTIVE])
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " ACTIVE");
else if (link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_UP])
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " STANDBY");
else
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " DEFUNCT");
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " MTU:%u Priority:%u",
nla_get_u32(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_MTU]),
nla_get_u32(prop[TIPC_NLA_PROP_PRIO]));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " Tolerance:%u ms Window:%u packets\n",
nla_get_u32(prop[TIPC_NLA_PROP_TOL]),
nla_get_u32(prop[TIPC_NLA_PROP_WIN]));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep,
" RX packets:%u fragments:%u/%u bundles:%u/%u\n",
nla_get_u32(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_RX]) -
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_INFO]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_FRAGMENTS]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_FRAGMENTED]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_BUNDLES]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_BUNDLED]));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep,
" TX packets:%u fragments:%u/%u bundles:%u/%u\n",
nla_get_u32(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_TX]) -
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_INFO]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_FRAGMENTS]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_FRAGMENTED]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_BUNDLES]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_BUNDLED]));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep,
" TX profile sample:%u packets average:%u octets\n",
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_LEN_CNT]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_LEN_TOT]) /
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_PROF_TOT]));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep,
" 0-64:%u%% -256:%u%% -1024:%u%% -4096:%u%% ",
perc(nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_LEN_P0]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_PROF_TOT])),
perc(nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_LEN_P1]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_PROF_TOT])),
perc(nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_LEN_P2]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_PROF_TOT])),
perc(nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_LEN_P3]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_PROF_TOT])));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, "-16384:%u%% -32768:%u%% -66000:%u%%\n",
perc(nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_LEN_P4]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_PROF_TOT])),
perc(nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_LEN_P5]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_PROF_TOT])),
perc(nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_LEN_P6]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_PROF_TOT])));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep,
" RX states:%u probes:%u naks:%u defs:%u dups:%u\n",
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_STATES]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_PROBES]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_NACKS]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_DEFERRED]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_DUPLICATES]));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep,
" TX states:%u probes:%u naks:%u acks:%u dups:%u\n",
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_STATES]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_PROBES]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_NACKS]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_ACKS]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RETRANSMITTED]));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep,
" Congestion link:%u Send queue max:%u avg:%u",
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_LINK_CONGS]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MAX_QUEUE]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_AVG_QUEUE]));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tipc: fix an infoleak in tipc_nl_compat_link_dump
link_info.str is a char array of size 60. Memory after the NULL
byte is not initialized. Sending the whole object out can cause
a leak.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 52,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void disk_events_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct delayed_work *dwork = to_delayed_work(work);
struct disk_events *ev = container_of(dwork, struct disk_events, dwork);
disk_check_events(ev, &ev->clearing);
}
Commit Message: block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,683 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoBindAttribLocation(
GLuint program, GLuint index, const char* name) {
if (!StringIsValidForGLES(name)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glBindAttribLocation", "Invalid character");
return;
}
if (ProgramManager::IsInvalidPrefix(name, strlen(name))) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glBindAttribLocation", "reserved prefix");
return;
}
if (index >= group_->max_vertex_attribs()) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glBindAttribLocation", "index out of range");
return;
}
ProgramManager::ProgramInfo* info = GetProgramInfoNotShader(
program, "glBindAttribLocation");
if (!info) {
return;
}
info->SetAttribLocationBinding(name, static_cast<GLint>(index));
glBindAttribLocation(info->service_id(), index, name);
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 103,504 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentWriter::replaceDocument(const String& source)
{
m_frame->loader()->stopAllLoaders();
begin(m_frame->document()->url(), true, m_frame->document()->securityOrigin());
if (!source.isNull()) {
if (!m_hasReceivedSomeData) {
m_hasReceivedSomeData = true;
m_frame->document()->setCompatibilityMode(Document::NoQuirksMode);
}
if (DocumentParser* parser = m_frame->document()->parser())
parser->append(source);
}
end();
}
Commit Message: Remove DocumentWriter::setDecoder as a grep of WebKit shows no callers
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=67803
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
Smells like dead code.
* loader/DocumentWriter.cpp:
* loader/DocumentWriter.h:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@94800 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 98,538 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pi_pre_block(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long flags;
unsigned int dest;
struct pi_desc old, new;
struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
if (!kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm) ||
!irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP) ||
!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
return 0;
vcpu->pre_pcpu = vcpu->cpu;
spin_lock_irqsave(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock,
vcpu->pre_pcpu), flags);
list_add_tail(&vcpu->blocked_vcpu_list,
&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu,
vcpu->pre_pcpu));
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock,
vcpu->pre_pcpu), flags);
do {
old.control = new.control = pi_desc->control;
/*
* We should not block the vCPU if
* an interrupt is posted for it.
*/
if (pi_test_on(pi_desc) == 1) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock,
vcpu->pre_pcpu), flags);
list_del(&vcpu->blocked_vcpu_list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(
&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock,
vcpu->pre_pcpu), flags);
vcpu->pre_pcpu = -1;
return 1;
}
WARN((pi_desc->sn == 1),
"Warning: SN field of posted-interrupts "
"is set before blocking\n");
/*
* Since vCPU can be preempted during this process,
* vcpu->cpu could be different with pre_pcpu, we
* need to set pre_pcpu as the destination of wakeup
* notification event, then we can find the right vCPU
* to wakeup in wakeup handler if interrupts happen
* when the vCPU is in blocked state.
*/
dest = cpu_physical_id(vcpu->pre_pcpu);
if (x2apic_enabled())
new.ndst = dest;
else
new.ndst = (dest << 8) & 0xFF00;
/* set 'NV' to 'wakeup vector' */
new.nv = POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR;
} while (cmpxchg(&pi_desc->control, old.control,
new.control) != old.control);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pp::Resource PDFiumEngine::PrintPages(
const PP_PrintPageNumberRange_Dev* page_ranges,
uint32_t page_range_count,
const PP_PrintSettings_Dev& print_settings) {
ScopedSubstFont scoped_subst_font(this);
if ((print_settings.format & PP_PRINTOUTPUTFORMAT_PDF) &&
HasPermission(PERMISSION_PRINT_HIGH_QUALITY)) {
return PrintPagesAsPDF(page_ranges, page_range_count, print_settings);
}
if (HasPermission(PERMISSION_PRINT_LOW_QUALITY))
return PrintPagesAsRasterPDF(page_ranges, page_range_count, print_settings);
return pp::Resource();
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 146,191 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: garp_group_interfaces_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
garp_delay_t *delay = LIST_TAIL_DATA(garp_delay);
interface_t *ifp;
vector_t *interface_vec = read_value_block(strvec);
size_t i;
garp_delay_t *gd;
element e;
/* Handle the interfaces block being empty */
if (!interface_vec) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Warning - empty garp_group interfaces block");
return;
}
/* First set the next aggregation group number */
delay->aggregation_group = 1;
for (e = LIST_HEAD(garp_delay); e; ELEMENT_NEXT(e)) {
gd = ELEMENT_DATA(e);
if (gd->aggregation_group && gd != delay)
delay->aggregation_group++;
}
for (i = 0; i < vector_size(interface_vec); i++) {
ifp = if_get_by_ifname(vector_slot(interface_vec, i), IF_CREATE_IF_DYNAMIC);
if (!ifp) {
if (global_data->dynamic_interfaces)
log_message(LOG_INFO, "WARNING - interface %s specified for garp_group doesn't exist", FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, i));
else
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "WARNING - interface %s specified for garp_group doesn't exist", FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, i));
continue;
}
if (ifp->garp_delay) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "garp_group already specified for %s - ignoring", FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, 1));
continue;
}
#ifdef _HAVE_VRRP_VMAC_
if (ifp->vmac_type) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Cannot specify garp_delay on a vmac (%s) - ignoring", ifp->ifname);
continue;
}
#endif
ifp->garp_delay = delay;
}
free_strvec(interface_vec);
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 75,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ping_v4_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk, struct pingfakehdr *pfh,
struct flowi4 *fl4)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_write_queue);
if (!skb)
return 0;
pfh->wcheck = csum_partial((char *)&pfh->icmph,
sizeof(struct icmphdr), pfh->wcheck);
pfh->icmph.checksum = csum_fold(pfh->wcheck);
memcpy(icmp_hdr(skb), &pfh->icmph, sizeof(struct icmphdr));
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
return ip_push_pending_frames(sk, fl4);
}
Commit Message: ping: implement proper locking
We got a report of yet another bug in ping
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/03/24/6
->disconnect() is not called with socket lock held.
Fix this by acquiring ping rwlock earlier.
Thanks to Daniel, Alexander and Andrey for letting us know this problem.
Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Daniel Jiang <danieljiang0415@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 69,399 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AppListControllerDelegate::~AppListControllerDelegate() {}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void checkThrottle(struct airo_info *ai)
{
int i;
/* Old hardware had a limit on encryption speed */
if (ai->config.authType != AUTH_OPEN && maxencrypt) {
for(i=0; i<8; i++) {
if (ai->config.rates[i] > maxencrypt) {
ai->config.rates[i] = 0;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void checkAppendMsg(
IntegrityCk *pCheck,
const char *zFormat,
...
){
va_list ap;
if( !pCheck->mxErr ) return;
pCheck->mxErr--;
pCheck->nErr++;
va_start(ap, zFormat);
if( pCheck->errMsg.nChar ){
sqlite3StrAccumAppend(&pCheck->errMsg, "\n", 1);
}
if( pCheck->zPfx ){
sqlite3XPrintf(&pCheck->errMsg, pCheck->zPfx, pCheck->v1, pCheck->v2);
}
sqlite3VXPrintf(&pCheck->errMsg, zFormat, ap);
va_end(ap);
if( pCheck->errMsg.accError==STRACCUM_NOMEM ){
pCheck->mallocFailed = 1;
}
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,379 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: circle_contained(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
CIRCLE *circle1 = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(0);
CIRCLE *circle2 = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPle((point_dt(&circle1->center, &circle2->center) + circle1->radius), circle2->radius));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_reclaim_complete_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nfs4_reclaim_complete_data *calldata = data;
struct nfs_client *clp = calldata->clp;
struct nfs4_sequence_res *res = &calldata->res.seq_res;
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
if (!nfs41_sequence_done(task, res))
return;
trace_nfs4_reclaim_complete(clp, task->tk_status);
if (nfs41_reclaim_complete_handle_errors(task, clp) == -EAGAIN) {
rpc_restart_call_prepare(task);
return;
}
dprintk("<-- %s\n", __func__);
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mipspmu_add(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
int idx;
int err = 0;
perf_pmu_disable(event->pmu);
/* To look for a free counter for this event. */
idx = mipspmu->alloc_counter(cpuc, hwc);
if (idx < 0) {
err = idx;
goto out;
}
/*
* If there is an event in the counter we are going to use then
* make sure it is disabled.
