instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RendererSchedulerImpl::VirtualTimeAllowedToAdvance() const {
return !main_thread_only().virtual_time_stopped;
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 143,493 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ParamTraits<net::HostPortPair>::Log(const param_type& p, std::string* l) {
l->append(p.ToString());
}
Commit Message: Beware of print-read inconsistency when serializing GURLs.
BUG=165622
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11576038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173583 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 117,446 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool CanAccessAncestor(const SecurityOrigin& active_security_origin,
const Frame* target_frame) {
if (!target_frame)
return false;
const bool is_local_active_origin = active_security_origin.IsLocal();
for (const Frame* ancestor_frame = target_frame; ancestor_frame;
ancestor_frame = ancestor_frame->Tree().Parent()) {
const SecurityOrigin* ancestor_security_origin =
ancestor_frame->GetSecurityContext()->GetSecurityOrigin();
if (active_security_origin.CanAccess(ancestor_security_origin))
return true;
if (is_local_active_origin && ancestor_security_origin->IsLocal())
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppResult::ExtensionEnableFlowAborted(bool user_initiated) {
extension_enable_flow_.reset();
controller_->OnCloseChildDialog();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: zalloc(unsigned long size)
{
void *mem = xalloc(size);
if (mem)
memset(mem, 0, size);
return mem;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int event2keytype(int event)
{
switch (event) {
case XFRM_MSG_DELSA:
return SADB_DELETE;
case XFRM_MSG_NEWSA:
return SADB_ADD;
case XFRM_MSG_UPDSA:
return SADB_UPDATE;
case XFRM_MSG_EXPIRE:
return SADB_EXPIRE;
default:
pr_err("pfkey: Unknown SA event %d\n", event);
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 31,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoCoverStrokePathInstancedCHROMIUM(
GLsizei numPaths,
GLenum pathNameType,
const GLvoid* paths,
GLsizei pathsBufsize,
GLuint pathBase,
GLenum coverMode,
GLenum transformType,
const GLfloat* transformValues,
GLsizei transformValuesBufsize) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,916 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::SetURL(const KURL& url) {
const KURL& new_url = url.IsEmpty() ? BlankURL() : url;
if (new_url == url_)
return;
url_ = new_url;
access_entry_from_url_ = nullptr;
UpdateBaseURL();
GetContextFeatures().UrlDidChange(this);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,158 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void VideoCaptureImpl::StartCapture(
int client_id,
const media::VideoCaptureParams& params,
const VideoCaptureStateUpdateCB& state_update_cb,
const VideoCaptureDeliverFrameCB& deliver_frame_cb) {
DVLOG(1) << __func__ << " |device_id_| = " << device_id_;
DCHECK(io_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
ClientInfo client_info;
client_info.params = params;
client_info.state_update_cb = state_update_cb;
client_info.deliver_frame_cb = deliver_frame_cb;
switch (state_) {
case VIDEO_CAPTURE_STATE_STARTING:
case VIDEO_CAPTURE_STATE_STARTED:
clients_[client_id] = client_info;
DCHECK_EQ(params_.resolution_change_policy,
params.resolution_change_policy);
return;
case VIDEO_CAPTURE_STATE_STOPPING:
clients_pending_on_restart_[client_id] = client_info;
DVLOG(1) << __func__ << " Got new resolution while stopping: "
<< params.requested_format.frame_size.ToString();
return;
case VIDEO_CAPTURE_STATE_STOPPED:
case VIDEO_CAPTURE_STATE_ENDED:
clients_[client_id] = client_info;
params_ = params;
params_.requested_format.frame_rate =
std::min(params_.requested_format.frame_rate,
static_cast<float>(media::limits::kMaxFramesPerSecond));
DVLOG(1) << "StartCapture: starting with first resolution "
<< params_.requested_format.frame_size.ToString();
StartCaptureInternal();
return;
case VIDEO_CAPTURE_STATE_ERROR:
state_update_cb.Run(VIDEO_CAPTURE_STATE_ERROR);
return;
case VIDEO_CAPTURE_STATE_PAUSED:
case VIDEO_CAPTURE_STATE_RESUMED:
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillPopupBaseView::DoShow() {
const bool initialize_widget = !GetWidget();
if (initialize_widget) {
if (parent_widget_)
parent_widget_->AddObserver(this);
views::Widget* widget = new views::Widget;
views::Widget::InitParams params(views::Widget::InitParams::TYPE_POPUP);
params.delegate = this;
params.parent = parent_widget_ ? parent_widget_->GetNativeView()
: delegate_->container_view();
AddExtraInitParams(¶ms);
widget->Init(params);
std::unique_ptr<views::View> wrapper = CreateWrapperView();
if (wrapper)
widget->SetContentsView(wrapper.release());
widget->AddObserver(this);
widget->SetVisibilityAnimationTransition(views::Widget::ANIMATE_HIDE);
show_time_ = base::Time::Now();
}
GetWidget()->GetRootView()->SetBorder(CreateBorder());
DoUpdateBoundsAndRedrawPopup();
GetWidget()->Show();
if (initialize_widget)
views::WidgetFocusManager::GetInstance()->AddFocusChangeListener(this);
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 172,096 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebPluginDelegateProxy::BackgroundChanged(
gfx::NativeDrawingContext context,
const gfx::Rect& rect) {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
#else
#if defined(OS_WIN)
HBITMAP hbitmap = static_cast<HBITMAP>(GetCurrentObject(context, OBJ_BITMAP));
if (hbitmap == NULL) {
NOTREACHED();
return true;
}
BITMAP bitmap = { 0 };
int result = GetObject(hbitmap, sizeof(bitmap), &bitmap);
if (!result) {
NOTREACHED();
return true;
}
XFORM xf;
if (!GetWorldTransform(context, &xf)) {
NOTREACHED();
return true;
}
gfx::Rect bitmap_rect(static_cast<int>(-xf.eDx), static_cast<int>(-xf.eDy),
bitmap.bmWidth, bitmap.bmHeight);
gfx::Rect check_rect = rect.Intersect(bitmap_rect);
int row_byte_size = check_rect.width() * (bitmap.bmBitsPixel / 8);
for (int y = check_rect.y(); y < check_rect.bottom(); y++) {
char* hdc_row_start = static_cast<char*>(bitmap.bmBits) +
(y + static_cast<int>(xf.eDy)) * bitmap.bmWidthBytes +
(check_rect.x() + static_cast<int>(xf.eDx)) * (bitmap.bmBitsPixel / 8);
uint32_t* canvas_row_start =
background_store_.canvas->getDevice()->accessBitmap(true).getAddr32(
check_rect.x() - plugin_rect_.x(), y - plugin_rect_.y());
if (memcmp(hdc_row_start, canvas_row_start, row_byte_size) != 0)
return true;
}
#else
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
CGAffineTransform transform = CGContextGetCTM(context);
bool flipped = fabs(transform.d + 1) < 0.0001;
CGFloat context_offset_x = -transform.tx;
CGFloat context_offset_y = flipped ? transform.ty -
CGBitmapContextGetHeight(context)
: -transform.ty;
gfx::Rect full_content_rect(context_offset_x, context_offset_y,
CGBitmapContextGetWidth(context),
CGBitmapContextGetHeight(context));
#else
cairo_surface_t* page_surface = cairo_get_target(context);
DCHECK_EQ(cairo_surface_get_type(page_surface), CAIRO_SURFACE_TYPE_IMAGE);
DCHECK_EQ(cairo_image_surface_get_format(page_surface), CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32);
double page_x_double = rect.x();
double page_y_double = rect.y();
cairo_user_to_device(context, &page_x_double, &page_y_double);
gfx::Rect full_content_rect(0, 0,
cairo_image_surface_get_width(page_surface),
cairo_image_surface_get_height(page_surface));
#endif
gfx::Rect content_rect = rect.Intersect(full_content_rect);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
const unsigned char* page_bytes = static_cast<const unsigned char*>(
CGBitmapContextGetData(context));
int page_stride = CGBitmapContextGetBytesPerRow(context);
int page_start_x = content_rect.x() - context_offset_x;
int page_start_y = content_rect.y() - context_offset_y;
skia::ScopedPlatformPaint scoped_platform_paint(
background_store_.canvas.get());
CGContextRef bg_context = scoped_platform_paint.GetPlatformSurface();
DCHECK_EQ(CGBitmapContextGetBitsPerPixel(context),
CGBitmapContextGetBitsPerPixel(bg_context));
const unsigned char* bg_bytes = static_cast<const unsigned char*>(
CGBitmapContextGetData(bg_context));
int full_bg_width = CGBitmapContextGetWidth(bg_context);
int full_bg_height = CGBitmapContextGetHeight(bg_context);
int bg_stride = CGBitmapContextGetBytesPerRow(bg_context);
int bg_last_row = CGBitmapContextGetHeight(bg_context) - 1;
int bytes_per_pixel = CGBitmapContextGetBitsPerPixel(context) / 8;
#else
cairo_surface_flush(page_surface);
const unsigned char* page_bytes = cairo_image_surface_get_data(page_surface);
int page_stride = cairo_image_surface_get_stride(page_surface);
int page_start_x = static_cast<int>(page_x_double);
int page_start_y = static_cast<int>(page_y_double);
skia::ScopedPlatformPaint scoped_platform_paint(
background_store_.canvas.get());
cairo_surface_t* bg_surface =cairo_get_target(
scoped_platform_paint.GetPlatformSurface());
DCHECK_EQ(cairo_surface_get_type(bg_surface), CAIRO_SURFACE_TYPE_IMAGE);
DCHECK_EQ(cairo_image_surface_get_format(bg_surface), CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32);
cairo_surface_flush(bg_surface);
const unsigned char* bg_bytes = cairo_image_surface_get_data(bg_surface);
int full_bg_width = cairo_image_surface_get_width(bg_surface);
int full_bg_height = cairo_image_surface_get_height(bg_surface);
int bg_stride = cairo_image_surface_get_stride(bg_surface);
int bytes_per_pixel = 4; // ARGB32 = 4 bytes per pixel.
#endif
int damage_width = content_rect.width();
int damage_height = content_rect.height();
int bg_start_x = rect.x() - plugin_rect_.x();
int bg_start_y = rect.y() - plugin_rect_.y();
DCHECK_LE(bg_start_x + damage_width, full_bg_width);
DCHECK_LE(bg_start_y + damage_height, full_bg_height);
int bg_x_byte_offset = bg_start_x * bytes_per_pixel;
int page_x_byte_offset = page_start_x * bytes_per_pixel;
for (int row = 0; row < damage_height; ++row) {
int page_offset = page_stride * (page_start_y + row) + page_x_byte_offset;
int bg_y = bg_start_y + row;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
bg_y = bg_last_row - bg_y;
#endif
int bg_offset = bg_stride * bg_y + bg_x_byte_offset;
if (memcmp(page_bytes + page_offset,
bg_bytes + bg_offset,
damage_width * bytes_per_pixel) != 0)
return true;
}
#endif
#endif // OS_ANDROID
return false;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,125 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int may_open(struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
{
struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
int error;
if (!inode)
return -ENOENT;
switch (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT) {
case S_IFLNK:
return -ELOOP;
case S_IFDIR:
if (acc_mode & MAY_WRITE)
return -EISDIR;
break;
case S_IFBLK:
case S_IFCHR:
if (path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV)
return -EACCES;
/*FALLTHRU*/
case S_IFIFO:
case S_IFSOCK:
flag &= ~O_TRUNC;
break;
}
error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode);
if (error)
return error;
/*
* An append-only file must be opened in append mode for writing.
*/
if (IS_APPEND(inode)) {
if ((flag & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY && !(flag & O_APPEND))
return -EPERM;
if (flag & O_TRUNC)
return -EPERM;
}
/* O_NOATIME can only be set by the owner or superuser */
if (flag & O_NOATIME && !inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfs: rename: check backing inode being equal
If a file is renamed to a hardlink of itself POSIX specifies that rename(2)
should do nothing and return success.
This condition is checked in vfs_rename(). However it won't detect hard
links on overlayfs where these are given separate inodes on the overlayfs
layer.
Overlayfs itself detects this condition and returns success without doing
anything, but then vfs_rename() will proceed as if this was a successful
rename (detach_mounts(), d_move()).
