instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int http_start_receive_data(HTTPContext *c)
{
int fd;
int ret;
int64_t ret64;
if (c->stream->feed_opened) {
http_log("Stream feed '%s' was not opened\n",
c->stream->feed_filename);
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
/* Don't permit writing to this one */
if (c->stream->readonly) {
http_log("Cannot write to read-only file '%s'\n",
c->stream->feed_filename);
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
/* open feed */
fd = open(c->stream->feed_filename, O_RDWR);
if (fd < 0) {
ret = AVERROR(errno);
http_log("Could not open feed file '%s': %s\n",
c->stream->feed_filename, strerror(errno));
return ret;
}
c->feed_fd = fd;
if (c->stream->truncate) {
/* truncate feed file */
ffm_write_write_index(c->feed_fd, FFM_PACKET_SIZE);
http_log("Truncating feed file '%s'\n", c->stream->feed_filename);
if (ftruncate(c->feed_fd, FFM_PACKET_SIZE) < 0) {
ret = AVERROR(errno);
http_log("Error truncating feed file '%s': %s\n",
c->stream->feed_filename, strerror(errno));
return ret;
}
} else {
ret64 = ffm_read_write_index(fd);
if (ret64 < 0) {
http_log("Error reading write index from feed file '%s': %s\n",
c->stream->feed_filename, strerror(errno));
return ret64;
}
c->stream->feed_write_index = ret64;
}
c->stream->feed_write_index = FFMAX(ffm_read_write_index(fd),
FFM_PACKET_SIZE);
c->stream->feed_size = lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_END);
lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
/* init buffer input */
c->buffer_ptr = c->buffer;
c->buffer_end = c->buffer + FFM_PACKET_SIZE;
c->stream->feed_opened = 1;
c->chunked_encoding = !!av_stristr(c->buffer, "Transfer-Encoding: chunked");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 70,812
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MPEG4Extractor::populateMetrics() {
ALOGV("MPEG4Extractor::populateMetrics");
}
Commit Message: Skip track if verification fails
Bug: 62187433
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: Ib9b0b6de88d046d8149e9ea5073d6c40ffec7b0c
(cherry picked from commit ef8c7830d838d877e6b37b75b47294b064c79397)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 162,159
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnSetFocus(bool enable) {
CHECK(webview()->MainFrame()->IsWebLocalFrame());
SetFocus(enable);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 148,000
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int scsi_disk_emulate_command(SCSIDiskReq *r, uint8_t *outbuf)
{
SCSIRequest *req = &r->req;
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, req->dev);
uint64_t nb_sectors;
int buflen = 0;
switch (req->cmd.buf[0]) {
case TEST_UNIT_READY:
if (s->tray_open || !bdrv_is_inserted(s->bs))
goto not_ready;
break;
case INQUIRY:
buflen = scsi_disk_emulate_inquiry(req, outbuf);
if (buflen < 0)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case MODE_SENSE:
case MODE_SENSE_10:
buflen = scsi_disk_emulate_mode_sense(r, outbuf);
if (buflen < 0)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case READ_TOC:
buflen = scsi_disk_emulate_read_toc(req, outbuf);
if (buflen < 0)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case RESERVE:
if (req->cmd.buf[1] & 1)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case RESERVE_10:
if (req->cmd.buf[1] & 3)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case RELEASE:
if (req->cmd.buf[1] & 1)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case RELEASE_10:
if (req->cmd.buf[1] & 3)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case START_STOP:
if (scsi_disk_emulate_start_stop(r) < 0) {
return -1;
}
break;
case ALLOW_MEDIUM_REMOVAL:
s->tray_locked = req->cmd.buf[4] & 1;
bdrv_lock_medium(s->bs, req->cmd.buf[4] & 1);
break;
case READ_CAPACITY_10:
/* The normal LEN field for this command is zero. */
memset(outbuf, 0, 8);
bdrv_get_geometry(s->bs, &nb_sectors);
if (!nb_sectors)
goto not_ready;
nb_sectors /= s->cluster_size;
/* Returned value is the address of the last sector. */
nb_sectors--;
/* Remember the new size for read/write sanity checking. */
s->max_lba = nb_sectors;
/* Clip to 2TB, instead of returning capacity modulo 2TB. */
if (nb_sectors > UINT32_MAX)
nb_sectors = UINT32_MAX;
outbuf[0] = (nb_sectors >> 24) & 0xff;
outbuf[1] = (nb_sectors >> 16) & 0xff;
outbuf[2] = (nb_sectors >> 8) & 0xff;
outbuf[3] = nb_sectors & 0xff;
outbuf[4] = 0;
outbuf[5] = 0;
outbuf[6] = s->cluster_size * 2;
outbuf[7] = 0;
buflen = 8;
break;
case GET_CONFIGURATION:
memset(outbuf, 0, 8);
/* ??? This should probably return much more information. For now
just return the basic header indicating the CD-ROM profile. */
outbuf[7] = 8; // CD-ROM
buflen = 8;
break;
case SERVICE_ACTION_IN_16:
/* Service Action In subcommands. */
if ((req->cmd.buf[1] & 31) == SAI_READ_CAPACITY_16) {
DPRINTF("SAI READ CAPACITY(16)\n");
memset(outbuf, 0, req->cmd.xfer);
bdrv_get_geometry(s->bs, &nb_sectors);
if (!nb_sectors)
goto not_ready;
nb_sectors /= s->cluster_size;
/* Returned value is the address of the last sector. */
nb_sectors--;
/* Remember the new size for read/write sanity checking. */
s->max_lba = nb_sectors;
outbuf[0] = (nb_sectors >> 56) & 0xff;
outbuf[1] = (nb_sectors >> 48) & 0xff;
outbuf[2] = (nb_sectors >> 40) & 0xff;
outbuf[3] = (nb_sectors >> 32) & 0xff;
outbuf[4] = (nb_sectors >> 24) & 0xff;
outbuf[5] = (nb_sectors >> 16) & 0xff;
outbuf[6] = (nb_sectors >> 8) & 0xff;
outbuf[7] = nb_sectors & 0xff;
outbuf[8] = 0;
outbuf[9] = 0;
outbuf[10] = s->cluster_size * 2;
outbuf[11] = 0;
outbuf[12] = 0;
outbuf[13] = get_physical_block_exp(&s->qdev.conf);
/* set TPE bit if the format supports discard */
if (s->qdev.conf.discard_granularity) {
outbuf[14] = 0x80;
}
/* Protection, exponent and lowest lba field left blank. */
buflen = req->cmd.xfer;
break;
}
DPRINTF("Unsupported Service Action In\n");
goto illegal_request;
case VERIFY_10:
break;
default:
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(INVALID_OPCODE));
return -1;
}
return buflen;
not_ready:
if (s->tray_open || !bdrv_is_inserted(s->bs)) {
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(NO_MEDIUM));
} else {
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(LUN_NOT_READY));
}
return -1;
illegal_request:
if (r->req.status == -1) {
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(INVALID_FIELD));
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 166,551
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init set_thash_entries(char *str)
{
ssize_t ret;
if (!str)
return 0;
ret = kstrtoul(str, 0, &thash_entries);
if (ret)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: tcp: initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0
When tcp_disconnect() is called, inet_csk_delack_init() sets
icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss to 0.
This could potentially cause tcp_recvmsg() => tcp_cleanup_rbuf() =>
__tcp_select_window() call path to have division by 0 issue.
So this patch initializes rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 61,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hci_uart_set_proto(struct hci_uart *hu, int id)
{
const struct hci_uart_proto *p;
int err;
p = hci_uart_get_proto(id);
if (!p)
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
hu->proto = p;
set_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
err = hci_uart_register_dev(hu);
if (err) {
clear_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
return err;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: hci_ldisc: Postpone HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit set in hci_uart_set_proto()
task A: task B:
hci_uart_set_proto flush_to_ldisc
- p->open(hu) -> h5_open //alloc h5 - receive_buf
- set_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY - tty_port_default_receive_buf
- hci_uart_register_dev - tty_ldisc_receive_buf
- hci_uart_tty_receive
- test_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY
- h5_recv
- clear_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY while() {
- p->open(hu) -> h5_close //free h5
- h5_rx_3wire_hdr
- h5_reset() //use-after-free
}
It could use ioctl to set hci uart proto, but there is
a use-after-free issue when hci_uart_register_dev() fail in
hci_uart_set_proto(), see stack above, fix this by setting
HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit only when hci_uart_register_dev()
return success.
Reported-by: syzbot+899a33dc0fa0dbaf06a6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 169,528
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CmdBufferImageTransportFactory::~CmdBufferImageTransportFactory() {
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,503
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_violation_chunk(
struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
static const char err_str[] = "The following chunk violates protocol:";
if (!asoc)
return sctp_sf_violation(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
return sctp_sf_abort_violation(net, ep, asoc, arg, commands, err_str,
sizeof(err_str));
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing
This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,360
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int efx_ethtool_phys_id(struct net_device *net_dev,
enum ethtool_phys_id_state state)
{
struct efx_nic *efx = netdev_priv(net_dev);
enum efx_led_mode mode = EFX_LED_DEFAULT;
switch (state) {
case ETHTOOL_ID_ON:
mode = EFX_LED_ON;
break;
case ETHTOOL_ID_OFF:
mode = EFX_LED_OFF;
break;
case ETHTOOL_ID_INACTIVE:
mode = EFX_LED_DEFAULT;
break;
case ETHTOOL_ID_ACTIVE:
return 1; /* cycle on/off once per second */
}
efx->type->set_id_led(efx, mode);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,461
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ACodec::UninitializedState::onAllocateComponent(const sp<AMessage> &msg) {
ALOGV("onAllocateComponent");
CHECK(mCodec->mNode == 0);
OMXClient client;
if (client.connect() != OK) {
mCodec->signalError(OMX_ErrorUndefined, NO_INIT);
return false;
}
sp<IOMX> omx = client.interface();
sp<AMessage> notify = new AMessage(kWhatOMXDied, mCodec);
mDeathNotifier = new DeathNotifier(notify);
if (IInterface::asBinder(omx)->linkToDeath(mDeathNotifier) != OK) {
mDeathNotifier.clear();
}
Vector<OMXCodec::CodecNameAndQuirks> matchingCodecs;
AString mime;
AString componentName;
uint32_t quirks = 0;
int32_t encoder = false;
if (msg->findString("componentName", &componentName)) {
ssize_t index = matchingCodecs.add();
OMXCodec::CodecNameAndQuirks *entry = &matchingCodecs.editItemAt(index);
entry->mName = String8(componentName.c_str());
if (!OMXCodec::findCodecQuirks(
componentName.c_str(), &entry->mQuirks)) {
entry->mQuirks = 0;
}
} else {
CHECK(msg->findString("mime", &mime));
if (!msg->findInt32("encoder", &encoder)) {
encoder = false;
}
OMXCodec::findMatchingCodecs(
mime.c_str(),
encoder, // createEncoder
NULL, // matchComponentName
0, // flags
&matchingCodecs);
}
sp<CodecObserver> observer = new CodecObserver;
IOMX::node_id node = 0;
status_t err = NAME_NOT_FOUND;
for (size_t matchIndex = 0; matchIndex < matchingCodecs.size();
++matchIndex) {
componentName = matchingCodecs.itemAt(matchIndex).mName.string();
quirks = matchingCodecs.itemAt(matchIndex).mQuirks;
pid_t tid = gettid();
int prevPriority = androidGetThreadPriority(tid);
androidSetThreadPriority(tid, ANDROID_PRIORITY_FOREGROUND);
err = omx->allocateNode(componentName.c_str(), observer, &node);
androidSetThreadPriority(tid, prevPriority);
if (err == OK) {
break;
} else {
ALOGW("Allocating component '%s' failed, try next one.", componentName.c_str());
}
node = 0;
}
if (node == 0) {
if (!mime.empty()) {
ALOGE("Unable to instantiate a %scoder for type '%s' with err %#x.",
encoder ? "en" : "de", mime.c_str(), err);
} else {
ALOGE("Unable to instantiate codec '%s' with err %#x.", componentName.c_str(), err);
}
mCodec->signalError((OMX_ERRORTYPE)err, makeNoSideEffectStatus(err));
return false;
}
notify = new AMessage(kWhatOMXMessageList, mCodec);
observer->setNotificationMessage(notify);
mCodec->mComponentName = componentName;
mCodec->mRenderTracker.setComponentName(componentName);
mCodec->mFlags = 0;
if (componentName.endsWith(".secure")) {
mCodec->mFlags |= kFlagIsSecure;
mCodec->mFlags |= kFlagIsGrallocUsageProtected;
mCodec->mFlags |= kFlagPushBlankBuffersToNativeWindowOnShutdown;
}
mCodec->mQuirks = quirks;
mCodec->mOMX = omx;
mCodec->mNode = node;
{
sp<AMessage> notify = mCodec->mNotify->dup();
notify->setInt32("what", CodecBase::kWhatComponentAllocated);
notify->setString("componentName", mCodec->mComponentName.c_str());
notify->post();
}
mCodec->changeState(mCodec->mLoadedState);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,077
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pmcraid_initiate_reset(struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance)
{
struct pmcraid_cmd *cmd;
/* If the reset is already in progress, just return, otherwise start
* reset sequence and return
*/
if (!pinstance->ioa_reset_in_progress) {
scsi_block_requests(pinstance->host);
cmd = pmcraid_get_free_cmd(pinstance);
if (cmd == NULL) {
pmcraid_err("no cmnd blocks for initiate_reset\n");
return;
}
pinstance->ioa_shutdown_type = SHUTDOWN_NONE;
pinstance->reset_cmd = cmd;
pinstance->force_ioa_reset = 1;
pmcraid_notify_ioastate(pinstance,
PMC_DEVICE_EVENT_RESET_START);
pmcraid_ioa_reset(cmd);
}
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 26,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CorePageLoadMetricsObserver::OnLoadEventStart(
const page_load_metrics::PageLoadTiming& timing,
const page_load_metrics::PageLoadExtraInfo& info) {
if (WasStartedInForegroundOptionalEventInForeground(timing.load_event_start,
info)) {
PAGE_LOAD_HISTOGRAM(internal::kHistogramLoadImmediate,
timing.load_event_start.value());
} else {
PAGE_LOAD_HISTOGRAM(internal::kBackgroundHistogramLoadImmediate,
timing.load_event_start.value());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove clock resolution page load histograms.
