instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int masq_device_event(struct notifier_block *this,
unsigned long event,
void *ptr)
{
const struct net_device *dev = netdev_notifier_info_to_dev(ptr);
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
if (event == NETDEV_DOWN) {
/* Device was downed. Search entire table for
* conntracks which were associated with that device,
* and forget them.
*/
NF_CT_ASSERT(dev->ifindex != 0);
nf_ct_iterate_cleanup(net, device_cmp,
(void *)(long)dev->ifindex, 0, 0);
}
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 54,149
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rpc_free_task(struct rpc_task *task)
{
const struct rpc_call_ops *tk_ops = task->tk_ops;
void *calldata = task->tk_calldata;
if (task->tk_flags & RPC_TASK_DYNAMIC) {
dprintk("RPC: %5u freeing task\n", task->tk_pid);
mempool_free(task, rpc_task_mempool);
}
rpc_release_calldata(tk_ops, calldata);
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 34,960
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static RBinSection* _get_vsection_at(RBin *bin, ut64 vaddr) {
RBinObject *cur = r_bin_object_get_cur (bin);
return r_bin_get_section_at (cur, vaddr, true);
}
Commit Message: Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 60,087
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int snd_seq_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
{
struct snd_seq_client *client = file->private_data;
unsigned int mask = 0;
/* check client structures are in place */
if (snd_BUG_ON(!client))
return -ENXIO;
if ((snd_seq_file_flags(file) & SNDRV_SEQ_LFLG_INPUT) &&
client->data.user.fifo) {
/* check if data is available in the outqueue */
if (snd_seq_fifo_poll_wait(client->data.user.fifo, file, wait))
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
}
if (snd_seq_file_flags(file) & SNDRV_SEQ_LFLG_OUTPUT) {
/* check if data is available in the pool */
if (!snd_seq_write_pool_allocated(client) ||
snd_seq_pool_poll_wait(client->pool, file, wait))
mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
}
return mask;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pfkey_terminate_dump(struct pfkey_sock *pfk)
{
if (pfk->dump.dump) {
if (pfk->dump.skb) {
kfree_skb(pfk->dump.skb);
pfk->dump.skb = NULL;
}
pfk->dump.done(pfk);
pfk->dump.dump = NULL;
pfk->dump.done = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,472
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ip_icmp_error(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int err,
__be16 port, u32 info, u8 *payload)
{
struct sock_exterr_skb *serr;
skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return;
serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
serr->ee.ee_errno = err;
serr->ee.ee_origin = SO_EE_ORIGIN_ICMP;
serr->ee.ee_type = icmp_hdr(skb)->type;
serr->ee.ee_code = icmp_hdr(skb)->code;
serr->ee.ee_pad = 0;
serr->ee.ee_info = info;
serr->ee.ee_data = 0;
serr->addr_offset = (u8 *)&(((struct iphdr *)(icmp_hdr(skb) + 1))->daddr) -
skb_network_header(skb);
serr->port = port;
if (skb_pull(skb, payload - skb->data)) {
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
if (sock_queue_err_skb(sk, skb) == 0)
return;
}
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: ip: fix IP_CHECKSUM handling
The skbs processed by ip_cmsg_recv() are not guaranteed to
be linear e.g. when sending UDP packets over loopback with
MSGMORE.
Using csum_partial() on [potentially] the whole skb len
is dangerous; instead be on the safe side and use skb_checksum().
Thanks to syzkaller team to detect the issue and provide the
reproducer.
v1 -> v2:
- move the variable declaration in a tighter scope
Fixes: ad6f939ab193 ("ip: Add offset parameter to ip_cmsg_recv")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 68,174
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ContainerNode::getUpperLeftCorner(FloatPoint& point) const
{
if (!renderer())
return false;
RenderObject *o = renderer();
RenderObject *p = o;
if (!o->isInline() || o->isReplaced()) {
point = o->localToAbsolute(FloatPoint(), false, true);
return true;
}
while (o) {
p = o;
if (o->firstChild())
o = o->firstChild();
else if (o->nextSibling())
o = o->nextSibling();
else {
RenderObject *next = 0;
while (!next && o->parent()) {
o = o->parent();
next = o->nextSibling();
}
o = next;
if (!o)
break;
}
ASSERT(o);
if (!o->isInline() || o->isReplaced()) {
point = o->localToAbsolute(FloatPoint(), false, true);
return true;
}
if (p->node() && p->node() == this && o->isText() && !o->isBR() && !toRenderText(o)->firstTextBox()) {
} else if ((o->isText() && !o->isBR()) || o->isReplaced()) {
point = FloatPoint();
if (o->isText() && toRenderText(o)->firstTextBox()) {
point.move(toRenderText(o)->linesBoundingBox().x(),
toRenderText(o)->firstTextBox()->root()->lineTop());
} else if (o->isBox()) {
RenderBox* box = toRenderBox(o);
point.moveBy(box->location());
}
point = o->container()->localToAbsolute(point, false, true);
return true;
}
}
if (!o && document()->view()) {
point = FloatPoint(0, document()->view()->contentsHeight());
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93587
Node::replaceChild() can create bad DOM topology with MutationEvent, Part 2
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
Source/WebCore:
This is a followup of r124156. replaceChild() has yet another hidden
MutationEvent trigger. This change added a guard for it.
Test: fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html
* dom/ContainerNode.cpp:
(WebCore::ContainerNode::replaceChild):
LayoutTests:
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@125237 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 98,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: move_task_thread_func (GTask *task,
gpointer source_object,
gpointer task_data,
GCancellable *cancellable)
{
CopyMoveJob *job;
CommonJob *common;
GList *fallbacks;
SourceInfo source_info;
TransferInfo transfer_info;
char *dest_fs_id;
char *dest_fs_type;
GList *fallback_files;
job = task_data;
common = &job->common;
dest_fs_id = NULL;
dest_fs_type = NULL;
fallbacks = NULL;
nautilus_progress_info_start (job->common.progress);
verify_destination (&job->common,
job->destination,
&dest_fs_id,
-1);
if (job_aborted (common))
{
goto aborted;
}
/* This moves all files that we can do without copy + delete */
move_files_prepare (job, dest_fs_id, &dest_fs_type, &fallbacks);
if (job_aborted (common))
{
goto aborted;
}
/* The rest we need to do deep copy + delete behind on,
* so scan for size */
fallback_files = get_files_from_fallbacks (fallbacks);
scan_sources (fallback_files,
&source_info,
common,
OP_KIND_MOVE);
g_list_free (fallback_files);
if (job_aborted (common))
{
goto aborted;
}
verify_destination (&job->common,
job->destination,
NULL,
source_info.num_bytes);
if (job_aborted (common))
{
goto aborted;
}
memset (&transfer_info, 0, sizeof (transfer_info));
move_files (job,
fallbacks,
dest_fs_id, &dest_fs_type,
&source_info, &transfer_info);
aborted:
g_list_free_full (fallbacks, g_free);
g_free (dest_fs_id);
g_free (dest_fs_type);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,100
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: crm_smtp_debug(const char *buf, int buflen, int writing, void *arg)
{
char type = 0;
int lpc = 0, last = 0, level = *(int *)arg;
if (writing == SMTP_CB_HEADERS) {
type = 'H';
} else if (writing) {
type = 'C';
} else {
type = 'S';
}
for (; lpc < buflen; lpc++) {
switch (buf[lpc]) {
case 0:
case '\n':
if (last > 0) {
do_crm_log(level, " %.*s", lpc - last, buf + last);
} else {
do_crm_log(level, "%c: %.*s", type, lpc - last, buf + last);
}
last = lpc + 1;
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,936
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t NuMediaExtractor::seekTo(
int64_t timeUs, MediaSource::ReadOptions::SeekMode mode) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
ssize_t minIndex = fetchTrackSamples(timeUs, mode);
if (minIndex < 0) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow and divide-by-zero
Bug: 35763994
Test: ran CTS with and without fix
Change-Id: If835e97ce578d4fa567e33e349e48fb7b2559e0e
(cherry picked from commit 8538a603ef992e75f29336499cb783f3ec19f18c)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 162,426
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ikev1_n_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi0 _U_,
uint32_t proto0 _U_, int depth _U_)
{
const struct ikev1_pl_n *p;
struct ikev1_pl_n n;
const u_char *cp;
const u_char *ep2;
uint32_t doi;
uint32_t proto;
static const char *notify_error_str[] = {
NULL, "INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE",
"DOI-NOT-SUPPORTED", "SITUATION-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"INVALID-COOKIE", "INVALID-MAJOR-VERSION",
"INVALID-MINOR-VERSION", "INVALID-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"INVALID-FLAGS", "INVALID-MESSAGE-ID",
"INVALID-PROTOCOL-ID", "INVALID-SPI",
"INVALID-TRANSFORM-ID", "ATTRIBUTES-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"NO-PROPOSAL-CHOSEN", "BAD-PROPOSAL-SYNTAX",
"PAYLOAD-MALFORMED", "INVALID-KEY-INFORMATION",
"INVALID-ID-INFORMATION", "INVALID-CERT-ENCODING",
"INVALID-CERTIFICATE", "CERT-TYPE-UNSUPPORTED",
"INVALID-CERT-AUTHORITY", "INVALID-HASH-INFORMATION",
"AUTHENTICATION-FAILED", "INVALID-SIGNATURE",
"ADDRESS-NOTIFICATION", "NOTIFY-SA-LIFETIME",
"CERTIFICATE-UNAVAILABLE", "UNSUPPORTED-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"UNEQUAL-PAYLOAD-LENGTHS",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_error_str[] = {
"RESERVED",
};
static const char *notify_status_str[] = {
"CONNECTED",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_status_str[] = {
"RESPONDER-LIFETIME", "REPLAY-STATUS",
"INITIAL-CONTACT",
};
/* NOTE: these macro must be called with x in proper range */
/* 0 - 8191 */
#define NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((x), notify_error_str)
/* 8192 - 16383 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 8192), ipsec_notify_error_str)
/* 16384 - 24575 */
#define NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 16384), notify_status_str)
/* 24576 - 32767 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 24576), ipsec_notify_status_str)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
p = (const struct ikev1_pl_n *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&n, ext, sizeof(n));
doi = ntohl(n.doi);
proto = n.prot_id;
if (doi != 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=%d", doi));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%d", proto));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=ipsec"));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%s", PROTOIDSTR(proto)));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 32768)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
ep2 = (const u_char *)p + item_len;
if (cp < ep) {
switch (ntohs(n.type)) {
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_RESPONDER_LIFETIME:
{
const struct attrmap *map = oakley_t_map;
size_t nmap = sizeof(oakley_t_map)/sizeof(oakley_t_map[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo," attrs=("));
while (cp < ep && cp < ep2) {
cp = ikev1_attrmap_print(ndo, cp,
(ep < ep2) ? ep : ep2, map, nmap);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
}
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_REPLAY_STATUS:
ND_PRINT((ndo," status=("));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"replay detection %sabled",
EXTRACT_32BITS(cp) ? "en" : "dis"));
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
default:
/*
* XXX - fill in more types here; see, for example,
* draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," data=("));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(cp), ep - cp))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
} else {
if (!ike_show_somedata(ndo, cp, ep))
goto trunc;
}
break;
}
}
return (const u_char *)ext + item_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13039/IKEv1: Do more bounds checking.
Have ikev1_attrmap_print() and ikev1_attr_print() do full bounds
checking, and return null on a bounds overflow. Have their callers
check for a null return.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 167,841
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sctp_v4_dst_saddr(union sctp_addr *saddr, struct flowi4 *fl4,
__be16 port)
{
saddr->v4.sin_family = AF_INET;
saddr->v4.sin_port = port;
saddr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr = fl4->saddr;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 42,934
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit exit_iso9660_fs(void)
{
unregister_filesystem(&iso9660_fs_type);
#ifdef CONFIG_ZISOFS
zisofs_cleanup();
#endif
destroy_inodecache();
}
Commit Message: isofs: Fix unbounded recursion when processing relocated directories
We did not check relocated directory in any way when processing Rock
Ridge 'CL' tag. Thus a corrupted isofs image can possibly have a CL
entry pointing to another CL entry leading to possibly unbounded
recursion in kernel code and thus stack overflow or deadlocks (if there
is a loop created from CL entries).
