instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppListSyncableService::AddItem(scoped_ptr<AppListItem> app_item) {
SyncItem* sync_item = FindOrAddSyncItem(app_item.get());
if (!sync_item)
return; // Item is not valid.
std::string folder_id;
if (app_list::switches::IsFolderUIEnabled()) {
if (AppIsOem(app_item->id())) {
folder_id = FindOrCreateOemFolder();
VLOG_IF(2, !folder_id.empty())
<< this << ": AddItem to OEM folder: " << sync_item->ToString();
} else {
folder_id = sync_item->parent_id;
}
}
VLOG(2) << this << ": AddItem: " << sync_item->ToString()
<< " Folder: '" << folder_id << "'";
model_->AddItemToFolder(app_item.Pass(), folder_id);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,888
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void Ins_SSW( INS_ARG )
{
/* XXX : Undocumented or bug in the Windows engine ? */
/* */
/* It seems that the value that is read here is */
/* expressed in 16.16 format, rather than in */
/* font units.. */
/* */
CUR.GS.single_width_value = (TT_F26Dot6)(args[0] >> 10);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
{
int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
short version;
unsigned mac_size;
size_t extra;
unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
sess=s->session;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
else
extra=0;
if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
{
/* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
* set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
again:
/* check if we have the header */
if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
(s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
{
n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
p=s->packet;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
rr->type= *(p++);
ssl_major= *(p++);
ssl_minor= *(p++);
version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
n2s(p,rr->length);
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
#endif
/* Lets check version */
if (!s->first_packet)
{
if (version != s->version)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
/* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
s->version = (unsigned short)version;
al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
}
if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
goto err;
}
if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
}
/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
/* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
i=rr->length;
n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
/* now n == rr->length,
* and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
}
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
/* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
* and we have that many bytes in s->packet
*/
rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
/* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
* rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
* need to be copied into rr->data by either
* the decryption or by the decompression
* When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
* rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
/* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
* rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
/* check is not needed I believe */
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
rr->data=rr->input;
rr->orig_len=rr->length;
/* If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record.
* All the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
*/
if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash)
{
unsigned char *mac;
mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
if (rr->length < mac_size)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
rr->length -= mac_size;
mac = rr->data + rr->length;
i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
goto f_err;
}
}
enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
/*-
* enc_err is:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
* 1: if the padding is valid
* -1: if the padding is invalid
*/
if (enc_err == 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
printf("\n");
#endif
/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
if ((sess != NULL) &&
(s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
(EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s))
{
/* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
unsigned char *mac = NULL;
unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
/* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
* removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
* therefore we can safely process the record in a different
* amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
*/
if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
/* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
{
/* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
* can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
* the MAC in constant time from within the record,
* without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
* */
mac = mac_tmp;
ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
rr->length -= mac_size;
}
else
{
/* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
* equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
* enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
rr->length -= mac_size;
mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
}
i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
enc_err = -1;
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
enc_err = -1;
}
if (enc_err < 0)
{
/* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
* SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
* failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
* we should not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this
* might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
goto f_err;
}
/* r->length is now just compressed */
if (s->expand != NULL)
{
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
}
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
rr->off=0;
/*-
* So at this point the following is true
* ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
* ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
* ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
* ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
* after use :-).
*/
/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
s->packet_length=0;
/* just read a 0 length packet */
if (rr->length == 0)
{
empty_record_count++;
if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
goto f_err;
}
goto again;
}
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
#endif
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in dtls1_get_record whilst in the listen state where you get two
separate reads performed - one for the header and one for the body of the
handshake record.
CVE-2014-3571
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 94,701
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_decode_destroy_session(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp,
struct nfsd4_destroy_session *destroy_session)
{
DECODE_HEAD;
READ_BUF(NFS4_MAX_SESSIONID_LEN);
COPYMEM(destroy_session->sessionid.data, NFS4_MAX_SESSIONID_LEN);
DECODE_TAIL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,744
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SoftG711::DecodeALaw(
int16_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t inSize) {
while (inSize-- > 0) {
int32_t x = *in++;
int32_t ix = x ^ 0x55;
ix &= 0x7f;
int32_t iexp = ix >> 4;
int32_t mant = ix & 0x0f;
if (iexp > 0) {
mant += 16;
}
mant = (mant << 4) + 8;
if (iexp > 1) {
mant = mant << (iexp - 1);
}
*out++ = (x > 127) ? mant : -mant;
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (gsm|g711)dec
Bug: 27793163
Bug: 27793367
Change-Id: Iec3de8a237ee2379d87a8371c13e543878c6652c
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 160,632
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void comps_rtree_set_n(COMPS_RTree * rt, char * key, size_t keylen, void * data)
{
__comps_rtree_set(rt, key, keylen, data);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,830
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sspi_CredentialsFree(CREDENTIALS* credentials)
{
if (!credentials)
return;
free(credentials);
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 58,607
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
BIGNUM **rp)
{
BN_CTX *ctx;
BIGNUM k, kq, *K, *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL;
BIGNUM l, m;
int ret = 0;
int q_bits;
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
BN_init(&k);
BN_init(&kq);
BN_init(&l);
BN_init(&m);
if (ctx_in == NULL) {
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
} else
ctx = ctx_in;
if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
/* Preallocate space */
q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
if (!BN_set_bit(&k, q_bits)
|| !BN_set_bit(&l, q_bits)
|| !BN_set_bit(&m, q_bits))
goto err;
/* Get random k */
do
if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
goto err;
while (BN_is_zero(&k));
if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx))
goto err;
}
/* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */
if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
/*
* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
* compute G^k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length.
*
* We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a
* small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is
* one bit longer than the modulus.
*
* TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
* conditional copy.
*/
if (!BN_add(&l, &k, dsa->q)
|| !BN_add(&m, &l, dsa->q)
|| !BN_copy(&kq, BN_num_bits(&l) > q_bits ? &l : &m))
goto err;
BN_set_flags(&kq, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
K = &kq;
} else {
K = &k;
}
DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
dsa->method_mont_p);
if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
/* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, &k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (*kinvp != NULL)
BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
*kinvp = kinv;
kinv = NULL;
if (*rp != NULL)
BN_clear_free(*rp);
*rp = r;
ret = 1;
err:
if (!ret) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
if (r != NULL)
BN_clear_free(r);
}
if (ctx_in == NULL)
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
BN_clear_free(&k);
BN_clear_free(&kq);
BN_clear_free(&l);
BN_clear_free(&m);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-320
| 1
| 165,331
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void ext2_xattr_hash_entry(struct ext2_xattr_header *header,
struct ext2_xattr_entry *entry)
{
__u32 hash = 0;
char *name = entry->e_name;
int n;
for (n=0; n < entry->e_name_len; n++) {
hash = (hash << NAME_HASH_SHIFT) ^
(hash >> (8*sizeof(hash) - NAME_HASH_SHIFT)) ^
*name++;
}
if (entry->e_value_block == 0 && entry->e_value_size != 0) {
__le32 *value = (__le32 *)((char *)header +
le16_to_cpu(entry->e_value_offs));
for (n = (le32_to_cpu(entry->e_value_size) +
EXT2_XATTR_ROUND) >> EXT2_XATTR_PAD_BITS; n; n--) {
hash = (hash << VALUE_HASH_SHIFT) ^
(hash >> (8*sizeof(hash) - VALUE_HASH_SHIFT)) ^
le32_to_cpu(*value++);
}
}
entry->e_hash = cpu_to_le32(hash);
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 94,981
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static gboolean rpc_event_prepare(GSource *source, gint *timeout)
{
*timeout = -1;
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,172
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void flush_tlb_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
preempt_disable();
if (current->active_mm == mm) {
if (current->mm)
__flush_tlb_one(start);
else
leave_mm(smp_processor_id());
}
if (cpumask_any_but(mm_cpumask(mm), smp_processor_id()) < nr_cpu_ids)
flush_tlb_others(mm_cpumask(mm), mm, start, 0UL);
preempt_enable();
}
Commit Message: x86/mm: Add barriers and document switch_mm()-vs-flush synchronization
When switch_mm() activates a new PGD, it also sets a bit that
tells other CPUs that the PGD is in use so that TLB flush IPIs
will be sent. In order for that to work correctly, the bit
needs to be visible prior to loading the PGD and therefore
starting to fill the local TLB.
Document all the barriers that make this work correctly and add
a couple that were missing.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 167,441
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLInputElement::defaultEventHandler(Event* evt)
{
if (evt->isMouseEvent() && evt->type() == eventNames().clickEvent && static_cast<MouseEvent*>(evt)->button() == LeftButton) {
m_inputType->handleClickEvent(static_cast<MouseEvent*>(evt));
if (evt->defaultHandled())
return;
}
if (evt->isTouchEvent()) {
m_inputType->handleTouchEvent(static_cast<TouchEvent*>(evt));
if (evt->defaultHandled())
return;
}
if (evt->isKeyboardEvent() && evt->type() == eventNames().keydownEvent) {
m_inputType->handleKeydownEvent(static_cast<KeyboardEvent*>(evt));
if (evt->defaultHandled())
return;
}
bool callBaseClassEarly = isTextField() && (evt->type() == eventNames().keydownEvent || evt->type() == eventNames().keypressEvent);
if (callBaseClassEarly) {
HTMLTextFormControlElement::defaultEventHandler(evt);
if (evt->defaultHandled())
return;
}
if (evt->type() == eventNames().DOMActivateEvent) {
m_inputType->handleDOMActivateEvent(evt);
if (evt->defaultHandled())
return;
}
if (evt->isKeyboardEvent() && evt->type() == eventNames().keypressEvent) {
m_inputType->handleKeypressEvent(static_cast<KeyboardEvent*>(evt));
if (evt->defaultHandled())
return;
}
if (evt->isKeyboardEvent() && evt->type() == eventNames().keyupEvent) {
m_inputType->handleKeyupEvent(static_cast<KeyboardEvent*>(evt));
if (evt->defaultHandled())
return;
}
if (m_inputType->shouldSubmitImplicitly(evt)) {
if (isSearchField())
onSearch();
if (wasChangedSinceLastFormControlChangeEvent())
dispatchFormControlChangeEvent();
RefPtr<HTMLFormElement> formForSubmission = m_inputType->formForSubmission();
if (formForSubmission)
formForSubmission->submitImplicitly(evt, canTriggerImplicitSubmission());
evt->setDefaultHandled();
return;
}
if (evt->isBeforeTextInsertedEvent())
m_inputType->handleBeforeTextInsertedEvent(static_cast<BeforeTextInsertedEvent*>(evt));
if (evt->isMouseEvent() && evt->type() == eventNames().mousedownEvent) {
m_inputType->handleMouseDownEvent(static_cast<MouseEvent*>(evt));
if (evt->defaultHandled())
return;
}
m_inputType->forwardEvent(evt);
if (!callBaseClassEarly && !evt->defaultHandled())
HTMLTextFormControlElement::defaultEventHandler(evt);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 112,884
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int datablob_hmac_append(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen)
{
u8 derived_key[HASH_SIZE];
u8 *digest;
int ret;
ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, AUTH_KEY, master_key, master_keylen);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
digest = epayload->format + epayload->datablob_len;
ret = calc_hmac(digest, derived_key, sizeof derived_key,
epayload->format, epayload->datablob_len);
if (!ret)
dump_hmac(NULL, digest, HASH_SIZE);
out:
memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 60,209
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bt_status_t btif_dm_pin_reply( const bt_bdaddr_t *bd_addr, uint8_t accept,
uint8_t pin_len, bt_pin_code_t *pin_code)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s: accept=%d", __FUNCTION__, accept);
if (pin_code == NULL)
return BT_STATUS_FAIL;
#if (defined(BLE_INCLUDED) && (BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE))
if (pairing_cb.is_le_only)
{
int i;
UINT32 passkey = 0;
int multi[] = {100000, 10000, 1000, 100, 10,1};
BD_ADDR remote_bd_addr;
bdcpy(remote_bd_addr, bd_addr->address);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
{
passkey += (multi[i] * (pin_code->pin[i] - '0'));
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_dm_pin_reply: passkey: %d", passkey);
BTA_DmBlePasskeyReply(remote_bd_addr, accept, passkey);
}
else
{
BTA_DmPinReply( (UINT8 *)bd_addr->address, accept, pin_len, pin_code->pin);
if (accept)
pairing_cb.pin_code_len = pin_len;
}
#else
BTA_DmPinReply( (UINT8 *)bd_addr->address, accept, pin_len, pin_code->pin);
if (accept)
pairing_cb.pin_code_len = pin_len;
#endif
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Check size of pin before replying
If a malicious client set a pin that was too long it would overflow
the pin code memory.
Bug: 27411268
Change-Id: I9197ac6fdaa92a4799dacb6364e04671a39450cc
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 173,886
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderViewImpl* RenderViewImpl::Create(
gfx::NativeViewId parent_hwnd,
int32 opener_id,
const content::RendererPreferences& renderer_prefs,
const WebPreferences& webkit_prefs,
SharedRenderViewCounter* counter,
int32 routing_id,
int32 surface_id,
int64 session_storage_namespace_id,
const string16& frame_name,
int32 next_page_id,
const WebKit::WebScreenInfo& screen_info,
bool guest) {
DCHECK(routing_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
return new RenderViewImpl(
parent_hwnd,
opener_id,
renderer_prefs,
webkit_prefs,
counter,
routing_id,
surface_id,
session_storage_namespace_id,
frame_name,
next_page_id,
screen_info,
guest);
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 108,596
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_dump(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct nlattr *bearer[TIPC_NLA_BEARER_MAX + 1];
int err;
if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_BEARER])
return -EINVAL;
err = nla_parse_nested(bearer, TIPC_NLA_BEARER_MAX,
attrs[TIPC_NLA_BEARER], NULL);
if (err)
return err;
return tipc_add_tlv(msg->rep, TIPC_TLV_BEARER_NAME,
nla_data(bearer[TIPC_NLA_BEARER_NAME]),
nla_len(bearer[TIPC_NLA_BEARER_NAME]));
}
Commit Message: tipc: fix an infoleak in tipc_nl_compat_link_dump
link_info.str is a char array of size 60. Memory after the NULL
byte is not initialized. Sending the whole object out can cause
a leak.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 52,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void red_channel_client_pipe_clear(RedChannelClient *rcc)
{
PipeItem *item;
if (rcc) {
red_channel_client_clear_sent_item(rcc);
}
while ((item = (PipeItem *)ring_get_head(&rcc->pipe))) {
ring_remove(&item->link);
red_channel_client_release_item(rcc, item, FALSE);
}
rcc->pipe_size = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,117
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int setciedefspace(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *r, int *stage, int *cont, int CIESubst)
{
int code = 0;
ref CIEDict, *nocie;
ulong dictkey;
gs_md5_state_t md5;
byte key[16];
if (i_ctx_p->language_level < 3)
return_error(gs_error_undefined);
code = dict_find_string(systemdict, "NOCIE", &nocie);
if (code > 0) {
if (!r_has_type(nocie, t_boolean))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
if (nocie->value.boolval)
return setrgbspace(i_ctx_p, r, stage, cont, 1);
}
*cont = 0;
code = array_get(imemory, r, 1, &CIEDict);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if ((*stage) > 0) {
gs_client_color cc;
int i;
cc.pattern = 0x00;
for (i=0;i<3;i++)
cc.paint.values[i] = 0;
code = gs_setcolor(igs, &cc);
*stage = 0;
return code;
}
gs_md5_init(&md5);
/* If the hash (dictkey) is 0, we don't check for an existing
* ICC profile dor this space. So if we get an error hashing
* the space, we construct a new profile.