The correct thing to do is to detect this condition before even calling
into overlayfs. This patch does this by calling vfs_select_inode() to get
the underlying inodes.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 51,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sm_state_dump(p_fm_config_conx_hdlt hdl, fm_mgr_type_t mgr, int argc, char *argv[]) {
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res;
fm_msg_ret_code_t ret_code;
char dirName[256];
if (argc == 1 && strlen(argv[0]) < 256) {
strncpy(dirName, argv[0], sizeof(dirName));
dirName[sizeof(dirName)-1]=0;
} else {
sprintf(dirName, "/tmp");
}
printf("Sending command to dump the SM state into the directory %s\n", dirName);
if((res = fm_mgr_simple_query(hdl, FM_ACT_GET, FM_DT_SM_DUMP_STATE, mgr,
strlen(dirName) + 1, dirName, &ret_code)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "sm_state_dump: Failed to retrieve data: \n"
"\tError:(%d) %s \n\tRet code:(%d) %s\n",
res, fm_mgr_get_error_str(res),ret_code,
fm_mgr_get_resp_error_str(ret_code));
} else {
printf("Successfully sent state dump command to local SM instance\n");
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 96,221 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tg3_write_indirect_reg32(struct tg3 *tp, u32 off, u32 val)
{
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&tp->indirect_lock, flags);
pci_write_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_REG_BASE_ADDR, off);
pci_write_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_REG_DATA, val);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->indirect_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,805 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int JBIG2MMRDecoder::get2DCode() {
const CCITTCode *p;
if (bufLen == 0) {
buf = str->getChar() & 0xff;
bufLen = 8;
++nBytesRead;
p = &twoDimTab1[(buf >> 1) & 0x7f];
} else if (bufLen == 8) {
p = &twoDimTab1[(buf >> 1) & 0x7f];
} else {
p = &twoDimTab1[(buf << (7 - bufLen)) & 0x7f];
if (p->bits < 0 || p->bits > (int)bufLen) {
buf = (buf << 8) | (str->getChar() & 0xff);
bufLen += 8;
++nBytesRead;
p = &twoDimTab1[(buf >> (bufLen - 7)) & 0x7f];
}
}
if (p->bits < 0) {
error(errSyntaxError, str->getPos(), "Bad two dim code in JBIG2 MMR stream");
return EOF;
}
bufLen -= p->bits;
return p->n;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,693 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FinishRequest(DownloadCheckResult result,
DownloadCheckResultReason reason) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (finished_) {
return;
}
finished_ = true;
weakptr_factory_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
if (!request_start_time_.is_null()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("SBClientDownload.DownloadRequestNetworkStats",
reason,
REASON_MAX);
}
if (!timeout_start_time_.is_null()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("SBClientDownload.DownloadRequestTimeoutStats",
reason,
REASON_MAX);
if (reason != REASON_REQUEST_CANCELED) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("SBClientDownload.DownloadRequestTimeoutDuration",
base::TimeTicks::Now() - timeout_start_time_);
}
}
if (service_) {
DVLOG(2) << "SafeBrowsing download verdict for: "
<< item_->DebugString(true) << " verdict:" << reason
<< " result:" << result;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("SBClientDownload.CheckDownloadStats",
reason,
REASON_MAX);
callback_.Run(result);
item_->RemoveObserver(this);
item_ = NULL;
DownloadProtectionService* service = service_;
service_ = NULL;
service->RequestFinished(this);
} else {
callback_.Run(UNKNOWN);
}
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: blink::mojom::FileChooserPtr RenderFrameHostImpl::BindFileChooserForTesting() {
blink::mojom::FileChooserPtr chooser;
FileChooserImpl::Create(this, mojo::MakeRequest(&chooser));
return chooser;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::didChangeSelection(bool is_empty_selection) {
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
if (!handling_input_event_)
return;
if (is_empty_selection) {
last_selection_.clear();
} else {
WebFrame* frame = webview()->focusedFrame();
const std::string& this_selection = frame->selectionAsText().utf8();
if (this_selection == last_selection_)
return;
last_selection_ = this_selection;
}
ui::Range range(ui::Range::InvalidRange());
size_t location, length;
if (webview()->caretOrSelectionRange(&location, &length)) {
range.set_start(location);
range.set_end(location + length);
}
Send(new ViewHostMsg_SelectionChanged(routing_id_, last_selection_, range));
#endif // defined(OS_POSIX)
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void generic_start_io_acct(struct request_queue *q, int rw,
unsigned long sectors, struct hd_struct *part)
{
int cpu = part_stat_lock();
part_round_stats(q, cpu, part);
part_stat_inc(cpu, part, ios[rw]);
part_stat_add(cpu, part, sectors[rw], sectors);
part_inc_in_flight(q, part, rw);
part_stat_unlock();
}
Commit Message: fix unbalanced page refcounting in bio_map_user_iov
bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if
IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page.
bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never
dropped.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 62,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameSelection::SelectSubString(const Element& element,
int offset,
int length) {
VisiblePosition start = VisiblePosition::FirstPositionInNode(element);
for (int i = 0; i < offset; ++i)
start = NextPositionOf(start);
if (start.IsNull())
return;
VisiblePosition end(start);
for (int i = 0; i < length; ++i)
end = NextPositionOf(end);
if (end.IsNull())
return;
SetSelectionAndEndTyping(
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(start.DeepEquivalent(), end.DeepEquivalent())
.SetAffinity(start.Affinity())
.Build());
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void* Type_ViewingConditions_Dup(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, const void *Ptr, cmsUInt32Number n)
{
return _cmsDupMem(self->ContextID, Ptr, sizeof(cmsICCViewingConditions));
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(n);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 71,072 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Range::getBorderAndTextQuads(Vector<FloatQuad>& quads) const
{
Node* startContainer = m_start.container();
Node* endContainer = m_end.container();
Node* stopNode = pastLastNode();
HashSet<Node*> nodeSet;
for (Node* node = firstNode(); node != stopNode; node = node->traverseNextNode()) {
if (node->isElementNode())
nodeSet.add(node);
}
for (Node* node = firstNode(); node != stopNode; node = node->traverseNextNode()) {
if (node->isElementNode()) {
if (!nodeSet.contains(node->parentNode())) {
if (RenderBoxModelObject* renderBoxModelObject = static_cast<Element*>(node)->renderBoxModelObject()) {
Vector<FloatQuad> elementQuads;
renderBoxModelObject->absoluteQuads(elementQuads);
adjustFloatQuadsForScrollAndAbsoluteZoomAndPageScale(elementQuads, m_ownerDocument.get(), renderBoxModelObject);
quads.append(elementQuads);
}
}
} else if (node->isTextNode()) {
if (RenderObject* renderer = toText(node)->renderer()) {
RenderText* renderText = toRenderText(renderer);
int startOffset = (node == startContainer) ? m_start.offset() : 0;
int endOffset = (node == endContainer) ? m_end.offset() : INT_MAX;
Vector<FloatQuad> textQuads;
renderText->absoluteQuadsForRange(textQuads, startOffset, endOffset);
adjustFloatQuadsForScrollAndAbsoluteZoomAndPageScale(textQuads, m_ownerDocument.get(), renderText);
quads.append(textQuads);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleBindUniformLocationCHROMIUMBucket(
uint32 immediate_data_size,
const cmds::BindUniformLocationCHROMIUMBucket& c) {
GLuint program = static_cast<GLuint>(c.program);
GLint location = static_cast<GLint>(c.location);
Bucket* bucket = GetBucket(c.name_bucket_id);
if (!bucket || bucket->size() == 0) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
std::string name_str;
if (!bucket->GetAsString(&name_str)) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
DoBindUniformLocationCHROMIUM(program, location, name_str.c_str());
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ftrace_update_record(struct dyn_ftrace *rec, int enable)
{
return ftrace_check_record(rec, enable, 1);
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 30,240 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_spki_export)
{
int spkstr_len;
char *spkstr = NULL, * spkstr_cleaned = NULL, * s = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki = NULL;
BIO *out = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &spkstr, &spkstr_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETVAL_FALSE;
if (spkstr == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to use supplied SPKAC");
goto cleanup;
}
spkstr_cleaned = emalloc(spkstr_len + 1);
openssl_spki_cleanup(spkstr, spkstr_cleaned);
spki = NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode(spkstr_cleaned, strlen(spkstr_cleaned));
if (spki == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to decode supplied SPKAC");
goto cleanup;
}
pkey = X509_PUBKEY_get(spki->spkac->pubkey);
if (pkey == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to acquire signed public key");
goto cleanup;
}
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (out && PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY(out, pkey)) {
BUF_MEM *bio_buf;
BIO_get_mem_ptr(out, &bio_buf);
RETVAL_STRINGL((char *)bio_buf->data, bio_buf->length, 1);
}
goto cleanup;
cleanup:
if (spki != NULL) {
NETSCAPE_SPKI_free(spki);
}
if (out != NULL) {
BIO_free_all(out);
}
if (pkey != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
if (spkstr_cleaned != NULL) {
efree(spkstr_cleaned);
}
if (s != NULL) {
efree(s);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int NavigationControllerImpl::GetCurrentEntryIndex() const {
if (transient_entry_index_ != -1)
return transient_entry_index_;
if (pending_entry_index_ != -1)
return pending_entry_index_;
return last_committed_entry_index_;
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mem_read(jas_stream_obj_t *obj, char *buf, int cnt)
{
int n;
assert(cnt >= 0);
assert(buf);
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("mem_read(%p, %p, %d)\n", obj, buf, cnt));
jas_stream_memobj_t *m = (jas_stream_memobj_t *)obj;
n = m->len_ - m->pos_;
cnt = JAS_MIN(n, cnt);
memcpy(buf, &m->buf_[m->pos_], cnt);
m->pos_ += cnt;
return cnt;
}
Commit Message: Made some changes to the I/O stream library for memory streams.
There were a number of potential problems due to the possibility
of integer overflow.
Changed some integral types to the larger types size_t or ssize_t.
For example, the function mem_resize now takes the buffer size parameter
as a size_t.
Added a new function jas_stream_memopen2, which takes a
buffer size specified as a size_t instead of an int.
This can be used in jas_image_cmpt_create to avoid potential
overflow problems.
Added a new function jas_deprecated to warn about reliance on
deprecated library behavior.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 168,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport void GetAffineMatrix(AffineMatrix *affine_matrix)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(affine_matrix != (AffineMatrix *) NULL);
(void) memset(affine_matrix,0,sizeof(*affine_matrix));
affine_matrix->sx=1.0;
affine_matrix->sy=1.0;
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: | 0 | 87,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ping_init_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
kgid_t group = current_egid();
struct group_info *group_info = get_current_groups();
int i, j, count = group_info->ngroups;
kgid_t low, high;
inet_get_ping_group_range_net(net, &low, &high);
if (gid_lte(low, group) && gid_lte(group, high))
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < group_info->nblocks; i++) {
int cp_count = min_t(int, NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK, count);
for (j = 0; j < cp_count; j++) {
kgid_t gid = group_info->blocks[i][j];
if (gid_lte(low, gid) && gid_lte(gid, high))
return 0;
}
count -= cp_count;
}
return -EACCES;
}
Commit Message: ping: prevent NULL pointer dereference on write to msg_name
A plain read() on a socket does set msg->msg_name to NULL. So check for
NULL pointer first.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool swap_count_continued(struct swap_info_struct *si,
pgoff_t offset, unsigned char count)
{
struct page *head;
struct page *page;
unsigned char *map;
head = vmalloc_to_page(si->swap_map + offset);
if (page_private(head) != SWP_CONTINUED) {
BUG_ON(count & COUNT_CONTINUED);
return false; /* need to add count continuation */
}
offset &= ~PAGE_MASK;
page = list_entry(head->lru.next, struct page, lru);
map = kmap_atomic(page, KM_USER0) + offset;
if (count == SWAP_MAP_MAX) /* initial increment from swap_map */
goto init_map; /* jump over SWAP_CONT_MAX checks */
if (count == (SWAP_MAP_MAX | COUNT_CONTINUED)) { /* incrementing */
/*
* Think of how you add 1 to 999
*/
while (*map == (SWAP_CONT_MAX | COUNT_CONTINUED)) {
kunmap_atomic(map, KM_USER0);
page = list_entry(page->lru.next, struct page, lru);
BUG_ON(page == head);
map = kmap_atomic(page, KM_USER0) + offset;
}
if (*map == SWAP_CONT_MAX) {
kunmap_atomic(map, KM_USER0);
page = list_entry(page->lru.next, struct page, lru);
if (page == head)
return false; /* add count continuation */
map = kmap_atomic(page, KM_USER0) + offset;
init_map: *map = 0; /* we didn't zero the page */
}
*map += 1;
kunmap_atomic(map, KM_USER0);
page = list_entry(page->lru.prev, struct page, lru);
while (page != head) {
map = kmap_atomic(page, KM_USER0) + offset;
*map = COUNT_CONTINUED;
kunmap_atomic(map, KM_USER0);
page = list_entry(page->lru.prev, struct page, lru);
}
return true; /* incremented */
} else { /* decrementing */
/*
* Think of how you subtract 1 from 1000
*/
BUG_ON(count != COUNT_CONTINUED);
while (*map == COUNT_CONTINUED) {
kunmap_atomic(map, KM_USER0);
page = list_entry(page->lru.next, struct page, lru);
BUG_ON(page == head);
map = kmap_atomic(page, KM_USER0) + offset;
}
BUG_ON(*map == 0);
*map -= 1;
if (*map == 0)
count = 0;
kunmap_atomic(map, KM_USER0);
page = list_entry(page->lru.prev, struct page, lru);
while (page != head) {
map = kmap_atomic(page, KM_USER0) + offset;
*map = SWAP_CONT_MAX | count;
count = COUNT_CONTINUED;
kunmap_atomic(map, KM_USER0);
page = list_entry(page->lru.prev, struct page, lru);
}
return count == COUNT_CONTINUED;
}
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int bm_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
{
static struct tree_descr bm_files[] = {
[2] = {"status", &bm_status_operations, S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO},
[3] = {"register", &bm_register_operations, S_IWUSR},
/* last one */ {""}
};
int err = simple_fill_super(sb, BINFMTFS_MAGIC, bm_files);
if (!err)
sb->s_op = &s_ops;
return err;
}
Commit Message: exec: do not leave bprm->interp on stack
If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via
unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak
into the command line.
Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively.
However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the
bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching
binfmt modules. Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and
binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted. They leave bprm->interp
pointing to their local stack. This means on restart bprm->interp is
left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the
userspace argv areas.
After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains
the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules. As
such, we need to protect the changes to interp.
This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the
bprm->interp. To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default
value is left as-is. Only when passing through binfmt_script or
binfmt_misc does an allocation take place.
For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from:
http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: halfdog <me@halfdog.net>
Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannelRLE(Image *image,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ssize_t type,MagickOffsetType *sizes,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
length,
row_size;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels,
*pixels;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is RLE compressed");
row_size=GetPSDRowSize(image);
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(row_size,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
length=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
if ((MagickOffsetType) length < sizes[y])
length=(size_t) sizes[y];
if (length > row_size + 256) // arbitrary number
{
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"InvalidLength",
image->filename);
}
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(compact_pixels,0,length*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
status=MagickTrue;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
status=MagickFalse;
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) sizes[y],compact_pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) sizes[y])
break;
count=DecodePSDPixels((size_t) sizes[y],compact_pixels,
(ssize_t) (image->depth == 1 ? 123456 : image->depth),row_size,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) row_size)
break;
status=ReadPSDChannelPixels(image,psd_info->channels,y,type,pixels,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/350
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 168,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long Chapters::Atom::ParseDisplay(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size) {
if (!ExpandDisplaysArray())
return -1;
Display& d = m_displays[m_displays_count++];
d.Init();
return d.Parse(pReader, pos, size);
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCreateFromGd2Ctx (gdIOCtxPtr in)
{
int sx, sy;
int i;
int ncx, ncy, nc, cs, cx, cy;
int x, y, ylo, yhi, xlo, xhi;
int vers, fmt;
t_chunk_info *chunkIdx = NULL; /* So we can gdFree it with impunity. */
unsigned char *chunkBuf = NULL; /* So we can gdFree it with impunity. */
int chunkNum = 0;
int chunkMax = 0;
uLongf chunkLen;
int chunkPos = 0;
int compMax = 0;
int bytesPerPixel;
char *compBuf = NULL; /* So we can gdFree it with impunity. */
gdImagePtr im;
/* Get the header */
im =
_gd2CreateFromFile (in, &sx, &sy, &cs, &vers, &fmt, &ncx, &ncy,
&chunkIdx);
if (im == NULL) {
gdFree (chunkIdx);
return 0;
}
bytesPerPixel = im->trueColor ? 4 : 1;
nc = ncx * ncy;
if (gd2_compressed (fmt)) {
/* Find the maximum compressed chunk size. */
compMax = 0;
for (i = 0; (i < nc); i++) {
if (chunkIdx[i].size > compMax) {
compMax = chunkIdx[i].size;
};
};
compMax++;
/* Allocate buffers */
chunkMax = cs * bytesPerPixel * cs;
chunkBuf = gdCalloc (chunkMax, 1);
if (!chunkBuf) {
goto fail;
}
compBuf = gdCalloc (compMax, 1);
if (!compBuf) {
goto fail;
}
GD2_DBG (printf ("Largest compressed chunk is %d bytes\n", compMax));
};
/* if ( (ncx != sx / cs) || (ncy != sy / cs)) { */
/* goto fail2; */
/* }; */
/* Read the data... */
for (cy = 0; (cy < ncy); cy++) {
for (cx = 0; (cx < ncx); cx++) {
ylo = cy * cs;
yhi = ylo + cs;
if (yhi > im->sy) {
yhi = im->sy;
};
GD2_DBG (printf
("Processing Chunk %d (%d, %d), y from %d to %d\n",
chunkNum, cx, cy, ylo, yhi));
if (gd2_compressed (fmt)) {
chunkLen = chunkMax;
if (!_gd2ReadChunk (chunkIdx[chunkNum].offset,
compBuf,
chunkIdx[chunkNum].size,
(char *) chunkBuf, &chunkLen, in)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Error reading comproessed chunk\n"));
goto fail;
};
chunkPos = 0;
};
for (y = ylo; (y < yhi); y++) {
xlo = cx * cs;
xhi = xlo + cs;
if (xhi > im->sx) {
xhi = im->sx;
};
/*GD2_DBG(printf("y=%d: ",y)); */
if (!gd2_compressed (fmt)) {
for (x = xlo; x < xhi; x++) {
if (im->trueColor) {
if (!gdGetInt (&im->tpixels[y][x], in)) {
/*printf("EOF while reading\n"); */
/*gdImageDestroy(im); */
/*return 0; */
im->tpixels[y][x] = 0;
}
} else {
int ch;
if (!gdGetByte (&ch, in)) {
/*printf("EOF while reading\n"); */
/*gdImageDestroy(im); */
/*return 0; */
ch = 0;
}
im->pixels[y][x] = ch;
}
}
} else {
for (x = xlo; x < xhi; x++) {
if (im->trueColor) {
/* 2.0.1: work around a gcc bug by being verbose.
TBB */
int a = chunkBuf[chunkPos++] << 24;
int r = chunkBuf[chunkPos++] << 16;
int g = chunkBuf[chunkPos++] << 8;
int b = chunkBuf[chunkPos++];
/* 2.0.11: tpixels */
im->tpixels[y][x] = a + r + g + b;
} else {
im->pixels[y][x] = chunkBuf[chunkPos++];
}
};
};
/*GD2_DBG(printf("\n")); */
};
chunkNum++;
};
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("Freeing memory\n"));
gdFree (chunkBuf);
gdFree (compBuf);
gdFree (chunkIdx);
GD2_DBG (printf ("Done\n"));
return im;
fail:
gdImageDestroy (im);
if (chunkBuf) {
gdFree (chunkBuf);
}
if (compBuf) {
gdFree (compBuf);
}
if (chunkIdx) {
gdFree (chunkIdx);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: gd2: handle corrupt images better (CVE-2016-3074)
Make sure we do some range checking on corrupted chunks.
Thanks to Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com> for indepth report
and reproducer information. Made for easy test case writing :).
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 54,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OJPEGPreDecodeSkipRaw(TIFF* tif)
{
OJPEGState* sp=(OJPEGState*)tif->tif_data;
uint32 m;
m=sp->lines_per_strile;
if (sp->subsampling_convert_state!=0)
{
if (sp->subsampling_convert_clines-sp->subsampling_convert_state>=m)
{
sp->subsampling_convert_state+=m;
if (sp->subsampling_convert_state==sp->subsampling_convert_clines)
sp->subsampling_convert_state=0;
return(1);
}
m-=sp->subsampling_convert_clines-sp->subsampling_convert_state;
sp->subsampling_convert_state=0;
}
while (m>=sp->subsampling_convert_clines)
{
if (jpeg_read_raw_data_encap(sp,&(sp->libjpeg_jpeg_decompress_struct),sp->subsampling_convert_ycbcrimage,sp->subsampling_ver*8)==0)
return(0);
m-=sp->subsampling_convert_clines;
}
if (m>0)
{
if (jpeg_read_raw_data_encap(sp,&(sp->libjpeg_jpeg_decompress_struct),sp->subsampling_convert_ycbcrimage,sp->subsampling_ver*8)==0)
return(0);
sp->subsampling_convert_state=m;
}
return(1);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c: make OJPEGDecode() early exit in case of failure in
OJPEGPreDecode(). This will avoid a divide by zero, and potential other issues.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2611
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 70,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_obj_ceqq(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
mrb_value v;
mrb_int i, len;
mrb_sym eqq = mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "===");
mrb_value ary = mrb_ary_splat(mrb, self);
mrb_get_args(mrb, "o", &v);
len = RARRAY_LEN(ary);
for (i=0; i<len; i++) {
mrb_value c = mrb_funcall_argv(mrb, mrb_ary_entry(ary, i), eqq, 1, &v);
if (mrb_test(c)) return mrb_true_value();
}
return mrb_false_value();
}
Commit Message: Allow `Object#clone` to copy frozen status only; fix #4036
Copying all flags from the original object may overwrite the clone's
flags e.g. the embedded flag.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 82,185 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int asprintf(char **strp, const char *fmt, ...) {
va_list ap;
int len;
*strp = MG_MALLOC(BUFSIZ);
if (*strp == NULL) return -1;
va_start(ap, fmt);
len = vsnprintf(*strp, BUFSIZ, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (len > 0) {
*strp = MG_REALLOC(*strp, len + 1);
if (*strp == NULL) return -1;
}
if (len >= BUFSIZ) {
va_start(ap, fmt);
len = vsnprintf(*strp, len + 1, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-based overflow in parse_mqtt
PUBLISHED_FROM=3306592896298597fff5269634df0c1a1555113b
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 89,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: evutil_new_addrinfo_(struct sockaddr *sa, ev_socklen_t socklen,
const struct evutil_addrinfo *hints)
{
struct evutil_addrinfo *res;
EVUTIL_ASSERT(hints);
if (hints->ai_socktype == 0 && hints->ai_protocol == 0) {
/* Indecisive user! Give them a UDP and a TCP. */
struct evutil_addrinfo *r1, *r2;
struct evutil_addrinfo tmp;
memcpy(&tmp, hints, sizeof(tmp));
tmp.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; tmp.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
r1 = evutil_new_addrinfo_(sa, socklen, &tmp);
if (!r1)
return NULL;
tmp.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; tmp.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_UDP;
r2 = evutil_new_addrinfo_(sa, socklen, &tmp);
if (!r2) {
evutil_freeaddrinfo(r1);
return NULL;
}
r1->ai_next = r2;
return r1;
}
/* We're going to allocate extra space to hold the sockaddr. */
res = mm_calloc(1,sizeof(struct evutil_addrinfo)+socklen);
if (!res)
return NULL;
res->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr*)
(((char*)res) + sizeof(struct evutil_addrinfo));
memcpy(res->ai_addr, sa, socklen);
res->ai_addrlen = socklen;
res->ai_family = sa->sa_family; /* Same or not? XXX */
res->ai_flags = EVUTIL_AI_LIBEVENT_ALLOCATED;
res->ai_socktype = hints->ai_socktype;
res->ai_protocol = hints->ai_protocol;
return res;
}
Commit Message: evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(): fix buffer overflow
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"Length between '[' and ']' is cast to signed 32 bit integer on line 1815. Is
the length is more than 2<<31 (INT_MAX), len will hold a negative value.
Consequently, it will pass the check at line 1816. Segfault happens at line
1819.
Generate a resolv.conf with generate-resolv.conf, then compile and run
poc.c. See entry-functions.txt for functions in tor that might be
vulnerable.
