instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: iasecc_sdo_get_data(struct sc_card *card, struct iasecc_sdo *sdo)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
int rv, sdo_tag;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
sdo_tag = iasecc_sdo_tag_from_class(sdo->sdo_class);
rv = iasecc_sdo_get_tagged_data(card, sdo_tag, sdo);
/* When there is no public data 'GET DATA' returns error */
if (rv != SC_ERROR_INCORRECT_PARAMETERS)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "cannot parse ECC SDO data");
rv = iasecc_sdo_get_tagged_data(card, IASECC_DOCP_TAG, sdo);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "cannot parse ECC DOCP data");
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,513
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ParamTraits<float>::Read(const Message* m, PickleIterator* iter,
param_type* r) {
const char *data;
int data_size;
if (!m->ReadData(iter, &data, &data_size) ||
data_size != sizeof(param_type)) {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
memcpy(r, data, sizeof(param_type));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 117,387
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::RaisesExceptionGetterLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_raisesExceptionGetterLongAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::RaisesExceptionGetterLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,040
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EventSuppressForWindow(WindowPtr pWin, ClientPtr client,
Mask mask, Bool *checkOptional)
{
int i, freed;
if (mask & ~PropagateMask) {
client->errorValue = mask;
return BadValue;
}
if (pWin->dontPropagate)
DontPropagateRefCnts[pWin->dontPropagate]--;
if (!mask)
i = 0;
else {
for (i = DNPMCOUNT, freed = 0; --i > 0;) {
if (!DontPropagateRefCnts[i])
freed = i;
else if (mask == DontPropagateMasks[i])
break;
}
if (!i && freed) {
i = freed;
DontPropagateMasks[i] = mask;
}
}
if (i || !mask) {
pWin->dontPropagate = i;
if (i)
DontPropagateRefCnts[i]++;
if (pWin->optional) {
pWin->optional->dontPropagateMask = mask;
*checkOptional = TRUE;
}
}
else {
if (!pWin->optional && !MakeWindowOptional(pWin)) {
if (pWin->dontPropagate)
DontPropagateRefCnts[pWin->dontPropagate]++;
return BadAlloc;
}
pWin->dontPropagate = 0;
pWin->optional->dontPropagateMask = mask;
}
RecalculateDeliverableEvents(pWin);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,829
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void intAttrAttrSetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, v8::Local<v8::Value> value, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.intAttr._set");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
int v = toInt32(value);
imp->setIntAttr(v);
return;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,565
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int authorized_client(CLIENT *opts) {
const char *ERRMSG="Invalid entry '%s' in authfile '%s', so, refusing all connections.";
FILE *f ;
char line[LINELEN];
char *tmp;
struct in_addr addr;
struct in_addr client;
struct in_addr cltemp;
int len;
if ((f=fopen(opts->server->authname,"r"))==NULL) {
msg4(LOG_INFO,"Can't open authorization file %s (%s).",
opts->server->authname,strerror(errno)) ;
return 1 ;
}
inet_aton(opts->clientname, &client);
while (fgets(line,LINELEN,f)!=NULL) {
if((tmp=index(line, '/'))) {
if(strlen(line)<=tmp-line) {
msg4(LOG_CRIT, ERRMSG, line, opts->server->authname);
return 0;
}
*(tmp++)=0;
if(!inet_aton(line,&addr)) {
msg4(LOG_CRIT, ERRMSG, line, opts->server->authname);
return 0;
}
len=strtol(tmp, NULL, 0);
addr.s_addr>>=32-len;
addr.s_addr<<=32-len;
memcpy(&cltemp,&client,sizeof(client));
cltemp.s_addr>>=32-len;
cltemp.s_addr<<=32-len;
if(addr.s_addr == cltemp.s_addr) {
return 1;
}
}
if (strncmp(line,opts->clientname,strlen(opts->clientname))==0) {
fclose(f);
return 1;
}
}
fclose(f);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer size checking
Yes, this means we've re-introduced CVE-2005-3534. Sigh.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::updateDistributionForNodeIfNeeded(Node* node)
{
if (node->inDocument()) {
updateDistributionIfNeeded();
return;
}
Node* root = node;
while (Node* host = root->shadowHost())
root = host;
while (Node* ancestor = root->parentOrShadowHostNode())
root = ancestor;
if (root->childNeedsDistributionRecalc())
root->recalcDistribution();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,908
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tlink_rb_search(struct rb_root *root, uid_t uid)
{
struct rb_node *node = root->rb_node;
struct tcon_link *tlink;
while (node) {
tlink = rb_entry(node, struct tcon_link, tl_rbnode);
if (tlink->tl_uid > uid)
node = node->rb_left;
else if (tlink->tl_uid < uid)
node = node->rb_right;
else
return tlink;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount
Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if
there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however
that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its
root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath,
so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit
a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for
the mount.
This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length
prefixpath. That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in
this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at
mount time instead.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: Yogesh Sharma <ysharma@cymer.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,522
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sp<MediaPlayerBase> MediaPlayerService::Client::createPlayer(player_type playerType)
{
sp<MediaPlayerBase> p = mPlayer;
if ((p != NULL) && (p->playerType() != playerType)) {
ALOGV("delete player");
p.clear();
}
if (p == NULL) {
p = MediaPlayerFactory::createPlayer(playerType, this, notify, mPid);
}
if (p != NULL) {
p->setUID(mUID);
}
return p;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 157,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::SetExternalTilePriorityConstraints(
const gfx::Rect& viewport_rect,
const gfx::Transform& transform) {
gfx::Rect viewport_rect_for_tile_priority_in_view_space;
gfx::Transform screen_to_view(gfx::Transform::kSkipInitialization);
if (transform.GetInverse(&screen_to_view)) {
viewport_rect_for_tile_priority_in_view_space =
MathUtil::ProjectEnclosingClippedRect(screen_to_view, viewport_rect);
}
const bool tile_priority_params_changed =
viewport_rect_for_tile_priority_ !=
viewport_rect_for_tile_priority_in_view_space;
viewport_rect_for_tile_priority_ =
viewport_rect_for_tile_priority_in_view_space;
if (tile_priority_params_changed) {
active_tree_->set_needs_update_draw_properties();
if (pending_tree_)
pending_tree_->set_needs_update_draw_properties();
SetFullViewportDamage();
SetNeedsRedraw();
}
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,360
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int find_unmapped_nsuid(struct lxc_conf *conf, enum idtype idtype)
{
struct lxc_list *it;
struct id_map *map;
unsigned int freeid = 0;
again:
lxc_list_for_each(it, &conf->id_map) {
map = it->elem;
if (map->idtype != idtype)
continue;
if (freeid >= map->nsid && freeid < map->nsid + map->range) {
freeid = map->nsid + map->range;
goto again;
}
}
return freeid;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 44,564
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool LoginDisplayHostWebUI::IsVoiceInteractionOobe() {
return is_voice_interaction_oobe_;
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,627
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::PluginWindowHandle RenderView::AllocateFakePluginWindowHandle(
bool opaque, bool root) {
gfx::PluginWindowHandle window = NULL;
Send(new ViewHostMsg_AllocateFakePluginWindowHandle(
routing_id(), opaque, root, &window));
if (window) {
fake_plugin_window_handles_.insert(window);
}
return window;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,895
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static EAS_I8 ConvertPan (EAS_I32 pan)
{
/* multiply by conversion factor */
pan = FMUL_15x15 (PAN_CONVERSION_FACTOR, pan);
if (pan < MIN_PAN_VALUE)
return MIN_PAN_VALUE;
if (pan > MAX_PAN_VALUE)
return MAX_PAN_VALUE;
return (EAS_I8) pan;
}
Commit Message: DLS parser: fix wave pool size check.
Bug: 21132860.
Change-Id: I8ae872ea2cc2e8fec5fa0b7815f0b6b31ce744ff
(cherry picked from commit 2d7f8e1be2241e48458f5d3cab5e90be2b07c699)
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 157,506
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SelectionEditor::UpdateCachedVisibleSelectionIfNeeded() const {
DCHECK_GE(GetDocument().Lifecycle().GetState(),
DocumentLifecycle::kAfterPerformLayout);
AssertSelectionValid();
if (!NeedsUpdateVisibleSelection())
return;
style_version_for_dom_tree_ = GetDocument().StyleVersion();
cached_visible_selection_in_dom_tree_is_dirty_ = false;
cached_visible_selection_in_dom_tree_ = CreateVisibleSelection(selection_);
if (!cached_visible_selection_in_dom_tree_.IsNone())
return;
style_version_for_flat_tree_ = GetDocument().StyleVersion();
cached_visible_selection_in_flat_tree_is_dirty_ = false;
cached_visible_selection_in_flat_tree_ = VisibleSelectionInFlatTree();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 124,972
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SavePackage::Init(
const SavePackageDownloadCreatedCallback& download_created_callback) {
if (wait_state_ != INITIALIZE)
return false;
wait_state_ = START_PROCESS;
BrowserContext* browser_context = web_contents()->GetBrowserContext();
if (!browser_context) {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
download_ = download_manager_->CreateSavePackageDownloadItem(
saved_main_file_path_,
page_url_,
((save_type_ == SAVE_PAGE_TYPE_AS_MHTML) ?
"multipart/related" : "text/html"),
this);
if (!download_created_callback.is_null())
download_created_callback.Run(download_);
if (save_type_ == SAVE_PAGE_TYPE_AS_COMPLETE_HTML) {
DCHECK(!saved_main_directory_path_.empty());
GetAllSavableResourceLinksForCurrentPage();
} else if (save_type_ == SAVE_PAGE_TYPE_AS_MHTML) {
web_contents()->GenerateMHTML(saved_main_file_path_, base::Bind(
&SavePackage::OnMHTMLGenerated, this));
} else {
wait_state_ = NET_FILES;
SaveFileCreateInfo::SaveFileSource save_source = page_url_.SchemeIsFile() ?
SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_FILE :
SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_NET;
SaveItem* save_item = new SaveItem(page_url_,
Referrer(),
this,
save_source);
waiting_item_queue_.push(save_item);
all_save_items_count_ = 1;
download_->SetTotalBytes(1);
DoSavingProcess();
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 115,197
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CLASS canon_600_load_raw()
{
uchar data[1120], *dp;
ushort pixel[896], *pix;
int irow, row, col, val;
static const short mul[4][2] =
{ { 1141,1145 }, { 1128,1109 }, { 1178,1149 }, { 1128,1109 } };
for (irow=row=0; irow < height; irow++) {
if ((int)fread (data, 1, raw_width*5/4, ifp) < raw_width*5/4) derror();
for (dp=data, pix=pixel; dp < data+1120; dp+=10, pix+=8) {
pix[0] = (dp[0] << 2) + (dp[1] >> 6 );
pix[1] = (dp[2] << 2) + (dp[1] >> 4 & 3);
pix[2] = (dp[3] << 2) + (dp[1] >> 2 & 3);
pix[3] = (dp[4] << 2) + (dp[1] & 3);
pix[4] = (dp[5] << 2) + (dp[9] & 3);
pix[5] = (dp[6] << 2) + (dp[9] >> 2 & 3);
pix[6] = (dp[7] << 2) + (dp[9] >> 4 & 3);
pix[7] = (dp[8] << 2) + (dp[9] >> 6 );
}
for (col=0; col < width; col++)
BAYER(row,col) = pixel[col];
for (col=width; col < raw_width; col++)
black += pixel[col];
if ((row+=2) > height) row = 1;
}
if (raw_width > width)
black = black / ((raw_width - width) * height) - 4;
for (row=0; row < height; row++)
for (col=0; col < width; col++) {
if ((val = BAYER(row,col) - black) < 0) val = 0;
val = val * mul[row & 3][col & 1] >> 9;
BAYER(row,col) = val;
}
canon_600_fixed_wb(1311);
canon_600_auto_wb();
canon_600_coeff();
maximum = (0x3ff - black) * 1109 >> 9;
black = 0;
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 43,245
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int r = -ENOTTY;
/*
* This union makes it completely explicit to gcc-3.x
* that these two variables' stack usage should be
* combined, not added together.
*/
union {
struct kvm_pit_state ps;
struct kvm_pit_state2 ps2;
struct kvm_pit_config pit_config;
} u;
switch (ioctl) {
case KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_tss_addr(kvm, arg);
break;
case KVM_SET_IDENTITY_MAP_ADDR: {
u64 ident_addr;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&ident_addr, argp, sizeof ident_addr))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_identity_map_addr(kvm, ident_addr);
break;
}
case KVM_SET_NR_MMU_PAGES:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_nr_mmu_pages(kvm, arg);
break;
case KVM_GET_NR_MMU_PAGES:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_nr_mmu_pages(kvm);
break;
case KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP: {
struct kvm_pic *vpic;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
r = -EEXIST;
if (kvm->arch.vpic)
goto create_irqchip_unlock;
r = -EINVAL;
if (atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus))
goto create_irqchip_unlock;
r = -ENOMEM;
vpic = kvm_create_pic(kvm);
if (vpic) {
r = kvm_ioapic_init(kvm);
if (r) {
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS,
&vpic->dev_master);
kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS,
&vpic->dev_slave);
kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS,
&vpic->dev_eclr);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
kfree(vpic);
goto create_irqchip_unlock;
}
} else
goto create_irqchip_unlock;
smp_wmb();
kvm->arch.vpic = vpic;
smp_wmb();
r = kvm_setup_default_irq_routing(kvm);
if (r) {
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
mutex_lock(&kvm->irq_lock);
kvm_ioapic_destroy(kvm);
kvm_destroy_pic(kvm);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->irq_lock);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
}
create_irqchip_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
break;
}
case KVM_CREATE_PIT:
u.pit_config.flags = KVM_PIT_SPEAKER_DUMMY;
goto create_pit;
case KVM_CREATE_PIT2:
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&u.pit_config, argp,
sizeof(struct kvm_pit_config)))
goto out;
create_pit:
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
r = -EEXIST;
if (kvm->arch.vpit)
goto create_pit_unlock;
r = -ENOMEM;
kvm->arch.vpit = kvm_create_pit(kvm, u.pit_config.flags);
if (kvm->arch.vpit)
r = 0;
create_pit_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
break;
case KVM_GET_IRQCHIP: {
/* 0: PIC master, 1: PIC slave, 2: IOAPIC */
struct kvm_irqchip *chip;
chip = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*chip));
if (IS_ERR(chip)) {
r = PTR_ERR(chip);
goto out;
}
r = -ENXIO;
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
goto get_irqchip_out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_irqchip(kvm, chip);
if (r)
goto get_irqchip_out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, chip, sizeof *chip))
goto get_irqchip_out;
r = 0;
get_irqchip_out:
kfree(chip);
break;
}
case KVM_SET_IRQCHIP: {
/* 0: PIC master, 1: PIC slave, 2: IOAPIC */
struct kvm_irqchip *chip;
chip = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*chip));
if (IS_ERR(chip)) {
r = PTR_ERR(chip);
goto out;
}
r = -ENXIO;
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
goto set_irqchip_out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_irqchip(kvm, chip);
if (r)
goto set_irqchip_out;
r = 0;
set_irqchip_out:
kfree(chip);
break;
}
case KVM_GET_PIT: {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&u.ps, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_pit_state)))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit(kvm, &u.ps);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &u.ps, sizeof(struct kvm_pit_state)))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_PIT: {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&u.ps, argp, sizeof u.ps))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit(kvm, &u.ps);
break;
}
case KVM_GET_PIT2: {
r = -ENXIO;
if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit2(kvm, &u.ps2);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &u.ps2, sizeof(u.ps2)))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_PIT2: {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&u.ps2, argp, sizeof(u.ps2)))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit2(kvm, &u.ps2);
break;
}
case KVM_REINJECT_CONTROL: {
struct kvm_reinject_control control;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&control, argp, sizeof(control)))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_reinject(kvm, &control);
break;
}
case KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG: {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config, argp,
sizeof(struct kvm_xen_hvm_config)))
goto out;
r = -EINVAL;
if (kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.flags)
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_CLOCK: {
struct kvm_clock_data user_ns;
u64 now_ns;
s64 delta;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&user_ns, argp, sizeof(user_ns)))
goto out;
r = -EINVAL;
if (user_ns.flags)
goto out;
r = 0;
local_irq_disable();
now_ns = get_kernel_ns();
delta = user_ns.clock - now_ns;
local_irq_enable();
kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset = delta;
kvm_gen_update_masterclock(kvm);
break;
}
case KVM_GET_CLOCK: {
struct kvm_clock_data user_ns;
u64 now_ns;
local_irq_disable();
now_ns = get_kernel_ns();
user_ns.clock = kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset + now_ns;
local_irq_enable();
user_ns.flags = 0;
memset(&user_ns.pad, 0, sizeof(user_ns.pad));
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &user_ns, sizeof(user_ns)))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
default:
;
}
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofpact_bitmap_format(uint64_t ofpacts_bitmap, struct ds *s)
{
if (!ofpacts_bitmap) {
ds_put_cstr(s, "<none>");
} else {
while (ofpacts_bitmap) {
ds_put_format(s, "%s ",
ofpact_name(rightmost_1bit_idx(ofpacts_bitmap)));
ofpacts_bitmap = zero_rightmost_1bit(ofpacts_bitmap);
}
ds_chomp(s, ' ');
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 76,978
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoVertexAttrib1fv(
GLuint indx,
const volatile GLfloat* values) {
api()->glVertexAttrib1fvFn(indx, const_cast<const GLfloat*>(values));
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 142,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char *ffs_prepare_buffer(const char __user *buf, size_t len)
{
char *data;
if (unlikely(!len))
return NULL;
data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!data))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (unlikely(copy_from_user(data, buf, len))) {
kfree(data);
return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
}
pr_vdebug("Buffer from user space:\n");
ffs_dump_mem("", data, len);
return data;
}
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 49,630
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleBindAttribLocation(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::BindAttribLocation& c) {
GLuint program = static_cast<GLuint>(c.program);
GLuint index = static_cast<GLuint>(c.index);
uint32 name_size = c.data_size;
const char* name = GetSharedMemoryAs<const char*>(
c.name_shm_id, c.name_shm_offset, name_size);
if (name == NULL) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
String name_str(name, name_size);
DoBindAttribLocation(program, index, name_str.c_str());
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 103,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __always_inline void *slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s,
gfp_t gfpflags, int node, void *addr)
{
void **object;
struct kmem_cache_cpu *c;
unsigned long flags;
local_irq_save(flags);
c = get_cpu_slab(s, smp_processor_id());
if (unlikely(!c->freelist || !node_match(c, node)))
object = __slab_alloc(s, gfpflags, node, addr, c);
else {
object = c->freelist;
c->freelist = object[c->offset];
stat(c, ALLOC_FASTPATH);
}
local_irq_restore(flags);
if (unlikely((gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && object))
memset(object, 0, c->objsize);
return object;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,898
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sm_adaptive_routing(p_fm_config_conx_hdlt hdl, fm_mgr_type_t mgr, int argc, char *argv[]) {
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res;
fm_msg_ret_code_t ret_code;
uint32_t enable=0;
if (argc == 1) {
enable = atol(argv[0]);
if((res = fm_mgr_simple_query(hdl, FM_ACT_GET, FM_DT_SM_SET_ADAPTIVE_ROUTING, mgr, sizeof(enable), (void*)&enable, &ret_code)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "sm_adaptive_routing: Failed to retrieve data: \n"
"\tError:(%d) %s \n\tRet code:(%d) %s\n",
res, fm_mgr_get_error_str(res),ret_code,
fm_mgr_get_resp_error_str(ret_code));
} else {
printf("Successfully sent SM Adaptive Routing control to local SM instance\n");
}
} else if (argc == 0) {
if((res = fm_mgr_simple_query(hdl, FM_ACT_GET, FM_DT_SM_GET_ADAPTIVE_ROUTING, mgr, sizeof(enable), (void*)&enable, &ret_code)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "sm_adaptive_routing: Failed to retrieve data: \n"
"\tError:(%d) %s \n\tRet code:(%d) %s\n",
res, fm_mgr_get_error_str(res),ret_code,
fm_mgr_get_resp_error_str(ret_code));
} else {
printf("SM Adaptive Routing is %s\n", enable ? "enabled" : "disabled");
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 96,197
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DOMHandler::DOMHandler()
: DevToolsDomainHandler(DOM::Metainfo::domainName),
host_(nullptr) {
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,431
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __clear_buddies_next(struct sched_entity *se)
{
for_each_sched_entity(se) {
struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq = cfs_rq_of(se);
if (cfs_rq->next != se)
break;
cfs_rq->next = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,437
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long __tun_chr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg, int ifreq_len)
{
struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
struct tun_struct *tun;
void __user* argp = (void __user*)arg;
struct ifreq ifr;
kuid_t owner;
kgid_t group;
int sndbuf;
int vnet_hdr_sz;
unsigned int ifindex;
int le;
int ret;
if (cmd == TUNSETIFF || cmd == TUNSETQUEUE || _IOC_TYPE(cmd) == SOCK_IOC_TYPE) {
if (copy_from_user(&ifr, argp, ifreq_len))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
}
if (cmd == TUNGETFEATURES) {
/* Currently this just means: "what IFF flags are valid?".
