instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int s390_last_break_get(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
{
if (count > 0) {
if (kbuf) {
unsigned long *k = kbuf;
*k = task_thread_info(target)->last_break;
} else {
unsigned long __user *u = ubuf;
if (__put_user(task_thread_info(target)->last_break, u))
return -EFAULT;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: s390/ptrace: fix PSW mask check
The PSW mask check of the PTRACE_POKEUSR_AREA command is incorrect.
The PSW_MASK_USER define contains the PSW_MASK_ASC bits, the ptrace
interface accepts all combinations for the address-space-control
bits. To protect the kernel space the PSW mask check in ptrace needs
to reject the address-space-control bit combination for home space.
Fixes CVE-2014-3534
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 38,038
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u64 snd_usb_interface_dsd_format_quirks(struct snd_usb_audio *chip,
struct audioformat *fp,
unsigned int sample_bytes)
{
/* Playback Designs */
if (USB_ID_VENDOR(chip->usb_id) == 0x23ba) {
switch (fp->altsetting) {
case 1:
fp->dsd_dop = true;
return SNDRV_PCM_FMTBIT_DSD_U16_LE;
case 2:
fp->dsd_bitrev = true;
return SNDRV_PCM_FMTBIT_DSD_U8;
case 3:
fp->dsd_bitrev = true;
return SNDRV_PCM_FMTBIT_DSD_U16_LE;
}
}
/* XMOS based USB DACs */
switch (chip->usb_id) {
case USB_ID(0x20b1, 0x3008): /* iFi Audio micro/nano iDSD */
case USB_ID(0x20b1, 0x2008): /* Matrix Audio X-Sabre */
case USB_ID(0x20b1, 0x300a): /* Matrix Audio Mini-i Pro */
case USB_ID(0x22d9, 0x0416): /* OPPO HA-1 */
if (fp->altsetting == 2)
return SNDRV_PCM_FMTBIT_DSD_U32_BE;
break;
case USB_ID(0x20b1, 0x000a): /* Gustard DAC-X20U */
case USB_ID(0x20b1, 0x2009): /* DIYINHK DSD DXD 384kHz USB to I2S/DSD */
case USB_ID(0x20b1, 0x2023): /* JLsounds I2SoverUSB */
case USB_ID(0x20b1, 0x3023): /* Aune X1S 32BIT/384 DSD DAC */
case USB_ID(0x2616, 0x0106): /* PS Audio NuWave DAC */
if (fp->altsetting == 3)
return SNDRV_PCM_FMTBIT_DSD_U32_BE;
break;
default:
break;
}
/* Denon/Marantz devices with USB DAC functionality */
if (is_marantz_denon_dac(chip->usb_id)) {
if (fp->altsetting == 2)
return SNDRV_PCM_FMTBIT_DSD_U32_BE;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix NULL dereference in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
create_fixed_stream_quirk() may cause a NULL-pointer dereference by
accessing the non-existing endpoint when a USB device with a malformed
USB descriptor is used.
This patch avoids it simply by adding a sanity check of bNumEndpoints
before the accesses.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 55,268
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Shell::PlatformResizeSubViews() {
}
Commit Message: shell_aura: Set child to root window size, not host size
The host size is in pixels and the root window size is in scaled pixels.
So, using the pixel size may make the child window much larger than the
root window (and screen). Fix this by matching the root window size.
BUG=335713
TEST=ozone content_shell with --force-device-scale-factor=2
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/141853003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@246389 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 113,706
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didDisplayInsecureContent(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
render_view_->Send(new ViewHostMsg_DidDisplayInsecureContent(
render_view_->GetRoutingID()));
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,245
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int perf_pmu_commit_txn(struct pmu *pmu)
{
perf_pmu_enable(pmu);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DomOperationObserver::~DomOperationObserver() {}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint32_t pcnet_bcr_readw(PCNetState *s, uint32_t rap)
{
uint32_t val;
rap &= 127;
switch (rap) {
case BCR_LNKST:
case BCR_LED1:
case BCR_LED2:
case BCR_LED3:
val = s->bcr[rap] & ~0x8000;
val |= (val & 0x017f & s->lnkst) ? 0x8000 : 0;
break;
default:
val = rap < 32 ? s->bcr[rap] : 0;
break;
}
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_BCR
printf("pcnet_bcr_readw rap=%d val=0x%04x\n", rap, val);
#endif
return val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,512
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rechunk_length(struct IDAT *idat)
/* Return the length for the next IDAT chunk, taking into account
* rechunking.
*/
{
png_uint_32 len = idat->global->idat_max;
if (len == 0) /* use original chunk lengths */
{
const struct IDAT_list *cur;
unsigned int count;
if (idat->idat_index == 0) /* at the new chunk (first time) */
return idat->idat_length; /* use the cache */
/* Otherwise rechunk_length is called at the end of a chunk for the length
* of the next one.
*/
cur = idat->idat_cur;
count = idat->idat_count;
assert(idat->idat_index == idat->idat_length &&
idat->idat_length == cur->lengths[count]);
/* Return length of the *next* chunk */
if (++count < cur->count)
return cur->lengths[count];
/* End of this list */
assert(cur != idat->idat_list_tail);
cur = cur->next;
assert(cur != NULL && cur->count > 0);
return cur->lengths[0];
}
else /* rechunking */
{
/* The chunk size is the lesser of file->idat_max and the number
* of remaining bytes.
*/
png_uint_32 have = idat->idat_length - idat->idat_index;
if (len > have)
{
struct IDAT_list *cur = idat->idat_cur;
unsigned int j = idat->idat_count+1; /* the next IDAT in the list */
do
{
/* Add up the remaining bytes. This can't overflow because the
* individual lengths are always <= 0x7fffffff, so when we add two
* of them overflow is not possible.
*/
assert(cur != NULL);
for (;;)
{
/* NOTE: IDAT_list::count here, not IDAT_list::length */
for (; j < cur->count; ++j)
{
have += cur->lengths[j];
if (len <= have)
return len;
}
/* If this was the end return the count of the available bytes */
if (cur == idat->idat_list_tail)
return have;
cur = cur->next;
j = 0;
}
}
while (len > have);
}
return len;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,141
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ReportAboutFlagsHistogram(const std::string& uma_histogram_name,
const std::set<std::string>& switches,
const std::set<std::string>& features) {
ReportAboutFlagsHistogramSwitches(uma_histogram_name, switches);
ReportAboutFlagsHistogramFeatures(uma_histogram_name, features);
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <nikhil.sahni@samsung.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,585
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ssl_set_dbg( ssl_context *ssl,
void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *),
void *p_dbg )
{
ssl->f_dbg = f_dbg;
ssl->p_dbg = p_dbg;
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,030
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_zbuf(AVBPrint *bp, const uint8_t *data,
const uint8_t *data_end)
{
z_stream zstream;
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned buf_size;
int ret;
zstream.zalloc = ff_png_zalloc;
zstream.zfree = ff_png_zfree;
zstream.opaque = NULL;
if (inflateInit(&zstream) != Z_OK)
return AVERROR_EXTERNAL;
zstream.next_in = (unsigned char *)data;
zstream.avail_in = data_end - data;
av_bprint_init(bp, 0, -1);
while (zstream.avail_in > 0) {
av_bprint_get_buffer(bp, 2, &buf, &buf_size);
if (buf_size < 2) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto fail;
}
zstream.next_out = buf;
zstream.avail_out = buf_size - 1;
ret = inflate(&zstream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
if (ret != Z_OK && ret != Z_STREAM_END) {
ret = AVERROR_EXTERNAL;
goto fail;
}
bp->len += zstream.next_out - buf;
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
break;
}
inflateEnd(&zstream);
bp->str[bp->len] = 0;
return 0;
fail:
inflateEnd(&zstream);
av_bprint_finalize(bp, NULL);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/pngdec: Check trns more completely
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 546/clusterfuzz-testcase-4809433909559296
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 67,064
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcRenderQueryPictFormats (ClientPtr client)
{
RenderClientPtr pRenderClient = GetRenderClient (client);
xRenderQueryPictFormatsReply *reply;
xPictScreen *pictScreen;
xPictDepth *pictDepth;
xPictVisual *pictVisual;
xPictFormInfo *pictForm;
CARD32 *pictSubpixel;
ScreenPtr pScreen;
VisualPtr pVisual;
DepthPtr pDepth;
int v, d;
PictureScreenPtr ps;
PictFormatPtr pFormat;
int nformat;
int ndepth;
int nvisual;
int rlength;
int s;
int n;
int numScreens;
int numSubpixel;
/* REQUEST(xRenderQueryPictFormatsReq); */
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderQueryPictFormatsReq);
#ifdef PANORAMIX
if (noPanoramiXExtension)
numScreens = screenInfo.numScreens;
else
numScreens = ((xConnSetup *)ConnectionInfo)->numRoots;
#else
numScreens = screenInfo.numScreens;
#endif
ndepth = nformat = nvisual = 0;
for (s = 0; s < numScreens; s++)
{
pScreen = screenInfo.screens[s];
for (d = 0; d < pScreen->numDepths; d++)
{
pDepth = pScreen->allowedDepths + d;
++ndepth;
for (v = 0; v < pDepth->numVids; v++)
{
pVisual = findVisual (pScreen, pDepth->vids[v]);
if (pVisual && PictureMatchVisual (pScreen, pDepth->depth, pVisual))
++nvisual;
}
}
ps = GetPictureScreenIfSet(pScreen);
if (ps)
nformat += ps->nformats;
}
if (pRenderClient->major_version == 0 && pRenderClient->minor_version < 6)
numSubpixel = 0;
else
numSubpixel = numScreens;
rlength = (sizeof (xRenderQueryPictFormatsReply) +
nformat * sizeof (xPictFormInfo) +
numScreens * sizeof (xPictScreen) +
ndepth * sizeof (xPictDepth) +
nvisual * sizeof (xPictVisual) +
numSubpixel * sizeof (CARD32));
reply = (xRenderQueryPictFormatsReply *) calloc(1, rlength);
if (!reply)
return BadAlloc;
reply->type = X_Reply;
reply->sequenceNumber = client->sequence;
reply->length = bytes_to_int32(rlength - sizeof(xGenericReply));
reply->numFormats = nformat;
reply->numScreens = numScreens;
reply->numDepths = ndepth;
reply->numVisuals = nvisual;
reply->numSubpixel = numSubpixel;
pictForm = (xPictFormInfo *) (reply + 1);
for (s = 0; s < numScreens; s++)
{
pScreen = screenInfo.screens[s];
ps = GetPictureScreenIfSet(pScreen);
if (ps)
{
for (nformat = 0, pFormat = ps->formats;
nformat < ps->nformats;
nformat++, pFormat++)
{
pictForm->id = pFormat->id;
