instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void prune_init_slice(char *cg)
{
char *point;
point = cg + strlen(cg) - strlen(INITSCOPE);
if (point < cg)
return;
if (strcmp(point, INITSCOPE) == 0) {
if (point == cg)
*(point+1) = '\0';
else
*point = '\0';
}
}
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int uv__process_init_stdio(uv_stdio_container_t* container, int fds[2]) {
int mask;
int fd;
mask = UV_IGNORE | UV_CREATE_PIPE | UV_INHERIT_FD | UV_INHERIT_STREAM;
switch (container->flags & mask) {
case UV_IGNORE:
return 0;
case UV_CREATE_PIPE:
assert(container->data.stream != NULL);
if (container->data.stream->type != UV_NAMED_PIPE)
return -EINVAL;
else
return uv__make_socketpair(fds, 0);
case UV_INHERIT_FD:
case UV_INHERIT_STREAM:
if (container->flags & UV_INHERIT_FD)
fd = container->data.fd;
else
fd = uv__stream_fd(container->data.stream);
if (fd == -1)
return -EINVAL;
fds[1] = fd;
return 0;
default:
assert(0 && "Unexpected flags");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Commit Message: unix: call setgoups before calling setuid/setgid
Partial fix for #1093
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,847
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int generic_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, char __user *buffer, int buflen)
{
struct nameidata nd;
void *cookie;
int res;
nd.depth = 0;
cookie = dentry->d_inode->i_op->follow_link(dentry, &nd);
if (IS_ERR(cookie))
return PTR_ERR(cookie);
res = vfs_readlink(dentry, buffer, buflen, nd_get_link(&nd));
if (dentry->d_inode->i_op->put_link)
dentry->d_inode->i_op->put_link(dentry, &nd, cookie);
return res;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,688
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void bta_hh_co_close(UINT8 dev_handle, UINT8 app_id)
{
UINT32 i;
btif_hh_device_t *p_dev = NULL;
APPL_TRACE_WARNING("%s: dev_handle = %d, app_id = %d", __FUNCTION__, dev_handle, app_id);
if (dev_handle == BTA_HH_INVALID_HANDLE) {
APPL_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Oops, dev_handle (%d) is invalid...", __FUNCTION__, dev_handle);
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < BTIF_HH_MAX_HID; i++) {
p_dev = &btif_hh_cb.devices[i];
if (p_dev->dev_status != BTHH_CONN_STATE_UNKNOWN && p_dev->dev_handle == dev_handle) {
APPL_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Found an existing device with the same handle "
"dev_status = %d, dev_handle =%d"
,__FUNCTION__,p_dev->dev_status
,p_dev->dev_handle);
btif_hh_close_poll_thread(p_dev);
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,505
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameView::removeSlowRepaintObject()
{
ASSERT(m_slowRepaintObjectCount > 0);
m_slowRepaintObjectCount--;
if (!m_slowRepaintObjectCount) {
if (Page* page = m_frame->page()) {
if (ScrollingCoordinator* scrollingCoordinator = page->scrollingCoordinator())
scrollingCoordinator->frameViewHasSlowRepaintObjectsDidChange(this);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 119,892
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Wait() { run_loop_->Run(); }
Commit Message: Security drop fullscreen for any nested WebContents level.
This relands 3dcaec6e30feebefc11e with a fix to the test.
BUG=873080
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: Ie68b197fc6b92447e9633f233354a68fefcf20c7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1175925
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#583335}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,976
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BrowserTabStripController::IsCompatibleWith(TabStrip* other) const {
Profile* other_profile =
static_cast<BrowserTabStripController*>(other->controller())->profile();
return other_profile == profile();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,495
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline size_t parse_uiv(const unsigned char *p)
{
unsigned char cursor;
size_t result = 0;
if (*p == '+') {
p++;
}
while (1) {
cursor = *p;
if (cursor >= '0' && cursor <= '9') {
result = result * 10 + (size_t)(cursor - (unsigned char)'0');
} else {
break;
}
p++;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,553
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TextTrack::InvalidateTrackIndex() {
track_index_ = kInvalidTrackIndex;
rendered_track_index_ = kInvalidTrackIndex;
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,009
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FakeCrosDisksClient::RemoveObserver(Observer* observer) {
observer_list_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 124,110
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int key_search(struct extent_buffer *b, struct btrfs_key *key,
int level, int *prev_cmp, int *slot)
{
if (*prev_cmp != 0) {
*prev_cmp = bin_search(b, key, level, slot);
return *prev_cmp;
}
key_search_validate(b, key, level);
*slot = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 45,337
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned long realpath_cache_key(const char *path, int path_len TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
register unsigned long h;
char *bucket_key_start = tsrm_win32_get_path_sid_key(path TSRMLS_CC);
char *bucket_key = (char *)bucket_key_start;
const char *e = bucket_key + strlen(bucket_key);
if (!bucket_key) {
return 0;
}
for (h = 2166136261U; bucket_key < e;) {
h *= 16777619;
h ^= *bucket_key++;
}
HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, (LPVOID)bucket_key_start);
return h;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 9,658
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::CopyImageAt(int x, int y) {
gfx::PointF point_in_view =
GetView()->TransformRootPointToViewCoordSpace(gfx::PointF(x, y));
Send(new FrameMsg_CopyImageAt(routing_id_, point_in_view.x(),
point_in_view.y()));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,223
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_free_createdata(struct nfs4_createdata *data)
{
kfree(data);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,908
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum test_return stop_memcached_server(void) {
close(sock);
assert(kill(server_pid, SIGTERM) == 0);
return TEST_PASS;
}
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 94,241
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _waiter_create(uint32_t jobid)
{
struct waiter *wp = xmalloc(sizeof(struct waiter));
wp->jobid = jobid;
wp->thd = pthread_self();
return wp;
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 72,162
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool LauncherView::ShouldHideTooltip(const gfx::Point& cursor_location) {
gfx::Rect active_bounds;
for (int i = 0; i < child_count(); ++i) {
views::View* child = child_at(i);
if (child == overflow_button_)
continue;
gfx::Rect child_bounds = child->GetMirroredBounds();
active_bounds = active_bounds.Union(child_bounds);
}
return !active_bounds.Contains(cursor_location);
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,258
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::DidGetRedirectForResourceRequest(
const ResourceRedirectDetails& details) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidGetRedirectForResourceRequest(details);
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RESOURCE_RECEIVED_REDIRECT,
Source<WebContents>(this),
Details<const ResourceRedirectDetails>(&details));
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ssl_decompress_buf( ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
unsigned char *msg_post = ssl->in_msg;
size_t len_pre = ssl->in_msglen;
unsigned char *msg_pre;
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> decompress buf" ) );
msg_pre = (unsigned char*) malloc( len_pre );
if( msg_pre == NULL )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "malloc(%d bytes) failed", len_pre ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_MALLOC_FAILED );
}
memcpy( msg_pre, ssl->in_msg, len_pre );
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before decompression: msglen = %d, ",
ssl->in_msglen ) );
SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before decompression: input payload",
ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen );
ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.next_in = msg_pre;
ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_in = len_pre;
ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.next_out = msg_post;
ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_out = SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
ret = inflate( &ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate, Z_SYNC_FLUSH );
if( ret != Z_OK )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "failed to perform decompression (%d)", ret ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED );
}
ssl->in_msglen = SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_out;
free( msg_pre );
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "after decompression: msglen = %d, ",
ssl->in_msglen ) );
SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after decompression: input payload",
ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen );
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= decompress buf" ) );
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,990
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::RegisterSchemes() {
WebString chrome_scheme(WebString::FromASCII(kChromeUIScheme));
WebSecurityPolicy::RegisterURLSchemeAsDisplayIsolated(chrome_scheme);
WebSecurityPolicy::RegisterURLSchemeAsNotAllowingJavascriptURLs(
chrome_scheme);
WebString devtools_scheme(WebString::FromASCII(kChromeDevToolsScheme));
WebSecurityPolicy::RegisterURLSchemeAsDisplayIsolated(devtools_scheme);
WebString view_source_scheme(WebString::FromASCII(kViewSourceScheme));
WebSecurityPolicy::RegisterURLSchemeAsDisplayIsolated(view_source_scheme);
WebString error_scheme(WebString::FromASCII(kChromeErrorScheme));
WebSecurityPolicy::RegisterURLSchemeAsDisplayIsolated(error_scheme);
WebSecurityPolicy::RegisterURLSchemeAsNotAllowingJavascriptURLs(error_scheme);
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 150,577
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hns_nic_ring_open(struct net_device *netdev, int idx)
{
struct hns_nic_priv *priv = netdev_priv(netdev);
struct hnae_handle *h = priv->ae_handle;
napi_enable(&priv->ring_data[idx].napi);
enable_irq(priv->ring_data[idx].ring->irq);
h->dev->ops->toggle_ring_irq(priv->ring_data[idx].ring, 0);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <lipeng321@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Jun He <hjat2005@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 85,709
