instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandler::OnConnectionChange(
webrtc::PeerConnectionInterface::PeerConnectionState new_state) {
DCHECK(task_runner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
if (!is_closed_)
client_->DidChangePeerConnectionState(new_state);
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,970
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void unlink1_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
int status = urb->status;
/* we "know" -EPIPE (stall) never happens */
if (!status)
status = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (status) {
urb->status = status;
complete(urb->context);
}
}
Commit Message: usb: usbtest: fix NULL pointer dereference
If the usbtest driver encounters a device with an IN bulk endpoint but
no OUT bulk endpoint, it will try to dereference a NULL pointer
(out->desc.bEndpointAddress). The problem can be solved by adding a
missing test.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 59,874
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GestureSequence::PinchEnd(const TouchEvent& event,
const GesturePoint& point, Gestures* gestures) {
DCHECK(state_ == GS_PINCH);
float distance = points_[0].Distance(points_[1]);
AppendPinchGestureEnd(points_[0], points_[1],
distance / pinch_distance_start_, gestures);
pinch_distance_start_ = 0;
pinch_distance_current_ = 0;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 108,750
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void vbe_ioport_write_data(void *opaque, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val)
{
VGACommonState *s = opaque;
if (s->vbe_index <= VBE_DISPI_INDEX_NB) {
trace_vga_vbe_write(s->vbe_index, val);
switch(s->vbe_index) {
case VBE_DISPI_INDEX_ID:
if (val == VBE_DISPI_ID0 ||
val == VBE_DISPI_ID1 ||
val == VBE_DISPI_ID2 ||
val == VBE_DISPI_ID3 ||
val == VBE_DISPI_ID4) {
s->vbe_regs[s->vbe_index] = val;
}
break;
case VBE_DISPI_INDEX_XRES:
case VBE_DISPI_INDEX_YRES:
case VBE_DISPI_INDEX_BPP:
case VBE_DISPI_INDEX_VIRT_WIDTH:
case VBE_DISPI_INDEX_X_OFFSET:
case VBE_DISPI_INDEX_Y_OFFSET:
s->vbe_regs[s->vbe_index] = val;
vbe_fixup_regs(s);
vbe_update_vgaregs(s);
break;
case VBE_DISPI_INDEX_BANK:
val &= s->vbe_bank_mask;
s->vbe_regs[s->vbe_index] = val;
s->bank_offset = (val << 16);
vga_update_memory_access(s);
break;
case VBE_DISPI_INDEX_ENABLE:
if ((val & VBE_DISPI_ENABLED) &&
!(s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_ENABLE] & VBE_DISPI_ENABLED)) {
s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_VIRT_WIDTH] = 0;
s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_X_OFFSET] = 0;
s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_Y_OFFSET] = 0;
s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_ENABLE] |= VBE_DISPI_ENABLED;
vbe_fixup_regs(s);
vbe_update_vgaregs(s);
/* clear the screen */
if (!(val & VBE_DISPI_NOCLEARMEM)) {
memset(s->vram_ptr, 0,
s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_YRES] * s->vbe_line_offset);
}
} else {
s->bank_offset = 0;
}
s->dac_8bit = (val & VBE_DISPI_8BIT_DAC) > 0;
s->vbe_regs[s->vbe_index] = val;
vga_update_memory_access(s);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 2,993
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: iperf_get_test_burst(struct iperf_test *ipt)
{
return ipt->settings->burst;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 53,379
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLInputElement::rangeOverflow() const
{
return willValidate() && m_inputType->rangeOverflow(value());
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 112,966
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ShellWindowViews::ViewHierarchyChanged(
bool is_add, views::View *parent, views::View *child) {
if (is_add && child == this) {
web_view_ = new views::WebView(NULL);
AddChildView(web_view_);
web_view_->SetWebContents(web_contents());
}
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 103,198
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void user_ta_ctx_destroy(struct tee_ta_ctx *ctx)
{
free_utc(to_user_ta_ctx(ctx));
}
Commit Message: core: clear the entire TA area
Previously we cleared (memset to zero) the size corresponding to code
and data segments, however the allocation for the TA is made on the
granularity of the memory pool, meaning that we did not clear all memory
and because of that we could potentially leak code and data of a
previous loaded TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0006: "Potential disclosure of previously loaded TA
code and data"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Suggested-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 86,956
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hid_parser_reserved(struct hid_parser *parser, struct hid_item *item)
{
dbg_hid("reserved item type, tag 0x%x\n", item->tag);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings
Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of
out-of-bound readings.
The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do
not have enough fields to fit the incoming values.
Add checks and silence KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 49,511
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int CLASS nikon_is_compressed()
{
uchar test[256];
int i;
fseek (ifp, data_offset, SEEK_SET);
fread (test, 1, 256, ifp);
for (i=15; i < 256; i+=16)
if (test[i]) return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 43,328
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void StopCapture() {
base::RunLoop run_loop;
EXPECT_CALL(*this, OnStateChanged(media::mojom::VideoCaptureState::STOPPED))
.WillOnce(ExitMessageLoop(task_runner_, run_loop.QuitClosure()));
host_->Stop(kDeviceId);
run_loop.Run();
EXPECT_TRUE(host_->controllers_.empty());
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,279
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PermissionsData::IsRuntimeBlockedHostUnsafe(const GURL& url) const {
runtime_lock_.AssertAcquired();
return PolicyBlockedHostsUnsafe().MatchesURL(url) &&
!PolicyAllowedHostsUnsafe().MatchesURL(url);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,692
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
size_t i;
if (minor_status == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
*minor_status = 0;
if (desired_object == GSS_C_NO_OID)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ;
if (data_set == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
*data_set = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established)
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops)/
sizeof(krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[0]); i++) {
if (g_OID_prefix_equal(desired_object, &krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[i].oid)) {
return (*krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[i].func)(minor_status,
context_handle,
desired_object,
data_set);
}
}
*minor_status = EINVAL;
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
}
Commit Message: Fix IAKERB context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2696]
The IAKERB mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
krb5 mechanism handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the IAKERB context structure after context
establishment and add new IAKERB entry points to refer to it with that
type. Add initiate and established flags to the IAKERB context
structure for use in gss_inquire_context() prior to context
establishment.
CVE-2015-2696:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established IAKERB context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. Java server applications using the
native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this bug. A carefully crafted
IAKERB packet might allow the gss_inquire_context() call to succeed
with attacker-determined results, but applications should not make
access control decisions based on gss_inquire_context() results prior
to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-18
| 0
| 43,809
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: isis_print_extd_ip_reach(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *tptr, const char *ident, uint16_t afi)
{
char ident_buffer[20];
uint8_t prefix[sizeof(struct in6_addr)]; /* shared copy buffer for IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes */
u_int metric, status_byte, bit_length, byte_length, sublen, processed, subtlvtype, subtlvlen;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, 4))
return (0);
metric = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
processed=4;
tptr+=4;
if (afi == AF_INET) {
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, 1)) /* fetch status byte */
return (0);
status_byte=*(tptr++);
bit_length = status_byte&0x3f;
if (bit_length > 32) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sIPv4 prefix: bad bit length %u",
ident,
bit_length));
return (0);
}
processed++;
} else if (afi == AF_INET6) {
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, 2)) /* fetch status & prefix_len byte */
return (0);
status_byte=*(tptr++);
bit_length=*(tptr++);
if (bit_length > 128) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sIPv6 prefix: bad bit length %u",
ident,
bit_length));
return (0);
}
processed+=2;
} else
return (0); /* somebody is fooling us */
byte_length = (bit_length + 7) / 8; /* prefix has variable length encoding */
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, byte_length))
return (0);
memset(prefix, 0, sizeof prefix); /* clear the copy buffer */
memcpy(prefix,tptr,byte_length); /* copy as much as is stored in the TLV */
tptr+=byte_length;
processed+=byte_length;
if (afi == AF_INET)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sIPv4 prefix: %15s/%u",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, prefix),
bit_length));
else if (afi == AF_INET6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sIPv6 prefix: %s/%u",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, prefix),
bit_length));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Distribution: %s, Metric: %u",
ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP_UPDOWN(status_byte) ? "down" : "up",
metric));
if (afi == AF_INET && ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP_SUBTLV(status_byte))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", sub-TLVs present"));
else if (afi == AF_INET6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s%s",
ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP6_IE(status_byte) ? "External" : "Internal",
ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP6_SUBTLV(status_byte) ? ", sub-TLVs present" : ""));
if ((afi == AF_INET && ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP_SUBTLV(status_byte))
|| (afi == AF_INET6 && ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP6_SUBTLV(status_byte))
) {
/* assume that one prefix can hold more
than one subTLV - therefore the first byte must reflect
the aggregate bytecount of the subTLVs for this prefix
*/
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, 1))
return (0);
sublen=*(tptr++);
processed+=sublen+1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%u)", sublen)); /* print out subTLV length */
while (sublen>0) {
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr,2))
return (0);
subtlvtype=*(tptr++);
subtlvlen=*(tptr++);
/* prepend the indent string */
snprintf(ident_buffer, sizeof(ident_buffer), "%s ",ident);
if (!isis_print_ip_reach_subtlv(ndo, tptr, subtlvtype, subtlvlen, ident_buffer))
return(0);
tptr+=subtlvlen;
sublen-=(subtlvlen+2);
}
}
return (processed);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13055/IS-IS: fix an Extended IS Reachability sub-TLV
In isis_print_is_reach_subtlv() one of the case blocks did not check that
the sub-TLV "V" is actually present and could over-read the input buffer.
Add a length check to fix that and remove a useless boundary check from
a loop because the boundary is tested for the full length of "V" before
the switch block.