Fix the problem by not allowing CL entry to point to a directory entry
with CL entry (such use makes no good sense anyway) and by checking
whether CL entry doesn't point to itself.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Chris Evans <cevans@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 36,078
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ApiTestEnvironment::RunPromisesAgain() {
env()->isolate()->RunMicrotasks();
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&ApiTestEnvironment::RunPromisesAgain,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 133,038
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void vbg_linux_mouse_event(struct vbg_dev *gdev)
{
int rc;
/* Report events to the kernel input device */
gdev->mouse_status_req->mouse_features = 0;
gdev->mouse_status_req->pointer_pos_x = 0;
gdev->mouse_status_req->pointer_pos_y = 0;
rc = vbg_req_perform(gdev, gdev->mouse_status_req);
if (rc >= 0) {
input_report_abs(gdev->input, ABS_X,
gdev->mouse_status_req->pointer_pos_x);
input_report_abs(gdev->input, ABS_Y,
gdev->mouse_status_req->pointer_pos_y);
input_sync(gdev->input);
}
}
Commit Message: virt: vbox: Only copy_from_user the request-header once
In vbg_misc_device_ioctl(), the header of the ioctl argument is copied from
the userspace pointer 'arg' and saved to the kernel object 'hdr'. Then the
'version', 'size_in', and 'size_out' fields of 'hdr' are verified.
Before this commit, after the checks a buffer for the entire request would
be allocated and then all data including the verified header would be
copied from the userspace 'arg' pointer again.
Given that the 'arg' pointer resides in userspace, a malicious userspace
process can race to change the data pointed to by 'arg' between the two
copies. By doing so, the user can bypass the verifications on the ioctl
argument.
This commit fixes this by using the already checked copy of the header
to fill the header part of the allocated buffer and only copying the
remainder of the data from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 81,693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xps_load_sfnt_name(xps_font_t *font, char *namep, const int buflen)
{
byte *namedata;
int offset, length;
/*int format;*/
int count, stringoffset;
int found;
int i, k;
found = 0;
strcpy(namep, "Unknown");
offset = xps_find_sfnt_table(font, "name", &length);
if (offset < 0 || length < 6)
{
gs_warn("cannot find name table");
return;
}
/* validate the offset, and the data for the two
* values we're about to read
*/
if (offset + 6 > font->length)
{
gs_warn("name table byte offset invalid");
return;
}
namedata = font->data + offset;
/*format = u16(namedata + 0);*/
count = u16(namedata + 2);
stringoffset = u16(namedata + 4);
if (stringoffset + offset > font->length
|| offset + 6 + count * 12 > font->length)
{
gs_warn("name table invalid");
return;
}
if (length < 6 + (count * 12))
{
gs_warn("name table too short");
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
{
byte *record = namedata + 6 + i * 12;
int pid = u16(record + 0);
int eid = u16(record + 2);
int langid = u16(record + 4);
int nameid = u16(record + 6);
length = u16(record + 8);
offset = u16(record + 10);
length = length > buflen - 1 ? buflen - 1: length;
/* Full font name or postscript name */
if (nameid == 4 || nameid == 6)
{
if (pid == 1 && eid == 0 && langid == 0) /* mac roman, english */
{
if (found < 3)
{
memcpy(namep, namedata + stringoffset + offset, length);
namep[length] = 0;
found = 3;
}
}
if (pid == 3 && eid == 1 && langid == 0x409) /* windows unicode ucs-2, US */
{
if (found < 2)
{
unsigned char *s = namedata + stringoffset + offset;
int n = length / 2;
for (k = 0; k < n; k ++)
{
int c = u16(s + k * 2);
namep[k] = isprint(c) ? c : '?';
}
namep[k] = 0;
found = 2;
}
}
if (pid == 3 && eid == 10 && langid == 0x409) /* windows unicode ucs-4, US */
{
if (found < 1)
{
unsigned char *s = namedata + stringoffset + offset;
int n = length / 4;
for (k = 0; k < n; k ++)
{
int c = u32(s + k * 4);
namep[k] = isprint(c) ? c : '?';
}
namep[k] = 0;
found = 1;
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,344
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: etheraddr_string(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *ep)
{
register int i;
register char *cp;
register struct enamemem *tp;
int oui;
char buf[BUFSIZE];
tp = lookup_emem(ndo, ep);
if (tp->e_name)
return (tp->e_name);
#ifdef USE_ETHER_NTOHOST
if (!ndo->ndo_nflag) {
char buf2[BUFSIZE];
if (ether_ntohost(buf2, (const struct ether_addr *)ep) == 0) {
tp->e_name = strdup(buf2);
if (tp->e_name == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo,
"etheraddr_string: strdup(buf2)");
return (tp->e_name);
}
}
#endif
cp = buf;
oui = EXTRACT_24BITS(ep);
*cp++ = hex[*ep >> 4 ];
*cp++ = hex[*ep++ & 0xf];
for (i = 5; --i >= 0;) {
*cp++ = ':';
*cp++ = hex[*ep >> 4 ];
*cp++ = hex[*ep++ & 0xf];
}
if (!ndo->ndo_nflag) {
snprintf(cp, BUFSIZE - (2 + 5*3), " (oui %s)",
tok2str(oui_values, "Unknown", oui));
} else
*cp = '\0';
tp->e_name = strdup(buf);
if (tp->e_name == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "etheraddr_string: strdup(buf)");
return (tp->e_name);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12894/In lookup_bytestring(), take the length of the byte string into account.
Otherwise, if, in our search of the hash table, we come across a byte
string that's shorter than the string we're looking for, we'll search
past the end of the string in the hash table.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 62,588
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ext_t_0_wv_cspc_12(tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, guint32 value, guint32 str_tbl _U_)
{
char *str = wmem_strdup_printf(wmem_packet_scope(), "Common Value: '%s'",
val_to_str(value, vals_wv_csp_12_element_value_tokens,
"<Unknown WV-CSP 1.2 Common Value token 0x%X>"));
return str;
}
Commit Message: WBXML: add a basic sanity check for offset overflow
This is a naive approach allowing to detact that something went wrong,
without the need to replace all proto_tree_add_text() calls as what was
done in master-2.0 branch.
Bug: 12408
Change-Id: Ia14905005e17ae322c2fc639ad5e491fa08b0108
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15310
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Pascal Quantin <pascal.quantin@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 51,705
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void TerminateWorkerOnIOThread(scoped_refptr<WorkerData> worker_data) {
if (WorkerService::GetInstance()->TerminateWorker(
worker_data->worker_process_id, worker_data->worker_route_id)) {
WorkerService::GetInstance()->AddObserver(
new WorkerTerminationObserver(worker_data));
return;
}
FAIL() << "Failed to terminate worker.\n";
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,483
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InputEventAckState InputMsgWatcher::WaitForAck() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
base::RunLoop run_loop;
base::AutoReset<base::Closure> reset_quit(&quit_, run_loop.QuitClosure());
run_loop.Run();
return ack_result_;
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 156,195
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pvscsi_ring_init_msg(PVSCSIRingInfo *m, PVSCSICmdDescSetupMsgRing *ri)
{
int i;
uint32_t len_log2;
uint32_t ring_size;
if (ri->numPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_MSG_RING_MAX_NUM_PAGES) {
return -1;
}
ring_size = ri->numPages * PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_MSG_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
len_log2 = pvscsi_log2(ring_size - 1);
m->msg_len_mask = MASK(len_log2);
m->filled_msg_ptr = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ri->numPages; i++) {
m->msg_ring_pages_pa[i] = ri->ringPPNs[i] << VMW_PAGE_SHIFT;
}
RS_SET_FIELD(m, msgProdIdx, 0);
RS_SET_FIELD(m, msgConsIdx, 0);
RS_SET_FIELD(m, msgNumEntriesLog2, len_log2);
trace_pvscsi_ring_init_msg(len_log2);
/* Flush ring state page changes */
smp_wmb();
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,451
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GpuProcessHost* GpuProcessHost::Get(GpuProcessKind kind,
CauseForGpuLaunch cause) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
GpuDataManagerImpl* gpu_data_manager = GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance();
DCHECK(gpu_data_manager);
if (!gpu_data_manager->GpuAccessAllowed())
return NULL;
if (g_gpu_process_hosts[kind] && HostIsValid(g_gpu_process_hosts[kind]))
return g_gpu_process_hosts[kind];
if (cause == CAUSE_FOR_GPU_LAUNCH_NO_LAUNCH)
return NULL;
int host_id;
host_id = ++g_last_host_id;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("GPU.GPUProcessLaunchCause",
cause,
CAUSE_FOR_GPU_LAUNCH_MAX_ENUM);
GpuProcessHost* host = new GpuProcessHost(host_id, kind);
if (host->Init())
return host;
delete host;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,441
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool peernet_has_id(struct net *net, struct net *peer)
{
return peernet2id(net, peer) >= 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Fix double free and memory corruption in get_net_ns_by_id()
(I can trivially verify that that idr_remove in cleanup_net happens
after the network namespace count has dropped to zero --EWB)
Function get_net_ns_by_id() does not check for net::count
after it has found a peer in netns_ids idr.
It may dereference a peer, after its count has already been
finaly decremented. This leads to double free and memory
corruption:
put_net(peer) rtnl_lock()
atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0] ...
__put_net(peer) get_net_ns_by_id(net, id)
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
queue_work() peer = idr_find(&net->netns_ids, id)
| get_net(peer) [count=1]
| ...
| (use after final put)
v ...
cleanup_net() ...
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..) ...
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
... ...
... put_net(peer)
... atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0]
... spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
... spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... queue_work()
... rtnl_unlock()
rtnl_lock() ...
for_each_net(tmp) { ...
id = __peernet2id(tmp, peer) ...
spin_lock_irq(&tmp->nsid_lock) ...
idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id) ...
... ...
net_drop_ns() ...
net_free(peer) ...
} ...
|
v
cleanup_net()
...
(Second free of peer)
Also, put_net() on the right cpu may reorder with left's cpu
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..), and then cleanup_list
will be corrupted.
Since cleanup_net() is executed in worker thread, while
put_net(peer) can happen everywhere, there should be
enough time for concurrent get_net_ns_by_id() to pick
the peer up, and the race does not seem to be unlikely.
The patch fixes the problem in standard way.
(Also, there is possible problem in peernet2id_alloc(), which requires
check for net::count under nsid_lock and maybe_get_net(peer), but
in current stable kernel it's used under rtnl_lock() and it has to be
safe. Openswitch begun to use peernet2id_alloc(), and possibly it should
be fixed too. While this is not in stable kernel yet, so I'll send
a separate message to netdev@ later).