*/
event->hw.idx = idx;
mipspmu->disable_event(idx);
cpuc->events[idx] = event;
hwc->state = PERF_HES_STOPPED | PERF_HES_UPTODATE;
if (flags & PERF_EF_START)
mipspmu_start(event, PERF_EF_RELOAD);
/* Propagate our changes to the userspace mapping. */
perf_event_update_userpage(event);
out:
perf_pmu_enable(event->pmu);
return err;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,367 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: php_stream *phar_wrapper_open_dir(php_stream_wrapper *wrapper, char *path, char *mode, int options, char **opened_path, php_stream_context *context STREAMS_DC TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
php_url *resource = NULL;
php_stream *ret;
char *internal_file, *error, *str_key;
phar_zstr key;
uint keylen;
ulong unused;
phar_archive_data *phar;
phar_entry_info *entry = NULL;
uint host_len;
if ((resource = phar_parse_url(wrapper, path, mode, options TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
php_stream_wrapper_log_error(wrapper, options TSRMLS_CC, "phar url \"%s\" is unknown", path);
return NULL;
}
/* we must have at the very least phar://alias.phar/ */
if (!resource->scheme || !resource->host || !resource->path) {
if (resource->host && !resource->path) {
php_stream_wrapper_log_error(wrapper, options TSRMLS_CC, "phar error: no directory in \"%s\", must have at least phar://%s/ for root directory (always use full path to a new phar)", path, resource->host);
php_url_free(resource);
return NULL;
}
php_url_free(resource);
php_stream_wrapper_log_error(wrapper, options TSRMLS_CC, "phar error: invalid url \"%s\", must have at least phar://%s/", path, path);
return NULL;
}
if (strcasecmp("phar", resource->scheme)) {
php_url_free(resource);
php_stream_wrapper_log_error(wrapper, options TSRMLS_CC, "phar error: not a phar url \"%s\"", path);
return NULL;
}
host_len = strlen(resource->host);
phar_request_initialize(TSRMLS_C);
internal_file = resource->path + 1; /* strip leading "/" */
if (FAILURE == phar_get_archive(&phar, resource->host, host_len, NULL, 0, &error TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (error) {
php_stream_wrapper_log_error(wrapper, options TSRMLS_CC, "%s", error);
efree(error);
} else {
php_stream_wrapper_log_error(wrapper, options TSRMLS_CC, "phar file \"%s\" is unknown", resource->host);
}
php_url_free(resource);
return NULL;
}
if (error) {
efree(error);
}
if (*internal_file == '\0') {
/* root directory requested */
internal_file = estrndup(internal_file - 1, 1);
ret = phar_make_dirstream(internal_file, &phar->manifest TSRMLS_CC);
php_url_free(resource);
return ret;
}
if (!phar->manifest.arBuckets) {
php_url_free(resource);
return NULL;
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&phar->manifest, internal_file, strlen(internal_file), (void**)&entry) && !entry->is_dir) {
php_url_free(resource);
return NULL;
} else if (entry && entry->is_dir) {
if (entry->is_mounted) {
php_url_free(resource);
return php_stream_opendir(entry->tmp, options, context);
}
internal_file = estrdup(internal_file);
php_url_free(resource);
return phar_make_dirstream(internal_file, &phar->manifest TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
int i_len = strlen(internal_file);
/* search for directory */
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(&phar->manifest);
while (FAILURE != zend_hash_has_more_elements(&phar->manifest)) {
if (HASH_KEY_NON_EXISTENT !=
zend_hash_get_current_key_ex(
&phar->manifest, &key, &keylen, &unused, 0, NULL)) {
PHAR_STR(key, str_key);
if (keylen > (uint)i_len && 0 == memcmp(str_key, internal_file, i_len)) {
PHAR_STR_FREE(str_key);
/* directory found */
internal_file = estrndup(internal_file,
i_len);
php_url_free(resource);
return phar_make_dirstream(internal_file, &phar->manifest TSRMLS_CC);
}
PHAR_STR_FREE(str_key);
}
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_move_forward(&phar->manifest)) {
break;
}
}
}
php_url_free(resource);
return NULL;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputDispatcher::resetKeyRepeatLocked() {
if (mKeyRepeatState.lastKeyEntry) {
mKeyRepeatState.lastKeyEntry->release();
mKeyRepeatState.lastKeyEntry = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 163,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint8_t clip_pixel(int x) {
return x < 0 ? 0 :
x > 255 ? 255 :
x;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,379 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void setPathFromConvexPoints(SkPath* path, size_t numPoints, const FloatPoint* points)
{
path->incReserve(numPoints);
path->moveTo(WebCoreFloatToSkScalar(points[0].x()),
WebCoreFloatToSkScalar(points[0].y()));
for (size_t i = 1; i < numPoints; ++i) {
path->lineTo(WebCoreFloatToSkScalar(points[i].x()),
WebCoreFloatToSkScalar(points[i].y()));
}
path->setIsConvex(true);
}
Commit Message: [skia] not all convex paths are convex, so recompute convexity for the problematic ones
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75960
Reviewed by Stephen White.
No new tests.
See related chrome issue
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=108605
* platform/graphics/skia/GraphicsContextSkia.cpp:
(WebCore::setPathFromConvexPoints):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@104609 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 1 | 170,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_send_XGraphicsExposeEvent(rpc_message_t *message, XEvent *xevent)
{
int error;
if ((error = do_send_XAnyEvent(message, xevent)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_int32(message, xevent->xgraphicsexpose.x)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_int32(message, xevent->xgraphicsexpose.y)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, xevent->xgraphicsexpose.width)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, xevent->xgraphicsexpose.height)) < 0)
return error;
return RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ConvolverNode::process(size_t framesToProcess)
{
AudioBus* outputBus = output(0)->bus();
ASSERT(outputBus);
MutexTryLocker tryLocker(m_processLock);
if (tryLocker.locked()) {
if (!isInitialized() || !m_reverb.get())
outputBus->zero();
else {
m_reverb->process(input(0)->bus(), outputBus, framesToProcess);
}
} else {
outputBus->zero();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix threading races on ConvolverNode::m_reverb in ConvolverNode::latencyFrames()
According to the crash report (https://cluster-fuzz.appspot.com/testcase?key=6515787040817152),
ConvolverNode::m_reverb races between ConvolverNode::latencyFrames() and ConvolverNode::setBuffer().
This CL adds a proper lock for ConvolverNode::m_reverb.
BUG=223962
No tests because the crash depends on threading races and thus not reproducible.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23514037
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157245 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 111,028 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void native_flush_tlb_global(void)
{
__native_flush_tlb_global();
}
Commit Message: x86/paravirt: Fix spectre-v2 mitigations for paravirt guests
Nadav reported that on guests we're failing to rewrite the indirect
calls to CALLEE_SAVE paravirt functions. In particular the
pv_queued_spin_unlock() call is left unpatched and that is all over the
place. This obviously wrecks Spectre-v2 mitigation (for paravirt
guests) which relies on not actually having indirect calls around.
The reason is an incorrect clobber test in paravirt_patch_call(); this
function rewrites an indirect call with a direct call to the _SAME_
function, there is no possible way the clobbers can be different
because of this.
Therefore remove this clobber check. Also put WARNs on the other patch
failure case (not enough room for the instruction) which I've not seen
trigger in my (limited) testing.
Three live kernel image disassemblies for lock_sock_nested (as a small
function that illustrates the problem nicely). PRE is the current
situation for guests, POST is with this patch applied and NATIVE is with
or without the patch for !guests.
PRE:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: callq *0xffffffff822299e8
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
POST:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: callq 0xffffffff810a0c20 <__raw_callee_save___pv_queued_spin_unlock>
0xffffffff817be9a5 <+53>: xchg %ax,%ax
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063aa0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
NATIVE:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: movb $0x0,(%rdi)
0xffffffff817be9a3 <+51>: nopl 0x0(%rax)
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
Fixes: 63f70270ccd9 ("[PATCH] i386: PARAVIRT: add common patching machinery")
Fixes: 3010a0663fd9 ("x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls")
Reported-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 79,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ext4_page_mkwrite(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
struct page *page = vmf->page;
loff_t size;
unsigned long len;
int ret;
struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
handle_t *handle;
get_block_t *get_block;
int retries = 0;
sb_start_pagefault(inode->i_sb);
file_update_time(vma->vm_file);
/* Delalloc case is easy... */
if (test_opt(inode->i_sb, DELALLOC) &&
!ext4_should_journal_data(inode) &&
!ext4_nonda_switch(inode->i_sb)) {
do {
ret = block_page_mkwrite(vma, vmf,
ext4_da_get_block_prep);
} while (ret == -ENOSPC &&
ext4_should_retry_alloc(inode->i_sb, &retries));
goto out_ret;
}
lock_page(page);
size = i_size_read(inode);
/* Page got truncated from under us? */
if (page->mapping != mapping || page_offset(page) > size) {
unlock_page(page);
ret = VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
goto out;
}
if (page->index == size >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT)
len = size & ~PAGE_CACHE_MASK;
else
len = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
/*
* Return if we have all the buffers mapped. This avoids the need to do
* journal_start/journal_stop which can block and take a long time
*/
if (page_has_buffers(page)) {
if (!ext4_walk_page_buffers(NULL, page_buffers(page),
0, len, NULL,
ext4_bh_unmapped)) {
/* Wait so that we don't change page under IO */
wait_for_stable_page(page);
ret = VM_FAULT_LOCKED;
goto out;
}
}
unlock_page(page);
/* OK, we need to fill the hole... */
if (ext4_should_dioread_nolock(inode))
get_block = ext4_get_block_write;
else
get_block = ext4_get_block;
retry_alloc:
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_WRITE_PAGE,
ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode));
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
goto out;
}
ret = block_page_mkwrite(vma, vmf, get_block);
if (!ret && ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
if (ext4_walk_page_buffers(handle, page_buffers(page), 0,
PAGE_CACHE_SIZE, NULL, do_journal_get_write_access)) {
unlock_page(page);
ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
goto out;
}
ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_JDATA);
}
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (ret == -ENOSPC && ext4_should_retry_alloc(inode->i_sb, &retries))
goto retry_alloc;
out_ret:
ret = block_page_mkwrite_return(ret);
out:
sb_end_pagefault(inode->i_sb);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 167,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_xdr_enc_open_noattr(struct rpc_rqst *req,
struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct nfs_openargs *args)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.minorversion = nfs4_xdr_minorversion(&args->seq_args),
};
encode_compound_hdr(xdr, req, &hdr);
encode_sequence(xdr, &args->seq_args, &hdr);
encode_putfh(xdr, args->fh, &hdr);
encode_open(xdr, args, &hdr);
encode_getfattr(xdr, args->bitmask, &hdr);
encode_nops(&hdr);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,480 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VirtualKeyboardController::VirtualKeyboardController()
: has_external_keyboard_(false),
has_internal_keyboard_(false),
has_touchscreen_(false),
ignore_external_keyboard_(false) {
Shell::GetInstance()->AddShellObserver(this);
ui::DeviceDataManager::GetInstance()->AddObserver(this);
UpdateDevices();
}
Commit Message: Move smart deploy to tristate.
BUG=
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1149383006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333058}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: monitor_child (int event_fd)
{
int res;
uint64_t val;
ssize_t s;
int signal_fd;
sigset_t mask;
struct pollfd fds[2];
int num_fds;
struct signalfd_siginfo fdsi;
int dont_close[] = { event_fd, -1 };
/* Close all extra fds in the monitoring process.