*/
dictkey = 0;
if (hashciedefspace(i_ctx_p, r, &md5)) {
/* Ideally we would use the whole md5 hash, but the ICC code only
* expects a long. I'm 'slightly' concerned about collisions here
* but I think its unlikely really. If it ever becomes a problem
* we could add the hash bytes up, or modify the ICC cache to store
* the full 16 byte hashs.
*/
gs_md5_finish(&md5, key);
dictkey = *(ulong *)&key[sizeof(key) - sizeof(ulong)];
} else {
gs_md5_finish(&md5, key);
}
code = ciedefspace(i_ctx_p, &CIEDict, dictkey);
*cont = 1;
(*stage)++;
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 3,138
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rtadv_cmd_init (void)
{
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_suppress_ra_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &no_ipv6_nd_suppress_ra_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_ra_interval_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_ra_interval_msec_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &no_ipv6_nd_ra_interval_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &no_ipv6_nd_ra_interval_val_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &no_ipv6_nd_ra_interval_msec_val_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_ra_lifetime_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &no_ipv6_nd_ra_lifetime_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &no_ipv6_nd_ra_lifetime_val_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_reachable_time_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &no_ipv6_nd_reachable_time_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &no_ipv6_nd_reachable_time_val_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_managed_config_flag_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &no_ipv6_nd_managed_config_flag_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_other_config_flag_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &no_ipv6_nd_other_config_flag_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_homeagent_config_flag_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &no_ipv6_nd_homeagent_config_flag_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_homeagent_preference_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &no_ipv6_nd_homeagent_preference_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &no_ipv6_nd_homeagent_preference_val_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_homeagent_lifetime_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &no_ipv6_nd_homeagent_lifetime_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &no_ipv6_nd_homeagent_lifetime_val_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_adv_interval_config_option_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &no_ipv6_nd_adv_interval_config_option_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_prefix_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_prefix_val_rev_rtaddr_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_prefix_val_nortaddr_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_prefix_val_rev_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_prefix_val_noauto_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_prefix_val_offlink_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_prefix_val_rtaddr_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_prefix_val_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_prefix_noval_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_prefix_noval_rev_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_prefix_noval_noauto_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_prefix_noval_offlink_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_prefix_noval_rtaddr_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_prefix_prefix_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &no_ipv6_nd_prefix_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_router_preference_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &no_ipv6_nd_router_preference_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &no_ipv6_nd_router_preference_val_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &ipv6_nd_mtu_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &no_ipv6_nd_mtu_cmd);
install_element (INTERFACE_NODE, &no_ipv6_nd_mtu_val_cmd);
}
Commit Message: zebra: stack overrun in IPv6 RA receive code (CVE-2016-1245)
The IPv6 RA code also receives ICMPv6 RS and RA messages.
Unfortunately, by bad coding practice, the buffer size specified on
receiving such messages mixed up 2 constants that in fact have
different values.
The code itself has:
#define RTADV_MSG_SIZE 4096
While BUFSIZ is system-dependent, in my case (x86_64 glibc):
/usr/include/_G_config.h:#define _G_BUFSIZ 8192
/usr/include/libio.h:#define _IO_BUFSIZ _G_BUFSIZ
/usr/include/stdio.h:# define BUFSIZ _IO_BUFSIZ
FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD and Illumos are not affected, since all of them
have BUFSIZ == 1024.
As the latter is passed to the kernel on recvmsg(), it's possible to
overwrite 4kB of stack -- with ICMPv6 packets that can be globally sent
to any of the system's addresses (using fragmentation to get to 8k).
(The socket has filters installed limiting this to RS and RA packets,
but does not have a filter for source address or TTL.)
Issue discovered by trying to test other stuff, which randomly caused
the stack to be smaller than 8kB in that code location, which then
causes the kernel to report EFAULT (Bad address).
Signed-off-by: David Lamparter <equinox@opensourcerouting.org>
Reviewed-by: Donald Sharp <sharpd@cumulusnetworks.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 73,943
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebMediaPlayerMS::GetPaintCanvasVideoRenderer() {
return &video_renderer_;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,148
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_ringmemory(struct b43_dmaring *ring)
{
dma_free_coherent(ring->dev->dev->dma_dev, B43_DMA_RINGMEMSIZE,
ring->descbase, ring->dmabase);
}
Commit Message: b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,551
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned parse_hex4(const char *str)
{
unsigned h=0;
if (*str>='0' && *str<='9') h+=(*str)-'0'; else if (*str>='A' && *str<='F') h+=10+(*str)-'A'; else if (*str>='a' && *str<='f') h+=10+(*str)-'a'; else return 0;
h=h<<4;str++;
if (*str>='0' && *str<='9') h+=(*str)-'0'; else if (*str>='A' && *str<='F') h+=10+(*str)-'A'; else if (*str>='a' && *str<='f') h+=10+(*str)-'a'; else return 0;
h=h<<4;str++;
if (*str>='0' && *str<='9') h+=(*str)-'0'; else if (*str>='A' && *str<='F') h+=10+(*str)-'A'; else if (*str>='a' && *str<='f') h+=10+(*str)-'a'; else return 0;
h=h<<4;str++;
if (*str>='0' && *str<='9') h+=(*str)-'0'; else if (*str>='A' && *str<='F') h+=10+(*str)-'A'; else if (*str>='a' && *str<='f') h+=10+(*str)-'a'; else return 0;
return h;
}
Commit Message: fix buffer overflow (#30)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 93,732
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileSystemManagerImpl::TruncateSync(const GURL& file_path,
int64_t length,
TruncateSyncCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
FileSystemURL url(context_->CrackURL(file_path));
base::Optional<base::File::Error> opt_error = ValidateFileSystemURL(url);
if (opt_error) {
std::move(callback).Run(opt_error.value());
return;
}
if (!security_policy_->CanWriteFileSystemFile(process_id_, url)) {
std::move(callback).Run(base::File::FILE_ERROR_SECURITY);
return;
}
operation_runner()->Truncate(
url, length,
base::BindRepeating(&FileSystemManagerImpl::DidFinish, GetWeakPtr(),
base::Passed(&callback)));
}
Commit Message: Disable FileSystemManager::CreateWriter if WritableFiles isn't enabled.
Bug: 922677
Change-Id: Ib16137cbabb2ec07f1ffc0484722f1d9cc533404
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1416570
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623552}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MngPair mng_read_pair(MngPair previous_pair,int delta_type,
unsigned char *p)
{
MngPair
pair;
/*
Read two ssize_ts from CLON, MOVE or PAST chunk
*/
pair.a=(long) ((p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) | (p[2] << 8) | p[3]);
pair.b=(long) ((p[4] << 24) | (p[5] << 16) | (p[6] << 8) | p[7]);
if (delta_type != 0)
{
pair.a+=previous_pair.a;
pair.b+=previous_pair.b;
}
return(pair);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 62,160
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cifs_readdata_alloc(unsigned int nr_pages, work_func_t complete)
{
struct cifs_readdata *rdata;
rdata = kzalloc(sizeof(*rdata) + (sizeof(struct page *) * nr_pages),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (rdata != NULL) {
kref_init(&rdata->refcount);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rdata->list);
init_completion(&rdata->done);
INIT_WORK(&rdata->work, complete);
}
return rdata;
}
Commit Message: cifs: ensure that uncached writes handle unmapped areas correctly
It's possible for userland to pass down an iovec via writev() that has a
bogus user pointer in it. If that happens and we're doing an uncached
write, then we can end up getting less bytes than we expect from the
call to iov_iter_copy_from_user. This is CVE-2014-0069
cifs_iovec_write isn't set up to handle that situation however. It'll
blindly keep chugging through the page array and not filling those pages
with anything useful. Worse yet, we'll later end up with a negative
number in wdata->tailsz, which will confuse the sending routines and
cause an oops at the very least.
Fix this by having the copy phase of cifs_iovec_write stop copying data
in this situation and send the last write as a short one. At the same
time, we want to avoid sending a zero-length write to the server, so
break out of the loop and set rc to -EFAULT if that happens. This also
allows us to handle the case where no address in the iovec is valid.
[Note: Marking this for stable on v3.4+ kernels, but kernels as old as
v2.6.38 may have a similar problem and may need similar fix]
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 40,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cma_check_req_qp_type(struct rdma_cm_id *id, struct ib_cm_event *ib_event)
{
return (((ib_event->event == IB_CM_REQ_RECEIVED) &&
(ib_event->param.req_rcvd.qp_type == id->qp_type)) ||
((ib_event->event == IB_CM_SIDR_REQ_RECEIVED) &&
(id->qp_type == IB_QPT_UD)) ||
(!id->qp_type));
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,464
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: write_iso9660_data(struct archive_write *a, const void *buff, size_t s)
{
struct iso9660 *iso9660 = a->format_data;
size_t ws;
if (iso9660->temp_fd < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Couldn't create temporary file");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
ws = s;
if (iso9660->need_multi_extent &&
(iso9660->cur_file->cur_content->size + ws) >=
(MULTI_EXTENT_SIZE - LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
struct content *con;
size_t ts;
ts = (size_t)(MULTI_EXTENT_SIZE - LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE -
iso9660->cur_file->cur_content->size);
if (iso9660->zisofs.detect_magic)
zisofs_detect_magic(a, buff, ts);
if (iso9660->zisofs.making) {
if (zisofs_write_to_temp(a, buff, ts) != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
} else {
if (wb_write_to_temp(a, buff, ts) != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
iso9660->cur_file->cur_content->size += ts;
}
/* Write padding. */
if (wb_write_padding_to_temp(a,
iso9660->cur_file->cur_content->size) != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
/* Compute the logical block number. */
iso9660->cur_file->cur_content->blocks = (int)
((iso9660->cur_file->cur_content->size
+ LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE -1) >> LOGICAL_BLOCK_BITS);
/*
* Make next extent.
*/
ws -= ts;
buff = (const void *)(((const unsigned char *)buff) + ts);
/* Make a content for next extent. */
con = calloc(1, sizeof(*con));
if (con == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate content data");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
con->offset_of_temp = wb_offset(a);
iso9660->cur_file->cur_content->next = con;
iso9660->cur_file->cur_content = con;
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB_H
iso9660->zisofs.block_offset = 0;
#endif
}
if (iso9660->zisofs.detect_magic)
zisofs_detect_magic(a, buff, ws);
if (iso9660->zisofs.making) {
if (zisofs_write_to_temp(a, buff, ws) != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
} else {
if (wb_write_to_temp(a, buff, ws) != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
iso9660->cur_file->cur_content->size += ws;
}
return (s);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 50,899
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool IsValidElementName(Document* document, const String& name) {
bool is_valid_dom_name = Document::IsValidName(name);
bool is_valid_html_name = IsValidElementNamePerHTMLParser(name);
if (UNLIKELY(is_valid_html_name != is_valid_dom_name)) {
UseCounter::Count(document,
is_valid_dom_name
? WebFeature::kElementNameDOMValidHTMLParserInvalid
: WebFeature::kElementNameDOMInvalidHTMLParserValid);
}
return is_valid_dom_name;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,773
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_obj_alloc(mrb_state *mrb, enum mrb_vtype ttype, struct RClass *cls)
{
struct RBasic *p;
static const RVALUE RVALUE_zero = { { { MRB_TT_FALSE } } };
mrb_gc *gc = &mrb->gc;
if (cls) {
enum mrb_vtype tt;
switch (cls->tt) {
case MRB_TT_CLASS:
case MRB_TT_SCLASS:
case MRB_TT_MODULE:
case MRB_TT_ENV:
break;
default:
mrb_raise(mrb, E_TYPE_ERROR, "allocation failure");
}
tt = MRB_INSTANCE_TT(cls);
if (tt != MRB_TT_FALSE &&
ttype != MRB_TT_SCLASS &&
ttype != MRB_TT_ICLASS &&
ttype != MRB_TT_ENV &&
ttype != tt) {
mrb_raisef(mrb, E_TYPE_ERROR, "allocation failure of %S", mrb_obj_value(cls));
}
}
#ifdef MRB_GC_STRESS
mrb_full_gc(mrb);
#endif
if (gc->threshold < gc->live) {
mrb_incremental_gc(mrb);
}
if (gc->free_heaps == NULL) {
add_heap(mrb, gc);
}
p = gc->free_heaps->freelist;
gc->free_heaps->freelist = ((struct free_obj*)p)->next;
if (gc->free_heaps->freelist == NULL) {
unlink_free_heap_page(gc, gc->free_heaps);
}
gc->live++;
gc_protect(mrb, gc, p);
*(RVALUE *)p = RVALUE_zero;
p->tt = ttype;
p->c = cls;
paint_partial_white(gc, p);
return p;
}
Commit Message: Clear unused stack region that may refer freed objects; fix #3596
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 64,448
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void copy_chroma(AVFrame *dst, AVFrame *src, int width, int height)
{
int i, j;
for (j = 1; j < 3; j++) {
for (i = 0; i < height / 2; i++)
memcpy(dst->data[j] + i * dst->linesize[j],
src->data[j] + i * src->linesize[j], width / 2);
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetHttpWarningEnabled() {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeature(
security_state::kHttpFormWarningFeature);
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <nikhil.sahni@samsung.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,623
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char **argv) {
testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv); // Removes gtest-specific args.
CommandLine::Init(argc, argv);
CommandLine* cmd_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
DCHECK(cmd_line);
CommandLine::SwitchMap switches = cmd_line->GetSwitches();
for (CommandLine::SwitchMap::const_iterator it = switches.begin();
it != switches.end(); ++it) {
if (it->first == "test_video_data") {
test_video_data = it->second.c_str();
continue;
}
LOG(FATAL) << "Unexpected switch: " << it->first << ":" << it->second;
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
base::ShadowingAtExitManager at_exit_manager;
gfx::InitializeGLBindings(gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2);
gfx::GLSurface::InitializeOneOff();
{
scoped_refptr<gfx::GLSurface> surface(
gfx::GLSurface::CreateOffscreenGLSurface(false, gfx::Size(1, 1)));
scoped_refptr<gfx::GLContext> context(
gfx::GLContext::CreateGLContext(NULL, surface.get(),
gfx::PreferIntegratedGpu));
context->MakeCurrent(surface.get());
}
DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::PreSandboxInitialization();
#endif // OS_WIN
return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,997
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoSamplerParameterfv(GLuint client_id,
GLenum pname,
const volatile GLfloat* params) {
DCHECK(params);
Sampler* sampler = GetSampler(client_id);
if (!sampler) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glSamplerParameterfv", "unknown sampler");
return;
}
sampler_manager()->SetParameterf(
"glSamplerParameterfv", GetErrorState(), sampler, pname, params[0]);
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 145,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SoundPool::setCallback(SoundPoolCallback* callback, void* user)
{
Mutex::Autolock lock(&mCallbackLock);
mCallback = callback;
mUserData = user;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE SoundPool: add lock for findSample access from SoundPoolThread
Sample decoding still occurs in SoundPoolThread
without holding the SoundPool lock.