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Fixes: 0c7aecd4bde4 "netns: add rtnl cmd to add and get peer netns ids"
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 86,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AppLauncherHandler::AppInstallInfo::~AppInstallInfo() {}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,352
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t MediaRecorder::getMaxAmplitude(int* max)
{
ALOGV("getMaxAmplitude");
if (mMediaRecorder == NULL) {
ALOGE("media recorder is not initialized yet");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (mCurrentState & MEDIA_RECORDER_ERROR) {
ALOGE("getMaxAmplitude called in an invalid state: %d", mCurrentState);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
status_t ret = mMediaRecorder->getMaxAmplitude(max);
if (OK != ret) {
ALOGE("getMaxAmplitude failed: %d", ret);
mCurrentState = MEDIA_RECORDER_ERROR;
return ret;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 159,527
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserView::RestoreFocus() {
WebContents* selected_web_contents = GetActiveWebContents();
if (selected_web_contents)
selected_web_contents->GetView()->RestoreFocus();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct thread_local_inits_st *ossl_init_get_thread_local(int alloc)
{
struct thread_local_inits_st *local =
CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&destructor_key.value);
if (alloc) {
if (local == NULL
&& (local = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*local))) != NULL
&& !CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&destructor_key.value, local)) {
OPENSSL_free(local);
return NULL;
}
} else {
CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&destructor_key.value, NULL);
}
return local;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330
| 0
| 12,017
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get8_packet(vorb *f)
{
int x = get8_packet_raw(f);
f->valid_bits = 0;
return x;
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 75,262
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int recover_xattr_data(struct inode *inode, struct page *page, block_t blkaddr)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
nid_t prev_xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
nid_t new_xnid = nid_of_node(page);
struct node_info ni;
struct page *xpage;
if (!prev_xnid)
goto recover_xnid;
/* 1: invalidate the previous xattr nid */
get_node_info(sbi, prev_xnid, &ni);
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, ni.blk_addr == NULL_ADDR);
invalidate_blocks(sbi, ni.blk_addr);
dec_valid_node_count(sbi, inode);
set_node_addr(sbi, &ni, NULL_ADDR, false);
recover_xnid:
/* 2: update xattr nid in inode */
remove_free_nid(sbi, new_xnid);
f2fs_i_xnid_write(inode, new_xnid);
if (unlikely(!inc_valid_node_count(sbi, inode)))
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, 1);
update_inode_page(inode);
/* 3: update and set xattr node page dirty */
xpage = grab_cache_page(NODE_MAPPING(sbi), new_xnid);
if (!xpage)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(F2FS_NODE(xpage), F2FS_NODE(page), PAGE_SIZE);
get_node_info(sbi, new_xnid, &ni);
ni.ino = inode->i_ino;
set_node_addr(sbi, &ni, NEW_ADDR, false);
set_page_dirty(xpage);
f2fs_put_page(xpage, 1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,290
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nntp_check_new_groups(struct NntpServer *nserv)
{
struct NntpData nntp_data;
time_t now;
struct tm *tm = NULL;
char buf[LONG_STRING];
char *msg = _("Checking for new newsgroups...");
unsigned int i;
int rc, update_active = false;
if (!nserv || !nserv->newgroups_time)
return -1;
/* check subscribed newsgroups for new articles */
if (ShowNewNews)
{
mutt_message(_("Checking for new messages..."));
for (i = 0; i < nserv->groups_num; i++)
{
struct NntpData *data = nserv->groups_list[i];
if (data && data->subscribed)
{
rc = nntp_group_poll(data, 1);
if (rc < 0)
return -1;
if (rc > 0)
update_active = true;
}
}
/* select current newsgroup */
if (Context && Context->magic == MUTT_NNTP)
{
buf[0] = '\0';
if (nntp_query((struct NntpData *) Context->data, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0)
return -1;
}
}
else if (nserv->newgroups_time)
return 0;
/* get list of new groups */
mutt_message(msg);
if (nntp_date(nserv, &now) < 0)
return -1;
nntp_data.nserv = nserv;
if (Context && Context->magic == MUTT_NNTP)
nntp_data.group = ((struct NntpData *) Context->data)->group;
else
nntp_data.group = NULL;
i = nserv->groups_num;
tm = gmtime(&nserv->newgroups_time);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "NEWGROUPS %02d%02d%02d %02d%02d%02d GMT\r\n",
tm->tm_year % 100, tm->tm_mon + 1, tm->tm_mday, tm->tm_hour,
tm->tm_min, tm->tm_sec);
rc = nntp_fetch_lines(&nntp_data, buf, sizeof(buf), msg, nntp_add_group, nserv);
if (rc)
{
if (rc > 0)
{
mutt_error("NEWGROUPS: %s", buf);
}
return -1;
}
/* new groups found */
rc = 0;
if (nserv->groups_num != i)
{
int groups_num = i;
nserv->newgroups_time = now;
for (; i < nserv->groups_num; i++)
{
struct NntpData *data = nserv->groups_list[i];
data->new = true;
}
/* loading descriptions */
if (NntpLoadDescription)
{
unsigned int count = 0;
struct Progress progress;
mutt_progress_init(&progress, _("Loading descriptions..."),
MUTT_PROGRESS_MSG, ReadInc, nserv->groups_num - i);
for (i = groups_num; i < nserv->groups_num; i++)
{
struct NntpData *data = nserv->groups_list[i];
if (get_description(data, NULL, NULL) < 0)
return -1;
mutt_progress_update(&progress, ++count, -1);
}
}
update_active = true;
rc = 1;
}
if (update_active)
nntp_active_save_cache(nserv);
mutt_clear_error();
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Add alloc fail check in nntp_fetch_headers
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 79,499
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AddEntry(Entries *e, Entry *entry)
{
register int n;
for (n = 0; n < e->used; n++) {
if (!strcmp(e->entry[n].tag, entry->tag)) {
/* overwrite old entry */
if (e->entry[n].lineno && !quiet) {
fprintf (stderr,
"%s: \"%s\" on line %d overrides entry on line %d\n",
ProgramName, entry->tag, entry->lineno,
e->entry[n].lineno);
}
free(e->entry[n].tag);
free(e->entry[n].value);
entry->usable = True;
e->entry[n] = *entry;
return; /* ok to leave, now there's only one of each tag in db */
}
}
if (e->used == e->room) {
e->entry = (Entry *)realloc((char *)e->entry,
2*e->room*(sizeof(Entry)));
e->room *= 2;
}
entry->usable = True;
e->entry[e->used++] = *entry;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,057
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserViewRenderer::ClearView() {
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("android_webview",
"BrowserViewRenderer::ClearView",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD);
if (clear_view_)
return;
clear_view_ = true;
PostInvalidateWithFallback();
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,513
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetProfiles(std::vector<AutofillProfile>* profiles) {
WindowedPersonalDataManagerObserver observer(browser());
personal_data_manager()->SetProfiles(profiles);
observer.Wait();
}
Commit Message: Fix OS_MACOS typos. Should be OS_MACOSX.
BUG=163208
TEST=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12829005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@189130 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 118,731
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GraphicsContext3D::createGraphicsSurfaces(const IntSize& size)
{
m_private->createGraphicsSurfaces(size);
}
Commit Message: [Qt] Remove an unnecessary masking from swapBgrToRgb()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=103630
Reviewed by Zoltan Herczeg.
Get rid of a masking command in swapBgrToRgb() to speed up a little bit.
* platform/graphics/qt/GraphicsContext3DQt.cpp:
(WebCore::swapBgrToRgb):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@136375 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 107,382
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BuildObjectForResourceResponse(const ResourceResponse& response,
Resource* cached_resource = nullptr,
bool* is_empty = nullptr) {
if (response.IsNull())
return nullptr;
int status;
String status_text;
if (response.GetResourceLoadInfo() &&
response.GetResourceLoadInfo()->http_status_code) {
status = response.GetResourceLoadInfo()->http_status_code;
status_text = response.GetResourceLoadInfo()->http_status_text;
} else {
status = response.HttpStatusCode();
status_text = response.HttpStatusText();
}
HTTPHeaderMap headers_map;
if (response.GetResourceLoadInfo() &&
response.GetResourceLoadInfo()->response_headers.size())
headers_map = response.GetResourceLoadInfo()->response_headers;
else
headers_map = response.HttpHeaderFields();
int64_t encoded_data_length = response.EncodedDataLength();
String security_state = protocol::Security::SecurityStateEnum::Unknown;
switch (response.GetSecurityStyle()) {
case ResourceResponse::kSecurityStyleUnknown:
security_state = protocol::Security::SecurityStateEnum::Unknown;
break;
case ResourceResponse::kSecurityStyleUnauthenticated:
security_state = protocol::Security::SecurityStateEnum::Neutral;
break;
case ResourceResponse::kSecurityStyleAuthenticationBroken:
security_state = protocol::Security::SecurityStateEnum::Insecure;
break;
case ResourceResponse::kSecurityStyleAuthenticated:
security_state = protocol::Security::SecurityStateEnum::Secure;
break;
}
String mime_type = response.MimeType();
if (mime_type.IsEmpty() && cached_resource)
mime_type = cached_resource->GetResponse().MimeType();
if (is_empty)
*is_empty = !status && mime_type.IsEmpty() && !headers_map.size();
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Response> response_object =
protocol::Network::Response::create()
.setUrl(UrlWithoutFragment(response.Url()).GetString())
.setStatus(status)
.setStatusText(status_text)
.setHeaders(BuildObjectForHeaders(headers_map))
.setMimeType(mime_type)
.setConnectionReused(response.ConnectionReused())
.setConnectionId(response.ConnectionID())
.setEncodedDataLength(encoded_data_length)
.setSecurityState(security_state)
.build();
response_object->setFromDiskCache(response.WasCached());
response_object->setFromServiceWorker(response.WasFetchedViaServiceWorker());
if (response.GetResourceLoadTiming())
response_object->setTiming(
BuildObjectForTiming(*response.GetResourceLoadTiming()));
if (response.GetResourceLoadInfo()) {
if (!response.GetResourceLoadInfo()->response_headers_text.IsEmpty())
response_object->setHeadersText(
response.GetResourceLoadInfo()->response_headers_text);
if (response.GetResourceLoadInfo()->request_headers.size())
response_object->setRequestHeaders(BuildObjectForHeaders(
response.GetResourceLoadInfo()->request_headers));
if (!response.GetResourceLoadInfo()->request_headers_text.IsEmpty())
response_object->setRequestHeadersText(
response.GetResourceLoadInfo()->request_headers_text);
}
String remote_ip_address = response.RemoteIPAddress();
if (!remote_ip_address.IsEmpty()) {
response_object->setRemoteIPAddress(remote_ip_address);
response_object->setRemotePort(response.RemotePort());
}
String protocol;
if (response.GetResourceLoadInfo())
protocol = response.GetResourceLoadInfo()->npn_negotiated_protocol;
if (protocol.IsEmpty() || protocol == "unknown") {
if (response.WasFetchedViaSPDY()) {
protocol = "spdy";
} else if (response.IsHTTP()) {
protocol = "http";
if (response.HttpVersion() ==
ResourceResponse::HTTPVersion::kHTTPVersion_0_9)
protocol = "http/0.9";
else if (response.HttpVersion() ==
ResourceResponse::HTTPVersion::kHTTPVersion_1_0)
protocol = "http/1.0";
else if (response.HttpVersion() ==
ResourceResponse::HTTPVersion::kHTTPVersion_1_1)
protocol = "http/1.1";
} else {
protocol = response.Url().Protocol();
}
}
response_object->setProtocol(protocol);
if (response.GetSecurityStyle() != ResourceResponse::kSecurityStyleUnknown &&
response.GetSecurityStyle() !=
ResourceResponse::kSecurityStyleUnauthenticated) {
const ResourceResponse::SecurityDetails* response_security_details =
response.GetSecurityDetails();
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Array<String>> san_list =
protocol::Array<String>::create();
for (auto const& san : response_security_details->san_list)
san_list->addItem(san);
std::unique_ptr<
protocol::Array<protocol::Network::SignedCertificateTimestamp>>
signed_certificate_timestamp_list = protocol::Array<
protocol::Network::SignedCertificateTimestamp>::create();
for (auto const& sct : response_security_details->sct_list) {
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::SignedCertificateTimestamp>
signed_certificate_timestamp =
protocol::Network::SignedCertificateTimestamp::create()
.setStatus(sct.status_)
.setOrigin(sct.origin_)
.setLogDescription(sct.log_description_)
.setLogId(sct.log_id_)
.setTimestamp(sct.timestamp_)
.setHashAlgorithm(sct.hash_algorithm_)
.setSignatureAlgorithm(sct.signature_algorithm_)
.setSignatureData(sct.signature_data_)
.build();
signed_certificate_timestamp_list->addItem(
std::move(signed_certificate_timestamp));
}
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::SecurityDetails> security_details =
protocol::Network::SecurityDetails::create()
.setProtocol(response_security_details->protocol)
.setKeyExchange(response_security_details->key_exchange)
.setCipher(response_security_details->cipher)
.setSubjectName(response_security_details->subject_name)
.setSanList(std::move(san_list))
.setIssuer(response_security_details->issuer)
.setValidFrom(response_security_details->valid_from)
.setValidTo(response_security_details->valid_to)
.setCertificateId(0) // Keep this in protocol for compatability.