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlURIEscape(const xmlChar * str)
{
xmlChar *ret, *segment = NULL;
xmlURIPtr uri;
int ret2;
#define NULLCHK(p) if(!p) { \
xmlURIErrMemory("escaping URI value\n"); \
xmlFreeURI(uri); \
return NULL; } \
if (str == NULL)
return (NULL);
uri = xmlCreateURI();
if (uri != NULL) {
/*
* Allow escaping errors in the unescaped form
*/
uri->cleanup = 1;
ret2 = xmlParseURIReference(uri, (const char *)str);
if (ret2) {
xmlFreeURI(uri);
return (NULL);
}
}
if (!uri)
return NULL;
ret = NULL;
if (uri->scheme) {
segment = xmlURIEscapeStr(BAD_CAST uri->scheme, BAD_CAST "+-.");
NULLCHK(segment)
ret = xmlStrcat(ret, segment);
ret = xmlStrcat(ret, BAD_CAST ":");
xmlFree(segment);
}
if (uri->authority) {
segment =
xmlURIEscapeStr(BAD_CAST uri->authority, BAD_CAST "/?;:@");
NULLCHK(segment)
ret = xmlStrcat(ret, BAD_CAST "//");
ret = xmlStrcat(ret, segment);
xmlFree(segment);
}
if (uri->user) {
segment = xmlURIEscapeStr(BAD_CAST uri->user, BAD_CAST ";:&=+$,");
NULLCHK(segment)
ret = xmlStrcat(ret,BAD_CAST "//");
ret = xmlStrcat(ret, segment);
ret = xmlStrcat(ret, BAD_CAST "@");
xmlFree(segment);
}
if (uri->server) {
segment = xmlURIEscapeStr(BAD_CAST uri->server, BAD_CAST "/?;:@");
NULLCHK(segment)
if (uri->user == NULL)
ret = xmlStrcat(ret, BAD_CAST "//");
ret = xmlStrcat(ret, segment);
xmlFree(segment);
}
if (uri->port) {
xmlChar port[10];
snprintf((char *) port, 10, "%d", uri->port);
ret = xmlStrcat(ret, BAD_CAST ":");
ret = xmlStrcat(ret, port);
}
if (uri->path) {
segment =
xmlURIEscapeStr(BAD_CAST uri->path, BAD_CAST ":@&=+$,/?;");
NULLCHK(segment)
ret = xmlStrcat(ret, segment);
xmlFree(segment);
}
if (uri->query_raw) {
ret = xmlStrcat(ret, BAD_CAST "?");
ret = xmlStrcat(ret, BAD_CAST uri->query_raw);
}
else if (uri->query) {
segment =
xmlURIEscapeStr(BAD_CAST uri->query, BAD_CAST ";/?:@&=+,$");
NULLCHK(segment)
ret = xmlStrcat(ret, BAD_CAST "?");
ret = xmlStrcat(ret, segment);
xmlFree(segment);
}
if (uri->opaque) {
segment = xmlURIEscapeStr(BAD_CAST uri->opaque, BAD_CAST "");
NULLCHK(segment)
ret = xmlStrcat(ret, segment);
xmlFree(segment);
}
if (uri->fragment) {
segment = xmlURIEscapeStr(BAD_CAST uri->fragment, BAD_CAST "#");
NULLCHK(segment)
ret = xmlStrcat(ret, BAD_CAST "#");
ret = xmlStrcat(ret, segment);
xmlFree(segment);
}
xmlFreeURI(uri);
#undef NULLCHK
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Use correct limit for port values
no upstream report yet, add it here when we have it
issue found & patch by nmehta@
Bug: 36555370
Change-Id: Ibf1efea554b95f514e23e939363d608021de4614
(cherry picked from commit b62884fb49fe92081e414966d9b5fe58250ae53c)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,364
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void migration_entry_wait(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmd,
unsigned long address)
{
spinlock_t *ptl = pte_lockptr(mm, pmd);
pte_t *ptep = pte_offset_map(pmd, address);
__migration_entry_wait(mm, ptep, ptl);
}
Commit Message: mm: migrate dirty page without clear_page_dirty_for_io etc
clear_page_dirty_for_io() has accumulated writeback and memcg subtleties
since v2.6.16 first introduced page migration; and the set_page_dirty()
which completed its migration of PageDirty, later had to be moderated to
__set_page_dirty_nobuffers(); then PageSwapBacked had to skip that too.
No actual problems seen with this procedure recently, but if you look into
what the clear_page_dirty_for_io(page)+set_page_dirty(newpage) is actually
achieving, it turns out to be nothing more than moving the PageDirty flag,
and its NR_FILE_DIRTY stat from one zone to another.
It would be good to avoid a pile of irrelevant decrementations and
incrementations, and improper event counting, and unnecessary descent of
the radix_tree under tree_lock (to set the PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY which
radix_tree_replace_slot() left in place anyway).
Do the NR_FILE_DIRTY movement, like the other stats movements, while
interrupts still disabled in migrate_page_move_mapping(); and don't even
bother if the zone is the same. Do the PageDirty movement there under
tree_lock too, where old page is frozen and newpage not yet visible:
bearing in mind that as soon as newpage becomes visible in radix_tree, an
un-page-locked set_page_dirty() might interfere (or perhaps that's just
not possible: anything doing so should already hold an additional
reference to the old page, preventing its migration; but play safe).
But we do still need to transfer PageDirty in migrate_page_copy(), for
those who don't go the mapping route through migrate_page_move_mapping().
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 54,483
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sfnt_find_encoding( int platform_id,
int encoding_id )
{
typedef struct TEncoding_
{
int platform_id;
int encoding_id;
FT_Encoding encoding;
} TEncoding;
static
const TEncoding tt_encodings[] =
{
{ TT_PLATFORM_ISO, -1, FT_ENCODING_UNICODE },
{ TT_PLATFORM_APPLE_UNICODE, -1, FT_ENCODING_UNICODE },
{ TT_PLATFORM_MACINTOSH, TT_MAC_ID_ROMAN, FT_ENCODING_APPLE_ROMAN },
{ TT_PLATFORM_MICROSOFT, TT_MS_ID_SYMBOL_CS, FT_ENCODING_MS_SYMBOL },
{ TT_PLATFORM_MICROSOFT, TT_MS_ID_UCS_4, FT_ENCODING_UNICODE },
{ TT_PLATFORM_MICROSOFT, TT_MS_ID_UNICODE_CS, FT_ENCODING_UNICODE },
{ TT_PLATFORM_MICROSOFT, TT_MS_ID_SJIS, FT_ENCODING_SJIS },
{ TT_PLATFORM_MICROSOFT, TT_MS_ID_PRC, FT_ENCODING_PRC },
{ TT_PLATFORM_MICROSOFT, TT_MS_ID_BIG_5, FT_ENCODING_BIG5 },
{ TT_PLATFORM_MICROSOFT, TT_MS_ID_WANSUNG, FT_ENCODING_WANSUNG },
{ TT_PLATFORM_MICROSOFT, TT_MS_ID_JOHAB, FT_ENCODING_JOHAB }
};
const TEncoding *cur, *limit;
cur = tt_encodings;
limit = cur + sizeof ( tt_encodings ) / sizeof ( tt_encodings[0] );
for ( ; cur < limit; cur++ )
{
if ( cur->platform_id == platform_id )
{
if ( cur->encoding_id == encoding_id ||
cur->encoding_id == -1 )
return cur->encoding;
}
}
return FT_ENCODING_NONE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 7,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u64 __init get_ramdisk_size(void)
{
u64 ramdisk_size = boot_params.hdr.ramdisk_size;
ramdisk_size |= (u64)boot_params.ext_ramdisk_size << 32;
return ramdisk_size;
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 53,791
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __tcp_free_md5sig_pool(struct tcp_md5sig_pool * __percpu *pool)
{
int cpu;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
struct tcp_md5sig_pool *p = *per_cpu_ptr(pool, cpu);
if (p) {
if (p->md5_desc.tfm)
crypto_free_hash(p->md5_desc.tfm);
kfree(p);
p = NULL;
}
}
free_percpu(pool);
}
Commit Message: net: Fix oops from tcp_collapse() when using splice()
tcp_read_sock() can have a eat skbs without immediately advancing copied_seq.
This can cause a panic in tcp_collapse() if it is called as a result
of the recv_actor dropping the socket lock.
A userspace program that splices data from a socket to either another
socket or to a file can trigger this bug.
Signed-off-by: Steven J. Magnani <steve@digidescorp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,850
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __register_pernet_operations(struct list_head *list,
struct pernet_operations *ops)
{
struct net *net;
int error;
LIST_HEAD(net_exit_list);
list_add_tail(&ops->list, list);
if (ops->init || (ops->id && ops->size)) {
/* We held write locked pernet_ops_rwsem, and parallel
* setup_net() and cleanup_net() are not possible.
*/
for_each_net(net) {
error = ops_init(ops, net);
if (error)
goto out_undo;
list_add_tail(&net->exit_list, &net_exit_list);
}
}
return 0;
out_undo:
/* If I have an error cleanup all namespaces I initialized */
list_del(&ops->list);
ops_exit_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
ops_free_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
return error;
}
Commit Message: netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()
net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.
Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.
Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 91,084
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lg_input_mapped(struct hid_device *hdev, struct hid_input *hi,
struct hid_field *field, struct hid_usage *usage,
unsigned long **bit, int *max)
{
struct lg_drv_data *drv_data = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
if ((drv_data->quirks & LG_BAD_RELATIVE_KEYS) && usage->type == EV_KEY &&
(field->flags & HID_MAIN_ITEM_RELATIVE))
field->flags &= ~HID_MAIN_ITEM_RELATIVE;
if ((drv_data->quirks & LG_DUPLICATE_USAGES) && (usage->type == EV_KEY ||
usage->type == EV_REL || usage->type == EV_ABS))
clear_bit(usage->code, *bit);
/* Ensure that Logitech wheels are not given a default fuzz/flat value */
if (usage->type == EV_ABS && (usage->code == ABS_X ||
usage->code == ABS_Y || usage->code == ABS_Z ||
usage->code == ABS_RZ)) {
switch (hdev->product) {
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_WHEEL:
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_MOMO_WHEEL:
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_DFP_WHEEL:
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_G25_WHEEL:
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_DFGT_WHEEL:
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_G27_WHEEL:
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_WII_WHEEL:
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_MOMO_WHEEL2:
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_VIBRATION_WHEEL:
field->application = HID_GD_MULTIAXIS;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 38,114
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void jslFunctionCharAsString(unsigned char ch, char *str, size_t len) {
if (ch >= LEX_TOKEN_START) {
jslTokenAsString(ch, str, len);
} else {
str[0] = (char)ch;
str[1] = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix strncat/cpy bounding issues (fix #1425)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 82,519
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: perf_callchain_user(struct perf_callchain_entry *entry, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct frame_tail __user *tail;
if (perf_guest_cbs && perf_guest_cbs->is_in_guest()) {
/* We don't support guest os callchain now */
return;
}
perf_callchain_store(entry, regs->ARM_pc);
tail = (struct frame_tail __user *)regs->ARM_fp - 1;
while ((entry->nr < PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH) &&
tail && !((unsigned long)tail & 0x3))
tail = user_backtrace(tail, entry);
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7809/1: perf: fix event validation for software group leaders
It is possible to construct an event group with a software event as a
group leader and then subsequently add a hardware event to the group.