These were temporary metrics intended to understand whether high/low
resolution clocks adversely impact page load metrics. After collecting a few
months of data it was determined that clock resolution doesn't adversely
impact our metrics, and it that these histograms were no longer needed.
BUG=394757
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2155143003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#406143}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 121,100
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl2_new(SSL *s)
{
SSL2_STATE *s2;
if ((s2 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *s2)) == NULL)
goto err;
memset(s2, 0, sizeof *s2);
# if SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER + 3 > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER + 2
# error "assertion failed"
# endif
if ((s2->rbuf =
OPENSSL_malloc(SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER + 2)) == NULL)
goto err;
/*
* wbuf needs one byte more because when using two-byte headers, we leave
* the first byte unused in do_ssl_write (s2_pkt.c)
*/
if ((s2->wbuf =
OPENSSL_malloc(SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER + 3)) == NULL)
goto err;
s->s2 = s2;
ssl2_clear(s);
return (1);
err:
if (s2 != NULL) {
if (s2->wbuf != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s2->wbuf);
if (s2->rbuf != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s2->rbuf);
OPENSSL_free(s2);
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,111
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void TestEnumAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "testEnumAttribute");
V8StringResource<> cpp_value = v8_value;
if (!cpp_value.Prepare())
return;
DummyExceptionStateForTesting dummy_exception_state;
{
const char* const kValidValues[] = {
"",
"EnumValue1",
"EnumValue2",
"EnumValue3",
};
if (!IsValidEnum(cpp_value, kValidValues, base::size(kValidValues),
"TestEnum", dummy_exception_state)) {
ExecutionContext::ForCurrentRealm(info)->AddConsoleMessage(
ConsoleMessage::Create(mojom::ConsoleMessageSource::kJavaScript,
mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel::kWarning,
dummy_exception_state.Message()));
return;
}
}
impl->setTestEnumAttribute(cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,217
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pcm_chmap_ctl_tlv(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, int op_flag,
unsigned int size, unsigned int __user *tlv)
{
struct snd_pcm_chmap *info = snd_kcontrol_chip(kcontrol);
const struct snd_pcm_chmap_elem *map;
unsigned int __user *dst;
int c, count = 0;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!info->chmap))
return -EINVAL;
if (size < 8)
return -ENOMEM;
if (put_user(SNDRV_CTL_TLVT_CONTAINER, tlv))
return -EFAULT;
size -= 8;
dst = tlv + 2;
for (map = info->chmap; map->channels; map++) {
int chs_bytes = map->channels * 4;
if (!valid_chmap_channels(info, map->channels))
continue;
if (size < 8)
return -ENOMEM;
if (put_user(SNDRV_CTL_TLVT_CHMAP_FIXED, dst) ||
put_user(chs_bytes, dst + 1))
return -EFAULT;
dst += 2;
size -= 8;
count += 8;
if (size < chs_bytes)
return -ENOMEM;
size -= chs_bytes;
count += chs_bytes;
for (c = 0; c < map->channels; c++) {
if (put_user(map->map[c], dst))
return -EFAULT;
dst++;
}
}
if (put_user(count, tlv + 1))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 47,789
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Round_Super_45( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_F26Dot6 distance,
FT_F26Dot6 compensation )
{
FT_F26Dot6 val;
if ( distance >= 0 )
{
val = ( ADD_LONG( distance,
exc->threshold - exc->phase + compensation ) /
exc->period ) * exc->period;
val += exc->phase;
if ( val < 0 )
val = exc->phase;
}
else
{
val = NEG_LONG( ( SUB_LONG( exc->threshold - exc->phase + compensation,
distance ) /
exc->period ) * exc->period );
val -= exc->phase;
if ( val > 0 )
val = -exc->phase;
}
return val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 10,707
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: conn *conn_from_freelist() {
conn *c;
pthread_mutex_lock(&conn_lock);
if (freecurr > 0) {
c = freeconns[--freecurr];
} else {
c = NULL;
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&conn_lock);
return c;
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,241
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayoutSVGViewportContainer::determineIfLayoutSizeChanged()
{
ASSERT(element());
if (!isSVGSVGElement(*element()))
return;
m_isLayoutSizeChanged = toSVGSVGElement(element())->hasRelativeLengths() && selfNeedsLayout();
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 121,139
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::ScheduleGpuTask(
base::OnceClosure callback,
std::vector<gpu::SyncToken> sync_tokens) {
task_sequence_->ScheduleTask(std::move(callback), std::move(sync_tokens));
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 135,984
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LoadWatcher(content::RenderFrame* frame,
const base::Callback<void(bool)>& callback)
: content::RenderFrameObserver(frame), callback_(callback) {}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,629
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::SelectNextTab() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("SelectNextTab"));
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->SelectNextTab();
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,359
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cuse_send_init(struct cuse_conn *cc)
{
int rc;
struct fuse_req *req;
struct page *page;
struct fuse_conn *fc = &cc->fc;
struct cuse_init_in *arg;
void *outarg;
BUILD_BUG_ON(CUSE_INIT_INFO_MAX > PAGE_SIZE);
req = fuse_get_req_for_background(fc, 1);
if (IS_ERR(req)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(req);
goto err;
}
rc = -ENOMEM;
page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (!page)
goto err_put_req;
outarg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cuse_init_out), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!outarg)
goto err_free_page;
arg = &req->misc.cuse_init_in;
arg->major = FUSE_KERNEL_VERSION;
arg->minor = FUSE_KERNEL_MINOR_VERSION;
arg->flags |= CUSE_UNRESTRICTED_IOCTL;
req->in.h.opcode = CUSE_INIT;
req->in.numargs = 1;
req->in.args[0].size = sizeof(struct cuse_init_in);
req->in.args[0].value = arg;
req->out.numargs = 2;
req->out.args[0].size = sizeof(struct cuse_init_out);
req->out.args[0].value = outarg;
req->out.args[1].size = CUSE_INIT_INFO_MAX;
req->out.argvar = 1;
req->out.argpages = 1;
req->pages[0] = page;
req->page_descs[0].length = req->out.args[1].size;
req->num_pages = 1;
req->end = cuse_process_init_reply;
fuse_request_send_background(fc, req);
return 0;
err_free_page:
__free_page(page);
err_put_req:
fuse_put_request(fc, req);
err:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cuse: fix memory leak
The problem is that fuse_dev_alloc() acquires an extra reference to cc.fc,
and the original ref count is never dropped.
Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: cc080e9e9be1 ("fuse: introduce per-instance fuse_dev structure")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 58,068
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MirrorMockJobInterceptor(const base::FilePath& root_http,
ReportResponseHeadersOnUI report_on_ui)
: root_http_(root_http), report_on_ui_(report_on_ui) {}
Commit Message: Fix ChromeResourceDispatcherHostDelegateMirrorBrowserTest.MirrorRequestHeader with network service.
The functionality worked, as part of converting DICE, however the test code didn't work since it
depended on accessing the net objects directly. Switch the tests to use the EmbeddedTestServer, to
better match production, which removes the dependency on net/.
Also:
-make GetFilePathWithReplacements replace strings in the mock headers if they're present
-add a global to google_util to ignore ports; that way other tests can be converted without having
to modify each callsite to google_util
Bug: 881976
Change-Id: Ic52023495c1c98c1248025c11cdf37f433fef058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1328142
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607652}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 172,577
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void red_channel_client_send_item(RedChannelClient *rcc, PipeItem *item)
{
int handled = TRUE;
spice_assert(red_channel_client_no_item_being_sent(rcc));
red_channel_client_reset_send_data(rcc);
switch (item->type) {
case PIPE_ITEM_TYPE_SET_ACK:
red_channel_client_send_set_ack(rcc);
free(item);
break;
case PIPE_ITEM_TYPE_MIGRATE:
red_channel_client_send_migrate(rcc);
free(item);
break;
case PIPE_ITEM_TYPE_EMPTY_MSG:
red_channel_client_send_empty_msg(rcc, item);
free(item);
break;
case PIPE_ITEM_TYPE_PING:
red_channel_client_send_ping(rcc);
free(item);
break;
default:
handled = FALSE;
}
if (!handled) {
rcc->channel->channel_cbs.send_item(rcc, item);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,136
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GDataFileError GDataWapiFeedProcessor::ApplyFeeds(
const std::vector<DocumentFeed*>& feed_list,
int64 start_changestamp,
int64 root_feed_changestamp,
std::set<FilePath>* changed_dirs) {
bool is_delta_feed = start_changestamp != 0;
directory_service_->set_origin(FROM_SERVER);
int64 delta_feed_changestamp = 0;
FeedToFileResourceMapUmaStats uma_stats;
FileResourceIdMap file_map;
GDataFileError error = FeedToFileResourceMap(feed_list,
&file_map,
&delta_feed_changestamp,
&uma_stats);
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK)
return error;
ApplyFeedFromFileUrlMap(
is_delta_feed,
is_delta_feed ? delta_feed_changestamp : root_feed_changestamp,
&file_map,
changed_dirs);
if (!is_delta_feed)
UpdateFileCountUmaHistograms(uma_stats);
return GDATA_FILE_OK;
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 117,133
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fst_openport(struct fst_port_info *port)
{
int signals;
int txq_length;
/* Only init things if card is actually running. This allows open to
* succeed for downloads etc.
*/
if (port->card->state == FST_RUNNING) {
if (port->run) {
dbg(DBG_OPEN, "open: found port already running\n");
fst_issue_cmd(port, STOPPORT);
port->run = 0;
}
fst_rx_config(port);
fst_tx_config(port);
fst_op_raise(port, OPSTS_RTS | OPSTS_DTR);
fst_issue_cmd(port, STARTPORT);
port->run = 1;
signals = FST_RDL(port->card, v24DebouncedSts[port->index]);
if (signals & (((port->hwif == X21) || (port->hwif == X21D))
? IPSTS_INDICATE : IPSTS_DCD))
netif_carrier_on(port_to_dev(port));
else
netif_carrier_off(port_to_dev(port));
txq_length = port->txqe - port->txqs;
port->txqe = 0;
port->txqs = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: farsync: fix info leak in ioctl
The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 39,528
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proc_id_map_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
const struct seq_operations *seq_ops)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = NULL;
struct task_struct *task;
struct seq_file *seq;
int ret = -EINVAL;
task = get_proc_task(inode);
if (task) {
rcu_read_lock();
ns = get_user_ns(task_cred_xxx(task, user_ns));
rcu_read_unlock();
put_task_struct(task);
}
if (!ns)
goto err;
ret = seq_open(file, seq_ops);
if (ret)
goto err_put_ns;
seq = file->private_data;
seq->private = ns;
return 0;
err_put_ns:
put_user_ns(ns);
err:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 49,420
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sched_feat_set(char *cmp)
{
int i;
int neg = 0;
if (strncmp(cmp, "NO_", 3) == 0) {
neg = 1;
cmp += 3;
}
for (i = 0; i < __SCHED_FEAT_NR; i++) {
if (strcmp(cmp, sched_feat_names[i]) == 0) {
if (neg) {
sysctl_sched_features &= ~(1UL << i);
sched_feat_disable(i);
} else {
sysctl_sched_features |= (1UL << i);
sched_feat_enable(i);
}
break;
}
}
return i;
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 58,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: content::RenderFrameHost* GetMostVisitedIframe(content::WebContents* tab) {
CHECK_EQ(2u, tab->GetAllFrames().size());
for (content::RenderFrameHost* frame : tab->GetAllFrames()) {
if (frame != tab->GetMainFrame()) {
return frame;
}
}
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 127,665
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint32_t SparseBitSet::calcNumPages(const uint32_t* ranges, size_t nRanges) {
bool haveZeroPage = false;
uint32_t nonzeroPageEnd = 0;
uint32_t nPages = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < nRanges; i++) {
uint32_t start = ranges[i * 2];
uint32_t end = ranges[i * 2 + 1];
uint32_t startPage = start >> kLogValuesPerPage;
uint32_t endPage = (end - 1) >> kLogValuesPerPage;
if (startPage >= nonzeroPageEnd) {
if (startPage > nonzeroPageEnd) {
if (!haveZeroPage) {
haveZeroPage = true;
nPages++;
}
}
nPages++;
}
nPages += endPage - startPage;
nonzeroPageEnd = endPage + 1;
}
return nPages;
}
Commit Message: Reject fonts with invalid ranges in cmap
A corrupt or malicious font may have a negative size in its cmap
range, which in turn could lead to memory corruption. This patch
detects the case and rejects the font, and also includes an assertion
in the sparse bit set implementation if we missed any such case.
External issue:
https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=192618
Bug: 26413177
Change-Id: Icc0c80e4ef389abba0964495b89aa0fae3e9f4b2
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 164,327
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint32_t in_get_sample_rate(const struct audio_stream *stream)
{
struct stream_in *in = (struct stream_in *)stream;
return in->requested_rate;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 162,289
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long super_cache_scan(struct shrinker *shrink,
struct shrink_control *sc)
{
struct super_block *sb;
long fs_objects = 0;
long total_objects;
long freed = 0;
long dentries;
long inodes;
sb = container_of(shrink, struct super_block, s_shrink);
/*
* Deadlock avoidance. We may hold various FS locks, and we don't want
* to recurse into the FS that called us in clear_inode() and friends..