.setSignedCertificateTimestampList(
std::move(signed_certificate_timestamp_list))
.build();
if (response_security_details->key_exchange_group.length() > 0)
security_details->setKeyExchangeGroup(
response_security_details->key_exchange_group);
if (response_security_details->mac.length() > 0)
security_details->setMac(response_security_details->mac);
response_object->setSecurityDetails(std::move(security_details));
}
return response_object;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline u32 armv7_pmnc_enable_counter(unsigned int idx)
{
u32 val;
if ((idx != ARMV7_CYCLE_COUNTER) &&
((idx < ARMV7_COUNTER0) || (idx > ARMV7_COUNTER_LAST))) {
pr_err("CPU%u enabling wrong PMNC counter"
" %d\n", smp_processor_id(), idx);
return -1;
}
if (idx == ARMV7_CYCLE_COUNTER)
val = ARMV7_CNTENS_C;
else
val = ARMV7_CNTENS_P(idx);
asm volatile("mcr p15, 0, %0, c9, c12, 1" : : "r" (val));
return idx;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: create_pid_dir(void)
{
if (mkdir(pid_directory, S_IRWXU | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP | S_IROTH | S_IXOTH) && errno != EEXIST) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to create directory %s", pid_directory);
return;
}
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 75,916
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int jas_seq2d_output(jas_matrix_t *matrix, FILE *out)
{
#define MAXLINELEN 80
int i;
int j;
jas_seqent_t x;
char buf[MAXLINELEN + 1];
char sbuf[MAXLINELEN + 1];
int n;
fprintf(out, "%d %d\n", jas_seq2d_xstart(matrix),
jas_seq2d_ystart(matrix));
fprintf(out, "%d %d\n", jas_matrix_numcols(matrix),
jas_matrix_numrows(matrix));
buf[0] = '\0';
for (i = 0; i < jas_matrix_numrows(matrix); ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < jas_matrix_numcols(matrix); ++j) {
x = jas_matrix_get(matrix, i, j);
sprintf(sbuf, "%s%4ld", (strlen(buf) > 0) ? " " : "",
JAS_CAST(long, x));
n = strlen(buf);
if (n + strlen(sbuf) > MAXLINELEN) {
fputs(buf, out);
fputs("\n", out);
buf[0] = '\0';
}
strcat(buf, sbuf);
if (j == jas_matrix_numcols(matrix) - 1) {
fputs(buf, out);
fputs("\n", out);
buf[0] = '\0';
}
}
}
fputs(buf, out);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integer overflow problem.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 70,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void exif_process_TIFF_in_JPEG(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char *CharBuf, size_t length, size_t displacement TSRMLS_DC)
{
unsigned exif_value_2a, offset_of_ifd;
/* set the thumbnail stuff to nothing so we can test to see if they get set up */
if (memcmp(CharBuf, "II", 2) == 0) {
ImageInfo->motorola_intel = 0;
} else if (memcmp(CharBuf, "MM", 2) == 0) {
ImageInfo->motorola_intel = 1;
} else {
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Invalid TIFF alignment marker");
return;
}
/* Check the next two values for correctness. */
exif_value_2a = php_ifd_get16u(CharBuf+2, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
offset_of_ifd = php_ifd_get32u(CharBuf+4, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
if ( exif_value_2a != 0x2a || offset_of_ifd < 0x08) {
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Invalid TIFF start (1)");
return;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PresentationConnection::canSendMessage(ExceptionState& exceptionState) {
if (m_state != WebPresentationConnectionState::Connected) {
throwPresentationDisconnectedError(exceptionState);
return false;
}
return !!presentationClient(getExecutionContext());
}
Commit Message: [Presentation API] Add layout test for connection.close() and fix test failures
Add layout test.
1-UA connection.close() hits NOTREACHED() in PresentationConnection::didChangeState(). Use PresentationConnection::didClose() instead.
BUG=697719
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730123003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455225}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 129,533
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
{
int retval = 0;
const char *s = nd->name->name;
nd->last_type = LAST_ROOT; /* if there are only slashes... */
nd->flags = flags | LOOKUP_JUMPED | LOOKUP_PARENT;
nd->depth = 0;
nd->total_link_count = 0;
if (flags & LOOKUP_ROOT) {
struct dentry *root = nd->root.dentry;
struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
if (*s) {
if (!d_can_lookup(root))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
retval = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
if (retval)
return ERR_PTR(retval);
}
nd->path = nd->root;
nd->inode = inode;
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
rcu_read_lock();
nd->seq = __read_seqcount_begin(&nd->path.dentry->d_seq);
nd->root_seq = nd->seq;
nd->m_seq = read_seqbegin(&mount_lock);
} else {
path_get(&nd->path);
}
return s;
}
nd->root.mnt = NULL;
nd->m_seq = read_seqbegin(&mount_lock);
if (*s == '/') {
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
rcu_read_lock();
set_root_rcu(nd);
nd->seq = nd->root_seq;
} else {
set_root(nd);
path_get(&nd->root);
}
nd->path = nd->root;
} else if (nd->dfd == AT_FDCWD) {
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
struct fs_struct *fs = current->fs;
unsigned seq;
rcu_read_lock();
do {
seq = read_seqcount_begin(&fs->seq);
nd->path = fs->pwd;
nd->seq = __read_seqcount_begin(&nd->path.dentry->d_seq);
} while (read_seqcount_retry(&fs->seq, seq));
} else {
get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &nd->path);
}
} else {
/* Caller must check execute permissions on the starting path component */
struct fd f = fdget_raw(nd->dfd);
struct dentry *dentry;
if (!f.file)
return ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
dentry = f.file->f_path.dentry;
if (*s) {
if (!d_can_lookup(dentry)) {
fdput(f);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
}
}
nd->path = f.file->f_path;
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
rcu_read_lock();
nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
nd->seq = read_seqcount_begin(&nd->path.dentry->d_seq);
} else {
path_get(&nd->path);
nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
}
fdput(f);
return s;
}
nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
if (!(flags & LOOKUP_RCU))
return s;
if (likely(!read_seqcount_retry(&nd->path.dentry->d_seq, nd->seq)))
return s;
if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_ROOT))
nd->root.mnt = NULL;
rcu_read_unlock();
return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
}
Commit Message: vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root
In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount.
In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up
the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down
from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem.
Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given
a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component
the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match
the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole.
Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path
return -ENOENT.
- Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable
from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do
something nasty to the bind mount.
To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path
component to it's next path component.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 43,675
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *choose_init(const char *rootfs)
{
char *retv = NULL;
const char *empty = "",
*tmp;
int ret, env_set = 0;
struct stat mystat;
if (!getenv("PATH")) {
if (setenv("PATH", "/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin", 0))
SYSERROR("Failed to setenv");
env_set = 1;
}
retv = on_path("init.lxc", rootfs);
if (env_set) {
if (unsetenv("PATH"))
SYSERROR("Failed to unsetenv");
}
if (retv)
return retv;
retv = malloc(PATH_MAX);
if (!retv)
return NULL;
if (rootfs)
tmp = rootfs;
else
tmp = empty;
ret = snprintf(retv, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s/%s", tmp, SBINDIR, "/init.lxc");
if (ret < 0 || ret >= PATH_MAX) {
ERROR("pathname too long");
goto out1;
}
ret = stat(retv, &mystat);
if (ret == 0)
return retv;
ret = snprintf(retv, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s/%s", tmp, LXCINITDIR, "/lxc/lxc-init");
if (ret < 0 || ret >= PATH_MAX) {
ERROR("pathname too long");
goto out1;
}
ret = stat(retv, &mystat);
if (ret == 0)
return retv;
ret = snprintf(retv, PATH_MAX, "%s/usr/lib/lxc/lxc-init", tmp);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= PATH_MAX) {
ERROR("pathname too long");
goto out1;
}
ret = stat(retv, &mystat);
if (ret == 0)
return retv;
ret = snprintf(retv, PATH_MAX, "%s/sbin/lxc-init", tmp);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= PATH_MAX) {
ERROR("pathname too long");
goto out1;
}
ret = stat(retv, &mystat);
if (ret == 0)
return retv;
/*
* Last resort, look for the statically compiled init.lxc which we
* hopefully bind-mounted in.
* If we are called during container setup, and we get to this point,
* then the init.lxc.static from the host will need to be bind-mounted
* in. So we return NULL here to indicate that.
*/
if (rootfs)
goto out1;
ret = snprintf(retv, PATH_MAX, "/init.lxc.static");
if (ret < 0 || ret >= PATH_MAX) {
WARN("Nonsense - name /lxc.init.static too long");
goto out1;
}
ret = stat(retv, &mystat);
if (ret == 0)
return retv;
out1:
free(retv);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 44,667
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ShellSurface::IsResizing() const {
if (!resizer_)
return false;
return resizer_->details().bounds_change &
ash::WindowResizer::kBoundsChange_Resizes;
}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 120,075
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pmcraid_get_dump(struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance)
{
pmcraid_info("%s is not yet implemented\n", __func__);
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 26,445
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct phy_device *mdiobus_scan(struct mii_bus *bus, int addr)
{
struct phy_device *phydev;
int err;
phydev = get_phy_device(bus, addr, false);
if (IS_ERR(phydev))
return phydev;
/*
* For DT, see if the auto-probed phy has a correspoding child
* in the bus node, and set the of_node pointer in this case.
*/
of_mdiobus_link_mdiodev(bus, &phydev->mdio);
err = phy_device_register(phydev);
if (err) {
phy_device_free(phydev);
return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
}
return phydev;
}
Commit Message: mdio_bus: Fix use-after-free on device_register fails
KASAN has found use-after-free in fixed_mdio_bus_init,
commit 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call
put_device on device_register() failure") call put_device()
while device_register() fails,give up the last reference
to the device and allow mdiobus_release to be executed
,kfreeing the bus. However in most drives, mdiobus_free
be called to free the bus while mdiobus_register fails.
use-after-free occurs when access bus again, this patch
revert it to let mdiobus_free free the bus.