* This is needed because we never checked for invalid flags on
* TUNSETIFF.
*/
return put_user(IFF_TUN | IFF_TAP | TUN_FEATURES,
(unsigned int __user*)argp);
} else if (cmd == TUNSETQUEUE)
return tun_set_queue(file, &ifr);
ret = 0;
rtnl_lock();
tun = __tun_get(tfile);
if (cmd == TUNSETIFF) {
ret = -EEXIST;
if (tun)
goto unlock;
ifr.ifr_name[IFNAMSIZ-1] = '\0';
ret = tun_set_iff(sock_net(&tfile->sk), file, &ifr);
if (ret)
goto unlock;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ifr, ifreq_len))
ret = -EFAULT;
goto unlock;
}
if (cmd == TUNSETIFINDEX) {
ret = -EPERM;
if (tun)
goto unlock;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&ifindex, argp, sizeof(ifindex)))
goto unlock;
ret = 0;
tfile->ifindex = ifindex;
goto unlock;
}
ret = -EBADFD;
if (!tun)
goto unlock;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "tun_chr_ioctl cmd %u\n", cmd);
ret = 0;
switch (cmd) {
case TUNGETIFF:
tun_get_iff(current->nsproxy->net_ns, tun, &ifr);
if (tfile->detached)
ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_DETACH_QUEUE;
if (!tfile->socket.sk->sk_filter)
ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_NOFILTER;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ifr, ifreq_len))
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
case TUNSETNOCSUM:
/* Disable/Enable checksum */
/* [unimplemented] */
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "ignored: set checksum %s\n",
arg ? "disabled" : "enabled");
break;
case TUNSETPERSIST:
/* Disable/Enable persist mode. Keep an extra reference to the
* module to prevent the module being unprobed.
*/
if (arg && !(tun->flags & IFF_PERSIST)) {
tun->flags |= IFF_PERSIST;
__module_get(THIS_MODULE);
}
if (!arg && (tun->flags & IFF_PERSIST)) {
tun->flags &= ~IFF_PERSIST;
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
}
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "persist %s\n",
arg ? "enabled" : "disabled");
break;
case TUNSETOWNER:
/* Set owner of the device */
owner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), arg);
if (!uid_valid(owner)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
tun->owner = owner;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "owner set to %u\n",
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, tun->owner));
break;
case TUNSETGROUP:
/* Set group of the device */
group = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), arg);
if (!gid_valid(group)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
tun->group = group;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "group set to %u\n",
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, tun->group));
break;
case TUNSETLINK:
/* Only allow setting the type when the interface is down */
if (tun->dev->flags & IFF_UP) {
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun,
"Linktype set failed because interface is up\n");
ret = -EBUSY;
} else {
tun->dev->type = (int) arg;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "linktype set to %d\n",
tun->dev->type);
ret = 0;
}
break;
#ifdef TUN_DEBUG
case TUNSETDEBUG:
tun->debug = arg;
break;
#endif
case TUNSETOFFLOAD:
ret = set_offload(tun, arg);
break;
case TUNSETTXFILTER:
/* Can be set only for TAPs */
ret = -EINVAL;
if ((tun->flags & TUN_TYPE_MASK) != IFF_TAP)
break;
ret = update_filter(&tun->txflt, (void __user *)arg);
break;
case SIOCGIFHWADDR:
/* Get hw address */
memcpy(ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data, tun->dev->dev_addr, ETH_ALEN);
ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_family = tun->dev->type;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ifr, ifreq_len))
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
case SIOCSIFHWADDR:
/* Set hw address */
tun_debug(KERN_DEBUG, tun, "set hw address: %pM\n",
ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data);
ret = dev_set_mac_address(tun->dev, &ifr.ifr_hwaddr);
break;
case TUNGETSNDBUF:
sndbuf = tfile->socket.sk->sk_sndbuf;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &sndbuf, sizeof(sndbuf)))
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
case TUNSETSNDBUF:
if (copy_from_user(&sndbuf, argp, sizeof(sndbuf))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
tun->sndbuf = sndbuf;
tun_set_sndbuf(tun);
break;
case TUNGETVNETHDRSZ:
vnet_hdr_sz = tun->vnet_hdr_sz;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &vnet_hdr_sz, sizeof(vnet_hdr_sz)))
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
case TUNSETVNETHDRSZ:
if (copy_from_user(&vnet_hdr_sz, argp, sizeof(vnet_hdr_sz))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (vnet_hdr_sz < (int)sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
tun->vnet_hdr_sz = vnet_hdr_sz;
break;
case TUNGETVNETLE:
le = !!(tun->flags & TUN_VNET_LE);
if (put_user(le, (int __user *)argp))
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
case TUNSETVNETLE:
if (get_user(le, (int __user *)argp)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (le)
tun->flags |= TUN_VNET_LE;
else
tun->flags &= ~TUN_VNET_LE;
break;
case TUNGETVNETBE:
ret = tun_get_vnet_be(tun, argp);
break;
case TUNSETVNETBE:
ret = tun_set_vnet_be(tun, argp);
break;
case TUNATTACHFILTER:
/* Can be set only for TAPs */
ret = -EINVAL;
if ((tun->flags & TUN_TYPE_MASK) != IFF_TAP)
break;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&tun->fprog, argp, sizeof(tun->fprog)))
break;
ret = tun_attach_filter(tun);
break;
case TUNDETACHFILTER:
/* Can be set only for TAPs */
ret = -EINVAL;
if ((tun->flags & TUN_TYPE_MASK) != IFF_TAP)
break;
ret = 0;
tun_detach_filter(tun, tun->numqueues);
break;
case TUNGETFILTER:
ret = -EINVAL;
if ((tun->flags & TUN_TYPE_MASK) != IFF_TAP)
break;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &tun->fprog, sizeof(tun->fprog)))
break;
ret = 0;
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
unlock:
rtnl_unlock();
if (tun)
tun_put(tun);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 93,254
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: megasas_read_fw_status_reg_xscale(struct megasas_instance *instance)
{
return readl(&instance->reg_set->outbound_msg_0);
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 90,394
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void block_sigs(sigset_t *oldset)
{
sigset_t mask;
siginitsetinv(&mask, sigmask(SIGKILL));
sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &mask, oldset);
}
Commit Message: fuse: check size of FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY message
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwenn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,584
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void btif_in_storage_request_copy_cb(UINT16 event,
char *p_new_buf, char *p_old_buf)
{
btif_storage_req_t *new_req = (btif_storage_req_t*)p_new_buf;
btif_storage_req_t *old_req = (btif_storage_req_t*)p_old_buf;
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __FUNCTION__);
switch (event)
{
case BTIF_CORE_STORAGE_REMOTE_WRITE:
case BTIF_CORE_STORAGE_ADAPTER_WRITE:
{
bdcpy(new_req->write_req.bd_addr.address, old_req->write_req.bd_addr.address);
/* Copy the member variables one at a time */
new_req->write_req.prop.type = old_req->write_req.prop.type;
new_req->write_req.prop.len = old_req->write_req.prop.len;
new_req->write_req.prop.val = (UINT8 *)(p_new_buf + sizeof(btif_storage_req_t));
memcpy(new_req->write_req.prop.val, old_req->write_req.prop.val,
old_req->write_req.prop.len);
}break;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IRCView::replaceDecoration(QString& line, char decoration, char replacement)
{
int pos;
bool decorated = false;
while((pos=line.indexOf(decoration))!=-1)
{
line.replace(pos,1,(decorated) ? QString("</%1>").arg(replacement) : QString("<%1>").arg(replacement));
decorated = !decorated;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,771
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: free_cache(struct name_cache *cache)
{
size_t i;
if (cache != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < cache->size; i++)
free(cache->cache[i].name);
free(cache);
}
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 43,869
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const wchar_t* default_channel() const { return mode_->default_channel_name; }
Commit Message: Ignore switches following "--" when parsing a command line.