This results in the event group being validated by adding all members
of the group to a fake PMU and attempting to allocate each event on
their respective PMU.
Unfortunately, for software events wthout a corresponding arm_pmu, this
results in a kernel crash attempting to dereference the ->get_event_idx
function pointer.
This patch fixes the problem by checking explicitly for software events
and ignoring those in event validation (since they can always be
scheduled). We will probably want to revisit this for 3.12, since the
validation checks don't appear to work correctly when dealing with
multiple hardware PMUs anyway.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,803
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::PruneAllButVisible() {
PruneAllButVisibleInternal();
DCHECK_NE(-1, last_committed_entry_index_);
NavigationEntryImpl* entry =
NavigationEntryImpl::FromNavigationEntry(GetActiveEntry());
web_contents_->SetHistoryLengthAndPrune(
entry->site_instance(), 0, entry->GetPageID());
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 111,547
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SplashBitmap::getPixel(int x, int y, SplashColorPtr pixel) {
SplashColorPtr p;
if (y < 0 || y >= height || x < 0 || x >= width) {
return;
}
switch (mode) {
case splashModeMono1:
p = &data[y * rowSize + (x >> 3)];
pixel[0] = (p[0] & (0x80 >> (x & 7))) ? 0xff : 0x00;
break;
case splashModeMono8:
p = &data[y * rowSize + x];
pixel[0] = p[0];
break;
case splashModeRGB8:
p = &data[y * rowSize + 3 * x];
pixel[0] = p[0];
pixel[1] = p[1];
pixel[2] = p[2];
break;
case splashModeXBGR8:
p = &data[y * rowSize + 4 * x];
pixel[0] = p[2];
pixel[1] = p[1];
pixel[2] = p[0];
pixel[3] = p[3];
break;
case splashModeBGR8:
p = &data[y * rowSize + 3 * x];
pixel[0] = p[2];
pixel[1] = p[1];
pixel[2] = p[0];
break;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
case splashModeCMYK8:
p = &data[y * rowSize + 4 * x];
pixel[0] = p[0];
pixel[1] = p[1];
pixel[2] = p[2];
pixel[3] = p[3];
break;
#endif
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,301
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_eac3(MOVMuxContext *mov, AVPacket *pkt, MOVTrack *track)
{
AC3HeaderInfo *hdr = NULL;
struct eac3_info *info;
int num_blocks, ret;
if (!track->eac3_priv && !(track->eac3_priv = av_mallocz(sizeof(*info))))
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
info = track->eac3_priv;
if (avpriv_ac3_parse_header(&hdr, pkt->data, pkt->size) < 0) {
/* drop the packets until we see a good one */
if (!track->entry) {
av_log(mov, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Dropping invalid packet from start of the stream\n");
ret = 0;
} else
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto end;
}
info->data_rate = FFMAX(info->data_rate, hdr->bit_rate / 1000);
num_blocks = hdr->num_blocks;
if (!info->ec3_done) {
/* AC-3 substream must be the first one */
if (hdr->bitstream_id <= 10 && hdr->substreamid != 0) {
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto end;
}
/* this should always be the case, given that our AC-3 parser
* concatenates dependent frames to their independent parent */
if (hdr->frame_type == EAC3_FRAME_TYPE_INDEPENDENT) {
/* substream ids must be incremental */
if (hdr->substreamid > info->num_ind_sub + 1) {
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto end;
}
if (hdr->substreamid == info->num_ind_sub + 1) {
avpriv_request_sample(track->par, "Multiple independent substreams");
ret = AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
goto end;
} else if (hdr->substreamid < info->num_ind_sub ||
hdr->substreamid == 0 && info->substream[0].bsid) {
info->ec3_done = 1;
goto concatenate;
}
} else {
if (hdr->substreamid != 0) {
avpriv_request_sample(mov->fc, "Multiple non EAC3 independent substreams");
ret = AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
goto end;
}
}
/* fill the info needed for the "dec3" atom */
info->substream[hdr->substreamid].fscod = hdr->sr_code;
info->substream[hdr->substreamid].bsid = hdr->bitstream_id;
info->substream[hdr->substreamid].bsmod = hdr->bitstream_mode;
info->substream[hdr->substreamid].acmod = hdr->channel_mode;
info->substream[hdr->substreamid].lfeon = hdr->lfe_on;
/* Parse dependent substream(s), if any */
if (pkt->size != hdr->frame_size) {
int cumul_size = hdr->frame_size;
int parent = hdr->substreamid;
while (cumul_size != pkt->size) {
GetBitContext gbc;
int i;
ret = avpriv_ac3_parse_header(&hdr, pkt->data + cumul_size, pkt->size - cumul_size);
if (ret < 0)
goto end;
if (hdr->frame_type != EAC3_FRAME_TYPE_DEPENDENT) {
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto end;
}
info->substream[parent].num_dep_sub++;
ret /= 8;
/* header is parsed up to lfeon, but custom channel map may be needed */
init_get_bits8(&gbc, pkt->data + cumul_size + ret, pkt->size - cumul_size - ret);
/* skip bsid */
skip_bits(&gbc, 5);
/* skip volume control params */
for (i = 0; i < (hdr->channel_mode ? 1 : 2); i++) {
skip_bits(&gbc, 5); // skip dialog normalization
if (get_bits1(&gbc)) {
skip_bits(&gbc, 8); // skip compression gain word
}
}
/* get the dependent stream channel map, if exists */
if (get_bits1(&gbc))
info->substream[parent].chan_loc |= (get_bits(&gbc, 16) >> 5) & 0x1f;
else
info->substream[parent].chan_loc |= hdr->channel_mode;
cumul_size += hdr->frame_size;
}
}
}
concatenate:
if (!info->num_blocks && num_blocks == 6) {
ret = pkt->size;
goto end;
}
else if (info->num_blocks + num_blocks > 6) {
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto end;
}
if (!info->num_blocks) {
ret = av_packet_ref(&info->pkt, pkt);
if (!ret)
info->num_blocks = num_blocks;
goto end;
} else {
if ((ret = av_grow_packet(&info->pkt, pkt->size)) < 0)
goto end;
memcpy(info->pkt.data + info->pkt.size - pkt->size, pkt->data, pkt->size);
info->num_blocks += num_blocks;
info->pkt.duration += pkt->duration;
if ((ret = av_copy_packet_side_data(&info->pkt, pkt)) < 0)
goto end;
if (info->num_blocks != 6)
goto end;
av_packet_unref(pkt);
av_packet_move_ref(pkt, &info->pkt);
info->num_blocks = 0;
}
ret = pkt->size;
end:
av_free(hdr);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Do not pass AVCodecParameters in avpriv_request_sample
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_8.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 169,162
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static UINT dvcman_close_channel(IWTSVirtualChannelManager* pChannelMgr,
UINT32 ChannelId)
{
DVCMAN_CHANNEL* channel;
UINT error = CHANNEL_RC_OK;
DVCMAN* dvcman = (DVCMAN*) pChannelMgr;
channel = (DVCMAN_CHANNEL*) dvcman_find_channel_by_id(pChannelMgr, ChannelId);
if (!channel)
{
/**
* Windows 8 / Windows Server 2012 send close requests for channels that failed to be created.
* Do not warn, simply return success here.
*/
return CHANNEL_RC_OK;
}
ArrayList_Remove(dvcman->channels, channel);
return error;
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID:
| 0
| 74,972
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int futex_requeue(u32 __user *uaddr1, unsigned int flags,
u32 __user *uaddr2, int nr_wake, int nr_requeue,
u32 *cmpval, int requeue_pi)
{
union futex_key key1 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT, key2 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
int drop_count = 0, task_count = 0, ret;
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = NULL;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1, *hb2;
struct futex_q *this, *next;
DEFINE_WAKE_Q(wake_q);
/*
* When PI not supported: return -ENOSYS if requeue_pi is true,
* consequently the compiler knows requeue_pi is always false past
* this point which will optimize away all the conditional code
* further down.
*/
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FUTEX_PI) && requeue_pi)
return -ENOSYS;
if (requeue_pi) {
/*
* Requeue PI only works on two distinct uaddrs. This
* check is only valid for private futexes. See below.
*/
if (uaddr1 == uaddr2)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* requeue_pi requires a pi_state, try to allocate it now
* without any locks in case it fails.
*/
if (refill_pi_state_cache())
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* requeue_pi must wake as many tasks as it can, up to nr_wake
* + nr_requeue, since it acquires the rt_mutex prior to
* returning to userspace, so as to not leave the rt_mutex with
* waiters and no owner. However, second and third wake-ups
* cannot be predicted as they involve race conditions with the
* first wake and a fault while looking up the pi_state. Both
* pthread_cond_signal() and pthread_cond_broadcast() should
* use nr_wake=1.