Update one of the prior test cases as it turns out it depended on this
previously incorrect code path to make it to its own malformed structure
further down the buffer, the bugfix has changed its output.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 62,220
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool access_gic_sre(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct sys_reg_params *p,
const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
{
if (p->is_write)
return ignore_write(vcpu, p);
p->regval = vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3.vgic_sre;
return true;
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 62,863
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int jas_stream_pad(jas_stream_t *stream, int n, int c)
{
int m;
m = n;
for (m = n; m > 0; --m) {
if (jas_stream_putc(stream, c) == EOF)
return n - m;
}
return n;
}
Commit Message: Made some changes to the I/O stream library for memory streams.
There were a number of potential problems due to the possibility
of integer overflow.
Changed some integral types to the larger types size_t or ssize_t.
For example, the function mem_resize now takes the buffer size parameter
as a size_t.
Added a new function jas_stream_memopen2, which takes a
buffer size specified as a size_t instead of an int.
This can be used in jas_image_cmpt_create to avoid potential
overflow problems.
Added a new function jas_deprecated to warn about reliance on
deprecated library behavior.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 168,746
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void camellia_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
struct camellia_sparc64_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
camellia_sparc64_crypt(&ctx->decrypt_key[0],
(const u32 *) src,
(u32 *) dst, ctx->key_len);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: disp_srchresult(int result, char *prompt, char *str)
{
if (str == NULL)
str = "";
if (result & SR_NOTFOUND)
disp_message(Sprintf("Not found: %s", str)->ptr, TRUE);
else if (result & SR_WRAPPED)
disp_message(Sprintf("Search wrapped: %s", str)->ptr, TRUE);
else if (show_srch_str)
disp_message(Sprintf("%s%s", prompt, str)->ptr, TRUE);
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 84,485
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ImageCapture::ContextDestroyed(ExecutionContext*) {
RemoveAllEventListeners();
service_requests_.clear();
DCHECK(!HasEventListeners());
}
Commit Message: Convert MediaTrackConstraints to a ScriptValue
IDLDictionaries such as MediaTrackConstraints should not be stored on
the heap which would happen when binding one as a parameter to a
callback. This change converts the object to a ScriptValue ahead of
time. This is fine because the value will be passed to a
ScriptPromiseResolver that will converted it to a V8 value if it
isn't already.
Bug: 759457
Change-Id: I3009a0f7711cc264aeaae07a36c18a6db8c915c8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/701358
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507177}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 151,082
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NewTabObserver::Observe(int type,
const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
DCHECK_EQ(chrome::NOTIFICATION_TAB_PARENTED, type);
NavigationController* controller =
&(content::Source<content::WebContents>(source).ptr()->GetController());
if (automation_) {
if (!use_json_interface_)
AutomationMsg_WindowExecuteCommand::WriteReplyParams(reply_message_.get(),
true);
new NavigationNotificationObserver(controller, automation_,
reply_message_.release(),
1, false, use_json_interface_);
}
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,587
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::Print(WebKit::WebFrame* frame,
const WebKit::WebNode& node) {
if (print_web_view_)
return;
scoped_ptr<PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint> prepare;
if (!InitPrintSettingsAndPrepareFrame(frame, node, &prepare)) {
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT_INIT);
return; // Failed to init print page settings.
}
int expected_page_count = 0;
bool use_browser_overlays = true;
expected_page_count = prepare->GetExpectedPageCount();
if (expected_page_count)
use_browser_overlays = prepare->ShouldUseBrowserOverlays();
prepare.reset();
if (!expected_page_count) {
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
return;
}
if (!GetPrintSettingsFromUser(frame, node, expected_page_count,
use_browser_overlays)) {
DidFinishPrinting(OK); // Release resources and fail silently.
return;
}
if (!RenderPagesForPrint(frame, node)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RenderPagesForPrint failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
}
ResetScriptedPrintCount();
}
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 102,583
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: do_save_yourself (GsmXSMPClient *client,
int save_type,
gboolean allow_interact)
{
g_assert (client->priv->conn != NULL);
if (client->priv->next_save_yourself != -1) {
/* Either we're currently doing a shutdown and there's a checkpoint
* queued after it, or vice versa. Either way, the new SaveYourself
* is redundant.
*/
g_debug ("GsmXSMPClient: skipping redundant SaveYourself for '%s'",
client->priv->description);
} else if (client->priv->current_save_yourself != -1) {
g_debug ("GsmXSMPClient: queuing new SaveYourself for '%s'",
client->priv->description);
client->priv->next_save_yourself = save_type;
client->priv->next_save_yourself_allow_interact = allow_interact;
} else {
client->priv->current_save_yourself = save_type;
/* make sure we don't have anything queued */
client->priv->next_save_yourself = -1;
client->priv->next_save_yourself_allow_interact = FALSE;
switch (save_type) {
case SmSaveLocal:
/* Save state */
SmsSaveYourself (client->priv->conn,
SmSaveLocal,
FALSE,
SmInteractStyleNone,
FALSE);
break;
default:
/* Logout */
if (!allow_interact) {
SmsSaveYourself (client->priv->conn,
save_type, /* save type */
TRUE, /* shutdown */
SmInteractStyleNone, /* interact style */
TRUE); /* fast */
} else {
SmsSaveYourself (client->priv->conn,
save_type, /* save type */
TRUE, /* shutdown */
SmInteractStyleAny, /* interact style */
FALSE /* fast */);
}
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: [gsm] Delay the creation of the GsmXSMPClient until it really exists
We used to create the GsmXSMPClient before the XSMP connection is really
accepted. This can lead to some issues, though. An example is:
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211#c19. Quoting:
"What is happening is that a new client (probably metacity in your
case) is opening an ICE connection in the GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_END_SESSION
phase, which causes a new GsmXSMPClient to be added to the client
store. The GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_EXIT phase then begins before the client
has had a chance to establish a xsmp connection, which means that
client->priv->conn will not be initialized at the point that xsmp_stop
is called on the new unregistered client."
The fix is to create the GsmXSMPClient object when there's a real XSMP
connection. This implies moving the timeout that makes sure we don't
have an empty client to the XSMP server.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 63,559
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __tg3_set_coalesce(struct tg3 *tp, struct ethtool_coalesce *ec)
{
tg3_coal_tx_init(tp, ec);
tg3_coal_rx_init(tp, ec);
if (!tg3_flag(tp, 5705_PLUS)) {
u32 val = ec->stats_block_coalesce_usecs;
tw32(HOSTCC_RXCOAL_TICK_INT, ec->rx_coalesce_usecs_irq);
tw32(HOSTCC_TXCOAL_TICK_INT, ec->tx_coalesce_usecs_irq);
if (!tp->link_up)
val = 0;
tw32(HOSTCC_STAT_COAL_TICKS, val);
}
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,476
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: scoped_refptr<base::MessageLoopProxy> RenderThreadImpl::GetIOLoopProxy() {
return ChildProcess::current()->io_message_loop_proxy();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RendererSchedulerImpl::UnregisterTimeDomain(TimeDomain* time_domain) {
helper_.UnregisterTimeDomain(time_domain);
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 143,486
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void rfc_send_fcoff(tRFC_MCB* p_mcb, bool is_command) {
uint8_t* p_data;
BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(RFCOMM_CMD_BUF_SIZE);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET + RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN;
p_data = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + p_buf->offset;
*p_data++ = RFCOMM_EA | RFCOMM_I_CR(is_command) | RFCOMM_MX_FCOFF;
*p_data++ = RFCOMM_EA | (RFCOMM_MX_FCOFF_LEN << 1);
/* Total length is sizeof FCOFF data + mx header 2 */
p_buf->len = RFCOMM_MX_FCOFF_LEN + 2;
rfc_send_buf_uih(p_mcb, RFCOMM_MX_DLCI, p_buf);
}
Commit Message: Check remaining frame length in rfc_process_mx_message
Bug: 111936792
Bug: 80432928
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ie2c09f3d598fb230ce060c9043f5a88c241cdd79
(cherry picked from commit 0471355c8b035aaa2ce07a33eecad60ad49c5ad0)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 162,913
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static vpx_codec_err_t init_decoder(vpx_codec_alg_priv_t *ctx) {
int i;
const VPxWorkerInterface *const winterface = vpx_get_worker_interface();
ctx->last_show_frame = -1;
ctx->next_submit_worker_id = 0;
ctx->last_submit_worker_id = 0;
ctx->next_output_worker_id = 0;
ctx->frame_cache_read = 0;
ctx->frame_cache_write = 0;
ctx->num_cache_frames = 0;
ctx->need_resync = 1;
ctx->num_frame_workers =
(ctx->frame_parallel_decode == 1) ? ctx->cfg.threads: 1;
if (ctx->num_frame_workers > MAX_DECODE_THREADS)
ctx->num_frame_workers = MAX_DECODE_THREADS;
ctx->available_threads = ctx->num_frame_workers;
ctx->flushed = 0;
ctx->buffer_pool = (BufferPool *)vpx_calloc(1, sizeof(BufferPool));
if (ctx->buffer_pool == NULL)
return VPX_CODEC_MEM_ERROR;
#if CONFIG_MULTITHREAD
if (pthread_mutex_init(&ctx->buffer_pool->pool_mutex, NULL)) {
set_error_detail(ctx, "Failed to allocate buffer pool mutex");
return VPX_CODEC_MEM_ERROR;
}
#endif
ctx->frame_workers = (VPxWorker *)
vpx_malloc(ctx->num_frame_workers * sizeof(*ctx->frame_workers));
if (ctx->frame_workers == NULL) {
set_error_detail(ctx, "Failed to allocate frame_workers");
return VPX_CODEC_MEM_ERROR;
}
for (i = 0; i < ctx->num_frame_workers; ++i) {
VPxWorker *const worker = &ctx->frame_workers[i];
FrameWorkerData *frame_worker_data = NULL;
winterface->init(worker);
worker->data1 = vpx_memalign(32, sizeof(FrameWorkerData));
if (worker->data1 == NULL) {
set_error_detail(ctx, "Failed to allocate frame_worker_data");
return VPX_CODEC_MEM_ERROR;
}
frame_worker_data = (FrameWorkerData *)worker->data1;
frame_worker_data->pbi = vp9_decoder_create(ctx->buffer_pool);
if (frame_worker_data->pbi == NULL) {
set_error_detail(ctx, "Failed to allocate frame_worker_data");
return VPX_CODEC_MEM_ERROR;
}
frame_worker_data->pbi->frame_worker_owner = worker;
frame_worker_data->worker_id = i;
frame_worker_data->scratch_buffer = NULL;
frame_worker_data->scratch_buffer_size = 0;
frame_worker_data->frame_context_ready = 0;
frame_worker_data->received_frame = 0;
#if CONFIG_MULTITHREAD
if (pthread_mutex_init(&frame_worker_data->stats_mutex, NULL)) {
set_error_detail(ctx, "Failed to allocate frame_worker_data mutex");
return VPX_CODEC_MEM_ERROR;
}
if (pthread_cond_init(&frame_worker_data->stats_cond, NULL)) {
set_error_detail(ctx, "Failed to allocate frame_worker_data cond");
return VPX_CODEC_MEM_ERROR;
}
#endif
frame_worker_data->pbi->max_threads =
(ctx->frame_parallel_decode == 0) ? ctx->cfg.threads : 0;
frame_worker_data->pbi->inv_tile_order = ctx->invert_tile_order;
frame_worker_data->pbi->frame_parallel_decode = ctx->frame_parallel_decode;
frame_worker_data->pbi->common.frame_parallel_decode =
ctx->frame_parallel_decode;
worker->hook = (VPxWorkerHook)frame_worker_hook;
if (!winterface->reset(worker)) {
set_error_detail(ctx, "Frame Worker thread creation failed");
return VPX_CODEC_MEM_ERROR;
}
}
if (!ctx->postproc_cfg_set &&
(ctx->base.init_flags & VPX_CODEC_USE_POSTPROC))
set_default_ppflags(&ctx->postproc_cfg);
init_buffer_callbacks(ctx);
return VPX_CODEC_OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE | libvpx: cherry-pick aa1c813 from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp9: Fix potential SEGV in decoder_peek_si_internal
decoder_peek_si_internal could potentially read more bytes than
what actually exists in the input buffer. We check for the buffer
size to be at least 8, but we try to read up to 10 bytes in the
worst case. A well crafted file could thus cause a segfault.