KASAN report details as below:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881dc824d78 by task syz-executor.0/3524
CPU: 1 PID: 3524 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x65/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x283/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f6215c19c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f6215c19c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f6215c1a6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
Allocated by task 3524:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:496
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:740 [inline]
mdiobus_alloc_size+0x54/0x1b0 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:143
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x163/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 3524:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:458
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1409 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1436 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2986 [inline]
kfree+0xe1/0x270 mm/slub.c:3938
device_release+0x78/0x200 drivers/base/core.c:919
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:662 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:691 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:67 [inline]
kobject_put+0x146/0x240 lib/kobject.c:708
put_device+0x1c/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:2060
__mdiobus_register+0x483/0x560 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:382
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x26b/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881dc824c80
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 248 bytes inside of
2048-byte region [ffff8881dc824c80, ffff8881dc825480)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0007720800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881f6c02800 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x2fffc0000010200(slab|head)
raw: 02fffc0000010200 0000000000000000 0000000500000001 ffff8881f6c02800
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8881dc824c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8881dc824c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8881dc824d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8881dc824d80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8881dc824e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call put_device on device_register() failure")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 89,651
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void destroy_pid_t(gpointer data) {
g_free(data);
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer size checking
Yes, this means we've re-introduced CVE-2005-3534. Sigh.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,426
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IndexedDBDatabase::DeleteRange(
IndexedDBTransaction* transaction,
int64_t object_store_id,
std::unique_ptr<IndexedDBKeyRange> key_range,
scoped_refptr<IndexedDBCallbacks> callbacks) {
DCHECK(transaction);
IDB_TRACE1("IndexedDBDatabase::DeleteRange", "txn.id", transaction->id());
DCHECK_NE(transaction->mode(), blink::kWebIDBTransactionModeReadOnly);
if (!ValidateObjectStoreId(object_store_id))
return;
transaction->ScheduleTask(
base::BindOnce(&IndexedDBDatabase::DeleteRangeOperation, this,
object_store_id, std::move(key_range), callbacks));
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 155,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BlockPainter::Paint(const PaintInfo& paint_info,
const LayoutPoint& paint_offset) {
AdjustPaintOffsetScope adjustment(layout_block_, paint_info, paint_offset);
auto adjusted_paint_offset = adjustment.AdjustedPaintOffset();
auto& local_paint_info = adjustment.MutablePaintInfo();
if (!IntersectsPaintRect(local_paint_info, adjusted_paint_offset))
return;
PaintPhase original_phase = local_paint_info.phase;
ContentsClipBehavior contents_clip_behavior = kForceContentsClip;
if (layout_block_.ShouldClipOverflow() && !layout_block_.HasControlClip() &&
!layout_block_.ShouldPaintCarets())
contents_clip_behavior = kSkipContentsClipIfPossible;
if (original_phase == PaintPhase::kOutline) {
local_paint_info.phase = PaintPhase::kDescendantOutlinesOnly;
} else if (ShouldPaintSelfBlockBackground(original_phase)) {
local_paint_info.phase = PaintPhase::kSelfBlockBackgroundOnly;
layout_block_.PaintObject(local_paint_info, adjusted_paint_offset);
if (ShouldPaintDescendantBlockBackgrounds(original_phase))
local_paint_info.phase = PaintPhase::kDescendantBlockBackgroundsOnly;
}
if (original_phase != PaintPhase::kSelfBlockBackgroundOnly &&
original_phase != PaintPhase::kSelfOutlineOnly) {
base::Optional<BoxClipper> clipper;
if (!layout_block_.IsSVGForeignObject() ||
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV175Enabled()) {
clipper.emplace(layout_block_, local_paint_info, adjusted_paint_offset,
contents_clip_behavior);
}
layout_block_.PaintObject(local_paint_info, adjusted_paint_offset);
}
if (ShouldPaintSelfOutline(original_phase)) {
local_paint_info.phase = PaintPhase::kSelfOutlineOnly;
layout_block_.PaintObject(local_paint_info, adjusted_paint_offset);
}
local_paint_info.phase = original_phase;
PaintOverflowControlsIfNeeded(local_paint_info, adjusted_paint_offset);
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,404
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
const EVP_MD *type;
unsigned char *buf_in=NULL;
int ret= -1,i,inl;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
i=OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm);
type=EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(i));
if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,type, NULL))
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
if (buf_in == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)buf_in,inl);
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl);
OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx,(unsigned char *)signature->data,
(unsigned int)signature->length,pkey) <= 0)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
/* we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked
* public information */
/* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */
ret=1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 1
| 164,792
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rgb2cmyk(fz_context *ctx, fz_color_converter *cc, float *dv, const float *sv)
{
float c = 1 - sv[0];
float m = 1 - sv[1];
float y = 1 - sv[2];
float k = fz_min(c, fz_min(m, y));
dv[0] = c - k;
dv[1] = m - k;
dv[2] = y - k;
dv[3] = k;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sctp_v4_pf_init(void)
{
/* Initialize the SCTP specific PF functions. */
sctp_register_pf(&sctp_pf_inet, PF_INET);
sctp_register_af(&sctp_af_inet);
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 42,945
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cac_pin_cmd(sc_card_t *card, struct sc_pin_cmd_data *data, int *tries_left)
{
/* CAC, like PIV needs Extra validation of (new) PIN during
* a PIN change request, to ensure it's not outside the
* FIPS 201 4.1.6.1 (numeric only) and * FIPS 140-2
* (6 character minimum) requirements.
*/
struct sc_card_driver *iso_drv = sc_get_iso7816_driver();
if (data->cmd == SC_PIN_CMD_CHANGE) {
int i = 0;
if (data->pin2.len < 6) {
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_PIN_LENGTH;
}
for(i=0; i < data->pin2.len; ++i) {
if (!isdigit(data->pin2.data[i])) {
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
}
}
}
return iso_drv->ops->pin_cmd(card, data, tries_left);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,253
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~RelayCreateTemporary() {
if (file_handle_ != base::kInvalidPlatformFileValue)
base::FileUtilProxy::Close(message_loop_proxy_, file_handle_, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 97,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ext4_find_delalloc_cluster(struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t lblk)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
ext4_lblk_t lblk_start, lblk_end;
lblk_start = EXT4_LBLK_CMASK(sbi, lblk);
lblk_end = lblk_start + sbi->s_cluster_ratio - 1;
return ext4_find_delalloc_range(inode, lblk_start, lblk_end);
}
Commit Message: ext4: allocate entire range in zero range
Currently there is a bug in zero range code which causes zero range
calls to only allocate block aligned portion of the range, while
ignoring the rest in some cases.
In some cases, namely if the end of the range is past i_size, we do
attempt to preallocate the last nonaligned block. However this might
cause kernel to BUG() in some carefully designed zero range requests
on setups where page size > block size.
Fix this problem by first preallocating the entire range, including
the nonaligned edges and converting the written extents to unwritten
in the next step. This approach will also give us the advantage of
having the range to be as linearly contiguous as possible.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 44,895
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void scsi_dma_restart_cb(void *opaque, int running, int reason)
{
SCSIDiskState *s = opaque;
if (!running)
return;
if (!s->bh) {
s->bh = qemu_bh_new(scsi_dma_restart_bh, s);
qemu_bh_schedule(s->bh);
}
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 41,261
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virDomainSendKey(virDomainPtr domain,
unsigned int codeset,
unsigned int holdtime,
unsigned int *keycodes,
int nkeycodes,
unsigned int flags)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "codeset=%u, holdtime=%u, nkeycodes=%u, flags=%x",
codeset, holdtime, nkeycodes, flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
conn = domain->conn;
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(keycodes, error);
virCheckPositiveArgGoto(nkeycodes, error);
if (nkeycodes > VIR_DOMAIN_SEND_KEY_MAX_KEYS) {
virReportInvalidArg(nkeycodes,
_("nkeycodes must be <= %d"),
VIR_DOMAIN_SEND_KEY_MAX_KEYS);
goto error;
}
if (conn->driver->domainSendKey) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainSendKey(domain, codeset, holdtime,
keycodes, nkeycodes, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 93,910
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SocketStreamDispatcherHost::OnSentData(net::SocketStream* socket,
int amount_sent) {
int socket_id = SocketStreamHost::SocketIdFromSocketStream(socket);
DVLOG(1) << "SocketStreamDispatcherHost::OnSentData socket_id=" << socket_id
<< " amount_sent=" << amount_sent;
if (socket_id == content::kNoSocketId) {
LOG(ERROR) << "NoSocketId in OnSentData";
return;
}
if (!Send(new SocketStreamMsg_SentData(socket_id, amount_sent))) {
LOG(ERROR) << "SocketStreamMsg_SentData failed.";
DeleteSocketStreamHost(socket_id);
}
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 107,928
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::~UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS() {}
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 110,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static vpx_codec_err_t vp8_get_last_ref_frame(vpx_codec_alg_priv_t *ctx,
va_list args)
{
int *ref_info = va_arg(args, int *);
if (ref_info && !ctx->yv12_frame_buffers.use_frame_threads)
{
VP8D_COMP *pbi = (VP8D_COMP *)ctx->yv12_frame_buffers.pbi[0];
VP8_COMMON *oci = &pbi->common;
*ref_info =
(vp8dx_references_buffer( oci, ALTREF_FRAME )?VP8_ALTR_FRAME:0) |
(vp8dx_references_buffer( oci, GOLDEN_FRAME )?VP8_GOLD_FRAME:0) |
(vp8dx_references_buffer( oci, LAST_FRAME )?VP8_LAST_FRAME:0);
return VPX_CODEC_OK;
}
else
return VPX_CODEC_INVALID_PARAM;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE | libvpx: Cherry-pick 0f42d1f from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp8: fix decoder crash with invalid leading keyframes
decoding the same invalid keyframe twice would result in a crash as the
second time through the decoder would be assumed to have been
initialized as there was no resolution change. in this case the
resolution was itself invalid (0x6), but vp8_peek_si() was only failing
in the case of 0x0.
invalid-vp80-00-comprehensive-018.ivf.2kf_0x6.ivf tests this case by
duplicating the first keyframe and additionally adds a valid one to
ensure decoding can resume without error.
Bug: 30593765
Change-Id: I0de85f5a5eb5c0a5605230faf20c042b69aea507
(cherry picked from commit fc0466b695dce03e10390101844caa374848d903)
(cherry picked from commit 1114575245cb9d2f108749f916c76549524f5136)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 157,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlCtxtResetPush(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const char *chunk,
int size, const char *filename, const char *encoding)
{
xmlParserInputPtr inputStream;
xmlParserInputBufferPtr buf;
xmlCharEncoding enc = XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE;
if (ctxt == NULL)
return(1);
if ((encoding == NULL) && (chunk != NULL) && (size >= 4))
enc = xmlDetectCharEncoding((const xmlChar *) chunk, size);
buf = xmlAllocParserInputBuffer(enc);
if (buf == NULL)
return(1);
if (ctxt == NULL) {
xmlFreeParserInputBuffer(buf);
return(1);
}
xmlCtxtReset(ctxt);
if (ctxt->pushTab == NULL) {
ctxt->pushTab = (void **) xmlMalloc(ctxt->nameMax * 3 *
sizeof(xmlChar *));
if (ctxt->pushTab == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFreeParserInputBuffer(buf);
return(1);
}
}
if (filename == NULL) {
ctxt->directory = NULL;
} else {
ctxt->directory = xmlParserGetDirectory(filename);
}
inputStream = xmlNewInputStream(ctxt);
if (inputStream == NULL) {
xmlFreeParserInputBuffer(buf);
return(1);
}
if (filename == NULL)
inputStream->filename = NULL;
else
inputStream->filename = (char *)
xmlCanonicPath((const xmlChar *) filename);
inputStream->buf = buf;
xmlBufResetInput(buf->buffer, inputStream);
inputPush(ctxt, inputStream);
if ((size > 0) && (chunk != NULL) && (ctxt->input != NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->buf != NULL)) {
size_t base = xmlBufGetInputBase(ctxt->input->buf->buffer, ctxt->input);
size_t cur = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base;
xmlParserInputBufferPush(ctxt->input->buf, size, chunk);
xmlBufSetInputBaseCur(ctxt->input->buf->buffer, ctxt->input, base, cur);
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "PP: pushed %d\n", size);
#endif
}
if (encoding != NULL) {
xmlCharEncodingHandlerPtr hdlr;
if (ctxt->encoding != NULL)
xmlFree((xmlChar *) ctxt->encoding);
ctxt->encoding = xmlStrdup((const xmlChar *) encoding);
hdlr = xmlFindCharEncodingHandler(encoding);
if (hdlr != NULL) {
xmlSwitchToEncoding(ctxt, hdlr);
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING,
"Unsupported encoding %s\n", BAD_CAST encoding);
}
} else if (enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE) {
xmlSwitchEncoding(ctxt, enc);
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 59,425
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t SampleTable::setTimeToSampleParams(
off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mTimeToSample != NULL || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mTimeToSampleCount = U32_AT(&header[4]);
uint64_t allocSize = (uint64_t)mTimeToSampleCount * 2 * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (allocSize > UINT32_MAX) {
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mTimeToSample = new (std::nothrow) uint32_t[mTimeToSampleCount * 2];
if (!mTimeToSample)
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
size_t size = sizeof(uint32_t) * mTimeToSampleCount * 2;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, mTimeToSample, size) < (ssize_t)size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mTimeToSampleCount * 2; ++i) {
mTimeToSample[i] = ntohl(mTimeToSample[i]);
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Resolve merge conflict when cp'ing ag/931301 to mnc-mr1-release
Change-Id: I079d1db2d30d126f8aed348bd62451acf741037d
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 174,173
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_task_root(struct task_struct *task, struct path *root)
{
int result = -ENOENT;
task_lock(task);
if (task->fs) {
get_fs_root(task->fs, root);
result = 0;
}
task_unlock(task);
return result;
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,811
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static AttachedClientHosts* GetInstance() {
return Singleton<AttachedClientHosts>::get();
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,236
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_lock_release(void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_lockdata *data = calldata;
dprintk("%s: begin!\n", __func__);
nfs_free_seqid(data->arg.open_seqid);
if (data->cancelled != 0) {
struct rpc_task *task;
task = nfs4_do_unlck(&data->fl, data->ctx, data->lsp,
data->arg.lock_seqid);
if (!IS_ERR(task))
rpc_put_task(task);
dprintk("%s: cancelling lock!\n", __func__);
} else
nfs_free_seqid(data->arg.lock_seqid);
nfs4_put_lock_state(data->lsp);
put_nfs_open_context(data->ctx);
kfree(data);
dprintk("%s: done!\n", __func__);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::LogConsoleMessageToAll(const std::string& message) {
HostNotifier host_notifier;
AddAllAssociatedHostsToNotifier(&host_notifier);
host_notifier.SendLogMessage(message);
}
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 124,143
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WrongHWIDScreenActor* OobeUI::GetWrongHWIDScreenActor() {
return wrong_hwid_screen_actor_;
}
Commit Message: One polymer_config.js to rule them all.