BUG=933004
R=wfh@chromium.org
Change-Id: I911be4cbfc38a4d41dec85d85f7fe0f50ddca392
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481210
Auto-Submit: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634604}
CWE ID: CWE-77
| 0
| 152,674
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::ResizeOffscreenFrameBuffer(const gfx::Size& size) {
bool is_offscreen = !!offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get();
if (!is_offscreen) {
LOG(ERROR) << "GLES2DecoderImpl::ResizeOffscreenFrameBuffer called "
<< " with an onscreen framebuffer.";
return false;
}
if (offscreen_size_ == size)
return true;
offscreen_size_ = size;
int w = offscreen_size_.width();
int h = offscreen_size_.height();
if (w < 0 || h < 0 || h >= (INT_MAX / 4) / (w ? w : 1)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "GLES2DecoderImpl::ResizeOffscreenFrameBuffer failed "
<< "to allocate storage due to excessive dimensions.";
return false;
}
DCHECK(offscreen_target_color_format_);
if (IsOffscreenBufferMultisampled()) {
if (!offscreen_target_color_render_buffer_->AllocateStorage(
offscreen_size_, offscreen_target_color_format_,
offscreen_target_samples_)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "GLES2DecoderImpl::ResizeOffscreenFrameBuffer failed "
<< "to allocate storage for offscreen target color buffer.";
return false;
}
} else {
if (!offscreen_target_color_texture_->AllocateStorage(
offscreen_size_, offscreen_target_color_format_)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "GLES2DecoderImpl::ResizeOffscreenFrameBuffer failed "
<< "to allocate storage for offscreen target color texture.";
return false;
}
}
if (offscreen_target_depth_format_ &&
!offscreen_target_depth_render_buffer_->AllocateStorage(
offscreen_size_, offscreen_target_depth_format_,
offscreen_target_samples_)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "GLES2DecoderImpl::ResizeOffscreenFrameBuffer failed "
<< "to allocate storage for offscreen target depth buffer.";
return false;
}
if (offscreen_target_stencil_format_ &&
!offscreen_target_stencil_render_buffer_->AllocateStorage(
offscreen_size_, offscreen_target_stencil_format_,
offscreen_target_samples_)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "GLES2DecoderImpl::ResizeOffscreenFrameBuffer failed "
<< "to allocate storage for offscreen target stencil buffer.";
return false;
}
if (IsOffscreenBufferMultisampled()) {
offscreen_target_frame_buffer_->AttachRenderBuffer(
GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0,
offscreen_target_color_render_buffer_.get());
} else {
offscreen_target_frame_buffer_->AttachRenderTexture(
offscreen_target_color_texture_.get());
}
if (offscreen_target_depth_format_) {
offscreen_target_frame_buffer_->AttachRenderBuffer(
GL_DEPTH_ATTACHMENT,
offscreen_target_depth_render_buffer_.get());
}
const bool packed_depth_stencil =
offscreen_target_depth_format_ == GL_DEPTH24_STENCIL8;
if (packed_depth_stencil) {
offscreen_target_frame_buffer_->AttachRenderBuffer(
GL_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT,
offscreen_target_depth_render_buffer_.get());
} else if (offscreen_target_stencil_format_) {
offscreen_target_frame_buffer_->AttachRenderBuffer(
GL_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT,
offscreen_target_stencil_render_buffer_.get());
}
if (offscreen_target_frame_buffer_->CheckStatus() !=
GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
LOG(ERROR) << "GLES2DecoderImpl::ResizeOffscreenFrameBuffer failed "
<< "because offscreen FBO was incomplete.";
return false;
}
{
ScopedFrameBufferBinder binder(this, offscreen_target_frame_buffer_->id());
glClearColor(0, 0, 0, (GLES2Util::GetChannelsForFormat(
offscreen_target_color_format_) & 0x0008) != 0 ? 0 : 1);
glColorMask(GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE);
glClearStencil(0);
glStencilMaskSeparate(GL_FRONT, -1);
glStencilMaskSeparate(GL_BACK, -1);
glClearDepth(0);
glDepthMask(GL_TRUE);
glDisable(GL_SCISSOR_TEST);
glClear(GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT | GL_DEPTH_BUFFER_BIT | GL_STENCIL_BUFFER_BIT);
RestoreClearState();
}
if (offscreen_resolved_frame_buffer_.get())
offscreen_resolved_frame_buffer_->Destroy();
if (offscreen_resolved_color_texture_.get())
offscreen_resolved_color_texture_->Destroy();
offscreen_resolved_color_texture_.reset();
offscreen_resolved_frame_buffer_.reset();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,302
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void user_single_step_siginfo(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct pt_regs *regs,
struct siginfo *info)
{
fill_sigtrap_info(tsk, regs, 0, TRAP_BRKPT, info);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,921
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void handle_id3(AVIOContext *pb, struct playlist *pls)
{
AVDictionary *metadata = NULL;
ID3v2ExtraMetaAPIC *apic = NULL;
ID3v2ExtraMeta *extra_meta = NULL;
int64_t timestamp = AV_NOPTS_VALUE;
parse_id3(pls->ctx, pb, &metadata, ×tamp, &apic, &extra_meta);
if (timestamp != AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
pls->id3_mpegts_timestamp = timestamp;
pls->id3_offset = 0;
}
if (!pls->id3_found) {
/* initial ID3 tags */
av_assert0(!pls->id3_deferred_extra);
pls->id3_found = 1;
/* get picture attachment and set text metadata */
if (pls->ctx->nb_streams)
ff_id3v2_parse_apic(pls->ctx, &extra_meta);
else
/* demuxer not yet opened, defer picture attachment */
pls->id3_deferred_extra = extra_meta;
av_dict_copy(&pls->ctx->metadata, metadata, 0);
pls->id3_initial = metadata;
} else {
if (!pls->id3_changed && id3_has_changed_values(pls, metadata, apic)) {
avpriv_report_missing_feature(pls->ctx, "Changing ID3 metadata in HLS audio elementary stream");
pls->id3_changed = 1;
}
av_dict_free(&metadata);
}
if (!pls->id3_deferred_extra)
ff_id3v2_free_extra_meta(&extra_meta);
}
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <lingjiujianke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 61,792
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBlock::paintContinuationOutlines(PaintInfo& info, const LayoutPoint& paintOffset)
{
ContinuationOutlineTableMap* table = continuationOutlineTable();
if (table->isEmpty())
return;
OwnPtr<ListHashSet<RenderInline*> > continuations = table->take(this);
if (!continuations)
return;
LayoutPoint accumulatedPaintOffset = paintOffset;
ListHashSet<RenderInline*>::iterator end = continuations->end();
for (ListHashSet<RenderInline*>::iterator it = continuations->begin(); it != end; ++it) {
RenderInline* flow = *it;
RenderBlock* block = flow->containingBlock();
for ( ; block && block != this; block = block->containingBlock())
accumulatedPaintOffset.moveBy(block->location());
ASSERT(block);
flow->paintOutline(info, accumulatedPaintOffset);
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nlmsvc_release_block(struct nlm_block *block)
{
if (block != NULL)
kref_put_mutex(&block->b_count, nlmsvc_free_block, &block->b_file->f_mutex);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,229
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void btif_dm_ssp_key_notif_evt(tBTA_DM_SP_KEY_NOTIF *p_ssp_key_notif)
{
bt_bdaddr_t bd_addr;
bt_bdname_t bd_name;
UINT32 cod;
int dev_type;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __FUNCTION__);
/* Remote properties update */
if (!btif_get_device_type(p_ssp_key_notif->bd_addr, &dev_type))
{
dev_type = BT_DEVICE_TYPE_BREDR;
}
btif_update_remote_properties(p_ssp_key_notif->bd_addr, p_ssp_key_notif->bd_name,
p_ssp_key_notif->dev_class, (tBT_DEVICE_TYPE) dev_type);
bdcpy(bd_addr.address, p_ssp_key_notif->bd_addr);
memcpy(bd_name.name, p_ssp_key_notif->bd_name, BD_NAME_LEN);
bond_state_changed(BT_STATUS_SUCCESS, &bd_addr, BT_BOND_STATE_BONDING);
pairing_cb.is_ssp = TRUE;
cod = devclass2uint(p_ssp_key_notif->dev_class);
if (cod == 0) {
LOG_DEBUG("%s cod is 0, set as unclassified", __func__);
cod = COD_UNCLASSIFIED;
}
HAL_CBACK(bt_hal_cbacks, ssp_request_cb, &bd_addr, &bd_name,
cod, BT_SSP_VARIANT_PASSKEY_NOTIFICATION,
p_ssp_key_notif->passkey);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,612
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: content::RenderView* view() { return view_; }
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,357
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void append_bin_stats(const char *key, const uint16_t klen,
const char *val, const uint32_t vlen,
conn *c) {
char *buf = c->stats.buffer + c->stats.offset;
uint32_t bodylen = klen + vlen;
protocol_binary_response_header header = {
.response.magic = (uint8_t)PROTOCOL_BINARY_RES,
.response.opcode = PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_STAT,
.response.keylen = (uint16_t)htons(klen),
.response.datatype = (uint8_t)PROTOCOL_BINARY_RAW_BYTES,
.response.bodylen = htonl(bodylen),
.response.opaque = c->opaque
};
memcpy(buf, header.bytes, sizeof(header.response));
buf += sizeof(header.response);
if (klen > 0) {
memcpy(buf, key, klen);
buf += klen;
if (vlen > 0) {
memcpy(buf, val, vlen);
}
}
c->stats.offset += sizeof(header.response) + bodylen;
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::DidCreatePpapiPlugin(
content::BrowserPpapiHost* browser_host) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
ChromeContentBrowserClientPluginsPart::DidCreatePpapiPlugin(browser_host);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,623
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport void LocaleUpper(char *string)
{
register char
*q;
assert(string != (char *) NULL);
for (q=string; *q != '\0'; q++)
*q=(char) LocaleUppercase((int) *q);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 90,903
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int clientstr_hashval(const char *name)
{
return opaque_hashval(name, 8) & CLIENT_HASH_MASK;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int32_t PPB_URLLoader_Impl::FollowRedirect(PP_CompletionCallback callback) {
int32_t rv = ValidateCallback(callback);
if (rv != PP_OK)
return rv;
WebURL redirect_url = GURL(response_info_->redirect_url());
loader_->setDefersLoading(false); // Allow the redirect to continue.