pictForm->type = pFormat->type;
pictForm->depth = pFormat->depth;
pictForm->direct.red = pFormat->direct.red;
pictForm->direct.redMask = pFormat->direct.redMask;
pictForm->direct.green = pFormat->direct.green;
pictForm->direct.greenMask = pFormat->direct.greenMask;
pictForm->direct.blue = pFormat->direct.blue;
pictForm->direct.blueMask = pFormat->direct.blueMask;
pictForm->direct.alpha = pFormat->direct.alpha;
pictForm->direct.alphaMask = pFormat->direct.alphaMask;
if (pFormat->type == PictTypeIndexed && pFormat->index.pColormap)
pictForm->colormap = pFormat->index.pColormap->mid;
else
pictForm->colormap = None;
if (client->swapped)
{
swapl (&pictForm->id, n);
swaps (&pictForm->direct.red, n);
swaps (&pictForm->direct.redMask, n);
swaps (&pictForm->direct.green, n);
swaps (&pictForm->direct.greenMask, n);
swaps (&pictForm->direct.blue, n);
swaps (&pictForm->direct.blueMask, n);
swaps (&pictForm->direct.alpha, n);
swaps (&pictForm->direct.alphaMask, n);
swapl (&pictForm->colormap, n);
}
pictForm++;
}
}
}
pictScreen = (xPictScreen *) pictForm;
for (s = 0; s < numScreens; s++)
{
pScreen = screenInfo.screens[s];
pictDepth = (xPictDepth *) (pictScreen + 1);
ndepth = 0;
for (d = 0; d < pScreen->numDepths; d++)
{
pictVisual = (xPictVisual *) (pictDepth + 1);
pDepth = pScreen->allowedDepths + d;
nvisual = 0;
for (v = 0; v < pDepth->numVids; v++)
{
pVisual = findVisual (pScreen, pDepth->vids[v]);
if (pVisual && (pFormat = PictureMatchVisual (pScreen,
pDepth->depth,
pVisual)))
{
pictVisual->visual = pVisual->vid;
pictVisual->format = pFormat->id;
if (client->swapped)
{
swapl (&pictVisual->visual, n);
swapl (&pictVisual->format, n);
}
pictVisual++;
nvisual++;
}
}
pictDepth->depth = pDepth->depth;
pictDepth->nPictVisuals = nvisual;
if (client->swapped)
{
swaps (&pictDepth->nPictVisuals, n);
}
ndepth++;
pictDepth = (xPictDepth *) pictVisual;
}
pictScreen->nDepth = ndepth;
ps = GetPictureScreenIfSet(pScreen);
if (ps)
pictScreen->fallback = ps->fallback->id;
else
pictScreen->fallback = 0;
if (client->swapped)
{
swapl (&pictScreen->nDepth, n);
swapl (&pictScreen->fallback, n);
}
pictScreen = (xPictScreen *) pictDepth;
}
pictSubpixel = (CARD32 *) pictScreen;
for (s = 0; s < numSubpixel; s++)
{
pScreen = screenInfo.screens[s];
ps = GetPictureScreenIfSet(pScreen);
if (ps)
*pictSubpixel = ps->subpixel;
else
*pictSubpixel = SubPixelUnknown;
if (client->swapped)
{
swapl (pictSubpixel, n);
}
++pictSubpixel;
}
if (client->swapped)
{
swaps (&reply->sequenceNumber, n);
swapl (&reply->length, n);
swapl (&reply->numFormats, n);
swapl (&reply->numScreens, n);
swapl (&reply->numDepths, n);
swapl (&reply->numVisuals, n);
swapl (&reply->numSubpixel, n);
}
WriteToClient(client, rlength, (char *) reply);
free(reply);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int open_socket(char *ifname, struct sockaddr *addr, int port)
{
int sd, val, rc;
char loop;
struct ip_mreqn mreq;
struct sockaddr_in sin, *address = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr;
sd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM | SOCK_NONBLOCK | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
if (sd < 0)
return -1;
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = htons(port);
sin.sin_addr = address->sin_addr;
if (bind(sd, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin)) < 0) {
close(sd);
logit(LOG_ERR, "Failed binding to %s:%d: %s", inet_ntoa(address->sin_addr), port, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
#if 0
ENABLE_SOCKOPT(sd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR);
#ifdef SO_REUSEPORT
ENABLE_SOCKOPT(sd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEPORT);
#endif
#endif
memset(&mreq, 0, sizeof(mreq));
mreq.imr_address = address->sin_addr;
mreq.imr_multiaddr.s_addr = inet_addr(MC_SSDP_GROUP);
if (setsockopt(sd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP, &mreq, sizeof(mreq))) {
close(sd);
logit(LOG_ERR, "Failed joining group %s: %s", MC_SSDP_GROUP, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
val = 2; /* Default 2, but should be configurable */
rc = setsockopt(sd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MULTICAST_TTL, &val, sizeof(val));
if (rc < 0) {
close(sd);
logit(LOG_ERR, "Failed setting multicast TTL: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
loop = 0;
rc = setsockopt(sd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MULTICAST_LOOP, &loop, sizeof(loop));
if (rc < 0) {
close(sd);
logit(LOG_ERR, "Failed disabing multicast loop: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
rc = setsockopt(sd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MULTICAST_IF, &address->sin_addr, sizeof(address->sin_addr));
if (rc < 0) {
close(sd);
logit(LOG_ERR, "Failed setting multicast interface: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "Adding new interface %s with address %s", ifname, inet_ntoa(address->sin_addr));
return sd;
}
Commit Message: Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <troglobit@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 88,803
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t ucma_query_addr(struct ucma_context *ctx,
void __user *response, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_query_addr_resp resp;
struct sockaddr *addr;
int ret = 0;
if (out_len < sizeof(resp))
return -ENOSPC;
memset(&resp, 0, sizeof resp);
addr = (struct sockaddr *) &ctx->cm_id->route.addr.src_addr;
resp.src_size = rdma_addr_size(addr);
memcpy(&resp.src_addr, addr, resp.src_size);
addr = (struct sockaddr *) &ctx->cm_id->route.addr.dst_addr;
resp.dst_size = rdma_addr_size(addr);
memcpy(&resp.dst_addr, addr, resp.dst_size);
ucma_query_device_addr(ctx->cm_id, &resp);
if (copy_to_user(response, &resp, sizeof(resp)))
ret = -EFAULT;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mpol_rebind_default(struct mempolicy *pol, const nodemask_t *nodes)
{
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy: fix use after free when calling get_mempolicy
I hit a use after free issue when executing trinity and repoduced it
with KASAN enabled. The related call trace is as follows.
BUG: KASan: use after free in SyS_get_mempolicy+0x3c8/0x960 at addr ffff8801f582d766
Read of size 2 by task syz-executor1/798
INFO: Allocated in mpol_new.part.2+0x74/0x160 age=3 cpu=1 pid=799
__slab_alloc+0x768/0x970
kmem_cache_alloc+0x2e7/0x450
mpol_new.part.2+0x74/0x160
mpol_new+0x66/0x80
SyS_mbind+0x267/0x9f0
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
INFO: Freed in __mpol_put+0x2b/0x40 age=4 cpu=1 pid=799
__slab_free+0x495/0x8e0
kmem_cache_free+0x2f3/0x4c0
__mpol_put+0x2b/0x40
SyS_mbind+0x383/0x9f0
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0009cb8dc0 objects=23 used=8 fp=0xffff8801f582de40 flags=0x200000000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff8801f582d760 @offset=5984 fp=0xffff8801f582d600
Bytes b4 ffff8801f582d750: ae 01 ff ff 00 00 00 00 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ........ZZZZZZZZ
Object ffff8801f582d760: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object ffff8801f582d770: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkk.
Redzone ffff8801f582d778: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........
Padding ffff8801f582d8b8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8801f582d600: fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8801f582d680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8801f582d700: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fc
!shared memory policy is not protected against parallel removal by other
thread which is normally protected by the mmap_sem. do_get_mempolicy,
however, drops the lock midway while we can still access it later.
Early premature up_read is a historical artifact from times when
put_user was called in this path see https://lwn.net/Articles/124754/
but that is gone since 8bccd85ffbaf ("[PATCH] Implement sys_* do_*
layering in the memory policy layer."). but when we have the the
current mempolicy ref count model. The issue was introduced
accordingly.
Fix the issue by removing the premature release.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1502950924-27521-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 83,107
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: server_http_authenticate(struct server_config *srv_conf, struct client *clt)
{
char decoded[1024];
FILE *fp = NULL;
struct http_descriptor *desc = clt->clt_descreq;
const struct auth *auth = srv_conf->auth;
struct kv *ba, key;
size_t linesize = 0;
ssize_t linelen;
int ret = -1;
char *line = NULL, *user = NULL, *pass = NULL;
char *clt_user = NULL, *clt_pass = NULL;
memset(decoded, 0, sizeof(decoded));
key.kv_key = "Authorization";
if ((ba = kv_find(&desc->http_headers, &key)) == NULL ||
ba->kv_value == NULL)
goto done;
if (strncmp(ba->kv_value, "Basic ", strlen("Basic ")) != 0)
goto done;
if (b64_pton(strchr(ba->kv_value, ' ') + 1, (uint8_t *)decoded,
sizeof(decoded)) <= 0)
goto done;
if ((clt_pass = strchr(decoded, ':')) == NULL)
goto done;
clt_user = decoded;
*clt_pass++ = '\0';
if ((clt->clt_remote_user = strdup(clt_user)) == NULL)
goto done;
if (clt_pass == NULL)
goto done;
if ((fp = fopen(auth->auth_htpasswd, "r")) == NULL)
goto done;
while ((linelen = getline(&line, &linesize, fp)) != -1) {
if (line[linelen - 1] == '\n')
line[linelen - 1] = '\0';
user = line;
pass = strchr(line, ':');
if (pass == NULL) {
explicit_bzero(line, linelen);
continue;
}
*pass++ = '\0';
if (strcmp(clt_user, user) != 0) {
explicit_bzero(line, linelen);
continue;
}
if (crypt_checkpass(clt_pass, pass) == 0) {
explicit_bzero(line, linelen);
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
done:
free(line);
if (fp != NULL)
fclose(fp);
if (ba != NULL && ba->kv_value != NULL) {
explicit_bzero(ba->kv_value, strlen(ba->kv_value));
explicit_bzero(decoded, sizeof(decoded));
}
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Reimplement httpd's support for byte ranges.
The previous implementation loaded all the output into a single output
buffer and used its size to determine the Content-Length of the body.
The new implementation calculates the body length first and writes the
individual ranges in an async way using the bufferevent mechanism.
This prevents httpd from using too much memory and applies the
watermark and throttling mechanisms to range requests.