Likely change that introduced this bug was:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/#/c/70439 (git hash:
7c43fb6)
Bug: 30013856
Change-Id: If556414cb5b82472d5673e045bc185cc57bb9af3
(cherry picked from commit bd57d587c2eb743c61b049add18f9fd72bf78c33)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 158,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dev_unicast_init(struct net_device *dev)
{
__hw_addr_init(&dev->uc);
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,151
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::Rect Textfield::GetCaretBounds() const {
gfx::Rect rect = GetRenderText()->GetUpdatedCursorBounds();
ConvertRectToScreen(this, &rect);
return rect;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,316
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err ipro_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_ItemProtectionBox *p = (GF_ItemProtectionBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "ItemProtectionBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
gf_isom_box_array_dump(p->protection_information, trace);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("ItemProtectionBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,773
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AuthenticatorBleActivateSheetModel::IsActivityIndicatorVisible() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLAnchorElement::canStartSelection() const
{
if (!isLink())
return HTMLElement::canStartSelection();
return hasEditableStyle();
}
Commit Message: Disable frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach in FrameLoader::startLoad
BUG=613266
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2006033002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#396241}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,644
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ipip6_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *dev)
{
struct ip_tunnel *tunnel = netdev_priv(dev);
struct ip_tunnel_parm *parm = &tunnel->parms;
if (nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_IPTUN_LINK, parm->link) ||
nla_put_in_addr(skb, IFLA_IPTUN_LOCAL, parm->iph.saddr) ||
nla_put_in_addr(skb, IFLA_IPTUN_REMOTE, parm->iph.daddr) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_IPTUN_TTL, parm->iph.ttl) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_IPTUN_TOS, parm->iph.tos) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_IPTUN_PMTUDISC,
!!(parm->iph.frag_off & htons(IP_DF))) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_IPTUN_PROTO, parm->iph.protocol) ||
nla_put_be16(skb, IFLA_IPTUN_FLAGS, parm->i_flags) ||
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_IPTUN_FWMARK, tunnel->fwmark))
goto nla_put_failure;
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SIT_6RD
if (nla_put_in6_addr(skb, IFLA_IPTUN_6RD_PREFIX,
&tunnel->ip6rd.prefix) ||
nla_put_in_addr(skb, IFLA_IPTUN_6RD_RELAY_PREFIX,
tunnel->ip6rd.relay_prefix) ||
nla_put_u16(skb, IFLA_IPTUN_6RD_PREFIXLEN,
tunnel->ip6rd.prefixlen) ||
nla_put_u16(skb, IFLA_IPTUN_6RD_RELAY_PREFIXLEN,
tunnel->ip6rd.relay_prefixlen))
goto nla_put_failure;
#endif
if (nla_put_u16(skb, IFLA_IPTUN_ENCAP_TYPE,
tunnel->encap.type) ||
nla_put_be16(skb, IFLA_IPTUN_ENCAP_SPORT,
tunnel->encap.sport) ||
nla_put_be16(skb, IFLA_IPTUN_ENCAP_DPORT,
tunnel->encap.dport) ||
nla_put_u16(skb, IFLA_IPTUN_ENCAP_FLAGS,
tunnel->encap.flags))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: net: sit: fix memory leak in sit_init_net()
If register_netdev() is failed to register sitn->fb_tunnel_dev,
it will go to err_reg_dev and forget to free netdev(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev).
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888378daad00 (size 512):
comm "syz-executor.1", pid 4006, jiffies 4295121142 (age 16.115s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 e6 ed c0 83 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:577 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:585 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] netif_alloc_netdev_queues net/core/dev.c:8380 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x600/0xcc0 net/core/dev.c:8970
[<00000000867e172f>] sit_init_net+0x295/0xa40 net/ipv6/sit.c:1848
[<00000000871019fa>] ops_init+0xad/0x3e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:129
[<00000000319507f6>] setup_net+0x2ba/0x690 net/core/net_namespace.c:314
[<0000000087db4f96>] copy_net_ns+0x1dc/0x330 net/core/net_namespace.c:437
[<0000000057efc651>] create_new_namespaces+0x382/0x730 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
[<00000000676f83de>] copy_namespaces+0x2ed/0x3d0 kernel/nsproxy.c:165
[<0000000030b74bac>] copy_process.part.27+0x231e/0x6db0 kernel/fork.c:1919
[<00000000fff78746>] copy_process kernel/fork.c:1713 [inline]
[<00000000fff78746>] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xe90 kernel/fork.c:2224
[<000000001c2e0d1c>] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000ec48bd44>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<0000000039acff8a>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 87,693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfc_llcp_send_i_frame(struct nfc_llcp_sock *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sk_buff *pdu;
struct sock *sk = &sock->sk;
struct nfc_llcp_local *local;
size_t frag_len = 0, remaining_len;
u8 *msg_data, *msg_ptr;
u16 remote_miu;
pr_debug("Send I frame len %zd\n", len);
local = sock->local;
if (local == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
/* Remote is ready but has not acknowledged our frames */
if((sock->remote_ready &&
skb_queue_len(&sock->tx_pending_queue) >= sock->remote_rw &&
skb_queue_len(&sock->tx_queue) >= 2 * sock->remote_rw)) {
pr_err("Pending queue is full %d frames\n",
skb_queue_len(&sock->tx_pending_queue));
return -ENOBUFS;
}
/* Remote is not ready and we've been queueing enough frames */
if ((!sock->remote_ready &&
skb_queue_len(&sock->tx_queue) >= 2 * sock->remote_rw)) {
pr_err("Tx queue is full %d frames\n",
skb_queue_len(&sock->tx_queue));
return -ENOBUFS;
}
msg_data = kmalloc(len, GFP_USER | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (msg_data == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (memcpy_from_msg(msg_data, msg, len)) {
kfree(msg_data);
return -EFAULT;
}
remaining_len = len;
msg_ptr = msg_data;
do {
remote_miu = sock->remote_miu > LLCP_MAX_MIU ?
LLCP_DEFAULT_MIU : sock->remote_miu;
frag_len = min_t(size_t, remote_miu, remaining_len);
pr_debug("Fragment %zd bytes remaining %zd",
frag_len, remaining_len);
pdu = llcp_allocate_pdu(sock, LLCP_PDU_I,
frag_len + LLCP_SEQUENCE_SIZE);
if (pdu == NULL) {
kfree(msg_data);
return -ENOMEM;
}
skb_put(pdu, LLCP_SEQUENCE_SIZE);
if (likely(frag_len > 0))
skb_put_data(pdu, msg_ptr, frag_len);
skb_queue_tail(&sock->tx_queue, pdu);
lock_sock(sk);
nfc_llcp_queue_i_frames(sock);
release_sock(sk);
remaining_len -= frag_len;
msg_ptr += frag_len;
} while (remaining_len > 0);
kfree(msg_data);
return len;
}
Commit Message: net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,679
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void bar_release(struct pci_dev *dev, int offset, void *data)
{
kfree(data);
}
Commit Message: xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register
Otherwise the guest can abuse that control to cause e.g. PCIe
Unsupported Request responses by disabling memory and/or I/O decoding
and subsequently causing (CPU side) accesses to the respective address
ranges, which (depending on system configuration) may be fatal to the
host.