Bug: 25781119
Change-Id: I11fde005aa9cf5438e0390a0d2dfe0ec1dd282e8
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,916
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit twofish_mod_fini(void)
{
crypto_unregister_alg(&alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: irc_server_disconnect (struct t_irc_server *server, int switch_address,
int reconnect)
{
struct t_irc_channel *ptr_channel;
if (server->is_connected)
{
/*
* remove all nicks and write disconnection message on each
* channel/private buffer
*/
for (ptr_channel = server->channels; ptr_channel;
ptr_channel = ptr_channel->next_channel)
{
irc_nick_free_all (server, ptr_channel);
weechat_printf (ptr_channel->buffer,
_("%s%s: disconnected from server"),
"",
IRC_PLUGIN_NAME);
}
}
irc_server_close_connection (server);
if (server->buffer)
{
weechat_printf (server->buffer,
_("%s: disconnected from server"),
IRC_PLUGIN_NAME);
}
if (switch_address)
irc_server_switch_address (server, 0);
else
irc_server_set_index_current_address(server, 0);
if (server->nick_modes)
{
free (server->nick_modes);
server->nick_modes = NULL;
weechat_bar_item_update ("input_prompt");
}
server->is_away = 0;
server->away_time = 0;
server->lag = 0;
server->lag_check_time.tv_sec = 0;
server->lag_check_time.tv_usec = 0;
server->lag_next_check = time (NULL) +
weechat_config_integer (irc_config_network_lag_check);
server->lag_last_refresh = 0;
if (reconnect
&& IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTORECONNECT))
irc_server_reconnect_schedule (server);
else
{
server->reconnect_delay = 0;
server->reconnect_start = 0;
}
/* discard current nick if no reconnection asked */
if (!reconnect && server->nick)
irc_server_set_nick (server, NULL);
irc_server_set_buffer_title (server);
/* send signal "irc_server_disconnected" with server name */
weechat_hook_signal_send ("irc_server_disconnected",
WEECHAT_HOOK_SIGNAL_STRING, server->name);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,475
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct ifblock * compiler_create_ifblock(struct condition *conds, struct block *blk)
{
struct ifblock *ifblk;
SAFE_CALLOC(ifblk, 1, sizeof(struct ifblock));
/* associate the pointers */
ifblk->conds = conds;
ifblk->blk = blk;
return ifblk;
}
Commit Message: Exit gracefully in case of corrupted filters (Closes issue #782)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 68,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: server_http_init(struct server *srv)
{
/* nothing */
}
Commit Message: Reimplement httpd's support for byte ranges.
The previous implementation loaded all the output into a single output
buffer and used its size to determine the Content-Length of the body.
The new implementation calculates the body length first and writes the
individual ranges in an async way using the bufferevent mechanism.
This prevents httpd from using too much memory and applies the
watermark and throttling mechanisms to range requests.
Problem reported by Pierre Kim (pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com)
OK benno@ sunil@
CWE ID: CWE-770
| 0
| 68,498
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static xmlDocPtr dom_document_parser(zval *id, int mode, char *source, int source_len, int options TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
xmlDocPtr ret;
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt = NULL;
dom_doc_propsptr doc_props;
dom_object *intern;
php_libxml_ref_obj *document = NULL;
int validate, recover, resolve_externals, keep_blanks, substitute_ent;
int resolved_path_len;
int old_error_reporting = 0;
char *directory=NULL, resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN];
if (id != NULL) {
intern = (dom_object *)zend_object_store_get_object(id TSRMLS_CC);
document = intern->document;
}
doc_props = dom_get_doc_props(document);
validate = doc_props->validateonparse;
resolve_externals = doc_props->resolveexternals;
keep_blanks = doc_props->preservewhitespace;
substitute_ent = doc_props->substituteentities;
recover = doc_props->recover;
if (document == NULL) {
efree(doc_props);
}
xmlInitParser();
if (mode == DOM_LOAD_FILE) {
char *file_dest = _dom_get_valid_file_path(source, resolved_path, MAXPATHLEN TSRMLS_CC);
if (file_dest) {
ctxt = xmlCreateFileParserCtxt(file_dest);
ctxt = xmlCreateMemoryParserCtxt(source, source_len);
}
if (ctxt == NULL) {
return(NULL);
}
/* If loading from memory, we need to set the base directory for the document */
if (mode != DOM_LOAD_FILE) {
#if HAVE_GETCWD
directory = VCWD_GETCWD(resolved_path, MAXPATHLEN);
#elif HAVE_GETWD
directory = VCWD_GETWD(resolved_path);
#endif
if (directory) {
if(ctxt->directory != NULL) {
xmlFree((char *) ctxt->directory);
}
resolved_path_len = strlen(resolved_path);
if (resolved_path[resolved_path_len - 1] != DEFAULT_SLASH) {
resolved_path[resolved_path_len] = DEFAULT_SLASH;
resolved_path[++resolved_path_len] = '\0';
}
ctxt->directory = (char *) xmlCanonicPath((const xmlChar *) resolved_path);
}
}
ctxt->vctxt.error = php_libxml_ctx_error;
ctxt->vctxt.warning = php_libxml_ctx_warning;
if (ctxt->sax != NULL) {
ctxt->sax->error = php_libxml_ctx_error;
ctxt->sax->warning = php_libxml_ctx_warning;
}
if (validate && ! (options & XML_PARSE_DTDVALID)) {
options |= XML_PARSE_DTDVALID;
}
if (resolve_externals && ! (options & XML_PARSE_DTDATTR)) {
options |= XML_PARSE_DTDATTR;
}
if (substitute_ent && ! (options & XML_PARSE_NOENT)) {
options |= XML_PARSE_NOENT;
}
if (keep_blanks == 0 && ! (options & XML_PARSE_NOBLANKS)) {
options |= XML_PARSE_NOBLANKS;
}
xmlCtxtUseOptions(ctxt, options);
ctxt->recovery = recover;
if (recover) {
old_error_reporting = EG(error_reporting);
EG(error_reporting) = old_error_reporting | E_WARNING;
}
xmlParseDocument(ctxt);
if (ctxt->wellFormed || recover) {
ret = ctxt->myDoc;
if (ctxt->recovery) {
EG(error_reporting) = old_error_reporting;
}
/* If loading from memory, set the base reference uri for the document */
if (ret && ret->URL == NULL && ctxt->directory != NULL) {
ret->URL = xmlStrdup(ctxt->directory);
}
} else {
ret = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(ret);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ static void dom_parse_document(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int mode) */
static void dom_parse_document(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int mode) {
zval *id;
xmlDoc *docp = NULL, *newdoc;
dom_doc_propsptr doc_prop;
dom_object *intern;
char *source;
int source_len, refcount, ret;
long options = 0;
id = getThis();
if (id != NULL && ! instanceof_function(Z_OBJCE_P(id), dom_document_class_entry TSRMLS_CC)) {
id = NULL;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|l", &source, &source_len, &options) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!source_len) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Empty string supplied as input");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
newdoc = dom_document_parser(id, mode, source, source_len, options TSRMLS_CC);
if (!newdoc)
RETURN_FALSE;
if (id != NULL) {
intern = (dom_object *)zend_object_store_get_object(id TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern != NULL) {
docp = (xmlDocPtr) dom_object_get_node(intern);
doc_prop = NULL;
if (docp != NULL) {
php_libxml_decrement_node_ptr((php_libxml_node_object *) intern TSRMLS_CC);
doc_prop = intern->document->doc_props;
intern->document->doc_props = NULL;
refcount = php_libxml_decrement_doc_ref((php_libxml_node_object *)intern TSRMLS_CC);
if (refcount != 0) {
docp->_private = NULL;
}
}
intern->document = NULL;
if (php_libxml_increment_doc_ref((php_libxml_node_object *)intern, newdoc TSRMLS_CC) == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
intern->document->doc_props = doc_prop;
}
php_libxml_increment_node_ptr((php_libxml_node_object *)intern, (xmlNodePtr)newdoc, (void *)intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
DOM_RET_OBJ((xmlNodePtr) newdoc, &ret, NULL);
}
}
/* }}} end dom_parser_document */
/* {{{ proto DOMNode dom_document_load(string source [, int options]);
URL: http://www.w3.org/TR/DOM-Level-3-LS/load-save.html#LS-DocumentLS-load
Since: DOM Level 3
*/
PHP_METHOD(domdocument, load)
{
dom_parse_document(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, DOM_LOAD_FILE);
}
/* }}} end dom_document_load */
/* {{{ proto DOMNode dom_document_loadxml(string source [, int options]);
URL: http://www.w3.org/TR/DOM-Level-3-LS/load-save.html#LS-DocumentLS-loadXML
Since: DOM Level 3
*/
PHP_METHOD(domdocument, loadXML)
{
dom_parse_document(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, DOM_LOAD_STRING);
}
/* }}} end dom_document_loadxml */
/* {{{ proto int dom_document_save(string file);
Convenience method to save to file
*/
PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_save)
{
zval *id;
xmlDoc *docp;
int file_len = 0, bytes, format, saveempty = 0;
dom_object *intern;
dom_doc_propsptr doc_props;
char *file;
long options = 0;
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "Os|l", &id, dom_document_class_entry, &file, &file_len, &options) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (file_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid Filename");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern);
/* encoding handled by property on doc */
doc_props = dom_get_doc_props(intern->document);
format = doc_props->formatoutput;
if (options & LIBXML_SAVE_NOEMPTYTAG) {
saveempty = xmlSaveNoEmptyTags;
xmlSaveNoEmptyTags = 1;
}
bytes = xmlSaveFormatFileEnc(file, docp, NULL, format);
if (options & LIBXML_SAVE_NOEMPTYTAG) {
xmlSaveNoEmptyTags = saveempty;
}
if (bytes == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_LONG(bytes);
}
/* }}} end dom_document_save */
/* {{{ proto string dom_document_savexml([node n]);
URL: http://www.w3.org/TR/DOM-Level-3-LS/load-save.html#LS-DocumentLS-saveXML
Since: DOM Level 3
*/
PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_savexml)
{
zval *id, *nodep = NULL;
xmlDoc *docp;
xmlNode *node;
xmlBufferPtr buf;
xmlChar *mem;
dom_object *intern, *nodeobj;
dom_doc_propsptr doc_props;
int size, format, saveempty = 0;
long options = 0;
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "O|O!l", &id, dom_document_class_entry, &nodep, dom_node_class_entry, &options) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern);
doc_props = dom_get_doc_props(intern->document);
format = doc_props->formatoutput;
if (nodep != NULL) {
/* Dump contents of Node */
DOM_GET_OBJ(node, nodep, xmlNodePtr, nodeobj);
if (node->doc != docp) {
php_dom_throw_error(WRONG_DOCUMENT_ERR, dom_get_strict_error(intern->document) TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
buf = xmlBufferCreate();
if (!buf) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not fetch buffer");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (options & LIBXML_SAVE_NOEMPTYTAG) {
saveempty = xmlSaveNoEmptyTags;
xmlSaveNoEmptyTags = 1;
}
xmlNodeDump(buf, docp, node, 0, format);
if (options & LIBXML_SAVE_NOEMPTYTAG) {
xmlSaveNoEmptyTags = saveempty;
}
mem = (xmlChar*) xmlBufferContent(buf);
if (!mem) {
xmlBufferFree(buf);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETVAL_STRING(mem, 1);
xmlBufferFree(buf);
} else {
if (options & LIBXML_SAVE_NOEMPTYTAG) {
saveempty = xmlSaveNoEmptyTags;
xmlSaveNoEmptyTags = 1;
}
/* Encoding is handled from the encoding property set on the document */
xmlDocDumpFormatMemory(docp, &mem, &size, format);
if (options & LIBXML_SAVE_NOEMPTYTAG) {
xmlSaveNoEmptyTags = saveempty;
}
if (!size) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETVAL_STRINGL(mem, size, 1);
xmlFree(mem);
}
}
/* }}} end dom_document_savexml */
static xmlNodePtr php_dom_free_xinclude_node(xmlNodePtr cur TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
xmlNodePtr xincnode;
xincnode = cur;
cur = cur->next;
xmlUnlinkNode(xincnode);
php_libxml_node_free_resource(xincnode TSRMLS_CC);
return cur;
}
/* }}} */
static void php_dom_remove_xinclude_nodes(xmlNodePtr cur TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
while(cur) {
if (cur->type == XML_XINCLUDE_START) {
cur = php_dom_free_xinclude_node(cur TSRMLS_CC);
/* XML_XINCLUDE_END node will be a sibling of XML_XINCLUDE_START */
while(cur && cur->type != XML_XINCLUDE_END) {
/* remove xinclude processing nodes from recursive xincludes */
if (cur->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
php_dom_remove_xinclude_nodes(cur->children TSRMLS_CC);
}
cur = cur->next;
}
if (cur && cur->type == XML_XINCLUDE_END) {
cur = php_dom_free_xinclude_node(cur TSRMLS_CC);
}
} else {
if (cur->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
php_dom_remove_xinclude_nodes(cur->children TSRMLS_CC);
}
cur = cur->next;
}
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int dom_document_xinclude([int options])
Substitutues xincludes in a DomDocument */
PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_xinclude)
{
zval *id;
xmlDoc *docp;
xmlNodePtr root;
long flags = 0;
int err;
dom_object *intern;
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "O|l", &id, dom_document_class_entry, &flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern);
err = xmlXIncludeProcessFlags(docp, flags);
/* XML_XINCLUDE_START and XML_XINCLUDE_END nodes need to be removed as these
are added via xmlXIncludeProcess to mark beginning and ending of xincluded document
but are not wanted in resulting document - must be done even if err as it could fail after
having processed some xincludes */
root = (xmlNodePtr) docp->children;
while(root && root->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE && root->type != XML_XINCLUDE_START) {
root = root->next;
}
if (root) {
php_dom_remove_xinclude_nodes(root TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (err) {
RETVAL_LONG(err);
} else {
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto boolean dom_document_validate();
Since: DOM extended
*/
PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_validate)
{
zval *id;
xmlDoc *docp;
dom_object *intern;
xmlValidCtxt *cvp;
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "O", &id, dom_document_class_entry) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern);
cvp = xmlNewValidCtxt();
cvp->userData = NULL;
cvp->error = (xmlValidityErrorFunc) php_libxml_error_handler;
cvp->warning = (xmlValidityErrorFunc) php_libxml_error_handler;
if (xmlValidateDocument(cvp, docp)) {
RETVAL_TRUE;
} else {
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
xmlFreeValidCtxt(cvp);
}
/* }}} */
#if defined(LIBXML_SCHEMAS_ENABLED)
static void _dom_document_schema_validate(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int type) /* {{{ */
{
zval *id;
xmlDoc *docp;
dom_object *intern;
char *source = NULL, *valid_file = NULL;
int source_len = 0;
xmlSchemaParserCtxtPtr parser;
xmlSchemaPtr sptr;
xmlSchemaValidCtxtPtr vptr;
int is_valid;
char resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN + 1];
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "Op", &id, dom_document_class_entry, &source, &source_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (source_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid Schema source");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern);
switch (type) {
case DOM_LOAD_FILE:
valid_file = _dom_get_valid_file_path(source, resolved_path, MAXPATHLEN TSRMLS_CC);
if (!valid_file) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid Schema file source");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
parser = xmlSchemaNewParserCtxt(valid_file);
break;