Problem reported by Pierre Kim (pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com)
OK benno@ sunil@
CWE ID: CWE-770
| 0
| 68,496
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit exit_nlm(void)
{
/* FIXME: delete all NLM clients */
nlm_shutdown_hosts();
lockd_remove_procfs();
unregister_pernet_subsys(&lockd_net_ops);
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
unregister_sysctl_table(nlm_sysctl_table);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,192
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMXNodeInstance::OMXNodeInstance(
OMX *owner, const sp<IOMXObserver> &observer, const char *name)
: mOwner(owner),
mNodeID(0),
mHandle(NULL),
mObserver(observer),
mDying(false),
mBufferIDCount(0)
{
mName = ADebug::GetDebugName(name);
DEBUG = ADebug::GetDebugLevelFromProperty(name, "debug.stagefright.omx-debug");
ALOGV("debug level for %s is %d", name, DEBUG);
DEBUG_BUMP = DEBUG;
mNumPortBuffers[0] = 0;
mNumPortBuffers[1] = 0;
mDebugLevelBumpPendingBuffers[0] = 0;
mDebugLevelBumpPendingBuffers[1] = 0;
mMetadataType[0] = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
mMetadataType[1] = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
mSecureBufferType[0] = kSecureBufferTypeUnknown;
mSecureBufferType[1] = kSecureBufferTypeUnknown;
mIsSecure = AString(name).endsWith(".secure");
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 174,129
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ModuleSystem::RegisterNativeHandler(
const std::string& name,
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler> native_handler) {
ClobberExistingNativeHandler(name);
native_handler_map_[name] =
linked_ptr<NativeHandler>(native_handler.release());
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 133,066
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void qemu_spice_create_primary_surface(SimpleSpiceDisplay *ssd, uint32_t id,
QXLDevSurfaceCreate *surface,
qxl_async_io async)
{
trace_qemu_spice_create_primary_surface(ssd->qxl.id, id, surface, async);
if (async != QXL_SYNC) {
spice_qxl_create_primary_surface_async(&ssd->qxl, id, surface,
(uintptr_t)qxl_cookie_new(QXL_COOKIE_TYPE_IO,
QXL_IO_CREATE_PRIMARY_ASYNC));
} else {
spice_qxl_create_primary_surface(&ssd->qxl, id, surface);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 12,186
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
{
kvm_mmu_invalidate_zap_all_pages(kvm);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,836
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MediaStreamManager::StopStreamDevice(int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id,
const std::string& device_id,
int session_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DVLOG(1) << "StopStreamDevice({render_frame_id = " << render_frame_id << "} "
<< ", {device_id = " << device_id << "}, session_id = " << session_id
<< "})";
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CompositorImpl::InitializeVizLayerTreeFrameSink(
scoped_refptr<ws::ContextProviderCommandBuffer> context_provider) {
DCHECK(enable_viz_);
pending_frames_ = 0;
gpu_capabilities_ = context_provider->ContextCapabilities();
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner =
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get();
auto root_params = viz::mojom::RootCompositorFrameSinkParams::New();
root_params->send_swap_size_notifications = true;
viz::mojom::CompositorFrameSinkAssociatedPtrInfo sink_info;
root_params->compositor_frame_sink = mojo::MakeRequest(&sink_info);
viz::mojom::CompositorFrameSinkClientRequest client_request =
mojo::MakeRequest(&root_params->compositor_frame_sink_client);
root_params->display_private = mojo::MakeRequest(&display_private_);
display_client_ = std::make_unique<AndroidHostDisplayClient>(
base::BindRepeating(&CompositorImpl::DidSwapBuffers,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
base::BindRepeating(
&CompositorImpl::OnFatalOrSurfaceContextCreationFailure,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
root_params->display_client =
display_client_->GetBoundPtr(task_runner).PassInterface();
viz::RendererSettings renderer_settings;
renderer_settings.allow_antialiasing = false;
renderer_settings.highp_threshold_min = 2048;
renderer_settings.requires_alpha_channel = requires_alpha_channel_;
renderer_settings.initial_screen_size =
display::Screen::GetScreen()
->GetDisplayNearestWindow(root_window_)
.GetSizeInPixel();
renderer_settings.use_skia_renderer = features::IsUsingSkiaRenderer();
renderer_settings.color_space = display_color_space_;
root_params->frame_sink_id = frame_sink_id_;
root_params->widget = surface_handle_;
root_params->gpu_compositing = true;
root_params->renderer_settings = renderer_settings;
GetHostFrameSinkManager()->CreateRootCompositorFrameSink(
std::move(root_params));
cc::mojo_embedder::AsyncLayerTreeFrameSink::InitParams params;
params.compositor_task_runner = task_runner;
params.gpu_memory_buffer_manager = BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance()
->gpu_channel_establish_factory()
->GetGpuMemoryBufferManager();
params.pipes.compositor_frame_sink_associated_info = std::move(sink_info);
params.pipes.client_request = std::move(client_request);
params.enable_surface_synchronization = true;
params.hit_test_data_provider =
std::make_unique<viz::HitTestDataProviderDrawQuad>(
false /* should_ask_for_child_region */,
true /* root_accepts_events */);
params.client_name = kBrowser;
auto layer_tree_frame_sink =
std::make_unique<cc::mojo_embedder::AsyncLayerTreeFrameSink>(
std::move(context_provider), nullptr, ¶ms);
host_->SetLayerTreeFrameSink(std::move(layer_tree_frame_sink));
display_private_->SetDisplayVisible(true);
display_private_->Resize(size_);
display_private_->SetDisplayColorSpace(display_color_space_,
display_color_space_);
display_private_->SetVSyncPaused(vsync_paused_);
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 172,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lut_init(AVFilterContext *ctx)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,765
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ssl_handshake_free( ssl_handshake_params *handshake )
{
#if defined(POLARSSL_DHM_C)
dhm_free( &handshake->dhm_ctx );
#endif
memset( handshake, 0, sizeof( ssl_handshake_params ) );
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,003
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_attr_owner(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap,
const struct nfs_server *server, uint32_t *uid, int may_sleep)
{
uint32_t len;
__be32 *p;
int ret = 0;
*uid = -2;
if (unlikely(bitmap[1] & (FATTR4_WORD1_OWNER - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[1] & FATTR4_WORD1_OWNER)) {
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
len = be32_to_cpup(p);
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, len);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
if (!may_sleep) {
/* do nothing */
} else if (len < XDR_MAX_NETOBJ) {
if (nfs_map_name_to_uid(server, (char *)p, len, uid) == 0)
ret = NFS_ATTR_FATTR_OWNER;
else
dprintk("%s: nfs_map_name_to_uid failed!\n",
__func__);
} else
dprintk("%s: name too long (%u)!\n",
__func__, len);
bitmap[1] &= ~FATTR4_WORD1_OWNER;
}
dprintk("%s: uid=%d\n", __func__, (int)*uid);
return ret;
out_overflow:
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,276
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ToColor_S4444_Alpha(SkColor dst[], const void* src, int width,
SkColorTable*) {
SkASSERT(width > 0);
const SkPMColor16* s = (const SkPMColor16*)src;
do {
*dst++ = SkUnPreMultiply::PMColorToColor(SkPixel4444ToPixel32(*s++));
} while (--width != 0);
}
Commit Message: Make Bitmap_createFromParcel check the color count. DO NOT MERGE
When reading from the parcel, if the number of colors is invalid, early
exit.
Add two more checks: setInfo must return true, and Parcel::readInplace
must return non-NULL. The former ensures that the previously read values
(width, height, etc) were valid, and the latter checks that the Parcel
had enough data even if the number of colors was reasonable.
Also use an auto-deleter to handle deletion of the SkBitmap.
Cherry pick from change-Id: Icbd562d6d1f131a723724883fd31822d337cf5a6
BUG=19666945
Change-Id: Iab0d218c41ae0c39606e333e44cda078eef32291
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 157,660
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IntRect RenderBox::localCaretRect(InlineBox* box, int caretOffset, int* extraWidthToEndOfLine)
{
IntRect rect(x(), y(), caretWidth, height());
bool ltr = box ? box->isLeftToRightDirection() : style()->isLeftToRightDirection();
if ((!caretOffset) ^ ltr)
rect.move(IntSize(width() - caretWidth, 0));
if (box) {
RootInlineBox* rootBox = box->root();
int top = rootBox->lineTop();
rect.setY(top);
rect.setHeight(rootBox->lineBottom() - top);
}
int fontHeight = style()->fontMetrics().height();
if (fontHeight > rect.height() || (!isReplaced() && !isTable()))
rect.setHeight(fontHeight);
if (extraWidthToEndOfLine)
*extraWidthToEndOfLine = x() + width() - rect.maxX();
rect.moveBy(-location());
return rect;
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,595
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnJavaBridgeInit() {
DCHECK(!java_bridge_dispatcher_.get());
#if defined(ENABLE_JAVA_BRIDGE)
java_bridge_dispatcher_.reset(new JavaBridgeDispatcher(this));
#endif
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,383
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_arch_exit(void)
{
kvm_free_vmm_area();
kfree(kvm_vmm_info);
kvm_vmm_info = NULL;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,582
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Resource::MarkClientFinished(ResourceClient* client) {
if (clients_.Contains(client)) {
finished_clients_.insert(client);
clients_.erase(client);
}
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 149,738
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParseAttValue(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (ctxt->input == NULL)) return(NULL);
return(xmlParseAttValueInternal(ctxt, NULL, NULL, 0));
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 163,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptPromise ImageBitmapFactories::createImageBitmap(EventTarget& eventTarget, Blob* blob, int sx, int sy, int sw, int sh, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
if (!blob) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError("The blob provided is invalid.");
return ScriptPromise();
}
if (!sw || !sh) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(IndexSizeError, String::format("The source %s provided is 0.", sw ? "height" : "width"));
return ScriptPromise();
}
RefPtr<ScriptPromiseResolver> resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::create(eventTarget.executionContext());
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->promise();
RefPtr<ImageBitmapLoader> loader = ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::create(from(eventTarget), resolver, IntRect(sx, sy, sw, sh));
from(eventTarget).addLoader(loader);
loader->loadBlobAsync(eventTarget.executionContext(), blob);
return promise;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash when creating an ImageBitmap from an invalid canvas
BUG=354356
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/211313003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169973 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 115,112
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_option(const struct dhcp_message *dhcp, uint8_t opt, int *len, int *type)
{
const uint8_t *p = dhcp->options;
const uint8_t *e = p + sizeof(dhcp->options);
uint8_t l, ol = 0;
uint8_t o = 0;
uint8_t overl = 0;
uint8_t *bp = NULL;
const uint8_t *op = NULL;
int bl = 0;
/* DHCP Options are in TLV format with T and L each being a single
* byte. In general, here we have p -> T, ol=p+1 -> L, op -> V.
* We must make sure there is enough room to read both T and L.
*/
while (p + 1 < e) {
o = *p++;
if (o == opt) {
if (op) {
if (!opt_buffer) {
opt_buffer = xmalloc(sizeof(*dhcp));
#ifdef DEBUG_MEMORY
atexit(free_option_buffer);
#endif
}
if (!bp)
bp = opt_buffer;
memcpy(bp, op, ol);
bp += ol;
}
ol = (p + *p < e) ? *p : e - (p + 1);
op = p + 1;
bl += ol;
}
switch (o) {
case DHO_PAD:
continue;
case DHO_END:
if (overl & 1) {
/* bit 1 set means parse boot file */
overl &= ~1;
p = dhcp->bootfile;
e = p + sizeof(dhcp->bootfile);
} else if (overl & 2) {
/* bit 2 set means parse server name */
overl &= ~2;
p = dhcp->servername;
e = p + sizeof(dhcp->servername);
} else
goto exit;
break;
case DHO_OPTIONSOVERLOADED:
/* Ensure we only get this option once */
if (!overl)
overl = 0x80 | p[1];
break;
}
l = *p++;
p += l;
}
exit:
if (valid_length(opt, bl, type) == -1) {
errno = EINVAL;
return NULL;
}
if (len)
*len = bl;
if (bp) {
memcpy(bp, op, ol);
return (const uint8_t *)opt_buffer;
}
if (op)
return op;
errno = ENOENT;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Improve length checks in DHCP Options parsing of dhcpcd.
Bug: 26461634
Change-Id: Ic4c2eb381a6819e181afc8ab13891f3fc58b7deb
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 161,356
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::BufferSubDataImpl(GLenum target,
long long offset,
GLsizeiptr size,
const void* data) {
WebGLBuffer* buffer = ValidateBufferDataTarget("bufferSubData", target);
if (!buffer)
return;
if (!ValidateValueFitNonNegInt32("bufferSubData", "offset", offset))
return;
if (!data)
return;
if (offset + static_cast<long long>(size) > buffer->GetSize()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "bufferSubData", "buffer overflow");
return;
}
ContextGL()->BufferSubData(target, static_cast<GLintptr>(offset), size, data);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,577
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ip_vs_use_count_inc(void)
{
return try_module_get(THIS_MODULE);
}
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,294
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfs4_init_nonuniform_client_string(struct nfs_client *clp)
{
int result;
size_t len;
char *str;
bool retried = false;
if (clp->cl_owner_id != NULL)
return 0;
retry:
rcu_read_lock();
len = 10 + strlen(clp->cl_ipaddr) + 1 +
strlen(rpc_peeraddr2str(clp->cl_rpcclient, RPC_DISPLAY_ADDR)) +
1 +
strlen(rpc_peeraddr2str(clp->cl_rpcclient, RPC_DISPLAY_PROTO)) +
1;
rcu_read_unlock();
if (len > NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT + 1)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Since this string is allocated at mount time, and held until the
* nfs_client is destroyed, we can use GFP_KERNEL here w/o worrying
* about a memory-reclaim deadlock.