Note that to alter any of the bits collected together as
PCI_COMMAND_GUEST permissive mode is now required to be enabled
globally or on the specific device.
This is CVE-2015-2150 / XSA-120.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 43,960
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline ssize_t EdgeY(const ssize_t y,const size_t rows)
{
if (y < 0L)
return(0L);
if (y >= (ssize_t) rows)
return((ssize_t) (rows-1));
return(y);
}
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=28946
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 73,457
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SendConnSetup(ClientPtr client, const char *reason)
{
xWindowRoot *root;
int i;
int numScreens;
char *lConnectionInfo;
xConnSetupPrefix *lconnSetupPrefix;
if (reason) {
xConnSetupPrefix csp;
csp.success = xFalse;
csp.lengthReason = strlen(reason);
csp.length = bytes_to_int32(csp.lengthReason);
csp.majorVersion = X_PROTOCOL;
csp.minorVersion = X_PROTOCOL_REVISION;
if (client->swapped)
WriteSConnSetupPrefix(client, &csp);
else
WriteToClient(client, sz_xConnSetupPrefix, &csp);
WriteToClient(client, (int) csp.lengthReason, reason);
return client->noClientException = -1;
}
numScreens = screenInfo.numScreens;
lConnectionInfo = ConnectionInfo;
lconnSetupPrefix = &connSetupPrefix;
/* We're about to start speaking X protocol back to the client by
* sending the connection setup info. This means the authorization
* step is complete, and we can count the client as an
* authorized one.
*/
nClients++;
client->requestVector = client->swapped ? SwappedProcVector : ProcVector;
client->sequence = 0;
((xConnSetup *) lConnectionInfo)->ridBase = client->clientAsMask;
((xConnSetup *) lConnectionInfo)->ridMask = RESOURCE_ID_MASK;
#ifdef MATCH_CLIENT_ENDIAN
((xConnSetup *) lConnectionInfo)->imageByteOrder = ClientOrder(client);
((xConnSetup *) lConnectionInfo)->bitmapBitOrder = ClientOrder(client);
#endif
/* fill in the "currentInputMask" */
root = (xWindowRoot *) (lConnectionInfo + connBlockScreenStart);
#ifdef PANORAMIX
if (noPanoramiXExtension)
numScreens = screenInfo.numScreens;
else
numScreens = ((xConnSetup *) ConnectionInfo)->numRoots;
#endif
for (i = 0; i < numScreens; i++) {
unsigned int j;
xDepth *pDepth;
WindowPtr pRoot = screenInfo.screens[i]->root;
root->currentInputMask = pRoot->eventMask | wOtherEventMasks(pRoot);
pDepth = (xDepth *) (root + 1);
for (j = 0; j < root->nDepths; j++) {
pDepth = (xDepth *) (((char *) (pDepth + 1)) +
pDepth->nVisuals * sizeof(xVisualType));
}
root = (xWindowRoot *) pDepth;
}
if (client->swapped) {
WriteSConnSetupPrefix(client, lconnSetupPrefix);
WriteSConnectionInfo(client,
(unsigned long) (lconnSetupPrefix->length << 2),
lConnectionInfo);
}
else {
WriteToClient(client, sizeof(xConnSetupPrefix), lconnSetupPrefix);
WriteToClient(client, (int) (lconnSetupPrefix->length << 2),
lConnectionInfo);
}
client->clientState = ClientStateRunning;
if (ClientStateCallback) {
NewClientInfoRec clientinfo;
clientinfo.client = client;
clientinfo.prefix = lconnSetupPrefix;
clientinfo.setup = (xConnSetup *) lConnectionInfo;
CallCallbacks((&ClientStateCallback), (void *) &clientinfo);
}
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 15,026
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void build_l4proto_icmp(const struct nf_conntrack *ct, struct nethdr *n)
{
ct_build_u8(ct, ATTR_ICMP_TYPE, n, NTA_ICMP_TYPE);
ct_build_u8(ct, ATTR_ICMP_CODE, n, NTA_ICMP_CODE);
ct_build_u16(ct, ATTR_ICMP_ID, n, NTA_ICMP_ID);
ct_build_group(ct, ATTR_GRP_ORIG_PORT, n, NTA_PORT,
sizeof(struct nfct_attr_grp_port));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 1
| 164,630
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int imap_delete_mailbox(struct Context *ctx, struct ImapMbox *mx)
{
char buf[PATH_MAX], mbox[PATH_MAX];
struct ImapData *idata = NULL;
if (!ctx || !ctx->data)
{
idata = imap_conn_find(&mx->account, ImapPassive ? MUTT_IMAP_CONN_NONEW : 0);
if (!idata)
{
FREE(&mx->mbox);
return -1;
}
}
else
{
idata = ctx->data;
}
imap_munge_mbox_name(idata, mbox, sizeof(mbox), mx->mbox);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "DELETE %s", mbox);
if (imap_exec(idata, buf, 0) != 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77
| 0
| 79,587
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int GetZoomPercent(const content::WebContents* contents,
bool* enable_plus,
bool* enable_minus) {
int percent =
zoom::ZoomController::FromWebContents(contents)->GetZoomPercent();
*enable_plus = percent < contents->GetMaximumZoomPercent();
*enable_minus = percent > contents->GetMinimumZoomPercent();
return percent;
}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fbCombineAddC (CARD32 *dest, CARD32 *src, CARD32 *mask, int width)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < width; ++i) {
CARD32 s = READ(src + i);
CARD32 m = READ(mask + i);
CARD32 d = READ(dest + i);
fbCombineMaskValueC (&s, &m);
FbByteAdd(d, s);
WRITE(dest + i, d);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 11,329
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::SetBlackTextureForNonRenderableTextures() {
DCHECK(current_program_);
if (!texture_manager()->HaveUnrenderableTextures()) {
return false;
}
bool textures_set = false;
const ProgramManager::ProgramInfo::SamplerIndices& sampler_indices =
current_program_->sampler_indices();
for (size_t ii = 0; ii < sampler_indices.size(); ++ii) {
const ProgramManager::ProgramInfo::UniformInfo* uniform_info =
current_program_->GetUniformInfo(sampler_indices[ii]);
DCHECK(uniform_info);
for (size_t jj = 0; jj < uniform_info->texture_units.size(); ++jj) {
GLuint texture_unit_index = uniform_info->texture_units[jj];
if (texture_unit_index < group_->max_texture_units()) {
TextureUnit& texture_unit = texture_units_[texture_unit_index];
TextureManager::TextureInfo* texture_info =
texture_unit.GetInfoForSamplerType(uniform_info->type);
if (!texture_info || !texture_manager()->CanRender(texture_info)) {
textures_set = true;
glActiveTexture(GL_TEXTURE0 + texture_unit_index);
glBindTexture(
GetBindTargetForSamplerType(uniform_info->type),
texture_manager()->black_texture_id(uniform_info->type));
}
}
}
}
return textures_set;
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,032
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void mmput(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
might_sleep();
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mm->mm_users)) {
uprobe_clear_state(mm);
exit_aio(mm);
ksm_exit(mm);
khugepaged_exit(mm); /* must run before exit_mmap */
exit_mmap(mm);
set_mm_exe_file(mm, NULL);
if (!list_empty(&mm->mmlist)) {
spin_lock(&mmlist_lock);
list_del(&mm->mmlist);
spin_unlock(&mmlist_lock);
}
if (mm->binfmt)
module_put(mm->binfmt->module);
mmdrop(mm);
}
}
Commit Message: userns: Don't allow CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_FS
Don't allowing sharing the root directory with processes in a
different user namespace. There doesn't seem to be any point, and to
allow it would require the overhead of putting a user namespace
reference in fs_struct (for permission checks) and incrementing that
reference count on practically every call to fork.
So just perform the inexpensive test of forbidding sharing fs_struct
acrosss processes in different user namespaces. We already disallow
other forms of threading when unsharing a user namespace so this
should be no real burden in practice.