Any passed in fds have been passed on to the child anyway. */
fdwalk (proc_fd, close_extra_fds, dont_close);
sigemptyset (&mask);
sigaddset (&mask, SIGCHLD);
signal_fd = signalfd (-1, &mask, SFD_CLOEXEC | SFD_NONBLOCK);
if (signal_fd == -1)
die_with_error ("Can't create signalfd");
num_fds = 1;
fds[0].fd = signal_fd;
fds[0].events = POLLIN;
if (event_fd != -1)
{
fds[1].fd = event_fd;
fds[1].events = POLLIN;
num_fds++;
}
while (1)
{
fds[0].revents = fds[1].revents = 0;
res = poll (fds, num_fds, -1);
if (res == -1 && errno != EINTR)
die_with_error ("poll");
/* Always read from the eventfd first, if pid 2 died then pid 1 often
* dies too, and we could race, reporting that first and we'd lose
* the real exit status. */
if (event_fd != -1)
{
s = read (event_fd, &val, 8);
if (s == -1 && errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN)
die_with_error ("read eventfd");
else if (s == 8)
exit ((int) val - 1);
}
s = read (signal_fd, &fdsi, sizeof (struct signalfd_siginfo));
if (s == -1 && errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN)
{
die_with_error ("read signalfd");
}
else if (s == sizeof (struct signalfd_siginfo))
{
if (fdsi.ssi_signo != SIGCHLD)
die ("Read unexpected signal\n");
exit (fdsi.ssi_status);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Call setsid() before executing sandboxed code (CVE-2017-5226)
This prevents the sandboxed code from getting a controlling tty,
which in turn prevents it from accessing the TIOCSTI ioctl and hence
faking terminal input.
Fixes: #142
Closes: #143
Approved by: cgwalters
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 69,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *js_realloc(js_State *J, void *ptr, int size)
{
ptr = J->alloc(J->actx, ptr, size);
if (!ptr)
js_outofmemory(J);
return ptr;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::DoubleOrStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_doubleOrStringAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::DoubleOrStringAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,694 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssize_t pdu_unmarshal(V9fsPDU *pdu, size_t offset, const char *fmt, ...)
{
ssize_t ret;
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
ret = virtio_pdu_vunmarshal(pdu, offset, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 7,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: arp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length, u_int caplen)
{
const struct arp_pkthdr *ap;
u_short pro, hrd, op, linkaddr;
ap = (const struct arp_pkthdr *)bp;
ND_TCHECK(*ap);
hrd = HRD(ap);
pro = PRO(ap);
op = OP(ap);
/* if its ATM then call the ATM ARP printer
for Frame-relay ARP most of the fields
are similar to Ethernet so overload the Ethernet Printer
and set the linkaddr type for linkaddr_string(ndo, ) accordingly */
switch(hrd) {
case ARPHRD_ATM2225:
atmarp_print(ndo, bp, length, caplen);
return;
case ARPHRD_FRELAY:
linkaddr = LINKADDR_FRELAY;
break;
default:
linkaddr = LINKADDR_ETHER;
break;
}
if (!ND_TTEST2(*ar_tpa(ap), PROTO_LEN(ap))) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)ap, length);
return;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ARP, "));
}
/* print hardware type/len and proto type/len */
if ((pro != ETHERTYPE_IP && pro != ETHERTYPE_TRAIL) ||
PROTO_LEN(ap) != 4 ||
HRD_LEN(ap) == 0 ||
ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (len %u), %s (len %u)",
tok2str(arphrd_values, "Unknown Hardware (%u)", hrd),
HRD_LEN(ap),
tok2str(ethertype_values, "Unknown Protocol (0x%04x)", pro),
PROTO_LEN(ap)));
/* don't know know about the address formats */
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) {
goto out;
}
}
/* print operation */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s ",
ndo->ndo_vflag ? ", " : "",
tok2str(arpop_values, "Unknown (%u)", op)));
switch (op) {
case ARPOP_REQUEST:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "who-has %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, TPA(ap))));
if (isnonzero((const u_char *)THA(ap), HRD_LEN(ap)))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%s)",
linkaddr_string(ndo, THA(ap), linkaddr, HRD_LEN(ap))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tell %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, SPA(ap))));
break;
case ARPOP_REPLY:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s is-at %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, SPA(ap)),
linkaddr_string(ndo, SHA(ap), linkaddr, HRD_LEN(ap))));
break;
case ARPOP_REVREQUEST:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "who-is %s tell %s",
linkaddr_string(ndo, THA(ap), linkaddr, HRD_LEN(ap)),
linkaddr_string(ndo, SHA(ap), linkaddr, HRD_LEN(ap))));
break;
case ARPOP_REVREPLY:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s at %s",
linkaddr_string(ndo, THA(ap), linkaddr, HRD_LEN(ap)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, TPA(ap))));
break;
case ARPOP_INVREQUEST:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "who-is %s tell %s",
linkaddr_string(ndo, THA(ap), linkaddr, HRD_LEN(ap)),
linkaddr_string(ndo, SHA(ap), linkaddr, HRD_LEN(ap))));
break;
case ARPOP_INVREPLY:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s at %s",
linkaddr_string(ndo, SHA(ap), linkaddr, HRD_LEN(ap)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, SPA(ap))));
break;
default:
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)ap, caplen);
return;
}
out:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13013/ARP: Fix printing of ARP protocol addresses.
If the protocol type isn't ETHERTYPE_IP or ETHERTYPE_TRAIL, or if the
protocol address length isn't 4, don't print the address as an IPv4 address.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update another test file's tcpdump output to reflect this change.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,880 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::FocusedNodeTouched(bool editable) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
RenderWidgetHostView* view = GetRenderWidgetHostView();
if (!view)
return;
POINT cursor_pos = {};
::GetCursorPos(&cursor_pos);
float scale = GetScaleFactorForView(view);
gfx::Point location_dips_screen =
gfx::ConvertPointToDIP(scale, gfx::Point(cursor_pos));
view->FocusedNodeTouched(location_dips_screen, editable);
#endif
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,695 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppResult::UpdateFromLastLaunched(const base::Time& current_time,
const base::Time& last_launched) {
base::TimeDelta delta = current_time - last_launched;
if (current_time < last_launched) {
set_relevance(1.0);
return;
}
const int kSecondsInWeek = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
set_relevance(1 / (1 + delta.InSecondsF() / kSecondsInWeek));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, getAlias)
{
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (phar_obj->arc.archive->alias && phar_obj->arc.archive->alias != phar_obj->arc.archive->fname) {
RETURN_STRINGL(phar_obj->arc.archive->alias, phar_obj->arc.archive->alias_len, 1);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool adapter_get_name() {
int error;
bt_property_t *name = property_new_name("get_name");
CALL_AND_WAIT(bt_interface->set_adapter_property(name), adapter_properties);
CALL_AND_WAIT(error = bt_interface->get_adapter_property(BT_PROPERTY_BDNAME), adapter_properties);
TASSERT(error == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS, "Error getting device name.");
TASSERT(adapter_get_property_count() == 1, "Expected 1 adapter property change, found %d instead.", adapter_get_property_count());
TASSERT(adapter_get_property(BT_PROPERTY_BDNAME), "The Bluetooth name property did not change.");
TASSERT(property_equals(adapter_get_property(BT_PROPERTY_BDNAME), name), "Bluetooth name '%s' does not match test value", property_as_name(adapter_get_property(BT_PROPERTY_BDNAME))->name);
property_free(name);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 159,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: initialize_request (const struct url *u, struct http_stat *hs, int *dt, struct url *proxy,
bool inhibit_keep_alive, bool *basic_auth_finished,
wgint *body_data_size, char **user, char **passwd, uerr_t *ret)
{
bool head_only = !!(*dt & HEAD_ONLY);
struct request *req;
/* Prepare the request to send. */
{
char *meth_arg;
const char *meth = "GET";
if (head_only)
meth = "HEAD";
else if (opt.method)
meth = opt.method;
/* Use the full path, i.e. one that includes the leading slash and
the query string. E.g. if u->path is "foo/bar" and u->query is
"param=value", full_path will be "/foo/bar?param=value". */
if (proxy
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
/* When using SSL over proxy, CONNECT establishes a direct
connection to the HTTPS server. Therefore use the same
argument as when talking to the server directly. */
&& u->scheme != SCHEME_HTTPS
#endif
)
meth_arg = xstrdup (u->url);
else
meth_arg = url_full_path (u);
req = request_new (meth, meth_arg);
}
request_set_header (req, "Referer", (char *) hs->referer, rel_none);
if (*dt & SEND_NOCACHE)
{
/* Cache-Control MUST be obeyed by all HTTP/1.1 caching mechanisms... */
request_set_header (req, "Cache-Control", "no-cache", rel_none);
/* ... but some HTTP/1.0 caches doesn't implement Cache-Control. */
request_set_header (req, "Pragma", "no-cache", rel_none);
}
if (*dt & IF_MODIFIED_SINCE)
{
char strtime[32];
uerr_t err = time_to_rfc1123 (hs->orig_file_tstamp, strtime, countof (strtime));
if (err != RETROK)
{
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Cannot convert timestamp to http format. "
"Falling back to time 0 as last modification "
"time.\n"));
strcpy (strtime, "Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT");
}
request_set_header (req, "If-Modified-Since", xstrdup (strtime), rel_value);
}
if (hs->restval)
request_set_header (req, "Range",
aprintf ("bytes=%s-",
number_to_static_string (hs->restval)),
rel_value);
SET_USER_AGENT (req);
request_set_header (req, "Accept", "*/*", rel_none);
#ifdef HAVE_LIBZ
if (opt.compression != compression_none)
request_set_header (req, "Accept-Encoding", "gzip", rel_none);
else
#endif
request_set_header (req, "Accept-Encoding", "identity", rel_none);
/* Find the username with priority */
if (u->user)
*user = u->user;
else if (opt.user && (opt.use_askpass || opt.ask_passwd))
*user = opt.user;
else if (opt.http_user)
*user = opt.http_user;
else if (opt.user)
*user = opt.user;
else
*user = NULL;
/* Find the password with priority */
if (u->passwd)
*passwd = u->passwd;
else if (opt.passwd && (opt.use_askpass || opt.ask_passwd))
*passwd = opt.passwd;
else if (opt.http_passwd)
*passwd = opt.http_passwd;
else if (opt.passwd)
*passwd = opt.passwd;
else
*passwd = NULL;
/* Check for ~/.netrc if none of the above match */
if (opt.netrc && (!*user || !*passwd))
search_netrc (u->host, (const char **) user, (const char **) passwd, 0, NULL);
/* We only do "site-wide" authentication with "global" user/password
* values unless --auth-no-challenge has been requested; URL user/password
* info overrides. */
if (*user && *passwd && (!u->user || opt.auth_without_challenge))
{
/* If this is a host for which we've already received a Basic
* challenge, we'll go ahead and send Basic authentication creds. */
*basic_auth_finished = maybe_send_basic_creds (u->host, *user, *passwd, req);
}
/* Generate the Host header, HOST:PORT. Take into account that:
- Broken server-side software often doesn't recognize the PORT
argument, so we must generate "Host: www.server.com" instead of
"Host: www.server.com:80" (and likewise for https port).