RegisterCallback(callback);
return PP_OK_COMPLETIONPENDING;
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,010
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virDomainInterfaceAddresses(virDomainPtr dom,
virDomainInterfacePtr **ifaces,
unsigned int source,
unsigned int flags)
{
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(dom, "ifaces=%p, source=%d, flags=%x", ifaces, source, flags);
virResetLastError();
if (ifaces)
*ifaces = NULL;
virCheckDomainReturn(dom, -1);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(ifaces, error);
if (source == VIR_DOMAIN_INTERFACE_ADDRESSES_SRC_AGENT)
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(dom->conn->flags, error);
if (dom->conn->driver->domainInterfaceAddresses) {
int ret;
ret = dom->conn->driver->domainInterfaceAddresses(dom, ifaces, source, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportError(VIR_ERR_NO_SUPPORT, __FUNCTION__);
error:
virDispatchError(dom->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 93,833
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual float SpoolPage(GraphicsContext& context, int page_number) {
IntRect page_rect = page_rects_[page_number];
float scale = printed_page_width_ / page_rect.Width();
AffineTransform transform;
#if defined(OS_POSIX) && !defined(OS_MACOSX)
transform.Scale(scale);
#endif
transform.Translate(static_cast<float>(-page_rect.X()),
static_cast<float>(-page_rect.Y()));
context.Save();
context.ConcatCTM(transform);
context.ClipRect(page_rect);
auto* frame_view = GetFrame()->View();
DCHECK(frame_view);
PropertyTreeState property_tree_state =
frame_view->GetLayoutView()->FirstFragment().LocalBorderBoxProperties();
PaintRecordBuilder builder(&context.Canvas()->getMetaData(), &context);
frame_view->PaintContents(builder.Context(), kGlobalPaintNormalPhase,
page_rect);
{
ScopedPaintChunkProperties scoped_paint_chunk_properties(
builder.Context().GetPaintController(), property_tree_state, builder,
DisplayItem::kPrintedContentDestinationLocations);
DrawingRecorder line_boundary_recorder(
builder.Context(), builder,
DisplayItem::kPrintedContentDestinationLocations);
OutputLinkedDestinations(builder.Context(), page_rect);
}
context.DrawRecord(builder.EndRecording(property_tree_state));
context.Restore();
return scale;
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 145,771
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct l2tp_eth_net *l2tp_eth_pernet(struct net *net)
{
return net_generic(net, l2tp_eth_net_id);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,310
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ps_parser_done( PS_Parser parser )
{
FT_UNUSED( parser );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,341
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs3svc_encode_setaclres(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_attrstat *resp)
{
p = nfs3svc_encode_post_op_attr(rqstp, p, &resp->fh);
return xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, p);
}
Commit Message: nfsd: check permissions when setting ACLs
Use set_posix_acl, which includes proper permission checks, instead of
calling ->set_acl directly. Without this anyone may be able to grant
themselves permissions to a file by setting the ACL.
Lock the inode to make the new checks atomic with respect to set_acl.
(Also, nfsd was the only caller of set_acl not locking the inode, so I
suspect this may fix other races.)
This also simplifies the code, and ensures our ACLs are checked by
posix_acl_valid.
The permission checks and the inode locking were lost with commit
4ac7249e, which changed nfsd to use the set_acl inode operation directly
instead of going through xattr handlers.
Reported-by: David Sinquin <david@sinquin.eu>
[agreunba@redhat.com: use set_posix_acl]
Fixes: 4ac7249e
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 55,757
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned int tcp_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, poll_table *wait)
{
unsigned int mask;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int state;
sock_rps_record_flow(sk);
sock_poll_wait(file, sk_sleep(sk), wait);
state = sk_state_load(sk);
if (state == TCP_LISTEN)
return inet_csk_listen_poll(sk);
/* Socket is not locked. We are protected from async events
* by poll logic and correct handling of state changes
* made by other threads is impossible in any case.
*/
mask = 0;
/*
* POLLHUP is certainly not done right. But poll() doesn't
* have a notion of HUP in just one direction, and for a
* socket the read side is more interesting.
*
* Some poll() documentation says that POLLHUP is incompatible
* with the POLLOUT/POLLWR flags, so somebody should check this
* all. But careful, it tends to be safer to return too many
* bits than too few, and you can easily break real applications
* if you don't tell them that something has hung up!
*
* Check-me.
*
* Check number 1. POLLHUP is _UNMASKABLE_ event (see UNIX98 and
* our fs/select.c). It means that after we received EOF,
* poll always returns immediately, making impossible poll() on write()
* in state CLOSE_WAIT. One solution is evident --- to set POLLHUP
* if and only if shutdown has been made in both directions.
* Actually, it is interesting to look how Solaris and DUX
* solve this dilemma. I would prefer, if POLLHUP were maskable,
* then we could set it on SND_SHUTDOWN. BTW examples given
* in Stevens' books assume exactly this behaviour, it explains
* why POLLHUP is incompatible with POLLOUT. --ANK
*
* NOTE. Check for TCP_CLOSE is added. The goal is to prevent
* blocking on fresh not-connected or disconnected socket. --ANK
*/
if (sk->sk_shutdown == SHUTDOWN_MASK || state == TCP_CLOSE)
mask |= POLLHUP;
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLRDHUP;
/* Connected or passive Fast Open socket? */
if (state != TCP_SYN_SENT &&
(state != TCP_SYN_RECV || tp->fastopen_rsk)) {
int target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, 0, INT_MAX);
if (tp->urg_seq == tp->copied_seq &&
!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_URGINLINE) &&
tp->urg_data)
target++;
if (tp->rcv_nxt - tp->copied_seq >= target)
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (!(sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN)) {
if (sk_stream_is_writeable(sk)) {
mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
} else { /* send SIGIO later */
sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk);
set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
/* Race breaker. If space is freed after
* wspace test but before the flags are set,
* IO signal will be lost. Memory barrier
* pairs with the input side.
*/
smp_mb__after_atomic();
if (sk_stream_is_writeable(sk))
mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
}
} else
mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
if (tp->urg_data & TCP_URG_VALID)
mask |= POLLPRI;
} else if (state == TCP_SYN_SENT && inet_sk(sk)->defer_connect) {
/* Active TCP fastopen socket with defer_connect
* Return POLLOUT so application can call write()
* in order for kernel to generate SYN+data
*/
mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
}
/* This barrier is coupled with smp_wmb() in tcp_reset() */
smp_rmb();
if (sk->sk_err || !skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_error_queue))
mask |= POLLERR;
return mask;
}
Commit Message: tcp: initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0
When tcp_disconnect() is called, inet_csk_delack_init() sets
icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss to 0.
This could potentially cause tcp_recvmsg() => tcp_cleanup_rbuf() =>
__tcp_select_window() call path to have division by 0 issue.
So this patch initializes rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 61,754
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int array_num_elements(HashTable* ht)
{
if (ht->pListTail && ht->pListTail->nKeyLength == 0) {
return ht->pListTail->h-1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,843
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct mschmd_header *chmd_open(struct mschm_decompressor *base,
const char *filename)
{
return chmd_real_open(base, filename, 1);
}
Commit Message: length checks when looking for control files
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,820
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void StreamTcpDetectLogFlush(ThreadVars *tv, StreamTcpThread *stt, Flow *f, Packet *p, PacketQueue *pq)
{
TcpSession *ssn = f->protoctx;
ssn->client.flags |= STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_TRIGGER_RAW;
ssn->server.flags |= STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_TRIGGER_RAW;
bool ts = PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p) ? true : false;
ts ^= StreamTcpInlineMode();
StreamTcpPseudoPacketCreateDetectLogFlush(tv, stt, p, ssn, pq, ts^0);
StreamTcpPseudoPacketCreateDetectLogFlush(tv, stt, p, ssn, pq, ts^1);
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID:
| 0
| 79,185
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ppp_do_recv(struct ppp *ppp, struct sk_buff *skb, struct channel *pch)
{
ppp_recv_lock(ppp);
if (!ppp->closing)
ppp_receive_frame(ppp, skb, pch);
else
kfree_skb(skb);
ppp_recv_unlock(ppp);
}
Commit Message: ppp: take reference on channels netns
Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace.
Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their
userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they
can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from
under them.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at
addr ffff880064e217e0
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581
=============================================================================
BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906
[< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440
[< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469
[< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532
[< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574
[< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579
[< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597
[< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325
[< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360
[< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95
[< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150
[< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451
[< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274
[< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723
[< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832
[< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826
[< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631
[< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650
[< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805
[< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814
[< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341
[< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348
[< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448
[< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036
[< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170
[< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303
[< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000
flags=0x5fffc0000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200
CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300
ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054
ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654
[<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661
[< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138
[<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236
[< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293
[<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241
[<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000
[<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478
[<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744
[<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772
[<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901
[<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688
[<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115
[< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750
[<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123
[<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357
[<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550
[<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145
[<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880
[<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307
[< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113
[<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158
[<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712
[<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655
[<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165
[<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692
[< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099
[<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678
[< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807
[<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283
[<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282
[<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344
[<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 52,625
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::DidGetResourceResponseStart(
const ResourceRequestDetails& details) {
controller_.ssl_manager()->DidStartResourceResponse(
details.url, details.has_certificate, details.ssl_cert_status);
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidGetResourceResponseStart(details);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,670
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_empty_slot(struct module *module, int slot)
{
return !slots[slot] || !*slots[slot];
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 36,506
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p)
{
int i, j = 0;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
unsigned char *q;
int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
/* Set disabled masks for this session */
ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
if (sk == NULL)
return (0);
q = p;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
/* Skip disabled ciphers */
if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
continue;
j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p);
p += j;
}
/*
* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
* applicable SCSVs.