This updates setns, clone, and unshare to disallow multiple user
namespaces sharing an fs_struct.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 32,893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit ClientControlledWindowStateDelegate(
ClientControlledShellSurface* shell_surface,
ash::wm::ClientControlledState::Delegate* delegate)
: shell_surface_(shell_surface), delegate_(delegate) {}
Commit Message: Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 137,676
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_resync_write(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
memcpy(rl->write_sequence, rl->read_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,685
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void php_zip_object_free_storage(void *object TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
ze_zip_object * intern = (ze_zip_object *) object;
int i;
if (!intern) {
return;
}
if (intern->za) {
if (zip_close(intern->za) != 0) {
_zip_free(intern->za);
}
intern->za = NULL;
}
if (intern->buffers_cnt>0) {
for (i=0; i<intern->buffers_cnt; i++) {
efree(intern->buffers[i]);
}
efree(intern->buffers);
}
intern->za = NULL;
#if (PHP_MAJOR_VERSION == 5 && PHP_MINOR_VERSION == 1 && PHP_RELEASE_VERSION > 2) || (PHP_MAJOR_VERSION == 5 && PHP_MINOR_VERSION > 1) || (PHP_MAJOR_VERSION > 5)
zend_object_std_dtor(&intern->zo TSRMLS_CC);
#else
if (intern->zo.guards) {
zend_hash_destroy(intern->zo.guards);
FREE_HASHTABLE(intern->zo.guards);
}
if (intern->zo.properties) {
zend_hash_destroy(intern->zo.properties);
FREE_HASHTABLE(intern->zo.properties);
}
#endif
if (intern->filename) {
efree(intern->filename);
}
efree(intern);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 51,300
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPluginDelegateProxy::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
gfx::PluginWindowHandle window, uint64 surface_handle) {
if (render_view_)
render_view_->AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(window, surface_handle);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,137
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rawv6_init_sk(struct sock *sk)
{
struct raw6_sock *rp = raw6_sk(sk);
switch (inet_sk(sk)->inet_num) {
case IPPROTO_ICMPV6:
rp->checksum = 1;
rp->offset = 2;
break;
case IPPROTO_MH:
rp->checksum = 1;
rp->offset = 4;
break;
default:
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 40,201
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVC::setVbvParams() {
ive_ctl_set_vbv_params_ip_t s_vbv_ip;
ive_ctl_set_vbv_params_op_t s_vbv_op;
IV_STATUS_T status;
s_vbv_ip.e_cmd = IVE_CMD_VIDEO_CTL;
s_vbv_ip.e_sub_cmd = IVE_CMD_CTL_SET_VBV_PARAMS;
s_vbv_ip.u4_vbv_buf_size = 0;
s_vbv_ip.u4_vbv_buffer_delay = 1000;
s_vbv_ip.u4_timestamp_high = -1;
s_vbv_ip.u4_timestamp_low = -1;
s_vbv_ip.u4_size = sizeof(ive_ctl_set_vbv_params_ip_t);
s_vbv_op.u4_size = sizeof(ive_ctl_set_vbv_params_op_t);
status = ive_api_function(mCodecCtx, &s_vbv_ip, &s_vbv_op);
if (status != IV_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Unable to set VBC params = 0x%x\n", s_vbv_op.u4_error_code);
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,974
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u8 *hid_alloc_report_buf(struct hid_report *report, gfp_t flags)
{
/*
* 7 extra bytes are necessary to achieve proper functionality
* of implement() working on 8 byte chunks
*/
int len = hid_report_len(report) + 7;
return kmalloc(len, flags);
}
Commit Message: HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings
Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of
out-of-bound readings.
The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do
not have enough fields to fit the incoming values.
Add checks and silence KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 49,479
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebGLUniformLocation* WebGLRenderingContextBase::getUniformLocation(
WebGLProgram* program,
const String& name) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateWebGLObject("getUniformLocation", program))
return nullptr;
if (!ValidateLocationLength("getUniformLocation", name))
return nullptr;
if (!ValidateString("getUniformLocation", name))
return nullptr;
if (IsPrefixReserved(name))
return nullptr;
if (!program->LinkStatus(this)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "getUniformLocation",
"program not linked");
return nullptr;
}
GLint uniform_location = ContextGL()->GetUniformLocation(
ObjectOrZero(program), name.Utf8().data());
if (uniform_location == -1)
return nullptr;
return WebGLUniformLocation::Create(program, uniform_location);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InspectorResourceAgent::didReceiveCORSRedirectResponse(LocalFrame* frame, unsigned long identifier, DocumentLoader* loader, const ResourceResponse& response, ResourceLoader* resourceLoader)
{
didReceiveResourceResponse(frame, identifier, loader, response, resourceLoader);
didFinishLoading(identifier, loader, 0, blink::WebURLLoaderClient::kUnknownEncodedDataLength);
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,149
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderViewHostImpl* WebContentsImpl::GetRenderViewHost() const {
return GetRenderManager()->current_host();
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,863
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int connect_server_socket(const char* name)
{
int s = socket(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if(s < 0)
return -1;
set_socket_blocking(s, TRUE);
if(socket_local_client_connect(s, name, ANDROID_SOCKET_NAMESPACE_ABSTRACT, SOCK_STREAM) >= 0)
{
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("connected to local socket:%s, fd:%d", name, s);
return s;
}
else APPL_TRACE_ERROR("connect to local socket:%s, fd:%d failed, errno:%d", name, s, errno);
close(s);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,903
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::Activate() {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->ActivateContents(this);
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void snd_usbmidi_do_output(struct snd_usb_midi_out_endpoint *ep)
{
unsigned int urb_index;
struct urb *urb;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&ep->buffer_lock, flags);
if (ep->umidi->disconnected) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->buffer_lock, flags);
return;
}
urb_index = ep->next_urb;
for (;;) {
if (!(ep->active_urbs & (1 << urb_index))) {
urb = ep->urbs[urb_index].urb;
urb->transfer_buffer_length = 0;
ep->umidi->usb_protocol_ops->output(ep, urb);
if (urb->transfer_buffer_length == 0)
break;
dump_urb("sending", urb->transfer_buffer,
urb->transfer_buffer_length);
urb->dev = ep->umidi->dev;
if (snd_usbmidi_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC) < 0)
break;
ep->active_urbs |= 1 << urb_index;
}
if (++urb_index >= OUTPUT_URBS)
urb_index = 0;
if (urb_index == ep->next_urb)
break;
}
ep->next_urb = urb_index;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->buffer_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: avoid freeing umidi object twice
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,765
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_find_delalloc_range(struct inode *inode,
ext4_lblk_t lblk_start,
ext4_lblk_t lblk_end,
int search_hint_reverse)
{
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
struct buffer_head *head, *bh = NULL;
struct page *page;
ext4_lblk_t i, pg_lblk;
pgoff_t index;
if (!test_opt(inode->i_sb, DELALLOC))
return 0;
/* reverse search wont work if fs block size is less than page size */
if (inode->i_blkbits < PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT)
search_hint_reverse = 0;
if (search_hint_reverse)
i = lblk_end;
else
i = lblk_start;
index = i >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
while ((i >= lblk_start) && (i <= lblk_end)) {
page = find_get_page(mapping, index);
if (!page)
goto nextpage;
if (!page_has_buffers(page))
goto nextpage;
head = page_buffers(page);
if (!head)
goto nextpage;
bh = head;
pg_lblk = index << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT -
inode->i_blkbits);
do {
if (unlikely(pg_lblk < lblk_start)) {
/*
* This is possible when fs block size is less
* than page size and our cluster starts/ends in
* middle of the page. So we need to skip the
* initial few blocks till we reach the 'lblk'
*/
pg_lblk++;
continue;
}
/* Check if the buffer is delayed allocated and that it
* is not yet mapped. (when da-buffers are mapped during
* their writeout, their da_mapped bit is set.)
*/
if (buffer_delay(bh) && !buffer_da_mapped(bh)) {
page_cache_release(page);
trace_ext4_find_delalloc_range(inode,
lblk_start, lblk_end,
search_hint_reverse,
1, i);
return 1;
}
if (search_hint_reverse)
i--;
else
i++;
} while ((i >= lblk_start) && (i <= lblk_end) &&
((bh = bh->b_this_page) != head));
nextpage:
if (page)
page_cache_release(page);
/*
* Move to next page. 'i' will be the first lblk in the next
* page.
*/
if (search_hint_reverse)
index--;
else
index++;
i = index << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
}
trace_ext4_find_delalloc_range(inode, lblk_start, lblk_end,
search_hint_reverse, 0, 0);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,599
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLOzone* X11SurfaceFactory::GetGLOzone(gl::GLImplementation implementation) {
switch (implementation) {
case gl::kGLImplementationDesktopGL:
return glx_implementation_.get();
case gl::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2:
return egl_implementation_.get();
default:
return nullptr;
}
}
Commit Message: Add ThreadChecker for Ozone X11 GPU.
Ensure Ozone X11 tests the same thread constraints we have in Ozone GBM.
BUG=none
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2366643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421817}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 1
| 171,603
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void queue_push(register Queue *qp, size_t extra_length, char const *info)
{
register char *cp;
size_t memory_length;
size_t available_length;
size_t begin_length;
size_t n_begin;
size_t q_length;
if (!extra_length)
return;
memory_length = qp->d_memory_end - qp->d_memory;
q_length =
qp->d_read <= qp->d_write ?
(size_t)(qp->d_write - qp->d_read)
:
memory_length - (qp->d_read - qp->d_write);
available_length = memory_length - q_length - 1;
/* -1, as the Q cannot completely fill up all */
/* available memory in the buffer */
if (message_show(MSG_INFO))
message("push_front %u bytes in `%s'", (unsigned)extra_length, info);
if (extra_length > available_length)
{
/* enlarge the buffer: */
memory_length += extra_length - available_length + BLOCK_QUEUE;
cp = new_memory(memory_length, sizeof(char));
if (message_show(MSG_INFO))
message("Reallocating queue at %p to %p", qp->d_memory, cp);
if (qp->d_read > qp->d_write) /* q wraps around end */
{
size_t tail_len = qp->d_memory_end - qp->d_read;
memcpy(cp, qp->d_read, tail_len); /* first part -> begin */
/* 2nd part beyond */
memcpy(cp + tail_len, qp->d_memory,
(size_t)(qp->d_write - qp->d_memory));
qp->d_write = cp + q_length;
qp->d_read = cp;
}
else /* q as one block */
{
memcpy(cp, qp->d_memory, memory_length);/* cp existing buffer */
qp->d_read = cp + (qp->d_read - qp->d_memory);
qp->d_write = cp + (qp->d_write - qp->d_memory);
}
free(qp->d_memory); /* free old memory */
qp->d_memory_end = cp + memory_length; /* update d_memory_end */
qp->d_memory = cp; /* update d_memory */
}
/*
Write as much as possible at the begin of the buffer, then write
the remaining chars at the end.
q_length is increased by the length of the info string
The first chars to write are at the end of info, and the 2nd part to
write are the initial chars of info, since the initial part of info
is then read first.