*/
if (!(sc->gfp_mask & __GFP_FS))
return SHRINK_STOP;
if (!grab_super_passive(sb))
return SHRINK_STOP;
if (sb->s_op->nr_cached_objects)
fs_objects = sb->s_op->nr_cached_objects(sb, sc->nid);
inodes = list_lru_count_node(&sb->s_inode_lru, sc->nid);
dentries = list_lru_count_node(&sb->s_dentry_lru, sc->nid);
total_objects = dentries + inodes + fs_objects + 1;
/* proportion the scan between the caches */
dentries = mult_frac(sc->nr_to_scan, dentries, total_objects);
inodes = mult_frac(sc->nr_to_scan, inodes, total_objects);
/*
* prune the dcache first as the icache is pinned by it, then
* prune the icache, followed by the filesystem specific caches
*/
freed = prune_dcache_sb(sb, dentries, sc->nid);
freed += prune_icache_sb(sb, inodes, sc->nid);
if (fs_objects) {
fs_objects = mult_frac(sc->nr_to_scan, fs_objects,
total_objects);
freed += sb->s_op->free_cached_objects(sb, fs_objects,
sc->nid);
}
drop_super(sb);
return freed;
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 46,210
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: reply_handle(struct request *const req, u16 flags, u32 ttl, struct reply *reply) {
int error;
char addrbuf[128];
static const int error_codes[] = {
DNS_ERR_FORMAT, DNS_ERR_SERVERFAILED, DNS_ERR_NOTEXIST,
DNS_ERR_NOTIMPL, DNS_ERR_REFUSED
};
ASSERT_LOCKED(req->base);
ASSERT_VALID_REQUEST(req);
if (flags & 0x020f || !reply || !reply->have_answer) {
/* there was an error */
if (flags & 0x0200) {
error = DNS_ERR_TRUNCATED;
} else if (flags & 0x000f) {
u16 error_code = (flags & 0x000f) - 1;
if (error_code > 4) {
error = DNS_ERR_UNKNOWN;
} else {
error = error_codes[error_code];
}
} else if (reply && !reply->have_answer) {
error = DNS_ERR_NODATA;
} else {
error = DNS_ERR_UNKNOWN;
}
switch (error) {
case DNS_ERR_NOTIMPL:
case DNS_ERR_REFUSED:
/* we regard these errors as marking a bad nameserver */
if (req->reissue_count < req->base->global_max_reissues) {
char msg[64];
evutil_snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "Bad response %d (%s)",
error, evdns_err_to_string(error));
nameserver_failed(req->ns, msg);
if (!request_reissue(req)) return;
}
break;
case DNS_ERR_SERVERFAILED:
/* rcode 2 (servfailed) sometimes means "we
* are broken" and sometimes (with some binds)
* means "that request was very confusing."
* Treat this as a timeout, not a failure.
*/
log(EVDNS_LOG_DEBUG, "Got a SERVERFAILED from nameserver"
"at %s; will allow the request to time out.",
evutil_format_sockaddr_port_(
(struct sockaddr *)&req->ns->address,
addrbuf, sizeof(addrbuf)));
/* Call the timeout function */
evdns_request_timeout_callback(0, 0, req);
return;
default:
/* we got a good reply from the nameserver: it is up. */
if (req->handle == req->ns->probe_request) {
/* Avoid double-free */
req->ns->probe_request = NULL;
}
nameserver_up(req->ns);
}
if (req->handle->search_state &&
req->request_type != TYPE_PTR) {
/* if we have a list of domains to search in,
* try the next one */
if (!search_try_next(req->handle)) {
/* a new request was issued so this
* request is finished and */
/* the user callback will be made when
* that request (or a */
/* child of it) finishes. */
return;
}
}
/* all else failed. Pass the failure up */
reply_schedule_callback(req, ttl, error, NULL);
request_finished(req, &REQ_HEAD(req->base, req->trans_id), 1);
} else {
/* all ok, tell the user */
reply_schedule_callback(req, ttl, 0, reply);
if (req->handle == req->ns->probe_request)
req->ns->probe_request = NULL; /* Avoid double-free */
nameserver_up(req->ns);
request_finished(req, &REQ_HEAD(req->base, req->trans_id), 1);
}
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,672
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> FrameLoader::ToTracedValue() const {
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> traced_value = TracedValue::Create();
traced_value->BeginDictionary("frame");
traced_value->SetString("id_ref", IdentifiersFactory::FrameId(frame_.Get()));
traced_value->EndDictionary();
traced_value->SetBoolean("isLoadingMainFrame", IsLoadingMainFrame());
traced_value->SetString("stateMachine", state_machine_.ToString());
traced_value->SetString("provisionalDocumentLoaderURL",
provisional_document_loader_
? provisional_document_loader_->Url().GetString()
: String());
traced_value->SetString(
"documentLoaderURL",
document_loader_ ? document_loader_->Url().GetString() : String());
return traced_value;
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 152,578
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void inject_pending_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
/* try to reinject previous events if any */
if (vcpu->arch.exception.pending) {
trace_kvm_inj_exception(vcpu->arch.exception.nr,
vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code,
vcpu->arch.exception.error_code);
kvm_x86_ops->queue_exception(vcpu, vcpu->arch.exception.nr,
vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code,
vcpu->arch.exception.error_code,
vcpu->arch.exception.reinject);
return;
}
if (vcpu->arch.nmi_injected) {
kvm_x86_ops->set_nmi(vcpu);
return;
}
if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.pending) {
kvm_x86_ops->set_irq(vcpu);
return;
}
/* try to inject new event if pending */
if (vcpu->arch.nmi_pending) {
if (kvm_x86_ops->nmi_allowed(vcpu)) {
--vcpu->arch.nmi_pending;
vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = true;
kvm_x86_ops->set_nmi(vcpu);
}
} else if (kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr(vcpu)) {
if (kvm_x86_ops->interrupt_allowed(vcpu)) {
kvm_queue_interrupt(vcpu, kvm_cpu_get_interrupt(vcpu),
false);
kvm_x86_ops->set_irq(vcpu);
}
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,827
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnPair(
const base::Closure& callback,
const ConnectErrorCallback& error_callback) {
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Paired";
if (!pairing_delegate_used_)
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Bluetooth.PairingMethod",
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_NONE,
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_COUNT);
UnregisterAgent();
SetTrusted();
ConnectInternal(true, callback, error_callback);
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,227
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void noinline __kprobes bogus_32bit_fault_tpc(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
static int times;
if (times++ < 10)
printk(KERN_ERR "FAULT[%s:%d]: 32-bit process reports "
"64-bit TPC [%lx]\n",
current->comm, current->pid,
regs->tpc);
show_regs(regs);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BOOL rdp_send(rdpRdp* rdp, STREAM* s, UINT16 channel_id)
{
UINT16 length;
UINT32 sec_bytes;
BYTE* sec_hold;
length = stream_get_length(s);
stream_set_pos(s, 0);
rdp_write_header(rdp, s, length, channel_id);
sec_bytes = rdp_get_sec_bytes(rdp);
sec_hold = s->p;
stream_seek(s, sec_bytes);
s->p = sec_hold;
length += rdp_security_stream_out(rdp, s, length);
stream_set_pos(s, length);
if (transport_write(rdp->transport, s) < 0)
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: security: add a NULL pointer check to fix a server crash.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 58,642
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void int32ArrayMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValue(info, imp->int32ArrayMethod());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,344
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t GraphicBuffer::lockAsync(uint32_t usage, const Rect& rect, void** vaddr, int fenceFd)
{
if (rect.left < 0 || rect.right > this->width ||
rect.top < 0 || rect.bottom > this->height) {
ALOGE("locking pixels (%d,%d,%d,%d) outside of buffer (w=%d, h=%d)",
rect.left, rect.top, rect.right, rect.bottom,
this->width, this->height);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
status_t res = getBufferMapper().lockAsync(handle, usage, rect, vaddr, fenceFd);
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fix for corruption when numFds or numInts is too large.
Bug: 18076253
Change-Id: I4c5935440013fc755e1d123049290383f4659fb6
(cherry picked from commit dfd06b89a4b77fc75eb85a3c1c700da3621c0118)
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 157,686
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ossl_cipher_set_auth_data(VALUE self, VALUE data)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
unsigned char *in;
long in_len, out_len;
StringValue(data);
in = (unsigned char *) RSTRING_PTR(data);
in_len = RSTRING_LEN(data);
GetCipher(self, ctx);
if (!ossl_cipher_update_long(ctx, NULL, &out_len, in, in_len))
ossl_raise(eCipherError, "couldn't set additional authenticated data");
return data;
}
Commit Message: cipher: don't set dummy encryption key in Cipher#initialize
Remove the encryption key initialization from Cipher#initialize. This
is effectively a revert of r32723 ("Avoid possible SEGV from AES
encryption/decryption", 2011-07-28).
r32723, which added the key initialization, was a workaround for
Ruby Bug #2768. For some certain ciphers, calling EVP_CipherUpdate()
before setting an encryption key caused segfault. It was not a problem
until OpenSSL implemented GCM mode - the encryption key could be
overridden by repeated calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex(). But, it is not the
case for AES-GCM ciphers. Setting a key, an IV, a key, in this order
causes the IV to be reset to an all-zero IV.
The problem of Bug #2768 persists on the current versions of OpenSSL.
So, make Cipher#update raise an exception if a key is not yet set by the
user. Since encrypting or decrypting without key does not make any
sense, this should not break existing applications.
Users can still call Cipher#key= and Cipher#iv= multiple times with
their own responsibility.
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/2768
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/8221
Reference: https://github.com/ruby/openssl/issues/49
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 73,420
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IPC::Message* reply_msg() { return reply_msg_; }
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 116,890
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id)
{
key_ref_t key_ref;
struct key *key;
long ret;
kenter("%d", id);
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
/* Root is permitted to invalidate certain special keys */
if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto error;
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL,
&key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->flags))
goto invalidate;
goto error_put;
}
goto error;
}
invalidate:
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
ret = 0;
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
ret = -EPERM;
else
key_invalidate(key);
error_put:
key_ref_put(key_ref);
error:
kleave(" = %ld", ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 60,236
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AXObject::containerLiveRegionAtomic() const {
updateCachedAttributeValuesIfNeeded();
return m_cachedLiveRegionRoot && m_cachedLiveRegionRoot->liveRegionAtomic();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,240
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FoFiType1C::~FoFiType1C() {
int i;
if (name) {
delete name;
}
if (encoding &&
encoding != fofiType1StandardEncoding &&
encoding != fofiType1ExpertEncoding) {
for (i = 0; i < 256; ++i) {
gfree(encoding[i]);
}
gfree(encoding);
}
if (privateDicts) {
gfree(privateDicts);
}
if (fdSelect) {
gfree(fdSelect);
}
if (charset &&
charset != fofiType1CISOAdobeCharset &&
charset != fofiType1CExpertCharset &&
charset != fofiType1CExpertSubsetCharset) {
gfree(charset);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 2,230
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline float fung(float x)
{
if (x >= 6.0f / 29.0f)
return x * x * x;
return (108.0f / 841.0f) * (x - (4.0f / 29.0f));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 319
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hub_port_connect(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1, u16 portstatus,
u16 portchange)
{
int status = -ENODEV;
int i;
unsigned unit_load;
struct usb_device *hdev = hub->hdev;
struct usb_hcd *hcd = bus_to_hcd(hdev->bus);
struct usb_port *port_dev = hub->ports[port1 - 1];
struct usb_device *udev = port_dev->child;
static int unreliable_port = -1;
/* Disconnect any existing devices under this port */
if (udev) {
if (hcd->usb_phy && !hdev->parent)
usb_phy_notify_disconnect(hcd->usb_phy, udev->speed);
usb_disconnect(&port_dev->child);
}
/* We can forget about a "removed" device when there's a physical
* disconnect or the connect status changes.
*/
if (!(portstatus & USB_PORT_STAT_CONNECTION) ||
(portchange & USB_PORT_STAT_C_CONNECTION))
clear_bit(port1, hub->removed_bits);
if (portchange & (USB_PORT_STAT_C_CONNECTION |
USB_PORT_STAT_C_ENABLE)) {
status = hub_port_debounce_be_stable(hub, port1);
if (status < 0) {
if (status != -ENODEV &&
port1 != unreliable_port &&
printk_ratelimit())
dev_err(&port_dev->dev, "connect-debounce failed\n");
portstatus &= ~USB_PORT_STAT_CONNECTION;
unreliable_port = port1;
} else {
portstatus = status;
}
}
/* Return now if debouncing failed or nothing is connected or
* the device was "removed".
*/
if (!(portstatus & USB_PORT_STAT_CONNECTION) ||
test_bit(port1, hub->removed_bits)) {
/*
* maybe switch power back on (e.g. root hub was reset)
* but only if the port isn't owned by someone else.
*/
if (hub_is_port_power_switchable(hub)
&& !port_is_power_on(hub, portstatus)
&& !port_dev->port_owner)
set_port_feature(hdev, port1, USB_PORT_FEAT_POWER);
if (portstatus & USB_PORT_STAT_ENABLE)
goto done;
return;
}
if (hub_is_superspeed(hub->hdev))
unit_load = 150;
else
unit_load = 100;
status = 0;
for (i = 0; i < SET_CONFIG_TRIES; i++) {
/* reallocate for each attempt, since references
* to the previous one can escape in various ways
*/
udev = usb_alloc_dev(hdev, hdev->bus, port1);
if (!udev) {
dev_err(&port_dev->dev,
"couldn't allocate usb_device\n");
goto done;
}
usb_set_device_state(udev, USB_STATE_POWERED);
udev->bus_mA = hub->mA_per_port;
udev->level = hdev->level + 1;
udev->wusb = hub_is_wusb(hub);
/* Devices connected to SuperSpeed hubs are USB 3.0 or later */
if (hub_is_superspeed(hub->hdev))
udev->speed = USB_SPEED_SUPER;
else
udev->speed = USB_SPEED_UNKNOWN;
choose_devnum(udev);
if (udev->devnum <= 0) {
status = -ENOTCONN; /* Don't retry */
goto loop;
}
/* reset (non-USB 3.0 devices) and get descriptor */
usb_lock_port(port_dev);
status = hub_port_init(hub, udev, port1, i);
usb_unlock_port(port_dev);
if (status < 0)
goto loop;
if (udev->quirks & USB_QUIRK_DELAY_INIT)
msleep(2000);
/* consecutive bus-powered hubs aren't reliable; they can
* violate the voltage drop budget. if the new child has
* a "powered" LED, users should notice we didn't enable it
* (without reading syslog), even without per-port LEDs
* on the parent.