*/
str = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!str)
return -ENOMEM;
rcu_read_lock();
result = scnprintf(str, len, "Linux NFSv4.0 %s/%s %s",
clp->cl_ipaddr,
rpc_peeraddr2str(clp->cl_rpcclient, RPC_DISPLAY_ADDR),
rpc_peeraddr2str(clp->cl_rpcclient, RPC_DISPLAY_PROTO));
rcu_read_unlock();
/* Did something change? */
if (result >= len) {
kfree(str);
if (retried)
return -EINVAL;
retried = true;
goto retry;
}
clp->cl_owner_id = str;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,136
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool FrameLoader::prepareForCommit()
{
PluginScriptForbiddenScope forbidPluginDestructorScripting;
DocumentLoader* pdl = m_provisionalDocumentLoader;
if (m_frame->document()) {
unsigned nodeCount = 0;
for (Frame* frame = m_frame; frame; frame = frame->tree().traverseNext()) {
if (frame->isLocalFrame()) {
LocalFrame* localFrame = toLocalFrame(frame);
nodeCount += localFrame->document()->nodeCount();
}
}
unsigned totalNodeCount = InstanceCounters::counterValue(InstanceCounters::NodeCounter);
float ratio = static_cast<float>(nodeCount) / totalNodeCount;
ThreadState::current()->schedulePageNavigationGCIfNeeded(ratio);
}
SubframeLoadingDisabler disabler(m_frame->document());
if (m_documentLoader) {
client()->dispatchWillClose();
dispatchUnloadEvent();
}
m_frame->detachChildren();
if (pdl != m_provisionalDocumentLoader)
return false;
if (m_documentLoader) {
FrameNavigationDisabler navigationDisabler(*m_frame);
TemporaryChange<bool> inDetachDocumentLoader(m_protectProvisionalLoader, true);
detachDocumentLoader(m_documentLoader);
}
if (!m_frame->client())
return false;
ASSERT(m_provisionalDocumentLoader == pdl);
if (m_frame->document())
m_frame->document()->detach();
m_documentLoader = m_provisionalDocumentLoader.release();
takeObjectSnapshot();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Disable frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach in FrameLoader::startLoad
BUG=613266
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2006033002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#396241}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,680
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::PauseVideoIfNeeded() {
DCHECK(IsHidden());
if (!pipeline_controller_.IsPipelineRunning() || is_pipeline_resuming_ ||
seeking_ || paused_)
return;
OnPause();
paused_when_hidden_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,479
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceFetcher::didFailLoading(const Resource* resource, const ResourceError& error)
{
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END0("net", "Resource", resource);
context().dispatchDidFail(m_documentLoader, resource->identifier(), error);
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 121,230
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::open(Document* ownerDocument, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
if (importLoader()) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(InvalidStateError, "Imported document doesn't support open().");
return;
}
if (ownerDocument) {
setURL(ownerDocument->url());
m_cookieURL = ownerDocument->cookieURL();
setSecurityOrigin(ownerDocument->securityOrigin());
}
if (m_frame) {
if (ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = scriptableDocumentParser()) {
if (parser->isParsing()) {
if (parser->isExecutingScript())
return;
if (!parser->wasCreatedByScript() && parser->hasInsertionPoint())
return;
}
}
if (m_frame->loader().provisionalDocumentLoader())
m_frame->loader().stopAllLoaders();
}
removeAllEventListenersRecursively();
implicitOpen(ForceSynchronousParsing);
if (ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = scriptableDocumentParser())
parser->setWasCreatedByScript(true);
if (m_frame)
m_frame->loader().didExplicitOpen();
if (m_loadEventProgress != LoadEventInProgress && m_loadEventProgress != UnloadEventInProgress)
m_loadEventProgress = LoadEventNotRun;
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,533
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RunProgressiveElisionTest(
const std::vector<ProgressiveTestcase>& testcases,
ElisionMethod method) {
const gfx::FontList font_list;
for (const auto& testcase : testcases) {
SCOPED_TRACE("Eliding " + testcase.input);
const GURL url(testcase.input);
ASSERT_FALSE(testcase.output.empty());
float width = std::max(
gfx::GetStringWidthF(base::UTF8ToUTF16(testcase.input), font_list),
gfx::GetStringWidthF(base::UTF8ToUTF16(testcase.output.front()),
font_list));
int mismatches = 0;
const int kMaxConsecutiveMismatches = 3;
for (size_t i = 0; i < testcase.output.size(); i++) {
const auto& expected = testcase.output[i];
base::string16 expected_utf16 = base::UTF8ToUTF16(expected);
base::string16 elided = Elide(url, font_list, width, method);
if (expected_utf16 != elided) {
if (i > 0 && i < testcase.output.size() - 1 &&
mismatches < kMaxConsecutiveMismatches) {
mismatches++;
continue;
}
EXPECT_EQ(expected_utf16, elided);
break;
}
mismatches = 0;
float new_width = gfx::GetStringWidthF(elided, font_list);
EXPECT_LE(new_width, std::ceil(width)) << " at " << elided;
width = new_width - 1.0f;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Percent-encode UTF8 characters in URL fragment identifiers.
This brings us into line with Firefox, Safari, and the spec.
Bug: 758523
Change-Id: I7e354ab441222d9fd08e45f0e70f91ad4e35fafe
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/668363
Commit-Queue: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507481}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 149,845
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vrrp_vscript_interval_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_script_t *vscript = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp_script);
unsigned interval;
/* The min value should be 1, but allow 0 to maintain backward compatibility
* with pre v2.0.7 */
if (!read_unsigned_strvec(strvec, 1, &interval, 0, UINT_MAX / TIMER_HZ, true)) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "(%s): vrrp script interval '%s' must be between 1 and %u - ignoring", vscript->sname, FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, 1), UINT_MAX / TIMER_HZ);
return;
}
if (interval == 0) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "(%s): vrrp script interval must be greater than 0, setting to 1", vscript->sname);
interval = 1;
}
vscript->interval = interval * TIMER_HZ;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 76,059
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GaiaCookieManagerService::ExternalCcResultFetcher::CreateFetcher(
const GURL& url) {
std::unique_ptr<net::URLFetcher> fetcher =
net::URLFetcher::Create(0, url, net::URLFetcher::GET, this);
fetcher->SetRequestContext(helper_->request_context());
fetcher->SetLoadFlags(net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SEND_COOKIES |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SAVE_COOKIES);
fetcher->SetAutomaticallyRetryOnNetworkChanges(1);
return fetcher;
}
Commit Message: Add data usage tracking for chrome services
Add data usage tracking for captive portal, web resource and signin services
BUG=655749
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2643013004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445810}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 172,019
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void btif_hl_start_cch_timer(UINT8 app_idx, UINT8 mcl_idx)
{
btif_hl_mcl_cb_t *p_mcb = BTIF_HL_GET_MCL_CB_PTR(app_idx, mcl_idx);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s app_idx=%d, mcl_idx=%d timer_active=%d timer_in_use=%d",
__FUNCTION__,app_idx, mcl_idx,
p_mcb->cch_timer_active, p_mcb->cch_timer.in_use);
p_mcb->cch_timer_active = TRUE;
if (!p_mcb->cch_timer.in_use)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Start CCH timer ");
memset(&p_mcb->cch_timer, 0, sizeof(TIMER_LIST_ENT));
p_mcb->cch_timer.param = (UINT32)btif_hl_tmr_hdlr;
btu_start_timer(&p_mcb->cch_timer, BTU_TTYPE_USER_FUNC,
BTIF_TIMEOUT_CCH_NO_DCH_SECS);
}
else
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Restart CCH timer ");
btu_stop_timer(&p_mcb->cch_timer);
btu_start_timer(&p_mcb->cch_timer, BTU_TTYPE_USER_FUNC,
BTIF_TIMEOUT_CCH_NO_DCH_SECS);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,755
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void scsi_disk_put(struct scsi_disk *sdkp)
{
struct scsi_device *sdev = sdkp->device;
mutex_lock(&sd_ref_mutex);
put_device(&sdkp->dev);
scsi_device_put(sdev);
mutex_unlock(&sd_ref_mutex);
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 94,382
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LogOneClickHistogramValue(int action) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Signin.OneClickActions", action,
one_click_signin::HISTOGRAM_MAX);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Signin.AllAccessPointActions", action,
one_click_signin::HISTOGRAM_MAX);
}
Commit Message: During redirects in the one click sign in flow, check the current URL
instead of original URL to validate gaia http headers.
BUG=307159
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/77343002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@236563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 109,828
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SoftAMR::isConfigured() const {
return mInputBufferCount > 0;
}
Commit Message: SoftAMR: check output buffer size to avoid overflow.
Bug: 27662364
Change-Id: I7b26892c41d6f2e690e77478ab855c2fed1ff6b0
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 160,950
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void llc_build_and_send_test_pkt(struct llc_sap *sap,
struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *dmac, u8 dsap)
{
struct llc_sap_state_ev *ev = llc_sap_ev(skb);
ev->saddr.lsap = sap->laddr.lsap;
ev->daddr.lsap = dsap;
memcpy(ev->saddr.mac, skb->dev->dev_addr, IFHWADDRLEN);
memcpy(ev->daddr.mac, dmac, IFHWADDRLEN);
ev->type = LLC_SAP_EV_TYPE_PRIM;
ev->prim = LLC_TEST_PRIM;
ev->prim_type = LLC_PRIM_TYPE_REQ;
llc_sap_state_process(sap, skb);
}
Commit Message: net/llc: avoid BUG_ON() in skb_orphan()
It seems nobody used LLC since linux-3.12.
Fortunately fuzzers like syzkaller still know how to run this code,
otherwise it would be no fun.
Setting skb->sk without skb->destructor leads to all kinds of
bugs, we now prefer to be very strict about it.
Ideally here we would use skb_set_owner() but this helper does not exist yet,
only CAN seems to have a private helper for that.