*/
if (nr_wake != 1)
return -EINVAL;
}
retry:
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr1, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key1, VERIFY_READ);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key2,
requeue_pi ? VERIFY_WRITE : VERIFY_READ);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out_put_key1;
/*
* The check above which compares uaddrs is not sufficient for
* shared futexes. We need to compare the keys:
*/
if (requeue_pi && match_futex(&key1, &key2)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_put_keys;
}
hb1 = hash_futex(&key1);
hb2 = hash_futex(&key2);
retry_private:
hb_waiters_inc(hb2);
double_lock_hb(hb1, hb2);
if (likely(cmpval != NULL)) {
u32 curval;
ret = get_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr1);
if (unlikely(ret)) {
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
hb_waiters_dec(hb2);
ret = get_user(curval, uaddr1);
if (ret)
goto out_put_keys;
if (!(flags & FLAGS_SHARED))
goto retry_private;
put_futex_key(&key2);
put_futex_key(&key1);
goto retry;
}
if (curval != *cmpval) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
if (requeue_pi && (task_count - nr_wake < nr_requeue)) {
/*
* Attempt to acquire uaddr2 and wake the top waiter. If we
* intend to requeue waiters, force setting the FUTEX_WAITERS
* bit. We force this here where we are able to easily handle
* faults rather in the requeue loop below.
*/
ret = futex_proxy_trylock_atomic(uaddr2, hb1, hb2, &key1,
&key2, &pi_state, nr_requeue);
/*
* At this point the top_waiter has either taken uaddr2 or is
* waiting on it. If the former, then the pi_state will not
* exist yet, look it up one more time to ensure we have a
* reference to it. If the lock was taken, ret contains the
* vpid of the top waiter task.
* If the lock was not taken, we have pi_state and an initial
* refcount on it. In case of an error we have nothing.
*/
if (ret > 0) {
WARN_ON(pi_state);
drop_count++;
task_count++;
/*
* If we acquired the lock, then the user space value
* of uaddr2 should be vpid. It cannot be changed by
* the top waiter as it is blocked on hb2 lock if it
* tries to do so. If something fiddled with it behind
* our back the pi state lookup might unearth it. So
* we rather use the known value than rereading and
* handing potential crap to lookup_pi_state.
*
* If that call succeeds then we have pi_state and an
* initial refcount on it.
*/
ret = lookup_pi_state(uaddr2, ret, hb2, &key2, &pi_state);
}
switch (ret) {
case 0:
/* We hold a reference on the pi state. */
break;
/* If the above failed, then pi_state is NULL */
case -EFAULT:
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
hb_waiters_dec(hb2);
put_futex_key(&key2);
put_futex_key(&key1);
ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr2);
if (!ret)
goto retry;
goto out;
case -EAGAIN:
/*
* Two reasons for this:
* - Owner is exiting and we just wait for the
* exit to complete.
* - The user space value changed.
*/
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
hb_waiters_dec(hb2);
put_futex_key(&key2);
put_futex_key(&key1);
cond_resched();
goto retry;
default:
goto out_unlock;
}
}
plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, &hb1->chain, list) {
if (task_count - nr_wake >= nr_requeue)
break;
if (!match_futex(&this->key, &key1))
continue;
/*
* FUTEX_WAIT_REQEUE_PI and FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI should always
* be paired with each other and no other futex ops.
*
* We should never be requeueing a futex_q with a pi_state,
* which is awaiting a futex_unlock_pi().
*/
if ((requeue_pi && !this->rt_waiter) ||
(!requeue_pi && this->rt_waiter) ||
this->pi_state) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/*
* Wake nr_wake waiters. For requeue_pi, if we acquired the
* lock, we already woke the top_waiter. If not, it will be
* woken by futex_unlock_pi().
*/
if (++task_count <= nr_wake && !requeue_pi) {
mark_wake_futex(&wake_q, this);
continue;
}
/* Ensure we requeue to the expected futex for requeue_pi. */
if (requeue_pi && !match_futex(this->requeue_pi_key, &key2)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/*
* Requeue nr_requeue waiters and possibly one more in the case
* of requeue_pi if we couldn't acquire the lock atomically.
*/
if (requeue_pi) {
/*
* Prepare the waiter to take the rt_mutex. Take a
* refcount on the pi_state and store the pointer in
* the futex_q object of the waiter.
*/
get_pi_state(pi_state);
this->pi_state = pi_state;
ret = rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(&pi_state->pi_mutex,
this->rt_waiter,
this->task);
if (ret == 1) {
/*
* We got the lock. We do neither drop the
* refcount on pi_state nor clear
* this->pi_state because the waiter needs the
* pi_state for cleaning up the user space
* value. It will drop the refcount after
* doing so.
*/
requeue_pi_wake_futex(this, &key2, hb2);
drop_count++;
continue;
} else if (ret) {
/*
* rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() detected a
* potential deadlock when we tried to queue
* that waiter. Drop the pi_state reference
* which we took above and remove the pointer
* to the state from the waiters futex_q
* object.
*/
this->pi_state = NULL;
put_pi_state(pi_state);
/*
* We stop queueing more waiters and let user
* space deal with the mess.
*/
break;
}
}
requeue_futex(this, hb1, hb2, &key2);
drop_count++;
}
/*
* We took an extra initial reference to the pi_state either
* in futex_proxy_trylock_atomic() or in lookup_pi_state(). We
* need to drop it here again.
*/
put_pi_state(pi_state);
out_unlock:
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
wake_up_q(&wake_q);
hb_waiters_dec(hb2);
/*
* drop_futex_key_refs() must be called outside the spinlocks. During
* the requeue we moved futex_q's from the hash bucket at key1 to the
* one at key2 and updated their key pointer. We no longer need to
* hold the references to key1.
*/
while (--drop_count >= 0)
drop_futex_key_refs(&key1);
out_put_keys:
put_futex_key(&key2);
out_put_key1:
put_futex_key(&key1);
out:
return ret ? ret : task_count;
}
Commit Message: futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
signed integer overflow:
0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.
Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 169,331
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int adev_dump(const audio_hw_device_t *device, int fd)
{
(void)device;
(void)fd;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 162,242
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool setup_stratum_socket(struct pool *pool)
{
struct addrinfo servinfobase, *servinfo, *hints, *p;
char *sockaddr_url, *sockaddr_port;
int sockd;
int ret;
mutex_lock(&pool->stratum_lock);
pool->stratum_active = false;
if (pool->sock) {
/* FIXME: change to LOG_DEBUG if issue #88 resolved */
applog(LOG_INFO, "Closing %s socket", get_pool_name(pool));
CLOSESOCKET(pool->sock);
}
pool->sock = 0;
mutex_unlock(&pool->stratum_lock);
hints = &pool->stratum_hints;
memset(hints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
hints->ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
hints->ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
servinfo = &servinfobase;
if (!pool->rpc_proxy && opt_socks_proxy) {
pool->rpc_proxy = opt_socks_proxy;
extract_sockaddr(pool->rpc_proxy, &pool->sockaddr_proxy_url, &pool->sockaddr_proxy_port);
pool->rpc_proxytype = PROXY_SOCKS5;
}
if (pool->rpc_proxy) {
sockaddr_url = pool->sockaddr_proxy_url;
sockaddr_port = pool->sockaddr_proxy_port;
} else {
sockaddr_url = pool->sockaddr_url;
sockaddr_port = pool->stratum_port;
}
ret = getaddrinfo(sockaddr_url, sockaddr_port, hints, &servinfo);
if (ret) {
applog(LOG_INFO, "getaddrinfo() in setup_stratum_socket() returned %i: %s", ret, gai_strerror(ret));
if (!pool->probed) {
applog(LOG_WARNING, "Failed to resolve (wrong URL?) %s:%s",
sockaddr_url, sockaddr_port);
pool->probed = true;
} else {
applog(LOG_INFO, "Failed to getaddrinfo for %s:%s",
sockaddr_url, sockaddr_port);
}
return false;
}
for (p = servinfo; p != NULL; p = p->ai_next) {
sockd = socket(p->ai_family, p->ai_socktype, p->ai_protocol);
if (sockd == -1) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed socket");
continue;
}
/* Iterate non blocking over entries returned by getaddrinfo
* to cope with round robin DNS entries, finding the first one
* we can connect to quickly. */
noblock_socket(sockd);
if (connect(sockd, p->ai_addr, p->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
struct timeval tv_timeout = {1, 0};
int selret;
fd_set rw;
if (!sock_connecting()) {
CLOSESOCKET(sockd);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed sock connect");
continue;
}
retry:
FD_ZERO(&rw);
FD_SET(sockd, &rw);
selret = select(sockd + 1, NULL, &rw, NULL, &tv_timeout);
if (selret > 0 && FD_ISSET(sockd, &rw)) {
socklen_t len;
int err, n;
len = sizeof(err);
n = getsockopt(sockd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, (char *)&err, &len);
if (!n && !err) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Succeeded delayed connect");
block_socket(sockd);
break;
}
}
if (selret < 0 && interrupted())
goto retry;
CLOSESOCKET(sockd);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Select timeout/failed connect");
continue;
}
applog(LOG_WARNING, "Succeeded immediate connect");
block_socket(sockd);
break;
}
if (p == NULL) {
applog(LOG_INFO, "Failed to connect to stratum on %s:%s",
sockaddr_url, sockaddr_port);
freeaddrinfo(servinfo);
return false;
}
freeaddrinfo(servinfo);
if (pool->rpc_proxy) {
switch (pool->rpc_proxytype) {
case PROXY_HTTP_1_0:
if (!http_negotiate(pool, sockd, true))
return false;
break;
case PROXY_HTTP:
if (!http_negotiate(pool, sockd, false))
return false;
break;
case PROXY_SOCKS5:
case PROXY_SOCKS5H:
if (!socks5_negotiate(pool, sockd))
return false;
break;
case PROXY_SOCKS4:
if (!socks4_negotiate(pool, sockd, false))
return false;
break;
case PROXY_SOCKS4A:
if (!socks4_negotiate(pool, sockd, true))
return false;
break;
default:
applog(LOG_WARNING, "Unsupported proxy type for %s:%s",
pool->sockaddr_proxy_url, pool->sockaddr_proxy_port);
return false;
break;
}
}
if (!pool->sockbuf) {
pool->sockbuf = (char *)calloc(RBUFSIZE, 1);
if (!pool->sockbuf)
quithere(1, "Failed to calloc pool sockbuf");
pool->sockbuf_size = RBUFSIZE;
}
pool->sock = sockd;
keep_sockalive(sockd);
return true;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 36,621
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::CloseTarget(
content::DevToolsAgentHost* agent_host,
int session_id,
int command_id,
const base::DictionaryValue* params) {