- IPv6 addresses contain ":", so "Host: 3ffe:8100:200:2::2:1234"
becomes ambiguous and needs to be rewritten as "Host:
[3ffe:8100:200:2::2]:1234". */
{
/* Formats arranged for hfmt[add_port][add_squares]. */
static const char *hfmt[][2] = {
{ "%s", "[%s]" }, { "%s:%d", "[%s]:%d" }
};
int add_port = u->port != scheme_default_port (u->scheme);
int add_squares = strchr (u->host, ':') != NULL;
request_set_header (req, "Host",
aprintf (hfmt[add_port][add_squares], u->host, u->port),
rel_value);
}
if (inhibit_keep_alive)
request_set_header (req, "Connection", "Close", rel_none);
else
{
request_set_header (req, "Connection", "Keep-Alive", rel_none);
if (proxy)
request_set_header (req, "Proxy-Connection", "Keep-Alive", rel_none);
}
if (opt.method)
{
if (opt.body_data || opt.body_file)
{
request_set_header (req, "Content-Type",
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded", rel_none);
if (opt.body_data)
*body_data_size = strlen (opt.body_data);
else
{
*body_data_size = file_size (opt.body_file);
if (*body_data_size == -1)
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("BODY data file %s missing: %s\n"),
quote (opt.body_file), strerror (errno));
request_free (&req);
*ret = FILEBADFILE;
return NULL;
}
}
request_set_header (req, "Content-Length",
xstrdup (number_to_static_string (*body_data_size)),
rel_value);
}
else if (c_strcasecmp (opt.method, "post") == 0
|| c_strcasecmp (opt.method, "put") == 0
|| c_strcasecmp (opt.method, "patch") == 0)
request_set_header (req, "Content-Length", "0", rel_none);
}
return req;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
}
Commit Message: AppArmor: fix oops in apparmor_setprocattr
When invalid parameters are passed to apparmor_setprocattr a NULL deref
oops occurs when it tries to record an audit message. This is because
it is passing NULL for the profile parameter for aa_audit. But aa_audit
now requires that the profile passed is not NULL.
Fix this by passing the current profile on the task that is trying to
setprocattr.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 34,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CLASS kodak_rgb_load_raw()
{
short buf[768], *bp;
int row, col, len, c, i, rgb[3];
ushort *ip=image[0];
for (row=0; row < height; row++)
for (col=0; col < width; col+=256) {
len = MIN (256, width-col);
kodak_65000_decode (buf, len*3);
memset (rgb, 0, sizeof rgb);
for (bp=buf, i=0; i < len; i++, ip+=4)
FORC3 if ((ip[c] = rgb[c] += *bp++) >> 12) derror();
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 43,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void CL_GenerateQKey(void)
{
int len = 0;
unsigned char buff[ QKEY_SIZE ];
fileHandle_t f;
len = FS_SV_FOpenFileRead( QKEY_FILE, &f );
FS_FCloseFile( f );
if( len == QKEY_SIZE ) {
Com_Printf( "RTCWKEY found.\n" );
return;
}
else {
if( len > 0 ) {
Com_Printf( "RTCWKEY file size != %d, regenerating\n",
QKEY_SIZE );
}
Com_Printf( "RTCWKEY building random string\n" );
Com_RandomBytes( buff, sizeof(buff) );
f = FS_SV_FOpenFileWrite( QKEY_FILE );
if( !f ) {
Com_Printf( "RTCWKEY could not open %s for write\n",
QKEY_FILE );
return;
}
FS_Write( buff, sizeof(buff), f );
FS_FCloseFile( f );
Com_Printf( "RTCWKEY generated\n" );
}
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct fuse_file *fuse_file_get(struct fuse_file *ff)
{
atomic_inc(&ff->count);
return ff;
}
Commit Message: fuse: verify ioctl retries
Verify that the total length of the iovec returned in FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY
doesn't overflow iov_length().
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
CC: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.31+]
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TEE_Result tee_svc_copy_kaddr_to_uref(uint32_t *uref, void *kaddr)
{
uint32_t ref = tee_svc_kaddr_to_uref(kaddr);
return tee_svc_copy_to_user(uref, &ref, sizeof(ref));
}
Commit Message: core: svc: always check ta parameters
Always check TA parameters from a user TA. This prevents a user TA from
passing invalid pointers to a pseudo TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0007: "Buffer checks missing when calling pseudo
TAs".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sp<IBinder> Parcel::readStrongBinder() const
{
sp<IBinder> val;
readStrongBinder(&val);
return val;
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 163,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SelectionEditor::NeedsUpdateVisibleSelectionInFlatTree() const {
return cached_visible_selection_in_flat_tree_is_dirty_ ||
style_version_for_flat_tree_ != GetDocument().StyleVersion();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,968 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_dec_process_poc(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_ms_t *ms)
{
jpc_poc_t *poc = &ms->parms.poc;
jpc_dec_tile_t *tile;
switch (dec->state) {
case JPC_MH:
if (jpc_dec_cp_setfrompoc(dec->cp, poc, 1)) {
return -1;
}
break;
case JPC_TPH:
if (!(tile = dec->curtile)) {
return -1;
}
if (!tile->partno) {
if (jpc_dec_cp_setfrompoc(tile->cp, poc, (!tile->partno))) {
return -1;
}
} else {
jpc_pi_addpchgfrompoc(tile->pi, poc);
}
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 70,430 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Text* Document::createTextNode(const String& data) {
return Text::Create(*this, data);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ehci_advance_state(EHCIState *ehci, int async)
{
EHCIQueue *q = NULL;
int again;
do {
case EST_WAITLISTHEAD:
again = ehci_state_waitlisthead(ehci, async);
break;
case EST_FETCHENTRY:
again = ehci_state_fetchentry(ehci, async);
break;
case EST_FETCHQH:
q = ehci_state_fetchqh(ehci, async);
if (q != NULL) {
assert(q->async == async);
again = 1;
} else {
again = 0;
}
break;
case EST_FETCHITD:
again = ehci_state_fetchitd(ehci, async);
break;
case EST_FETCHSITD:
again = ehci_state_fetchsitd(ehci, async);
break;
case EST_ADVANCEQUEUE:
case EST_FETCHQTD:
assert(q != NULL);
again = ehci_state_fetchqtd(q);
break;
case EST_HORIZONTALQH:
assert(q != NULL);
again = ehci_state_horizqh(q);
break;
case EST_EXECUTE:
assert(q != NULL);
again = ehci_state_execute(q);
if (async) {
ehci->async_stepdown = 0;
}
break;
case EST_EXECUTING:
assert(q != NULL);
if (async) {
ehci->async_stepdown = 0;
}
again = ehci_state_executing(q);
break;
case EST_WRITEBACK:
assert(q != NULL);
again = ehci_state_writeback(q);
if (!async) {
ehci->periodic_sched_active = PERIODIC_ACTIVE;
}
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Bad state!\n");
again = -1;
g_assert_not_reached();
break;
}
break;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 165,075 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct key *old;
might_sleep();
/* create an empty session keyring */
if (!keyring) {
flags = KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN;
if (cred->session_keyring)
flags = KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA;
keyring = keyring_alloc("_ses", cred->uid, cred->gid, cred,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
flags, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
return PTR_ERR(keyring);
} else {
__key_get(keyring);
}
/* install the keyring */
old = cred->session_keyring;
rcu_assign_pointer(cred->session_keyring, keyring);
if (old)
key_put(old);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: fix keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() to not leak thread keyrings
This fixes CVE-2017-7472.
Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:
#include <keyutils.h>
int main()
{
for (;;)
keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
}
Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.
Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.29+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 67,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: modifier_crc(png_bytep buffer)
{
/* Recalculate the chunk CRC - a complete chunk must be in
* the buffer, at the start.
*/
uInt datalen = png_get_uint_32(buffer);
uLong crc = crc32(0, buffer+4, datalen+4);
/* The cast to png_uint_32 is safe because a crc32 is always a 32 bit value.
*/
png_save_uint_32(buffer+datalen+8, (png_uint_32)crc);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PlatformSensorAccelerometerMac::CheckSensorConfiguration(
const PlatformSensorConfiguration& configuration) {
return configuration.frequency() > 0 &&
configuration.frequency() <=
SensorTraits<SensorType::ACCELEROMETER>::kMaxAllowedFrequency;
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 148,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int glob(const char *pattern, int flags,
int errfunc(const char *epath, int eerrno),
glob_t *pglob) {
glob_t *ret;
WIN32_FIND_DATA FindFileData;
HANDLE hFind;
unsigned int nb_paths = 0;
char directory[500];
int len;
if ((pattern == NULL) || (pglob == NULL)) return(-1);
strncpy(directory, pattern, 499);
for (len = strlen(directory);len >= 0;len--) {
if (directory[len] == '/') {
len++;
directory[len] = 0;
break;
}
}
if (len <= 0)
len = 0;
ret = pglob;
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(glob_t));
hFind = FindFirstFileA(pattern, &FindFileData);
if (hFind == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
return(0);
nb_paths = 20;
ret->gl_pathv = (char **) malloc(nb_paths * sizeof(char *));
if (ret->gl_pathv == NULL) {
FindClose(hFind);
return(-1);
}
strncpy(directory + len, FindFileData.cFileName, 499 - len);
ret->gl_pathv[ret->gl_pathc] = strdup(directory);
if (ret->gl_pathv[ret->gl_pathc] == NULL)
goto done;
ret->gl_pathc++;
while(FindNextFileA(hFind, &FindFileData)) {
if (FindFileData.cFileName[0] == '.')
continue;
if (ret->gl_pathc + 2 > nb_paths) {
char **tmp = realloc(ret->gl_pathv, nb_paths * 2 * sizeof(char *));
if (tmp == NULL)
break;
ret->gl_pathv = tmp;
nb_paths *= 2;
}
strncpy(directory + len, FindFileData.cFileName, 499 - len);
ret->gl_pathv[ret->gl_pathc] = strdup(directory);
if (ret->gl_pathv[ret->gl_pathc] == NULL)
break;
ret->gl_pathc++;
}
ret->gl_pathv[ret->gl_pathc] = NULL;
done:
FindClose(hFind);
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 59,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SERVER* dup_serve(SERVER *s) {
SERVER *serve = NULL;
serve=g_new0(SERVER, 1);
if(serve == NULL)
return NULL;
if(s->exportname)
serve->exportname = g_strdup(s->exportname);
serve->expected_size = s->expected_size;
if(s->listenaddr)
serve->listenaddr = g_strdup(s->listenaddr);
serve->port = s->port;
if(s->authname)
serve->authname = strdup(s->authname);
serve->flags = s->flags;
serve->socket = serve->socket;
serve->socket_family = serve->socket_family;
serve->cidrlen = s->cidrlen;
if(s->prerun)
serve->prerun = g_strdup(s->prerun);
if(s->postrun)
serve->postrun = g_strdup(s->postrun);
if(s->servename)
serve->servename = g_strdup(s->servename);
serve->max_connections = s->max_connections;
return serve;
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer size checking
Yes, this means we've re-introduced CVE-2005-3534. Sigh.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int qeth_core_get_sset_count(struct net_device *dev, int stringset)
{
switch (stringset) {
case ETH_SS_STATS:
return (sizeof(qeth_ethtool_stats_keys) / ETH_GSTRING_LEN);
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::InsertVisualStateCallback(
VisualStateCallback callback) {
static uint64_t next_id = 1;
uint64_t key = next_id++;
Send(new FrameMsg_VisualStateRequest(routing_id_, key));
visual_state_callbacks_.emplace(key, std::move(callback));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *ConvertUTF16ToUTF8(const char *content,size_t *length)
{
char
*utf8;
int
bits,
byte,
c,
encoding;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
extent;
ssize_t
j;
utf8=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(*length+1,sizeof(*utf8));
if (utf8 == (char *) NULL)
return((char *) NULL);
encoding=(*content == '\xFE') ? 1 : (*content == '\xFF') ? 0 : -1;
if (encoding == -1)
{
/*
Already UTF-8.