R=michaelpg@chromium.org,fukino@chromium.org,mfoltz@chromium.org
BUG=425626
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1224783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#337882}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,683
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::InvokeLoadAlgorithm() {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "invokeLoadAlgorithm(" << (void*)this << ")";
StopPeriodicTimers();
load_timer_.Stop();
CancelDeferredLoad();
pending_action_flags_ &= ~kLoadMediaResource;
sent_stalled_event_ = false;
have_fired_loaded_data_ = false;
display_mode_ = kUnknown;
autoplay_policy_->StopAutoplayMutedWhenVisible();
load_state_ = kWaitingForSource;
current_source_node_ = nullptr;
if (play_promise_resolve_task_handle_.IsActive() &&
!ScriptForbiddenScope::IsScriptForbidden()) {
play_promise_resolve_task_handle_.Cancel();
ResolveScheduledPlayPromises();
}
if (play_promise_reject_task_handle_.IsActive() &&
!ScriptForbiddenScope::IsScriptForbidden()) {
play_promise_reject_task_handle_.Cancel();
RejectScheduledPlayPromises();
}
CancelPendingEventsAndCallbacks();
if (network_state_ == kNetworkLoading || network_state_ == kNetworkIdle)
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::abort);
ResetMediaPlayerAndMediaSource();
if (network_state_ != kNetworkEmpty) {
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::emptied);
SetNetworkState(kNetworkEmpty);
ForgetResourceSpecificTracks();
ready_state_ = kHaveNothing;
ready_state_maximum_ = kHaveNothing;
DCHECK(!paused_ || play_promise_resolvers_.IsEmpty());
if (!paused_) {
paused_ = true;
RecordPlayPromiseRejected(PlayPromiseRejectReason::kInterruptedByLoad);
RejectPlayPromises(kAbortError,
"The play() request was interrupted by a new load "
"request. https://goo.gl/LdLk22");
}
seeking_ = false;
SetOfficialPlaybackPosition(0);
ScheduleTimeupdateEvent(false);
GetCueTimeline().UpdateActiveCues(0);
} else if (!paused_) {
UseCounter::Count(GetDocument(),
WebFeature::kHTMLMediaElementLoadNetworkEmptyNotPaused);
}
setPlaybackRate(defaultPlaybackRate());
error_ = nullptr;
can_autoplay_ = true;
InvokeResourceSelectionAlgorithm();
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 154,126
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebGL2RenderingContextBase::ValidateReadPixelsFormatAndType(
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
DOMArrayBufferView* buffer) {
switch (format) {
case GL_RED:
case GL_RED_INTEGER:
case GL_RG:
case GL_RG_INTEGER:
case GL_RGB:
case GL_RGB_INTEGER:
case GL_RGBA:
case GL_RGBA_INTEGER:
case GL_LUMINANCE_ALPHA:
case GL_LUMINANCE:
case GL_ALPHA:
break;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "readPixels", "invalid format");
return false;
}
switch (type) {
case GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE:
if (buffer && buffer->GetType() != DOMArrayBufferView::kTypeUint8) {
SynthesizeGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "readPixels",
"type UNSIGNED_BYTE but ArrayBufferView not Uint8Array");
return false;
}
return true;
case GL_BYTE:
if (buffer && buffer->GetType() != DOMArrayBufferView::kTypeInt8) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "readPixels",
"type BYTE but ArrayBufferView not Int8Array");
return false;
}
return true;
case GL_HALF_FLOAT:
if (buffer && buffer->GetType() != DOMArrayBufferView::kTypeUint16) {
SynthesizeGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "readPixels",
"type HALF_FLOAT but ArrayBufferView not Uint16Array");
return false;
}
return true;
case GL_FLOAT:
if (buffer && buffer->GetType() != DOMArrayBufferView::kTypeFloat32) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "readPixels",
"type FLOAT but ArrayBufferView not Float32Array");
return false;
}
return true;
case GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT:
case GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT_5_6_5:
case GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT_4_4_4_4:
case GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT_5_5_5_1:
if (buffer && buffer->GetType() != DOMArrayBufferView::kTypeUint16) {
SynthesizeGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "readPixels",
"type UNSIGNED_SHORT but ArrayBufferView not Uint16Array");
return false;
}
return true;
case GL_SHORT:
if (buffer && buffer->GetType() != DOMArrayBufferView::kTypeInt16) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "readPixels",
"type SHORT but ArrayBufferView not Int16Array");
return false;
}
return true;
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT:
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_2_10_10_10_REV:
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_10F_11F_11F_REV:
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_5_9_9_9_REV:
if (buffer && buffer->GetType() != DOMArrayBufferView::kTypeUint32) {
SynthesizeGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "readPixels",
"type UNSIGNED_INT but ArrayBufferView not Uint32Array");
return false;
}
return true;
case GL_INT:
if (buffer && buffer->GetType() != DOMArrayBufferView::kTypeInt32) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "readPixels",
"type INT but ArrayBufferView not Int32Array");
return false;
}
return true;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "readPixels", "invalid type");
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,356
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int regs_query_register_offset(const char *name)
{
const struct pt_regs_offset *roff;
for (roff = regoffset_table; roff->name != NULL; roff++)
if (!strcmp(roff->name, name))
return roff->offset;
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,335
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InputConnectionImpl::SetComposingText(
const base::string16& text,
int new_cursor_pos,
const base::Optional<gfx::Range>& new_selection_range) {
new_cursor_pos += text.length() - 1;
StartStateUpdateTimer();
const int selection_start = new_selection_range
? new_selection_range.value().start()
: new_cursor_pos;
const int selection_end =
new_selection_range ? new_selection_range.value().end() : new_cursor_pos;
std::string error;
if (!ime_engine_->SetComposition(
input_context_id_, base::UTF16ToUTF8(text).c_str(), selection_start,
selection_end, new_cursor_pos,
std::vector<input_method::InputMethodEngineBase::SegmentInfo>(),
&error)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "SetComposingText failed: pos=" << new_cursor_pos
<< ", error=\"" << error << "\"";
return;
}
composing_text_ = text;
}
Commit Message: Clear |composing_text_| after CommitText() is called.
|composing_text_| of InputConnectionImpl should be cleared after
CommitText() is called. Otherwise, FinishComposingText() will commit the
same text twice.
Bug: 899736
Test: unit_tests
Change-Id: Idb22d968ffe95d946789fbe62454e8e79cb0b384
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1304773
Commit-Queue: Yusuke Sato <yusukes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yusuke Sato <yusukes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#603518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,945
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IOThread::Globals::~Globals() {}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,532
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int local_set_xattrat(int dirfd, const char *path, FsCred *credp)
{
int err;
if (credp->fc_uid != -1) {
uint32_t tmp_uid = cpu_to_le32(credp->fc_uid);
err = fsetxattrat_nofollow(dirfd, path, "user.virtfs.uid", &tmp_uid,
sizeof(uid_t), 0);
if (err) {
return err;
}
}
if (credp->fc_gid != -1) {
uint32_t tmp_gid = cpu_to_le32(credp->fc_gid);
err = fsetxattrat_nofollow(dirfd, path, "user.virtfs.gid", &tmp_gid,
sizeof(gid_t), 0);
if (err) {
return err;
}
}
if (credp->fc_mode != -1) {
uint32_t tmp_mode = cpu_to_le32(credp->fc_mode);
err = fsetxattrat_nofollow(dirfd, path, "user.virtfs.mode", &tmp_mode,
sizeof(mode_t), 0);
if (err) {
return err;
}
}
if (credp->fc_rdev != -1) {
uint64_t tmp_rdev = cpu_to_le64(credp->fc_rdev);
err = fsetxattrat_nofollow(dirfd, path, "user.virtfs.rdev", &tmp_rdev,
sizeof(dev_t), 0);
if (err) {
return err;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 17,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void busy_poll_stop(struct napi_struct *napi, void *have_poll_lock)
{
int rc;
/* Busy polling means there is a high chance device driver hard irq
* could not grab NAPI_STATE_SCHED, and that NAPI_STATE_MISSED was
* set in napi_schedule_prep().
* Since we are about to call napi->poll() once more, we can safely
* clear NAPI_STATE_MISSED.
*
* Note: x86 could use a single "lock and ..." instruction
* to perform these two clear_bit()
*/
clear_bit(NAPI_STATE_MISSED, &napi->state);
clear_bit(NAPI_STATE_IN_BUSY_POLL, &napi->state);
local_bh_disable();
/* All we really want here is to re-enable device interrupts.
* Ideally, a new ndo_busy_poll_stop() could avoid another round.
*/
rc = napi->poll(napi, BUSY_POLL_BUDGET);
trace_napi_poll(napi, rc, BUSY_POLL_BUDGET);
netpoll_poll_unlock(have_poll_lock);
if (rc == BUSY_POLL_BUDGET)
__napi_schedule(napi);
local_bh_enable();
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 93,364
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPixelCacheIndexes(
CacheInfo *magick_restrict cache_info,NexusInfo *magick_restrict nexus_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickOffsetType
count,
offset;
MagickSizeType
extent,
length;
register IndexPacket
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
y;
size_t
rows;
if (cache_info->active_index_channel == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
if (nexus_info->authentic_pixel_cache != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
offset=(MagickOffsetType) nexus_info->region.y*cache_info->columns+
nexus_info->region.x;
length=(MagickSizeType) nexus_info->region.width*sizeof(IndexPacket);
rows=nexus_info->region.height;
extent=length*rows;
q=nexus_info->indexes;
y=0;
switch (cache_info->type)
{
case MemoryCache:
case MapCache:
{
register IndexPacket
*magick_restrict p;
/*
Read indexes from memory.
*/
if ((cache_info->columns == nexus_info->region.width) &&
(extent == (MagickSizeType) ((size_t) extent)))
{
length=extent;
rows=1UL;
}
p=cache_info->indexes+offset;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) rows; y++)
{
(void) memcpy(q,p,(size_t) length);
p+=cache_info->columns;
q+=nexus_info->region.width;
}
break;
}
case DiskCache:
{
/*
Read indexes from disk.
*/
LockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->file_semaphore);
if (OpenPixelCacheOnDisk(cache_info,IOMode) == MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile",
cache_info->cache_filename);
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->file_semaphore);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if ((cache_info->columns == nexus_info->region.width) &&
(extent <= MagickMaxBufferExtent))
{
length=extent;
rows=1UL;
}
extent=(MagickSizeType) cache_info->columns*cache_info->rows;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) rows; y++)
{
count=ReadPixelCacheRegion(cache_info,cache_info->offset+extent*
sizeof(PixelPacket)+offset*sizeof(*q),length,(unsigned char *) q);
if ((MagickSizeType) count < length)
break;
offset+=cache_info->columns;
q+=nexus_info->region.width;
}
if (IsFileDescriptorLimitExceeded() != MagickFalse)
(void) ClosePixelCacheOnDisk(cache_info);
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->file_semaphore);
break;
}
case DistributedCache:
{
RectangleInfo
region;
/*
Read indexes from distributed cache.