Fixes: 376c7311bdb6 ("net: add a temporary sanity check in skb_orphan()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 68,216
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __ref setup_cpu_cache(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t gfp)
{
if (slab_state >= FULL)
return enable_cpucache(cachep, gfp);
cachep->cpu_cache = alloc_kmem_cache_cpus(cachep, 1, 1);
if (!cachep->cpu_cache)
return 1;
if (slab_state == DOWN) {
/* Creation of first cache (kmem_cache). */
set_up_node(kmem_cache, CACHE_CACHE);
} else if (slab_state == PARTIAL) {
/* For kmem_cache_node */
set_up_node(cachep, SIZE_NODE);
} else {
int node;
for_each_online_node(node) {
cachep->node[node] = kmalloc_node(
sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node), gfp, node);
BUG_ON(!cachep->node[node]);
kmem_cache_node_init(cachep->node[node]);
}
}
cachep->node[numa_mem_id()]->next_reap =
jiffies + REAPTIMEOUT_NODE +
((unsigned long)cachep) % REAPTIMEOUT_NODE;
cpu_cache_get(cachep)->avail = 0;
cpu_cache_get(cachep)->limit = BOOT_CPUCACHE_ENTRIES;
cpu_cache_get(cachep)->batchcount = 1;
cpu_cache_get(cachep)->touched = 0;
cachep->batchcount = 1;
cachep->limit = BOOT_CPUCACHE_ENTRIES;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 68,926
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: write_null(struct archive_write *a, size_t size)
{
size_t remaining;
unsigned char *p, *old;
int r;
remaining = wb_remaining(a);
p = wb_buffptr(a);
if (size <= remaining) {
memset(p, 0, size);
return (wb_consume(a, size));
}
memset(p, 0, remaining);
r = wb_consume(a, remaining);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
size -= remaining;
old = p;
p = wb_buffptr(a);
memset(p, 0, old - p);
remaining = wb_remaining(a);
while (size) {
size_t wsize = size;
if (wsize > remaining)
wsize = remaining;
r = wb_consume(a, wsize);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
size -= wsize;
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 50,900
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xml_acl_filtered_copy(const char *user, xmlNode* acl_source, xmlNode *xml, xmlNode ** result)
{
GListPtr aIter = NULL;
xmlNode *target = NULL;
xml_private_t *p = NULL;
xml_private_t *doc = NULL;
*result = NULL;
if(xml == NULL || pcmk_acl_required(user) == FALSE) {
crm_trace("no acls needed for '%s'", user);
return FALSE;
}
crm_trace("filtering copy of %p for '%s'", xml, user);
target = copy_xml(xml);
if(target == NULL) {
return TRUE;
}
__xml_acl_unpack(acl_source, target, user);
set_doc_flag(target, xpf_acl_enabled);
__xml_acl_apply(target);
doc = target->doc->_private;
for(aIter = doc->acls; aIter != NULL && target; aIter = aIter->next) {
int max = 0;
xml_acl_t *acl = aIter->data;
if(acl->mode != xpf_acl_deny) {
/* Nothing to do */
} else if(acl->xpath) {
int lpc = 0;
xmlXPathObjectPtr xpathObj = xpath_search(target, acl->xpath);
max = numXpathResults(xpathObj);
for(lpc = 0; lpc < max; lpc++) {
xmlNode *match = getXpathResult(xpathObj, lpc);
crm_trace("Purging attributes from %s", acl->xpath);
if(__xml_purge_attributes(match) == FALSE && match == target) {
crm_trace("No access to the entire document for %s", user);
freeXpathObject(xpathObj);
return TRUE;
}
}
crm_trace("Enforced ACL %s (%d matches)", acl->xpath, max);
freeXpathObject(xpathObj);
}
}
p = target->_private;
if(is_set(p->flags, xpf_acl_deny) && __xml_purge_attributes(target) == FALSE) {
crm_trace("No access to the entire document for %s", user);
return TRUE;
}
if(doc->acls) {
g_list_free_full(doc->acls, __xml_acl_free);
doc->acls = NULL;
} else {
crm_trace("Ordinary user '%s' cannot access the CIB without any defined ACLs", doc->user);
free_xml(target);
target = NULL;
}
if(target) {
*result = target;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,102
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WillWaitForDialog() { waiting_for_ = kDialog; }
Commit Message: Security drop fullscreen for any nested WebContents level.
This relands 3dcaec6e30feebefc11e with a fix to the test.
BUG=873080
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: Ie68b197fc6b92447e9633f233354a68fefcf20c7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1175925
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#583335}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,981
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void scsi_disk_register_devices(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(scsi_disk_info); i++) {
scsi_qdev_register(&scsi_disk_info[i]);
}
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 41,259
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ahash_mcryptd_update(struct ahash_request *desc)
{
/* alignment is to be done by multi-buffer crypto algorithm if needed */
return crypto_ahash_update(desc);
}
Commit Message: crypto: mcryptd - Check mcryptd algorithm compatibility
Algorithms not compatible with mcryptd could be spawned by mcryptd
with a direct crypto_alloc_tfm invocation using a "mcryptd(alg)" name
construct. This causes mcryptd to crash the kernel if an arbitrary
"alg" is incompatible and not intended to be used with mcryptd. It is
an issue if AF_ALG tries to spawn mcryptd(alg) to expose it externally.
But such algorithms must be used internally and not be exposed.
We added a check to enforce that only internal algorithms are allowed
with mcryptd at the time mcryptd is spawning an algorithm.
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=148063683310477&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 71,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePSDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
const char
*property;
const StringInfo
*icc_profile;
Image
*base_image,
*next_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PSDInfo
psd_info;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
channel_size,
channelLength,
layer_count,
layer_info_size,
length,
num_channels,
packet_size,
rounded_layer_info_size;
StringInfo
*bim_profile;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
packet_size=(size_t) (image->depth > 8 ? 6 : 3);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
packet_size+=image->depth > 8 ? 2 : 1;
psd_info.version=1;
if ((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PSB") == 0) ||
(image->columns > 30000) || (image->rows > 30000))
psd_info.version=2;
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,(const unsigned char *) "8BPS");
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,psd_info.version); /* version */
for (i=1; i <= 6; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image, 0); /* 6 bytes of reserved */
if (SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse)
num_channels=(image->matte != MagickFalse ? 2UL : 1UL);
else
if ((image_info->type != TrueColorType) && (image_info->type !=
TrueColorMatteType) && (image->storage_class == PseudoClass))
num_channels=(image->matte != MagickFalse ? 2UL : 1UL);
else
{
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
num_channels=(image->matte != MagickFalse ? 4UL : 3UL);
else
num_channels=(image->matte != MagickFalse ? 5UL : 4UL);
}
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) num_channels);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) image->columns);
if (IsGrayImage(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse)
{
MagickBooleanType
monochrome;
/*
Write depth & mode.
*/
monochrome=IsMonochromeImage(image,&image->exception) &&
(image->depth == 1) ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(monochrome != MagickFalse ? 1 : image->depth > 8 ? 16 : 8));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(monochrome != MagickFalse ? BitmapMode : GrayscaleMode));
}
else
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (image->storage_class ==
PseudoClass ? 8 : image->depth > 8 ? 16 : 8));
if (((image_info->colorspace != UndefinedColorspace) ||
(image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)) &&
(image_info->colorspace != CMYKColorspace))
{
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(image->storage_class == PseudoClass ? IndexedMode : RGBMode));
}
else
{
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,CMYKMode);
}
}
if ((IsGrayImage(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse) ||
(image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0);
else
{
/*
Write PSD raster colormap.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,768);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].red));
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
image->colormap[i].green));
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].blue));
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
}
/*
Image resource block.
*/
length=28; /* 0x03EB */
bim_profile=(StringInfo *) GetImageProfile(image,"8bim");
icc_profile=GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
if (bim_profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
bim_profile=CloneStringInfo(bim_profile);
if (icc_profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
RemoveICCProfileFromResourceBlock(bim_profile);
RemoveResolutionFromResourceBlock(bim_profile);
length+=PSDQuantum(GetStringInfoLength(bim_profile));
}
if (icc_profile != (const StringInfo *) NULL)
length+=PSDQuantum(GetStringInfoLength(icc_profile))+12;
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) length);
WriteResolutionResourceBlock(image);
if (bim_profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(bim_profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(bim_profile));
bim_profile=DestroyStringInfo(bim_profile);
}
if (icc_profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,(const unsigned char *) "8BIM");
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000040F);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) GetStringInfoLength(
icc_profile));
(void) WriteBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(icc_profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(icc_profile));
if ((MagickOffsetType) GetStringInfoLength(icc_profile) !=
PSDQuantum(GetStringInfoLength(icc_profile)))
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
}
layer_count=0;
layer_info_size=2;
base_image=GetNextImageInList(image);
if (base_image == (Image *) NULL)
base_image=image;
next_image=base_image;
while (next_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
packet_size=next_image->depth > 8 ? 2UL : 1UL;
if (IsGrayImage(next_image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse)
num_channels=next_image->matte != MagickFalse ? 2UL : 1UL;
else
if (next_image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
num_channels=next_image->matte != MagickFalse ? 2UL : 1UL;
else
if (next_image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
num_channels=next_image->matte != MagickFalse ? 4UL : 3UL;
else
num_channels=next_image->matte != MagickFalse ? 5UL : 4UL;
channelLength=(size_t) (next_image->columns*next_image->rows*packet_size+2);
layer_info_size+=(size_t) (4*4+2+num_channels*6+(psd_info.version == 1 ? 8 :
16)+4*1+4+num_channels*channelLength);
property=(const char *) GetImageProperty(next_image,"label");
if (property == (const char *) NULL)
layer_info_size+=16;
else
{
size_t
length;
length=strlen(property);
layer_info_size+=8+length+(4-(length % 4));
}
layer_count++;
next_image=GetNextImageInList(next_image);
}
if (layer_count == 0)
(void) SetPSDSize(&psd_info,image,0);
else
{
CompressionType
compression;
(void) SetPSDSize(&psd_info,image,layer_info_size+
(psd_info.version == 1 ? 8 : 16));
if ((layer_info_size/2) != ((layer_info_size+1)/2))
rounded_layer_info_size=layer_info_size+1;
else
rounded_layer_info_size=layer_info_size;
(void) SetPSDSize(&psd_info,image,rounded_layer_info_size);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,-(unsigned short) layer_count);
else
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) layer_count);
layer_count=1;
compression=base_image->compression;
for (next_image=base_image; next_image != NULL; )
{
next_image->compression=NoCompression;
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) next_image->page.y);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) next_image->page.x);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) (next_image->page.y+
next_image->rows));
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) (next_image->page.x+
next_image->columns));
packet_size=next_image->depth > 8 ? 2UL : 1UL;
channel_size=(unsigned int) ((packet_size*next_image->rows*
next_image->columns)+2);
if ((IsGrayImage(next_image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse) ||
(next_image->storage_class == PseudoClass))
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(next_image->matte != MagickFalse ? 2 : 1));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0);
(void) SetPSDSize(&psd_info,image,channel_size);
if (next_image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) -1);
(void) SetPSDSize(&psd_info,image,channel_size);
}
}
else
if (next_image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(next_image->matte != MagickFalse ? 4 : 3));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0);
(void) SetPSDSize(&psd_info,image,channel_size);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,1);
(void) SetPSDSize(&psd_info,image,channel_size);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,2);
(void) SetPSDSize(&psd_info,image,channel_size);
if (next_image->matte!= MagickFalse )
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) -1);
(void) SetPSDSize(&psd_info,image,channel_size);
}
}
else
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(next_image->matte ? 5 : 4));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0);
(void) SetPSDSize(&psd_info,image,channel_size);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,1);
(void) SetPSDSize(&psd_info,image,channel_size);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,2);
(void) SetPSDSize(&psd_info,image,channel_size);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,3);
(void) SetPSDSize(&psd_info,image,channel_size);
if (next_image->matte)
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) -1);
(void) SetPSDSize(&psd_info,image,channel_size);
}
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,(const unsigned char *) "8BIM");
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,(const unsigned char *)
CompositeOperatorToPSDBlendMode(next_image->compose));
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,255); /* layer opacity */
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,next_image->compose==NoCompositeOp ?
1 << 0x02 : 1); /* layer properties - visible, etc. */
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
property=(const char *) GetImageProperty(next_image,"label");
if (property == (const char *) NULL)
{
char
layer_name[MaxTextExtent];
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,16);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0);
(void) FormatLocaleString(layer_name,MaxTextExtent,"L%04ld",(long)
layer_count++);
WritePascalString(image,layer_name,4);
}
else
{
size_t
length;
length=strlen(property);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) (length+(4-
(length % 4))+8));
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0);
WritePascalString(image,property,4);
}
next_image=GetNextImageInList(next_image);
}
/*
Now the image data!
*/
next_image=base_image;
while (next_image != NULL)
{
status=WriteImageChannels(&psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
MagickTrue);
next_image=GetNextImageInList(next_image);
}
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0); /* user mask data */
base_image->compression=compression;
}
/*
Write composite image.
*/
if (status != MagickFalse)
status=WriteImageChannels(&psd_info,image_info,image,image,MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/148
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 73,535
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InputType::SetValueAsDate(double, ExceptionState& exception_state) const {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError, "This input element does not support Date values.");
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,237
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ipmi_si_port_setup(struct si_sm_io *io)
{
unsigned int addr = io->addr_data;
int idx;
if (!addr)
return -ENODEV;
io->io_cleanup = port_cleanup;
/*
* Figure out the actual inb/inw/inl/etc routine to use based
* upon the register size.