*/
(void) CopyMagickMemory(utf8,content,*length*sizeof(*utf8));
utf8[*length]='\0';
return(utf8);
}
j=0;
extent=(*length);
for (i=2; i < (ssize_t) (*length-1); i+=2)
{
c=(encoding != 0) ? ((content[i] & 0xff) << 8) | (content[i+1] & 0xff) :
((content[i+1] & 0xff) << 8) | (content[i] & 0xff);
if ((c >= 0xd800) && (c <= 0xdfff) && ((i+=2) < (ssize_t) (*length-1)))
{
byte=(encoding != 0) ? ((content[i] & 0xff) << 8) |
(content[i+1] & 0xff) : ((content[i+1] & 0xff) << 8) |
(content[i] & 0xff);
c=(((c & 0x3ff) << 10) | (byte & 0x3ff))+0x10000;
}
if ((size_t) (j+MaxTextExtent) > extent)
{
extent=(size_t) j+MaxTextExtent;
utf8=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(utf8,extent,sizeof(*utf8));
if (utf8 == (char *) NULL)
return(utf8);
}
if (c < 0x80)
{
utf8[j]=c;
j++;
continue;
}
/*
Multi-byte UTF-8 sequence.
*/
byte=c;
for (bits=0; byte != 0; byte/=2)
bits++;
bits=(bits-2)/5;
utf8[j++]=(0xFF << (7-bits)) | (c >> (6*bits));
while (bits != 0)
{
bits--;
utf8[j]=0x80 | ((c >> (6*bits)) & 0x3f);
j++;
}
}
*length=(size_t) j;
utf8=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(utf8,*length,sizeof(*utf8));
if (utf8 != (char *) NULL)
utf8[*length]='\0';
return(utf8);
}
Commit Message: Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 71,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PKEY, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT);
return 0;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(ri->d.ktri->pkey);
ri->d.ktri->pkey = pkey;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 11,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit MouseLockAdapter(Plugin* plugin)
: pp::MouseLock(plugin),
plugin_(plugin) {
BrowserPpp* proxy = plugin_->ppapi_proxy();
CHECK(proxy != NULL);
ppp_mouse_lock_ = static_cast<const PPP_MouseLock*>(
proxy->GetPluginInterface(PPP_MOUSELOCK_INTERFACE));
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,371 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DiceTurnSyncOnHelper::ShowSyncConfirmationUI() {
delegate_->ShowSyncConfirmation(
base::BindOnce(&DiceTurnSyncOnHelper::FinishSyncSetupAndDelete,
weak_pointer_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::RemoveBrowserPluginEmbedder() {
if (browser_plugin_embedder_)
browser_plugin_embedder_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: good_file( const char *dir, const char *name )
{
if( VerboseFlag ) {
printf( "%s%c%s - OK\n", dir, DIR_DELIM_CHAR, name );
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "%s%c%s - OK\n", dir, DIR_DELIM_CHAR, name );
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PageHandler::PrintToPDF(Maybe<bool> landscape,
Maybe<bool> display_header_footer,
Maybe<bool> print_background,
Maybe<double> scale,
Maybe<double> paper_width,
Maybe<double> paper_height,
Maybe<double> margin_top,
Maybe<double> margin_bottom,
Maybe<double> margin_left,
Maybe<double> margin_right,
Maybe<String> page_ranges,
Maybe<bool> ignore_invalid_page_ranges,
std::unique_ptr<PrintToPDFCallback> callback) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::Error("PrintToPDF is not implemented"));
return;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <jzfeng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err gppc_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_3GPPConfigBox *p = (GF_3GPPConfigBox *)a;
const char *name = gf_4cc_to_str(p->cfg.vendor);
switch (p->cfg.type) {
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_3GP_AMR:
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_3GP_AMR_WB:
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "AMRConfigurationBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "Vendor=\"%s\" Version=\"%d\"", name, p->cfg.decoder_version);
fprintf(trace, " FramesPerSample=\"%d\" SupportedModes=\"%x\" ModeRotating=\"%d\"", p->cfg.frames_per_sample, p->cfg.AMR_mode_set, p->cfg.AMR_mode_change_period);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("AMRConfigurationBox", a, trace);
break;
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_3GP_EVRC:
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "EVRCConfigurationBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "Vendor=\"%s\" Version=\"%d\" FramesPerSample=\"%d\" >\n", name, p->cfg.decoder_version, p->cfg.frames_per_sample);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("EVRCConfigurationBox", a, trace);
break;
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_3GP_QCELP:
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "QCELPConfigurationBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "Vendor=\"%s\" Version=\"%d\" FramesPerSample=\"%d\" >\n", name, p->cfg.decoder_version, p->cfg.frames_per_sample);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("QCELPConfigurationBox", a, trace);
break;
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_3GP_SMV:
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "SMVConfigurationBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "Vendor=\"%s\" Version=\"%d\" FramesPerSample=\"%d\" >\n", name, p->cfg.decoder_version, p->cfg.frames_per_sample);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("SMVConfigurationBox", a, trace);
break;
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_3GP_H263:
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "H263ConfigurationBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "Vendor=\"%s\" Version=\"%d\"", name, p->cfg.decoder_version);
fprintf(trace, " Profile=\"%d\" Level=\"%d\"", p->cfg.H263_profile, p->cfg.H263_level);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("H263ConfigurationBox", a, trace);
break;
default:
break;
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void update_pvclock_gtod(struct timekeeper *tk)
{
struct pvclock_gtod_data *vdata = &pvclock_gtod_data;
u64 boot_ns;
boot_ns = ktime_to_ns(ktime_add(tk->tkr.base_mono, tk->offs_boot));
write_seqcount_begin(&vdata->seq);
/* copy pvclock gtod data */
vdata->clock.vclock_mode = tk->tkr.clock->archdata.vclock_mode;
vdata->clock.cycle_last = tk->tkr.cycle_last;
vdata->clock.mask = tk->tkr.mask;
vdata->clock.mult = tk->tkr.mult;
vdata->clock.shift = tk->tkr.shift;
vdata->boot_ns = boot_ns;
vdata->nsec_base = tk->tkr.xtime_nsec;
write_seqcount_end(&vdata->seq);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 35,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ActivatePassiveGrab(DeviceIntPtr device, GrabPtr grab, InternalEvent *event,
InternalEvent *real_event)
{
SpritePtr pSprite = device->spriteInfo->sprite;
GrabInfoPtr grabinfo = &device->deviceGrab;
xEvent *xE = NULL;
int count;
int rc;
/* The only consumers of corestate are Xi 1.x and core events, which
* are guaranteed to come from DeviceEvents. */
if (grab->grabtype == XI || grab->grabtype == CORE) {
DeviceIntPtr gdev;
event->device_event.corestate &= 0x1f00;
if (grab->grabtype == CORE)
gdev = GetMaster(device, KEYBOARD_OR_FLOAT);
else
gdev = grab->modifierDevice;
if (gdev && gdev->key && gdev->key->xkbInfo)
event->device_event.corestate |=
gdev->key->xkbInfo->state.grab_mods & (~0x1f00);
}
if (grab->grabtype == CORE) {
rc = EventToCore(event, &xE, &count);
if (rc != Success) {
BUG_WARN_MSG(rc != BadMatch, "[dix] %s: core conversion failed"
"(%d, %d).\n", device->name, event->any.type, rc);
return FALSE;
}
}
else if (grab->grabtype == XI2) {
rc = EventToXI2(event, &xE);
if (rc != Success) {
if (rc != BadMatch)
BUG_WARN_MSG(rc != BadMatch, "[dix] %s: XI2 conversion failed"
"(%d, %d).\n", device->name, event->any.type, rc);
return FALSE;
}
count = 1;
}
else {
rc = EventToXI(event, &xE, &count);
if (rc != Success) {
if (rc != BadMatch)
BUG_WARN_MSG(rc != BadMatch, "[dix] %s: XI conversion failed"
"(%d, %d).\n", device->name, event->any.type, rc);
return FALSE;
}
}
(*grabinfo->ActivateGrab) (device, grab,
ClientTimeToServerTime(event->any.time), TRUE);
if (xE) {
FixUpEventFromWindow(pSprite, xE, grab->window, None, TRUE);
/* XXX: XACE? */
TryClientEvents(rClient(grab), device, xE, count,
GetEventFilter(device, xE),
GetEventFilter(device, xE), grab);
}
if (grabinfo->sync.state == FROZEN_NO_EVENT)
grabinfo->sync.state = FROZEN_WITH_EVENT;
*grabinfo->sync.event = real_event->device_event;
free(xE);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,789 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionInstallDialogView::ExtensionInstallDialogView(
Profile* profile,
content::PageNavigator* navigator,
ExtensionInstallPrompt::Delegate* delegate,
scoped_refptr<ExtensionInstallPrompt::Prompt> prompt)
: profile_(profile),
navigator_(navigator),
delegate_(delegate),
prompt_(prompt),
container_(NULL),
scroll_view_(NULL),
handled_result_(false) {
InitView();
}
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 131,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void floatArrayAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::floatArrayAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ShellSurface::ScopedAnimationsDisabled::ScopedAnimationsDisabled(
ShellSurface* shell_surface)
: shell_surface_(shell_surface) {
if (shell_surface_->widget_) {
aura::Window* window = shell_surface_->widget_->GetNativeWindow();
saved_animations_disabled_ =
window->GetProperty(aura::client::kAnimationsDisabledKey);
window->SetProperty(aura::client::kAnimationsDisabledKey, true);
}
}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 120,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int send_reply_chunks(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt,
struct rpcrdma_write_array *rp_ary,
struct rpcrdma_msg *rdma_resp,
struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
struct svc_rdma_req_map *vec)
{
u32 xfer_len = rqstp->rq_res.len;