*/
/* # chars available at the */
begin_length = qp->d_read - qp->d_memory; /* begin of the buffer */
n_begin = extra_length <= begin_length ? /* determine # to write at */
extra_length /* the begin of the buffer */
:
begin_length;
memcpy /* write trailing part of */
( /* info first */
qp->d_read -= n_begin,
info + extra_length - n_begin,
n_begin
);
if (extra_length > begin_length) /* not yet all chars written*/
{
/* continue with the remaining number of characters. Insert these at*/
/* the end of the buffer */
extra_length -= begin_length; /* reduce # to write */
memcpy /* d_read wraps to the end */
( /* write info's rest */
qp->d_read = qp->d_memory_end - extra_length,
info,
extra_length
);
}
}
Commit Message: fixed invalid memory reads detected by the address sanitizer
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 168,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PdfMetafileSkia* PrintRenderFrameHelper::PrintPreviewContext::metafile() {
DCHECK(IsRendering());
return metafile_.get();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ahci_dma_prepare_buf(IDEDMA *dma, int is_write)
{
AHCIDevice *ad = DO_UPCAST(AHCIDevice, dma, dma);
IDEState *s = &ad->port.ifs[0];
ahci_populate_sglist(ad, &s->sg, 0);
s->io_buffer_size = s->sg.size;
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "len=%#x\n", s->io_buffer_size);
return s->io_buffer_size != 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,764
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: QWebPreferences* QQuickWebViewExperimental::preferences() const
{
QQuickWebViewPrivate* const d = d_ptr;
if (!d->preferences)
d->preferences = adoptPtr(QWebPreferencesPrivate::createPreferences(d));
return d->preferences.get();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 101,756
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PaintLayerScrollableArea::ComputeScrollbarExistence(
bool& needs_horizontal_scrollbar,
bool& needs_vertical_scrollbar,
ComputeScrollbarExistenceOption option) const {
DCHECK(GetLayoutBox()->GetFrame()->GetSettings());
if (VisualViewportSuppliesScrollbars() ||
!CanHaveOverflowScrollbars(*GetLayoutBox()) ||
GetLayoutBox()->GetFrame()->GetSettings()->GetHideScrollbars()) {
needs_horizontal_scrollbar = false;
needs_vertical_scrollbar = false;
return;
}
needs_horizontal_scrollbar = GetLayoutBox()->ScrollsOverflowX();
needs_vertical_scrollbar = GetLayoutBox()->ScrollsOverflowY();
if (GetLayoutBox()->HasAutoHorizontalScrollbar()) {
if (option == kForbidAddingAutoBars)
needs_horizontal_scrollbar &= HasHorizontalScrollbar();
needs_horizontal_scrollbar &=
GetLayoutBox()->IsRooted() && HasHorizontalOverflow() &&
VisibleContentRect(kIncludeScrollbars).Height();
}
if (GetLayoutBox()->HasAutoVerticalScrollbar()) {
if (option == kForbidAddingAutoBars)
needs_vertical_scrollbar &= HasVerticalScrollbar();
needs_vertical_scrollbar &= GetLayoutBox()->IsRooted() &&
HasVerticalOverflow() &&
VisibleContentRect(kIncludeScrollbars).Width();
}
if (GetLayoutBox()->IsLayoutView()) {
ScrollbarMode h_mode;
ScrollbarMode v_mode;
ToLayoutView(GetLayoutBox())->CalculateScrollbarModes(h_mode, v_mode);
if (h_mode == kScrollbarAlwaysOn)
needs_horizontal_scrollbar = true;
else if (h_mode == kScrollbarAlwaysOff)
needs_horizontal_scrollbar = false;
if (v_mode == kScrollbarAlwaysOn)
needs_vertical_scrollbar = true;
else if (v_mode == kScrollbarAlwaysOff)
needs_vertical_scrollbar = false;
}
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,021
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void ModulateHCL(const double percent_hue,
const double percent_chroma,const double percent_luma,double *red,
double *green,double *blue)
{
double
hue,
luma,
chroma;
/*
Increase or decrease color luma, chroma, or hue.
*/
ConvertRGBToHCL(*red,*green,*blue,&hue,&chroma,&luma);
hue+=fmod((percent_hue-100.0),200.0)/200.0;
chroma*=0.01*percent_chroma;
luma*=0.01*percent_luma;
ConvertHCLToRGB(hue,chroma,luma,red,green,blue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/663
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/655
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 62,632
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lg_ultrax_remote_mapping(struct hid_input *hi,
struct hid_usage *usage, unsigned long **bit, int *max)
{
if ((usage->hid & HID_USAGE_PAGE) != HID_UP_LOGIVENDOR)
return 0;
set_bit(EV_REP, hi->input->evbit);
switch (usage->hid & HID_USAGE) {
/* Reported on Logitech Ultra X Media Remote */
case 0x004: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_AGAIN); break;
case 0x00d: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_HOME); break;
case 0x024: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_SHUFFLE); break;
case 0x025: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_TV); break;
case 0x026: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_MENU); break;
case 0x031: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_AUDIO); break;
case 0x032: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_TEXT); break;
case 0x033: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_LAST); break;
case 0x047: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_MP3); break;
case 0x048: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_DVD); break;
case 0x049: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_MEDIA); break;
case 0x04a: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_VIDEO); break;
case 0x04b: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_ANGLE); break;
case 0x04c: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_LANGUAGE); break;
case 0x04d: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_SUBTITLE); break;
case 0x051: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_RED); break;
case 0x052: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_CLOSE); break;
default:
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 38,117
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResetScreenHandler::Show() {
if (!page_is_ready()) {
show_on_init_ = true;
return;
}
PrefService* prefs = g_browser_process->local_state();
restart_required_ = !CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kFirstExecAfterBoot);
reboot_was_requested_ = false;
rollback_available_ = false;
if (!restart_required_) // First exec after boot.
reboot_was_requested_ = prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kFactoryResetRequested);
if (!restart_required_ && reboot_was_requested_) {
rollback_available_ = prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kRollbackRequested);
ShowWithParams();
} else {
chromeos::DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetUpdateEngineClient()->
CanRollbackCheck(base::Bind(&ResetScreenHandler::OnRollbackCheck,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
}
Commit Message: Rollback option put behind the flag.
BUG=368860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/267393011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@269753 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 171,181
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::IsScriptInitiatedPrintAllowed(
WebKit::WebFrame* frame, bool user_initiated) {
if (is_scripted_printing_blocked_)
return false;
if (!is_scripted_print_throttling_disabled_ &&
!is_preview_enabled_ &&
!user_initiated)
return !IsScriptInitiatedPrintTooFrequent(frame);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 102,572
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: print_unknown_data(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *cp,const char *ident,int len)
{
if (len < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%sDissector error: print_unknown_data called with negative length",
ident));
return(0);
}
if (ndo->ndo_snapend - cp < len)
len = ndo->ndo_snapend - cp;
if (len < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%sDissector error: print_unknown_data called with pointer past end of packet",
ident));
return(0);
}
hex_print(ndo, ident,cp,len);
return(1); /* everything is ok */
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13011/Properly check for buffer overflow in bittok2str_internal().
Also, make the buffer bigger.