const base::Value* target_id_value = params->FindKey("targetId");
if (!target_id_value)
return CreateInvalidParamResponse(command_id, "targetId");
HeadlessWebContents* web_contents =
browser_->GetWebContentsForDevToolsAgentHostId(
target_id_value->GetString());
bool success = false;
if (web_contents) {
web_contents->Close();
success = true;
}
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> result(target::CloseTargetResult::Builder()
.SetSuccess(success)
.Build()
->Serialize());
return CreateSuccessResponse(command_id, std::move(result));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <jzfeng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 149,809
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VideoCaptureManager::OnDeviceLaunchAborted() {
EmitLogMessage("Launching device has been aborted.", 1);
device_start_request_queue_.pop_front();
ProcessDeviceStartRequestQueue();
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,248
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TopSitesCache::StoreRedirectChain(const RedirectList& redirects,
size_t destination) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < redirects.size(); i++) {
if (!IsKnownURL(redirects[i])) {
CanonicalURLEntry entry;
entry.first = &(top_sites_[destination]);
entry.second = i;
canonical_urls_[entry] = destination;
}
}
}
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 147,045
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::UpdateTextureSizeFromTarget(GLenum target) {
GLenum texture_type = TextureTargetToTextureType(target);
TextureTarget internal_texture_type = GLenumToTextureTarget(texture_type);
DCHECK(internal_texture_type != TextureTarget::kUnkown);
BoundTexture& bound_texture =
bound_textures_[static_cast<size_t>(internal_texture_type)]
[active_texture_unit_];
UpdateTextureSizeFromTexturePassthrough(bound_texture.texture.get(),
bound_texture.client_id);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,844
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetEffectiveURL(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& url) {
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context);
if (!profile)
return url;
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (search::ShouldAssignURLToInstantRenderer(url, profile))
return search::GetEffectiveURLForInstant(url, profile);
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
return ChromeContentBrowserClientExtensionsPart::GetEffectiveURL(profile,
url);
#else
return url;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,648
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestingAutomationProvider::ConnectToWifiNetwork(
DictionaryValue* args, IPC::Message* reply_message) {
AutomationJSONReply reply(this, reply_message);
std::string service_path, password;
bool shared;
if (!args->GetString("service_path", &service_path) ||
!args->GetString("password", &password) ||
!args->GetBoolean("shared", &shared)) {
reply.SendError("Invalid or missing args.");
return;
}
NetworkLibrary* network_library = CrosLibrary::Get()->GetNetworkLibrary();
chromeos::WifiNetwork* wifi =
network_library->FindWifiNetworkByPath(service_path);
if (!wifi) {
reply.SendError("No network found with specified service path.");
return;
}
if (!password.empty())
wifi->SetPassphrase(password);
if (wifi->encryption() == chromeos::SECURITY_NONE)
shared = true;
new ServicePathConnectObserver(this, reply_message, service_path);
network_library->ConnectToWifiNetwork(wifi, shared);
network_library->RequestNetworkScan();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 109,203
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExecuteBrowserCommandObserver::Observe(
int type, const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
if (type == notification_type_) {
if (automation_) {
if (use_json_interface_) {
AutomationJSONReply(automation_,
reply_message_.release()).SendSuccess(NULL);
} else {
AutomationMsg_WindowExecuteCommand::WriteReplyParams(
reply_message_.get(), true);
automation_->Send(reply_message_.release());
}
}
delete this;
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,570
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lua_ap_escape_logitem(lua_State *L)
{
char *returnValue;
request_rec *r;
const char *str;
luaL_checktype(L, 1, LUA_TUSERDATA);
r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
luaL_checktype(L, 2, LUA_TSTRING);
str = lua_tostring(L, 2);
returnValue = ap_escape_logitem(r->pool, str);
lua_pushstring(L, returnValue);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 45,057
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int BrowserTabStripController::GetActiveIndex() const {
return model_->active_index();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,488
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: write_config_variable(const param_info_t* value, void* file_desc) {
int config_fd = *((int*) file_desc);
char* actual_value = param(value->name);
if(strcmp(actual_value, value->str_val) != 0) {
char output[512];
snprintf(output, 512, "# %s: Default value = (%s)\n", value->name, value->str_val);
if(write(config_fd, &output, 512*sizeof(char)) == -1) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "Failed to write to configuration file.\n");
return -1;
}
snprintf(output, 512, "%s = %s", value->name, actual_value);
if(write(config_fd, &output, 512*sizeof(char)) == -1) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "Failed to write to configuration file.\n");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,532
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static HB_Error Get_Anchor( GPOS_Instance* gpi,
HB_Anchor* an,
HB_UShort glyph_index,
HB_Fixed* x_value,
HB_Fixed* y_value )
{
HB_Error error = HB_Err_Ok;
#ifdef HB_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_MASTER
HB_GPOSHeader* gpos = gpi->gpos;
#endif
HB_UShort ap;
HB_Short pixel_value;
HB_UShort x_ppem, y_ppem;
HB_16Dot16 x_scale, y_scale;
x_ppem = gpi->font->x_ppem;
y_ppem = gpi->font->y_ppem;
x_scale = gpi->font->x_scale;
y_scale = gpi->font->y_scale;
switch ( an->PosFormat )
{
case 0:
/* The special case of an empty AnchorTable */
default:
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
case 1:
*x_value = x_scale * an->af.af1.XCoordinate / 0x10000;
*y_value = y_scale * an->af.af1.YCoordinate / 0x10000;
break;
case 2:
if ( !gpi->dvi )
{
hb_uint32 n_points = 0;
ap = an->af.af2.AnchorPoint;
if (!gpi->font->klass->getPointInOutline)
goto no_contour_point;
error = gpi->font->klass->getPointInOutline(gpi->font, glyph_index, gpi->load_flags, ap, x_value, y_value, &n_points);
if (error)
return error;
/* if n_points is set to zero, we use the design coordinate value pair.
* This can happen e.g. for sbit glyphs. */
if (!n_points)
goto no_contour_point;
}
else
{
no_contour_point:
*x_value = x_scale * an->af.af3.XCoordinate / 0x10000;
*y_value = y_scale * an->af.af3.YCoordinate / 0x10000;
}
break;
case 3:
if ( !gpi->dvi )
{
_HB_OPEN_Get_Device( an->af.af3.DeviceTables[AF3_X_DEVICE_TABLE], x_ppem, &pixel_value );
*x_value = pixel_value << 6;
_HB_OPEN_Get_Device( an->af.af3.DeviceTables[AF3_Y_DEVICE_TABLE], y_ppem, &pixel_value );
*y_value = pixel_value << 6;
}
else
*x_value = *y_value = 0;
*x_value += x_scale * an->af.af3.XCoordinate / 0x10000;
*y_value += y_scale * an->af.af3.YCoordinate / 0x10000;
break;
case 4:
#ifdef HB_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_MASTER
error = (gpos->mmfunc)( gpi->font, an->af.af4.XIdAnchor,
x_value, gpos->data );
if ( error )
return error;
error = (gpos->mmfunc)( gpi->font, an->af.af4.YIdAnchor,
y_value, gpos->data );
if ( error )
return error;
break;
#else
return ERR(HB_Err_Not_Covered);
#endif
}
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,553
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
int i;
for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++)
__clear_all_pkt_pointers(env, vstate->frame[i]);
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 76,390
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void license_print_product_info(PRODUCT_INFO* productInfo)
{
char* CompanyName = NULL;
char* ProductId = NULL;
ConvertFromUnicode(CP_UTF8, 0, (WCHAR*) productInfo->pbCompanyName,
productInfo->cbCompanyName / 2, &CompanyName, 0, NULL, NULL);
ConvertFromUnicode(CP_UTF8, 0, (WCHAR*) productInfo->pbProductId,
productInfo->cbProductId / 2, &ProductId, 0, NULL, NULL);
fprintf(stderr, "ProductInfo:\n");
fprintf(stderr, "\tdwVersion: 0x%08X\n", productInfo->dwVersion);
fprintf(stderr, "\tCompanyName: %s\n", CompanyName);
fprintf(stderr, "\tProductId: %s\n", ProductId);
free(CompanyName);
free(ProductId);
}
Commit Message: Fix possible integer overflow in license_read_scope_list()
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 39,560
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dump_data_string(FILE *trace, char *data, u32 dataLength)
{
u32 i;
for (i=0; i<dataLength; i++) {
switch ((unsigned char) data[i]) {
case '\'':
fprintf(trace, "'");
break;
case '\"':
fprintf(trace, """);
break;
case '&':
fprintf(trace, "&");
break;
case '>':
fprintf(trace, ">");
break;
case '<':
fprintf(trace, "<");
break;
default:
fprintf(trace, "%c", (u8) data[i]);
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,719
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool segmentIsEmpty(const InlineIterator& segmentStart, const InlineIterator& segmentEnd)
{
return segmentStart == segmentEnd;
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,397
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SVGElement::RemoveInstanceMapping(SVGElement* instance) {
DCHECK(instance);
DCHECK(instance->InUseShadowTree());
if (!HasSVGRareData())
return;
HeapHashSet<WeakMember<SVGElement>>& instances =
SvgRareData()->ElementInstances();
instances.erase(instance);
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 152,787
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::FinishMemoryUsageReport(int64_t demuxer_memory_usage) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
const PipelineStatistics stats = GetPipelineStatistics();
const int64_t data_source_memory_usage =
data_source_ ? data_source_->GetMemoryUsage() : 0;
const int64_t video_memory_usage =
stats.video_memory_usage +
((pipeline_metadata_.has_video && !stats.video_memory_usage &&
has_first_frame_)
? VideoFrame::AllocationSize(PIXEL_FORMAT_I420,
pipeline_metadata_.natural_size)
: 0);
const int64_t current_memory_usage =
stats.audio_memory_usage + video_memory_usage + data_source_memory_usage +
demuxer_memory_usage;
DVLOG(2) << "Memory Usage -- Total: " << current_memory_usage