int write_len;
u32 xdr_off;
int chunk_no;
int chunk_off;
int nchunks;
struct rpcrdma_segment *ch;
struct rpcrdma_write_array *res_ary;
int ret;
/* XXX: need to fix when reply lists occur with read-list and or
* write-list */
res_ary = (struct rpcrdma_write_array *)
&rdma_resp->rm_body.rm_chunks[2];
/* xdr offset starts at RPC message */
nchunks = be32_to_cpu(rp_ary->wc_nchunks);
for (xdr_off = 0, chunk_no = 0;
xfer_len && chunk_no < nchunks;
chunk_no++) {
u64 rs_offset;
ch = &rp_ary->wc_array[chunk_no].wc_target;
write_len = min(xfer_len, be32_to_cpu(ch->rs_length));
/* Prepare the reply chunk given the length actually
* written */
xdr_decode_hyper((__be32 *)&ch->rs_offset, &rs_offset);
svc_rdma_xdr_encode_array_chunk(res_ary, chunk_no,
ch->rs_handle, ch->rs_offset,
write_len);
chunk_off = 0;
while (write_len) {
ret = send_write(xprt, rqstp,
be32_to_cpu(ch->rs_handle),
rs_offset + chunk_off,
xdr_off,
write_len,
vec);
if (ret <= 0)
goto out_err;
chunk_off += ret;
xdr_off += ret;
xfer_len -= ret;
write_len -= ret;
}
}
/* Update the req with the number of chunks actually used */
svc_rdma_xdr_encode_reply_array(res_ary, chunk_no);
return rqstp->rq_res.len;
out_err:
pr_err("svcrdma: failed to send reply chunks, rc=%d\n", ret);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 1 | 168,168 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_image_filter_emboss(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS)
{
PHP_GD_SINGLE_RES
if (gdImageEmboss(im_src) == 1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dev_set_promiscuity(struct net_device *dev, int inc)
{
unsigned int old_flags = dev->flags;
int err;
err = __dev_set_promiscuity(dev, inc, true);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (dev->flags != old_flags)
dev_set_rx_mode(dev);
return err;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,811 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __net_exit ip6_tables_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
xt_proto_fini(net, NFPROTO_IPV6);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void create_EXIF(ExifElement_t* elements, int exifTagCount, int gpsTagCount, int hasDateTimeTag)
{
const int EXIF_MAX_SIZE = 1024*64;
char* Buffer = malloc(EXIF_MAX_SIZE);
if (Buffer != NULL) {
create_EXIF_internal(elements, exifTagCount, gpsTagCount, hasDateTimeTag, Buffer);
free(Buffer);
} else {
ErrFatal("Could not allocate memory");
}
}
Commit Message: Fix possible out of bounds access
Bug: 28868315
Change-Id: I2b416c662f9ad7f9b3c6cf973a39c6693c66775a
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 159,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct rtable *__mkroute_output(const struct fib_result *res,
const struct flowi4 *fl4, int orig_oif,
struct net_device *dev_out,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct fib_info *fi = res->fi;
struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe;
struct in_device *in_dev;
u16 type = res->type;
struct rtable *rth;
bool do_cache;
in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev_out);
if (!in_dev)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (likely(!IN_DEV_ROUTE_LOCALNET(in_dev)))
if (ipv4_is_loopback(fl4->saddr) && !(dev_out->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (ipv4_is_lbcast(fl4->daddr))
type = RTN_BROADCAST;
else if (ipv4_is_multicast(fl4->daddr))
type = RTN_MULTICAST;
else if (ipv4_is_zeronet(fl4->daddr))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (dev_out->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)
flags |= RTCF_LOCAL;
do_cache = true;
if (type == RTN_BROADCAST) {
flags |= RTCF_BROADCAST | RTCF_LOCAL;
fi = NULL;
} else if (type == RTN_MULTICAST) {
flags |= RTCF_MULTICAST | RTCF_LOCAL;
if (!ip_check_mc_rcu(in_dev, fl4->daddr, fl4->saddr,
fl4->flowi4_proto))
flags &= ~RTCF_LOCAL;
else
do_cache = false;
/* If multicast route do not exist use
* default one, but do not gateway in this case.
* Yes, it is hack.
*/
if (fi && res->prefixlen < 4)
fi = NULL;
} else if ((type == RTN_LOCAL) && (orig_oif != 0) &&
(orig_oif != dev_out->ifindex)) {
/* For local routes that require a particular output interface
* we do not want to cache the result. Caching the result
* causes incorrect behaviour when there are multiple source
* addresses on the interface, the end result being that if the
* intended recipient is waiting on that interface for the
* packet he won't receive it because it will be delivered on
* the loopback interface and the IP_PKTINFO ipi_ifindex will
* be set to the loopback interface as well.
*/
fi = NULL;
}
fnhe = NULL;
do_cache &= fi != NULL;
if (do_cache) {
struct rtable __rcu **prth;
struct fib_nh *nh = &FIB_RES_NH(*res);
fnhe = find_exception(nh, fl4->daddr);
if (fnhe)
prth = &fnhe->fnhe_rth_output;
else {
if (unlikely(fl4->flowi4_flags &
FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH &&
!(nh->nh_gw &&
nh->nh_scope == RT_SCOPE_LINK))) {
do_cache = false;
goto add;
}
prth = raw_cpu_ptr(nh->nh_pcpu_rth_output);
}
rth = rcu_dereference(*prth);
if (rt_cache_valid(rth)) {
dst_hold(&rth->dst);
return rth;
}
}
add:
rth = rt_dst_alloc(dev_out,
IN_DEV_CONF_GET(in_dev, NOPOLICY),
IN_DEV_CONF_GET(in_dev, NOXFRM),
do_cache);
if (!rth)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOBUFS);
rth->dst.output = ip_output;
rth->rt_genid = rt_genid_ipv4(dev_net(dev_out));
rth->rt_flags = flags;
rth->rt_type = type;
rth->rt_is_input = 0;
rth->rt_iif = orig_oif ? : 0;
rth->rt_pmtu = 0;
rth->rt_gateway = 0;
rth->rt_uses_gateway = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rth->rt_uncached);
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(out_slow_tot);
if (flags & RTCF_LOCAL)
rth->dst.input = ip_local_deliver;
if (flags & (RTCF_BROADCAST | RTCF_MULTICAST)) {
if (flags & RTCF_LOCAL &&
!(dev_out->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)) {
rth->dst.output = ip_mc_output;
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(out_slow_mc);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE
if (type == RTN_MULTICAST) {
if (IN_DEV_MFORWARD(in_dev) &&
!ipv4_is_local_multicast(fl4->daddr)) {
rth->dst.input = ip_mr_input;
rth->dst.output = ip_mc_output;
}
}
#endif
}
rt_set_nexthop(rth, fl4->daddr, res, fnhe, fi, type, 0);
return rth;
}
Commit Message: inet: update the IP ID generation algorithm to higher standards.
Commit 355b98553789 ("netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()")
makes net_hash_mix() return a true 32 bits of entropy. When used in the
IP ID generation algorithm, this has the effect of extending the IP ID
generation key from 32 bits to 64 bits.
However, net_hash_mix() is only used for IP ID generation starting with
kernel version 4.1. Therefore, earlier kernels remain with 32-bit key
no matter what the net_hash_mix() return value is.
This change addresses the issue by explicitly extending the key to 64
bits for kernels older than 4.1.
Signed-off-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 97,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char *get_snd_device_name(snd_device_t snd_device)
{
const char *name = NULL;
if (snd_device >= SND_DEVICE_MIN && snd_device < SND_DEVICE_MAX)
name = device_table[snd_device];
ALOGE_IF(name == NULL, "%s: invalid snd device %d", __func__, snd_device);
return name;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sc_file_set_prop_attr(sc_file_t *file, const u8 *prop_attr,
size_t prop_attr_len)
{
u8 *tmp;
if (!sc_file_valid(file)) {
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
}
if (prop_attr == NULL) {
if (file->prop_attr != NULL)
free(file->prop_attr);
file->prop_attr = NULL;
file->prop_attr_len = 0;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
tmp = (u8 *) realloc(file->prop_attr, prop_attr_len);
if (!tmp) {
if (file->prop_attr)
free(file->prop_attr);
file->prop_attr = NULL;
file->prop_attr_len = 0;
return SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
file->prop_attr = tmp;
memcpy(file->prop_attr, prop_attr, prop_attr_len);
file->prop_attr_len = prop_attr_len;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 78,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoftAACEncoder2::initPorts() {
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = 0;
def.eDir = OMX_DirInput;
def.nBufferCountMin = kNumBuffers;
def.nBufferCountActual = def.nBufferCountMin;
def.nBufferSize = kNumSamplesPerFrame * sizeof(int16_t) * 2;
def.bEnabled = OMX_TRUE;
def.bPopulated = OMX_FALSE;
def.eDomain = OMX_PortDomainAudio;
def.bBuffersContiguous = OMX_FALSE;
def.nBufferAlignment = 1;
def.format.audio.cMIMEType = const_cast<char *>("audio/raw");
def.format.audio.pNativeRender = NULL;
def.format.audio.bFlagErrorConcealment = OMX_FALSE;
def.format.audio.eEncoding = OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM;
addPort(def);
def.nPortIndex = 1;
def.eDir = OMX_DirOutput;
def.nBufferCountMin = kNumBuffers;
def.nBufferCountActual = def.nBufferCountMin;
def.nBufferSize = 8192;
def.bEnabled = OMX_TRUE;
def.bPopulated = OMX_FALSE;
def.eDomain = OMX_PortDomainAudio;
def.bBuffersContiguous = OMX_FALSE;
def.nBufferAlignment = 2;
def.format.audio.cMIMEType = const_cast<char *>("audio/aac");
def.format.audio.pNativeRender = NULL;
def.format.audio.bFlagErrorConcealment = OMX_FALSE;
def.format.audio.eEncoding = OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC;
addPort(def);
}
Commit Message: Add bounds check in SoftAACEncoder2::onQueueFilled()
Original code blindly copied some header information into the
user-supplied buffer without checking for sufficient space.
The code does check when it gets to filling the data -- it's
just the header copies that weren't checked.