This fixes a buffer overflow discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 62,388
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeClientImpl::setResizable(bool value)
{
m_resizable = value;
}
Commit Message: Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,656
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static boolean parse_label( struct translate_ctx *ctx, uint *val )
{
const char *cur = ctx->cur;
if (parse_uint( &cur, val )) {
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (*cur == ':') {
cur++;
ctx->cur = cur;
return TRUE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void voidMethodOctetArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::voidMethodOctetArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,859
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jbig2_generic_stats_size(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, int template)
{
int stats_size = template == 0 ? 1 << 16 : template == 1 ? 1 << 1 << 13 : 1 << 10;
return stats_size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,033
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int printuserlist(char *buf, int bufsize, struct userlist* ul, char * delim){
int printed = 0;
for(; ul; ul = ul->next){
if(printed > (bufsize - 64)) break;
printed += sprintf(buf+printed, "%s%s", ul->user, ul->next?delim:"");
if(printed > (bufsize - 64)) {
printed += sprintf(buf+printed, "...");
break;
}
}
return printed;
}
Commit Message: Fix: out-of-bounds write and few more bugs in 'admin' configuration upload
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 88,712
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(int) gdImagePaletteToTrueColor(gdImagePtr src)
{
unsigned int y;
unsigned int yy;
if (src == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (src->trueColor == 1) {
return 1;
} else {
unsigned int x;
const unsigned int sy = gdImageSY(src);
const unsigned int sx = gdImageSX(src);
src->tpixels = (int **) gdMalloc(sizeof(int *) * sy);
if (src->tpixels == NULL) {
return 0;
}
for (y = 0; y < sy; y++) {
const unsigned char *src_row = src->pixels[y];
int * dst_row;
/* no need to calloc it, we overwrite all pxl anyway */
src->tpixels[y] = (int *) gdMalloc(sx * sizeof(int));
if (src->tpixels[y] == NULL) {
goto clean_on_error;
}
dst_row = src->tpixels[y];
for (x = 0; x < sx; x++) {
const unsigned char c = *(src_row + x);
if (c == src->transparent) {
*(dst_row + x) = gdTrueColorAlpha(0, 0, 0, 127);
} else {
*(dst_row + x) = gdTrueColorAlpha(src->red[c], src->green[c], src->blue[c], src->alpha[c]);
}
}
}
}
/* free old palette buffer (y is sy) */
for (yy = 0; yy < y; yy++) {
gdFree(src->pixels[yy]);
}
gdFree(src->pixels);
src->trueColor = 1;
src->pixels = NULL;
src->alphaBlendingFlag = 0;
src->saveAlphaFlag = 1;
if (src->transparent >= 0) {
const unsigned char c = src->transparent;
src->transparent = gdTrueColorAlpha(src->red[c], src->green[c], src->blue[c], src->alpha[c]);
}
return 1;
clean_on_error:
/* free new true color buffer (y is not allocated, have failed) */
for (yy = 0; yy < y; yy++) {
gdFree(src->tpixels[yy]);
}
gdFree(src->tpixels);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 73,076
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataFileSystem::CopyOnUIThreadAfterGetEntryInfoPair(
const FilePath& dest_file_path,
const FileOperationCallback& callback,
scoped_ptr<EntryInfoPairResult> result) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
DCHECK(result.get());
if (result->first.error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
callback.Run(result->first.error);
return;
} else if (result->second.error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
callback.Run(result->second.error);
return;
}
scoped_ptr<GDataEntryProto> src_file_proto = result->first.proto.Pass();
scoped_ptr<GDataEntryProto> dest_parent_proto = result->second.proto.Pass();
if (!dest_parent_proto->file_info().is_directory()) {
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_ERROR_NOT_A_DIRECTORY);
return;
} else if (src_file_proto->file_info().is_directory()) {
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_ERROR_INVALID_OPERATION);
return;
}
if (src_file_proto->file_specific_info().is_hosted_document()) {
CopyDocumentToDirectory(dest_file_path.DirName(),
src_file_proto->resource_id(),
dest_file_path.BaseName().RemoveExtension().value(),
callback);
return;
}
const FilePath& src_file_path = result->first.path;
GetFileByPath(src_file_path,
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::OnGetFileCompleteForCopy,
ui_weak_ptr_,
dest_file_path,
callback),
GetDownloadDataCallback());
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 116,932
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: blink::WebSecurityStyle Browser::GetSecurityStyle(
WebContents* web_contents,
content::SecurityStyleExplanations* security_style_explanations) {
SecurityStateTabHelper* helper =
SecurityStateTabHelper::FromWebContents(web_contents);
DCHECK(helper);
security_state::SecurityInfo security_info;
helper->GetSecurityInfo(&security_info);
return security_state::GetSecurityStyle(security_info,
security_style_explanations);
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 139,002
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QuotaManager::RegisterClient(QuotaClient* client) {
DCHECK(!database_.get());
clients_.push_back(client);
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 102,216
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fdctrl_handle_configure(FDCtrl *fdctrl, int direction)
{
fdctrl->config = fdctrl->fifo[2];
fdctrl->precomp_trk = fdctrl->fifo[3];
/* No result back */
fdctrl_reset_fifo(fdctrl);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,308
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::RecordUserMetrics(const std::string& action) {
Send(new ViewHostMsg_UserMetricsRecordAction(action));
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 108,595
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void writeBlobIndex(int blobIndex)
{
ASSERT(blobIndex >= 0);
append(BlobIndexTag);
doWriteUint32(blobIndex);
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,547
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __init free_initrd_mem(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
{
/*
* end could be not aligned, and We can not align that,
* decompresser could be confused by aligned initrd_end
* We already reserve the end partial page before in
* - i386_start_kernel()
* - x86_64_start_kernel()
* - relocate_initrd()
* So here We can do PAGE_ALIGN() safely to get partial page to be freed
*/
free_init_pages("initrd", start, PAGE_ALIGN(end));
}
Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 66,859
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: P2PSocketHost* P2PSocketDispatcherHost::LookupSocket(
int32 routing_id, int socket_id) {
SocketsMap::iterator it = sockets_.find(
ExtendedSocketId(routing_id, socket_id));
if (it == sockets_.end())
return NULL;
else
return it->second;
}
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 98,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ShellSurface::SetApplicationId(aura::Window* window,
std::string* application_id) {
window->SetProperty(kApplicationIdKey, application_id);
}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 120,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: s64 vsock_stream_has_data(struct vsock_sock *vsk)
{
return transport->stream_has_data(vsk);
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: Fix missing msg_namelen update in vsock_stream_recvmsg()
The code misses to update the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage
variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,363
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderFrameSubmissionObserver::RenderFrameSubmissionObserver(
WebContents* web_contents)
: RenderFrameSubmissionObserver(
RenderFrameMetadataProviderFromWebContents(web_contents)) {}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 156,129
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JsVarRef jsvGetNextSibling(const JsVar *v) { return (JsVarRef)(v->varData.ref.nextSibling | (((v->varData.ref.pack >> (JSVARREF_PACKED_BITS*2))&JSVARREF_PACKED_BIT_MASK))<<8); }
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 82,437
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TIFFWriteScanline(TIFF* tif, void* buf, uint32 row, uint16 sample)
{
static const char module[] = "TIFFWriteScanline";
register TIFFDirectory *td;
int status, imagegrew = 0;
uint32 strip;
if (!WRITECHECKSTRIPS(tif, module))
return (-1);
/*
* Handle delayed allocation of data buffer. This
* permits it to be sized more intelligently (using
* directory information).
*/
if (!BUFFERCHECK(tif))
return (-1);
tif->tif_flags |= TIFF_BUF4WRITE; /* not strictly sure this is right*/
td = &tif->tif_dir;
/*
* Extend image length if needed
* (but only for PlanarConfig=1).
*/
if (row >= td->td_imagelength) { /* extend image */
if (td->td_planarconfig == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Can not change \"ImageLength\" when using separate planes");
return (-1);
}
td->td_imagelength = row+1;
imagegrew = 1;
}
/*
* Calculate strip and check for crossings.
*/
if (td->td_planarconfig == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE) {
if (sample >= td->td_samplesperpixel) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"%lu: Sample out of range, max %lu",
(unsigned long) sample, (unsigned long) td->td_samplesperpixel);
return (-1);
}
strip = sample*td->td_stripsperimage + row/td->td_rowsperstrip;
} else
strip = row / td->td_rowsperstrip;
/*
* Check strip array to make sure there's space. We don't support
* dynamically growing files that have data organized in separate
* bitplanes because it's too painful. In that case we require that
* the imagelength be set properly before the first write (so that the
* strips array will be fully allocated above).
*/
if (strip >= td->td_nstrips && !TIFFGrowStrips(tif, 1, module))
return (-1);
if (strip != tif->tif_curstrip) {
/*
* Changing strips -- flush any data present.
*/
if (!TIFFFlushData(tif))
return (-1);
tif->tif_curstrip = strip;
/*
* Watch out for a growing image. The value of strips/image
* will initially be 1 (since it can't be deduced until the
* imagelength is known).
*/
if (strip >= td->td_stripsperimage && imagegrew)
td->td_stripsperimage =
TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength,td->td_rowsperstrip);
if (td->td_stripsperimage == 0) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "Zero strips per image");
return (-1);
}
tif->tif_row =
(strip % td->td_stripsperimage) * td->td_rowsperstrip;
if ((tif->tif_flags & TIFF_CODERSETUP) == 0) {
if (!(*tif->tif_setupencode)(tif))
return (-1);
tif->tif_flags |= TIFF_CODERSETUP;
}
tif->tif_rawcc = 0;
tif->tif_rawcp = tif->tif_rawdata;
if( td->td_stripbytecount[strip] > 0 )
{
/* if we are writing over existing tiles, zero length */
td->td_stripbytecount[strip] = 0;
/* this forces TIFFAppendToStrip() to do a seek */
tif->tif_curoff = 0;
}
if (!(*tif->tif_preencode)(tif, sample))
return (-1);
tif->tif_flags |= TIFF_POSTENCODE;
}
/*
* Ensure the write is either sequential or at the
* beginning of a strip (or that we can randomly
* access the data -- i.e. no encoding).
*/
if (row != tif->tif_row) {
if (row < tif->tif_row) {
/*
* Moving backwards within the same strip:
* backup to the start and then decode
* forward (below).
*/
tif->tif_row = (strip % td->td_stripsperimage) *
td->td_rowsperstrip;
tif->tif_rawcp = tif->tif_rawdata;
}
/*
* Seek forward to the desired row.