<< " Audio: " << stats.audio_memory_usage
<< ", Video: " << video_memory_usage
<< ", DataSource: " << data_source_memory_usage
<< ", Demuxer: " << demuxer_memory_usage;
const int64_t delta = current_memory_usage - last_reported_memory_usage_;
last_reported_memory_usage_ = current_memory_usage;
adjust_allocated_memory_cb_.Run(delta);
if (HasAudio()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEMORY_KB("Media.WebMediaPlayerImpl.Memory.Audio",
stats.audio_memory_usage / 1024);
}
if (HasVideo()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEMORY_KB("Media.WebMediaPlayerImpl.Memory.Video",
video_memory_usage / 1024);
}
if (data_source_) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEMORY_KB("Media.WebMediaPlayerImpl.Memory.DataSource",
data_source_memory_usage / 1024);
}
if (demuxer_) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEMORY_KB("Media.WebMediaPlayerImpl.Memory.Demuxer",
demuxer_memory_usage / 1024);
}
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,394
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlAttrPtr get_attribute_ex(xmlAttrPtr node, char *name, char *ns)
{
while (node!=NULL) {
if (attr_is_equal_ex(node, name, ns)) {
return node;
}
node = node->next;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 3,854
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRA32F,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoUnmultiply,
float,
float>(const float* source,
float* destination,
unsigned pixels_per_row) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < pixels_per_row; ++i) {
float scale_factor = source[3] ? 1.0f / source[3] : 1.0f;
destination[0] = source[0] * scale_factor;
destination[1] = source[3];
source += 4;
destination += 2;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 146,693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __inline__ void rt6_release(struct rt6_info *rt)
{
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&rt->rt6i_ref))
dst_free(&rt->dst);
}
Commit Message: net: fib: fib6_add: fix potential NULL pointer dereference
When the kernel is compiled with CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES, and we return
with an error in fn = fib6_add_1(), then error codes are encoded into
the return pointer e.g. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT). In such an error case, we
write the error code into err and jump to out, hence enter the if(err)
condition. Now, if CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES is enabled, we check for:
if (pn != fn && pn->leaf == rt)
...
if (pn != fn && !pn->leaf && !(pn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO))
...
Since pn is NULL and fn is f.e. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT), then pn != fn
evaluates to true and causes a NULL-pointer dereference on further
checks on pn. Fix it, by setting both NULL in error case, so that
pn != fn already evaluates to false and no further dereference
takes place.
This was first correctly implemented in 4a287eba2 ("IPv6 routing,
NLM_F_* flag support: REPLACE and EXCL flags support, warn about
missing CREATE flag"), but the bug got later on introduced by
188c517a0 ("ipv6: return errno pointers consistently for fib6_add_1()").
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Lin Ming <mlin@ss.pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Matti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Matti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 28,439
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: scoped_refptr<HttpNetworkSession> SetupSessionForGroupNameTests(
NextProto next_proto,
SpdySessionDependencies* session_deps_) {
scoped_refptr<HttpNetworkSession> session(CreateSession(session_deps_));
base::WeakPtr<HttpServerProperties> http_server_properties =
session->http_server_properties();
http_server_properties->SetAlternateProtocol(
HostPortPair("host.with.alternate", 80), 443,
AlternateProtocolFromNextProto(next_proto), 1);
return session;
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 129,289
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Factory(const std::string& name,
const std::vector<Sample>* custom_ranges,
int32_t flags)
: Histogram::Factory(name, CUSTOM_HISTOGRAM, 0, 0, 0, flags) {
custom_ranges_ = custom_ranges;
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 140,025
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pidfile_write(const char *pid_file, int pid)
{
FILE *pidfile = NULL;
int pidfd = creat(pid_file, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH);
if (pidfd != -1) pidfile = fdopen(pidfd, "w");
if (!pidfile) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "pidfile_write : Cannot open %s pidfile",
pid_file);
return 0;
}
fprintf(pidfile, "%d\n", pid);
fclose(pidfile);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 1
| 168,986
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr TIFFReadDirEntryByte(TIFF* tif, TIFFDirEntry* direntry, uint8* value)
{
enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr err;
if (direntry->tdir_count!=1)
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrCount);
switch (direntry->tdir_type)
{
case TIFF_BYTE:
TIFFReadDirEntryCheckedByte(tif,direntry,value);
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
case TIFF_SBYTE:
{
int8 m;
TIFFReadDirEntryCheckedSbyte(tif,direntry,&m);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeByteSbyte(m);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
return(err);
*value=(uint8)m;
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
case TIFF_SHORT:
{
uint16 m;
TIFFReadDirEntryCheckedShort(tif,direntry,&m);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeByteShort(m);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
return(err);
*value=(uint8)m;
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
case TIFF_SSHORT:
{
int16 m;
TIFFReadDirEntryCheckedSshort(tif,direntry,&m);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeByteSshort(m);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
return(err);
*value=(uint8)m;
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
case TIFF_LONG:
{
uint32 m;
TIFFReadDirEntryCheckedLong(tif,direntry,&m);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeByteLong(m);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
return(err);
*value=(uint8)m;
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
case TIFF_SLONG:
{
int32 m;
TIFFReadDirEntryCheckedSlong(tif,direntry,&m);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeByteSlong(m);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
return(err);
*value=(uint8)m;
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
case TIFF_LONG8:
{
uint64 m;
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckedLong8(tif,direntry,&m);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
return(err);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeByteLong8(m);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
return(err);
*value=(uint8)m;
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
case TIFF_SLONG8:
{
int64 m;
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckedSlong8(tif,direntry,&m);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
return(err);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeByteSlong8(m);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
return(err);
*value=(uint8)m;
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
default:
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrType);
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,132
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLFormElement::Disassociate(ListedElement& e) {
listed_elements_are_dirty_ = true;
listed_elements_.clear();
RemoveFromPastNamesMap(ToHTMLElement(e));
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 152,214
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const AutocompleteInput ZeroSuggestProvider::GetInput(bool is_keyword) const {
return AutocompleteInput(base::string16(), base::string16::npos,
std::string(), GURL(current_query_), current_title_,
current_page_classification_, true, false, false,
true, false, client()->GetSchemeClassifier());
}
Commit Message: Provide experimental contextual suggestions when current URL comes from a google domain.
The counts for the Omnibox.ZeroSuggestRequests historgram are 35% smaller for groups that are running under the ZeroSuggestRedirectToChrome flag. Note that previous to this CL, a request was not made when the user was visiting an HTTPS page and the domain of the current was different from that of the service providing zero suggestions. This CL addresses this restrictions by making sure that requests are sent to the experimental service when Google is the default search engine AND the same request was validated to be sent to Google.
BUG=692471
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2915163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#476786}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_decode_tlv_table_mod(const struct ofp_header *oh,
struct ofputil_tlv_table_mod *ttm)
{
struct ofpbuf msg = ofpbuf_const_initializer(oh, ntohs(oh->length));
ofpraw_pull_assert(&msg);
struct nx_tlv_table_mod *nx_ttm = ofpbuf_pull(&msg, sizeof *nx_ttm);
ttm->command = ntohs(nx_ttm->command);
if (ttm->command > NXTTMC_CLEAR) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&bad_ofmsg_rl,
"tlv table mod command (%u) is out of range",
ttm->command);
return OFPERR_NXTTMFC_BAD_COMMAND;
}
return decode_tlv_table_mappings(&msg, TUN_METADATA_NUM_OPTS,
&ttm->mappings);
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,550
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int bt_get(struct blk_mq_alloc_data *data,
struct blk_mq_bitmap_tags *bt,
struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx,
unsigned int *last_tag, struct blk_mq_tags *tags)
{
struct bt_wait_state *bs;
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
int tag;
tag = __bt_get(hctx, bt, last_tag, tags);
if (tag != -1)
return tag;
if (!(data->gfp & __GFP_WAIT))
return -1;
bs = bt_wait_ptr(bt, hctx);
do {
prepare_to_wait(&bs->wait, &wait, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
tag = __bt_get(hctx, bt, last_tag, tags);
if (tag != -1)
break;
/*
* We're out of tags on this hardware queue, kick any
* pending IO submits before going to sleep waiting for
* some to complete. Note that hctx can be NULL here for
* reserved tag allocation.
*/
if (hctx)
blk_mq_run_hw_queue(hctx, false);
/*
* Retry tag allocation after running the hardware queue,
* as running the queue may also have found completions.