*/
switch (io->regsize) {
case 1:
io->inputb = port_inb;
io->outputb = port_outb;
break;
case 2:
io->inputb = port_inw;
io->outputb = port_outw;
break;
case 4:
io->inputb = port_inl;
io->outputb = port_outl;
break;
default:
dev_warn(io->dev, "Invalid register size: %d\n",
io->regsize);
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* Some BIOSes reserve disjoint I/O regions in their ACPI
* tables. This causes problems when trying to register the
* entire I/O region. Therefore we must register each I/O
* port separately.
*/
for (idx = 0; idx < io->io_size; idx++) {
if (request_region(addr + idx * io->regspacing,
io->regsize, DEVICE_NAME) == NULL) {
/* Undo allocations */
while (idx--)
release_region(addr + idx * io->regspacing,
io->regsize);
return -EIO;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 169,682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb,
void *arg)
{
if (s == NULL)
return (0);
s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb = cb;
s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg = arg;
return (1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 12,802
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::RendererDidNavigateToNewPage(
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
bool is_same_document,
bool replace_entry,
NavigationHandleImpl* handle) {
std::unique_ptr<NavigationEntryImpl> new_entry;
bool update_virtual_url = false;
if (is_same_document && GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
FrameNavigationEntry* frame_entry = new FrameNavigationEntry(
rfh->frame_tree_node()->unique_name(), params.item_sequence_number,
params.document_sequence_number, rfh->GetSiteInstance(), nullptr,
params.url, params.referrer, params.redirects, params.page_state,
params.method, params.post_id);
new_entry = GetLastCommittedEntry()->CloneAndReplace(
frame_entry, true, rfh->frame_tree_node(),
delegate_->GetFrameTree()->root());
if (new_entry->GetURL().GetOrigin() != params.url.GetOrigin()) {
new_entry->GetSSL() = SSLStatus();
if (params.url.SchemeIs(url::kHttpsScheme) && !rfh->GetParent() &&
handle->GetNetErrorCode() == net::OK) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN(
"Navigation.SecureSchemeHasSSLStatus.NewPageInPageOriginMismatch",
!!new_entry->GetSSL().certificate);
}
}
CHECK(frame_entry->HasOneRef());
update_virtual_url = new_entry->update_virtual_url_with_url();
if (params.url.SchemeIs(url::kHttpsScheme) && !rfh->GetParent() &&
handle->GetNetErrorCode() == net::OK) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Navigation.SecureSchemeHasSSLStatus.NewPageInPage",
!!new_entry->GetSSL().certificate);
}
}
if (!new_entry &&
PendingEntryMatchesHandle(handle) && pending_entry_index_ == -1 &&
(!pending_entry_->site_instance() ||
pending_entry_->site_instance() == rfh->GetSiteInstance())) {
new_entry = pending_entry_->Clone();
update_virtual_url = new_entry->update_virtual_url_with_url();
new_entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
if (params.url.SchemeIs(url::kHttpsScheme) && !rfh->GetParent() &&
handle->GetNetErrorCode() == net::OK) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN(
"Navigation.SecureSchemeHasSSLStatus.NewPagePendingEntryMatches",
!!new_entry->GetSSL().certificate);
}
}
if (!new_entry) {
new_entry = base::WrapUnique(new NavigationEntryImpl);
GURL url = params.url;
bool needs_update = false;
BrowserURLHandlerImpl::GetInstance()->RewriteURLIfNecessary(
&url, browser_context_, &needs_update);
new_entry->set_update_virtual_url_with_url(needs_update);
update_virtual_url = needs_update;
new_entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
if (params.url.SchemeIs(url::kHttpsScheme) && !rfh->GetParent() &&
handle->GetNetErrorCode() == net::OK) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN(
"Navigation.SecureSchemeHasSSLStatus.NewPageNoMatchingEntry",
!!new_entry->GetSSL().certificate);
}
}
new_entry->set_page_type(params.url_is_unreachable ? PAGE_TYPE_ERROR
: PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL);
new_entry->SetURL(params.url);
if (update_virtual_url)
UpdateVirtualURLToURL(new_entry.get(), params.url);
new_entry->SetReferrer(params.referrer);
new_entry->SetTransitionType(params.transition);
new_entry->set_site_instance(
static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(rfh->GetSiteInstance()));
new_entry->SetOriginalRequestURL(params.original_request_url);
new_entry->SetIsOverridingUserAgent(params.is_overriding_user_agent);
FrameNavigationEntry* frame_entry =
new_entry->GetFrameEntry(rfh->frame_tree_node());
frame_entry->set_frame_unique_name(rfh->frame_tree_node()->unique_name());
frame_entry->set_item_sequence_number(params.item_sequence_number);
frame_entry->set_document_sequence_number(params.document_sequence_number);
frame_entry->set_redirect_chain(params.redirects);
frame_entry->SetPageState(params.page_state);
frame_entry->set_method(params.method);
frame_entry->set_post_id(params.post_id);
if (is_same_document && GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
new_entry->SetTitle(GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetTitle());
new_entry->GetFavicon() = GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetFavicon();
}
DCHECK(!params.history_list_was_cleared || !replace_entry);
if (params.history_list_was_cleared) {
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
entries_.clear();
last_committed_entry_index_ = -1;
}
InsertOrReplaceEntry(std::move(new_entry), replace_entry);
}
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 150,396
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void xfer_recover(struct xfer_header *xfer)
{
struct xfer_item *item;
int r;
syslog(LOG_INFO, "XFER: recovering");
/* Backout any changes - we stop on first untouched mailbox */
for (item = xfer->items; item && item->state; item = item->next) {
switch (item->state) {
case XFER_UNDUMPED:
case XFER_LOCAL_MOVING:
/* Unset mailbox as MOVING on local server */
r = mboxlist_update(item->mbentry, 1);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR,
"Could not back out MOVING flag during move of %s (%s)",
item->mbentry->name, error_message(r));
}
case XFER_REMOTE_CREATED:
if (!xfer->use_replication) {
/* Delete remote mailbox */
prot_printf(xfer->be->out,
"LD1 LOCALDELETE {" SIZE_T_FMT "+}\r\n%s\r\n",
strlen(item->extname), item->extname);
r = getresult(xfer->be->in, "LD1");
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR,
"Could not back out remote mailbox during move of %s (%s)",
item->mbentry->name, error_message(r));
}
}
case XFER_DEACTIVATED:
/* Tell murder it's back here and active */
r = xfer_mupdate(1, item->mbentry->name, item->mbentry->partition,
config_servername, item->mbentry->acl);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR,
"Could not back out mupdate during move of %s (%s)",
item->mbentry->name, error_message(r));
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 95,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ContentSecurityPolicy::addAndReportPolicyFromHeaderValue(
const String& header,
ContentSecurityPolicyHeaderType type,
ContentSecurityPolicyHeaderSource source) {
size_t previousPolicyCount = m_policies.size();
addPolicyFromHeaderValue(header, type, source);
if (document() && document()->frame()) {
std::vector<blink::WebContentSecurityPolicyPolicy> policies;
for (size_t i = previousPolicyCount; i < m_policies.size(); ++i)
policies.push_back(m_policies[i]->exposeForNavigationalChecks());
document()->frame()->client()->didAddContentSecurityPolicy(
header, type, source, policies);
}
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 136,720
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::SetApplicationLocaleOnIOThread(
const std::string& locale) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
io_thread_application_locale_ = locale;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,782
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pdf_run_gs_SMask(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, pdf_xobject *smask, pdf_obj *page_resources, float *bc, int luminosity)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pdf_gstate *gstate = pdf_flush_text(ctx, pr);
int i;
if (gstate->softmask)
{
pdf_drop_xobject(ctx, gstate->softmask);
gstate->softmask = NULL;
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, gstate->softmask_resources);
gstate->softmask_resources = NULL;
}
if (smask)
{
fz_colorspace *cs = pdf_xobject_colorspace(ctx, smask);
int cs_n = 1;
if (cs)
cs_n = fz_colorspace_n(ctx, cs);
gstate->softmask_ctm = gstate->ctm;
gstate->softmask = pdf_keep_xobject(ctx, smask);
gstate->softmask_resources = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, page_resources);
for (i = 0; i < cs_n; ++i)
gstate->softmask_bc[i] = bc[i];
gstate->luminosity = luminosity;
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, cs);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static gboolean webkit_web_view_button_release_event(GtkWidget* widget, GdkEventButton* event)
{
WebKitWebView* webView = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW(widget);
Frame* focusedFrame = core(webView)->focusController()->focusedFrame();
if (focusedFrame && focusedFrame->editor()->canEdit()) {
#ifdef MAEMO_CHANGES
WebKitWebViewPrivate* priv = webView->priv;
hildon_gtk_im_context_filter_event(priv->imContext.get(), (GdkEvent*)event);
#endif
}
Frame* mainFrame = core(webView)->mainFrame();
if (mainFrame->view())
mainFrame->eventHandler()->handleMouseReleaseEvent(PlatformMouseEvent(event));
/* We always return FALSE here because WebKit can, for the same click, decide
* to not handle press-event but handle release-event, which can totally confuse
* some GTK+ containers when there are no other events in between. This way we
* guarantee that this case never happens, and that if press-event goes through
* release-event also goes through.
*/
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fdctrl_reset(FDCtrl *fdctrl, int do_irq)
{
int i;
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("reset controller\n");
fdctrl_reset_irq(fdctrl);
/* Initialise controller */
fdctrl->sra = 0;
fdctrl->srb = 0xc0;
if (!fdctrl->drives[1].blk) {
fdctrl->sra |= FD_SRA_nDRV2;
}
fdctrl->cur_drv = 0;
fdctrl->dor = FD_DOR_nRESET;
fdctrl->dor |= (fdctrl->dma_chann != -1) ? FD_DOR_DMAEN : 0;
fdctrl->msr = FD_MSR_RQM;
fdctrl->reset_sensei = 0;
timer_del(fdctrl->result_timer);
/* FIFO state */
fdctrl->data_pos = 0;
fdctrl->data_len = 0;
fdctrl->data_state = 0;
fdctrl->data_dir = FD_DIR_WRITE;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_FD; i++)
fd_recalibrate(&fdctrl->drives[i]);
fdctrl_reset_fifo(fdctrl);
if (do_irq) {
fdctrl->status0 |= FD_SR0_RDYCHG;
fdctrl_raise_irq(fdctrl);
fdctrl->reset_sensei = FD_RESET_SENSEI_COUNT;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,336
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChooserContextBase::ChooserContextBase(
Profile* profile,
const ContentSettingsType guard_content_settings_type,
const ContentSettingsType data_content_settings_type)
: guard_content_settings_type_(guard_content_settings_type),
data_content_settings_type_(data_content_settings_type),
host_content_settings_map_(
HostContentSettingsMapFactory::GetForProfile(profile)) {
DCHECK(host_content_settings_map_);
}
Commit Message: Fix memory leak in ChooserContextBase::GetGrantedObjects.