*/
if (!(*tif->tif_seek)(tif, row - tif->tif_row))
return (-1);
tif->tif_row = row;
}
/* swab if needed - note that source buffer will be altered */
tif->tif_postdecode( tif, (uint8*) buf, tif->tif_scanlinesize );
status = (*tif->tif_encoderow)(tif, (uint8*) buf,
tif->tif_scanlinesize, sample);
/* we are now poised at the beginning of the next row */
tif->tif_row = row + 1;
return (status);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 48,330
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dbus_send_state_signal(vrrp_t *vrrp)
{
gchar *object_path;
GVariant *args;
/* the interface will go through the initial state changes before
* the main loop can be started and global_connection initialised */
if (global_connection == NULL)
return;
object_path = dbus_object_create_path_instance(IF_NAME(IF_BASE_IFP(vrrp->ifp)), vrrp->vrid, vrrp->family);
args = g_variant_new("(u)", vrrp->state);
dbus_emit_signal(global_connection, object_path, DBUS_VRRP_INSTANCE_INTERFACE, "VrrpStatusChange", args);
g_free(object_path);
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 75,954
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ucma_copy_conn_event(struct rdma_ucm_conn_param *dst,
struct rdma_conn_param *src)
{
if (src->private_data_len)
memcpy(dst->private_data, src->private_data,
src->private_data_len);
dst->private_data_len = src->private_data_len;
dst->responder_resources =src->responder_resources;
dst->initiator_depth = src->initiator_depth;
dst->flow_control = src->flow_control;
dst->retry_count = src->retry_count;
dst->rnr_retry_count = src->rnr_retry_count;
dst->srq = src->srq;
dst->qp_num = src->qp_num;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,836
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CCHAR ParaNdis_GetScalingDataForPacket(PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext, PNET_PACKET_INFO pPacketInfo, PPROCESSOR_NUMBER pTargetProcessor)
{
#if PARANDIS_SUPPORT_RSS
return ParaNdis6_RSSGetScalingDataForPacket(&pContext->RSSParameters, pPacketInfo, pTargetProcessor);
#else
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(pContext);
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(pPacketInfo);
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(pTargetProcessor);
return PARANDIS_RECEIVE_QUEUE_UNCLASSIFIED;
#endif
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 74,372
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct dentry *ovl_clear_empty(struct dentry *dentry,
struct list_head *list)
{
struct dentry *workdir = ovl_workdir(dentry);
struct inode *wdir = workdir->d_inode;
struct dentry *upperdir = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry->d_parent);
struct inode *udir = upperdir->d_inode;
struct path upperpath;
struct dentry *upper;
struct dentry *opaquedir;
struct kstat stat;
int err;
if (WARN_ON(!workdir))
return ERR_PTR(-EROFS);
err = ovl_lock_rename_workdir(workdir, upperdir);
if (err)
goto out;
ovl_path_upper(dentry, &upperpath);
err = vfs_getattr(&upperpath, &stat);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
err = -ESTALE;
if (!S_ISDIR(stat.mode))
goto out_unlock;
upper = upperpath.dentry;
if (upper->d_parent->d_inode != udir)
goto out_unlock;
opaquedir = ovl_lookup_temp(workdir, dentry);
err = PTR_ERR(opaquedir);
if (IS_ERR(opaquedir))
goto out_unlock;
err = ovl_create_real(wdir, opaquedir, &stat, NULL, NULL, true);
if (err)
goto out_dput;
err = ovl_copy_xattr(upper, opaquedir);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
err = ovl_set_opaque(opaquedir);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
inode_lock(opaquedir->d_inode);
err = ovl_set_attr(opaquedir, &stat);
inode_unlock(opaquedir->d_inode);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
err = ovl_do_rename(wdir, opaquedir, udir, upper, RENAME_EXCHANGE);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
ovl_cleanup_whiteouts(upper, list);
ovl_cleanup(wdir, upper);
unlock_rename(workdir, upperdir);
/* dentry's upper doesn't match now, get rid of it */
d_drop(dentry);
return opaquedir;
out_cleanup:
ovl_cleanup(wdir, opaquedir);
out_dput:
dput(opaquedir);
out_unlock:
unlock_rename(workdir, upperdir);
out:
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: ovl: verify upper dentry before unlink and rename
Unlink and rename in overlayfs checked the upper dentry for staleness by
verifying upper->d_parent against upperdir. However the dentry can go
stale also by being unhashed, for example.
Expand the verification to actually look up the name again (under parent
lock) and check if it matches the upper dentry. This matches what the VFS
does before passing the dentry to filesytem's unlink/rename methods, which
excludes any inconsistency caused by overlayfs.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 51,053
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: exsltDateDurationFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs)
{
xmlChar *ret;
xmlChar *number = NULL;
if ((nargs < 0) || (nargs > 1)) {
xmlXPathSetArityError(ctxt);
return;
}
if (nargs == 1) {
number = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
if (xmlXPathCheckError(ctxt)) {
xmlXPathSetTypeError(ctxt);
return;
}
}
ret = exsltDateDuration(number);
if (number != NULL)
xmlFree(number);
if (ret == NULL)
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString(ctxt);
else
xmlXPathReturnString(ctxt, ret);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,606
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct task_group *task_group(struct task_struct *p)
{
struct cgroup_subsys_state *css;
css = task_subsys_state_check(p, cpu_cgroup_subsys_id,
lockdep_is_held(&task_rq(p)->lock));
return container_of(css, struct task_group, css);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,614
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDLayer(Image *image,const ImageInfo *image_info,
const PSDInfo *psd_info,LayerInfo* layer_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
message[MagickPathExtent];
MagickBooleanType
status;
PSDCompressionType
compression;
ssize_t
j;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" setting up new layer image");
if (psd_info->mode != IndexedMode)
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(layer_info->image,exception);
layer_info->image->compose=PSDBlendModeToCompositeOperator(
layer_info->blendkey);
if (layer_info->visible == MagickFalse)
layer_info->image->compose=NoCompositeOp;
/*
Set up some hidden attributes for folks that need them.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g",
(double) layer_info->page.x);
(void) SetImageArtifact(layer_info->image,"psd:layer.x",message);
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g",
(double) layer_info->page.y);
(void) SetImageArtifact(layer_info->image,"psd:layer.y",message);
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g",(double)
layer_info->opacity);
(void) SetImageArtifact(layer_info->image,"psd:layer.opacity",message);
(void) SetImageProperty(layer_info->image,"label",(char *) layer_info->name,
exception);
status=MagickTrue;
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) layer_info->channels; j++)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading data for channel %.20g",(double) j);
compression=(PSDCompressionType) ReadBlobShort(layer_info->image);
/* TODO: Remove this when we figure out how to support this */
if ((compression == ZipWithPrediction) && (image->depth == 32))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
TypeError,"CompressionNotSupported","ZipWithPrediction(32 bit)");
return(MagickFalse);
}
layer_info->image->compression=ConvertPSDCompression(compression);
if (layer_info->channel_info[j].type == -1)
layer_info->image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
status=ReadPSDChannel(layer_info->image,image_info,psd_info,layer_info,
(size_t) j,compression,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
status=ApplyPSDLayerOpacity(layer_info->image,layer_info->opacity,
MagickFalse,exception);
if ((status != MagickFalse) &&
(layer_info->image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace))
status=NegateCMYK(layer_info->image,exception);
if ((status != MagickFalse) && (layer_info->mask.image != (Image *) NULL))
{
const char
*option;
layer_info->mask.image->page.x=layer_info->mask.page.x;
layer_info->mask.image->page.y=layer_info->mask.page.y;
/* Do not composite the mask when it is disabled */
if ((layer_info->mask.flags & 0x02) == 0x02)
layer_info->mask.image->compose=NoCompositeOp;
else
status=ApplyPSDOpacityMask(layer_info->image,layer_info->mask.image,
layer_info->mask.background == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,MagickFalse,
exception);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"psd:preserve-opacity-mask");
if (IsStringTrue(option) != MagickFalse)
PreservePSDOpacityMask(image,layer_info,exception);
layer_info->mask.image=DestroyImage(layer_info->mask.image);
}
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1451
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 91,372
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void hide_shell(u32 cmd_type)
{
#if defined(WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
typedef HWND (WINAPI *GetConsoleWindowT)(void);
HMODULE hk32 = GetModuleHandle("kernel32.dll");
GetConsoleWindowT GetConsoleWindow = (GetConsoleWindowT ) GetProcAddress(hk32,"GetConsoleWindow");
if (cmd_type==0) {
ShowWindow( GetConsoleWindow(), SW_SHOW);
shell_visible = GF_TRUE;
}
else if (cmd_type==1) {
ShowWindow( GetConsoleWindow(), SW_HIDE);
shell_visible = GF_FALSE;
}
else if (cmd_type==2) PostMessage(GetConsoleWindow(), WM_CLOSE, 0, 0);
#endif
}
Commit Message: add some boundary checks on gf_text_get_utf8_line (#1188)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 92,820
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: decrypt_response(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t * out_len)
{
size_t in_len;
size_t i;
unsigned char iv[16] = { 0 };
unsigned char plaintext[4096] = { 0 };
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
/* no cipher */
if (in[0] == 0x99)
return 0;
/* parse cipher length */
if (0x01 == in[2] && 0x82 != in[1]) {
in_len = in[1];
i = 3;
}
else if (0x01 == in[3] && 0x81 == in[1]) {
in_len = in[2];
i = 4;
}
else if (0x01 == in[4] && 0x82 == in[1]) {
in_len = in[2] * 0x100;
in_len += in[3];
i = 5;
}
else {
return -1;
}
/* decrypt */
if (KEY_TYPE_AES == exdata->smtype)
aes128_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], in_len - 1, plaintext);
else
des3_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], in_len - 1, plaintext);
/* unpadding */
while (0x80 != plaintext[in_len - 2] && (in_len - 2 > 0))
in_len--;
if (2 == in_len)
return -1;
memcpy(out, plaintext, in_len - 2);
*out_len = in_len - 2;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 169,054
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void locationAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::locationAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,744
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rar_read_ahead(struct archive_read *a, size_t min, ssize_t *avail)
{
struct rar *rar = (struct rar *)(a->format->data);
const void *h = __archive_read_ahead(a, min, avail);
int ret;
if (avail)
{
if (a->archive.read_data_is_posix_read && *avail > (ssize_t)a->archive.read_data_requested)
*avail = a->archive.read_data_requested;
if (*avail > rar->bytes_remaining)
*avail = (ssize_t)rar->bytes_remaining;
if (*avail < 0)
return NULL;
else if (*avail == 0 && rar->main_flags & MHD_VOLUME &&
rar->file_flags & FHD_SPLIT_AFTER)
{
ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry);
if (ret == (ARCHIVE_EOF))
{
rar->has_endarc_header = 1;
ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry);
}
if (ret != (ARCHIVE_OK))
return NULL;
return rar_read_ahead(a, min, avail);
}
}
return h;
}
Commit Message: Issue 719: Fix for TALOS-CAN-154
A RAR file with an invalid zero dictionary size was not being
rejected, leading to a zero-sized allocation for the dictionary
storage which was then overwritten during the dictionary initialization.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco for
reporting this.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 53,491
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int instantiate_none(struct lxc_handler *handler, struct lxc_netdev *netdev)
{
netdev->ifindex = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 44,574
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_path_lookup(int dfd, const char *name,
unsigned int flags, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct filename filename = { .name = name };
return filename_lookup(dfd, &filename, flags, nd);
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 36,304
|
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