*/
tag = __bt_get(hctx, bt, last_tag, tags);
if (tag != -1)
break;
blk_mq_put_ctx(data->ctx);
io_schedule();
data->ctx = blk_mq_get_ctx(data->q);
data->hctx = data->q->mq_ops->map_queue(data->q,
data->ctx->cpu);
if (data->reserved) {
bt = &data->hctx->tags->breserved_tags;
} else {
last_tag = &data->ctx->last_tag;
hctx = data->hctx;
bt = &hctx->tags->bitmap_tags;
}
finish_wait(&bs->wait, &wait);
bs = bt_wait_ptr(bt, hctx);
} while (1);
finish_wait(&bs->wait, &wait);
return tag;
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 86,657
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void task_numa_free(struct task_struct *p)
{
struct numa_group *grp = p->numa_group;
void *numa_faults = p->numa_faults;
unsigned long flags;
int i;
if (grp) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&grp->lock, flags);
for (i = 0; i < NR_NUMA_HINT_FAULT_STATS * nr_node_ids; i++)
grp->faults[i] -= p->numa_faults[i];
grp->total_faults -= p->total_numa_faults;
grp->nr_tasks--;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&grp->lock, flags);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(p->numa_group, NULL);
put_numa_group(grp);
}
p->numa_faults = NULL;
kfree(numa_faults);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,713
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void stringAttrWithGetterExceptionAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setStringAttrWithGetterException(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int StreamPredictor::getChars(int nChars, Guchar *buffer) {
int n, m;
n = 0;
while (n < nChars) {
if (predIdx >= rowBytes) {
if (!getNextLine()) {
break;
}
}
m = rowBytes - predIdx;
if (m > nChars - n) {
m = nChars - n;
}
memcpy(buffer + n, predLine + predIdx, m);
predIdx += m;
n += m;
}
return n;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,947
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SavePackage::OnPathPicked(
const FilePath& final_name,
SavePageType type,
const SavePackageDownloadCreatedCallback& download_created_callback) {
saved_main_file_path_ = final_name;
net::GenerateSafeFileName(web_contents()->GetContentsMimeType(), false,
&saved_main_file_path_);
saved_main_directory_path_ = saved_main_file_path_.DirName();
save_type_ = type;
if (save_type_ == SAVE_PAGE_TYPE_AS_COMPLETE_HTML) {
saved_main_directory_path_ = saved_main_directory_path_.Append(
saved_main_file_path_.RemoveExtension().BaseName().value() +
FILE_PATH_LITERAL("_files"));
}
Init(download_created_callback);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 115,203
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
struct sk_buff *skb = chunk->skb;
sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch;
sctp_errhdr_t *err;
__u8 *ch_end;
int ootb_shut_ack = 0;
int ootb_cookie_ack = 0;
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTOFBLUES);
ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) chunk->chunk_hdr;
do {
/* Report violation if the chunk is less then minimal */
if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
/* Now that we know we at least have a chunk header,
* do things that are type appropriate.
*/
if (SCTP_CID_SHUTDOWN_ACK == ch->type)
ootb_shut_ack = 1;
/* RFC 2960, Section 3.3.7
* Moreover, under any circumstances, an endpoint that
* receives an ABORT MUST NOT respond to that ABORT by
* sending an ABORT of its own.
*/
if (SCTP_CID_ABORT == ch->type)
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* RFC 8.4, 7) If the packet contains a "Stale cookie" ERROR
* or a COOKIE ACK the SCTP Packet should be silently
* discarded.
*/
if (SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ACK == ch->type)
ootb_cookie_ack = 1;
if (SCTP_CID_ERROR == ch->type) {
sctp_walk_errors(err, ch) {
if (SCTP_ERROR_STALE_COOKIE == err->cause) {
ootb_cookie_ack = 1;
break;
}
}
}
/* Report violation if chunk len overflows */
ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + WORD_ROUND(ntohs(ch->length));
if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) ch_end;
} while (ch_end < skb_tail_pointer(skb));
if (ootb_shut_ack)
return sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
else if (ootb_cookie_ack)
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
else
return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 31,625
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: alt_merge_opt_map(OnigEncoding enc, OptMap* to, OptMap* add)
{
int i, val;
/* if (! is_equal_mml(&to->mmd, &add->mmd)) return ; */
if (to->value == 0) return ;
if (add->value == 0 || to->mmd.max < add->mmd.min) {
clear_opt_map(to);
return ;
}
alt_merge_mml(&to->mmd, &add->mmd);
val = 0;
for (i = 0; i < CHAR_MAP_SIZE; i++) {
if (add->map[i])
to->map[i] = 1;
if (to->map[i])
val += map_position_value(enc, i);
}
to->value = val;
alt_merge_opt_anc_info(&to->anc, &add->anc);
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GBool DCTStream::readMCURow() {
int data1[64];
Guchar data2[64];
Guchar *p1, *p2;
int pY, pCb, pCr, pR, pG, pB;
int h, v, horiz, vert, hSub, vSub;
int x1, x2, y2, x3, y3, x4, y4, x5, y5, cc, i;
int c;
for (x1 = 0; x1 < width; x1 += mcuWidth) {
if (restartInterval > 0 && restartCtr == 0) {
c = readMarker();
if (c != restartMarker) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
"Bad DCT data: incorrect restart marker");
return gFalse;
}
if (++restartMarker == 0xd8)
restartMarker = 0xd0;
restart();
}
for (cc = 0; cc < numComps; ++cc) {
h = compInfo[cc].hSample;
v = compInfo[cc].vSample;
horiz = mcuWidth / h;
vert = mcuHeight / v;
hSub = horiz / 8;
vSub = vert / 8;
for (y2 = 0; y2 < mcuHeight; y2 += vert) {
for (x2 = 0; x2 < mcuWidth; x2 += horiz) {
if (unlikely(scanInfo.dcHuffTable[cc] >= 4) || unlikely(scanInfo.acHuffTable[cc] >= 4)) {
return gFalse;
}
if (!readDataUnit(&dcHuffTables[scanInfo.dcHuffTable[cc]],
&acHuffTables[scanInfo.acHuffTable[cc]],
&compInfo[cc].prevDC,
data1)) {
return gFalse;
}
transformDataUnit(quantTables[compInfo[cc].quantTable],
data1, data2);
if (hSub == 1 && vSub == 1) {
for (y3 = 0, i = 0; y3 < 8; ++y3, i += 8) {
p1 = &rowBuf[cc][y2+y3][x1+x2];
p1[0] = data2[i];
p1[1] = data2[i+1];
p1[2] = data2[i+2];
p1[3] = data2[i+3];
p1[4] = data2[i+4];
p1[5] = data2[i+5];
p1[6] = data2[i+6];
p1[7] = data2[i+7];
}
} else if (hSub == 2 && vSub == 2) {
for (y3 = 0, i = 0; y3 < 16; y3 += 2, i += 8) {
p1 = &rowBuf[cc][y2+y3][x1+x2];
p2 = &rowBuf[cc][y2+y3+1][x1+x2];
p1[0] = p1[1] = p2[0] = p2[1] = data2[i];
p1[2] = p1[3] = p2[2] = p2[3] = data2[i+1];
p1[4] = p1[5] = p2[4] = p2[5] = data2[i+2];
p1[6] = p1[7] = p2[6] = p2[7] = data2[i+3];
p1[8] = p1[9] = p2[8] = p2[9] = data2[i+4];
p1[10] = p1[11] = p2[10] = p2[11] = data2[i+5];
p1[12] = p1[13] = p2[12] = p2[13] = data2[i+6];
p1[14] = p1[15] = p2[14] = p2[15] = data2[i+7];
}
} else {
i = 0;
for (y3 = 0, y4 = 0; y3 < 8; ++y3, y4 += vSub) {
for (x3 = 0, x4 = 0; x3 < 8; ++x3, x4 += hSub) {
for (y5 = 0; y5 < vSub; ++y5)
for (x5 = 0; x5 < hSub; ++x5)
rowBuf[cc][y2+y4+y5][x1+x2+x4+x5] = data2[i];
++i;
}
}
}
}
}
}
--restartCtr;
if (colorXform) {
if (numComps == 3) {
for (y2 = 0; y2 < mcuHeight; ++y2) {
for (x2 = 0; x2 < mcuWidth; ++x2) {
pY = rowBuf[0][y2][x1+x2];
pCb = rowBuf[1][y2][x1+x2] - 128;
pCr = rowBuf[2][y2][x1+x2] - 128;
pR = ((pY << 16) + dctCrToR * pCr + 32768) >> 16;
rowBuf[0][y2][x1+x2] = dctClip[dctClipOffset + pR];
pG = ((pY << 16) + dctCbToG * pCb + dctCrToG * pCr + 32768) >> 16;
rowBuf[1][y2][x1+x2] = dctClip[dctClipOffset + pG];
pB = ((pY << 16) + dctCbToB * pCb + 32768) >> 16;
rowBuf[2][y2][x1+x2] = dctClip[dctClipOffset + pB];
}
}
} else if (numComps == 4) {
for (y2 = 0; y2 < mcuHeight; ++y2) {
for (x2 = 0; x2 < mcuWidth; ++x2) {
pY = rowBuf[0][y2][x1+x2];
pCb = rowBuf[1][y2][x1+x2] - 128;
pCr = rowBuf[2][y2][x1+x2] - 128;
pR = ((pY << 16) + dctCrToR * pCr + 32768) >> 16;
rowBuf[0][y2][x1+x2] = 255 - dctClip[dctClipOffset + pR];
pG = ((pY << 16) + dctCbToG * pCb + dctCrToG * pCr + 32768) >> 16;
rowBuf[1][y2][x1+x2] = 255 - dctClip[dctClipOffset + pG];
pB = ((pY << 16) + dctCbToB * pCb + 32768) >> 16;
rowBuf[2][y2][x1+x2] = 255 - dctClip[dctClipOffset + pB];
}
}
}
}
}
return gTrue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,020
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ConversionContext::SwitchToEffect(
const EffectPaintPropertyNode* target_effect) {
if (target_effect == current_effect_)
return;
const EffectPaintPropertyNode* lca_effect =
&LowestCommonAncestor(*target_effect, *current_effect_);
while (current_effect_ != lca_effect) {
EndClips();
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
DCHECK(state_stack_.size())
<< "Error: Chunk has an effect that escapes layer's effect.\n"
<< "target_effect:\n"
<< target_effect->ToTreeString().Utf8().data() << "current_effect_:\n"
<< current_effect_->ToTreeString().Utf8().data();
#endif
if (!state_stack_.size())
break;
EndEffect();
}
Vector<const EffectPaintPropertyNode*, 1u> pending_effects;
for (const EffectPaintPropertyNode* effect = target_effect;
effect != current_effect_; effect = effect->Parent()) {
if (!effect)
break;
pending_effects.push_back(effect);
}
for (size_t i = pending_effects.size(); i--;) {
const EffectPaintPropertyNode* sub_effect = pending_effects[i];
DCHECK_EQ(current_effect_, sub_effect->Parent());
StartEffect(sub_effect);
}
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,590
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t tcm_loop_tpg_store_nexus(
struct se_portal_group *se_tpg,
const char *page,
size_t count)
{
struct tcm_loop_tpg *tl_tpg = container_of(se_tpg,
struct tcm_loop_tpg, tl_se_tpg);
struct tcm_loop_hba *tl_hba = tl_tpg->tl_hba;
unsigned char i_port[TL_WWN_ADDR_LEN], *ptr, *port_ptr;
int ret;
/*
* Shutdown the active I_T nexus if 'NULL' is passed..