*/
if (udev->descriptor.bDeviceClass == USB_CLASS_HUB
&& udev->bus_mA <= unit_load) {
u16 devstat;
status = usb_get_std_status(udev, USB_RECIP_DEVICE, 0,
&devstat);
if (status) {
dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "get status %d ?\n", status);
goto loop_disable;
}
if ((devstat & (1 << USB_DEVICE_SELF_POWERED)) == 0) {
dev_err(&udev->dev,
"can't connect bus-powered hub "
"to this port\n");
if (hub->has_indicators) {
hub->indicator[port1-1] =
INDICATOR_AMBER_BLINK;
queue_delayed_work(
system_power_efficient_wq,
&hub->leds, 0);
}
status = -ENOTCONN; /* Don't retry */
goto loop_disable;
}
}
/* check for devices running slower than they could */
if (le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.bcdUSB) >= 0x0200
&& udev->speed == USB_SPEED_FULL
&& highspeed_hubs != 0)
check_highspeed(hub, udev, port1);
/* Store the parent's children[] pointer. At this point
* udev becomes globally accessible, although presumably
* no one will look at it until hdev is unlocked.
*/
status = 0;
mutex_lock(&usb_port_peer_mutex);
/* We mustn't add new devices if the parent hub has
* been disconnected; we would race with the
* recursively_mark_NOTATTACHED() routine.
*/
spin_lock_irq(&device_state_lock);
if (hdev->state == USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED)
status = -ENOTCONN;
else
port_dev->child = udev;
spin_unlock_irq(&device_state_lock);
mutex_unlock(&usb_port_peer_mutex);
/* Run it through the hoops (find a driver, etc) */
if (!status) {
status = usb_new_device(udev);
if (status) {
mutex_lock(&usb_port_peer_mutex);
spin_lock_irq(&device_state_lock);
port_dev->child = NULL;
spin_unlock_irq(&device_state_lock);
mutex_unlock(&usb_port_peer_mutex);
} else {
if (hcd->usb_phy && !hdev->parent)
usb_phy_notify_connect(hcd->usb_phy,
udev->speed);
}
}
if (status)
goto loop_disable;
status = hub_power_remaining(hub);
if (status)
dev_dbg(hub->intfdev, "%dmA power budget left\n", status);
return;
loop_disable:
hub_port_disable(hub, port1, 1);
loop:
usb_ep0_reinit(udev);
release_devnum(udev);
hub_free_dev(udev);
usb_put_dev(udev);
if ((status == -ENOTCONN) || (status == -ENOTSUPP))
break;
/* When halfway through our retry count, power-cycle the port */
if (i == (SET_CONFIG_TRIES / 2) - 1) {
dev_info(&port_dev->dev, "attempt power cycle\n");
usb_hub_set_port_power(hdev, hub, port1, false);
msleep(2 * hub_power_on_good_delay(hub));
usb_hub_set_port_power(hdev, hub, port1, true);
msleep(hub_power_on_good_delay(hub));
}
}
if (hub->hdev->parent ||
!hcd->driver->port_handed_over ||
!(hcd->driver->port_handed_over)(hcd, port1)) {
if (status != -ENOTCONN && status != -ENODEV)
dev_err(&port_dev->dev,
"unable to enumerate USB device\n");
}
done:
hub_port_disable(hub, port1, 1);
if (hcd->driver->relinquish_port && !hub->hdev->parent) {
if (status != -ENOTCONN && status != -ENODEV)
hcd->driver->relinquish_port(hcd, port1);
}
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 75,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromeNavigationBrowserTest() {}
Commit Message: Drop navigations to NavigationEntry with invalid virtual URLs.
BUG=657720
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2452443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#428056}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 142,490
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mailimf_resent_cc_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx, struct mailimf_cc ** result)
{
struct mailimf_address_list * addr_list;
struct mailimf_cc * cc;
size_t cur_token;
int r;
int res;
cur_token = * indx;
r = mailimf_token_case_insensitive_parse(message, length,
&cur_token, "Resent-Cc");
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_colon_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_address_list_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &addr_list);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_unstrict_crlf_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_addr_list;
}
cc = mailimf_cc_new(addr_list);
if (cc == NULL) {
res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
goto free_addr_list;
}
* result = cc;
* indx = cur_token;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
free_addr_list:
mailimf_address_list_free(addr_list);
err:
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 66,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SynchronizeVisualPropertiesMessageFilter::OnUpdatedFrameSinkIdOnUI() {
frame_sink_id_run_loop_.Quit();
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 156,118
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kvm_update_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long dr7;
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)
dr7 = vcpu->arch.guest_debug_dr7;
else
dr7 = vcpu->arch.dr7;
kvm_x86_ops->set_dr7(vcpu, dr7);
vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs &= ~KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED;
if (dr7 & DR7_BP_EN_MASK)
vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs |= KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 35,806
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: test_bson_iter_init_from_data_at_offset (void)
{
bson_t *bson = bson_with_all_types ();
/* zero out iter, since bson_iter_init doesn't zero out iter->value. */
bson_iter_t iter = {0};
BSON_ASSERT (bson_iter_init (&iter, bson));
ASSERT_CMPINT (bson_iter_offset (&iter), ==, 0);
while (bson_iter_next (&iter)) {
const uint8_t *data = bson_get_data (bson);
int keylen = bson_iter_key_len (&iter);
uint32_t offset = bson_iter_offset (&iter);
bson_iter_t recreated = {0};
BSON_ASSERT (bson_iter_init_from_data_at_offset (
&recreated, data, bson->len, offset, keylen));
if (memcmp ((void *) &iter, (void *) &recreated, sizeof (bson_iter_t)) !=
0) {
int i;
bson_iter_t *iters[] = {&iter, &recreated};
fprintf (stderr,
"recreated iterator does not match initial iterator:\n");
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
fprintf (stderr, "iter %d: ", i);
fprintf (stderr,
"len=%d, off=%d, type=%d, key=%d, d1=%d, d2=%d, "
"d3=%d, d4=%d, next_off=%d, err_off=%d\n",
iters[i]->len,
iters[i]->off,
iters[i]->type,
iters[i]->key,
iters[i]->d1,
iters[i]->d2,
iters[i]->d3,
iters[i]->d4,
iters[i]->next_off,
iters[i]->err_off);
}
ASSERT (false);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 77,919
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: usbtest_do_ioctl(struct usb_interface *intf, struct usbtest_param_32 *param)
{
struct usbtest_dev *dev = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
struct usb_device *udev = testdev_to_usbdev(dev);
struct urb *urb;
struct scatterlist *sg;
struct usb_sg_request req;
unsigned i;
int retval = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (param->iterations <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (param->sglen > MAX_SGLEN)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Just a bunch of test cases that every HCD is expected to handle.
*
* Some may need specific firmware, though it'd be good to have
* one firmware image to handle all the test cases.
*
* FIXME add more tests! cancel requests, verify the data, control
* queueing, concurrent read+write threads, and so on.
*/
switch (param->test_num) {
case 0:
dev_info(&intf->dev, "TEST 0: NOP\n");
retval = 0;
break;
/* Simple non-queued bulk I/O tests */
case 1:
if (dev->out_pipe == 0)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 1: write %d bytes %u times\n",
param->length, param->iterations);
urb = simple_alloc_urb(udev, dev->out_pipe, param->length, 0);
if (!urb) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
/* FIRMWARE: bulk sink (maybe accepts short writes) */
retval = simple_io(dev, urb, param->iterations, 0, 0, "test1");
simple_free_urb(urb);
break;
case 2:
if (dev->in_pipe == 0)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 2: read %d bytes %u times\n",
param->length, param->iterations);
urb = simple_alloc_urb(udev, dev->in_pipe, param->length, 0);
if (!urb) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
/* FIRMWARE: bulk source (maybe generates short writes) */
retval = simple_io(dev, urb, param->iterations, 0, 0, "test2");
simple_free_urb(urb);
break;
case 3:
if (dev->out_pipe == 0 || param->vary == 0)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 3: write/%d 0..%d bytes %u times\n",
param->vary, param->length, param->iterations);
urb = simple_alloc_urb(udev, dev->out_pipe, param->length, 0);
if (!urb) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
/* FIRMWARE: bulk sink (maybe accepts short writes) */
retval = simple_io(dev, urb, param->iterations, param->vary,
0, "test3");
simple_free_urb(urb);
break;
case 4:
if (dev->in_pipe == 0 || param->vary == 0)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 4: read/%d 0..%d bytes %u times\n",
param->vary, param->length, param->iterations);
urb = simple_alloc_urb(udev, dev->in_pipe, param->length, 0);
if (!urb) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
/* FIRMWARE: bulk source (maybe generates short writes) */
retval = simple_io(dev, urb, param->iterations, param->vary,
0, "test4");
simple_free_urb(urb);
break;
/* Queued bulk I/O tests */
case 5:
if (dev->out_pipe == 0 || param->sglen == 0)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 5: write %d sglists %d entries of %d bytes\n",
param->iterations,
param->sglen, param->length);
sg = alloc_sglist(param->sglen, param->length,
0, dev, dev->out_pipe);
if (!sg) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
/* FIRMWARE: bulk sink (maybe accepts short writes) */
retval = perform_sglist(dev, param->iterations, dev->out_pipe,
&req, sg, param->sglen);
free_sglist(sg, param->sglen);
break;
case 6:
if (dev->in_pipe == 0 || param->sglen == 0)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 6: read %d sglists %d entries of %d bytes\n",
param->iterations,
param->sglen, param->length);
sg = alloc_sglist(param->sglen, param->length,
0, dev, dev->in_pipe);
if (!sg) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
/* FIRMWARE: bulk source (maybe generates short writes) */
retval = perform_sglist(dev, param->iterations, dev->in_pipe,
&req, sg, param->sglen);
free_sglist(sg, param->sglen);
break;
case 7:
if (dev->out_pipe == 0 || param->sglen == 0 || param->vary == 0)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 7: write/%d %d sglists %d entries 0..%d bytes\n",
param->vary, param->iterations,
param->sglen, param->length);
sg = alloc_sglist(param->sglen, param->length,
param->vary, dev, dev->out_pipe);
if (!sg) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
/* FIRMWARE: bulk sink (maybe accepts short writes) */
retval = perform_sglist(dev, param->iterations, dev->out_pipe,
&req, sg, param->sglen);
free_sglist(sg, param->sglen);
break;
case 8:
if (dev->in_pipe == 0 || param->sglen == 0 || param->vary == 0)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 8: read/%d %d sglists %d entries 0..%d bytes\n",
param->vary, param->iterations,
param->sglen, param->length);
sg = alloc_sglist(param->sglen, param->length,
param->vary, dev, dev->in_pipe);
if (!sg) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
/* FIRMWARE: bulk source (maybe generates short writes) */
retval = perform_sglist(dev, param->iterations, dev->in_pipe,
&req, sg, param->sglen);
free_sglist(sg, param->sglen);
break;
/* non-queued sanity tests for control (chapter 9 subset) */
case 9:
retval = 0;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 9: ch9 (subset) control tests, %d times\n",
param->iterations);
for (i = param->iterations; retval == 0 && i--; /* NOP */)
retval = ch9_postconfig(dev);
if (retval)
dev_err(&intf->dev, "ch9 subset failed, "
"iterations left %d\n", i);
break;
/* queued control messaging */
case 10:
retval = 0;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 10: queue %d control calls, %d times\n",
param->sglen,
param->iterations);
retval = test_ctrl_queue(dev, param);
break;
/* simple non-queued unlinks (ring with one urb) */
case 11:
if (dev->in_pipe == 0 || !param->length)
break;
retval = 0;
dev_info(&intf->dev, "TEST 11: unlink %d reads of %d\n",
param->iterations, param->length);
for (i = param->iterations; retval == 0 && i--; /* NOP */)
retval = unlink_simple(dev, dev->in_pipe,
param->length);
if (retval)
dev_err(&intf->dev, "unlink reads failed %d, "
"iterations left %d\n", retval, i);
break;
case 12:
if (dev->out_pipe == 0 || !param->length)
break;
retval = 0;
dev_info(&intf->dev, "TEST 12: unlink %d writes of %d\n",
param->iterations, param->length);
for (i = param->iterations; retval == 0 && i--; /* NOP */)
retval = unlink_simple(dev, dev->out_pipe,
param->length);
if (retval)
dev_err(&intf->dev, "unlink writes failed %d, "
"iterations left %d\n", retval, i);
break;
/* ep halt tests */
case 13:
if (dev->out_pipe == 0 && dev->in_pipe == 0)
break;
retval = 0;
dev_info(&intf->dev, "TEST 13: set/clear %d halts\n",
param->iterations);
for (i = param->iterations; retval == 0 && i--; /* NOP */)
retval = halt_simple(dev);
if (retval)
ERROR(dev, "halts failed, iterations left %d\n", i);
break;
/* control write tests */
case 14:
if (!dev->info->ctrl_out)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev, "TEST 14: %d ep0out, %d..%d vary %d\n",
param->iterations,
realworld ? 1 : 0, param->length,
param->vary);
retval = ctrl_out(dev, param->iterations,
param->length, param->vary, 0);
break;
/* iso write tests */
case 15:
if (dev->out_iso_pipe == 0 || param->sglen == 0)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 15: write %d iso, %d entries of %d bytes\n",
param->iterations,
param->sglen, param->length);
/* FIRMWARE: iso sink */
retval = test_queue(dev, param,
dev->out_iso_pipe, dev->iso_out, 0);
break;
/* iso read tests */
case 16:
if (dev->in_iso_pipe == 0 || param->sglen == 0)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 16: read %d iso, %d entries of %d bytes\n",
param->iterations,
param->sglen, param->length);
/* FIRMWARE: iso source */
retval = test_queue(dev, param,
dev->in_iso_pipe, dev->iso_in, 0);
break;
/* FIXME scatterlist cancel (needs helper thread) */