*/
if (p != q) {
if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
p += j;
}
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
p += j;
}
}
return (p - q);
}
Commit Message: Fix missing NULL checks in CKE processing
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 69,369
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExecuteJavaScriptForTests(const std::string& js) {
base::RunLoop run_loop;
browser()
->tab_strip_model()
->GetActiveWebContents()
->GetMainFrame()
->ExecuteJavaScriptForTests(
base::ASCIIToUTF16(js),
base::Bind([](const base::Closure& quit_callback,
const base::Value* result) { quit_callback.Run(); },
run_loop.QuitClosure()));
run_loop.Run();
}
Commit Message: Skip Service workers in requests for mime handler plugins
BUG=808838
TEST=./browser_tests --gtest_filter=*/ServiceWorkerTest.MimeHandlerView*
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: I82e75c200091babbab648a04232db47e2938d914
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914150
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Istiaque Ahmed <lazyboy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#537386}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,419
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline ssize_t SetPSDOffset(const PSDInfo *psd_info,Image *image,
const size_t offset)
{
if (psd_info->version == 1)
return(WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) offset));
return(WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) offset));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1451
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 91,377
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void cJSON_Delete( cJSON *c )
{
cJSON *next;
while ( c ) {
next = c->next;
if ( ! ( c->type & cJSON_IsReference ) && c->child )
cJSON_Delete( c->child );
if ( ! ( c->type & cJSON_IsReference ) && c->valuestring )
cJSON_free( c->valuestring );
if ( c->string )
cJSON_free( c->string );
cJSON_free( c );
c = next;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 167,281
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen(struct sock *parent)
{
struct sock *sk;
BT_DBG("parent %p", parent);
/* Close not yet accepted channels */
while ((sk = bt_accept_dequeue(parent, NULL))) {
struct l2cap_chan *chan = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan;
l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
__clear_chan_timer(chan);
l2cap_chan_close(chan, ECONNRESET);
l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
l2cap_sock_kill(sk);
}
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: L2CAP - Fix info leak via getsockname()
The L2CAP code fails to initialize the l2_bdaddr_type member of struct
sockaddr_l2 and the padding byte added for alignment. It that for leaks
two bytes kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 94,518
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TaskService::RunTask(InstanceId instance_id,
RunnerId runner_id,
base::OnceClosure task) {
base::subtle::AutoReadLock task_lock(task_lock_);
{
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (instance_id != bound_instance_id_)
return;
}
std::move(task).Run();
}
Commit Message: Change ReadWriteLock to Lock+ConditionVariable in TaskService
There are non-trivial performance implications of using shared
SRWLocking on Windows as more state has to be checked.
Since there are only two uses of the ReadWriteLock in Chromium after
over 1 year, the decision is to remove it.
BUG=758721
Change-Id: I84d1987d7b624a89e896eb37184ee50845c39d80
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/634423
Commit-Queue: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takashi Toyoshima <toyoshim@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Francois Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#497632}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 172,212
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_track_tsc_matching(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
bool vcpus_matched;
bool do_request = false;
struct kvm_arch *ka = &vcpu->kvm->arch;
struct pvclock_gtod_data *gtod = &pvclock_gtod_data;
vcpus_matched = (ka->nr_vcpus_matched_tsc + 1 ==
atomic_read(&vcpu->kvm->online_vcpus));
if (vcpus_matched && gtod->clock.vclock_mode == VCLOCK_TSC)
if (!ka->use_master_clock)
do_request = 1;
if (!vcpus_matched && ka->use_master_clock)
do_request = 1;
if (do_request)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MASTERCLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
trace_kvm_track_tsc(vcpu->vcpu_id, ka->nr_vcpus_matched_tsc,
atomic_read(&vcpu->kvm->online_vcpus),
ka->use_master_clock, gtod->clock.vclock_mode);
#endif
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,886
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserLauncherItemController::Close() {
views::Widget* widget = views::Widget::GetWidgetForNativeView(window_);
if (widget)
widget->Close();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,723
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ActivationCallback() { ++callback_count_; }
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hardcopy(WebKitWebView *page, GArray *argv, GString *result) {
(void) argv;
(void) result;
webkit_web_frame_print(webkit_web_view_get_main_frame(page));
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,355
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void NewObjectTestInterfacePromiseMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "newObjectTestInterfacePromiseMethod");
ExceptionToRejectPromiseScope reject_promise_scope(info, exception_state);
if (!V8TestObject::HasInstance(info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate())) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("Illegal invocation");
return;
}
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
ScriptPromise result = impl->newObjectTestInterfacePromiseMethod();
V8SetReturnValue(info, result.V8Value());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,899
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void setLineColor(Color8888* dst, Color8888 color, int width) {
for (; width > 0; width--, dst++) {
*dst = color;
}
}
Commit Message: Skip composition of frames lacking a color map
Bug:68399117
Change-Id: I32f1d6856221b8a60130633edb69da2d2986c27c
(cherry picked from commit 0dc887f70eeea8d707cb426b96c6756edd1c607d)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 163,291
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __dm_suspend(struct mapped_device *md, struct dm_table *map,
unsigned suspend_flags, long task_state,
int dmf_suspended_flag)
{
bool do_lockfs = suspend_flags & DM_SUSPEND_LOCKFS_FLAG;
bool noflush = suspend_flags & DM_SUSPEND_NOFLUSH_FLAG;
int r;
lockdep_assert_held(&md->suspend_lock);
/*
* DMF_NOFLUSH_SUSPENDING must be set before presuspend.
* This flag is cleared before dm_suspend returns.
*/
if (noflush)
set_bit(DMF_NOFLUSH_SUSPENDING, &md->flags);
else
pr_debug("%s: suspending with flush\n", dm_device_name(md));
/*
* This gets reverted if there's an error later and the targets
* provide the .presuspend_undo hook.
*/
dm_table_presuspend_targets(map);
/*
* Flush I/O to the device.
* Any I/O submitted after lock_fs() may not be flushed.
* noflush takes precedence over do_lockfs.
* (lock_fs() flushes I/Os and waits for them to complete.)
*/
if (!noflush && do_lockfs) {
r = lock_fs(md);
if (r) {
dm_table_presuspend_undo_targets(map);
return r;
}
}
/*
* Here we must make sure that no processes are submitting requests
* to target drivers i.e. no one may be executing
* __split_and_process_bio. This is called from dm_request and
* dm_wq_work.
*
* To get all processes out of __split_and_process_bio in dm_request,
* we take the write lock. To prevent any process from reentering
* __split_and_process_bio from dm_request and quiesce the thread
* (dm_wq_work), we set BMF_BLOCK_IO_FOR_SUSPEND and call
* flush_workqueue(md->wq).
*/
set_bit(DMF_BLOCK_IO_FOR_SUSPEND, &md->flags);
if (map)
synchronize_srcu(&md->io_barrier);
/*
* Stop md->queue before flushing md->wq in case request-based
* dm defers requests to md->wq from md->queue.
*/
if (dm_request_based(md)) {
dm_stop_queue(md->queue);
if (md->kworker_task)
kthread_flush_worker(&md->kworker);
}
flush_workqueue(md->wq);
/*
* At this point no more requests are entering target request routines.
* We call dm_wait_for_completion to wait for all existing requests
* to finish.
*/
r = dm_wait_for_completion(md, task_state);
if (!r)
set_bit(dmf_suspended_flag, &md->flags);
if (noflush)
clear_bit(DMF_NOFLUSH_SUSPENDING, &md->flags);
if (map)
synchronize_srcu(&md->io_barrier);
/* were we interrupted ? */
if (r < 0) {
dm_queue_flush(md);
if (dm_request_based(md))
dm_start_queue(md->queue);
unlock_fs(md);
dm_table_presuspend_undo_targets(map);
/* pushback list is already flushed, so skip flush */
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,842
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Box *trpy_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_TRPYBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_TRPY);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,609
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::LoadingStateChanged(WebContents* source,
bool to_different_document) {
ScheduleUIUpdate(source, content::INVALIDATE_TYPE_LOAD);
UpdateWindowForLoadingStateChanged(source, to_different_document);
}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,017
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvm_fetch_guest_virt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
gva_t addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
struct x86_exception *exception)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
u32 access = (kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) == 3) ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
unsigned offset;
int ret;
/* Inline kvm_read_guest_virt_helper for speed. */
gpa_t gpa = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, addr, access|PFERR_FETCH_MASK,
exception);
if (unlikely(gpa == UNMAPPED_GVA))
return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
offset = addr & (PAGE_SIZE-1);
if (WARN_ON(offset + bytes > PAGE_SIZE))
bytes = (unsigned)PAGE_SIZE - offset;
ret = kvm_read_guest_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT, val,
offset, bytes);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
return X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 35,787
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebViewExperimental::setContentX(qreal x)
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
ASSERT(d->flickProvider);
d->flickProvider->setContentX(x);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 101,776
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: chunkVectIter ContainerChunk::getChild( Chunk* needle )
{
chunkVectIter iter;
for( iter = this->children.begin(); iter != this->children.end(); iter++ )
{
Chunk* temp1 = *iter;
Chunk* temp2 = needle;
if ( (*iter) == needle ) return iter;
}
return this->children.end();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 16,076
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int openssl_init_fork_handlers(void)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330
| 0
| 12,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sas_get_phy_change_count(struct domain_device *dev,
int phy_id, int *pcc)
{
int res;
struct smp_resp *disc_resp;
disc_resp = alloc_smp_resp(DISCOVER_RESP_SIZE);
if (!disc_resp)
return -ENOMEM;
res = sas_get_phy_discover(dev, phy_id, disc_resp);
if (!res)
*pcc = disc_resp->disc.change_count;
kfree(disc_resp);
return res;
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: fix memory leak in sas_smp_get_phy_events()
We've got a memory leak with the following producer:
while true;
do cat /sys/class/sas_phy/phy-1:0:12/invalid_dword_count >/dev/null;
done
The buffer req is allocated and not freed after we return. Fix it.