case DOM_LOAD_STRING:
parser = xmlSchemaNewMemParserCtxt(source, source_len);
/* If loading from memory, we need to set the base directory for the document
but it is not apparent how to do that for schema's */
break;
default:
return;
}
xmlSchemaSetParserErrors(parser,
(xmlSchemaValidityErrorFunc) php_libxml_error_handler,
(xmlSchemaValidityWarningFunc) php_libxml_error_handler,
parser);
sptr = xmlSchemaParse(parser);
xmlSchemaFreeParserCtxt(parser);
if (!sptr) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid Schema");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
docp = (xmlDocPtr) dom_object_get_node(intern);
vptr = xmlSchemaNewValidCtxt(sptr);
if (!vptr) {
xmlSchemaFree(sptr);
php_error(E_ERROR, "Invalid Schema Validation Context");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
xmlSchemaSetValidErrors(vptr, php_libxml_error_handler, php_libxml_error_handler, vptr);
is_valid = xmlSchemaValidateDoc(vptr, docp);
xmlSchemaFree(sptr);
xmlSchemaFreeValidCtxt(vptr);
if (is_valid == 0) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto boolean dom_document_schema_validate_file(string filename); */
PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_schema_validate_file)
{
_dom_document_schema_validate(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, DOM_LOAD_FILE);
}
/* }}} end dom_document_schema_validate_file */
/* {{{ proto boolean dom_document_schema_validate(string source); */
PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_schema_validate_xml)
{
_dom_document_schema_validate(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, DOM_LOAD_STRING);
}
/* }}} end dom_document_schema_validate */
static void _dom_document_relaxNG_validate(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int type) /* {{{ */
{
zval *id;
xmlDoc *docp;
dom_object *intern;
char *source = NULL, *valid_file = NULL;
int source_len = 0;
xmlRelaxNGParserCtxtPtr parser;
xmlRelaxNGPtr sptr;
xmlRelaxNGValidCtxtPtr vptr;
int is_valid;
char resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN + 1];
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "Op", &id, dom_document_class_entry, &source, &source_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (source_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid Schema source");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern);
switch (type) {
case DOM_LOAD_FILE:
valid_file = _dom_get_valid_file_path(source, resolved_path, MAXPATHLEN TSRMLS_CC);
if (!valid_file) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid RelaxNG file source");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
parser = xmlRelaxNGNewParserCtxt(valid_file);
break;
case DOM_LOAD_STRING:
parser = xmlRelaxNGNewMemParserCtxt(source, source_len);
/* If loading from memory, we need to set the base directory for the document
but it is not apparent how to do that for schema's */
break;
default:
return;
}
xmlRelaxNGSetParserErrors(parser,
(xmlRelaxNGValidityErrorFunc) php_libxml_error_handler,
(xmlRelaxNGValidityWarningFunc) php_libxml_error_handler,
parser);
sptr = xmlRelaxNGParse(parser);
xmlRelaxNGFreeParserCtxt(parser);
if (!sptr) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid RelaxNG");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
docp = (xmlDocPtr) dom_object_get_node(intern);
vptr = xmlRelaxNGNewValidCtxt(sptr);
if (!vptr) {
xmlRelaxNGFree(sptr);
php_error(E_ERROR, "Invalid RelaxNG Validation Context");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
xmlRelaxNGSetValidErrors(vptr, php_libxml_error_handler, php_libxml_error_handler, vptr);
is_valid = xmlRelaxNGValidateDoc(vptr, docp);
xmlRelaxNGFree(sptr);
xmlRelaxNGFreeValidCtxt(vptr);
if (is_valid == 0) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto boolean dom_document_relaxNG_validate_file(string filename); */
PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_relaxNG_validate_file)
{
_dom_document_relaxNG_validate(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, DOM_LOAD_FILE);
}
/* }}} end dom_document_relaxNG_validate_file */
/* {{{ proto boolean dom_document_relaxNG_validate_xml(string source); */
PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_relaxNG_validate_xml)
{
_dom_document_relaxNG_validate(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, DOM_LOAD_STRING);
}
/* }}} end dom_document_relaxNG_validate_xml */
#endif
#if defined(LIBXML_HTML_ENABLED)
static void dom_load_html(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int mode) /* {{{ */
{
zval *id;
xmlDoc *docp = NULL, *newdoc;
dom_object *intern;
dom_doc_propsptr doc_prop;
char *source;
int source_len, refcount, ret;
long options = 0;
htmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt;
id = getThis();
id = getThis();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|l", &source, &source_len, &options) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
}
if (mode == DOM_LOAD_FILE) {
ctxt = htmlCreateFileParserCtxt(source, NULL);
} else {
source_len = xmlStrlen(source);
ctxt = htmlCreateMemoryParserCtxt(source, source_len);
}
if (!ctxt) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (options) {
htmlCtxtUseOptions(ctxt, options);
}
ctxt->vctxt.error = php_libxml_ctx_error;
ctxt->vctxt.warning = php_libxml_ctx_warning;
if (ctxt->sax != NULL) {
ctxt->sax->error = php_libxml_ctx_error;
ctxt->sax->warning = php_libxml_ctx_warning;
}
htmlParseDocument(ctxt);
newdoc = ctxt->myDoc;
htmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
if (!newdoc)
RETURN_FALSE;
if (id != NULL && instanceof_function(Z_OBJCE_P(id), dom_document_class_entry TSRMLS_CC)) {
intern = (dom_object *)zend_object_store_get_object(id TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern != NULL) {
docp = (xmlDocPtr) dom_object_get_node(intern);
doc_prop = NULL;
if (docp != NULL) {
php_libxml_decrement_node_ptr((php_libxml_node_object *) intern TSRMLS_CC);
doc_prop = intern->document->doc_props;
intern->document->doc_props = NULL;
refcount = php_libxml_decrement_doc_ref((php_libxml_node_object *)intern TSRMLS_CC);
if (refcount != 0) {
docp->_private = NULL;
}
}
intern->document = NULL;
if (php_libxml_increment_doc_ref((php_libxml_node_object *)intern, newdoc TSRMLS_CC) == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
intern->document->doc_props = doc_prop;
}
php_libxml_increment_node_ptr((php_libxml_node_object *)intern, (xmlNodePtr)newdoc, (void *)intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
DOM_RET_OBJ((xmlNodePtr) newdoc, &ret, NULL);
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 1
| 165,309
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int atl2_check_link(struct atl2_adapter *adapter)
{
struct atl2_hw *hw = &adapter->hw;
struct net_device *netdev = adapter->netdev;
int ret_val;
u16 speed, duplex, phy_data;
int reconfig = 0;
/* MII_BMSR must read twise */
atl2_read_phy_reg(hw, MII_BMSR, &phy_data);
atl2_read_phy_reg(hw, MII_BMSR, &phy_data);
if (!(phy_data&BMSR_LSTATUS)) { /* link down */
if (netif_carrier_ok(netdev)) { /* old link state: Up */
u32 value;
/* disable rx */
value = ATL2_READ_REG(hw, REG_MAC_CTRL);
value &= ~MAC_CTRL_RX_EN;
ATL2_WRITE_REG(hw, REG_MAC_CTRL, value);
adapter->link_speed = SPEED_0;
netif_carrier_off(netdev);
netif_stop_queue(netdev);
}
return 0;
}
/* Link Up */
ret_val = atl2_get_speed_and_duplex(hw, &speed, &duplex);
if (ret_val)
return ret_val;
switch (hw->MediaType) {
case MEDIA_TYPE_100M_FULL:
if (speed != SPEED_100 || duplex != FULL_DUPLEX)
reconfig = 1;
break;
case MEDIA_TYPE_100M_HALF:
if (speed != SPEED_100 || duplex != HALF_DUPLEX)
reconfig = 1;
break;
case MEDIA_TYPE_10M_FULL:
if (speed != SPEED_10 || duplex != FULL_DUPLEX)
reconfig = 1;
break;
case MEDIA_TYPE_10M_HALF:
if (speed != SPEED_10 || duplex != HALF_DUPLEX)
reconfig = 1;
break;
}
/* link result is our setting */
if (reconfig == 0) {
if (adapter->link_speed != speed ||
adapter->link_duplex != duplex) {
adapter->link_speed = speed;
adapter->link_duplex = duplex;
atl2_setup_mac_ctrl(adapter);
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: %s NIC Link is Up<%d Mbps %s>\n",
atl2_driver_name, netdev->name,
adapter->link_speed,
adapter->link_duplex == FULL_DUPLEX ?
"Full Duplex" : "Half Duplex");
}
if (!netif_carrier_ok(netdev)) { /* Link down -> Up */
netif_carrier_on(netdev);
netif_wake_queue(netdev);
}
return 0;
}
/* change original link status */
if (netif_carrier_ok(netdev)) {
u32 value;
/* disable rx */
value = ATL2_READ_REG(hw, REG_MAC_CTRL);
value &= ~MAC_CTRL_RX_EN;
ATL2_WRITE_REG(hw, REG_MAC_CTRL, value);
adapter->link_speed = SPEED_0;
netif_carrier_off(netdev);
netif_stop_queue(netdev);
}
/* auto-neg, insert timer to re-config phy
* (if interval smaller than 5 seconds, something strange) */
if (!test_bit(__ATL2_DOWN, &adapter->flags)) {
if (!test_and_set_bit(0, &adapter->cfg_phy))
mod_timer(&adapter->phy_config_timer,
round_jiffies(jiffies + 5 * HZ));
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 55,285
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_send_NPPrintData(rpc_message_t *message, void *p_value)
{
NPPrintData *printData = (NPPrintData *)p_value;
int error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, printData->size)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_bytes(message, printData->data, printData->size)) < 0)
return error;
return RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,994
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBlock::markPositionedObjectsForLayout()
{
TrackedRendererListHashSet* positionedDescendants = positionedObjects();
if (positionedDescendants) {
RenderBox* r;
TrackedRendererListHashSet::iterator end = positionedDescendants->end();
for (TrackedRendererListHashSet::iterator it = positionedDescendants->begin(); it != end; ++it) {
r = *it;
r->setChildNeedsLayout();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cmsBool Type_S15Fixed16_Write(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, void* Ptr, cmsUInt32Number nItems)
{
cmsFloat64Number* Value = (cmsFloat64Number*) Ptr;
cmsUInt32Number i;
for (i=0; i < nItems; i++) {
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, Value[i])) return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(self);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 71,047
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL ReplaceURLHostAndPath(const GURL& url,
const std::string& host,
const std::string& path) {
url::Replacements<char> replacements;
replacements.SetHost(host.c_str(), url::Component(0, host.length()));
replacements.SetPath(path.c_str(), url::Component(0, path.length()));
return url.ReplaceComponents(replacements);
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,744
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int diskstats_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return seq_open(file, &diskstats_op);
}
Commit Message: block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 49,701
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LogHistogramValue(signin::Source source, int action) {
switch (source) {
case signin::SOURCE_START_PAGE:
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Signin.StartPageActions", action,
one_click_signin::HISTOGRAM_MAX);
break;
case signin::SOURCE_NTP_LINK:
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Signin.NTPLinkActions", action,
one_click_signin::HISTOGRAM_MAX);
break;
case signin::SOURCE_MENU:
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Signin.MenuActions", action,
one_click_signin::HISTOGRAM_MAX);
break;
case signin::SOURCE_SETTINGS:
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Signin.SettingsActions", action,
one_click_signin::HISTOGRAM_MAX);
break;
case signin::SOURCE_EXTENSION_INSTALL_BUBBLE:
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Signin.ExtensionInstallBubbleActions", action,
one_click_signin::HISTOGRAM_MAX);
break;
case signin::SOURCE_WEBSTORE_INSTALL:
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Signin.WebstoreInstallActions", action,
one_click_signin::HISTOGRAM_MAX);
break;
case signin::SOURCE_APP_LAUNCHER:
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Signin.AppLauncherActions", action,
one_click_signin::HISTOGRAM_MAX);
break;
case signin::SOURCE_APPS_PAGE_LINK:
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Signin.AppsPageLinkActions", action,
one_click_signin::HISTOGRAM_MAX);
break;
case signin::SOURCE_BOOKMARK_BUBBLE:
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Signin.BookmarkBubbleActions", action,
one_click_signin::HISTOGRAM_MAX);
break;
default:
COMPILE_ASSERT(signin::SOURCE_UNKNOWN == 11,
kSourceEnumHasChangedButNotThisSwitchStatement);
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Signin.AllAccessPointActions", action,
one_click_signin::HISTOGRAM_MAX);
}
Commit Message: During redirects in the one click sign in flow, check the current URL
instead of original URL to validate gaia http headers.
BUG=307159
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/77343002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@236563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 109,827
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeClientImpl::SetWindowRect(const IntRect& r, LocalFrame& frame) {
DCHECK_EQ(&frame, web_view_->MainFrameImpl()->GetFrame());
WebWidgetClient* client =
WebLocalFrameImpl::FromFrame(&frame)->FrameWidget()->Client();
client->SetWindowRect(r);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 148,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
int al, i, ok, ret = -1, exp_idx;
unsigned long n, nc, llen, l;
X509 *x = NULL;
const unsigned char *q, *p;
unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
-1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return (1);
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
n2l3(p, llen);
if (llen + 3 != n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
n2l3(p, l);
if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
q = p;
x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, l);
if (x == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
if (q != (p + l)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x = NULL;
nc += l + 3;
p = q;
}
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
if (i > 1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
sc = ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (sc == NULL)
goto err;
ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
s->session->sess_cert = sc;
sc->cert_chain = sk;
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
* which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
*/
x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
sk = NULL;
/*
* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
*/
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
if (i < 0) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
sc->peer_cert_type = i;
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
/*
* Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
* of lines ago.
*/
X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
X509_free(s->session->peer);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
s->session->peer = x;
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
x = NULL;
ret = 1;
goto done;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
done:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix race condition in NewSessionTicket
If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.
CVE-2015-1791
This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.
Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
https://github.com/akamai/openssl/commit/c0bf69a791239ceec64509f9f19fcafb2461b0d3
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 44,201
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: irqfd_resampler_ack(struct kvm_irq_ack_notifier *kian)
{
struct kvm_kernel_irqfd_resampler *resampler;
struct kvm *kvm;
struct kvm_kernel_irqfd *irqfd;
int idx;
resampler = container_of(kian,
struct kvm_kernel_irqfd_resampler, notifier);
kvm = resampler->kvm;
kvm_set_irq(kvm, KVM_IRQFD_RESAMPLE_IRQ_SOURCE_ID,
resampler->notifier.gsi, 0, false);
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->irq_srcu);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(irqfd, &resampler->list, resampler_link)
eventfd_signal(irqfd->resamplefd, 1);
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->irq_srcu, idx);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Don't accept obviously wrong gsi values via KVM_IRQFD
We cannot add routes for gsi values >= KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES -- see
kvm_set_irq_routing(). Hence, there is no sense in accepting them
via KVM_IRQFD. Prevent them from entering the system in the first
place.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 58,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hfs_cat_traverse(HFS_INFO * hfs,
TSK_HFS_BTREE_CB a_cb, void *ptr)
{
TSK_FS_INFO *fs = &(hfs->fs_info);
uint32_t cur_node; /* node id of the current node */
char *node;
uint16_t nodesize;
uint8_t is_done = 0;
tsk_error_reset();
nodesize = tsk_getu16(fs->endian, hfs->catalog_header.nodesize);
if ((node = (char *) tsk_malloc(nodesize)) == NULL)
return 1;
/* start at root node */
cur_node = tsk_getu32(fs->endian, hfs->catalog_header.rootNode);
/* if the root node is zero, then the extents btree is empty */
/* if no files have overflow extents, the Extents B-tree still
exists on disk, but is an empty B-tree containing only
the header node */
if (cur_node == 0) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr, "hfs_cat_traverse: "
"empty extents btree\n");
free(node);
return 1;
}
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr, "hfs_cat_traverse: starting at "
"root node %" PRIu32 "; nodesize = %"
PRIu16 "\n", cur_node, nodesize);
/* Recurse down to the needed leaf nodes and then go forward */
is_done = 0;
while (is_done == 0) {
TSK_OFF_T cur_off; /* start address of cur_node */
uint16_t num_rec; /* number of records in this node */
ssize_t cnt;
hfs_btree_node *node_desc;
if (cur_node > tsk_getu32(fs->endian,
hfs->catalog_header.totalNodes)) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: Node %d too large for file", cur_node);
free(node);
return 1;
}
cur_off = cur_node * nodesize;
cnt = tsk_fs_attr_read(hfs->catalog_attr, cur_off,
node, nodesize, 0);
if (cnt != nodesize) {
if (cnt >= 0) {
tsk_error_reset();
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_READ);
}
tsk_error_set_errstr2
("hfs_cat_traverse: Error reading node %d at offset %"
PRIuOFF, cur_node, cur_off);
free(node);
return 1;
}
if (nodesize < sizeof(hfs_btree_node)) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: Node size %d is too small to be valid", nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
node_desc = (hfs_btree_node *) node;
num_rec = tsk_getu16(fs->endian, node_desc->num_rec);
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr, "hfs_cat_traverse: node %" PRIu32
" @ %" PRIu64 " has %" PRIu16 " records\n",
cur_node, cur_off, num_rec);
if (num_rec == 0) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr("hfs_cat_traverse: zero records in node %"
PRIu32, cur_node);
free(node);
return 1;
}
/* With an index node, find the record with the largest key that is smaller
* to or equal to cnid */
if (node_desc->type == HFS_BT_NODE_TYPE_IDX) {
uint32_t next_node = 0;
int rec;
for (rec = 0; rec < num_rec; ++rec) {
size_t rec_off;
hfs_btree_key_cat *key;
uint8_t retval;
int keylen;
rec_off =
tsk_getu16(fs->endian,
&node[nodesize - (rec + 1) * 2]);
if (rec_off > nodesize) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: offset of record %d in index node %d too large (%d vs %"
PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node, (int) rec_off,
nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
key = (hfs_btree_key_cat *) & node[rec_off];
keylen = 2 + tsk_getu16(hfs->fs_info.endian, key->key_len);
if ((keylen) > nodesize) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: length of key %d in index node %d too large (%d vs %"
PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node, keylen, nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
/*
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_cat_traverse: record %" PRIu16
" ; keylen %" PRIu16 " (%" PRIu32 ")\n", rec,
tsk_getu16(fs->endian, key->key_len),
tsk_getu32(fs->endian, key->parent_cnid));
*/
/* save the info from this record unless it is too big */
retval =
a_cb(hfs, HFS_BT_NODE_TYPE_IDX, key,
cur_off + rec_off, ptr);
if (retval == HFS_BTREE_CB_ERR) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr2
("hfs_cat_traverse: Callback returned error");
free(node);
return 1;
}
else if ((retval == HFS_BTREE_CB_IDX_LT)
|| (next_node == 0)) {
hfs_btree_index_record *idx_rec;
int keylen =
2 + hfs_get_idxkeylen(hfs, tsk_getu16(fs->endian,
key->key_len), &(hfs->catalog_header));
if (rec_off + keylen > nodesize) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: offset of record and keylength %d in index node %d too large (%d vs %"
PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node,
(int) rec_off + keylen, nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
idx_rec =
(hfs_btree_index_record *) & node[rec_off +
keylen];
next_node = tsk_getu32(fs->endian, idx_rec->childNode);
}
if (retval == HFS_BTREE_CB_IDX_EQGT) {
break;
}
}
if (next_node == 0) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: did not find any keys in index node %d",
cur_node);
is_done = 1;
break;
}
if (next_node == cur_node) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: node %d references itself as next node",
cur_node);
is_done = 1;
break;
}
cur_node = next_node;
}
/* With a leaf, we look for the specific record. */
else if (node_desc->type == HFS_BT_NODE_TYPE_LEAF) {
int rec;
for (rec = 0; rec < num_rec; ++rec) {
size_t rec_off;
hfs_btree_key_cat *key;
uint8_t retval;
int keylen;
rec_off =
tsk_getu16(fs->endian,
&node[nodesize - (rec + 1) * 2]);
if (rec_off > nodesize) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: offset of record %d in leaf node %d too large (%d vs %"
PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node, (int) rec_off,
nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
key = (hfs_btree_key_cat *) & node[rec_off];
keylen = 2 + tsk_getu16(hfs->fs_info.endian, key->key_len);
if ((keylen) > nodesize) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: length of key %d in leaf node %d too large (%d vs %"
PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node, keylen, nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
/*
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_cat_traverse: record %" PRIu16
"; keylen %" PRIu16 " (%" PRIu32 ")\n", rec,
tsk_getu16(fs->endian, key->key_len),
tsk_getu32(fs->endian, key->parent_cnid));
*/
retval =
a_cb(hfs, HFS_BT_NODE_TYPE_LEAF, key,
cur_off + rec_off, ptr);
if (retval == HFS_BTREE_CB_LEAF_STOP) {
is_done = 1;
break;
}
else if (retval == HFS_BTREE_CB_ERR) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr2
("hfs_cat_traverse: Callback returned error");
free(node);
return 1;
}
}
if (is_done == 0) {
cur_node = tsk_getu32(fs->endian, node_desc->flink);
if (cur_node == 0) {
is_done = 1;
}
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_cat_traverse: moving forward to next leaf");
}
}
else {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr("hfs_cat_traverse: btree node %" PRIu32
" (%" PRIu64 ") is neither index nor leaf (%" PRIu8 ")",
cur_node, cur_off, node_desc->type);
free(node);
return 1;
}
}
free(node);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 168,974
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void finish_lock_switch(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *prev)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
* After ->on_cpu is cleared, the task can be moved to a different CPU.
* We must ensure this doesn't happen until the switch is completely
* finished.
*/
smp_wmb();
prev->on_cpu = 0;
#endif
#ifndef __ARCH_WANT_INTERRUPTS_ON_CTXSW
local_irq_enable();
#endif
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,282
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TextTrackCue::CueDidChange(CueMutationAffectsOrder affects_order) {
if (track_)
track_->CueDidChange(this, affects_order == kCueMutationAffectsOrder);
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void shutdown()
{
if (Platform::current()->currentThread()) {
delete s_endOfTaskRunner;
s_endOfTaskRunner = 0;
}
ASSERT(s_isolateInterruptor);
ThreadState::current()->removeInterruptor(s_isolateInterruptor);
if (Platform::current()->currentThread()) {
ASSERT(s_pendingGCRunner);
delete s_pendingGCRunner;
s_pendingGCRunner = 0;
ASSERT(s_messageLoopInterruptor);
ThreadState::current()->removeInterruptor(s_messageLoopInterruptor);
delete s_messageLoopInterruptor;
s_messageLoopInterruptor = 0;
}
ScriptStreamerThread::shutdown();
v8::Isolate* isolate = V8PerIsolateData::mainThreadIsolate();
V8PerIsolateData::willBeDestroyed(isolate);
WorkerThread::terminateAndWaitForAllWorkers();
ModulesInitializer::terminateThreads();
ThreadState::detachMainThread();
V8PerIsolateData::destroy(isolate);
shutdownWithoutV8();
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,650
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int block_device_ejected(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct inode *bd_inode = sb->s_bdev->bd_inode;
struct backing_dev_info *bdi = inode_to_bdi(bd_inode);
return bdi->dev == NULL;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 56,640
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool MoveCustomWallpaperDirectory(const char* sub_dir,
const std::string& from_name,
const std::string& to_name) {
base::FilePath base_path =
WallpaperManagerBase::GetCustomWallpaperDir(sub_dir);
base::FilePath to_path = base_path.Append(to_name);
base::FilePath from_path = base_path.Append(from_name);
if (base::PathExists(from_path))
return base::Move(from_path, to_path);
return false;
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 128,070
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void hns_ppe_reset_common(struct dsaf_device *dsaf_dev, u8 ppe_common_index)
{
u32 i;
int ret;
struct ppe_common_cb *ppe_common;
ppe_common = dsaf_dev->ppe_common[ppe_common_index];
ret = hns_ppe_common_init_hw(ppe_common);
if (ret)
return;
for (i = 0; i < ppe_common->ppe_num; i++) {
/* We only need to initiate ppe when the port exists */
if (dsaf_dev->mac_cb[i])
hns_ppe_init_hw(&ppe_common->ppe_cb[i]);
}
ret = hns_rcb_common_init_hw(dsaf_dev->rcb_common[ppe_common_index]);
if (ret)
return;
hns_rcb_common_init_commit_hw(dsaf_dev->rcb_common[ppe_common_index]);
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 85,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int32_t PPB_ImageData_Impl::GetSharedMemory(int* handle, uint32_t* byte_count) {
return backend_->GetSharedMemory(handle, byte_count);
}
Commit Message: Security fix: integer overflow on checking image size
Test is left in another CL (codereview.chromiu,.org/11274036) to avoid conflict there. Hope it's fine.
BUG=160926
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11410081
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167882 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 102,378
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int parse_token(char **name, char **value, char **cp)
{
char *end;
if (!name || !value || !cp)
return -BLKID_ERR_PARAM;
if (!(*value = strchr(*cp, '=')))
return 0;
**value = '\0';
*name = strip_line(*cp);
*value = skip_over_blank(*value + 1);
if (**value == '"') {
end = strchr(*value + 1, '"');
if (!end) {
DBG(READ, ul_debug("unbalanced quotes at: %s", *value));
*cp = *value;
return -BLKID_ERR_CACHE;
}
(*value)++;
*end = '\0';
end++;
} else {
end = skip_over_word(*value);
if (*end) {
*end = '\0';
end++;
}
}
*cp = end;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: libblkid: care about unsafe chars in cache
The high-level libblkid API uses /run/blkid/blkid.tab cache to
store probing results. The cache format is
<device NAME="value" ...>devname</device>
and unfortunately the cache code does not escape quotation marks:
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'AAA"BBB'
# cat /run/blkid/blkid.tab
...
<device ... LABEL="AAA"BBB" ...>/dev/sdb1</device>
such string is later incorrectly parsed and blkid(8) returns
nonsenses. And for use-cases like
# eval $(blkid -o export /dev/sdb1)
it's also insecure.
Note that mount, udevd and blkid -p are based on low-level libblkid
API, it bypass the cache and directly read data from the devices.
The current udevd upstream does not depend on blkid(8) output at all,
it's directly linked with the library and all unsafe chars are encoded by
\x<hex> notation.
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'X"`/tmp/foo` "' /dev/sdb1
# udevadm info --export-db | grep LABEL
...
E: ID_FS_LABEL=X__/tmp/foo___
E: ID_FS_LABEL_ENC=X\x22\x60\x2ftmp\x2ffoo\x60\x20\x22
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-77
| 1
| 168,909
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct tty_struct *tty_init_dev(struct tty_driver *driver, int idx)
{
struct tty_struct *tty;
int retval;
/*
* First time open is complex, especially for PTY devices.
* This code guarantees that either everything succeeds and the
* TTY is ready for operation, or else the table slots are vacated
* and the allocated memory released. (Except that the termios
* and locked termios may be retained.)
*/
if (!try_module_get(driver->owner))
return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
tty = alloc_tty_struct(driver, idx);
if (!tty) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
goto err_module_put;
}
tty_lock(tty);
retval = tty_driver_install_tty(driver, tty);
if (retval < 0)
goto err_deinit_tty;
if (!tty->port)
tty->port = driver->ports[idx];
WARN_RATELIMIT(!tty->port,
"%s: %s driver does not set tty->port. This will crash the kernel later. Fix the driver!\n",
__func__, tty->driver->name);
tty->port->itty = tty;
/*
* Structures all installed ... call the ldisc open routines.
* If we fail here just call release_tty to clean up. No need
* to decrement the use counts, as release_tty doesn't care.
*/
retval = tty_ldisc_setup(tty, tty->link);
if (retval)
goto err_release_tty;
/* Return the tty locked so that it cannot vanish under the caller */
return tty;
err_deinit_tty:
tty_unlock(tty);
deinitialize_tty_struct(tty);
free_tty_struct(tty);
err_module_put:
module_put(driver->owner);
return ERR_PTR(retval);
/* call the tty release_tty routine to clean out this slot */
err_release_tty:
tty_unlock(tty);
tty_info_ratelimited(tty, "ldisc open failed (%d), clearing slot %d\n",
retval, idx);
release_tty(tty, idx);
return ERR_PTR(retval);
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 55,924
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterPALMImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("PALM");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPALMImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePALMImage;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Palm pixmap");
entry->module=ConstantString("PALM");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/574
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 62,691
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uintmax_t parse_mark_ref(const char *p, char **endptr)
{
uintmax_t mark;
assert(*p == ':');
p++;
mark = strtoumax(p, endptr, 10);
if (*endptr == p)
die("No value after ':' in mark: %s", command_buf.buf);
return mark;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,113
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPage::setSpellCheckingEnabled(bool enabled)
{
static_cast<EditorClientBlackBerry*>(d->m_page->editorClient())->enableSpellChecking(enabled);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,421
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tcp_v4_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct tcp_extend_values tmp_ext;
struct tcp_options_received tmp_opt;
u8 *hash_location;
struct request_sock *req;
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
__be32 saddr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
__be32 daddr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr;
__u32 isn = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->when;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
int want_cookie = 0;
#else
#define want_cookie 0 /* Argh, why doesn't gcc optimize this :( */
#endif
/* Never answer to SYNs send to broadcast or multicast */
if (skb_rtable(skb)->rt_flags & (RTCF_BROADCAST | RTCF_MULTICAST))
goto drop;
/* TW buckets are converted to open requests without
* limitations, they conserve resources and peer is
* evidently real one.
*/
if (inet_csk_reqsk_queue_is_full(sk) && !isn) {
if (net_ratelimit())
syn_flood_warning(skb);
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
if (sysctl_tcp_syncookies) {
want_cookie = 1;
} else
#endif
goto drop;
}
/* Accept backlog is full. If we have already queued enough
* of warm entries in syn queue, drop request. It is better than
* clogging syn queue with openreqs with exponentially increasing
* timeout.