/* Tests for bulk I/O using DMA mapping by core and odd address */
case 17:
if (dev->out_pipe == 0)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 17: write odd addr %d bytes %u times core map\n",
param->length, param->iterations);
retval = test_unaligned_bulk(
dev, dev->out_pipe,
param->length, param->iterations,
0, "test17");
break;
case 18:
if (dev->in_pipe == 0)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 18: read odd addr %d bytes %u times core map\n",
param->length, param->iterations);
retval = test_unaligned_bulk(
dev, dev->in_pipe,
param->length, param->iterations,
0, "test18");
break;
/* Tests for bulk I/O using premapped coherent buffer and odd address */
case 19:
if (dev->out_pipe == 0)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 19: write odd addr %d bytes %u times premapped\n",
param->length, param->iterations);
retval = test_unaligned_bulk(
dev, dev->out_pipe,
param->length, param->iterations,
URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP, "test19");
break;
case 20:
if (dev->in_pipe == 0)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 20: read odd addr %d bytes %u times premapped\n",
param->length, param->iterations);
retval = test_unaligned_bulk(
dev, dev->in_pipe,
param->length, param->iterations,
URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP, "test20");
break;
/* control write tests with unaligned buffer */
case 21:
if (!dev->info->ctrl_out)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 21: %d ep0out odd addr, %d..%d vary %d\n",
param->iterations,
realworld ? 1 : 0, param->length,
param->vary);
retval = ctrl_out(dev, param->iterations,
param->length, param->vary, 1);
break;
/* unaligned iso tests */
case 22:
if (dev->out_iso_pipe == 0 || param->sglen == 0)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 22: write %d iso odd, %d entries of %d bytes\n",
param->iterations,
param->sglen, param->length);
retval = test_queue(dev, param,
dev->out_iso_pipe, dev->iso_out, 1);
break;
case 23:
if (dev->in_iso_pipe == 0 || param->sglen == 0)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 23: read %d iso odd, %d entries of %d bytes\n",
param->iterations,
param->sglen, param->length);
retval = test_queue(dev, param,
dev->in_iso_pipe, dev->iso_in, 1);
break;
/* unlink URBs from a bulk-OUT queue */
case 24:
if (dev->out_pipe == 0 || !param->length || param->sglen < 4)
break;
retval = 0;
dev_info(&intf->dev, "TEST 24: unlink from %d queues of "
"%d %d-byte writes\n",
param->iterations, param->sglen, param->length);
for (i = param->iterations; retval == 0 && i > 0; --i) {
retval = unlink_queued(dev, dev->out_pipe,
param->sglen, param->length);
if (retval) {
dev_err(&intf->dev,
"unlink queued writes failed %d, "
"iterations left %d\n", retval, i);
break;
}
}
break;
/* Simple non-queued interrupt I/O tests */
case 25:
if (dev->out_int_pipe == 0)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 25: write %d bytes %u times\n",
param->length, param->iterations);
urb = simple_alloc_urb(udev, dev->out_int_pipe, param->length,
dev->int_out->bInterval);
if (!urb) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
/* FIRMWARE: interrupt sink (maybe accepts short writes) */
retval = simple_io(dev, urb, param->iterations, 0, 0, "test25");
simple_free_urb(urb);
break;
case 26:
if (dev->in_int_pipe == 0)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 26: read %d bytes %u times\n",
param->length, param->iterations);
urb = simple_alloc_urb(udev, dev->in_int_pipe, param->length,
dev->int_in->bInterval);
if (!urb) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
/* FIRMWARE: interrupt source (maybe generates short writes) */
retval = simple_io(dev, urb, param->iterations, 0, 0, "test26");
simple_free_urb(urb);
break;
case 27:
/* We do performance test, so ignore data compare */
if (dev->out_pipe == 0 || param->sglen == 0 || pattern != 0)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 27: bulk write %dMbytes\n", (param->iterations *
param->sglen * param->length) / (1024 * 1024));
retval = test_queue(dev, param,
dev->out_pipe, NULL, 0);
break;
case 28:
if (dev->in_pipe == 0 || param->sglen == 0 || pattern != 0)
break;
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"TEST 28: bulk read %dMbytes\n", (param->iterations *
param->sglen * param->length) / (1024 * 1024));
retval = test_queue(dev, param,
dev->in_pipe, NULL, 0);
break;
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: usb: usbtest: fix NULL pointer dereference
If the usbtest driver encounters a device with an IN bulk endpoint but
no OUT bulk endpoint, it will try to dereference a NULL pointer
(out->desc.bEndpointAddress). The problem can be solved by adding a
missing test.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 59,880
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void gdImageBrushApply (gdImagePtr im, int x, int y)
{
int lx, ly;
int hy, hx;
int x1, y1, x2, y2;
int srcx, srcy;
if (!im->brush) {
return;
}
hy = gdImageSY(im->brush) / 2;
y1 = y - hy;
y2 = y1 + gdImageSY(im->brush);
hx = gdImageSX(im->brush) / 2;
x1 = x - hx;
x2 = x1 + gdImageSX(im->brush);
srcy = 0;
if (im->trueColor) {
if (im->brush->trueColor) {
for (ly = y1; ly < y2; ly++) {
srcx = 0;
for (lx = x1; (lx < x2); lx++) {
int p;
p = gdImageGetTrueColorPixel(im->brush, srcx, srcy);
/* 2.0.9, Thomas Winzig: apply simple full transparency */
if (p != gdImageGetTransparent(im->brush)) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, lx, ly, p);
}
srcx++;
}
srcy++;
}
} else {
/* 2.0.12: Brush palette, image truecolor (thanks to Thorben Kundinger for pointing out the issue) */
for (ly = y1; ly < y2; ly++) {
srcx = 0;
for (lx = x1; lx < x2; lx++) {
int p, tc;
p = gdImageGetPixel(im->brush, srcx, srcy);
tc = gdImageGetTrueColorPixel(im->brush, srcx, srcy);
/* 2.0.9, Thomas Winzig: apply simple full transparency */
if (p != gdImageGetTransparent(im->brush)) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, lx, ly, tc);
}
srcx++;
}
srcy++;
}
}
} else {
for (ly = y1; ly < y2; ly++) {
srcx = 0;
for (lx = x1; lx < x2; lx++) {
int p;
p = gdImageGetPixel(im->brush, srcx, srcy);
/* Allow for non-square brushes! */
if (p != gdImageGetTransparent(im->brush)) {
/* Truecolor brush. Very slow on a palette destination. */
if (im->brush->trueColor) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, lx, ly, gdImageColorResolveAlpha(im, gdTrueColorGetRed(p),
gdTrueColorGetGreen(p),
gdTrueColorGetBlue(p),
gdTrueColorGetAlpha(p)));
} else {
gdImageSetPixel(im, lx, ly, im->brushColorMap[p]);
}
}
srcx++;
}
srcy++;
}
}
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 51,417
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<NodeList> Document::handleZeroPadding(const HitTestRequest& request, HitTestResult& result) const
{
renderView()->hitTest(request, result);
Node* node = result.innerNode();
if (!node)
return 0;
node = node->deprecatedShadowAncestorNode();
ListHashSet<RefPtr<Node> > list;
list.add(node);
return StaticHashSetNodeList::adopt(list);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: INST_HANDLER (adiw) { // ADIW Rd+1:Rd, K
int d = ((buf[0] & 0x30) >> 3) + 24;
int k = (buf[0] & 0xf) | ((buf[0] >> 2) & 0x30);
op->val = k;
ESIL_A ("r%d:r%d,%d,+,", d + 1, d, k); // Rd+1:Rd + Rr
ESIL_A ("r%d,0x80,&,!," // V
"0,RPICK,0x8000,&,!,!,"
"&,vf,=,", d + 1);
ESIL_A ("0,RPICK,0x8000,&,!,!,nf,=,"); // N
ESIL_A ("0,RPICK,!,zf,=,"); // Z
ESIL_A ("r%d,0x80,&,!,!," // C
"0,RPICK,0x8000,&,!,"
"&,cf,=,", d + 1);
ESIL_A ("vf,nf,^,sf,=,"); // S
ESIL_A ("r%d:r%d,=,", d + 1, d); // Rd = result
}
Commit Message: Fix #9943 - Invalid free on RAnal.avr
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 82,698
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dns_packet_read_raw_string(DnsPacket *p, const void **ret, size_t *size, size_t *start) {
_cleanup_(rewind_dns_packet) DnsPacketRewinder rewinder;
uint8_t c;
int r;
assert(p);
INIT_REWINDER(rewinder, p);
r = dns_packet_read_uint8(p, &c, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = dns_packet_read(p, c, ret, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (size)
*size = c;
if (start)
*start = rewinder.saved_rindex;
CANCEL_REWINDER(rewinder);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: resolved: bugfix of null pointer p->question dereferencing (#6020)
See https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/systemd/+bug/1621396
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 64,748
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: StartFadeAnimationDelegate(LauncherView* host,
views::View* view)
: launcher_view_(host),
view_(view) {}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,260
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tun_net_change_mtu(struct net_device *dev, int new_mtu)
{
if (new_mtu < MIN_MTU || new_mtu + dev->hard_header_len > MAX_MTU)
return -EINVAL;
dev->mtu = new_mtu;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,863
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlXPtrNewPoint(xmlNodePtr node, int indx) {
xmlXPathObjectPtr ret;
if (node == NULL)
return(NULL);
if (indx < 0)
return(NULL);
ret = (xmlXPathObjectPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlXPathObject));
if (ret == NULL) {
xmlXPtrErrMemory("allocating point");
return(NULL);
}
memset(ret, 0 , (size_t) sizeof(xmlXPathObject));
ret->type = XPATH_POINT;
ret->user = (void *) node;
ret->index = indx;
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix XPointer bug.
BUG=125462
AUTHOR=asd@ut.ee
R=cevans@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10344022
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@135174 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 109,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ldb_dn_mark_invalid(struct ldb_dn *dn)
{
dn->invalid = true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 2,289
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void CheckSafeSearch(Browser* browser, bool expect_safe_search) {
content::WebContents* web_contents =
browser->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents();
content::TestNavigationObserver observer(web_contents);
LocationBar* location_bar = browser->window()->GetLocationBar();
ui_test_utils::SendToOmniboxAndSubmit(location_bar, "http://google.com/");
OmniboxEditModel* model = location_bar->GetOmniboxView()->model();
observer.Wait();
EXPECT_TRUE(model->CurrentMatch(NULL).destination_url.is_valid());
EXPECT_EQ(GetExpectedSearchURL(expect_safe_search), web_contents->GetURL());
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,015
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gss_mech_initialize(void)
{
return (&spnego_mechanism);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 36,711
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfc_llcp_rx_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct nfc_llcp_local *local = container_of(work, struct nfc_llcp_local,
rx_work);
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = local->rx_pending;
if (skb == NULL) {
pr_debug("No pending SKB\n");
return;
}
__net_timestamp(skb);
nfc_llcp_send_to_raw_sock(local, skb, NFC_DIRECTION_RX);
nfc_llcp_rx_skb(local, skb);
schedule_work(&local->tx_work);
kfree_skb(local->rx_pending);
local->rx_pending = NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,717
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: grub_disk_get_size (grub_disk_t disk)
{
if (disk->partition)
return grub_partition_get_len (disk->partition);
else
return disk->total_sectors;
}
Commit Message: Fix r2_hbo_grub_memmove ext2 crash
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,717
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Tab::SelectedStateChanged() {
UpdateForegroundColors();
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 140,657
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_eat_data_fast_4_4(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
int error;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPORT_BAD_TAG,
SCTP_NULL());
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_data_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
error = sctp_eat_data(asoc, chunk, commands );
switch (error) {
case SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR:
case SCTP_IERROR_HIGH_TSN:
case SCTP_IERROR_DUP_TSN:
case SCTP_IERROR_IGNORE_TSN:
case SCTP_IERROR_BAD_STREAM:
break;
case SCTP_IERROR_NO_DATA:
goto consume;
case SCTP_IERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION:
return sctp_sf_abort_violation(net, ep, asoc, chunk, commands,
(u8 *)chunk->subh.data_hdr, sizeof(sctp_datahdr_t));
default:
BUG();
}
/* Go a head and force a SACK, since we are shutting down. */
/* Implementor's Guide.
*
* While in SHUTDOWN-SENT state, the SHUTDOWN sender MUST immediately
* respond to each received packet containing one or more DATA chunk(s)
* with a SACK, a SHUTDOWN chunk, and restart the T2-shutdown timer
*/
if (chunk->end_of_packet) {
/* We must delay the chunk creation since the cumulative
* TSN has not been updated yet.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_GEN_SHUTDOWN, SCTP_NULL());
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_GEN_SACK, SCTP_FORCE());
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_RESTART,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T2_SHUTDOWN));
}
consume:
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 31,615
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int firm_set_dtr(struct usb_serial_port *port, __u8 onoff)
{
struct whiteheat_set_rdb dtr_command;
dtr_command.port = port->port_number + 1;
dtr_command.state = onoff;
return firm_send_command(port, WHITEHEAT_SET_DTR,
(__u8 *)&dtr_command, sizeof(dtr_command));
}
Commit Message: USB: whiteheat: Added bounds checking for bulk command response
This patch fixes a potential security issue in the whiteheat USB driver
which might allow a local attacker to cause kernel memory corrpution. This
is due to an unchecked memcpy into a fixed size buffer (of 64 bytes). On
EHCI and XHCI busses it's possible to craft responses greater than 64
bytes leading a buffer overflow.