Fixes: 2908d778ab3e ("[SCSI] aic94xx: new driver")
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: chenqilin <chenqilin2@huawei.com>
CC: chenxiang <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 83,964
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: message_send_invite(const char *const roomjid, const char *const contact,
const char *const reason)
{
xmpp_ctx_t * const ctx = connection_get_ctx();
xmpp_stanza_t *stanza;
muc_member_type_t member_type = muc_member_type(roomjid);
if (member_type == MUC_MEMBER_TYPE_PUBLIC) {
log_debug("Sending direct invite to %s, for %s", contact, roomjid);
char *password = muc_password(roomjid);
stanza = stanza_create_invite(ctx, roomjid, contact, reason, password);
} else {
log_debug("Sending mediated invite to %s, for %s", contact, roomjid);
stanza = stanza_create_mediated_invite(ctx, roomjid, contact, reason);
}
_send_message_stanza(stanza);
xmpp_stanza_release(stanza);
}
Commit Message: Add carbons from check
CWE ID: CWE-346
| 0
| 68,675
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int php_snmp_write_valueretrieval(php_snmp_object *snmp_object, zval *newval)
{
zval ztmp;
int ret = SUCCESS;
if (Z_TYPE_P(newval) != IS_LONG) {
ztmp = *newval;
zval_copy_ctor(&ztmp);
convert_to_long(&ztmp);
newval = &ztmp;
}
if (Z_LVAL_P(newval) >= 0 && Z_LVAL_P(newval) <= (SNMP_VALUE_LIBRARY|SNMP_VALUE_PLAIN|SNMP_VALUE_OBJECT)) {
snmp_object->valueretrieval = Z_LVAL_P(newval);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unknown SNMP value retrieval method '%pd'", Z_LVAL_P(newval));
ret = FAILURE;
}
if (newval == &ztmp) {
zval_dtor(newval);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FormAssociatedElement::insertedInto(ContainerNode* insertionPoint)
{
if (m_form && insertionPoint->highestAncestor() != m_form->highestAncestor())
setForm(0);
resetFormOwner();
if (!insertionPoint->inDocument())
return;
HTMLElement* element = toHTMLElement(this);
if (element->fastHasAttribute(formAttr))
resetFormAttributeTargetObserver();
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash when a form control is in a past naems map of a demoted form element.
Note that we wanted to add the protector in FormAssociatedElement::setForm(),
but we couldn't do it because it is called from the constructor.
BUG=326854
TEST=automated.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/105693013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@163680 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 123,827
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ImportBlackQuantum(const Image *image,QuantumInfo *quantum_info,
const MagickSizeType number_pixels,const unsigned char *magick_restrict p,
Quantum *magick_restrict q,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
x;
unsigned int
pixel;
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),ImageError,
"ColorSeparatedImageRequired","`%s'",image->filename);
return;
}
switch (quantum_info->depth)
{
case 8:
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlack(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
pixel;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlack(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlack(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
unsigned int
pixel;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
float
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlack(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlack(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 64:
{
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
double
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlack(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
default:
{
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlack(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/129
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 71,866
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err asrt_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
u32 i;
GF_AdobeSegmentRunTableBox *p = (GF_AdobeSegmentRunTableBox*)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "AdobeSegmentRunTableBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
for (i=0; i<p->quality_entry_count; i++) {
char *str = (char*)gf_list_get(p->quality_segment_url_modifiers, i);
fprintf(trace, "<QualityEntry>%s</QualityEntry>\n", str);
}
for (i=0; i<p->segment_run_entry_count; i++) {
GF_AdobeSegmentRunEntry *sre = (GF_AdobeSegmentRunEntry *)gf_list_get(p->segment_run_entry_table, i);
fprintf(trace, "<SegmentRunEntry FirstSegment=\"%u\" FragmentsPerSegment=\"%u\"/>\n", sre->first_segment, sre->fragment_per_segment);
}
gf_isom_box_dump_done("AdobeSegmentRunTableBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,686
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __init sched_init_smp(void)
{
cpumask_var_t non_isolated_cpus;
alloc_cpumask_var(&non_isolated_cpus, GFP_KERNEL);
alloc_cpumask_var(&fallback_doms, GFP_KERNEL);
#if defined(CONFIG_NUMA)
sched_group_nodes_bycpu = kzalloc(nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(void **),
GFP_KERNEL);
BUG_ON(sched_group_nodes_bycpu == NULL);
#endif
get_online_cpus();
mutex_lock(&sched_domains_mutex);
arch_init_sched_domains(cpu_active_mask);
cpumask_andnot(non_isolated_cpus, cpu_possible_mask, cpu_isolated_map);
if (cpumask_empty(non_isolated_cpus))
cpumask_set_cpu(smp_processor_id(), non_isolated_cpus);
mutex_unlock(&sched_domains_mutex);
put_online_cpus();
hotcpu_notifier(cpuset_cpu_active, CPU_PRI_CPUSET_ACTIVE);
hotcpu_notifier(cpuset_cpu_inactive, CPU_PRI_CPUSET_INACTIVE);
/* RT runtime code needs to handle some hotplug events */
hotcpu_notifier(update_runtime, 0);
init_hrtick();
/* Move init over to a non-isolated CPU */
if (set_cpus_allowed_ptr(current, non_isolated_cpus) < 0)
BUG();
sched_init_granularity();
free_cpumask_var(non_isolated_cpus);
init_sched_rt_class();
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int arm_coherent_iommu_map_sg(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sg,
int nents, enum dma_data_direction dir, struct dma_attrs *attrs)
{
return __iommu_map_sg(dev, sg, nents, dir, attrs, true);
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 58,286
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ShellWindowFrameView::~ShellWindowFrameView() {
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 103,199
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const char* event_type() const { return event_type_; }
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 103,408
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __net_exit igmp_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
proc_net_remove(net, "mcfilter");
proc_net_remove(net, "igmp");
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,609
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void promiseMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::promiseMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,532
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FakeCentral::FakeCentral(mojom::CentralState state,
mojom::FakeCentralRequest request)
: state_(state), binding_(this, std::move(request)) {}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,218
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,ch_len;
unsigned long l;
int ssl2_compat;
int version = 0, version_major, version_minor;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
int j;
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
int ret;
unsigned long mask, options = s->options;
ssl2_compat = (options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) ? 0 : 1;
if (ssl2_compat && ssl23_no_ssl2_ciphers(s))
ssl2_compat = 0;
/*
* SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are
* some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order
* to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So
* that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of
* TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the
* answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.
*/
mask = SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1|SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
|(ssl2_compat?SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2:0)
#endif
;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT)
version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) && (options & mask) != mask)
version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
#else
version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
#endif
mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & mask) != mask)
version = TLS1_VERSION;
mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & mask) != mask)
version = SSL3_VERSION;
mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3) && (options & mask) != mask)
version = SSL2_VERSION;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (version != SSL2_VERSION)
{
/* have to disable SSL 2.0 compatibility if we need TLS extensions */
if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
ssl2_compat = 0;
if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1)
ssl2_compat = 0;
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0 || s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
ssl2_compat = 0;
#endif
}
#endif
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
{
#if 0
/* don't reuse session-id's */
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
{
return(-1);
}
#endif
p=s->s3->client_random;
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
return -1;
if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
{
version_major = TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR;
version_minor = TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR;
}
else if (version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
{
version_major = TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR;
version_minor = TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR;
}
else if (version == TLS1_VERSION)
{
version_major = TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR;
version_minor = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
else if(FIPS_mode())
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
return -1;
}
#endif
else if (version == SSL3_VERSION)
{
version_major = SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR;
version_minor = SSL3_VERSION_MINOR;
}
else if (version == SSL2_VERSION)
{
version_major = SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR;
version_minor = SSL2_VERSION_MINOR;
}
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
return(-1);
}
s->client_version = version;
if (ssl2_compat)
{
/* create SSL 2.0 compatible Client Hello */
/* two byte record header will be written last */
d = &(buf[2]);
p = d + 9; /* leave space for message type, version, individual length fields */
*(d++) = SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
*(d++) = version_major;
*(d++) = version_minor;
/* Ciphers supported */
i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),p,0);
if (i == 0)
{
/* no ciphers */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
return -1;
}
s2n(i,d);
p+=i;
/* put in the session-id length (zero since there is no reuse) */
#if 0
s->session->session_id_length=0;
#endif
s2n(0,d);
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG)
ch_len=SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
else
ch_len=SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
/* write out sslv2 challenge */
/* Note that ch_len must be <= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE (32),
because it is one of SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH (32)
or SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH (16), but leave the
check in for futurproofing */
if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE < ch_len)
i=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
else
i=ch_len;
s2n(i,d);
memset(&(s->s3->client_random[0]),0,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-i]),i) <= 0)
return -1;
memcpy(p,&(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-i]),i);
p+=i;
i= p- &(buf[2]);
buf[0]=((i>>8)&0xff)|0x80;
buf[1]=(i&0xff);
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num=i+2;
s->init_off=0;
ssl3_finish_mac(s,&(buf[2]),i);
}
else
{
/* create Client Hello in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 format */
/* do the record header (5 bytes) and handshake message header (4 bytes) last */
d = p = &(buf[9]);
*(p++) = version_major;
*(p++) = version_minor;
/* Random stuff */
memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* Session ID (zero since there is no reuse) */
*(p++) = 0;
/* Ciphers supported (using SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 format) */
i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),ssl3_put_cipher_by_char);
if (i == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
return -1;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
/* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes
* as hack workaround chop number of supported ciphers
* to keep it well below this if we use TLS v1.2
*/
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
#endif
s2n(i,p);
p+=i;
/* COMPRESSION */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
*(p++)=1;
#else
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
|| !s->ctx->comp_methods)
j=0;
else
j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
*(p++)=1+j;
for (i=0; i<j; i++)
{
comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,i);
*(p++)=comp->id;
}
#endif
*(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions*/
if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
return -1;
}
if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
#endif
l = p-d;
/* fill in 4-byte handshake header */
d=&(buf[5]);
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
l2n3(l,d);
l += 4;
if (l > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
/* fill in 5-byte record header */
d=buf;
*(d++) = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
*(d++) = version_major;
/* Some servers hang if we use long client hellos
* and a record number > TLS 1.0.