*/
LockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->file_semaphore);
region=nexus_info->region;
if ((cache_info->columns != nexus_info->region.width) ||
(extent > MagickMaxBufferExtent))
region.height=1UL;
else
{
length=extent;
rows=1UL;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) rows; y++)
{
count=ReadDistributePixelCacheIndexes((DistributeCacheInfo *)
cache_info->server_info,®ion,length,(unsigned char *) q);
if (count != (MagickOffsetType) length)
break;
q+=nexus_info->region.width;
region.y++;
}
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->file_semaphore);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (y < (ssize_t) rows)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CacheError,"UnableToReadPixelCache",
cache_info->cache_filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if ((cache_info->debug != MagickFalse) &&
(CacheTick(nexus_info->region.y,cache_info->rows) != MagickFalse))
(void) LogMagickEvent(CacheEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"%s[%.20gx%.20g%+.20g%+.20g]",cache_info->filename,(double)
nexus_info->region.width,(double) nexus_info->region.height,(double)
nexus_info->region.x,(double) nexus_info->region.y);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=28946
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 73,501
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::AdjustUtilityServiceProcessCommandLine(
const service_manager::Identity& identity,
base::CommandLine* command_line) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
bool copy_switches = false;
if (identity.name() == ash::mojom::kServiceName) {
copy_switches = true;
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kMessageLoopTypeUi);
}
if (ash_service_registry::IsAshRelatedServiceName(identity.name())) {
copy_switches = true;
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kMashServiceName,
identity.name());
}
if (identity.name() == viz::mojom::kVizServiceName)
content::GpuDataManager::GetInstance()->AppendGpuCommandLine(command_line);
if (copy_switches) {
for (const auto& sw : base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitches())
command_line->AppendSwitchNative(sw.first, sw.second);
}
#endif
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (identity.name() == video_capture::mojom::kServiceName ||
identity.name() == audio::mojom::kServiceName)
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kMessageLoopTypeUi);
#endif
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 152,362
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void webkitWebViewBaseSetTooltipText(WebKitWebViewBase* webViewBase, const char* tooltip)
{
WebKitWebViewBasePrivate* priv = webViewBase->priv;
if (tooltip && tooltip[0] != '\0') {
priv->tooltipText = tooltip;
gtk_widget_set_has_tooltip(GTK_WIDGET(webViewBase), TRUE);
} else {
priv->tooltipText = "";
gtk_widget_set_has_tooltip(GTK_WIDGET(webViewBase), FALSE);
}
gtk_widget_trigger_tooltip_query(GTK_WIDGET(webViewBase));
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 108,897
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: grub_ext2_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
int (*hook) (const char *filename,
enum grub_fshelp_filetype filetype,
grub_fshelp_node_t node,
void *closure),
void *closure)
{
unsigned int fpos = 0;
struct grub_fshelp_node *diro = (struct grub_fshelp_node *) dir;
if (! diro->inode_read)
{
grub_ext2_read_inode (diro->data, diro->ino, &diro->inode);
if (grub_errno)
return 0;
}
/* Search the file. */
if (hook)
while (fpos < grub_le_to_cpu32 (diro->inode.size))
{
struct ext2_dirent dirent;
grub_ext2_read_file (diro, NULL, NULL, 0, fpos, sizeof (dirent),
(char *) &dirent);
if (grub_errno)
return 0;
if (dirent.direntlen == 0)
return 0;
if (dirent.namelen != 0)
{
#ifndef _MSC_VER
char filename[dirent.namelen + 1];
#else
char * filename = grub_malloc (dirent.namelen + 1);
#endif
struct grub_fshelp_node *fdiro;
enum grub_fshelp_filetype type = GRUB_FSHELP_UNKNOWN;
grub_ext2_read_file (diro, 0, 0, 0,
fpos + sizeof (struct ext2_dirent),
dirent.namelen, filename);
if (grub_errno)
return 0;
fdiro = grub_malloc (sizeof (struct grub_fshelp_node));
if (! fdiro)
return 0;
fdiro->data = diro->data;
fdiro->ino = grub_le_to_cpu32 (dirent.inode);
filename[dirent.namelen] = '\0';
if (dirent.filetype != FILETYPE_UNKNOWN)
{
fdiro->inode_read = 0;
if (dirent.filetype == FILETYPE_DIRECTORY)
type = GRUB_FSHELP_DIR;
else if (dirent.filetype == FILETYPE_SYMLINK)
type = GRUB_FSHELP_SYMLINK;
else if (dirent.filetype == FILETYPE_REG)
type = GRUB_FSHELP_REG;
}
else
{
/* The filetype can not be read from the dirent, read
the inode to get more information. */
grub_ext2_read_inode (diro->data,
grub_le_to_cpu32 (dirent.inode),
&fdiro->inode);
if (grub_errno)
{
grub_free (fdiro);
return 0;
}
fdiro->inode_read = 1;
if ((grub_le_to_cpu16 (fdiro->inode.mode)
& FILETYPE_INO_MASK) == FILETYPE_INO_DIRECTORY)
type = GRUB_FSHELP_DIR;
else if ((grub_le_to_cpu16 (fdiro->inode.mode)
& FILETYPE_INO_MASK) == FILETYPE_INO_SYMLINK)
type = GRUB_FSHELP_SYMLINK;
else if ((grub_le_to_cpu16 (fdiro->inode.mode)
& FILETYPE_INO_MASK) == FILETYPE_INO_REG)
type = GRUB_FSHELP_REG;
}
if (hook (filename, type, fdiro, closure))
return 1;
}
fpos += grub_le_to_cpu16 (dirent.direntlen);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix ext2 buffer overflow in r2_sbu_grub_memmove
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 168,082
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int bnep_net_set_mac_addr(struct net_device *dev, void *arg)
{
BT_DBG("%s", dev->name);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool brcmf_cfg80211_vif_event_armed(struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg)
{
struct brcmf_cfg80211_vif_event *event = &cfg->vif_event;
bool armed;
spin_lock(&event->vif_event_lock);
armed = event->vif != NULL;
spin_unlock(&event->vif_event_lock);
return armed;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,046
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static gboolean webkitWebViewBaseScrollEvent(GtkWidget* widget, GdkEventScroll* event)
{
WebKitWebViewBase* webViewBase = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW_BASE(widget);
WebKitWebViewBasePrivate* priv = webViewBase->priv;
priv->pageProxy->handleWheelEvent(NativeWebWheelEvent(reinterpret_cast<GdkEvent*>(event)));
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 108,895
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u)
{
const SSL_CIPHER *ciph = ssl3_get_cipher(u);
if (ciph != NULL)
{
if (ciph->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
return NULL;
}
return ciph;
}
Commit Message: Free up s->d1->buffered_app_data.q properly.
PR#3286
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 46,108
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SandboxIPCHandler::HandleMakeSharedMemorySegment(
int fd,
base::PickleIterator iter,
const std::vector<base::ScopedFD>& fds) {
base::SharedMemoryCreateOptions options;
uint32_t size;
if (!iter.ReadUInt32(&size))
return;
options.size = size;
if (!iter.ReadBool(&options.executable))
return;
int shm_fd = -1;
base::SharedMemory shm;
if (shm.Create(options))
shm_fd = shm.handle().GetHandle();
base::Pickle reply;
SendRendererReply(fds, reply, shm_fd);
}
Commit Message: Serialize struct tm in a safe way.
BUG=765512
Change-Id: If235b8677eb527be2ac0fe621fc210e4116a7566
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/679441
Commit-Queue: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 150,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: G_DEFINE_TYPE (RSFilter, rs_filter, G_TYPE_OBJECT)
enum {
CHANGED_SIGNAL,
LAST_SIGNAL
};
Commit Message: Fixes insecure use of temporary file (CVE-2014-4978).
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 74,672
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ieee80211_tx_h_select_key(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
struct ieee80211_key *key;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(tx->skb);
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)tx->skb->data;
if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_DONT_ENCRYPT))
tx->key = NULL;
else if (tx->sta &&
(key = rcu_dereference(tx->sta->ptk[tx->sta->ptk_idx])))
tx->key = key;
else if (ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control) &&
is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) &&
ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(hdr) &&
(key = rcu_dereference(tx->sdata->default_mgmt_key)))
tx->key = key;
else if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) &&
(key = rcu_dereference(tx->sdata->default_multicast_key)))
tx->key = key;
else if (!is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) &&
(key = rcu_dereference(tx->sdata->default_unicast_key)))
tx->key = key;
else if (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_INJECTED)
tx->key = NULL;
else if (!tx->sdata->drop_unencrypted)
tx->key = NULL;
else if (tx->skb->protocol == tx->sdata->control_port_protocol)
tx->key = NULL;
else if (ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(hdr) &&
!(ieee80211_is_action(hdr->frame_control) &&
tx->sta && test_sta_flag(tx->sta, WLAN_STA_MFP)))
tx->key = NULL;
else if (ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control) &&
!ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(hdr))
tx->key = NULL;
else {
I802_DEBUG_INC(tx->local->tx_handlers_drop_unencrypted);
return TX_DROP;
}
if (tx->key) {
bool skip_hw = false;
tx->key->tx_rx_count++;
/* TODO: add threshold stuff again */
switch (tx->key->conf.cipher) {
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40:
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104:
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
tx->key = NULL;
break;
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control) &&
!ieee80211_use_mfp(hdr->frame_control, tx->sta,
tx->skb))
tx->key = NULL;
else
skip_hw = (tx->key->conf.flags &
IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_SW_MGMT_TX) &&
ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control);
break;
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
tx->key = NULL;
break;
}
if (unlikely(tx->key && tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_TAINTED &&
!ieee80211_is_deauth(hdr->frame_control)))
return TX_DROP;
if (!skip_hw && tx->key &&
tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE)
info->control.hw_key = &tx->key->conf;
}
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: mac80211: fix fragmentation code, particularly for encryption
The "new" fragmentation code (since my rewrite almost 5 years ago)
erroneously sets skb->len rather than using skb_trim() to adjust
the length of the first fragment after copying out all the others.
This leaves the skb tail pointer pointing to after where the data
originally ended, and thus causes the encryption MIC to be written
at that point, rather than where it belongs: immediately after the
data.
The impact of this is that if software encryption is done, then
a) encryption doesn't work for the first fragment, the connection
becomes unusable as the first fragment will never be properly
verified at the receiver, the MIC is practically guaranteed to
be wrong
b) we leak up to 8 bytes of plaintext (!) of the packet out into
the air
This is only mitigated by the fact that many devices are capable
of doing encryption in hardware, in which case this can't happen
as the tail pointer is irrelevant in that case. Additionally,
fragmentation is not used very frequently and would normally have
to be configured manually.