Signed-off-by: James Forshaw <forshaw@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 38,090
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct domain_device *sas_find_dev_by_rphy(struct sas_rphy *rphy)
{
struct Scsi_Host *shost = dev_to_shost(rphy->dev.parent);
struct sas_ha_struct *ha = SHOST_TO_SAS_HA(shost);
struct domain_device *found_dev = NULL;
int i;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&ha->phy_port_lock, flags);
for (i = 0; i < ha->num_phys; i++) {
struct asd_sas_port *port = ha->sas_port[i];
struct domain_device *dev;
spin_lock(&port->dev_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(dev, &port->dev_list, dev_list_node) {
if (rphy == dev->rphy) {
found_dev = dev;
spin_unlock(&port->dev_list_lock);
goto found;
}
}
spin_unlock(&port->dev_list_lock);
}
found:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ha->phy_port_lock, flags);
return found_dev;
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: defer ata device eh commands to libata
When ata device doing EH, some commands still attached with tasks are
not passed to libata when abort failed or recover failed, so libata did
not handle these commands. After these commands done, sas task is freed,
but ata qc is not freed. This will cause ata qc leak and trigger a
warning like below:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28512 at drivers/ata/libata-eh.c:4037
ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
CPU: 0 PID: 28512 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Tainted: G W OE 4.14.0#1
......
Call trace:
[<ffff0000088b7bd0>] ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
[<ffff0000088b8420>] ata_do_eh+0xc4/0xd8
[<ffff0000088b8478>] ata_std_error_handler+0x44/0x8c
[<ffff0000088b8068>] ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x480/0x694
[<ffff000008875fc4>] async_sas_ata_eh+0x4c/0x80
[<ffff0000080f6be8>] async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x170
[<ffff0000080ebd70>] process_one_work+0x144/0x390
[<ffff0000080ec100>] worker_thread+0x144/0x418
[<ffff0000080f2c98>] kthread+0x10c/0x138
[<ffff0000080855dc>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
If ata qc leaked too many, ata tag allocation will fail and io blocked
for ever.
As suggested by Dan Williams, defer ata device commands to libata and
merge sas_eh_finish_cmd() with sas_eh_defer_cmd(). libata will handle
ata qcs correctly after this.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 83,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::didFinishLoading()
{
if (!m_loader.arrayBufferResult()) {
rejectPromise();
return;
}
RefPtr<SharedBuffer> sharedBuffer = SharedBuffer::create((char*)m_loader.arrayBufferResult()->data(), m_loader.arrayBufferResult()->byteLength());
OwnPtr<ImageSource> source = adoptPtr(new ImageSource());
source->setData(sharedBuffer.get(), true);
RefPtr<NativeImageSkia> imageSkia = source->createFrameAtIndex(0);
if (!imageSkia) {
rejectPromise();
return;
}
RefPtr<Image> image = BitmapImage::create(imageSkia);
if (!image->width() || !image->height()) {
rejectPromise();
return;
}
if (!m_cropRect.width() && !m_cropRect.height()) {
m_cropRect = IntRect(IntPoint(), image->size());
}
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ImageBitmap> imageBitmap = ImageBitmap::create(image.get(), m_cropRect);
ScriptScope scope(m_scriptState);
m_resolver->resolve(imageBitmap.release());
m_factory->didFinishLoading(this);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash when creating an ImageBitmap from an invalid canvas
BUG=354356
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/211313003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169973 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 115,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long Segment::DoParseNext(const Cluster*& pResult, long long& pos, long& len) {
long long total, avail;
long status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
long long off_next = 0;
long long cluster_size = -1;
for (;;) {
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
return 1; // EOF
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (pos >= segment_stop))
return 1; // EOF
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos; // absolute
const long long idoff = pos - m_start; // relative
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len); // absolute
if (id < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0) // weird
return -1; // generic error
pos += len; // consume ID
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (size != unknown_size) &&
((pos + size) > segment_stop)) {
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) { // Cues ID
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const long long element_stop = pos + size;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (element_stop > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const long long element_start = idpos;
const long long element_size = element_stop - element_start;
if (m_pCues == NULL) {
m_pCues = new Cues(this, pos, size, element_start, element_size);
assert(m_pCues); // TODO
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
continue;
}
if (id != 0x0F43B675) { // not a Cluster ID
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += size; // consume payload
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
continue;
}
#if 0 // this is commented-out to support incremental cluster parsing
len = static_cast<long>(size);
if (element_stop > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
#endif
off_next = idoff;
if (size != unknown_size)
cluster_size = size;
break;
}
assert(off_next > 0); // have cluster
Cluster** const ii = m_clusters + m_clusterCount;
Cluster** i = ii;
Cluster** const jj = ii + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** j = jj;
while (i < j) {
Cluster** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
const Cluster* const pNext = *k;
assert(pNext);
assert(pNext->m_index < 0);
pos = pNext->GetPosition();
assert(pos >= 0);
if (pos < off_next)
i = k + 1;
else if (pos > off_next)
j = k;
else {
pResult = pNext;
return 0; // success
}
}
assert(i == j);
long long pos_;
long len_;
status = Cluster::HasBlockEntries(this, off_next, pos_, len_);
if (status < 0) { // error or underflow
pos = pos_;
len = len_;
return status;
}
if (status > 0) { // means "found at least one block entry"
Cluster* const pNext = Cluster::Create(this,
-1, // preloaded
off_next);
assert(pNext);
const ptrdiff_t idx_next = i - m_clusters; // insertion position
PreloadCluster(pNext, idx_next);
assert(m_clusters);
assert(idx_next < m_clusterSize);
assert(m_clusters[idx_next] == pNext);
pResult = pNext;
return 0; // success
}
if (cluster_size < 0) { // unknown size
const long long payload_pos = pos; // absolute pos of cluster payload
for (;;) { // determine cluster size
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
break;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (pos >= segment_stop))
break; // no more clusters
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) // error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0x0F43B675) // Cluster ID
break;
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) // Cues ID
break;
pos += len; // consume ID (of sub-element)
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; // consume size field of element
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; // not allowed for sub-elements
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > segment_stop)) // weird
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += size; // consume payload of sub-element
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
} // determine cluster size
cluster_size = pos - payload_pos;
assert(cluster_size >= 0); // TODO: handle cluster_size = 0
pos = payload_pos; // reset and re-parse original cluster
}
pos += cluster_size; // consume payload
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
return 2; // try to find a cluster that follows next
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 173,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: simple_method_call (void)
{
DBusMessage *message;
/* Keeping this small makes stuff go faster */
message = dbus_message_new_method_call ("o.b.Q",
"/f/b",
"o.b.Z",
"Fro");
if (message == NULL)
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
return message;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 7,504
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static UINT32 RawCheckSumCalculator(PVOID buffer, ULONG len)
{
UINT32 val = 0;
PUSHORT pus = (PUSHORT)buffer;
ULONG count = len >> 1;
while (count--) val += *pus++;
if (len & 1) val += (USHORT)*(PUCHAR)pus;
return val;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 74,439
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TranslateInfoBarDelegate::ShouldShowMessageInfoBarButton() {
return !GetMessageInfoBarButtonText().empty();
}
Commit Message: Remove dependency of TranslateInfobarDelegate on profile
This CL uses TranslateTabHelper instead of Profile and also cleans up
some unused code and irrelevant dependencies.
BUG=371845
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/286973003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@270758 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 111,050
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const char *perf_config_dirname(const char *name, const char *value)
{
if (!name)
return NULL;
return value;
}
Commit Message: perf tools: do not look at ./config for configuration
In addition to /etc/perfconfig and $HOME/.perfconfig, perf looks for
configuration in the file ./config, imitating git which looks at
$GIT_DIR/config. If ./config is not a perf configuration file, it
fails, or worse, treats it as a configuration file and changes behavior
in some unexpected way.
"config" is not an unusual name for a file to be lying around and perf
does not have a private directory dedicated for its own use, so let's
just stop looking for configuration in the cwd. Callers needing
context-sensitive configuration can use the PERF_CONFIG environment
variable.
Requested-by: Christian Ohm <chr.ohm@gmx.net>
Cc: 632923@bugs.debian.org
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Ohm <chr.ohm@gmx.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20110805165838.GA7237@elie.gateway.2wire.net
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 34,837
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FileTransfer::DoUpload(filesize_t *total_bytes, ReliSock *s)
{
int rc;
MyString fullname;
filesize_t bytes;
bool is_the_executable;
bool upload_success = false;
bool do_download_ack = false;
bool do_upload_ack = false;
bool try_again = false;
int hold_code = 0;
int hold_subcode = 0;
MyString error_desc;
bool I_go_ahead_always = false;
bool peer_goes_ahead_always = false;
DCTransferQueue xfer_queue(m_xfer_queue_contact_info);
CondorError errstack;
bool first_failed_file_transfer_happened = false;
bool first_failed_upload_success = false;
bool first_failed_try_again = false;
int first_failed_hold_code = 0;
int first_failed_hold_subcode = 0;
MyString first_failed_error_desc;
int first_failed_line_number;
*total_bytes = 0;
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"entering FileTransfer::DoUpload\n");
priv_state saved_priv = PRIV_UNKNOWN;
if( want_priv_change ) {
saved_priv = set_priv( desired_priv_state );
}
s->encode();
if( !s->code(m_final_transfer_flag) ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
if( !s->end_of_message() ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
bool socket_default_crypto = s->get_encryption();
if( want_priv_change && saved_priv == PRIV_UNKNOWN ) {
saved_priv = set_priv( desired_priv_state );
}
FileTransferList filelist;
ExpandFileTransferList( FilesToSend, filelist );
FileTransferList::iterator filelist_it;
for( filelist_it = filelist.begin();
filelist_it != filelist.end();
filelist_it++ )
{
char const *filename = filelist_it->srcName();
char const *dest_dir = filelist_it->destDir();
if( dest_dir && *dest_dir ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: sending file %s to %s%c\n",filename,dest_dir,DIR_DELIM_CHAR);
}
else {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: sending file %s\n",filename);
}
bool is_url;
is_url = false;
if( param_boolean("ENABLE_URL_TRANSFERS", true) && IsUrl(filename) ) {
is_url = true;
fullname = filename;
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: sending %s as URL.\n", filename);
} else if( filename[0] != '/' && filename[0] != '\\' && filename[1] != ':' ){
fullname.sprintf("%s%c%s",Iwd,DIR_DELIM_CHAR,filename);
} else {
fullname = filename;
}
#ifdef WIN32
if( !is_url && perm_obj && !is_the_executable &&
(perm_obj->read_access(fullname.Value()) != 1) ) {
upload_success = false;
error_desc.sprintf("error reading from %s: permission denied",fullname.Value());
do_upload_ack = true; // tell receiver that we failed
do_download_ack = true;
try_again = false; // put job on hold
hold_code = CONDOR_HOLD_CODE_UploadFileError;
hold_subcode = EPERM;
return ExitDoUpload(total_bytes,s,saved_priv,socket_default_crypto,
upload_success,do_upload_ack,do_download_ack,
try_again,hold_code,hold_subcode,
error_desc.Value(),__LINE__);
}
#endif
if (is_the_executable) {} // Done to get rid of the compiler set-but-not-used warnings.