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: Ia163d503a4207859cd41c847c9d5f67e77580fbc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1456080
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Marek Haranczyk <mharanczyk@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629919}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 130,169
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPluginAcceleratedSurfaceProxy::SetWindowHandle(
gfx::PluginWindowHandle window) {
window_handle_ = window;
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 100,984
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void set_got_user_gesture(bool got_it) {
got_user_gesture_ = got_it;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __check_sit_bitmap(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
block_t start, block_t end)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS
struct seg_entry *sentry;
unsigned int segno;
block_t blk = start;
unsigned long offset, size, max_blocks = sbi->blocks_per_seg;
unsigned long *map;
while (blk < end) {
segno = GET_SEGNO(sbi, blk);
sentry = get_seg_entry(sbi, segno);
offset = GET_BLKOFF_FROM_SEG0(sbi, blk);
if (end < START_BLOCK(sbi, segno + 1))
size = GET_BLKOFF_FROM_SEG0(sbi, end);
else
size = max_blocks;
map = (unsigned long *)(sentry->cur_valid_map);
offset = __find_rev_next_bit(map, size, offset);
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, offset != size);
blk = START_BLOCK(sbi, segno + 1);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 85,999
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void option_error(void)
{
if (!err_buf[0]) {
strlcpy(err_buf, "Error parsing options: option may "
"be supported on client but not on server?\n",
sizeof err_buf);
}
rprintf(FERROR, RSYNC_NAME ": %s", err_buf);
msleep(20);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,866
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ShellWindow::IsPopupOrPanel(const WebContents* source) const {
DCHECK(source == web_contents_);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,341
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Camera3Device::RequestThread::RequestThread(wp<Camera3Device> parent,
sp<StatusTracker> statusTracker,
camera3_device_t *hal3Device,
bool aeLockAvailable) :
Thread(/*canCallJava*/false),
mParent(parent),
mStatusTracker(statusTracker),
mHal3Device(hal3Device),
mId(getId(parent)),
mReconfigured(false),
mDoPause(false),
mPaused(true),
mFrameNumber(0),
mLatestRequestId(NAME_NOT_FOUND),
mCurrentAfTriggerId(0),
mCurrentPreCaptureTriggerId(0),
mRepeatingLastFrameNumber(NO_IN_FLIGHT_REPEATING_FRAMES),
mAeLockAvailable(aeLockAvailable) {
mStatusId = statusTracker->addComponent();
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,020
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::isAnimatingFullScreen() const
{
return m_isAnimatingFullScreen;
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,541
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sic10_opaque_binary_attr(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset,
guint8 token, guint8 codepage, guint32 *length)
{
guint32 data_len = tvb_get_guintvar(tvb, offset, length);
char *str = NULL;
switch (codepage) {
case 0: /* Only valid codepage for SI */
switch (token) {
case 0x0A: /* created= */
case 0x10: /* si-expires= */
str = date_time_from_opaque(tvb,
offset + *length, data_len);
break;
default:
break;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
if (str == NULL) { /* Error, or not parsed */
str = wmem_strdup_printf(wmem_packet_scope(), "(%d bytes of unparsed opaque data)", data_len);
}
*length += data_len;
return str;
}
Commit Message: WBXML: add a basic sanity check for offset overflow
This is a naive approach allowing to detact that something went wrong,
without the need to replace all proto_tree_add_text() calls as what was
done in master-2.0 branch.
Bug: 12408
Change-Id: Ia14905005e17ae322c2fc639ad5e491fa08b0108
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15310
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Pascal Quantin <pascal.quantin@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 51,715
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::vertexAttrib3f(GLuint index,
GLfloat v0,
GLfloat v1,
GLfloat v2) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
ContextGL()->VertexAttrib3f(index, v0, v1, v2);
SetVertexAttribType(index, kFloat32ArrayType);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,916
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long get_user_pages_longterm(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
unsigned int gup_flags, struct page **pages,
struct vm_area_struct **vmas_arg)
{
struct vm_area_struct **vmas = vmas_arg;
unsigned long flags;
long rc, i;
if (!pages)
return -EINVAL;
if (!vmas) {
vmas = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(struct vm_area_struct *),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vmas)
return -ENOMEM;
}
flags = memalloc_nocma_save();
rc = get_user_pages(start, nr_pages, gup_flags, pages, vmas);
memalloc_nocma_restore(flags);
if (rc < 0)
goto out;
if (check_dax_vmas(vmas, rc)) {
for (i = 0; i < rc; i++)
put_page(pages[i]);
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
rc = check_and_migrate_cma_pages(start, rc, gup_flags, pages, vmas);
out:
if (vmas != vmas_arg)
kfree(vmas);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 96,956
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct sk_buff *__pskb_copy_fclone(struct sk_buff *skb, int headroom,
gfp_t gfp_mask, bool fclone)
{
unsigned int size = skb_headlen(skb) + headroom;
int flags = skb_alloc_rx_flag(skb) | (fclone ? SKB_ALLOC_FCLONE : 0);
struct sk_buff *n = __alloc_skb(size, gfp_mask, flags, NUMA_NO_NODE);
if (!n)
goto out;
/* Set the data pointer */
skb_reserve(n, headroom);
/* Set the tail pointer and length */
skb_put(n, skb_headlen(skb));
/* Copy the bytes */
skb_copy_from_linear_data(skb, n->data, n->len);
n->truesize += skb->data_len;
n->data_len = skb->data_len;
n->len = skb->len;
if (skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags) {
int i;
if (skb_orphan_frags(skb, gfp_mask)) {
kfree_skb(n);
n = NULL;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++) {
skb_shinfo(n)->frags[i] = skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i];
skb_frag_ref(skb, i);
}
skb_shinfo(n)->nr_frags = i;
}
if (skb_has_frag_list(skb)) {
skb_shinfo(n)->frag_list = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list;
skb_clone_fraglist(n);
}
copy_skb_header(n, skb);
out:
return n;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 67,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __remove_section(struct zone *zone, struct mem_section *ms)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct pglist_data *pgdat = zone->zone_pgdat;
int ret = -EINVAL;
if (!valid_section(ms))
return ret;
ret = unregister_memory_section(ms);
if (ret)
return ret;
pgdat_resize_lock(pgdat, &flags);
sparse_remove_one_section(zone, ms);
pgdat_resize_unlock(pgdat, &flags);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm/hotplug: correctly add new zone to all other nodes' zone lists
When online_pages() is called to add new memory to an empty zone, it
rebuilds all zone lists by calling build_all_zonelists(). But there's a
bug which prevents the new zone to be added to other nodes' zone lists.
online_pages() {
build_all_zonelists()
.....
node_set_state(zone_to_nid(zone), N_HIGH_MEMORY)
}
Here the node of the zone is put into N_HIGH_MEMORY state after calling
build_all_zonelists(), but build_all_zonelists() only adds zones from
nodes in N_HIGH_MEMORY state to the fallback zone lists.
build_all_zonelists()
->__build_all_zonelists()
->build_zonelists()
->find_next_best_node()
->for_each_node_state(n, N_HIGH_MEMORY)
So memory in the new zone will never be used by other nodes, and it may
cause strange behavor when system is under memory pressure. So put node
into N_HIGH_MEMORY state before calling build_all_zonelists().
Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Keping Chen <chenkeping@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ossl_cipher_copy(VALUE self, VALUE other)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx1, *ctx2;
rb_check_frozen(self);
if (self == other) return self;
GetCipherInit(self, ctx1);
if (!ctx1) {
AllocCipher(self, ctx1);
}
SafeGetCipher(other, ctx2);
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(ctx1, ctx2) != 1)
ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
return self;
}
Commit Message: cipher: don't set dummy encryption key in Cipher#initialize
Remove the encryption key initialization from Cipher#initialize. This
is effectively a revert of r32723 ("Avoid possible SEGV from AES
encryption/decryption", 2011-07-28).
r32723, which added the key initialization, was a workaround for
Ruby Bug #2768. For some certain ciphers, calling EVP_CipherUpdate()
before setting an encryption key caused segfault. It was not a problem
until OpenSSL implemented GCM mode - the encryption key could be
overridden by repeated calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex(). But, it is not the
case for AES-GCM ciphers. Setting a key, an IV, a key, in this order
causes the IV to be reset to an all-zero IV.
The problem of Bug #2768 persists on the current versions of OpenSSL.
So, make Cipher#update raise an exception if a key is not yet set by the
user. Since encrypting or decrypting without key does not make any
sense, this should not break existing applications.
Users can still call Cipher#key= and Cipher#iv= multiple times with
their own responsibility.
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/2768
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/8221
Reference: https://github.com/ruby/openssl/issues/49
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 73,408
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_start_buffer_writeback(
struct buffer_head *bh)
{
ASSERT(buffer_mapped(bh));
ASSERT(buffer_locked(bh));
ASSERT(!buffer_delay(bh));
ASSERT(!buffer_unwritten(bh));
mark_buffer_async_write(bh);
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
clear_buffer_dirty(bh);
}
Commit Message: xfs: don't BUG() on mixed direct and mapped I/O
We've had reports of generic/095 causing XFS to BUG() in
__xfs_get_blocks() due to the existence of delalloc blocks on a
direct I/O read. generic/095 issues a mix of various types of I/O,
including direct and memory mapped I/O to a single file. This is
clearly not supported behavior and is known to lead to such
problems. E.g., the lack of exclusion between the direct I/O and
write fault paths means that a write fault can allocate delalloc
blocks in a region of a file that was previously a hole after the
direct read has attempted to flush/inval the file range, but before
it actually reads the block mapping. In turn, the direct read
discovers a delalloc extent and cannot proceed.
While the appropriate solution here is to not mix direct and memory
mapped I/O to the same regions of the same file, the current
BUG_ON() behavior is probably overkill as it can crash the entire
system. Instead, localize the failure to the I/O in question by
returning an error for a direct I/O that cannot be handled safely
due to delalloc blocks. Be careful to allow the case of a direct
write to post-eof delalloc blocks. This can occur due to speculative
preallocation and is safe as post-eof blocks are not accompanied by
dirty pages in pagecache (conversely, preallocation within eof must
have been zeroed, and thus dirtied, before the inode size could have
been increased beyond said blocks).
Finally, provide an additional warning if a direct I/O write occurs
while the file is memory mapped. This may not catch all problematic
scenarios, but provides a hint that some known-to-be-problematic I/O
methods are in use.