*/
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk) && inet_csk_reqsk_queue_young(sk) > 1)
goto drop;
req = inet_reqsk_alloc(&tcp_request_sock_ops);
if (!req)
goto drop;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
tcp_rsk(req)->af_specific = &tcp_request_sock_ipv4_ops;
#endif
tcp_clear_options(&tmp_opt);
tmp_opt.mss_clamp = TCP_MSS_DEFAULT;
tmp_opt.user_mss = tp->rx_opt.user_mss;
tcp_parse_options(skb, &tmp_opt, &hash_location, 0);
if (tmp_opt.cookie_plus > 0 &&
tmp_opt.saw_tstamp &&
!tp->rx_opt.cookie_out_never &&
(sysctl_tcp_cookie_size > 0 ||
(tp->cookie_values != NULL &&
tp->cookie_values->cookie_desired > 0))) {
u8 *c;
u32 *mess = &tmp_ext.cookie_bakery[COOKIE_DIGEST_WORDS];
int l = tmp_opt.cookie_plus - TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE;
if (tcp_cookie_generator(&tmp_ext.cookie_bakery[0]) != 0)
goto drop_and_release;
/* Secret recipe starts with IP addresses */
*mess++ ^= (__force u32)daddr;
*mess++ ^= (__force u32)saddr;
/* plus variable length Initiator Cookie */
c = (u8 *)mess;
while (l-- > 0)
*c++ ^= *hash_location++;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
want_cookie = 0; /* not our kind of cookie */
#endif
tmp_ext.cookie_out_never = 0; /* false */
tmp_ext.cookie_plus = tmp_opt.cookie_plus;
} else if (!tp->rx_opt.cookie_in_always) {
/* redundant indications, but ensure initialization. */
tmp_ext.cookie_out_never = 1; /* true */
tmp_ext.cookie_plus = 0;
} else {
goto drop_and_release;
}
tmp_ext.cookie_in_always = tp->rx_opt.cookie_in_always;
if (want_cookie && !tmp_opt.saw_tstamp)
tcp_clear_options(&tmp_opt);
tmp_opt.tstamp_ok = tmp_opt.saw_tstamp;
tcp_openreq_init(req, &tmp_opt, skb);
ireq = inet_rsk(req);
ireq->loc_addr = daddr;
ireq->rmt_addr = saddr;
ireq->no_srccheck = inet_sk(sk)->transparent;
ireq->opt = tcp_v4_save_options(sk, skb);
if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req))
goto drop_and_free;
if (!want_cookie || tmp_opt.tstamp_ok)
TCP_ECN_create_request(req, tcp_hdr(skb));
if (want_cookie) {
isn = cookie_v4_init_sequence(sk, skb, &req->mss);
req->cookie_ts = tmp_opt.tstamp_ok;
} else if (!isn) {
struct inet_peer *peer = NULL;
struct flowi4 fl4;
/* VJ's idea. We save last timestamp seen
* from the destination in peer table, when entering
* state TIME-WAIT, and check against it before
* accepting new connection request.
*
* If "isn" is not zero, this request hit alive
* timewait bucket, so that all the necessary checks
* are made in the function processing timewait state.
*/
if (tmp_opt.saw_tstamp &&
tcp_death_row.sysctl_tw_recycle &&
(dst = inet_csk_route_req(sk, &fl4, req)) != NULL &&
fl4.daddr == saddr &&
(peer = rt_get_peer((struct rtable *)dst, fl4.daddr)) != NULL) {
inet_peer_refcheck(peer);
if ((u32)get_seconds() - peer->tcp_ts_stamp < TCP_PAWS_MSL &&
(s32)(peer->tcp_ts - req->ts_recent) >
TCP_PAWS_WINDOW) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_PAWSPASSIVEREJECTED);
goto drop_and_release;
}
}
/* Kill the following clause, if you dislike this way. */
else if (!sysctl_tcp_syncookies &&
(sysctl_max_syn_backlog - inet_csk_reqsk_queue_len(sk) <
(sysctl_max_syn_backlog >> 2)) &&
(!peer || !peer->tcp_ts_stamp) &&
(!dst || !dst_metric(dst, RTAX_RTT))) {
/* Without syncookies last quarter of
* backlog is filled with destinations,
* proven to be alive.
* It means that we continue to communicate
* to destinations, already remembered
* to the moment of synflood.
*/
LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_DEBUG "TCP: drop open request from %pI4/%u\n",
&saddr, ntohs(tcp_hdr(skb)->source));
goto drop_and_release;
}
isn = tcp_v4_init_sequence(skb);
}
tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn = isn;
tcp_rsk(req)->snt_synack = tcp_time_stamp;
if (tcp_v4_send_synack(sk, dst, req,
(struct request_values *)&tmp_ext) ||
want_cookie)
goto drop_and_free;
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add(sk, req, TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT);
return 0;
drop_and_release:
dst_release(dst);
drop_and_free:
reqsk_free(req);
drop:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,195
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsAndroid::OnTransitionElementsFetched(
scoped_ptr<const TransitionLayerData> transition_data,
bool has_transition_data) {
DCHECK(has_transition_data);
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
std::vector<TransitionElement>::const_iterator it =
transition_data->elements.begin();
for (; it != transition_data->elements.end(); ++it) {
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jstring_name(ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env,
it->id));
Java_WebContentsImpl_addNavigationTransitionElements(
env, obj_.obj(), jstring_name.obj(),
it->rect.x(), it->rect.y(), it->rect.width(), it->rect.height());
}
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jstring_css_selector(
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, transition_data->css_selector));
Java_WebContentsImpl_onTransitionElementsFetched(
env, obj_.obj(), jstring_css_selector.obj());
}
Commit Message: Revert "Load web contents after tab is created."
This reverts commit 4c55f398def3214369aefa9f2f2e8f5940d3799d.
BUG=432562
TBR=tedchoc@chromium.org,jbudorick@chromium.org,sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/894003005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#314469}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 109,895
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void TearDownTestCase() {
vpx_free(input_ - 1);
input_ = NULL;
vpx_free(output_);
output_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,507
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(xml_get_error_code)
{
xml_parser *parser;
zval *pind;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &pind) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(parser,xml_parser *, &pind, -1, "XML Parser", le_xml_parser);
RETVAL_LONG((long)XML_GetErrorCode(parser->parser));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DisableLimitedSchedulingLatency(void)
{
--SmartScheduleLatencyLimited;
/* protect against bugs */
if (SmartScheduleLatencyLimited < 0)
SmartScheduleLatencyLimited = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 14,935
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int php_snmp_parse_oid(zval *object, int st, struct objid_query *objid_query, zval *oid, zval *type, zval *value)
{
char *pptr;
uint32_t idx_type = 0, idx_value = 0;
zval *tmp_oid, *tmp_type, *tmp_value;
if (Z_TYPE_P(oid) != IS_ARRAY) {
convert_to_string_ex(oid);
}
if (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(type) != IS_ARRAY) {
convert_to_string_ex(type);
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(value) != IS_ARRAY) {
convert_to_string_ex(value);
}
}
objid_query->count = 0;
objid_query->array_output = ((st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) ? TRUE : FALSE);
if (Z_TYPE_P(oid) == IS_STRING) {
objid_query->vars = (snmpobjarg *)emalloc(sizeof(snmpobjarg));
if (objid_query->vars == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "emalloc() failed while parsing oid: %s", strerror(errno));
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].oid = Z_STRVAL_P(oid);
if (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(type) == IS_STRING && Z_TYPE_P(value) == IS_STRING) {
if (Z_STRLEN_P(type) != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Bogus type '%s', should be single char, got %u", Z_STRVAL_P(type), Z_STRLEN_P(type));
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
pptr = Z_STRVAL_P(type);
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].type = *pptr;
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].value = Z_STRVAL_P(value);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Single objid and multiple type or values are not supported");
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
}
objid_query->count++;
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(oid) == IS_ARRAY) { /* we got objid array */
if (zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(oid)) == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Got empty OID array");
return FALSE;
}
objid_query->vars = (snmpobjarg *)emalloc(sizeof(snmpobjarg) * zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(oid)));
if (objid_query->vars == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "emalloc() failed while parsing oid array: %s", strerror(errno));
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
objid_query->array_output = ( (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) ? FALSE : TRUE );
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_VAL(Z_ARRVAL_P(oid), tmp_oid) {
convert_to_string_ex(tmp_oid);
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].oid = Z_STRVAL_P(tmp_oid);
if (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(type) == IS_STRING) {
pptr = Z_STRVAL_P(type);
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].type = *pptr;
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(type) == IS_ARRAY) {
while (idx_type < Z_ARRVAL_P(type)->nNumUsed) {
tmp_type = &Z_ARRVAL_P(type)->arData[idx_type].val;
if (Z_TYPE_P(tmp_type) != IS_UNDEF) {
break;
}
idx_type++;
}
if (idx_type < Z_ARRVAL_P(type)->nNumUsed) {
convert_to_string_ex(tmp_type);
if (Z_STRLEN_P(tmp_type) != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "'%s': bogus type '%s', should be single char, got %u", Z_STRVAL_P(tmp_oid), Z_STRVAL_P(tmp_type), Z_STRLEN_P(tmp_type));
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
pptr = Z_STRVAL_P(tmp_type);
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].type = *pptr;
idx_type++;
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "'%s': no type set", Z_STRVAL_P(tmp_oid));
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(value) == IS_STRING) {
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].value = Z_STRVAL_P(value);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(value) == IS_ARRAY) {
while (idx_value < Z_ARRVAL_P(value)->nNumUsed) {
tmp_value = &Z_ARRVAL_P(value)->arData[idx_value].val;
if (Z_TYPE_P(tmp_value) != IS_UNDEF) {
break;
}
idx_value++;
}
if (idx_value < Z_ARRVAL_P(value)->nNumUsed) {
convert_to_string_ex(tmp_value);
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].value = Z_STRVAL_P(tmp_value);
idx_value++;
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "'%s': no value set", Z_STRVAL_P(tmp_oid));
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
}
}
objid_query->count++;
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
}
/* now parse all OIDs */
if (st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) {
if (objid_query->count > 1) {
php_snmp_error(object, NULL, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_OID_PARSING_ERROR, "Multi OID walks are not supported!");
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
objid_query->vars[0].name_length = MAX_NAME_LEN;
if (strlen(objid_query->vars[0].oid)) { /* on a walk, an empty string means top of tree - no error */
if (!snmp_parse_oid(objid_query->vars[0].oid, objid_query->vars[0].name, &(objid_query->vars[0].name_length))) {
php_snmp_error(object, NULL, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_OID_PARSING_ERROR, "Invalid object identifier: %s", objid_query->vars[0].oid);
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
} else {
memmove((char *)objid_query->vars[0].name, (char *)objid_mib, sizeof(objid_mib));
objid_query->vars[0].name_length = sizeof(objid_mib) / sizeof(oid);
}
} else {
for (objid_query->offset = 0; objid_query->offset < objid_query->count; objid_query->offset++) {
objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].name_length = MAX_OID_LEN;
if (!snmp_parse_oid(objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].oid, objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].name, &(objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].name_length))) {
php_snmp_error(object, NULL, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_OID_PARSING_ERROR, "Invalid object identifier: %s", objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].oid);
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
}
}
objid_query->offset = 0;
objid_query->step = objid_query->count;
return (objid_query->count > 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,237
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rxrpc_rxk5_free(struct rxk5_key *rxk5)
{
int loop;
rxrpc_free_krb5_principal(&rxk5->client);
rxrpc_free_krb5_principal(&rxk5->server);
rxrpc_free_krb5_tagged(&rxk5->session);
if (rxk5->addresses) {
for (loop = rxk5->n_addresses - 1; loop >= 0; loop--)
rxrpc_free_krb5_tagged(&rxk5->addresses[loop]);
kfree(rxk5->addresses);
}
if (rxk5->authdata) {
for (loop = rxk5->n_authdata - 1; loop >= 0; loop--)
rxrpc_free_krb5_tagged(&rxk5->authdata[loop]);
kfree(rxk5->authdata);
}
kfree(rxk5->ticket);
kfree(rxk5->ticket2);
kfree(rxk5);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 69,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FakeCrosDisksClient::Init(dbus::Bus* bus) {
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 124,106
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static RList* fields(RBinFile *bf) {
RList *ret = NULL;
RBinField *ptr = NULL;
struct r_bin_elf_field_t *field = NULL;
int i;
if (!(ret = r_list_new ())) {
return NULL;
}
ret->free = free;
if (!(field = Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_fields) (bf->o->bin_obj))) {
return ret;
}
for (i = 0; !field[i].last; i++) {
if (!(ptr = R_NEW0 (RBinField))) {
break;
}
ptr->name = strdup (field[i].name);
ptr->comment = NULL;
ptr->vaddr = field[i].offset;
ptr->paddr = field[i].offset;
r_list_append (ret, ptr);
}
free (field);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9904 - crash in r2_hoobr_r_read_le32 (over 9000 entrypoints) and read_le oobread (#9923)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,923
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hook_config (struct t_weechat_plugin *plugin, const char *option,
t_hook_callback_config *callback, void *callback_data)
{
struct t_hook *new_hook;
struct t_hook_config *new_hook_config;
int priority;
const char *ptr_option;
if (!callback)
return NULL;
new_hook = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook));
if (!new_hook)
return NULL;
new_hook_config = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook_config));
if (!new_hook_config)
{
free (new_hook);
return NULL;
}
hook_get_priority_and_name (option, &priority, &ptr_option);
hook_init_data (new_hook, plugin, HOOK_TYPE_CONFIG, priority,
callback_data);
new_hook->hook_data = new_hook_config;
new_hook_config->callback = callback;
new_hook_config->option = strdup ((ptr_option) ? ptr_option :
((option) ? option : ""));
hook_add_to_list (new_hook);
return new_hook;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void mark_tree_uninteresting(struct tree *tree)
{
struct object *obj = &tree->object;
if (!tree)
return;
if (obj->flags & UNINTERESTING)
return;
obj->flags |= UNINTERESTING;
mark_tree_contents_uninteresting(tree);
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,169
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserPluginGuest::UpdateRectACK(
int message_id,
const BrowserPluginHostMsg_AutoSize_Params& auto_size_params,
const BrowserPluginHostMsg_ResizeGuest_Params& resize_guest_params) {
RenderViewHost* render_view_host = pending_updates_.Lookup(message_id);
if (render_view_host) {
pending_updates_.Remove(message_id);
render_view_host->Send(
new ViewMsg_UpdateRect_ACK(render_view_host->GetRoutingID()));
}
SetSize(auto_size_params, resize_guest_params);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,430
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ignoring_children(struct sighand_struct *sigh)
{
int ret;
spin_lock(&sigh->siglock);
ret = (sigh->action[SIGCHLD-1].sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN) ||
(sigh->action[SIGCHLD-1].sa.sa_flags & SA_NOCLDWAIT);
spin_unlock(&sigh->siglock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 30,942
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mmu_pte_write_new_pte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, u64 *spte,
const void *new)
{
if (sp->role.level != PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL) {
++vcpu->kvm->stat.mmu_pde_zapped;
return;
}
++vcpu->kvm->stat.mmu_pte_updated;
vcpu->arch.mmu.update_pte(vcpu, sp, spte, new);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 37,535
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_buf_wait_unpin(
xfs_buf_t *bp)
{
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE (wait, current);
if (atomic_read(&bp->b_pin_count) == 0)
return;
add_wait_queue(&bp->b_waiters, &wait);
for (;;) {
set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
if (atomic_read(&bp->b_pin_count) == 0)
break;
io_schedule();
}
remove_wait_queue(&bp->b_waiters, &wait);
set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix _xfs_buf_find oops on blocks beyond the filesystem end
When _xfs_buf_find is passed an out of range address, it will fail
to find a relevant struct xfs_perag and oops with a null
dereference. This can happen when trying to walk a filesystem with a
metadata inode that has a partially corrupted extent map (i.e. the
block number returned is corrupt, but is otherwise intact) and we
try to read from the corrupted block address.