int file_command = 1;
int file_subcommand = 0;
if ( DontEncryptFiles->file_contains_withwildcard(filename) ) {
file_command = 3;
}
if ( EncryptFiles->file_contains_withwildcard(filename) ) {
file_command = 2;
}
if ( X509UserProxy && file_strcmp( filename, X509UserProxy ) == 0 &&
DelegateX509Credentials ) {
file_command = 4;
}
if ( is_url ) {
file_command = 5;
}
if ( m_final_transfer_flag && OutputDestination ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "FILETRANSFER: Using command 999:7 for OutputDestionation: %s\n",
OutputDestination);
file_command = 999;
file_subcommand = 7;
}
bool fail_because_mkdir_not_supported = false;
bool fail_because_symlink_not_supported = false;
if( filelist_it->is_directory ) {
if( filelist_it->is_symlink ) {
fail_because_symlink_not_supported = true;
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"DoUpload: attempting to transfer symlink %s which points to a directory. This is not supported.\n",filename);
}
else if( PeerUnderstandsMkdir ) {
file_command = 6;
}
else {
fail_because_mkdir_not_supported = true;
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"DoUpload: attempting to transfer directory %s, but the version of Condor we are talking to is too old to support that!\n",
filename);
}
}
dprintf ( D_FULLDEBUG, "FILETRANSFER: outgoing file_command is %i for %s\n",
file_command, filename );
if( !s->snd_int(file_command,FALSE) ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
if( !s->end_of_message() ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
if (file_command == 2) {
s->set_crypto_mode(true);
} else if (file_command == 3) {
s->set_crypto_mode(false);
}
else {
s->set_crypto_mode(socket_default_crypto);
}
MyString dest_filename;
if ( ExecFile && !simple_init && (file_strcmp(ExecFile,filename)==0 )) {
is_the_executable = true;
dest_filename = CONDOR_EXEC;
} else {
is_the_executable = false;
if( dest_dir && *dest_dir ) {
dest_filename.sprintf("%s%c",dest_dir,DIR_DELIM_CHAR);
}
dest_filename.sprintf_cat( condor_basename(filename) );
}
if( !s->put(dest_filename.Value()) ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
if( PeerDoesGoAhead ) {
if( !s->end_of_message() ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: failed on eom before GoAhead; exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
if( !peer_goes_ahead_always ) {
if( !ReceiveTransferGoAhead(s,fullname.Value(),false,peer_goes_ahead_always) ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
}
if( !I_go_ahead_always ) {
if( !ObtainAndSendTransferGoAhead(xfer_queue,false,s,fullname.Value(),I_go_ahead_always) ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
}
s->encode();
}
if ( file_command == 999) {
ClassAd file_info;
file_info.Assign("ProtocolVersion", 1);
file_info.Assign("Command", file_command);
file_info.Assign("SubCommand", file_subcommand);
if(file_subcommand == 7) {
MyString source_filename;
source_filename = Iwd;
source_filename += DIR_DELIM_CHAR;
source_filename += filename;
MyString URL;
URL = OutputDestination;
URL += DIR_DELIM_CHAR;
URL += filename;
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: calling IFTP(fn,U): fn\"%s\", U\"%s\"\n", source_filename.Value(), URL.Value());
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "LocalProxyName: %s\n", LocalProxyName.Value());
rc = InvokeFileTransferPlugin(errstack, source_filename.Value(), URL.Value(), LocalProxyName.Value());
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: IFTP(fn,U): fn\"%s\", U\"%s\" returns %i\n", source_filename.Value(), URL.Value(), rc);
file_info.Assign("Filename", source_filename);
file_info.Assign("OutputDestination", URL);
file_info.Assign("Result", rc);
if (rc) {
file_info.Assign("ErrorString", errstack.getFullText());
}
if(!file_info.put(*s)) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoDownload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
MyString junkbuf;
file_info.sPrint(junkbuf);
bytes = junkbuf.Length();
} else {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "DoUpload: invalid subcommand %i, skipping %s.",
file_subcommand, filename);
bytes = 0;
rc = 0;
}
} else if ( file_command == 4 ) {
if ( (PeerDoesGoAhead || s->end_of_message()) ) {
time_t expiration_time = GetDesiredDelegatedJobCredentialExpiration(&jobAd);
rc = s->put_x509_delegation( &bytes, fullname.Value(), expiration_time, NULL );
dprintf( D_FULLDEBUG,
"DoUpload: put_x509_delegation() returned %d\n",
rc );
} else {
rc = -1;
}
} else if (file_command == 5) {
if(!s->code(fullname)) {
dprintf( D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: failed to send fullname: %s\n", fullname.Value());
rc = -1;
} else {
dprintf( D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: sent fullname and NO eom: %s\n", fullname.Value());
rc = 0;
}
bytes = fullname.Length();
} else if( file_command == 6 ) { // mkdir
bytes = sizeof( filelist_it->file_mode );
if( !s->put( filelist_it->file_mode ) ) {
rc = -1;
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"DoUpload: failed to send mkdir mode\n");
}
else {
rc = 0;
}
} else if( fail_because_mkdir_not_supported || fail_because_symlink_not_supported ) {
if( TransferFilePermissions ) {
rc = s->put_file_with_permissions( &bytes, NULL_FILE );
}
else {
rc = s->put_file( &bytes, NULL_FILE );
}
if( rc == 0 ) {
rc = PUT_FILE_OPEN_FAILED;
errno = EISDIR;
}
} else if ( TransferFilePermissions ) {
rc = s->put_file_with_permissions( &bytes, fullname.Value() );
} else {
rc = s->put_file( &bytes, fullname.Value() );
}
if( rc < 0 ) {
int the_error = errno;
upload_success = false;
error_desc.sprintf("error sending %s",fullname.Value());
if((rc == PUT_FILE_OPEN_FAILED) || (rc == PUT_FILE_PLUGIN_FAILED)) {
if (rc == PUT_FILE_OPEN_FAILED) {
error_desc.replaceString("sending","reading from");
error_desc.sprintf_cat(": (errno %d) %s",the_error,strerror(the_error));
if( fail_because_mkdir_not_supported ) {
error_desc.sprintf_cat("; Remote condor version is too old to transfer directories.");
}
if( fail_because_symlink_not_supported ) {
error_desc.sprintf_cat("; Transfer of symlinks to directories is not supported.");
}
} else {
error_desc.sprintf_cat(": %s", errstack.getFullText());
}
try_again = false; // put job on hold
hold_code = CONDOR_HOLD_CODE_UploadFileError;
hold_subcode = the_error;
if (first_failed_file_transfer_happened == false) {
first_failed_file_transfer_happened = true;
first_failed_upload_success = false;
first_failed_try_again = false;
first_failed_hold_code = hold_code;
first_failed_hold_subcode = the_error;
first_failed_error_desc = error_desc;
first_failed_line_number = __LINE__;
}
}
else {
do_download_ack = true;
do_upload_ack = false;
try_again = true;
return ExitDoUpload(total_bytes,s,saved_priv,
socket_default_crypto,upload_success,
do_upload_ack,do_download_ack,
try_again,hold_code,hold_subcode,
error_desc.Value(),__LINE__);
}
}
if( !s->end_of_message() ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
*total_bytes += bytes;
if( dest_filename.FindChar(DIR_DELIM_CHAR) < 0 &&
dest_filename != condor_basename(JobStdoutFile.Value()) &&
dest_filename != condor_basename(JobStderrFile.Value()) )
{
Info.addSpooledFile( dest_filename.Value() );
}
}
do_download_ack = true;
do_upload_ack = true;
if (first_failed_file_transfer_happened == true) {
return ExitDoUpload(total_bytes,s,saved_priv,socket_default_crypto,
first_failed_upload_success,do_upload_ack,do_download_ack,
first_failed_try_again,first_failed_hold_code,
first_failed_hold_subcode,first_failed_error_desc.Value(),
first_failed_line_number);
}
upload_success = true;
return ExitDoUpload(total_bytes,s,saved_priv,socket_default_crypto,
upload_success,do_upload_ack,do_download_ack,
try_again,hold_code,hold_subcode,NULL,__LINE__);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 1
| 165,386
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_parse_sao(codec_t *ps_codec)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
sps_t *ps_sps;
sao_t *ps_sao;
WORD32 rx;
WORD32 ry;
WORD32 value;
bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm = &ps_codec->s_parse.s_bitstrm;
WORD32 sao_merge_left_flag;
WORD32 sao_merge_up_flag;
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr;
cab_ctxt_t *ps_cabac = &ps_codec->s_parse.s_cabac;
WORD32 ctxt_idx;
ps_slice_hdr = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr_base;
ps_slice_hdr += (ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1));
ps_sps = (ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps);
rx = ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_x;
ry = ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_y;
ps_sao = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_pic_sao + rx + ry * ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb;
/* Default values */
ps_sao->b3_y_type_idx = 0;
ps_sao->b3_cb_type_idx = 0;
ps_sao->b3_cr_type_idx = 0;
UNUSED(value);
ctxt_idx = IHEVC_CAB_SAO_MERGE;
sao_merge_left_flag = 0;
sao_merge_up_flag = 0;
if(rx > 0)
{
/*TODO:Implemented only for slice. condition for tile is not tested*/
if(((0 != ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_slice_x) || (0 != ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_slice_y)) &&
(0 != ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_tile_x))
{
TRACE_CABAC_CTXT("sao_merge_flag", ps_cabac->u4_range, ctxt_idx);
sao_merge_left_flag = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bin(ps_cabac,
ps_bitstrm,
ctxt_idx);
AEV_TRACE("sao_merge_flag", sao_merge_left_flag, ps_cabac->u4_range);
}
}
if(ry > 0 && !sao_merge_left_flag)
{
if((ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_slice_y > 0) && (ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_tile_y > 0))
{
TRACE_CABAC_CTXT("sao_merge_flag", ps_cabac->u4_range, ctxt_idx);
sao_merge_up_flag = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bin(ps_cabac,
ps_bitstrm,
ctxt_idx);
AEV_TRACE("sao_merge_flag", sao_merge_up_flag, ps_cabac->u4_range);
}
}
ctxt_idx = IHEVC_CAB_SAO_TYPE;
if(sao_merge_left_flag)
{
*ps_sao = *(ps_sao - 1);
}
else if(sao_merge_up_flag)
{
*ps_sao = *(ps_sao - ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb);
}
else // if(!sao_merge_up_flag && !sao_merge_left_flag)
{
WORD32 c_idx;
WORD32 sao_type_idx = 0;
for(c_idx = 0; c_idx < 3; c_idx++)
{
if((ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_sao_luma_flag && c_idx == 0) || (ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_sao_chroma_flag && c_idx > 0))
{
/* sao_type_idx will be same for c_idx == 1 and c_idx == 2 - hence not initialized to zero for c_idx == 2*/
if(c_idx == 0)
{
sao_type_idx = 0;
TRACE_CABAC_CTXT("sao_type_idx", ps_cabac->u4_range, ctxt_idx);
sao_type_idx = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bin(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm, ctxt_idx);
if(sao_type_idx)
{
sao_type_idx += ihevcd_cabac_decode_bypass_bin(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm);
}
AEV_TRACE("sao_type_idx", sao_type_idx, ps_cabac->u4_range);
ps_sao->b3_y_type_idx = sao_type_idx;
}
if(c_idx == 1)
{
sao_type_idx = 0;
TRACE_CABAC_CTXT("sao_type_idx", ps_cabac->u4_range, ctxt_idx);
sao_type_idx = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bin(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm, ctxt_idx);
if(sao_type_idx)
{
sao_type_idx += ihevcd_cabac_decode_bypass_bin(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm);
}
AEV_TRACE("sao_type_idx", sao_type_idx, ps_cabac->u4_range);
ps_sao->b3_cb_type_idx = sao_type_idx;
ps_sao->b3_cr_type_idx = sao_type_idx;
}
if(sao_type_idx != 0)
{
WORD32 i;
WORD32 sao_offset[4];
WORD32 sao_band_position = 0;
WORD32 c_max = (1 << (MIN(BIT_DEPTH, 10) - 5)) - 1;
for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
sao_offset[i] = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bypass_bins_tunary(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm, c_max);
AEV_TRACE("sao_offset_abs", sao_offset[i], ps_cabac->u4_range);
if((2 == sao_type_idx) && (i > 1))
{
sao_offset[i] = -sao_offset[i];
}
}
if(sao_type_idx == 1)
{
for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
if(sao_offset[i] != 0)
{
value = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bypass_bin(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm);
AEV_TRACE("sao_offset_sign", value, ps_cabac->u4_range);
if(value)
{
sao_offset[i] = -sao_offset[i];
}
}
}
value = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bypass_bins(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm, 5);
AEV_TRACE("sao_band_position", value, ps_cabac->u4_range);
sao_band_position = value;
}
else
{
if(c_idx == 0)
{
value = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bypass_bins(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm, 2);
AEV_TRACE("sao_eo_class", value, ps_cabac->u4_range);
ps_sao->b3_y_type_idx += value;
}
if(c_idx == 1)
{
value = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bypass_bins(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm, 2);
AEV_TRACE("sao_eo_class", value, ps_cabac->u4_range);
ps_sao->b3_cb_type_idx += value;
ps_sao->b3_cr_type_idx += value;
}
}
if(0 == c_idx)
{
ps_sao->b4_y_offset_1 = sao_offset[0];
ps_sao->b4_y_offset_2 = sao_offset[1];
ps_sao->b4_y_offset_3 = sao_offset[2];
ps_sao->b4_y_offset_4 = sao_offset[3];
ps_sao->b5_y_band_pos = sao_band_position;
}
else if(1 == c_idx)
{
ps_sao->b4_cb_offset_1 = sao_offset[0];
ps_sao->b4_cb_offset_2 = sao_offset[1];
ps_sao->b4_cb_offset_3 = sao_offset[2];
ps_sao->b4_cb_offset_4 = sao_offset[3];
ps_sao->b5_cb_band_pos = sao_band_position;
}
else // 2 == c_idx
{
ps_sao->b4_cr_offset_1 = sao_offset[0];
ps_sao->b4_cr_offset_2 = sao_offset[1];
ps_sao->b4_cr_offset_3 = sao_offset[2];
ps_sao->b4_cr_offset_4 = sao_offset[3];
ps_sao->b5_cr_band_pos = sao_band_position;
}
}
}
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Return error from cabac init if offset is greater than range
When the offset was greater than range, the bitstream was read
more than the valid range in leaf-level cabac parsing modules.
Error check was added to cabac init to fix this issue. Additionally
end of slice and slice error were signalled to suppress further
parsing of current slice.
Bug: 34897036
Change-Id: I1263f1d1219684ffa6e952c76e5a08e9a933c9d2
(cherry picked from commit 3b175da88a1807d19cdd248b74bce60e57f05c6a)
(cherry picked from commit b92314c860d01d754ef579eafe55d7377962b3ba)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 162,576
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mlx4_set_port_vlan_table(struct mlx4_dev *dev, u8 port,
__be32 *entries)
{
struct mlx4_cmd_mailbox *mailbox;
u32 in_mod;
int err;
mailbox = mlx4_alloc_cmd_mailbox(dev);
if (IS_ERR(mailbox))
return PTR_ERR(mailbox);
memcpy(mailbox->buf, entries, MLX4_VLAN_TABLE_SIZE);
in_mod = MLX4_SET_PORT_VLAN_TABLE << 8 | port;
err = mlx4_cmd(dev, mailbox->dma, in_mod, 1, MLX4_CMD_SET_PORT,
MLX4_CMD_TIME_CLASS_B);
mlx4_free_cmd_mailbox(dev, mailbox);
return err;
}
Commit Message: mlx4_en: Fix out of bounds array access
When searching for a free entry in either mlx4_register_vlan() or
mlx4_register_mac(), and there is no free entry, the loop terminates without
updating the local variable free thus causing out of array bounds access. Fix
this by adding a proper check outside the loop.
Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.co.il>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 94,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CWebServer::RType_Notifications(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "Notifications";
int ii = 0;
for (const auto & ittNotifiers : m_notifications.m_notifiers)
{
root["notifiers"][ii]["name"] = ittNotifiers.first;
root["notifiers"][ii]["description"] = ittNotifiers.first;
ii++;
}
uint64_t idx = 0;
if (request::findValue(&req, "idx") != "")
{
idx = std::strtoull(request::findValue(&req, "idx").c_str(), nullptr, 10);
}
std::vector<_tNotification> notifications = m_notifications.GetNotifications(idx);
if (notifications.size() > 0)
{
ii = 0;
for (const auto & itt : notifications)
{
root["result"][ii]["idx"] = itt.ID;
std::string sParams = itt.Params;
if (sParams.empty()) {
sParams = "S";
}
root["result"][ii]["Params"] = sParams;
root["result"][ii]["Priority"] = itt.Priority;
root["result"][ii]["SendAlways"] = itt.SendAlways;
root["result"][ii]["CustomMessage"] = itt.CustomMessage;
root["result"][ii]["ActiveSystems"] = itt.ActiveSystems;
ii++;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89
| 0
| 91,058
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init setup_relax_domain_level(char *str)
{
unsigned long val;
val = simple_strtoul(str, NULL, 0);
if (val < sched_domain_level_max)
default_relax_domain_level = val;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,349
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void pre_schedule(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p)
{
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,504
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vrrp_print_stats(void)
{
FILE *file;
file = fopen (stats_file, "w");
if (!file) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Can't open %s (%d: %s)",
stats_file, errno, strerror(errno));
return;
}
list l = vrrp_data->vrrp;
element e;
vrrp_t *vrrp;
for (e = LIST_HEAD(l); e; ELEMENT_NEXT(e)) {
vrrp = ELEMENT_DATA(e);
fprintf(file, "VRRP Instance: %s\n", vrrp->iname);
fprintf(file, " Advertisements:\n");
fprintf(file, " Received: %" PRIu64 "\n", vrrp->stats->advert_rcvd);
fprintf(file, " Sent: %d\n", vrrp->stats->advert_sent);
fprintf(file, " Became master: %d\n", vrrp->stats->become_master);
fprintf(file, " Released master: %d\n",
vrrp->stats->release_master);
fprintf(file, " Packet Errors:\n");
fprintf(file, " Length: %" PRIu64 "\n", vrrp->stats->packet_len_err);
fprintf(file, " TTL: %" PRIu64 "\n", vrrp->stats->ip_ttl_err);
fprintf(file, " Invalid Type: %" PRIu64 "\n",
vrrp->stats->invalid_type_rcvd);
fprintf(file, " Advertisement Interval: %" PRIu64 "\n",
vrrp->stats->advert_interval_err);
fprintf(file, " Address List: %" PRIu64 "\n",
vrrp->stats->addr_list_err);
fprintf(file, " Authentication Errors:\n");
fprintf(file, " Invalid Type: %d\n",
vrrp->stats->invalid_authtype);
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_AUTH_
fprintf(file, " Type Mismatch: %d\n",
vrrp->stats->authtype_mismatch);
fprintf(file, " Failure: %d\n",
vrrp->stats->auth_failure);
#endif
fprintf(file, " Priority Zero:\n");
fprintf(file, " Received: %" PRIu64 "\n", vrrp->stats->pri_zero_rcvd);
fprintf(file, " Sent: %" PRIu64 "\n", vrrp->stats->pri_zero_sent);
}
fclose(file);
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 1
| 168,992
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u32 h264bsdIsEndOfPicture(storage_t *pStorage)
{
/* Variables */
u32 i, tmp;
/* Code */
/* primary picture */
if (!pStorage->sliceHeader[0].redundantPicCnt)
{
if (pStorage->slice->numDecodedMbs == pStorage->picSizeInMbs)
return(HANTRO_TRUE);
}
else
{
for (i = 0, tmp = 0; i < pStorage->picSizeInMbs; i++)
tmp += pStorage->mb[i].decoded ? 1 : 0;
if (tmp == pStorage->picSizeInMbs)
return(HANTRO_TRUE);
}
return(HANTRO_FALSE);
}
Commit Message: h264bsdActivateParamSets: Prevent multiplication overflow.
Report MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR if pStorage->picSizeInMbs would
exceed UINT32_MAX bytes.
Bug: 28532266
Change-Id: Ia6f11efb18818afcdb5fa2a38a14f2a2d8c8447a
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 160,454
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mfill_zeropage_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm,
pmd_t *dst_pmd,
struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma,
unsigned long dst_addr)
{
pte_t _dst_pte, *dst_pte;
spinlock_t *ptl;
int ret;
_dst_pte = pte_mkspecial(pfn_pte(my_zero_pfn(dst_addr),
dst_vma->vm_page_prot));
ret = -EEXIST;
dst_pte = pte_offset_map_lock(dst_mm, dst_pmd, dst_addr, &ptl);
if (!pte_none(*dst_pte))
goto out_unlock;
set_pte_at(dst_mm, dst_addr, dst_pte, _dst_pte);
/* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */
update_mmu_cache(dst_vma, dst_addr, dst_pte);
ret = 0;
out_unlock:
pte_unmap_unlock(dst_pte, ptl);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: shmem/hugetlbfs: only allow to register VM_MAYWRITE vmas
After the VMA to register the uffd onto is found, check that it has
VM_MAYWRITE set before allowing registration. This way we inherit all
common code checks before allowing to fill file holes in shmem and
hugetlbfs with UFFDIO_COPY.
The userfaultfd memory model is not applicable for readonly files unless
it's a MAP_PRIVATE.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126173452.26955-4-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: ff62a3421044 ("hugetlb: implement memfd sealing")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Fixes: 4c27fe4c4c84 ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 76,477
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::unregisterNodeList(const LiveNodeListBase* list)
{
#if ENABLE(OILPAN)
ASSERT(m_nodeLists[list->invalidationType()].contains(list));
m_nodeLists[list->invalidationType()].remove(list);
#else
m_nodeListCounts[list->invalidationType()]--;
#endif
if (list->isRootedAtDocument()) {
ASSERT(m_listsInvalidatedAtDocument.contains(list));
m_listsInvalidatedAtDocument.remove(list);
}
}
Commit Message: Don't change Document load progress in any page dismissal events.
This can confuse the logic for blocking modal dialogs.
BUG=536652
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1373113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351419}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 125,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_exec_irep(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self, struct RProc *p)
{
mrb_callinfo *ci = mrb->c->ci;
int keep;
mrb->c->stack[0] = self;
ci->proc = p;
if (MRB_PROC_CFUNC_P(p)) {
return MRB_PROC_CFUNC(p)(mrb, self);
}
ci->nregs = p->body.irep->nregs;
if (ci->argc < 0) keep = 3;
else keep = ci->argc + 2;
if (ci->nregs < keep) {
stack_extend(mrb, keep);
}
else {
stack_extend(mrb, ci->nregs);
stack_clear(mrb->c->stack+keep, ci->nregs-keep);
}
ci = cipush(mrb);
ci->nregs = 0;
ci->target_class = 0;
ci->pc = p->body.irep->iseq;
ci->stackent = mrb->c->stack;
ci->acc = 0;
return self;
}
Commit Message: Check length of env stack before accessing upvar; fix #3995
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 83,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FrameStableObserver(RenderWidgetHostViewBase* view, base::TimeDelta delta)
: view_(view), delta_(delta) {}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 143,842
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint32_t ne2000_reset_ioport_read(void *opaque, uint32_t addr)
{
NE2000State *s = opaque;
ne2000_reset(s);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,584
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kvm_purge_vmm_mapping(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
ia64_ptr_entry(0x3, vcpu->arch.vmm_tr_slot);
ia64_ptr_entry(0x3, vcpu->arch.vm_tr_slot);
#if defined(CONFIG_IA64_SGI_SN2) || defined(CONFIG_IA64_GENERIC)
if (kvm->arch.is_sn2)
ia64_ptr_entry(0x3, vcpu->arch.sn_rtc_tr_slot);
#endif
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,630
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int emitjump(JF, int opcode)
{
int inst = F->codelen + 1;
emit(J, F, opcode);
emitraw(J, F, 0);
return inst;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 7,926
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::NeedsOverflowControlsClip() const {
if (!object_.HasOverflowClip())
return false;
const auto& box = ToLayoutBox(object_);
const auto* scrollable_area = box.GetScrollableArea();
IntRect scroll_controls_bounds =
scrollable_area->ScrollCornerAndResizerRect();
if (const auto* scrollbar = scrollable_area->HorizontalScrollbar())
scroll_controls_bounds.Unite(scrollbar->FrameRect());
if (const auto* scrollbar = scrollable_area->VerticalScrollbar())
scroll_controls_bounds.Unite(scrollbar->FrameRect());
auto pixel_snapped_border_box_rect = box.PixelSnappedBorderBoxRect(
ToLayoutSize(context_.current.paint_offset));
pixel_snapped_border_box_rect.SetLocation(IntPoint());
return !pixel_snapped_border_box_rect.Contains(scroll_controls_bounds);
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,436
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int bat_socket_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
unsigned int i;
struct socket_client *socket_client;
nonseekable_open(inode, file);
socket_client = kmalloc(sizeof(*socket_client), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!socket_client)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(socket_client_hash); i++) {
if (!socket_client_hash[i]) {
socket_client_hash[i] = socket_client;
break;
}
}
if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(socket_client_hash)) {
pr_err("Error - can't add another packet client: "
"maximum number of clients reached\n");
kfree(socket_client);
return -EXFULL;
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&socket_client->queue_list);
socket_client->queue_len = 0;
socket_client->index = i;
socket_client->bat_priv = inode->i_private;
spin_lock_init(&socket_client->lock);
init_waitqueue_head(&socket_client->queue_wait);
file->private_data = socket_client;
inc_module_count();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: batman-adv: Only write requested number of byte to user buffer
Don't write more than the requested number of bytes of an batman-adv icmp
packet to the userspace buffer. Otherwise unrelated userspace memory might get
overridden by the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <lindner_marek@yahoo.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 34,603
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct minidump_memory_info *r_bin_mdmp_get_mem_info(struct r_bin_mdmp_obj *obj, ut64 vaddr) {
struct minidump_memory_info *mem_info;
RListIter *it;
if (!obj) return NULL;
r_list_foreach (obj->streams.memory_infos, it, mem_info) {
if (mem_info->allocation_base && vaddr == mem_info->base_address) {
return mem_info;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #10464 - oobread crash in mdmp
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 79,705
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool canAppendNewLineFeedToSelection(const VisibleSelection& selection) {
Element* element = selection.rootEditableElement();
if (!element)
return false;
BeforeTextInsertedEvent* event =
BeforeTextInsertedEvent::create(String("\n"));
element->dispatchEvent(event);
return event->text().length();
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 129,197
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int bitmap_position_packfile(const unsigned char *sha1)
{
off_t offset = find_pack_entry_one(sha1, bitmap_git.pack);
if (!offset)
return -1;
return find_revindex_position(bitmap_git.pack, offset);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 54,924
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Part::slotLoadingFinished(KJob *job)
{
if (job->error()) {
if (arguments().metaData()[QStringLiteral("createNewArchive")] != QLatin1String("true")) {
if (job->error() != KJob::KilledJobError) {
displayMsgWidget(KMessageWidget::Error, xi18nc("@info", "Loading the archive <filename>%1</filename> failed with the following error:<nl/><message>%2</message>",
localFilePath(),
job->errorString()));
}
m_model->reset();
m_infoPanel->setPrettyFileName(QString());
m_infoPanel->updateWithDefaults();
emit setWindowCaption(QString());
}
}
m_view->sortByColumn(0, Qt::AscendingOrder);
if (m_view->model()->rowCount() == 1) {
m_view->expandToDepth(0);
}
m_view->header()->resizeSections(QHeaderView::ResizeToContents);
m_view->setDropsEnabled(true);
updateActions();
if (!m_model->archive()) {
return;
}
if (!m_model->archive()->comment().isEmpty()) {
m_commentView->setPlainText(m_model->archive()->comment());
slotShowComment();
} else {
m_commentView->clear();
m_commentBox->hide();
}
if (m_model->rowCount() == 0) {
qCWarning(ARK) << "No entry listed by the plugin";
displayMsgWidget(KMessageWidget::Warning, xi18nc("@info", "The archive is empty or Ark could not open its content."));
} else if (m_model->rowCount() == 1) {
if (m_model->archive()->mimeType().inherits(QStringLiteral("application/x-cd-image")) &&
m_model->entryForIndex(m_model->index(0, 0))->fullPath() == QLatin1String("README.TXT")) {
qCWarning(ARK) << "Detected ISO image with UDF filesystem";
displayMsgWidget(KMessageWidget::Warning, xi18nc("@info", "Ark does not currently support ISO files with UDF filesystem."));
}
}
if (arguments().metaData()[QStringLiteral("showExtractDialog")] == QLatin1String("true")) {
QTimer::singleShot(0, this, &Part::slotShowExtractionDialog);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 9,931
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::Value* PopulateDevice(const UsbDevice* device, int id) {
Device result;
result.device = id;
result.vendor_id = device->vendor_id();
result.product_id = device->product_id();
return result.ToValue().release();
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,394
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cx24116_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
{
return DVBFE_ALGO_HW;
}
Commit Message: [media] cx24116: fix a buffer overflow when checking userspace params
The maximum size for a DiSEqC command is 6, according to the
userspace API. However, the code allows to write up much more values:
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c:983 cx24116_send_diseqc_msg() error: buffer overflow 'd->msg' 6 <= 23
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 94,051
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ZIPARCHIVE_METHOD(getCommentIndex)
{
struct zip *intern;
zval *self = getThis();
zend_long index, flags = 0;
const char * comment;
int comment_len = 0;
struct zip_stat sb;
if (!self) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZIP_FROM_OBJECT(intern, self);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "l|l",
&index, &flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
PHP_ZIP_STAT_INDEX(intern, index, 0, sb);
comment = zip_get_file_comment(intern, index, &comment_len, (int)flags);
RETURN_STRINGL((char *)comment, (zend_long)comment_len);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 54,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CL_SetRecommended_f( void ) {
Com_SetRecommended();
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,721
|
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