Please credit 'Guido Vranken' for this discovery through the Tor bug bounty
program."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/be2b0d5e9417ba0dfe2c):
start
p (1ULL<<31)+1ULL
# $1 = 2147483649
p malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr))
# $2 = (void *) 0x646010
p malloc(sizeof(int))
# $3 = (void *) 0x646030
p malloc($1)
# $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
p memset($4, 1, $1)
# $5 = 1990369296
p (char *)$4
# $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
set $6[0]='['
set $6[$1]=']'
p evutil_parse_sockaddr_port($4, $2, $3)
# $7 = -1
Before:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb)
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:36
After:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb) $7 = -1
(gdb) (gdb) quit
Fixes: #318
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 70,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static sector_t ocfs2_bmap(struct address_space *mapping, sector_t block)
{
sector_t status;
u64 p_blkno = 0;
int err = 0;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
trace_ocfs2_bmap((unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno,
(unsigned long long)block);
/*
* The swap code (ab-)uses ->bmap to get a block mapping and then
* bypasseѕ the file system for actual I/O. We really can't allow
* that on refcounted inodes, so we have to skip out here. And yes,
* 0 is the magic code for a bmap error..
*/
if (ocfs2_is_refcount_inode(inode))
return 0;
/* We don't need to lock journal system files, since they aren't
* accessed concurrently from multiple nodes.
*/
if (!INODE_JOURNAL(inode)) {
err = ocfs2_inode_lock(inode, NULL, 0);
if (err) {
if (err != -ENOENT)
mlog_errno(err);
goto bail;
}
down_read(&OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_alloc_sem);
}
if (!(OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL))
err = ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks(inode, block, &p_blkno, NULL,
NULL);
if (!INODE_JOURNAL(inode)) {
up_read(&OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 0);
}
if (err) {
mlog(ML_ERROR, "get_blocks() failed, block = %llu\n",
(unsigned long long)block);
mlog_errno(err);
goto bail;
}
bail:
status = err ? 0 : p_blkno;
return status;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block()
ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block() when reading file in
DIRECT mode to prevent concurrent access to extent tree with
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), which may cause BUGON in the following
situation:
read file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A'
vfs_read
__vfs_read
ocfs2_file_read_iter
generic_file_read_iter
ocfs2_direct_IO
__blockdev_direct_IO
do_blockdev_direct_IO
do_direct_IO
get_more_blocks
ocfs2_get_block
ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks
ocfs2_get_clusters
ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache()
ocfs2_search_extent_list
return the index of record which
contains the v_cluster, that is
v_cluster > rec[i]->e_cpos.
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_mark_extent_written
ocfs2_change_extent_flag
ocfs2_split_extent
...
--> modify the rec[i]->e_cpos, resulting
in v_cluster < rec[i]->e_cpos.
BUG_ON(v_cluster < le32_to_cpu(rec->e_cpos))
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v3]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Fixes: c15471f79506 ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void get_iowait_load(unsigned long *nr_waiters, unsigned long *load)
{
struct rq *rq = this_rq();
*nr_waiters = atomic_read(&rq->nr_iowait);
*load = rq->load.weight;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool CharacterIsValidForGLES(unsigned char c) {
if (c >= 32 && c <= 126 &&
c != '"' &&
c != '$' &&
c != '`' &&
c != '@' &&
c != '\\' &&
c != '\'') {
return true;
}
if (c >= 9 && c <= 13) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 103,484 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int init_ipmi_si(void)
{
struct smi_info *e;
enum ipmi_addr_src type = SI_INVALID;
if (initialized)
return 0;
pr_info("IPMI System Interface driver\n");
/* If the user gave us a device, they presumably want us to use it */
if (!ipmi_si_hardcode_find_bmc())
goto do_scan;
ipmi_si_platform_init();
ipmi_si_pci_init();
ipmi_si_parisc_init();
/* We prefer devices with interrupts, but in the case of a machine
with multiple BMCs we assume that there will be several instances
of a given type so if we succeed in registering a type then also
try to register everything else of the same type */
do_scan:
mutex_lock(&smi_infos_lock);
list_for_each_entry(e, &smi_infos, link) {
/* Try to register a device if it has an IRQ and we either
haven't successfully registered a device yet or this
device has the same type as one we successfully registered */
if (e->io.irq && (!type || e->io.addr_source == type)) {
if (!try_smi_init(e)) {
type = e->io.addr_source;
}
}
}
/* type will only have been set if we successfully registered an si */
if (type)
goto skip_fallback_noirq;
/* Fall back to the preferred device */
list_for_each_entry(e, &smi_infos, link) {
if (!e->io.irq && (!type || e->io.addr_source == type)) {
if (!try_smi_init(e)) {
type = e->io.addr_source;
}
}
}
skip_fallback_noirq:
initialized = 1;
mutex_unlock(&smi_infos_lock);
if (type)
return 0;
mutex_lock(&smi_infos_lock);
if (unload_when_empty && list_empty(&smi_infos)) {
mutex_unlock(&smi_infos_lock);
cleanup_ipmi_si();
pr_warn("Unable to find any System Interface(s)\n");
return -ENODEV;
} else {
mutex_unlock(&smi_infos_lock);
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 90,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void qeth_determine_capabilities(struct qeth_card *card)
{
int rc;
int length;
char *prcd;
struct ccw_device *ddev;
int ddev_offline = 0;
QETH_DBF_TEXT(SETUP, 2, "detcapab");
ddev = CARD_DDEV(card);
if (!ddev->online) {
ddev_offline = 1;
rc = ccw_device_set_online(ddev);
if (rc) {
QETH_DBF_TEXT_(SETUP, 2, "3err%d", rc);
goto out;
}
}
rc = qeth_read_conf_data(card, (void **) &prcd, &length);
if (rc) {
QETH_DBF_MESSAGE(2, "%s qeth_read_conf_data returned %i\n",
dev_name(&card->gdev->dev), rc);
QETH_DBF_TEXT_(SETUP, 2, "5err%d", rc);
goto out_offline;
}
qeth_configure_unitaddr(card, prcd);
if (ddev_offline)
qeth_configure_blkt_default(card, prcd);
kfree(prcd);
rc = qdio_get_ssqd_desc(ddev, &card->ssqd);
if (rc)
QETH_DBF_TEXT_(SETUP, 2, "6err%d", rc);
QETH_DBF_TEXT_(SETUP, 2, "qfmt%d", card->ssqd.qfmt);
QETH_DBF_TEXT_(SETUP, 2, "%d", card->ssqd.qdioac1);
QETH_DBF_TEXT_(SETUP, 2, "%d", card->ssqd.qdioac3);
QETH_DBF_TEXT_(SETUP, 2, "icnt%d", card->ssqd.icnt);
if (!((card->ssqd.qfmt != QDIO_IQDIO_QFMT) ||
((card->ssqd.qdioac1 & CHSC_AC1_INITIATE_INPUTQ) == 0) ||
((card->ssqd.qdioac3 & CHSC_AC3_FORMAT2_CQ_AVAILABLE) == 0))) {
dev_info(&card->gdev->dev,
"Completion Queueing supported\n");
} else {
card->options.cq = QETH_CQ_NOTAVAILABLE;
}
out_offline:
if (ddev_offline == 1)
ccw_device_set_offline(ddev);
out:
return;
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __camellia_setkey(struct camellia_ctx *cctx, const unsigned char *key,
unsigned int key_len, u32 *flags)
{
if (key_len != 16 && key_len != 24 && key_len != 32) {
*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
return -EINVAL;
}
cctx->key_length = key_len;
switch (key_len) {
case 16:
camellia_setup128(key, cctx->key_table);
break;
case 24:
camellia_setup192(key, cctx->key_table);
break;
case 32:
camellia_setup256(key, cctx->key_table);
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int TextTrack::TrackIndex() {
DCHECK(track_list_);
if (track_index_ == kInvalidTrackIndex)
track_index_ = track_list_->GetTrackIndex(this);
return track_index_;
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hls_sao_param(HEVCContext *s, int rx, int ry)
{
HEVCLocalContext *lc = s->HEVClc;
int sao_merge_left_flag = 0;
int sao_merge_up_flag = 0;
SAOParams *sao = &CTB(s->sao, rx, ry);
int c_idx, i;
if (s->sh.slice_sample_adaptive_offset_flag[0] ||
s->sh.slice_sample_adaptive_offset_flag[1]) {
if (rx > 0) {
if (lc->ctb_left_flag)
sao_merge_left_flag = ff_hevc_sao_merge_flag_decode(s);
}
if (ry > 0 && !sao_merge_left_flag) {
if (lc->ctb_up_flag)
sao_merge_up_flag = ff_hevc_sao_merge_flag_decode(s);
}
}
for (c_idx = 0; c_idx < (s->ps.sps->chroma_format_idc ? 3 : 1); c_idx++) {
int log2_sao_offset_scale = c_idx == 0 ? s->ps.pps->log2_sao_offset_scale_luma :
s->ps.pps->log2_sao_offset_scale_chroma;
if (!s->sh.slice_sample_adaptive_offset_flag[c_idx]) {
sao->type_idx[c_idx] = SAO_NOT_APPLIED;
continue;
}
if (c_idx == 2) {
sao->type_idx[2] = sao->type_idx[1];
sao->eo_class[2] = sao->eo_class[1];
} else {
SET_SAO(type_idx[c_idx], ff_hevc_sao_type_idx_decode(s));
}
if (sao->type_idx[c_idx] == SAO_NOT_APPLIED)
continue;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
SET_SAO(offset_abs[c_idx][i], ff_hevc_sao_offset_abs_decode(s));
if (sao->type_idx[c_idx] == SAO_BAND) {
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
if (sao->offset_abs[c_idx][i]) {
SET_SAO(offset_sign[c_idx][i],
ff_hevc_sao_offset_sign_decode(s));
} else {
sao->offset_sign[c_idx][i] = 0;
}
}
SET_SAO(band_position[c_idx], ff_hevc_sao_band_position_decode(s));
} else if (c_idx != 2) {
SET_SAO(eo_class[c_idx], ff_hevc_sao_eo_class_decode(s));
}
sao->offset_val[c_idx][0] = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
sao->offset_val[c_idx][i + 1] = sao->offset_abs[c_idx][i];
if (sao->type_idx[c_idx] == SAO_EDGE) {
if (i > 1)
sao->offset_val[c_idx][i + 1] = -sao->offset_val[c_idx][i + 1];
} else if (sao->offset_sign[c_idx][i]) {
sao->offset_val[c_idx][i + 1] = -sao->offset_val[c_idx][i + 1];
}
sao->offset_val[c_idx][i + 1] *= 1 << log2_sao_offset_scale;
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/hevcdec: Avoid only partly skiping duplicate first slices
Fixes: NULL pointer dereference and out of array access
Fixes: 13871/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5746167087890432
Fixes: 13845/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5650370728034304
This also fixes the return code for explode mode
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool can_checksum_protocol(unsigned long features, __be16 protocol)
{
return ((features & NETIF_F_GEN_CSUM) ||
((features & NETIF_F_V4_CSUM) &&
protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) ||
((features & NETIF_F_V6_CSUM) &&
protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) ||
((features & NETIF_F_FCOE_CRC) &&
protocol == htons(ETH_P_FCOE)));
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sock *tcp_v6_hnd_req(struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct request_sock *req, **prev;
const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
struct sock *nsk;
/* Find possible connection requests. */
req = inet6_csk_search_req(sk, &prev, th->source,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr, inet6_iif(skb));
if (req)
return tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, prev);
nsk = __inet6_lookup_established(sock_net(sk), &tcp_hashinfo,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, th->source,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr, ntohs(th->dest), inet6_iif(skb));
if (nsk) {
if (nsk->sk_state != TCP_TIME_WAIT) {
bh_lock_sock(nsk);
return nsk;
}
inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(nsk));
return NULL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
if (!th->syn)
sk = cookie_v6_check(sk, skb);
#endif
return sk;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void vti_set_rr6(unsigned long rr6)
{
ia64_set_rr(RR6, rr6);
ia64_srlz_i();
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid)
{
const struct cred *old;
struct cred *new;
int retval;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
old = current_cred();
retval = -EPERM;
if (nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = gid;
else if (gid == old->gid || gid == old->sgid)
new->egid = new->fsgid = gid;
else
goto error;
return commit_creds(new);
error:
abort_creds(new);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <jld@mozilla.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 162,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void purple_transfer_cancel_all(struct im_connection *ic)
{
struct purple_data *pd = ic->proto_data;
while (pd->filetransfers) {
struct prpl_xfer_data *px = pd->filetransfers->data;
if (px->ft) {
imcb_file_canceled(ic, px->ft, "Logging out");
}
pd->filetransfers = g_slist_remove(pd->filetransfers, px);
}
}
Commit Message: purple: Fix crash on ft requests from unknown contacts
Followup to 701ab81 (included in 3.5) which was a partial fix which only
improved things for non-libpurple file transfers (that is, just jabber)
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 68,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void TRACE_IDX_INPUTS(sqlite3_index_info *p){
int i;
if( !sqlite3WhereTrace ) return;
for(i=0; i<p->nConstraint; i++){
sqlite3DebugPrintf(" constraint[%d]: col=%d termid=%d op=%d usabled=%d\n",
i,
p->aConstraint[i].iColumn,
p->aConstraint[i].iTermOffset,
p->aConstraint[i].op,
p->aConstraint[i].usable);
}
for(i=0; i<p->nOrderBy; i++){
sqlite3DebugPrintf(" orderby[%d]: col=%d desc=%d\n",
i,
p->aOrderBy[i].iColumn,
p->aOrderBy[i].desc);
}
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,263 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GfxDeviceCMYKColorSpace::GfxDeviceCMYKColorSpace() {
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int br_nf_pre_routing_finish_bridge(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct nf_bridge_info *nf_bridge = skb->nf_bridge;
struct dst_entry *dst;
skb->dev = bridge_parent(skb->dev);
if (!skb->dev)
goto free_skb;
dst = skb_dst(skb);
if (dst->hh) {
neigh_hh_bridge(dst->hh, skb);
skb->dev = nf_bridge->physindev;
return br_handle_frame_finish(skb);
} else if (dst->neighbour) {
/* the neighbour function below overwrites the complete
* MAC header, so we save the Ethernet source address and
* protocol number. */
skb_copy_from_linear_data_offset(skb, -(ETH_HLEN-ETH_ALEN), skb->nf_bridge->data, ETH_HLEN-ETH_ALEN);
/* tell br_dev_xmit to continue with forwarding */
nf_bridge->mask |= BRNF_BRIDGED_DNAT;
return dst->neighbour->output(skb);
}
free_skb:
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bridge: reset IPCB in br_parse_ip_options
Commit 462fb2af9788a82 (bridge : Sanitize skb before it enters the IP
stack), missed one IPCB init before calling ip_options_compile()
Thanks to Scot Doyle for his tests and bug reports.