In this case, just fail the lookup. If it is readahead being issued,
it will simply not be done, but if it is real read that fails we
will get an error being reported. Ideally this case should result
in an EFSCORRUPTED error being reported, but we cannot return an
error through xfs_buf_read() or xfs_buf_get() so this lookup failure
may result in ENOMEM or EIO errors being reported instead.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 33,237
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int iscsi_set_keys_irrelevant_for_discovery(
struct iscsi_param_list *param_list)
{
struct iscsi_param *param;
list_for_each_entry(param, ¶m_list->param_list, p_list) {
if (!strcmp(param->name, MAXCONNECTIONS))
param->state &= ~PSTATE_NEGOTIATE;
else if (!strcmp(param->name, INITIALR2T))
param->state &= ~PSTATE_NEGOTIATE;
else if (!strcmp(param->name, IMMEDIATEDATA))
param->state &= ~PSTATE_NEGOTIATE;
else if (!strcmp(param->name, MAXBURSTLENGTH))
param->state &= ~PSTATE_NEGOTIATE;
else if (!strcmp(param->name, FIRSTBURSTLENGTH))
param->state &= ~PSTATE_NEGOTIATE;
else if (!strcmp(param->name, MAXOUTSTANDINGR2T))
param->state &= ~PSTATE_NEGOTIATE;
else if (!strcmp(param->name, DATAPDUINORDER))
param->state &= ~PSTATE_NEGOTIATE;
else if (!strcmp(param->name, DATASEQUENCEINORDER))
param->state &= ~PSTATE_NEGOTIATE;
else if (!strcmp(param->name, ERRORRECOVERYLEVEL))
param->state &= ~PSTATE_NEGOTIATE;
else if (!strcmp(param->name, DEFAULTTIME2WAIT))
param->state &= ~PSTATE_NEGOTIATE;
else if (!strcmp(param->name, DEFAULTTIME2RETAIN))
param->state &= ~PSTATE_NEGOTIATE;
else if (!strcmp(param->name, IFMARKER))
param->state &= ~PSTATE_NEGOTIATE;
else if (!strcmp(param->name, OFMARKER))
param->state &= ~PSTATE_NEGOTIATE;
else if (!strcmp(param->name, IFMARKINT))
param->state &= ~PSTATE_NEGOTIATE;
else if (!strcmp(param->name, OFMARKINT))
param->state &= ~PSTATE_NEGOTIATE;
else if (!strcmp(param->name, RDMAEXTENSIONS))
param->state &= ~PSTATE_NEGOTIATE;
else if (!strcmp(param->name, INITIATORRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH))
param->state &= ~PSTATE_NEGOTIATE;
else if (!strcmp(param->name, TARGETRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH))
param->state &= ~PSTATE_NEGOTIATE;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication kernel memory corruption was possible if a
target was configured and listening on the network.
CVE-2013-2850
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 30,990
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
/*
* Note that as a general rule, the high half of the MSRs (bits in
* the control fields which may be 1) should be initialized by the
* intersection of the underlying hardware's MSR (i.e., features which
* can be supported) and the list of features we want to expose -
* because they are known to be properly supported in our code.
* Also, usually, the low half of the MSRs (bits which must be 1) can
* be set to 0, meaning that L1 may turn off any of these bits. The
* reason is that if one of these bits is necessary, it will appear
* in vmcs01 and prepare_vmcs02, when it bitwise-or's the control
* fields of vmcs01 and vmcs02, will turn these bits off - and
* nested_vmx_exit_handled() will not pass related exits to L1.
* These rules have exceptions below.
*/
/* pin-based controls */
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_pinbased_ctls_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_pinbased_ctls_high);
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_pinbased_ctls_low |=
PIN_BASED_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_pinbased_ctls_high &=
PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK |
PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING |
PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_pinbased_ctls_high |=
PIN_BASED_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR |
PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu))
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_pinbased_ctls_high |=
PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
/* exit controls */
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_exit_ctls_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_exit_ctls_high);
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_exit_ctls_low =
VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_exit_ctls_high &=
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE |
#endif
VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT | VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_PAT;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_exit_ctls_high |=
VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR |
VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER | VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_EFER |
VM_EXIT_SAVE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER | VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT;
if (kvm_mpx_supported())
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_exit_ctls_high |= VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS;
/* We support free control of debug control saving. */
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_true_exit_ctls_low =
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_exit_ctls_low &
~VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS;
/* entry controls */
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_entry_ctls_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_entry_ctls_high);
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_entry_ctls_low =
VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_entry_ctls_high &=
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE |
#endif
VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_entry_ctls_high |=
(VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR | VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER);
if (kvm_mpx_supported())
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_entry_ctls_high |= VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS;
/* We support free control of debug control loading. */
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_true_entry_ctls_low =
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_entry_ctls_low &
~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS;
/* cpu-based controls */
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_procbased_ctls_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_procbased_ctls_high);
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_procbased_ctls_low =
CPU_BASED_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_procbased_ctls_high &=
CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_INTR_PENDING |
CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMI_PENDING | CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETING |
CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING | CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING | CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING |
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING | CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING |
#endif
CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING | CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS | CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG |
CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING | CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING | CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW | CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS;
/*
* We can allow some features even when not supported by the
* hardware. For example, L1 can specify an MSR bitmap - and we
* can use it to avoid exits to L1 - even when L0 runs L2
* without MSR bitmaps.
*/
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_procbased_ctls_high |=
CPU_BASED_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR |
CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS;
/* We support free control of CR3 access interception. */
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_true_procbased_ctls_low =
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_procbased_ctls_low &
~(CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING | CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING);
/* secondary cpu-based controls */
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high);
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_low = 0;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high &=
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP |
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID |
SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY |
SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING |
SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES |
SECONDARY_EXEC_PCOMMIT;
if (enable_ept) {
/* nested EPT: emulate EPT also to L1 */
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high |=
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_ept_caps = VMX_EPT_PAGE_WALK_4_BIT |
VMX_EPTP_WB_BIT | VMX_EPT_2MB_PAGE_BIT |
VMX_EPT_INVEPT_BIT;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_ept_caps &= vmx_capability.ept;
/*
* For nested guests, we don't do anything specific
* for single context invalidation. Hence, only advertise
* support for global context invalidation.
*/
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_ept_caps |= VMX_EPT_EXTENT_GLOBAL_BIT;
} else
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_ept_caps = 0;
/*
* Old versions of KVM use the single-context version without
* checking for support, so declare that it is supported even
* though it is treated as global context. The alternative is
* not failing the single-context invvpid, and it is worse.
*/
if (enable_vpid)
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vpid_caps = VMX_VPID_INVVPID_BIT |
VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SINGLE_CONTEXT_BIT |
VMX_VPID_EXTENT_GLOBAL_CONTEXT_BIT;
else
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vpid_caps = 0;
if (enable_unrestricted_guest)
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high |=
SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
/* miscellaneous data */
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_misc_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_misc_high);
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_misc_low &= VMX_MISC_SAVE_EFER_LMA;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_misc_low |=
VMX_MISC_EMULATED_PREEMPTION_TIMER_RATE |
VMX_MISC_ACTIVITY_HLT;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_misc_high = 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm:vmx: more complete state update on APICv on/off
The function to update APICv on/off state (in particular, to deactivate
it when enabling Hyper-V SynIC) is incomplete: it doesn't adjust
APICv-related fields among secondary processor-based VM-execution
controls. As a result, Windows 2012 guests get stuck when SynIC-based
auto-EOI interrupt intersected with e.g. an IPI in the guest.
In addition, the MSR intercept bitmap isn't updated every time "virtualize
x2APIC mode" is toggled. This path can only be triggered by a malicious
guest, because Windows didn't use x2APIC but rather their own synthetic
APIC access MSRs; however a guest running in a SynIC-enabled VM could
switch to x2APIC and thus obtain direct access to host APIC MSRs
(CVE-2016-4440).
The patch fixes those omissions.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Reported-by: Yang Zhang <yang.zhang.wz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 53,318
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cmsBool CMSEXPORT cmsIT8SaveToFile(cmsHANDLE hIT8, const char* cFileName)
{
SAVESTREAM sd;
cmsUInt32Number i;
cmsIT8* it8 = (cmsIT8*) hIT8;
memset(&sd, 0, sizeof(sd));
sd.stream = fopen(cFileName, "wt");
if (!sd.stream) return FALSE;
for (i=0; i < it8 ->TablesCount; i++) {
cmsIT8SetTable(hIT8, i);
WriteHeader(it8, &sd);
WriteDataFormat(&sd, it8);
WriteData(&sd, it8);
}
if (fclose(sd.stream) != 0) return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 78,075
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::CloseWidgetSoon() {
RenderWidget::CloseWidgetSoon();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,952
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: crm_trigger_prepare(GSource * source, gint * timeout)
{
crm_trigger_t *trig = (crm_trigger_t *) source;
/* cluster-glue's FD and IPC related sources make use of
* g_source_add_poll() but do not set a timeout in their prepare
* functions
*
* This means mainloop's poll() will block until an event for one
* of these sources occurs - any /other/ type of source, such as
* this one or g_idle_*, that doesn't use g_source_add_poll() is
* S-O-L and wont be processed until there is something fd-based
* happens.
*
* Luckily the timeout we can set here affects all sources and
* puts an upper limit on how long poll() can take.
*
* So unconditionally set a small-ish timeout, not too small that
* we're in constant motion, which will act as an upper bound on
* how long the signal handling might be delayed for.
*/
*timeout = 500; /* Timeout in ms */
return trig->trigger;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::ShowWebsiteSettings(
Profile* profile,
TabContents* tab_contents,
const GURL& url,
const content::SSLStatus& ssl,
bool show_history) {
WebsiteSettingsPopupGtk::Show(GetNativeWindow(), profile,
tab_contents, url, ssl);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoGetUniformfv(GLuint program,
GLint location,
GLsizei bufsize,
GLsizei* length,
GLfloat* params) {
api()->glGetUniformfvRobustANGLEFn(GetProgramServiceID(program, resources_),
location, bufsize * sizeof(*params),
length, params);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 142,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cull_mntent_opt(struct mntent *mntent)
{
int i;
char *p, *p2;
char *list[] = {"create=dir",
"create=file",
"optional",
NULL };
for (i=0; list[i]; i++) {
if (!(p = strstr(mntent->mnt_opts, list[i])))
continue;
p2 = strchr(p, ',');
if (!p2) {
/* no more mntopts, so just chop it here */
*p = '\0';
continue;
}
memmove(p, p2+1, strlen(p2+1)+1);
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 44,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::RequestPrintPreview(PrintPreviewRequestType type) {
const bool is_modifiable = print_preview_context_.IsModifiable();
old_print_pages_params_.reset();
switch (type) {
case PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_ENTIRE_FRAME: {
Send(new PrintHostMsg_RequestPrintPreview(routing_id(), is_modifiable,
false));
break;
}
case PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_CONTEXT_NODE: {
Send(new PrintHostMsg_RequestPrintPreview(routing_id(), is_modifiable,
true));
break;
}
case PRINT_PREVIEW_SCRIPTED: {
IPC::SyncMessage* msg =
new PrintHostMsg_ScriptedPrintPreview(routing_id(), is_modifiable);
msg->EnableMessagePumping();
Send(msg);
break;
}
default: {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 102,592
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsSession::DispatchProtocolMessage(const std::string& message) {
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> value = base::JSONReader::Read(message);
DevToolsManagerDelegate* delegate =
DevToolsManager::GetInstance()->delegate();
if (value && value->is_dict() && delegate) {
base::DictionaryValue* dict_value =
static_cast<base::DictionaryValue*>(value.get());
if (delegate->HandleCommand(agent_host_, client_, dict_value))
return;
if (delegate->HandleAsyncCommand(agent_host_, client_, dict_value,
base::Bind(&DevToolsSession::SendResponse,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()))) {
return;
}
}
int call_id;
std::string method;
if (dispatcher_->dispatch(protocol::toProtocolValue(value.get(), 1000),
&call_id,
&method) != protocol::Response::kFallThrough) {
return;
}
DCHECK(!browser_only_);
if (suspended_sending_messages_to_agent_) {
suspended_messages_.push_back({call_id, method, message});
return;
}
DispatchProtocolMessageToAgent(call_id, method, message);
waiting_for_response_messages_[call_id] = {method, message};
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,413
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ExecuteHelp( SQLHDBC hDbc, char *szSQL, char cDelimiter, int bColumnNames, int bHTMLTable )
{
char szTable[250] = "";
SQLHSTMT hStmt;
SQLTCHAR szSepLine[32001];
SQLLEN nRows = 0;
szSepLine[ 0 ] = 0;
/****************************
* EXECUTE SQL
***************************/
if ( SQLAllocStmt( hDbc, &hStmt ) != SQL_SUCCESS )
{
if ( bVerbose ) DumpODBCLog( hEnv, hDbc, 0 );
fprintf( stderr, "[ISQL]ERROR: Could not SQLAllocStmt\n" );
return 0;
}
if ( iniElement( szSQL, ' ', '\0', 1, szTable, sizeof(szTable) ) == INI_SUCCESS )
{
SQLWCHAR tname[ 1024 ];
ansi_to_unicode( szTable, tname );
/* COLUMNS */
if ( SQLColumns( hStmt, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, tname, SQL_NTS, NULL, 0 ) != SQL_SUCCESS )
{
if ( bVerbose ) DumpODBCLog( hEnv, hDbc, hStmt );
fprintf( stderr, "[ISQL]ERROR: Could not SQLColumns\n" );
SQLFreeStmt( hStmt, SQL_DROP );
return 0;
}
}
else
{
/* TABLES */
if ( SQLTables( hStmt, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) != SQL_SUCCESS )
{
if ( bVerbose ) DumpODBCLog( hEnv, hDbc, hStmt );
fprintf( stderr, "[ISQL]ERROR: Could not SQLTables\n" );
SQLFreeStmt( hStmt, SQL_DROP );
return 0;
}
}
/****************************
* WRITE HEADER
***************************/
if ( bHTMLTable )
WriteHeaderHTMLTable( hStmt );
else if ( cDelimiter == 0 )
UWriteHeaderNormal( hStmt, szSepLine );
else if ( cDelimiter && bColumnNames )
WriteHeaderDelimited( hStmt, cDelimiter );
/****************************
* WRITE BODY
***************************/
if ( bHTMLTable )
WriteBodyHTMLTable( hStmt );
else if ( cDelimiter == 0 )
nRows = WriteBodyNormal( hStmt );
else
WriteBodyDelimited( hStmt, cDelimiter );
/****************************
* WRITE FOOTER
***************************/
if ( bHTMLTable )
WriteFooterHTMLTable( hStmt );
else if ( cDelimiter == 0 )
UWriteFooterNormal( hStmt, szSepLine, nRows );
/****************************
* CLEANUP
***************************/
SQLFreeStmt( hStmt, SQL_DROP );
return 1;
}
Commit Message: New Pre Source
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 84,093
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: blink::WebString WebMediaPlayerMS::GetErrorMessage() const {
return blink::WebString::FromUTF8(media_log_->GetErrorMessage());
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,146
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int add_persistent_gnt(struct xen_blkif *blkif,
struct persistent_gnt *persistent_gnt)
{
struct rb_node **new = NULL, *parent = NULL;
struct persistent_gnt *this;
if (blkif->persistent_gnt_c >= xen_blkif_max_pgrants) {
if (!blkif->vbd.overflow_max_grants)
blkif->vbd.overflow_max_grants = 1;
return -EBUSY;
}
/* Figure out where to put new node */
new = &blkif->persistent_gnts.rb_node;
while (*new) {
this = container_of(*new, struct persistent_gnt, node);
parent = *new;
if (persistent_gnt->gnt < this->gnt)
new = &((*new)->rb_left);
else if (persistent_gnt->gnt > this->gnt)
new = &((*new)->rb_right);
else {
pr_alert_ratelimited(DRV_PFX " trying to add a gref that's already in the tree\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
bitmap_zero(persistent_gnt->flags, PERSISTENT_GNT_FLAGS_SIZE);
set_bit(PERSISTENT_GNT_ACTIVE, persistent_gnt->flags);
/* Add new node and rebalance tree. */
rb_link_node(&(persistent_gnt->node), parent, new);
rb_insert_color(&(persistent_gnt->node), &blkif->persistent_gnts);
blkif->persistent_gnt_c++;
atomic_inc(&blkif->persistent_gnt_in_use);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xen/blkback: Check device permissions before allowing OP_DISCARD
We need to make sure that the device is not RO or that
the request is not past the number of sectors we want to
issue the DISCARD operation for.