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 93,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ReportPageHistogramsAfterDelete(
const std::map<int64_t, OfflinePageItem>& offline_pages,
const std::vector<OfflinePageItem>& deleted_pages,
const base::Time& delete_time) {
const int max_minutes = base::TimeDelta::FromDays(365).InMinutes();
int64_t total_size = 0;
for (const auto& page : deleted_pages) {
total_size += page.file_size;
ClientId client_id = page.client_id;
if (client_id.name_space == kDownloadNamespace) {
int remaining_pages_with_url;
GetMatchingURLCountAndMostRecentCreationTime(
offline_pages, page.client_id.name_space, page.url, base::Time::Max(),
&remaining_pages_with_url, nullptr);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_COUNTS(
"OfflinePages.DownloadDeletedPageDuplicateCount",
remaining_pages_with_url, 1, 20, 10);
}
base::HistogramBase* histogram = base::Histogram::FactoryGet(
AddHistogramSuffix(client_id, "OfflinePages.PageLifetime"), 1,
max_minutes, 100, base::HistogramBase::kUmaTargetedHistogramFlag);
histogram->Add((delete_time - page.creation_time).InMinutes());
histogram = base::Histogram::FactoryGet(
AddHistogramSuffix(client_id,
"OfflinePages.DeletePage.TimeSinceLastOpen"),
1, max_minutes, 100, base::HistogramBase::kUmaTargetedHistogramFlag);
histogram->Add((delete_time - page.last_access_time).InMinutes());
histogram = base::Histogram::FactoryGet(
AddHistogramSuffix(client_id,
"OfflinePages.DeletePage.LastOpenToCreated"),
1, max_minutes, 100, base::HistogramBase::kUmaTargetedHistogramFlag);
histogram->Add((page.last_access_time - page.creation_time).InMinutes());
histogram = base::Histogram::FactoryGet(
AddHistogramSuffix(client_id, "OfflinePages.DeletePage.PageSize"), 1,
10000, 50, base::HistogramBase::kUmaTargetedHistogramFlag);
histogram->Add(page.file_size / 1024);
histogram = base::Histogram::FactoryGet(
AddHistogramSuffix(client_id, "OfflinePages.DeletePage.AccessCount"), 1,
1000000, 50, base::HistogramBase::kUmaTargetedHistogramFlag);
histogram->Add(page.access_count);
}
if (deleted_pages.size() > 1) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("OfflinePages.BatchDelete.Count",
static_cast<int32_t>(deleted_pages.size()));
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEMORY_KB("OfflinePages.BatchDelete.TotalPageSize",
total_size / 1024);
}
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 155,921
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderWidgetHostImpl::RequestKeyboardLock(
base::Optional<base::flat_set<ui::DomCode>> codes) {
if (!delegate_) {
CancelKeyboardLock();
return false;
}
DCHECK(!codes.has_value() || !codes.value().empty());
keyboard_keys_to_lock_ = std::move(codes);
keyboard_lock_requested_ = true;
const bool esc_requested =
!keyboard_keys_to_lock_.has_value() ||
base::ContainsKey(keyboard_keys_to_lock_.value(), ui::DomCode::ESCAPE);
if (!delegate_->RequestKeyboardLock(this, esc_requested)) {
CancelKeyboardLock();
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,538
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool invalid_migration_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, void *arg)
{
return is_vma_temporary_stack(vma);
}
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 38,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Browser::~Browser() {
if (!browser_shutdown::ShuttingDownWithoutClosingBrowsers())
DCHECK(tab_strip_model_->empty());
search_model_->RemoveObserver(this);
tab_strip_model_->RemoveObserver(this);
BrowserList::RemoveBrowser(this);
SessionService* session_service =
SessionServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
if (session_service)
session_service->WindowClosed(session_id_);
TabRestoreService* tab_restore_service =
TabRestoreServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile());
if (tab_restore_service)
tab_restore_service->BrowserClosed(tab_restore_service_delegate());
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (!chrome::GetBrowserCount(profile_)) {
TabRestoreServiceFactory::ResetForProfile(profile_);
}
#endif
profile_pref_registrar_.RemoveAll();
encoding_auto_detect_.Destroy();
command_controller_.reset();
if (profile_->IsOffTheRecord() &&
!BrowserList::IsOffTheRecordSessionActiveForProfile(profile_)) {
ProfileDestroyer::DestroyProfileWhenAppropriate(profile_);
}
if (select_file_dialog_.get())
select_file_dialog_->ListenerDestroyed();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,854
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vmx_get_vmx_msr(struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs, u32 msr_index, u64 *pdata)
{
switch (msr_index) {
case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC:
*pdata = msrs->basic;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS:
*pdata = vmx_control_msr(
msrs->pinbased_ctls_low,
msrs->pinbased_ctls_high);
if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS)
*pdata |= PIN_BASED_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PROCBASED_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS:
*pdata = vmx_control_msr(
msrs->procbased_ctls_low,
msrs->procbased_ctls_high);
if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS)
*pdata |= CPU_BASED_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS:
*pdata = vmx_control_msr(
msrs->exit_ctls_low,
msrs->exit_ctls_high);
if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS)
*pdata |= VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS:
*pdata = vmx_control_msr(
msrs->entry_ctls_low,
msrs->entry_ctls_high);
if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS)
*pdata |= VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC:
*pdata = vmx_control_msr(
msrs->misc_low,
msrs->misc_high);
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED0:
*pdata = msrs->cr0_fixed0;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED1:
*pdata = msrs->cr0_fixed1;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED0:
*pdata = msrs->cr4_fixed0;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1:
*pdata = msrs->cr4_fixed1;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_VMCS_ENUM:
*pdata = msrs->vmcs_enum;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2:
*pdata = vmx_control_msr(
msrs->secondary_ctls_low,
msrs->secondary_ctls_high);
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP:
*pdata = msrs->ept_caps |
((u64)msrs->vpid_caps << 32);
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
*pdata = msrs->vmfunc_controls;
break;
default:
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 81,040
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ConstructType JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::getConstructData(JSCell*, ConstructData& constructData)
{
constructData.native.function = constructJSTestNamedConstructor;
return ConstructTypeHost;
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fatal (const char *format, ...)
{
char *s, buf[256];
va_list args;
int len;
term_reset(STO);
term_reset(STI);
va_start(args, format);
len = vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, args);
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
va_end(args);
s = "\r\nFATAL: ";
writen_ni(STO, s, strlen(s));
writen_ni(STO, buf, len);
s = "\r\n";
writen_ni(STO, s, strlen(s));
/* wait a bit for output to drain */
sleep(1);
#ifdef UUCP_LOCK_DIR
uucp_unlock();
#endif
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Commit Message: Do not use "/bin/sh" to run external commands.
Picocom no longer uses /bin/sh to run external commands for
file-transfer operations. Parsing the command line and spliting it into
arguments is now performed internally by picocom, using quoting rules
very similar to those of the Unix shell. Hopefully, this makes it
impossible to inject shell-commands when supplying filenames or
extra arguments to the send- and receive-file commands.
CWE ID: CWE-77
| 0
| 73,974
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsWindow::OpenExternalFrontend(
Profile* profile,
const std::string& frontend_url,
const scoped_refptr<content::DevToolsAgentHost>& agent_host,
FrontendType frontend_type) {
DevToolsWindow* window = FindDevToolsWindow(agent_host.get());
if (!window) {
window = Create(profile, nullptr, frontend_type,
DevToolsUI::GetProxyURL(frontend_url).spec(), false,
std::string(), std::string());
if (!window)
return;
window->bindings_->AttachTo(agent_host);
window->close_on_detach_ = false;
}
window->ScheduleShow(DevToolsToggleAction::Show());
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Use no-referrer for DevTools links
Bug: 732751
Change-Id: I77753120e2424203dedcc7bc0847fb67f87fe2b2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/615021
Reviewed-by: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#494413}
CWE ID: CWE-668
| 0
| 151,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ahci_trigger_irq(AHCIState *s, AHCIDevice *d,
int irq_type)
{
DPRINTF(d->port_no, "trigger irq %#x -> %x\n",
irq_type, d->port_regs.irq_mask & irq_type);
d->port_regs.irq_stat |= irq_type;
ahci_check_irq(s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 5,883
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FLAC_API FLAC__bool FLAC__stream_decoder_flush(FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder)
{
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder);
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder->private_);
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder->protected_);
decoder->private_->samples_decoded = 0;
decoder->private_->do_md5_checking = false;
#if FLAC__HAS_OGG
if(decoder->private_->is_ogg)
FLAC__ogg_decoder_aspect_flush(&decoder->protected_->ogg_decoder_aspect);
#endif
if(!FLAC__bitreader_clear(decoder->private_->input)) {
decoder->protected_->state = FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
return false;
}
decoder->protected_->state = FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_SEARCH_FOR_FRAME_SYNC;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Avoid free-before-initialize vulnerability in heap
Bug: 27211885
Change-Id: Ib9c93bd9ffdde2a5f8d31a86f06e267dc9c152db
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 161,183
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rtecp_create_file(sc_card_t *card, sc_file_t *file)
{
int r;
assert(card && card->ctx && file);
if (file->sec_attr_len == 0)
{
r = set_sec_attr_from_acl(card, file);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "Set sec_attr from ACL failed");
}
assert(iso_ops && iso_ops->create_file);
r = iso_ops->create_file(card, file);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static TT_F26Dot6 Norm( TT_F26Dot6 X, TT_F26Dot6 Y )
{
Int64 T1, T2;
MUL_64( X, X, T1 );
MUL_64( Y, Y, T2 );
ADD_64( T1, T2, T1 );
return (TT_F26Dot6)SQRT_64( T1 );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,482
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfc_genl_setup_device_added(struct nfc_dev *dev, struct sk_buff *msg)
{
if (nla_put_string(msg, NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_NAME, nfc_device_name(dev)) ||
nla_put_u32(msg, NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX, dev->idx) ||
nla_put_u32(msg, NFC_ATTR_PROTOCOLS, dev->supported_protocols) ||
nla_put_u8(msg, NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_POWERED, dev->dev_up) ||
nla_put_u8(msg, NFC_ATTR_RF_MODE, dev->rf_mode))
return -1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: nfc: Ensure presence of required attributes in the deactivate_target handler
Check that the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX attributes (in addition to
NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) are provided by the netlink client prior to
accessing them. This prevents potential unhandled NULL pointer dereference
exceptions which can be triggered by malicious user-mode programs,
if they omit one or both of these attributes.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char *lxclock_name(const char *p, const char *n)
{
int ret;
int len;
char *dest;
char *rundir;
/* lockfile will be:
* "/run" + "/lock/lxc/$lxcpath/$lxcname + '\0' if root
* or
* $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR + "/lock/lxc/$lxcpath/$lxcname + '\0' if non-root
*/
/* length of "/lock/lxc/" + $lxcpath + "/" + "." + $lxcname + '\0' */
len = strlen("/lock/lxc/") + strlen(n) + strlen(p) + 3;
rundir = get_rundir();
if (!rundir)
return NULL;
len += strlen(rundir);
if ((dest = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
free(rundir);
return NULL;
}
ret = snprintf(dest, len, "%s/lock/lxc/%s", rundir, p);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= len) {
free(dest);
free(rundir);
return NULL;
}
ret = mkdir_p(dest, 0755);
if (ret < 0) {
/* fall back to "/tmp/" + $(id -u) + "/lxc" + $lxcpath + "/" + "." + $lxcname + '\0'
* * maximum length of $(id -u) is 10 calculated by (log (2 ** (sizeof(uid_t) * 8) - 1) / log 10 + 1)
* * lxcpath always starts with '/'
*/
int l2 = 22 + strlen(n) + strlen(p);
if (l2 > len) {
char *d;
d = realloc(dest, l2);
if (!d) {
free(dest);
free(rundir);
return NULL;
}
len = l2;
dest = d;
}
ret = snprintf(dest, len, "/tmp/%d/lxc%s", geteuid(), p);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= len) {
free(dest);
free(rundir);
return NULL;
}
ret = mkdir_p(dest, 0755);
if (ret < 0) {
free(dest);
free(rundir);
return NULL;
}
ret = snprintf(dest, len, "/tmp/%d/lxc%s/.%s", geteuid(), p, n);
} else
ret = snprintf(dest, len, "%s/lock/lxc/%s/.%s", rundir, p, n);
free(rundir);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= len) {
free(dest);
return NULL;
}
return dest;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1331: lxclock: use /run/lxc/lock rather than /run/lock/lxc
This prevents an unprivileged user to use LXC to create arbitrary file
on the filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 1
| 166,725
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs4_xdr_enc_setclientid(struct rpc_rqst *req, __be32 *p, struct nfs4_setclientid *sc)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.nops = 1,
};
xdr_init_encode(&xdr, &req->rq_snd_buf, p);
encode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr);
return encode_setclientid(&xdr, sc);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,157
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: visit_corrupt (const bson_iter_t *iter, void *data)
{
*((bool *) data) = true;
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 77,937
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void vpid_sync_context(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
if (cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_single())
vpid_sync_vcpu_single(vmx);
else
vpid_sync_vcpu_global();
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,321
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::didMergeTextNodes(Text* oldNode, unsigned offset)
{
if (!m_ranges.isEmpty()) {
NodeWithIndex oldNodeWithIndex(oldNode);
HashSet<Range*>::const_iterator end = m_ranges.end();
for (HashSet<Range*>::const_iterator it = m_ranges.begin(); it != end; ++it)
(*it)->didMergeTextNodes(oldNodeWithIndex, offset);
}
if (m_frame)
m_frame->selection().didMergeTextNodes(*oldNode, offset);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,690
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval,
unsigned int optlen)
{
int val;
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(val, (int __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
if (!sctp_is_ep_boundall(sk) && val)
return -EINVAL;
if ((val && sp->do_auto_asconf) || (!val && !sp->do_auto_asconf))
return 0;
if (val == 0 && sp->do_auto_asconf) {
list_del(&sp->auto_asconf_list);
sp->do_auto_asconf = 0;
} else if (val && !sp->do_auto_asconf) {
list_add_tail(&sp->auto_asconf_list,
&sock_net(sk)->sctp.auto_asconf_splist);
sp->do_auto_asconf = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 33,041
|
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