Reported-by: Scot Doyle <lkml@scotdoyle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Hiroaki SHIMODA <shimoda.hiroaki@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Bandan Das <bandan.das@stratus.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Cc: Jan Lübbe <jluebbe@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 34,716 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SERVER_REC *cmd_options_get_server(const char *cmd,
GHashTable *optlist,
SERVER_REC *defserver)
{
SERVER_REC *server;
GSList *list, *tmp, *next;
/* get all the options, then remove the known ones. there should
be only one left - the server tag. */
list = hashtable_get_keys(optlist);
if (cmd != NULL) {
for (tmp = list; tmp != NULL; tmp = next) {
char *option = tmp->data;
next = tmp->next;
if (command_have_option(cmd, option))
list = g_slist_remove(list, option);
}
}
if (list == NULL)
return defserver;
server = server_find_tag(list->data);
if (server == NULL || list->next != NULL) {
/* unknown option (not server tag) */
signal_emit("error command", 2,
GINT_TO_POINTER(CMDERR_OPTION_UNKNOWN),
server == NULL ? list->data : list->next->data);
signal_stop();
server = NULL;
}
g_slist_free(list);
return server;
}
Commit Message: Check if an SSL certificate matches the hostname of the server we are connecting to
git-svn-id: http://svn.irssi.org/repos/irssi/trunk@5104 dbcabf3a-b0e7-0310-adc4-f8d773084564
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct cli_state *cli_cm_find(struct cli_state *cli,
const char *server,
const char *share)
{
struct cli_state *p;
if (cli == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
/* Search to the start of the list. */
for (p = cli; p; p = DLIST_PREV(p)) {
const char *remote_name =
smbXcli_conn_remote_name(p->conn);
if (strequal(server, remote_name) &&
strequal(share,p->share)) {
return p;
}
}
/* Search to the end of the list. */
for (p = cli->next; p; p = p->next) {
const char *remote_name =
smbXcli_conn_remote_name(p->conn);
if (strequal(server, remote_name) &&
strequal(share,p->share)) {
return p;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: archive_read_open(struct archive *a, void *client_data,
archive_open_callback *client_opener, archive_read_callback *client_reader,
archive_close_callback *client_closer)
{
/* Old archive_read_open() is just a thin shell around
* archive_read_open1. */
archive_read_set_open_callback(a, client_opener);
archive_read_set_read_callback(a, client_reader);
archive_read_set_close_callback(a, client_closer);
archive_read_set_callback_data(a, client_data);
return archive_read_open1(a);
}
Commit Message: Fix a potential crash issue discovered by Alexander Cherepanov:
It seems bsdtar automatically handles stacked compression. This is a
nice feature but it could be problematic when it's completely
unlimited. Most clearly it's illustrated with quines:
$ curl -sRO http://www.maximumcompression.com/selfgz.gz
$ (ulimit -v 10000000 && bsdtar -tvf selfgz.gz)
bsdtar: Error opening archive: Can't allocate data for gzip decompression
Without ulimit, bsdtar will eat all available memory. This could also
be a problem for other applications using libarchive.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 50,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mca_ccb_report_event(tMCA_CCB* p_ccb, uint8_t event, tMCA_CTRL* p_data) {
if (p_ccb && p_ccb->p_rcb && p_ccb->p_rcb->p_cback)
(*p_ccb->p_rcb->p_cback)(mca_rcb_to_handle(p_ccb->p_rcb),
mca_ccb_to_hdl(p_ccb), event, p_data);
}
Commit Message: Add packet length checks in mca_ccb_hdl_req
Bug: 110791536
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ica5d8037246682fdb190b2747a86ed8d44c2869a
(cherry picked from commit 4de7ccdd914b7a178df9180d15f675b257ea6e02)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bitmap_decompress4(uint8 * output, int width, int height, uint8 * input, int size)
{
int code;
int bytes_pro;
int total_pro;
code = CVAL(input);
if (code != 0x10)
{
return False;
}
total_pro = 1;
bytes_pro = process_plane(input, width, height, output + 3, size - total_pro);
total_pro += bytes_pro;
input += bytes_pro;
bytes_pro = process_plane(input, width, height, output + 2, size - total_pro);
total_pro += bytes_pro;
input += bytes_pro;
bytes_pro = process_plane(input, width, height, output + 1, size - total_pro);
total_pro += bytes_pro;
input += bytes_pro;
bytes_pro = process_plane(input, width, height, output + 0, size - total_pro);
total_pro += bytes_pro;
return size == total_pro;
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int aead_null_givdecrypt(struct aead_givcrypt_request *req)
{
return crypto_aead_decrypt(&req->areq);
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perWorldBindingsVoidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::perWorldBindingsVoidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void proc_flush_task_mnt(struct vfsmount *mnt, pid_t pid, pid_t tgid)
{
struct dentry *dentry, *leader, *dir;
char buf[PROC_NUMBUF];
struct qstr name;
name.name = buf;
name.len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", pid);
/* no ->d_hash() rejects on procfs */
dentry = d_hash_and_lookup(mnt->mnt_root, &name);
if (dentry) {
d_invalidate(dentry);
dput(dentry);
}
if (pid == tgid)
return;
name.name = buf;
name.len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", tgid);
leader = d_hash_and_lookup(mnt->mnt_root, &name);
if (!leader)
goto out;
name.name = "task";
name.len = strlen(name.name);
dir = d_hash_and_lookup(leader, &name);
if (!dir)
goto out_put_leader;
name.name = buf;
name.len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", pid);
dentry = d_hash_and_lookup(dir, &name);
if (dentry) {
d_invalidate(dentry);
dput(dentry);
}
dput(dir);
out_put_leader:
dput(leader);
out:
return;
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 49,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int network_write (const data_set_t *ds, const value_list_t *vl,
user_data_t __attribute__((unused)) *user_data)
{
int status;
if (!check_send_okay (vl))
{
#if COLLECT_DEBUG
char name[6*DATA_MAX_NAME_LEN];
FORMAT_VL (name, sizeof (name), vl);
name[sizeof (name) - 1] = 0;
DEBUG ("network plugin: network_write: "
"NOT sending %s.", name);
#endif
/* Counter is not protected by another lock and may be reached by
* multiple threads */
pthread_mutex_lock (&stats_lock);
stats_values_not_sent++;
pthread_mutex_unlock (&stats_lock);
return (0);
}
uc_meta_data_add_unsigned_int (vl,
"network:time_sent", (uint64_t) vl->time);
pthread_mutex_lock (&send_buffer_lock);
status = add_to_buffer (send_buffer_ptr,
network_config_packet_size - (send_buffer_fill + BUFF_SIG_SIZE),
&send_buffer_vl,
ds, vl);
if (status >= 0)
{
/* status == bytes added to the buffer */
send_buffer_fill += status;
send_buffer_ptr += status;
stats_values_sent++;
}
else
{
flush_buffer ();
status = add_to_buffer (send_buffer_ptr,
network_config_packet_size - (send_buffer_fill + BUFF_SIG_SIZE),
&send_buffer_vl,
ds, vl);
if (status >= 0)
{
send_buffer_fill += status;
send_buffer_ptr += status;
stats_values_sent++;
}
}
if (status < 0)
{
ERROR ("network plugin: Unable to append to the "
"buffer for some weird reason");
}
else if ((network_config_packet_size - send_buffer_fill) < 15)
{
flush_buffer ();
}
pthread_mutex_unlock (&send_buffer_lock);
return ((status < 0) ? -1 : 0);
} /* int network_write */
Commit Message: network plugin: Fix heap overflow in parse_packet().
Emilien Gaspar has identified a heap overflow in parse_packet(), the
function used by the network plugin to parse incoming network packets.
This is a vulnerability in collectd, though the scope is not clear at
this point. At the very least specially crafted network packets can be
used to crash the daemon. We can't rule out a potential remote code
execution though.
Fixes: CVE-2016-6254
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 50,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: varbit_in(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
char *input_string = PG_GETARG_CSTRING(0);
#ifdef NOT_USED
Oid typelem = PG_GETARG_OID(1);
#endif
int32 atttypmod = PG_GETARG_INT32(2);
VarBit *result; /* The resulting bit string */
char *sp; /* pointer into the character string */
bits8 *r; /* pointer into the result */
int len, /* Length of the whole data structure */
bitlen, /* Number of bits in the bit string */
slen; /* Length of the input string */
bool bit_not_hex; /* false = hex string true = bit string */
int bc;
bits8 x = 0;
/* Check that the first character is a b or an x */
if (input_string[0] == 'b' || input_string[0] == 'B')
{
bit_not_hex = true;
sp = input_string + 1;
}
else if (input_string[0] == 'x' || input_string[0] == 'X')
{
bit_not_hex = false;
sp = input_string + 1;
}
else
{
bit_not_hex = true;
sp = input_string;
}
slen = strlen(sp);
/* Determine bitlength from input string */
if (bit_not_hex)
bitlen = slen;
else
bitlen = slen * 4;
/*
* Sometimes atttypmod is not supplied. If it is supplied we need to make
* sure that the bitstring fits.