Bug: 34617444
Test: ran POC before/after
Change-Id: I6e80ec90616f6cd02bb8316cd2d6e309b7e4729d
(cherry picked from commit 6231243626b8b9c57593b1f0ee417f2c4af4c0aa)
CWE ID: CWE-120 | 0 | 162,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void qemu_spice_create_update(SimpleSpiceDisplay *ssd)
{
static const int blksize = 32;
int blocks = (surface_width(ssd->ds) + blksize - 1) / blksize;
int dirty_top[blocks];
int y, yoff, x, xoff, blk, bw;
int bpp = surface_bytes_per_pixel(ssd->ds);
uint8_t *guest, *mirror;
if (qemu_spice_rect_is_empty(&ssd->dirty)) {
return;
};
if (ssd->surface == NULL) {
ssd->surface = pixman_image_ref(ssd->ds->image);
ssd->mirror = qemu_pixman_mirror_create(ssd->ds->format,
ssd->ds->image);
}
for (blk = 0; blk < blocks; blk++) {
dirty_top[blk] = -1;
}
guest = surface_data(ssd->ds);
mirror = (void *)pixman_image_get_data(ssd->mirror);
for (y = ssd->dirty.top; y < ssd->dirty.bottom; y++) {
yoff = y * surface_stride(ssd->ds);
for (x = ssd->dirty.left; x < ssd->dirty.right; x += blksize) {
xoff = x * bpp;
blk = x / blksize;
bw = MIN(blksize, ssd->dirty.right - x);
if (memcmp(guest + yoff + xoff,
mirror + yoff + xoff,
bw * bpp) == 0) {
if (dirty_top[blk] != -1) {
QXLRect update = {
.top = dirty_top[blk],
.bottom = y,
.left = x,
.right = x + bw,
};
qemu_spice_create_one_update(ssd, &update);
dirty_top[blk] = -1;
}
} else {
if (dirty_top[blk] == -1) {
dirty_top[blk] = y;
}
}
}
}
for (x = ssd->dirty.left; x < ssd->dirty.right; x += blksize) {
blk = x / blksize;
bw = MIN(blksize, ssd->dirty.right - x);
if (dirty_top[blk] != -1) {
QXLRect update = {
.top = dirty_top[blk],
.bottom = ssd->dirty.bottom,
.left = x,
.right = x + bw,
};
qemu_spice_create_one_update(ssd, &update);
dirty_top[blk] = -1;
}
}
memset(&ssd->dirty, 0, sizeof(ssd->dirty));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 12,187 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sd_prep_fn(struct request_queue *q, struct request *rq)
{
struct scsi_cmnd *SCpnt;
struct scsi_device *sdp = q->queuedata;
struct gendisk *disk = rq->rq_disk;
struct scsi_disk *sdkp;
sector_t block = blk_rq_pos(rq);
sector_t threshold;
unsigned int this_count = blk_rq_sectors(rq);
int ret, host_dif;
unsigned char protect;
/*
* Discard request come in as REQ_TYPE_FS but we turn them into
* block PC requests to make life easier.
*/
if (rq->cmd_flags & REQ_DISCARD) {
ret = scsi_setup_discard_cmnd(sdp, rq);
goto out;
} else if (rq->cmd_flags & REQ_FLUSH) {
ret = scsi_setup_flush_cmnd(sdp, rq);
goto out;
} else if (rq->cmd_type == REQ_TYPE_BLOCK_PC) {
ret = scsi_setup_blk_pc_cmnd(sdp, rq);
goto out;
} else if (rq->cmd_type != REQ_TYPE_FS) {
ret = BLKPREP_KILL;
goto out;
}
ret = scsi_setup_fs_cmnd(sdp, rq);
if (ret != BLKPREP_OK)
goto out;
SCpnt = rq->special;
sdkp = scsi_disk(disk);
/* from here on until we're complete, any goto out
* is used for a killable error condition */
ret = BLKPREP_KILL;
SCSI_LOG_HLQUEUE(1, scmd_printk(KERN_INFO, SCpnt,
"sd_init_command: block=%llu, "
"count=%d\n",
(unsigned long long)block,
this_count));
if (!sdp || !scsi_device_online(sdp) ||
block + blk_rq_sectors(rq) > get_capacity(disk)) {
SCSI_LOG_HLQUEUE(2, scmd_printk(KERN_INFO, SCpnt,
"Finishing %u sectors\n",
blk_rq_sectors(rq)));
SCSI_LOG_HLQUEUE(2, scmd_printk(KERN_INFO, SCpnt,
"Retry with 0x%p\n", SCpnt));
goto out;
}
if (sdp->changed) {
/*
* quietly refuse to do anything to a changed disc until
* the changed bit has been reset
*/
/* printk("SCSI disk has been changed or is not present. Prohibiting further I/O.\n"); */
goto out;
}
/*
* Some SD card readers can't handle multi-sector accesses which touch
* the last one or two hardware sectors. Split accesses as needed.
*/
threshold = get_capacity(disk) - SD_LAST_BUGGY_SECTORS *
(sdp->sector_size / 512);
if (unlikely(sdp->last_sector_bug && block + this_count > threshold)) {
if (block < threshold) {
/* Access up to the threshold but not beyond */
this_count = threshold - block;
} else {
/* Access only a single hardware sector */
this_count = sdp->sector_size / 512;
}
}
SCSI_LOG_HLQUEUE(2, scmd_printk(KERN_INFO, SCpnt, "block=%llu\n",
(unsigned long long)block));
/*
* If we have a 1K hardware sectorsize, prevent access to single
* 512 byte sectors. In theory we could handle this - in fact
* the scsi cdrom driver must be able to handle this because
* we typically use 1K blocksizes, and cdroms typically have
* 2K hardware sectorsizes. Of course, things are simpler
* with the cdrom, since it is read-only. For performance
* reasons, the filesystems should be able to handle this
* and not force the scsi disk driver to use bounce buffers
* for this.
*/
if (sdp->sector_size == 1024) {
if ((block & 1) || (blk_rq_sectors(rq) & 1)) {
scmd_printk(KERN_ERR, SCpnt,
"Bad block number requested\n");
goto out;
} else {
block = block >> 1;
this_count = this_count >> 1;
}
}
if (sdp->sector_size == 2048) {
if ((block & 3) || (blk_rq_sectors(rq) & 3)) {
scmd_printk(KERN_ERR, SCpnt,
"Bad block number requested\n");
goto out;
} else {
block = block >> 2;
this_count = this_count >> 2;
}
}
if (sdp->sector_size == 4096) {
if ((block & 7) || (blk_rq_sectors(rq) & 7)) {
scmd_printk(KERN_ERR, SCpnt,
"Bad block number requested\n");
goto out;
} else {
block = block >> 3;
this_count = this_count >> 3;
}
}
if (rq_data_dir(rq) == WRITE) {
if (!sdp->writeable) {
goto out;
}
SCpnt->cmnd[0] = WRITE_6;
SCpnt->sc_data_direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
if (blk_integrity_rq(rq) &&
sd_dif_prepare(rq, block, sdp->sector_size) == -EIO)
goto out;
} else if (rq_data_dir(rq) == READ) {
SCpnt->cmnd[0] = READ_6;
SCpnt->sc_data_direction = DMA_FROM_DEVICE;
} else {
scmd_printk(KERN_ERR, SCpnt, "Unknown command %x\n", rq->cmd_flags);
goto out;
}
SCSI_LOG_HLQUEUE(2, scmd_printk(KERN_INFO, SCpnt,
"%s %d/%u 512 byte blocks.\n",
(rq_data_dir(rq) == WRITE) ?
"writing" : "reading", this_count,
blk_rq_sectors(rq)));
/* Set RDPROTECT/WRPROTECT if disk is formatted with DIF */
host_dif = scsi_host_dif_capable(sdp->host, sdkp->protection_type);
if (host_dif)
protect = 1 << 5;
else
protect = 0;
if (host_dif == SD_DIF_TYPE2_PROTECTION) {
SCpnt->cmnd = mempool_alloc(sd_cdb_pool, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(SCpnt->cmnd == NULL)) {
ret = BLKPREP_DEFER;
goto out;
}
SCpnt->cmd_len = SD_EXT_CDB_SIZE;
memset(SCpnt->cmnd, 0, SCpnt->cmd_len);
SCpnt->cmnd[0] = VARIABLE_LENGTH_CMD;
SCpnt->cmnd[7] = 0x18;
SCpnt->cmnd[9] = (rq_data_dir(rq) == READ) ? READ_32 : WRITE_32;
SCpnt->cmnd[10] = protect | ((rq->cmd_flags & REQ_FUA) ? 0x8 : 0);
/* LBA */
SCpnt->cmnd[12] = sizeof(block) > 4 ? (unsigned char) (block >> 56) & 0xff : 0;
SCpnt->cmnd[13] = sizeof(block) > 4 ? (unsigned char) (block >> 48) & 0xff : 0;
SCpnt->cmnd[14] = sizeof(block) > 4 ? (unsigned char) (block >> 40) & 0xff : 0;
SCpnt->cmnd[15] = sizeof(block) > 4 ? (unsigned char) (block >> 32) & 0xff : 0;
SCpnt->cmnd[16] = (unsigned char) (block >> 24) & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[17] = (unsigned char) (block >> 16) & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[18] = (unsigned char) (block >> 8) & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[19] = (unsigned char) block & 0xff;
/* Expected Indirect LBA */
SCpnt->cmnd[20] = (unsigned char) (block >> 24) & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[21] = (unsigned char) (block >> 16) & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[22] = (unsigned char) (block >> 8) & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[23] = (unsigned char) block & 0xff;
/* Transfer length */
SCpnt->cmnd[28] = (unsigned char) (this_count >> 24) & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[29] = (unsigned char) (this_count >> 16) & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[30] = (unsigned char) (this_count >> 8) & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[31] = (unsigned char) this_count & 0xff;
} else if (block > 0xffffffff) {
SCpnt->cmnd[0] += READ_16 - READ_6;
SCpnt->cmnd[1] = protect | ((rq->cmd_flags & REQ_FUA) ? 0x8 : 0);
SCpnt->cmnd[2] = sizeof(block) > 4 ? (unsigned char) (block >> 56) & 0xff : 0;
SCpnt->cmnd[3] = sizeof(block) > 4 ? (unsigned char) (block >> 48) & 0xff : 0;
SCpnt->cmnd[4] = sizeof(block) > 4 ? (unsigned char) (block >> 40) & 0xff : 0;
SCpnt->cmnd[5] = sizeof(block) > 4 ? (unsigned char) (block >> 32) & 0xff : 0;
SCpnt->cmnd[6] = (unsigned char) (block >> 24) & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[7] = (unsigned char) (block >> 16) & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[8] = (unsigned char) (block >> 8) & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[9] = (unsigned char) block & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[10] = (unsigned char) (this_count >> 24) & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[11] = (unsigned char) (this_count >> 16) & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[12] = (unsigned char) (this_count >> 8) & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[13] = (unsigned char) this_count & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[14] = SCpnt->cmnd[15] = 0;
} else if ((this_count > 0xff) || (block > 0x1fffff) ||
scsi_device_protection(SCpnt->device) ||
SCpnt->device->use_10_for_rw) {
if (this_count > 0xffff)
this_count = 0xffff;
SCpnt->cmnd[0] += READ_10 - READ_6;
SCpnt->cmnd[1] = protect | ((rq->cmd_flags & REQ_FUA) ? 0x8 : 0);
SCpnt->cmnd[2] = (unsigned char) (block >> 24) & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[3] = (unsigned char) (block >> 16) & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[4] = (unsigned char) (block >> 8) & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[5] = (unsigned char) block & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[6] = SCpnt->cmnd[9] = 0;
SCpnt->cmnd[7] = (unsigned char) (this_count >> 8) & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[8] = (unsigned char) this_count & 0xff;
} else {
if (unlikely(rq->cmd_flags & REQ_FUA)) {
/*
* This happens only if this drive failed
* 10byte rw command with ILLEGAL_REQUEST
* during operation and thus turned off
* use_10_for_rw.
*/
scmd_printk(KERN_ERR, SCpnt,
"FUA write on READ/WRITE(6) drive\n");
goto out;
}
SCpnt->cmnd[1] |= (unsigned char) ((block >> 16) & 0x1f);
SCpnt->cmnd[2] = (unsigned char) ((block >> 8) & 0xff);
SCpnt->cmnd[3] = (unsigned char) block & 0xff;
SCpnt->cmnd[4] = (unsigned char) this_count;
SCpnt->cmnd[5] = 0;
}
SCpnt->sdb.length = this_count * sdp->sector_size;
/* If DIF or DIX is enabled, tell HBA how to handle request */
if (host_dif || scsi_prot_sg_count(SCpnt))
sd_prot_op(SCpnt, host_dif);
/*
* We shouldn't disconnect in the middle of a sector, so with a dumb
* host adapter, it's safe to assume that we can at least transfer
* this many bytes between each connect / disconnect.