This fixes CVE-2013-2140.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
[v1: Made it pr_warn instead of pr_debug]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 31,822
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pppol2tp_session_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
struct l2tp_session *session = sk->sk_user_data;
if (session) {
sk->sk_user_data = NULL;
BUG_ON(session->magic != L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC);
l2tp_session_dec_refcount(session);
}
return;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,488
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LockContentsView::SwapActiveAuthBetweenPrimaryAndSecondary(
bool is_primary) {
if (Shell::Get()->login_screen_controller()->IsAuthenticating())
return;
if (is_primary && !primary_big_view_->IsAuthEnabled()) {
LayoutAuth(primary_big_view_, opt_secondary_big_view_, true /*animate*/);
OnBigUserChanged();
} else if (!is_primary && opt_secondary_big_view_ &&
!opt_secondary_big_view_->IsAuthEnabled()) {
LayoutAuth(opt_secondary_big_view_, primary_big_view_, true /*animate*/);
OnBigUserChanged();
}
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,542
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MojoAudioOutputStream::~MojoAudioOutputStream() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,547
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType GetTIFFInfo(const ImageInfo *image_info,TIFF *tiff,
TIFFInfo *tiff_info)
{
const char
*option;
MagickStatusType
flags;
uint32
tile_columns,
tile_rows;
assert(tiff_info != (TIFFInfo *) NULL);
(void) memset(tiff_info,0,sizeof(*tiff_info));
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:tile-geometry");
if (option == (const char *) NULL)
{
uint32
rows_per_strip;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:rows-per-strip");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
rows_per_strip=(size_t) strtol(option,(char **) NULL,10);
else
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH,&rows_per_strip) == 0)
rows_per_strip=0; /* use default */
rows_per_strip=TIFFDefaultStripSize(tiff,rows_per_strip);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,rows_per_strip);
return(MagickTrue);
}
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(option,&tiff_info->tile_geometry);
if ((flags & HeightValue) == 0)
tiff_info->tile_geometry.height=tiff_info->tile_geometry.width;
tile_columns=(uint32) tiff_info->tile_geometry.width;
tile_rows=(uint32) tiff_info->tile_geometry.height;
TIFFDefaultTileSize(tiff,&tile_columns,&tile_rows);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH,tile_columns);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH,tile_rows);
tiff_info->tile_geometry.width=tile_columns;
tiff_info->tile_geometry.height=tile_rows;
if ((TIFFScanlineSize(tiff) <= 0) || (TIFFTileSize(tiff) <= 0))
{
DestroyTIFFInfo(tiff_info);
return(MagickFalse);
}
tiff_info->scanlines=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
tile_rows*TIFFScanlineSize(tiff),sizeof(*tiff_info->scanlines));
tiff_info->pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
tile_rows*TIFFTileSize(tiff),sizeof(*tiff_info->scanlines));
if ((tiff_info->scanlines == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(tiff_info->pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL))
{
DestroyTIFFInfo(tiff_info);
return(MagickFalse);
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1560
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 88,461
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool socks4_negotiate(struct pool *pool, int sockd, bool socks4a)
{
unsigned short port;
in_addr_t inp;
char buf[515];
int i, len;
int ret;
buf[0] = 0x04;
buf[1] = 0x01;
port = atoi(pool->stratum_port);
buf[2] = port >> 8;
buf[3] = port & 0xff;
sprintf(&buf[8], "SGMINER");
/* See if we've been given an IP address directly to avoid needing to
* resolve it. */
inp = inet_addr(pool->sockaddr_url);
inp = ntohl(inp);
if ((int)inp != -1)
socks4a = false;
else {
/* Try to extract the IP address ourselves first */
struct addrinfo servinfobase, *servinfo, hints;
servinfo = &servinfobase;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
hints.ai_family = AF_INET; /* IPV4 only */
ret = getaddrinfo(pool->sockaddr_url, NULL, &hints, &servinfo);
if (!ret) {
applog(LOG_ERR, "getaddrinfo() in socks4_negotiate() returned %i: %s", ret, gai_strerror(ret));
struct sockaddr_in *saddr_in = (struct sockaddr_in *)servinfo->ai_addr;
inp = ntohl(saddr_in->sin_addr.s_addr);
socks4a = false;
freeaddrinfo(servinfo);
}
}
if (!socks4a) {
if ((int)inp == -1) {
applog(LOG_WARNING, "Invalid IP address specified for socks4 proxy: %s",
pool->sockaddr_url);
return false;
}
buf[4] = (inp >> 24) & 0xFF;
buf[5] = (inp >> 16) & 0xFF;
buf[6] = (inp >> 8) & 0xFF;
buf[7] = (inp >> 0) & 0xFF;
send(sockd, buf, 16, 0);
} else {
/* This appears to not be working but hopefully most will be
* able to resolve IP addresses themselves. */
buf[4] = 0;
buf[5] = 0;
buf[6] = 0;
buf[7] = 1;
len = strlen(pool->sockaddr_url);
if (len > 255)
len = 255;
memcpy(&buf[16], pool->sockaddr_url, len);
len += 16;
buf[len++] = '\0';
send(sockd, buf, len, 0);
}
if (recv_byte(sockd) != 0x00 || recv_byte(sockd) != 0x5a) {
applog(LOG_WARNING, "Bad response from %s:%s SOCKS4 server",
pool->sockaddr_proxy_url, pool->sockaddr_proxy_port);
return false;
}
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
recv_byte(sockd);
return true;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 36,626
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: assert_str_beginswith(GString *expected, gchar *actual) {
gchar *actual_beginning = g_strndup(actual, expected->len);
g_assert_cmpstr(expected->str, ==, actual_beginning);
g_free(actual_beginning);
/* return the part of the actual string that hasn't been compared yet */
return &actual[expected->len];
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,306
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void lcdInit_ArrayBuffer(JsGraphics *gfx) {
JsVar *buf = jswrap_arraybuffer_constructor(graphicsGetMemoryRequired(gfx));
jsvUnLock2(jsvAddNamedChild(gfx->graphicsVar, buf, "buffer"), buf);
}
Commit Message: Add height check for Graphics.createArrayBuffer(...vertical_byte:true) (fix #1421)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,592
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ovl_rename2(struct inode *olddir, struct dentry *old,
struct inode *newdir, struct dentry *new,
unsigned int flags)
{
int err;
enum ovl_path_type old_type;
enum ovl_path_type new_type;
struct dentry *old_upperdir;
struct dentry *new_upperdir;
struct dentry *olddentry;
struct dentry *newdentry;
struct dentry *trap;
bool old_opaque;
bool new_opaque;
bool new_create = false;
bool cleanup_whiteout = false;
bool overwrite = !(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE);
bool is_dir = d_is_dir(old);
bool new_is_dir = false;
struct dentry *opaquedir = NULL;
const struct cred *old_cred = NULL;
struct cred *override_cred = NULL;
err = -EINVAL;
if (flags & ~(RENAME_EXCHANGE | RENAME_NOREPLACE))
goto out;
flags &= ~RENAME_NOREPLACE;
err = ovl_check_sticky(old);
if (err)
goto out;
/* Don't copy up directory trees */
old_type = ovl_path_type(old);
err = -EXDEV;
if (OVL_TYPE_MERGE_OR_LOWER(old_type) && is_dir)
goto out;
if (new->d_inode) {
err = ovl_check_sticky(new);
if (err)
goto out;
if (d_is_dir(new))
new_is_dir = true;
new_type = ovl_path_type(new);
err = -EXDEV;
if (!overwrite && OVL_TYPE_MERGE_OR_LOWER(new_type) && new_is_dir)
goto out;
err = 0;
if (!OVL_TYPE_UPPER(new_type) && !OVL_TYPE_UPPER(old_type)) {
if (ovl_dentry_lower(old)->d_inode ==
ovl_dentry_lower(new)->d_inode)
goto out;
}
if (OVL_TYPE_UPPER(new_type) && OVL_TYPE_UPPER(old_type)) {
if (ovl_dentry_upper(old)->d_inode ==
ovl_dentry_upper(new)->d_inode)
goto out;
}
} else {
if (ovl_dentry_is_opaque(new))
new_type = __OVL_PATH_UPPER;
else
new_type = __OVL_PATH_UPPER | __OVL_PATH_PURE;
}
err = ovl_want_write(old);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ovl_copy_up(old);
if (err)
goto out_drop_write;
err = ovl_copy_up(new->d_parent);
if (err)
goto out_drop_write;
if (!overwrite) {
err = ovl_copy_up(new);
if (err)
goto out_drop_write;
}
old_opaque = !OVL_TYPE_PURE_UPPER(old_type);
new_opaque = !OVL_TYPE_PURE_UPPER(new_type);
if (old_opaque || new_opaque) {
err = -ENOMEM;
override_cred = prepare_creds();
if (!override_cred)
goto out_drop_write;
/*
* CAP_SYS_ADMIN for setting xattr on whiteout, opaque dir
* CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE for create in workdir
* CAP_FOWNER for removing whiteout from sticky dir
* CAP_FSETID for chmod of opaque dir
* CAP_CHOWN for chown of opaque dir
*/
cap_raise(override_cred->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
cap_raise(override_cred->cap_effective, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE);
cap_raise(override_cred->cap_effective, CAP_FOWNER);
cap_raise(override_cred->cap_effective, CAP_FSETID);
cap_raise(override_cred->cap_effective, CAP_CHOWN);
old_cred = override_creds(override_cred);
}
if (overwrite && OVL_TYPE_MERGE_OR_LOWER(new_type) && new_is_dir) {
opaquedir = ovl_check_empty_and_clear(new);
err = PTR_ERR(opaquedir);
if (IS_ERR(opaquedir)) {
opaquedir = NULL;
goto out_revert_creds;
}
}
if (overwrite) {
if (old_opaque) {
if (new->d_inode || !new_opaque) {
/* Whiteout source */
flags |= RENAME_WHITEOUT;
} else {
/* Switch whiteouts */
flags |= RENAME_EXCHANGE;
}
} else if (is_dir && !new->d_inode && new_opaque) {
flags |= RENAME_EXCHANGE;
cleanup_whiteout = true;
}
}
old_upperdir = ovl_dentry_upper(old->d_parent);
new_upperdir = ovl_dentry_upper(new->d_parent);
trap = lock_rename(new_upperdir, old_upperdir);
olddentry = ovl_dentry_upper(old);
newdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(new);
if (newdentry) {
if (opaquedir) {
newdentry = opaquedir;
opaquedir = NULL;
} else {
dget(newdentry);
}
} else {
new_create = true;
newdentry = lookup_one_len(new->d_name.name, new_upperdir,
new->d_name.len);
err = PTR_ERR(newdentry);
if (IS_ERR(newdentry))
goto out_unlock;
}
err = -ESTALE;
if (olddentry->d_parent != old_upperdir)
goto out_dput;
if (newdentry->d_parent != new_upperdir)
goto out_dput;
if (olddentry == trap)
goto out_dput;
if (newdentry == trap)
goto out_dput;
if (is_dir && !old_opaque && new_opaque) {
err = ovl_set_opaque(olddentry);
if (err)
goto out_dput;
}
if (!overwrite && new_is_dir && old_opaque && !new_opaque) {
err = ovl_set_opaque(newdentry);
if (err)
goto out_dput;
}
if (old_opaque || new_opaque) {
err = ovl_do_rename(old_upperdir->d_inode, olddentry,
new_upperdir->d_inode, newdentry,
flags);
} else {
/* No debug for the plain case */
BUG_ON(flags & ~RENAME_EXCHANGE);
err = vfs_rename(old_upperdir->d_inode, olddentry,
new_upperdir->d_inode, newdentry,
NULL, flags);
}
if (err) {
if (is_dir && !old_opaque && new_opaque)
ovl_remove_opaque(olddentry);
if (!overwrite && new_is_dir && old_opaque && !new_opaque)
ovl_remove_opaque(newdentry);
goto out_dput;
}
if (is_dir && old_opaque && !new_opaque)
ovl_remove_opaque(olddentry);
if (!overwrite && new_is_dir && !old_opaque && new_opaque)
ovl_remove_opaque(newdentry);
/*
* Old dentry now lives in different location. Dentries in
* lowerstack are stale. We cannot drop them here because
* access to them is lockless. This could be only pure upper
* or opaque directory - numlower is zero. Or upper non-dir
* entry - its pureness is tracked by flag opaque.
*/
if (old_opaque != new_opaque) {
ovl_dentry_set_opaque(old, new_opaque);
if (!overwrite)
ovl_dentry_set_opaque(new, old_opaque);
}
if (cleanup_whiteout)
ovl_cleanup(old_upperdir->d_inode, newdentry);
ovl_dentry_version_inc(old->d_parent);
ovl_dentry_version_inc(new->d_parent);
out_dput:
dput(newdentry);
out_unlock:
unlock_rename(new_upperdir, old_upperdir);
out_revert_creds:
if (old_opaque || new_opaque) {
revert_creds(old_cred);
put_cred(override_cred);
}
out_drop_write:
ovl_drop_write(old);
out:
dput(opaquedir);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ovl: verify upper dentry before unlink and rename
Unlink and rename in overlayfs checked the upper dentry for staleness by
verifying upper->d_parent against upperdir. However the dentry can go
stale also by being unhashed, for example.
Expand the verification to actually look up the name again (under parent
lock) and check if it matches the upper dentry. This matches what the VFS
does before passing the dentry to filesytem's unlink/rename methods, which
excludes any inconsistency caused by overlayfs.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 167,015
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int complete_emulated_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r;
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
r = emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE);
srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
if (r != EMULATE_DONE)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,804
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::VoidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArgOptionalLongArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArgOptionalLongArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArgOptionalLongArgMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,492
|
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