*/
if (atttypmod <= 0)
atttypmod = bitlen;
else if (bitlen > atttypmod)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_STRING_DATA_RIGHT_TRUNCATION),
errmsg("bit string too long for type bit varying(%d)",
atttypmod)));
len = VARBITTOTALLEN(bitlen);
/* set to 0 so that *r is always initialised and string is zero-padded */
result = (VarBit *) palloc0(len);
SET_VARSIZE(result, len);
VARBITLEN(result) = Min(bitlen, atttypmod);
r = VARBITS(result);
if (bit_not_hex)
{
/* Parse the bit representation of the string */
/* We know it fits, as bitlen was compared to atttypmod */
x = HIGHBIT;
for (; *sp; sp++)
{
if (*sp == '1')
*r |= x;
else if (*sp != '0')
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("\"%c\" is not a valid binary digit",
*sp)));
x >>= 1;
if (x == 0)
{
x = HIGHBIT;
r++;
}
}
}
else
{
/* Parse the hex representation of the string */
for (bc = 0; *sp; sp++)
{
if (*sp >= '0' && *sp <= '9')
x = (bits8) (*sp - '0');
else if (*sp >= 'A' && *sp <= 'F')
x = (bits8) (*sp - 'A') + 10;
else if (*sp >= 'a' && *sp <= 'f')
x = (bits8) (*sp - 'a') + 10;
else
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("\"%c\" is not a valid hexadecimal digit",
*sp)));
if (bc)
{
*r++ |= x;
bc = 0;
}
else
{
*r = x << 4;
bc = 1;
}
}
}
PG_RETURN_VARBIT_P(result);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 166,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLSelectElement::deselectItems(HTMLOptionElement* excludeElement)
{
deselectItemsWithoutValidation(excludeElement);
setNeedsValidityCheck();
}
Commit Message: SelectElement should remove an option when null is assigned by indexed setter
Fix bug embedded in r151449
see
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?revision=151449&view=revision
R=haraken@chromium.org, tkent@chromium.org, eseidel@chromium.org
BUG=262365
TEST=fast/forms/select/select-assign-null.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19947008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154743 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 103,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int get_words(OHCIState *ohci,
dma_addr_t addr, uint16_t *buf, int num)
{
int i;
addr += ohci->localmem_base;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++, buf++, addr += sizeof(*buf)) {
if (dma_memory_read(ohci->as, addr, buf, sizeof(*buf))) {
return -1;
}
*buf = le16_to_cpu(*buf);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 5,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tilde_map_1( httpd_conn* hc )
{
static char* temp;
static size_t maxtemp = 0;
int len;
static char* prefix = TILDE_MAP_1;
len = strlen( hc->expnfilename ) - 1;
httpd_realloc_str( &temp, &maxtemp, len );
(void) strcpy( temp, &hc->expnfilename[1] );
httpd_realloc_str(
&hc->expnfilename, &hc->maxexpnfilename, strlen( prefix ) + 1 + len );
(void) strcpy( hc->expnfilename, prefix );
if ( prefix[0] != '\0' )
(void) strcat( hc->expnfilename, "/" );
(void) strcat( hc->expnfilename, temp );
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix heap buffer overflow in de_dotdot
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 63,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void set_consume(bool consume) { consume_ = consume; }
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ClientConfig CreateConfigForServer(const net::EmbeddedTestServer& server) {
net::HostPortPair host_port_pair = server.host_port_pair();
return CreateConfig(kSessionKey, 1000, 0, ProxyServer_ProxyScheme_HTTP,
host_port_pair.host(), host_port_pair.port(),
ProxyServer_ProxyScheme_HTTP, "fallback.net", 80, 0.5f,
false);
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ShowBookmarkManagerView(Profile* profile) {
BookmarkManagerView::Show(profile);
}
Commit Message: Relands cl 16982 as it wasn't the cause of the build breakage. Here's
the description for that cl:
Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/115505 for bug
http://crbug.com/4030 for tyoshino.
BUG=http://crbug.com/4030
TEST=make sure control-w dismisses bookmark manager.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/113902
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@16987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,122 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cf2_hintmap_adjustHints( CF2_HintMap hintmap )
{
size_t i, j;
cf2_arrstack_clear( hintmap->hintMoves ); /* working storage */
/*
* First pass is bottom-up (font hint order) without look-ahead.
* Locked edges are already adjusted.
* Unlocked edges begin with dsCoord from `initialHintMap'.
* Save edges that are not optimally adjusted in `hintMoves' array,
* and process them in second pass.
*/
for ( i = 0; i < hintmap->count; i++ )
{
FT_Bool isPair = cf2_hint_isPair( &hintmap->edge[i] );
/* index of upper edge (same value for ghost hint) */
j = isPair ? i + 1 : i;
FT_ASSERT( j < hintmap->count );
FT_ASSERT( cf2_hint_isValid( &hintmap->edge[i] ) );
FT_ASSERT( cf2_hint_isValid( &hintmap->edge[j] ) );
FT_ASSERT( cf2_hint_isLocked( &hintmap->edge[i] ) ==
cf2_hint_isLocked( &hintmap->edge[j] ) );
if ( !cf2_hint_isLocked( &hintmap->edge[i] ) )
{
/* hint edge is not locked, we can adjust it */
CF2_Fixed fracDown = cf2_fixedFraction( hintmap->edge[i].dsCoord );
CF2_Fixed fracUp = cf2_fixedFraction( hintmap->edge[j].dsCoord );
/* calculate all four possibilities; moves down are negative */
CF2_Fixed downMoveDown = 0 - fracDown;
CF2_Fixed upMoveDown = 0 - fracUp;
CF2_Fixed downMoveUp = fracDown == 0
? 0
: cf2_intToFixed( 1 ) - fracDown;
CF2_Fixed upMoveUp = fracUp == 0
? 0
: cf2_intToFixed( 1 ) - fracUp;
/* smallest move up */
CF2_Fixed moveUp = FT_MIN( downMoveUp, upMoveUp );
/* smallest move down */
CF2_Fixed moveDown = FT_MAX( downMoveDown, upMoveDown );
/* final amount to move edge or edge pair */
CF2_Fixed move;
CF2_Fixed downMinCounter = CF2_MIN_COUNTER;
CF2_Fixed upMinCounter = CF2_MIN_COUNTER;
FT_Bool saveEdge = FALSE;
/* minimum counter constraint doesn't apply when adjacent edges */
/* are synthetic */
/* TODO: doesn't seem a big effect; for now, reduce the code */
#if 0
if ( i == 0 ||
cf2_hint_isSynthetic( &hintmap->edge[i - 1] ) )
downMinCounter = 0;
if ( j >= hintmap->count - 1 ||
cf2_hint_isSynthetic( &hintmap->edge[j + 1] ) )
upMinCounter = 0;
#endif
/* is there room to move up? */
/* there is if we are at top of array or the next edge is at or */
/* beyond proposed move up? */
if ( j >= hintmap->count - 1 ||
hintmap->edge[j + 1].dsCoord >=
hintmap->edge[j].dsCoord + moveUp + upMinCounter )
{
/* there is room to move up; is there also room to move down? */
if ( i == 0 ||
hintmap->edge[i - 1].dsCoord <=
hintmap->edge[i].dsCoord + moveDown - downMinCounter )
{
/* move smaller absolute amount */
move = ( -moveDown < moveUp ) ? moveDown : moveUp; /* optimum */
}
else
move = moveUp;
}
else
{
/* is there room to move down? */
if ( i == 0 ||
hintmap->edge[i - 1].dsCoord <=
hintmap->edge[i].dsCoord + moveDown - downMinCounter )
{
move = moveDown;
/* true if non-optimum move */
saveEdge = (FT_Bool)( moveUp < -moveDown );
}
else
{
/* no room to move either way without overlapping or reducing */
/* the counter too much */
move = 0;
saveEdge = TRUE;
}
}
/* Identify non-moves and moves down that aren't optimal, and save */
/* them for second pass. */
/* Do this only if there is an unlocked edge above (which could */
/* possibly move). */
if ( saveEdge &&
j < hintmap->count - 1 &&
!cf2_hint_isLocked( &hintmap->edge[j + 1] ) )
{
CF2_HintMoveRec savedMove;
savedMove.j = j;
/* desired adjustment in second pass */
savedMove.moveUp = moveUp - move;
cf2_arrstack_push( hintmap->hintMoves, &savedMove );
}
/* move the edge(s) */
hintmap->edge[i].dsCoord += move;
if ( isPair )
hintmap->edge[j].dsCoord += move;
}
/* assert there are no overlaps in device space */
FT_ASSERT( i == 0 ||
hintmap->edge[i - 1].dsCoord <= hintmap->edge[i].dsCoord );
FT_ASSERT( i < j ||
hintmap->edge[i].dsCoord <= hintmap->edge[j].dsCoord );
/* adjust the scales, avoiding divide by zero */
if ( i > 0 )
{
if ( hintmap->edge[i].csCoord != hintmap->edge[i - 1].csCoord )
hintmap->edge[i - 1].scale =
FT_DivFix(
hintmap->edge[i].dsCoord - hintmap->edge[i - 1].dsCoord,
hintmap->edge[i].csCoord - hintmap->edge[i - 1].csCoord );
}
if ( isPair )
{
if ( hintmap->edge[j].csCoord != hintmap->edge[j - 1].csCoord )
hintmap->edge[j - 1].scale =
FT_DivFix(
hintmap->edge[j].dsCoord - hintmap->edge[j - 1].dsCoord,
hintmap->edge[j].csCoord - hintmap->edge[j - 1].csCoord );
i += 1; /* skip upper edge on next loop */
}
}
/* second pass tries to move non-optimal hints up, in case there is */
/* room now */
for ( i = cf2_arrstack_size( hintmap->hintMoves ); i > 0; i-- )
{
CF2_HintMove hintMove = (CF2_HintMove)
cf2_arrstack_getPointer( hintmap->hintMoves, i - 1 );
j = hintMove->j;
/* this was tested before the push, above */
FT_ASSERT( j < hintmap->count - 1 );
/* is there room to move up? */
if ( hintmap->edge[j + 1].dsCoord >=
hintmap->edge[j].dsCoord + hintMove->moveUp + CF2_MIN_COUNTER )
{
/* there is more room now, move edge up */
hintmap->edge[j].dsCoord += hintMove->moveUp;
if ( cf2_hint_isPair( &hintmap->edge[j] ) )
{
FT_ASSERT( j > 0 );
hintmap->edge[j - 1].dsCoord += hintMove->moveUp;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~ExternalFrameBufferList() {
for (int i = 0; i < num_buffers_; ++i) {
delete [] ext_fb_list_[i].data;
}
delete [] ext_fb_list_;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,450 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeURLRequestContext::~ChromeURLRequestContext() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
if (load_time_stats_)
load_time_stats_->UnregisterURLRequestContext(this);
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
u32 exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
trace_kvm_nested_vmexit(kvm_rip_read(vcpu), exit_reason,
vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION),
vmx->idt_vectoring_info,
intr_info,
vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE),
KVM_ISA_VMX);
if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending)
return false;
if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
pr_info_ratelimited("%s failed vm entry %x\n", __func__,
vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));
return true;
}
switch (exit_reason) {
case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI:
if (!is_exception(intr_info))
return false;
else if (is_page_fault(intr_info))
return enable_ept;
else if (is_no_device(intr_info) &&
!(vmcs12->guest_cr0 & X86_CR0_TS))
return false;
else if (is_debug(intr_info) &&
vcpu->guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))
return false;
else if (is_breakpoint(intr_info) &&
vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)
return false;
return vmcs12->exception_bitmap &
(1u << (intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK));
case EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT:
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_PENDING_INTERRUPT:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_INTR_PENDING);
case EXIT_REASON_NMI_WINDOW:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMI_PENDING);
case EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_CPUID:
if (kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX) == 0xa)
return false;
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_HLT:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_INVD:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_INVLPG:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_RDPMC:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_RDTSC: case EXIT_REASON_RDTSCP:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_VMCALL: case EXIT_REASON_VMCLEAR:
case EXIT_REASON_VMLAUNCH: case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD:
case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRST: case EXIT_REASON_VMREAD:
case EXIT_REASON_VMRESUME: case EXIT_REASON_VMWRITE:
case EXIT_REASON_VMOFF: case EXIT_REASON_VMON:
case EXIT_REASON_INVEPT: case EXIT_REASON_INVVPID:
/*
* VMX instructions trap unconditionally. This allows L1 to
* emulate them for its L2 guest, i.e., allows 3-level nesting!
*/
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_CR_ACCESS:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr(vcpu, vmcs12);
case EXIT_REASON_DR_ACCESS:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_io(vcpu, vmcs12);
case EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ:
case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_msr(vcpu, vmcs12, exit_reason);
case EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_MWAIT_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG);
case EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_PAUSE_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING) ||
nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY:
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW);
case EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES);
case EXIT_REASON_APIC_WRITE:
case EXIT_REASON_EOI_INDUCED:
/* apic_write and eoi_induced should exit unconditionally. */
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
/*
* L0 always deals with the EPT violation. If nested EPT is
* used, and the nested mmu code discovers that the address is
* missing in the guest EPT table (EPT12), the EPT violation
* will be injected with nested_ept_inject_page_fault()
*/
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG:
/*
* L2 never uses directly L1's EPT, but rather L0's own EPT
* table (shadow on EPT) or a merged EPT table that L0 built
* (EPT on EPT). So any problems with the structure of the
* table is L0's fault.
*/
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_WBINVD:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_XSETBV:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_XSAVES: case EXIT_REASON_XRSTORS:
/*
* This should never happen, since it is not possible to
* set XSS to a non-zero value---neither in L1 nor in L2.
* If if it were, XSS would have to be checked against
* the XSS exit bitmap in vmcs12.
*/
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES);
case EXIT_REASON_PCOMMIT:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_PCOMMIT);
default:
return true;
}
}
Commit Message: kvm:vmx: more complete state update on APICv on/off
The function to update APICv on/off state (in particular, to deactivate
it when enabling Hyper-V SynIC) is incomplete: it doesn't adjust
APICv-related fields among secondary processor-based VM-execution
controls. As a result, Windows 2012 guests get stuck when SynIC-based
auto-EOI interrupt intersected with e.g. an IPI in the guest.