Fix this by using skb_trim() properly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2de8e0d999b8 ("mac80211: rewrite fragmentation")
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 35,484
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool long_press() const { return long_press_; }
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,103
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init procswaps_init(void)
{
proc_create("swaps", 0, NULL, &proc_swaps_operations);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,395
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: select_opt_map(OptMap* now, OptMap* alt)
{
static int z = 1<<15; /* 32768: something big value */
int vn, va;
if (alt->value == 0) return ;
if (now->value == 0) {
copy_opt_map(now, alt);
return ;
}
vn = z / now->value;
va = z / alt->value;
if (comp_distance_value(&now->mmd, &alt->mmd, vn, va) > 0)
copy_opt_map(now, alt);
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnDidGetPreviewPageCount(
const PrintHostMsg_DidGetPreviewPageCount_Params& params) {
print_preview_pages_remaining_ = params.page_count;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 105,863
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void async_chainiv_do_postponed(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct async_chainiv_ctx *ctx = container_of(work,
struct async_chainiv_ctx,
postponed);
struct skcipher_givcrypt_request *req;
struct ablkcipher_request *subreq;
int err;
/* Only handle one request at a time to avoid hogging keventd. */
spin_lock_bh(&ctx->lock);
req = skcipher_dequeue_givcrypt(&ctx->queue);
spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->lock);
if (!req) {
async_chainiv_schedule_work(ctx);
return;
}
subreq = skcipher_givcrypt_reqctx(req);
subreq->base.flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
err = async_chainiv_givencrypt_tail(req);
local_bh_disable();
skcipher_givcrypt_complete(req, err);
local_bh_enable();
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CreateUIRequest(const std::string& requested_audio_device_id,
const std::string& requested_video_device_id) {
DCHECK(!ui_request_);
target_process_id_ = requesting_process_id;
target_frame_id_ = requesting_frame_id;
ui_request_.reset(new MediaStreamRequest(
requesting_process_id, requesting_frame_id, page_request_id,
security_origin.GetURL(), user_gesture, request_type,
requested_audio_device_id, requested_video_device_id, audio_type_,
video_type_, controls.disable_local_echo));
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void zend_verify_abstract_class(zend_class_entry *ce) /* {{{ */
{
zend_function *func;
zend_abstract_info ai;
if ((ce->ce_flags & ZEND_ACC_IMPLICIT_ABSTRACT_CLASS) && !(ce->ce_flags & (ZEND_ACC_TRAIT | ZEND_ACC_EXPLICIT_ABSTRACT_CLASS))) {
memset(&ai, 0, sizeof(ai));
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_PTR(&ce->function_table, func) {
zend_verify_abstract_class_function(func, &ai);
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
if (ai.cnt) {
zend_error_noreturn(E_ERROR, "Class %s contains %d abstract method%s and must therefore be declared abstract or implement the remaining methods (" MAX_ABSTRACT_INFO_FMT MAX_ABSTRACT_INFO_FMT MAX_ABSTRACT_INFO_FMT ")",
ZSTR_VAL(ce->name), ai.cnt,
ai.cnt > 1 ? "s" : "",
DISPLAY_ABSTRACT_FN(0),
DISPLAY_ABSTRACT_FN(1),
DISPLAY_ABSTRACT_FN(2)
);
}
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Use format string
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 57,341
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabStripGtk::DropInfo::SetContainerTransparency() {
cairo_t* cairo_context = gdk_cairo_create(gtk_widget_get_window(container));
if (!cairo_context)
return;
cairo_scale(cairo_context, static_cast<double>(drop_indicator_width),
static_cast<double>(drop_indicator_height));
cairo_set_source_rgba(cairo_context, 1.0f, 1.0f, 1.0f, 0.0f);
cairo_set_operator(cairo_context, CAIRO_OPERATOR_SOURCE);
cairo_paint(cairo_context);
cairo_destroy(cairo_context);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,156
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: restore_entry(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
int ret = ARCHIVE_OK, en;
if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_UNLINK && !S_ISDIR(a->mode)) {
/*
* TODO: Fix this. Apparently, there are platforms
* that still allow root to hose the entire filesystem
* by unlinking a dir. The S_ISDIR() test above
* prevents us from using unlink() here if the new
* object is a dir, but that doesn't mean the old
* object isn't a dir.
*/
if (unlink(a->name) == 0) {
/* We removed it, reset cached stat. */
a->pst = NULL;
} else if (errno == ENOENT) {
/* File didn't exist, that's just as good. */
} else if (rmdir(a->name) == 0) {
/* It was a dir, but now it's gone. */
a->pst = NULL;
} else {
/* We tried, but couldn't get rid of it. */
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"Could not unlink");
return(ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
}
/* Try creating it first; if this fails, we'll try to recover. */
en = create_filesystem_object(a);
if ((en == ENOTDIR || en == ENOENT)
&& !(a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_NO_AUTODIR)) {
/* If the parent dir doesn't exist, try creating it. */
create_parent_dir(a, a->name);
/* Now try to create the object again. */
en = create_filesystem_object(a);
}
if ((en == EISDIR || en == EEXIST)
&& (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_NO_OVERWRITE)) {
/* If we're not overwriting, we're done. */
archive_entry_unset_size(a->entry);
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
/*
* Some platforms return EISDIR if you call
* open(O_WRONLY | O_EXCL | O_CREAT) on a directory, some
* return EEXIST. POSIX is ambiguous, requiring EISDIR
* for open(O_WRONLY) on a dir and EEXIST for open(O_EXCL | O_CREAT)
* on an existing item.
*/
if (en == EISDIR) {
/* A dir is in the way of a non-dir, rmdir it. */
if (rmdir(a->name) != 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"Can't remove already-existing dir");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
a->pst = NULL;
/* Try again. */
en = create_filesystem_object(a);
} else if (en == EEXIST) {
/*
* We know something is in the way, but we don't know what;
* we need to find out before we go any further.
*/
int r = 0;
/*
* The SECURE_SYMLINKS logic has already removed a
* symlink to a dir if the client wants that. So
* follow the symlink if we're creating a dir.
*/
if (S_ISDIR(a->mode))
r = stat(a->name, &a->st);
/*
* If it's not a dir (or it's a broken symlink),
* then don't follow it.
*/
if (r != 0 || !S_ISDIR(a->mode))
r = lstat(a->name, &a->st);
if (r != 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"Can't stat existing object");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
/*
* NO_OVERWRITE_NEWER doesn't apply to directories.
*/
if ((a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_NO_OVERWRITE_NEWER)
&& !S_ISDIR(a->st.st_mode)) {
if (!older(&(a->st), a->entry)) {
archive_entry_unset_size(a->entry);
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
}
/* If it's our archive, we're done. */
if (a->skip_file_set &&
a->st.st_dev == (dev_t)a->skip_file_dev &&
a->st.st_ino == (ino_t)a->skip_file_ino) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, 0,
"Refusing to overwrite archive");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
if (!S_ISDIR(a->st.st_mode)) {
/* A non-dir is in the way, unlink it. */
if (unlink(a->name) != 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"Can't unlink already-existing object");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
a->pst = NULL;
/* Try again. */
en = create_filesystem_object(a);
} else if (!S_ISDIR(a->mode)) {
/* A dir is in the way of a non-dir, rmdir it. */
if (rmdir(a->name) != 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"Can't replace existing directory with non-directory");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
/* Try again. */
en = create_filesystem_object(a);
} else {
/*
* There's a dir in the way of a dir. Don't
* waste time with rmdir()/mkdir(), just fix
* up the permissions on the existing dir.
* Note that we don't change perms on existing
* dirs unless _EXTRACT_PERM is specified.
*/
if ((a->mode != a->st.st_mode)
&& (a->todo & TODO_MODE_FORCE))
a->deferred |= (a->todo & TODO_MODE);
/* Ownership doesn't need deferred fixup. */
en = 0; /* Forget the EEXIST. */
}
}
if (en) {
/* Everything failed; give up here. */
archive_set_error(&a->archive, en, "Can't create '%s'",
a->name);
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
a->pst = NULL; /* Cached stat data no longer valid. */
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 43,927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rtl8150_set_multicast(struct net_device *netdev)
{
rtl8150_t *dev = netdev_priv(netdev);
u16 rx_creg = 0x9e;
netif_stop_queue(netdev);
if (netdev->flags & IFF_PROMISC) {
rx_creg |= 0x0001;
dev_info(&netdev->dev, "%s: promiscuous mode\n", netdev->name);
} else if (!netdev_mc_empty(netdev) ||
(netdev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI)) {
rx_creg &= 0xfffe;
rx_creg |= 0x0002;
dev_info(&netdev->dev, "%s: allmulti set\n", netdev->name);
} else {
/* ~RX_MULTICAST, ~RX_PROMISCUOUS */
rx_creg &= 0x00fc;
}
async_set_registers(dev, RCR, sizeof(rx_creg), rx_creg);
netif_wake_queue(netdev);
}
Commit Message: rtl8150: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 66,510
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct arm_pmu *__init armv8_pmuv3_pmu_init(void)
{
armv8pmu.name = "arm/armv8-pmuv3";
armv8pmu.map_event = armv8_pmuv3_map_event;
armv8pmu.num_events = armv8pmu_read_num_pmnc_events();
armv8pmu.set_event_filter = armv8pmu_set_event_filter;
return &armv8pmu;
}
Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 56,200
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void check_and_drop(void *_data)
{
struct detach_data *data = _data;
if (!data->mountpoint && list_empty(&data->select.dispose))
__d_drop(data->select.start);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 67,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CCThreadProxy::drawLayersAndPresentOnCCThread()
{
TRACE_EVENT("CCThreadProxy::drawLayersOnCCThread", this, 0);
ASSERT(isImplThread());
if (!m_layerTreeHostImpl)
return;
drawLayersOnCCThread();
m_layerTreeHostImpl->present();
m_schedulerOnCCThread->didDraw();
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,834
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileInfo, getRealPath)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char buff[MAXPATHLEN];
char *filename;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_RuntimeException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern->type == SPL_FS_DIR && !intern->file_name && intern->u.dir.entry.d_name[0]) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (intern->orig_path) {
filename = intern->orig_path;
} else {
filename = intern->file_name;
}
if (filename && VCWD_REALPATH(filename, buff)) {
#ifdef ZTS
if (VCWD_ACCESS(buff, F_OK)) {
RETVAL_FALSE;
} else
#endif
RETVAL_STRING(buff, 1);
} else {
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 167,039
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_handle_iCCP(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr, png_uint_32 length)
/* Note: this does not properly handle chunks that are > 64K under DOS */
{
png_byte compression_type;
png_bytep pC;
png_charp profile;
png_uint_32 skip = 0;
png_uint_32 profile_size, profile_length;
png_size_t slength, prefix_length, data_length;
png_debug(1, "in png_handle_iCCP");
if (!(png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IHDR))
png_error(png_ptr, "Missing IHDR before iCCP");
else if (png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IDAT)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Invalid iCCP after IDAT");
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
return;
}
else if (png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_PLTE)
/* Should be an error, but we can cope with it */
png_warning(png_ptr, "Out of place iCCP chunk");
if (info_ptr != NULL && (info_ptr->valid & PNG_INFO_iCCP))
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Duplicate iCCP chunk");
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
return;
}
#ifdef PNG_MAX_MALLOC_64K
if (length > (png_uint_32)65535L)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "iCCP chunk too large to fit in memory");
skip = length - (png_uint_32)65535L;
length = (png_uint_32)65535L;
}
#endif
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = (png_charp)png_malloc(png_ptr, length + 1);
slength = (png_size_t)length;
png_crc_read(png_ptr, (png_bytep)png_ptr->chunkdata, slength);
if (png_crc_finish(png_ptr, skip))
{
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
return;
}
png_ptr->chunkdata[slength] = 0x00;
for (profile = png_ptr->chunkdata; *profile; profile++)
/* Empty loop to find end of name */ ;
++profile;
/* There should be at least one zero (the compression type byte)
* following the separator, and we should be on it
*/
if ( profile >= png_ptr->chunkdata + slength - 1)
{
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
png_warning(png_ptr, "Malformed iCCP chunk");
return;
}
/* Compression_type should always be zero */
compression_type = *profile++;
if (compression_type)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Ignoring nonzero compression type in iCCP chunk");
compression_type = 0x00; /* Reset it to zero (libpng-1.0.6 through 1.0.8
wrote nonzero) */
}
prefix_length = profile - png_ptr->chunkdata;
png_decompress_chunk(png_ptr, compression_type,
slength, prefix_length, &data_length);
profile_length = data_length - prefix_length;
if ( prefix_length > data_length || profile_length < 4)
{
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
png_warning(png_ptr, "Profile size field missing from iCCP chunk");
return;
}
/* Check the profile_size recorded in the first 32 bits of the ICC profile */
pC = (png_bytep)(png_ptr->chunkdata + prefix_length);
profile_size = ((*(pC ))<<24) |
((*(pC + 1))<<16) |
((*(pC + 2))<< 8) |
((*(pC + 3)) );
if (profile_size < profile_length)
profile_length = profile_size;
if (profile_size > profile_length)
{
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
png_warning(png_ptr, "Ignoring truncated iCCP profile.");
return;
}
png_set_iCCP(png_ptr, info_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata,
compression_type, png_ptr->chunkdata + prefix_length, profile_length);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 172,178
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void buffer_free(Buffer *buffer)
{
g_free(buffer->buffer);
buffer->offset = 0;
buffer->capacity = 0;
buffer->buffer = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 7,955
|
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