*/
SCpnt->transfersize = sdp->sector_size;
SCpnt->underflow = this_count << 9;
SCpnt->allowed = SD_MAX_RETRIES;
/*
* This indicates that the command is ready from our end to be
* queued.
*/
ret = BLKPREP_OK;
out:
return scsi_prep_return(q, rq, ret);
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 94,395 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: notify_fifo_open(notify_fifo_t* global_fifo, notify_fifo_t* fifo, int (*script_exit)(thread_t *), const char *type)
{
/* Open the global FIFO if specified */
if (global_fifo->name)
fifo_open(global_fifo, script_exit, "");
/* Now the specific FIFO */
if (fifo->name)
fifo_open(fifo, script_exit, type);
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: QQmlComponent* OxideQQuickWebView::promptDialog() const {
Q_D(const OxideQQuickWebView);
return d->prompt_dialog_;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InternalPageInfoPopupView::~InternalPageInfoPopupView() {
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_read_mdhd(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
AVStream *st;
MOVStreamContext *sc;
int version;
char language[4] = {0};
unsigned lang;
int64_t creation_time;
if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1)
return 0;
st = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams-1];
sc = st->priv_data;
if (sc->time_scale) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Multiple mdhd?\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
version = avio_r8(pb);
if (version > 1) {
avpriv_request_sample(c->fc, "Version %d", version);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
avio_rb24(pb); /* flags */
if (version == 1) {
creation_time = avio_rb64(pb);
avio_rb64(pb);
} else {
creation_time = avio_rb32(pb);
avio_rb32(pb); /* modification time */
}
mov_metadata_creation_time(&st->metadata, creation_time);
sc->time_scale = avio_rb32(pb);
if (sc->time_scale <= 0) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid mdhd time scale %d, defaulting to 1\n", sc->time_scale);
sc->time_scale = 1;
}
st->duration = (version == 1) ? avio_rb64(pb) : avio_rb32(pb); /* duration */
lang = avio_rb16(pb); /* language */
if (ff_mov_lang_to_iso639(lang, language))
av_dict_set(&st->metadata, "language", language, 0);
avio_rb16(pb); /* quality */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,445 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool hctx_allow_merges(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx)
{
return (hctx->flags & BLK_MQ_F_SHOULD_MERGE) &&
!blk_queue_nomerges(hctx->queue);
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 86,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: init_servarray(netdissect_options *ndo)
{
struct servent *sv;
register struct hnamemem *table;
register int i;
char buf[sizeof("0000000000")];
while ((sv = getservent()) != NULL) {
int port = ntohs(sv->s_port);
i = port & (HASHNAMESIZE-1);
if (strcmp(sv->s_proto, "tcp") == 0)
table = &tporttable[i];
else if (strcmp(sv->s_proto, "udp") == 0)
table = &uporttable[i];
else
continue;
while (table->name)
table = table->nxt;
if (ndo->ndo_nflag) {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", port);
table->name = strdup(buf);
} else
table->name = strdup(sv->s_name);
if (table->name == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "init_servarray: strdup");
table->addr = port;
table->nxt = newhnamemem(ndo);
}
endservent();
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12894/In lookup_bytestring(), take the length of the byte string into account.
Otherwise, if, in our search of the hash table, we come across a byte
string that's shorter than the string we're looking for, we'll search
past the end of the string in the hash table.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> methodWithOptionalStringIsUndefinedCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.methodWithOptionalStringIsUndefined");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, str, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined));
imp->methodWithOptionalStringIsUndefined(str);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_definition(const char *buf)
{
const char *p;
def_t* def;
size_t def_name_len;
char *str;
if (buf[0] != '$')
return false;
if (!isalpha(buf[1]) && buf[1] != '_')
return NULL;
for (p = buf + 2; *p; p++) {
if (*p == '=')
break;
if (!isalnum(*p) &&
!isdigit(*p) &&
*p != '_')
return NULL;
}
def_name_len = (size_t)(p - &buf[1]);
p += strspn(p, " \t");
if (*p != '=')
return NULL;
if ((def = find_definition(&buf[1], def_name_len, true))) {
FREE(def->value);
def->fn = NULL; /* Allow a standard definition to be overridden */
}
else {
def = MALLOC(sizeof(*def));
def->name_len = def_name_len;
str = MALLOC(def->name_len + 1);
strncpy(str, &buf[1], def->name_len);
str[def->name_len] = '\0';
def->name = str;
if (!LIST_EXISTS(defs))
defs = alloc_list(free_definition, NULL);
list_add(defs, def);
}
/* Skip leading whitespace */
p += strspn(p + 1, " \t") + 1;
def->value_len = strlen(p);
if (p[def->value_len - 1] == '\\') {
/* Remove trailing whitespace */
while (def->value_len >= 2 &&
isblank(p[def->value_len - 2]))
def->value_len--;
if (def->value_len < 2) {
/* If the string has nothing except spaces and terminating '\'
* point to the string terminator. */
p += def->value_len;
def->value_len = 0;
}
def->multiline = true;
} else
def->multiline = false;
str = MALLOC(def->value_len + 1);
strcpy(str, p);
def->value = str;
/* If it a multiline definition, we need to mark the end of the first line
* by overwriting the '\' with the line end marker. */
if (def->value_len >= 2 && def->multiline)
def->value[def->value_len - 1] = DEF_LINE_END[0];
return def;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Magick_png_read_raw_profile(png_struct *ping,Image *image,
const ImageInfo *image_info, png_textp text,int ii,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*dp;
register png_charp
sp;
size_t
extent,
length,
nibbles;
StringInfo
*profile;
static const unsigned char
unhex[103]={0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1, 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,0,0,
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,10,11,12,
13,14,15};
sp=text[ii].text+1;
extent=text[ii].text_length;
/* look for newline */
while ((*sp != '\n') && extent--)
sp++;
/* look for length */
while (((*sp == '\0' || *sp == ' ' || *sp == '\n')) && extent--)
sp++;
if (extent == 0)
{
png_warning(ping,"invalid profile length");
return(MagickFalse);
}
length=StringToLong(sp);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" length: %lu",(unsigned long) length);
while ((*sp != ' ' && *sp != '\n') && extent--)
sp++;
if (extent == 0)
{
png_warning(ping,"missing profile length");
return(MagickFalse);
}
/* allocate space */
if (length == 0)
{
png_warning(ping,"invalid profile length");
return(MagickFalse);
}
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,length);
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
png_warning(ping, "unable to copy profile");
return(MagickFalse);
}
/* copy profile, skipping white space and column 1 "=" signs */
dp=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
nibbles=length*2;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) nibbles; i++)
{
while (*sp < '0' || (*sp > '9' && *sp < 'a') || *sp > 'f')
{
if (*sp == '\0')
{
png_warning(ping, "ran out of profile data");
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
return(MagickFalse);
}
sp++;
}
if (i%2 == 0)
*dp=(unsigned char) (16*unhex[(int) *sp++]);
else
(*dp++)+=unhex[(int) *sp++];
}
/*
We have already read "Raw profile type.
*/
(void) SetImageProfile(image,&text[ii].key[17],profile,exception);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
if (image_info->verbose)
(void) printf(" Found a generic profile, type %s\n",&text[ii].key[17]);
return MagickTrue;
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1201
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 77,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hugetlb_vmtruncate_list(struct prio_tree_root *root, pgoff_t pgoff)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct prio_tree_iter iter;
vma_prio_tree_foreach(vma, &iter, root, pgoff, ULONG_MAX) {
unsigned long v_offset;
/*
* Can the expression below overflow on 32-bit arches?
* No, because the prio_tree returns us only those vmas
* which overlap the truncated area starting at pgoff,
* and no vma on a 32-bit arch can span beyond the 4GB.
*/
if (vma->vm_pgoff < pgoff)
v_offset = (pgoff - vma->vm_pgoff) << PAGE_SHIFT;
else
v_offset = 0;
__unmap_hugepage_range(vma,
vma->vm_start + v_offset, vma->vm_end, NULL);
}
}
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <abarry@cray.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_quota_on(struct super_block *sb, int type, int format_id,
struct path *path)
{
int err;
if (!test_opt(sb, QUOTA))
return -EINVAL;
/* Quotafile not on the same filesystem? */
if (path->dentry->d_sb != sb)
return -EXDEV;
/* Journaling quota? */
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_qf_names[type]) {
/* Quotafile not in fs root? */
if (path->dentry->d_parent != sb->s_root)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"Quota file not on filesystem root. "
"Journaled quota will not work");
}
/*
* When we journal data on quota file, we have to flush journal to see
* all updates to the file when we bypass pagecache...
*/
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal &&
ext4_should_journal_data(d_inode(path->dentry))) {
/*
* We don't need to lock updates but journal_flush() could
* otherwise be livelocked...
*/
jbd2_journal_lock_updates(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal);
err = jbd2_journal_flush(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal);
jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal);
if (err)
return err;
}
return dquot_quota_on(sb, type, format_id, path);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 56,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
struct cred *new;
long error = 0;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
switch (option) {
case PR_CAPBSET_READ:
error = -EINVAL;
if (!cap_valid(arg2))
goto error;
error = !!cap_raised(new->cap_bset, arg2);
goto no_change;
case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
error = cap_prctl_drop(new, arg2);
if (error < 0)
goto error;
goto changed;
/*
* The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a
* system from legacy UID=0 based privilege (when filesystem
* capabilities are not in use) to a system using filesystem
* capabilities only - as the POSIX.1e draft intended.
*
* Note:
*
* PR_SET_SECUREBITS =
* issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)
* | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)
* | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)
* | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)
* | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED)
*
* will ensure that the current process and all of its
* children will be locked into a pure
* capability-based-privilege environment.
*/
case PR_SET_SECUREBITS:
error = -EPERM;
if ((((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
& (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
|| ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
|| (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
|| (cap_capable(current_cred(),
current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
/*
* [1] no changing of bits that are locked
* [2] no unlocking of locks
* [3] no setting of unsupported bits
* [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about
* the "sendmail capabilities bug")
*/
)
/* cannot change a locked bit */
goto error;
new->securebits = arg2;
goto changed;
case PR_GET_SECUREBITS:
error = new->securebits;
goto no_change;
case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
error = 1;
goto no_change;
case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS:
error = -EINVAL;
if (arg2 > 1) /* Note, we rely on arg2 being unsigned here */
goto error;
error = -EPERM;
if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
goto error;
if (arg2)
new->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
else
new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
goto changed;
default:
/* No functionality available - continue with default */
error = -ENOSYS;
goto error;
}
/* Functionality provided */
changed:
return commit_creds(new);
no_change:
error:
abort_creds(new);
return error;
}
Commit Message: fcaps: clear the same personality flags as suid when fcaps are used
If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous
personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared.
Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space
randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it
easier to attack.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,280 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.