In addition, the MSR intercept bitmap isn't updated every time "virtualize
x2APIC mode" is toggled. This path can only be triggered by a malicious
guest, because Windows didn't use x2APIC but rather their own synthetic
APIC access MSRs; however a guest running in a SynIC-enabled VM could
switch to x2APIC and thus obtain direct access to host APIC MSRs
(CVE-2016-4440).
The patch fixes those omissions.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Reported-by: Yang Zhang <yang.zhang.wz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 53,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptValue WebGLRenderingContextBase::getUniform(
ScriptState* script_state,
WebGLProgram* program,
const WebGLUniformLocation* uniform_location) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateWebGLObject("getUniform", program))
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
DCHECK(uniform_location);
if (uniform_location->Program() != program) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "getUniform",
"no uniformlocation or not valid for this program");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
GLint location = uniform_location->Location();
GLuint program_id = ObjectNonZero(program);
GLint max_name_length = -1;
ContextGL()->GetProgramiv(program_id, GL_ACTIVE_UNIFORM_MAX_LENGTH,
&max_name_length);
if (max_name_length < 0)
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
if (max_name_length == 0) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "getUniform",
"no active uniforms exist");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
GLint active_uniforms = 0;
ContextGL()->GetProgramiv(program_id, GL_ACTIVE_UNIFORMS, &active_uniforms);
for (GLint i = 0; i < active_uniforms; i++) {
LChar* name_ptr;
scoped_refptr<StringImpl> name_impl =
StringImpl::CreateUninitialized(max_name_length, name_ptr);
GLsizei length = 0;
GLint size = -1;
GLenum type = 0;
ContextGL()->GetActiveUniform(program_id, i, max_name_length, &length,
&size, &type,
reinterpret_cast<GLchar*>(name_ptr));
if (size < 0)
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
String name(name_impl->Substring(0, length));
StringBuilder name_builder;
if (size > 1 && name.EndsWith("[0]"))
name = name.Left(name.length() - 3);
for (GLint index = 0; index < size; ++index) {
name_builder.Clear();
name_builder.Append(name);
if (size > 1 && index >= 1) {
name_builder.Append('[');
name_builder.AppendNumber(index);
name_builder.Append(']');
}
GLint loc = ContextGL()->GetUniformLocation(
ObjectOrZero(program), name_builder.ToString().Utf8().data());
if (loc == location) {
GLenum base_type;
unsigned length;
switch (type) {
case GL_BOOL:
base_type = GL_BOOL;
length = 1;
break;
case GL_BOOL_VEC2:
base_type = GL_BOOL;
length = 2;
break;
case GL_BOOL_VEC3:
base_type = GL_BOOL;
length = 3;
break;
case GL_BOOL_VEC4:
base_type = GL_BOOL;
length = 4;
break;
case GL_INT:
base_type = GL_INT;
length = 1;
break;
case GL_INT_VEC2:
base_type = GL_INT;
length = 2;
break;
case GL_INT_VEC3:
base_type = GL_INT;
length = 3;
break;
case GL_INT_VEC4:
base_type = GL_INT;
length = 4;
break;
case GL_FLOAT:
base_type = GL_FLOAT;
length = 1;
break;
case GL_FLOAT_VEC2:
base_type = GL_FLOAT;
length = 2;
break;
case GL_FLOAT_VEC3:
base_type = GL_FLOAT;
length = 3;
break;
case GL_FLOAT_VEC4:
base_type = GL_FLOAT;
length = 4;
break;
case GL_FLOAT_MAT2:
base_type = GL_FLOAT;
length = 4;
break;
case GL_FLOAT_MAT3:
base_type = GL_FLOAT;
length = 9;
break;
case GL_FLOAT_MAT4:
base_type = GL_FLOAT;
length = 16;
break;
case GL_SAMPLER_2D:
case GL_SAMPLER_CUBE:
base_type = GL_INT;
length = 1;
break;
default:
if (!IsWebGL2OrHigher()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "getUniform",
"unhandled type");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
switch (type) {
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT:
base_type = GL_UNSIGNED_INT;
length = 1;
break;
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_VEC2:
base_type = GL_UNSIGNED_INT;
length = 2;
break;
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_VEC3:
base_type = GL_UNSIGNED_INT;
length = 3;
break;
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_VEC4:
base_type = GL_UNSIGNED_INT;
length = 4;
break;
case GL_FLOAT_MAT2x3:
base_type = GL_FLOAT;
length = 6;
break;
case GL_FLOAT_MAT2x4:
base_type = GL_FLOAT;
length = 8;
break;
case GL_FLOAT_MAT3x2:
base_type = GL_FLOAT;
length = 6;
break;
case GL_FLOAT_MAT3x4:
base_type = GL_FLOAT;
length = 12;
break;
case GL_FLOAT_MAT4x2:
base_type = GL_FLOAT;
length = 8;
break;
case GL_FLOAT_MAT4x3:
base_type = GL_FLOAT;
length = 12;
break;
case GL_SAMPLER_3D:
case GL_SAMPLER_2D_ARRAY:
case GL_SAMPLER_2D_SHADOW:
case GL_SAMPLER_CUBE_SHADOW:
case GL_SAMPLER_2D_ARRAY_SHADOW:
case GL_INT_SAMPLER_2D:
case GL_INT_SAMPLER_CUBE:
case GL_INT_SAMPLER_3D:
case GL_INT_SAMPLER_2D_ARRAY:
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_SAMPLER_2D:
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_SAMPLER_CUBE:
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_SAMPLER_3D:
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_SAMPLER_2D_ARRAY:
base_type = GL_INT;
length = 1;
break;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "getUniform",
"unhandled type");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
}
switch (base_type) {
case GL_FLOAT: {
GLfloat value[16] = {0};
ContextGL()->GetUniformfv(ObjectOrZero(program), location, value);
if (length == 1)
return WebGLAny(script_state, value[0]);
return WebGLAny(script_state,
DOMFloat32Array::Create(value, length));
}
case GL_INT: {
GLint value[4] = {0};
ContextGL()->GetUniformiv(ObjectOrZero(program), location, value);
if (length == 1)
return WebGLAny(script_state, value[0]);
return WebGLAny(script_state, DOMInt32Array::Create(value, length));
}
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT: {
GLuint value[4] = {0};
ContextGL()->GetUniformuiv(ObjectOrZero(program), location, value);
if (length == 1)
return WebGLAny(script_state, value[0]);
return WebGLAny(script_state,
DOMUint32Array::Create(value, length));
}
case GL_BOOL: {
GLint value[4] = {0};
ContextGL()->GetUniformiv(ObjectOrZero(program), location, value);
if (length > 1) {
bool bool_value[16] = {0};
for (unsigned j = 0; j < length; j++)
bool_value[j] = static_cast<bool>(value[j]);
return WebGLAny(script_state, bool_value, length);
}
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<bool>(value[0]));
}
default:
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
}
}
}
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "getUniform", "unknown error");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
Commit Message: Tighten about IntRect use in WebGL with overflow detection
BUG=784183
TEST=test case in the bug in ASAN build
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie25ca328af99de7828e28e6a6e3d775f1bebc43f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811826
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522213}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 146,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void h264bsdInitStorage(storage_t *pStorage)
{
/* Variables */
/* Code */
ASSERT(pStorage);
H264SwDecMemset(pStorage, 0, sizeof(storage_t));
pStorage->activeSpsId = MAX_NUM_SEQ_PARAM_SETS;
pStorage->activePpsId = MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAM_SETS;
pStorage->aub->firstCallFlag = HANTRO_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: h264bsdActivateParamSets: Prevent multiplication overflow.
Report MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR if pStorage->picSizeInMbs would
exceed UINT32_MAX bytes.
Bug: 28532266
Change-Id: Ia6f11efb18818afcdb5fa2a38a14f2a2d8c8447a
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_report_akcipher(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_akcipher rakcipher;
strlcpy(rakcipher.type, "akcipher", sizeof(rakcipher.type));
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_AKCIPHER,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_akcipher), &rakcipher))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix leaking uninitialized memory to userspace
All bytes of the NETLINK_CRYPTO report structures must be initialized,
since they are copied to userspace. The change from strncpy() to
strlcpy() broke this. As a minimal fix, change it back.
Fixes: 4473710df1f8 ("crypto: user - Prepare for CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME expansion")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: | 1 | 168,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int acl_permission_check(struct inode *inode, int mask,
int (*check_acl)(struct inode *inode, int mask))
{
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
if (current_fsuid() == inode->i_uid)
mode >>= 6;
else {
if (IS_POSIXACL(inode) && (mode & S_IRWXG) && check_acl) {
int error = check_acl(inode, mask);
if (error != -EAGAIN)
return error;
}
if (in_group_p(inode->i_gid))
mode >>= 3;
}
/*
* If the DACs are ok we don't need any capability check.
*/
if ((mask & ~mode) == 0)
return 0;
return -EACCES;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool isMenuListOption(Node* node) {
if (!isHTMLOptionElement(node))
return false;
HTMLSelectElement* select = toHTMLOptionElement(node)->ownerSelectElement();
if (!select)
return false;
LayoutObject* layoutObject = select->layoutObject();
return layoutObject && layoutObject->isMenuList();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vmxnet3_indicate_packet(VMXNET3State *s)
{
struct Vmxnet3_RxDesc rxd;
bool is_head = true;
uint32_t rxd_idx;
uint32_t rx_ridx = 0;
struct Vmxnet3_RxCompDesc rxcd;
uint32_t new_rxcd_gen = VMXNET3_INIT_GEN;
hwaddr new_rxcd_pa = 0;
hwaddr ready_rxcd_pa = 0;
struct iovec *data = vmxnet_rx_pkt_get_iovec(s->rx_pkt);
size_t bytes_copied = 0;
size_t bytes_left = vmxnet_rx_pkt_get_total_len(s->rx_pkt);
uint16_t num_frags = 0;
size_t chunk_size;
vmxnet_rx_pkt_dump(s->rx_pkt);
while (bytes_left > 0) {
/* cannot add more frags to packet */
if (num_frags == s->max_rx_frags) {
break;
}
new_rxcd_pa = vmxnet3_pop_rxc_descr(s, RXQ_IDX, &new_rxcd_gen);
if (!new_rxcd_pa) {
break;
}
if (!vmxnet3_get_next_rx_descr(s, is_head, &rxd, &rxd_idx, &rx_ridx)) {
break;
}
chunk_size = MIN(bytes_left, rxd.len);
vmxnet3_physical_memory_writev(data, bytes_copied,
le64_to_cpu(rxd.addr), chunk_size);
bytes_copied += chunk_size;
bytes_left -= chunk_size;
vmxnet3_dump_rx_descr(&rxd);
if (ready_rxcd_pa != 0) {
cpu_physical_memory_write(ready_rxcd_pa, &rxcd, sizeof(rxcd));
}
memset(&rxcd, 0, sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_RxCompDesc));
rxcd.rxdIdx = rxd_idx;
rxcd.len = chunk_size;
rxcd.sop = is_head;
rxcd.gen = new_rxcd_gen;
rxcd.rqID = RXQ_IDX + rx_ridx * s->rxq_num;
if (bytes_left == 0) {
vmxnet3_rx_update_descr(s->rx_pkt, &rxcd);
}
VMW_RIPRN("RX Completion descriptor: rxRing: %lu rxIdx %lu len %lu "
"sop %d csum_correct %lu",
(unsigned long) rx_ridx,
(unsigned long) rxcd.rxdIdx,
(unsigned long) rxcd.len,
(int) rxcd.sop,
(unsigned long) rxcd.tuc);
is_head = false;
ready_rxcd_pa = new_rxcd_pa;
new_rxcd_pa = 0;
num_frags++;
}
if (ready_rxcd_pa != 0) {
rxcd.eop = 1;
rxcd.err = (bytes_left != 0);
cpu_physical_memory_write(ready_rxcd_pa, &rxcd, sizeof(rxcd));
/* Flush RX descriptor changes */
smp_wmb();
}
if (new_rxcd_pa != 0) {
vmxnet3_revert_rxc_descr(s, RXQ_IDX);
}
vmxnet3_trigger_interrupt(s, s->rxq_descr[RXQ_IDX].intr_idx);
if (bytes_left == 0) {
vmxnet3_on_rx_done_update_stats(s, RXQ_IDX, VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_OK);
return true;
} else if (num_frags == s->max_rx_frags) {
vmxnet3_on_rx_done_update_stats(s, RXQ_IDX, VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_ERROR);
return false;
} else {
vmxnet3_on_rx_done_update_stats(s, RXQ_IDX,
VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_OUT_OF_BUF);
return false;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 14,324 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CameraService::ProClient::~ProClient() {
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoVertexAttrib1fv(GLuint index,
const volatile GLfloat* v) {
GLfloat t[4] = { v[0], 0.0f, 0.0f, 1.0f, };
if (SetVertexAttribValue("glVertexAttrib1fv", index, t)) {
state_.SetGenericVertexAttribBaseType(
index, SHADER_VARIABLE_FLOAT);
api()->glVertexAttrib1fvFn(index, t);
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WindowOpenDisposition BrowserWindowGtk::GetDispositionForPopupBounds(
const gfx::Rect& bounds) {
return NEW_POPUP;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUniform2fv(
GLint fake_location, GLsizei count, const GLfloat* value) {
GLenum type = 0;
GLint real_location = -1;
if (!PrepForSetUniformByLocation(fake_location,
"glUniform2fv",
Program::kUniform2f,
&real_location,
&type,
&count)) {
return;
}
if (type == GL_BOOL_VEC2) {
GLsizei num_values = count * 2;
scoped_ptr<GLint[]> temp(new GLint[num_values]);
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < num_values; ++ii) {
temp[ii] = static_cast<GLint>(value[ii] != 0.0f);
}
glUniform2iv(real_location, count, temp.get());
} else {
glUniform2fv(real_location, count, value);
}
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,860 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ossl_cipher_reset(VALUE self)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
GetCipher(self, ctx);
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, -1) != 1)
ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
return self;
}
Commit Message: cipher: don't set dummy encryption key in Cipher#initialize
Remove the encryption key initialization from Cipher#initialize. This
is effectively a revert of r32723 ("Avoid possible SEGV from AES
encryption/decryption", 2011-07-28).