*/
if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
*(d++) = 1;
else
*(d++) = version_minor;
s2n((int)l,d);
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num=p-buf;
s->init_off=0;
ssl3_finish_mac(s,&(buf[5]), s->init_num - 5);
}
s->state=SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
s->init_off=0;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
ret = ssl23_write_bytes(s);
if ((ret >= 2) && s->msg_callback)
{
/* Client Hello has been sent; tell msg_callback */
if (ssl2_compat)
s->msg_callback(1, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data+2, ret-2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
else
s->msg_callback(1, version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data+5, ret-5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 12,232
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct dns_resolvers *find_resolvers_by_id(const char *id)
{
struct dns_resolvers *res;
list_for_each_entry(res, &dns_resolvers, list) {
if (!strcmp(res->id, id))
return res;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void get_key_callback(void *c, struct key_params *params)
{
struct nlattr *key;
struct get_key_cookie *cookie = c;
if (params->key)
NLA_PUT(cookie->msg, NL80211_ATTR_KEY_DATA,
params->key_len, params->key);
if (params->seq)
NLA_PUT(cookie->msg, NL80211_ATTR_KEY_SEQ,
params->seq_len, params->seq);
if (params->cipher)
NLA_PUT_U32(cookie->msg, NL80211_ATTR_KEY_CIPHER,
params->cipher);
key = nla_nest_start(cookie->msg, NL80211_ATTR_KEY);
if (!key)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (params->key)
NLA_PUT(cookie->msg, NL80211_KEY_DATA,
params->key_len, params->key);
if (params->seq)
NLA_PUT(cookie->msg, NL80211_KEY_SEQ,
params->seq_len, params->seq);
if (params->cipher)
NLA_PUT_U32(cookie->msg, NL80211_KEY_CIPHER,
params->cipher);
NLA_PUT_U8(cookie->msg, NL80211_ATTR_KEY_IDX, cookie->idx);
nla_nest_end(cookie->msg, key);
return;
nla_put_failure:
cookie->error = 1;
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,658
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::FrameFocused() {
Send(new FrameHostMsg_FrameFocused(routing_id_));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,641
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned CSSComputedStyleDeclaration::length() const
{
Node* node = m_node.get();
if (!node)
return 0;
RenderStyle* style = node->computedStyle(m_pseudoElementSpecifier);
if (!style)
return 0;
return numComputedProperties;
}
Commit Message: Rename isPositioned to isOutOfFlowPositioned for clarity
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89836
Reviewed by Antti Koivisto.
RenderObject and RenderStyle had an isPositioned() method that was
confusing, because it excluded relative positioning. Rename to
isOutOfFlowPositioned(), which makes it clearer that it only applies
to absolute and fixed positioning.
Simple rename; no behavior change.
Source/WebCore:
* css/CSSComputedStyleDeclaration.cpp:
(WebCore::getPositionOffsetValue):
* css/StyleResolver.cpp:
(WebCore::StyleResolver::collectMatchingRulesForList):
* dom/Text.cpp:
(WebCore::Text::rendererIsNeeded):
* editing/DeleteButtonController.cpp:
(WebCore::isDeletableElement):
* editing/TextIterator.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldEmitNewlinesBeforeAndAfterNode):
* rendering/AutoTableLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldScaleColumns):
* rendering/InlineFlowBox.cpp:
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::addToLine):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInInlineDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::requiresIdeographicBaseline):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::adjustMaxAscentAndDescent):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeLogicalBoxHeights):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::flipLinesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverflow):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverAnnotationAdjustment):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeUnderAnnotationAdjustment):
* rendering/InlineIterator.h:
(WebCore::isIteratorTarget):
* rendering/LayoutState.cpp:
(WebCore::LayoutState::LayoutState):
* rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::MarginInfo::MarginInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::containingColumnsBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::columnsBlockForSpanningElement):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildIgnoringAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::getInlineRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelfCollapsingBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addOverflowFromBlockChildren):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::expandsToEncloseOverhangingFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::handlePositionedChild):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::moveRunInUnderSiblingBlockIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::collapseMargins):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloatsIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::simplifiedNormalFlowLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelectionRoot):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::blockSelectionGaps):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markSiblingsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::isChildHitTestCandidate):
(WebCore::InlineMinMaxIterator::next):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::firstLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::lastLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::updateFirstLetter):
(WebCore::shouldCheckLines):
(WebCore::getHeightForLineCount):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustForBorderFit):
(WebCore::inNormalFlow):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustLinePositionForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustBlockChildForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderBlock.h:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::shouldSkipCreatingRunsForObject):
* rendering/RenderBlockLineLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::setMarginsForRubyRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeInlineDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutInlineChildren):
(WebCore::requiresLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipTrailingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipLeadingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::nextLineBreak):
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::removeFloatingOrPositionedChildFromBlockLists):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::updateBoxModelInfoFromStyle):
(WebCore::RenderBox::offsetFromContainer):
(WebCore::RenderBox::positionLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalWidthInRegion):
(WebCore::RenderBox::renderBoxRegionInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computePercentageLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalWidthUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::percentageLogicalHeightIsResolvable):
* rendering/RenderBox.h:
(WebCore::RenderBox::stretchesToViewport):
(WebCore::RenderBox::isDeprecatedFlexItem):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::adjustedPositionRelativeToOffsetParent):
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::mapAbsoluteToLocalPoint):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::requiresLayer):
* rendering/RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::childDoesNotAffectWidthOrFlexing):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutHorizontalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutVerticalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::renderName):
* rendering/RenderFieldset.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFieldset::findLegend):
* rendering/RenderFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computePreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::autoMarginOffsetInMainAxis):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::availableAlignmentSpaceForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeMainAxisPreferredSizes):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeNextFlexLine):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::resolveFlexibleLengths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::prepareChildForPositionedLayout):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutAndPlaceChildren):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutColumnReverse):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::adjustAlignmentForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::flipForRightToLeftColumn):
* rendering/RenderGrid.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderGrid::renderName):
* rendering/RenderImage.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderImage::computeIntrinsicRatioInformation):
* rendering/RenderInline.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildIgnoringContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::generateCulledLineBoxRects):
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineFirstLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineLastLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineVisualOverflowBoundingBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderInline::dirtyLineBoxes):
* rendering/RenderLayer.cpp:
(WebCore::checkContainingBlockChainForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::updateLayerPosition):
(WebCore::isPositionedContainer):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::calculateClipRects):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::shouldBeNormalFlowOnly):
* rendering/RenderLayerCompositor.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLayerCompositor::requiresCompositingForPosition):
* rendering/RenderLineBoxList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLineBoxList::dirtyLinesFromChangedChild):
* rendering/RenderListItem.cpp:
(WebCore::getParentOfFirstLineBox):
* rendering/RenderMultiColumnBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMultiColumnBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObject::markContainingBlocksForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderObject::setPreferredLogicalWidthsDirty):
(WebCore::RenderObject::invalidateContainerPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderObject::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderObject::offsetParent):
* rendering/RenderObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderObject::isOutOfFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isInFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::hasClip):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned):
* rendering/RenderObjectChildList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObjectChildList::removeChildNode):
* rendering/RenderReplaced.cpp:
(WebCore::hasAutoHeightOrContainingBlockWithAutoHeight):
* rendering/RenderRubyRun.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderRubyRun::rubyText):
* rendering/RenderTable.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderTable::addChild):
(WebCore::RenderTable::computeLogicalWidth):
(WebCore::RenderTable::layout):
* rendering/style/RenderStyle.h:
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isNonRenderViewFixedPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isFixedPositionedContainer):
Source/WebKit2:
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::updateOffsetFromViewportForSelf):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@121123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::UpdateTextureSizeFromTexturePassthrough(
TexturePassthrough* texture,
GLuint client_id) {
if (texture == nullptr) {
return;
}
CheckErrorCallbackState();
GLenum target = texture->target();
TextureTarget internal_texture_type = GLenumToTextureTarget(target);
BoundTexture& bound_texture =
bound_textures_[static_cast<size_t>(internal_texture_type)]
[active_texture_unit_];
bool needs_rebind = bound_texture.texture == texture;
if (needs_rebind) {
glBindTexture(target, texture->service_id());
}
UpdateBoundTexturePassthroughSize(api(), texture);
if (client_id != 0) {
group_->passthrough_discardable_manager()->UpdateTextureSize(
client_id, group_.get(), texture->estimated_size());
}
if (needs_rebind) {
GLuint old_texture =
bound_texture.texture ? bound_texture.texture->service_id() : 0;
glBindTexture(target, old_texture);
}
DCHECK(!CheckErrorCallbackState());
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,845
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void MagickPNGWarningHandler(png_struct *ping,png_const_charp message)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
Image
*image;
PNGErrorInfo
*error_info;
if (LocaleCompare(message, "Missing PLTE before tRNS") == 0)
png_error(ping, message);
error_info=(PNGErrorInfo *) png_get_error_ptr(ping);
image=error_info->image;
exception=error_info->exception;
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" libpng-%s warning: %s", png_get_libpng_ver(NULL),message);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CoderWarning,
message,"`%s'",image->filename);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/58
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 63,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderMessageFilter::OnOpenChannelToPlugin(int routing_id,
const GURL& url,
const GURL& policy_url,
const std::string& mime_type,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
OpenChannelToNpapiPluginCallback* client =
new OpenChannelToNpapiPluginCallback(this, resource_context_, reply_msg);
DCHECK(!ContainsKey(plugin_host_clients_, client));
plugin_host_clients_.insert(client);
plugin_service_->OpenChannelToNpapiPlugin(
render_process_id_, routing_id,
url, policy_url, mime_type, client);
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 116,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetExternalBrowserPpapiHost(
int plugin_process_id) {
BrowserChildProcessHostIterator iter(content::PROCESS_TYPE_NACL_LOADER);
while (!iter.Done()) {
NaClProcessHost* host = static_cast<NaClProcessHost*>(iter.GetDelegate());
if (host->process() &&
host->process()->GetData().id == plugin_process_id) {
return host->browser_ppapi_host();
}
++iter;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,753
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tm_tar_active(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset)
{
if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_TM))
return -ENODEV;
if (MSR_TM_ACTIVE(target->thread.regs->msr))
return regset->n;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 84,833
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ahci_dma_reset(IDEDMA *dma)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,765
|
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