r32723, which added the key initialization, was a workaround for
Ruby Bug #2768. For some certain ciphers, calling EVP_CipherUpdate()
before setting an encryption key caused segfault. It was not a problem
until OpenSSL implemented GCM mode - the encryption key could be
overridden by repeated calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex(). But, it is not the
case for AES-GCM ciphers. Setting a key, an IV, a key, in this order
causes the IV to be reset to an all-zero IV.
The problem of Bug #2768 persists on the current versions of OpenSSL.
So, make Cipher#update raise an exception if a key is not yet set by the
user. Since encrypting or decrypting without key does not make any
sense, this should not break existing applications.
Users can still call Cipher#key= and Cipher#iv= multiple times with
their own responsibility.
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/2768
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/8221
Reference: https://github.com/ruby/openssl/issues/49
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 73,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool OmniboxViewViews::IsTextEditCommandEnabled(
ui::TextEditCommand command) const {
switch (command) {
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_UP:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_DOWN:
return !read_only();
case ui::TextEditCommand::PASTE:
return !read_only() && !GetClipboardText().empty();
default:
return Textfield::IsTextEditCommandEnabled(command);
}
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 142,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WaitForLoadStop(WebContents* web_contents) {
WebContentsDestroyedObserver observer(web_contents);
WaitForLoadStopWithoutSuccessCheck(web_contents);
if (observer.IsDestroyed()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "WebContents was destroyed during waiting for load stop.";
return false;
}
return IsLastCommittedEntryOfPageType(web_contents, PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL);
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,202 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool _parse_slab_sizes(char *s, uint32_t *slab_sizes) {
char *b = NULL;
uint32_t size = 0;
int i = 0;
uint32_t last_size = 0;
if (strlen(s) < 1)
return false;
for (char *p = strtok_r(s, "-", &b);
p != NULL;
p = strtok_r(NULL, "-", &b)) {
if (!safe_strtoul(p, &size) || size < settings.chunk_size
|| size > settings.slab_chunk_size_max) {
fprintf(stderr, "slab size %u is out of valid range\n", size);
return false;
}
if (last_size >= size) {
fprintf(stderr, "slab size %u cannot be lower than or equal to a previous class size\n", size);
return false;
}
if (size <= last_size + CHUNK_ALIGN_BYTES) {
fprintf(stderr, "slab size %u must be at least %d bytes larger than previous class\n",
size, CHUNK_ALIGN_BYTES);
return false;
}
slab_sizes[i++] = size;
last_size = size;
if (i >= MAX_NUMBER_OF_SLAB_CLASSES-1) {
fprintf(stderr, "too many slab classes specified\n");
return false;
}
}
slab_sizes[i] = 0;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 75,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API zval *zend_object_create_proxy(zval *object, zval *member TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_proxy_object *pobj = emalloc(sizeof(zend_proxy_object));
zval *retval;
pobj->object = object;
zval_add_ref(&pobj->object);
ALLOC_ZVAL(pobj->property);
INIT_PZVAL_COPY(pobj->property, member);
zval_copy_ctor(pobj->property);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(retval);
Z_TYPE_P(retval) = IS_OBJECT;
Z_OBJ_HANDLE_P(retval) = zend_objects_store_put(pobj, (zend_objects_store_dtor_t)zend_objects_proxy_destroy, (zend_objects_free_object_storage_t) zend_objects_proxy_free_storage, (zend_objects_store_clone_t) zend_objects_proxy_clone TSRMLS_CC);
Z_OBJ_HT_P(retval) = &zend_object_proxy_handlers;
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,966 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: next_bss_le(struct brcmf_scan_results *list, struct brcmf_bss_info_le *bss)
{
if (bss == NULL)
return list->bss_info_le;
return (struct brcmf_bss_info_le *)((unsigned long)bss +
le32_to_cpu(bss->length));
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,143 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SCTP_STATIC void sctp_shutdown(struct sock *sk, int how)
{
struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
if (!sctp_style(sk, TCP))
return;
if (how & SEND_SHUTDOWN) {
ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
if (!list_empty(&ep->asocs)) {
asoc = list_entry(ep->asocs.next,
struct sctp_association, asocs);
sctp_primitive_SHUTDOWN(asoc, NULL);
}
}
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 35,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void PreservePSDOpacityMask(Image *image,LayerInfo* layer_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
*key;
RandomInfo
*random_info;
StringInfo
*key_info;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" preserving opacity mask");
random_info=AcquireRandomInfo();
key_info=GetRandomKey(random_info,2+1);
key=(char *) GetStringInfoDatum(key_info);
key[8]=layer_info->mask.background;
key[9]='\0';
layer_info->mask.image->page.x+=layer_info->page.x;
layer_info->mask.image->page.y+=layer_info->page.y;
(void) SetImageRegistry(ImageRegistryType,(const char *) key,
layer_info->mask.image,exception);
(void) SetImageArtifact(layer_info->image,"psd:opacity-mask",
(const char *) key);
key_info=DestroyStringInfo(key_info);
random_info=DestroyRandomInfo(random_info);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/714
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Label::SetText(const std::wstring& text) {
text_ = WideToUTF16Hack(text);
url_set_ = false;
text_size_valid_ = false;
PreferredSizeChanged();
SchedulePaint();
}
Commit Message: wstring: remove wstring version of SplitString
Retry of r84336.
BUG=23581
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6930047
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@84355 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: on_file_monitor_changed (GFileMonitor *file_monitor,
GFile *file,
GFile *other_file,
GFileMonitorEvent event_type,
gpointer user_data)
{
PolkitBackendSessionMonitor *monitor = POLKIT_BACKEND_SESSION_MONITOR (user_data);
/* throw away cache */
if (monitor->database != NULL)
{
g_key_file_free (monitor->database);
monitor->database = NULL;
}
g_signal_emit (monitor, signals[CHANGED_SIGNAL], 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 14,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTMLLinkElement::GetLoadingTaskRunner() {
return GetDocument().GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kNetworking);
}
Commit Message: Avoid crash when setting rel=stylesheet on <link> in shadow root.
Link elements in shadow roots without rel=stylesheet are currently not
added as stylesheet candidates upon insertion. This causes a crash if
rel=stylesheet is set (and then loaded) later.
R=futhark@chromium.org
Bug: 886753
Change-Id: Ia0de2c1edf43407950f973982ee1c262a909d220
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1242463
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <andruud@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#593907}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 143,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_private_decrypt)
{
zval **key, *crypted;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
int cryptedlen;
unsigned char *cryptedbuf = NULL;
unsigned char *crypttemp;
int successful = 0;
long padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
long keyresource = -1;
char * data;
int data_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "szZ|l", &data, &data_len, &crypted, &key, &padding) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETVAL_FALSE;
pkey = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(key, 0, "", 0, &keyresource TSRMLS_CC);
if (pkey == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "key parameter is not a valid private key");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
cryptedlen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
crypttemp = emalloc(cryptedlen + 1);
switch (pkey->type) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
case EVP_PKEY_RSA2:
cryptedlen = RSA_private_decrypt(data_len,
(unsigned char *)data,
crypttemp,
pkey->pkey.rsa,
padding);
if (cryptedlen != -1) {
cryptedbuf = emalloc(cryptedlen + 1);
memcpy(cryptedbuf, crypttemp, cryptedlen);
successful = 1;
}
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "key type not supported in this PHP build!");
}
efree(crypttemp);
if (successful) {
zval_dtor(crypted);
cryptedbuf[cryptedlen] = '\0';
ZVAL_STRINGL(crypted, (char *)cryptedbuf, cryptedlen, 0);
cryptedbuf = NULL;
RETVAL_TRUE;
}
if (keyresource == -1) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
if (cryptedbuf) {
efree(cryptedbuf);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 14,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __init int seqgen_init(void)
{
rekey_seq_generator(NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable
IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for
IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS
attacks.
Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and
scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide)
This patch :
1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper
2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results
3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int entersafe_compute_with_prkey(sc_card_t *card,
const u8 * data, size_t datalen,
u8 * out, size_t outlen)
{
int r;
sc_apdu_t apdu;
u8 sbuf[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE];
u8 rbuf[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE];
u8* p=sbuf;
size_t size = datalen;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
if(!data)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
memcpy(p,data,size);
if(!card->drv_data)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,SC_ERROR_INTERNAL);
r = entersafe_internal_set_security_env(card,card->drv_data,&p,&size);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "internal set security env failed");
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_4_SHORT, 0x2A, 0x86,0x80);
apdu.data=p;
apdu.lc = size;
apdu.datalen = size;
apdu.resp = rbuf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(rbuf);
apdu.le = 256;
r = entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu,0,0,0,0);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
if (apdu.sw1 == 0x90 && apdu.sw2 == 0x00) {
size_t len = apdu.resplen > outlen ? outlen : apdu.resplen;
memcpy(out, apdu.resp, len);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, len);
}
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2));
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lookup_bytestring(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *bs,
const unsigned int nlen)
{
struct enamemem *tp;
register u_int i, j, k;
if (nlen >= 6) {
k = (bs[0] << 8) | bs[1];
j = (bs[2] << 8) | bs[3];
i = (bs[4] << 8) | bs[5];
} else if (nlen >= 4) {
k = (bs[0] << 8) | bs[1];
j = (bs[2] << 8) | bs[3];
i = 0;
} else
i = j = k = 0;
tp = &bytestringtable[(i ^ j) & (HASHNAMESIZE-1)];
while (tp->e_nxt)
if (tp->e_addr0 == i &&
tp->e_addr1 == j &&
tp->e_addr2 == k &&
memcmp((const char *)bs, (const char *)(tp->e_bs), nlen) == 0)
return tp;
else
tp = tp->e_nxt;
tp->e_addr0 = i;
tp->e_addr1 = j;
tp->e_addr2 = k;
tp->e_bs = (u_char *) calloc(1, nlen + 1);
if (tp->e_bs == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "lookup_bytestring: calloc");
memcpy(tp->e_bs, bs, nlen);
tp->e_nxt = (struct enamemem *)calloc(1, sizeof(*tp));
if (tp->e_nxt == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "lookup_bytestring: calloc");
return tp;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12894/In lookup_bytestring(), take the length of the byte string into account.
Otherwise, if, in our search of the hash table, we come across a byte
string that's shorter than the string we're looking for, we'll search
past the end of the string in the hash table.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gst_asf_demux_element_send_event (GstElement * element, GstEvent * event)
{
GstASFDemux *demux = GST_ASF_DEMUX (element);
gint i;
GST_DEBUG ("handling element event of type %s", GST_EVENT_TYPE_NAME (event));
for (i = 0; i < demux->num_streams; ++i) {
gst_event_ref (event);
if (gst_asf_demux_handle_src_event (demux->stream[i].pad,
GST_OBJECT_CAST (element), event)) {
gst_event_unref (event);
return TRUE;
}
}
gst_event_unref (event);
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,537 |
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