*/
if (!strncmp(page, "NULL", 4)) {
ret = tcm_loop_drop_nexus(tl_tpg);
return (!ret) ? count : ret;
}
/*
* Otherwise make sure the passed virtual Initiator port WWN matches
* the fabric protocol_id set in tcm_loop_make_scsi_hba(), and call
* tcm_loop_make_nexus()
*/
if (strlen(page) >= TL_WWN_ADDR_LEN) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Emulated NAA Sas Address: %s, exceeds"
" max: %d\n", page, TL_WWN_ADDR_LEN);
return -EINVAL;
}
snprintf(&i_port[0], TL_WWN_ADDR_LEN, "%s", page);
ptr = strstr(i_port, "naa.");
if (ptr) {
if (tl_hba->tl_proto_id != SCSI_PROTOCOL_SAS) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Passed SAS Initiator Port %s does not"
" match target port protoid: %s\n", i_port,
tcm_loop_dump_proto_id(tl_hba));
return -EINVAL;
}
port_ptr = &i_port[0];
goto check_newline;
}
ptr = strstr(i_port, "fc.");
if (ptr) {
if (tl_hba->tl_proto_id != SCSI_PROTOCOL_FCP) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Passed FCP Initiator Port %s does not"
" match target port protoid: %s\n", i_port,
tcm_loop_dump_proto_id(tl_hba));
return -EINVAL;
}
port_ptr = &i_port[3]; /* Skip over "fc." */
goto check_newline;
}
ptr = strstr(i_port, "iqn.");
if (ptr) {
if (tl_hba->tl_proto_id != SCSI_PROTOCOL_ISCSI) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Passed iSCSI Initiator Port %s does not"
" match target port protoid: %s\n", i_port,
tcm_loop_dump_proto_id(tl_hba));
return -EINVAL;
}
port_ptr = &i_port[0];
goto check_newline;
}
printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to locate prefix for emulated Initiator Port:"
" %s\n", i_port);
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Clear any trailing newline for the NAA WWN
*/
check_newline:
if (i_port[strlen(i_port)-1] == '\n')
i_port[strlen(i_port)-1] = '\0';
ret = tcm_loop_make_nexus(tl_tpg, port_ptr);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
return count;
}
Commit Message: loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 94,168
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int CMS_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, BIO *dcont, unsigned int flags)
{
BIO *cmsbio;
int ret = 0;
if ((cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont)) == NULL) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, CMS_R_CMS_LIB);
return 0;
}
SMIME_crlf_copy(data, cmsbio, flags);
(void)BIO_flush(cmsbio);
if (!CMS_dataFinal(cms, cmsbio)) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, CMS_R_CMS_DATAFINAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
do_free_upto(cmsbio, dcont);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 11,940
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jas_stream_t *jas_stream_memopen(char *buf, int bufsize)
{
jas_stream_t *stream;
jas_stream_memobj_t *obj;
if (!(stream = jas_stream_create())) {
return 0;
}
/* A stream associated with a memory buffer is always opened
for both reading and writing in binary mode. */
stream->openmode_ = JAS_STREAM_READ | JAS_STREAM_WRITE | JAS_STREAM_BINARY;
/* Since the stream data is already resident in memory, buffering
is not necessary. */
/* But... It still may be faster to use buffering anyways. */
jas_stream_initbuf(stream, JAS_STREAM_FULLBUF, 0, 0);
/* Select the operations for a memory stream. */
stream->ops_ = &jas_stream_memops;
/* Allocate memory for the underlying memory stream object. */
if (!(obj = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_stream_memobj_t)))) {
jas_stream_destroy(stream);
return 0;
}
stream->obj_ = (void *) obj;
/* Initialize a few important members of the memory stream object. */
obj->myalloc_ = 0;
obj->buf_ = 0;
/* If the buffer size specified is nonpositive, then the buffer
is allocated internally and automatically grown as needed. */
if (bufsize <= 0) {
obj->bufsize_ = 1024;
obj->growable_ = 1;
} else {
obj->bufsize_ = bufsize;
obj->growable_ = 0;
}
if (buf) {
obj->buf_ = (unsigned char *) buf;
} else {
obj->buf_ = jas_malloc(obj->bufsize_);
obj->myalloc_ = 1;
}
if (!obj->buf_) {
jas_stream_close(stream);
return 0;
}
if (bufsize > 0 && buf) {
/* If a buffer was supplied by the caller and its length is positive,
make the associated buffer data appear in the stream initially. */
obj->len_ = bufsize;
} else {
/* The stream is initially empty. */
obj->len_ = 0;
}
obj->pos_ = 0;
return stream;
}
Commit Message: The memory stream interface allows for a buffer size of zero.
The case of a zero-sized buffer was not handled correctly, as it could
lead to a double free.
This problem has now been fixed (hopefully).
One might ask whether a zero-sized buffer should be allowed at all,
but this is a question for another day.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 73,205
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
{
dh->p = p;
dh->q = q;
dh->g = g;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 4,476
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ins_GETINFO( INS_ARG )
{
FT_Long K;
K = 0;
/* We return MS rasterizer version 1.7 for the font scaler. */
if ( ( args[0] & 1 ) != 0 )
K = 35;
/* Has the glyph been rotated? */
if ( ( args[0] & 2 ) != 0 && CUR.tt_metrics.rotated )
K |= 0x80;
/* Has the glyph been stretched? */
if ( ( args[0] & 4 ) != 0 && CUR.tt_metrics.stretched )
K |= 1 << 8;
/* Are we hinting for grayscale? */
if ( ( args[0] & 32 ) != 0 && CUR.grayscale )
K |= 1 << 12;
args[0] = K;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void gen_helper_in_func(TCGMemOp ot, TCGv v, TCGv_i32 n)
{
switch (ot) {
case MO_8:
gen_helper_inb(v, cpu_env, n);
break;
case MO_16:
gen_helper_inw(v, cpu_env, n);
break;
case MO_32:
gen_helper_inl(v, cpu_env, n);
break;
default:
tcg_abort();
}
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-94
| 0
| 66,340
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ServiceWorkerContextCore::DeleteAndStartOver(StatusCallback callback) {
job_coordinator_->AbortAll();
storage_->DeleteAndStartOver(std::move(callback));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLSurfaceEGLOzoneX11::~GLSurfaceEGLOzoneX11() {
Destroy();
}
Commit Message: Add ThreadChecker for Ozone X11 GPU.
Ensure Ozone X11 tests the same thread constraints we have in Ozone GBM.
BUG=none
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2366643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421817}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 119,366
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf_grestore(fz_context *ctx, pdf_run_processor *pr)
{
pdf_gstate *gs = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
int clip_depth = gs->clip_depth;
if (pr->gtop <= pr->gbot)
{
fz_warn(ctx, "gstate underflow in content stream");
return;
}
pdf_drop_gstate(ctx, gs);
pr->gtop --;
gs = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
while (clip_depth > gs->clip_depth)
{
fz_try(ctx)
{
fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev);
}
fz_catch(ctx)
{
/* Silently swallow the problem - restores must
* never throw! */
}
clip_depth--;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 464
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::UpdatePreferredSize(WebContents* source,
const gfx::Size& pref_size) {
window_->UpdatePreferredSize(source, pref_size);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,840
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DGAGetViewportStatus(int index)
{
DGAScreenPtr pScreenPriv = DGA_GET_SCREEN_PRIV(screenInfo.screens[index]);
/* We rely on the extension to check that DGA is active */
if (!pScreenPriv->funcs->GetViewport)
return 0;
return (*pScreenPriv->funcs->GetViewport) (pScreenPriv->pScrn);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,709
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: read_ttr(usec *ttr, const char *buf, char **end)
{
return read_delay(ttr, buf, end);
}
Commit Message: Discard job body bytes if the job is too big.
Previously, a malicious user could craft a job payload and inject
beanstalk commands without the client application knowing. (An
extra-careful client library could check the size of the job body before
sending the put command, but most libraries do not do this, nor should
they have to.)
Reported by Graham Barr.
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: poppler_rectangle_new (void)
{
return g_new0 (PopplerRectangle, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 815
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ewk_frame_redirect_requested(Evas_Object* ewkFrame, const char* url)
{
evas_object_smart_callback_call(ewkFrame, "redirect,requested", (void*)url);
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 107,689
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: T42_Size_Done( FT_Size t42size ) /* T42_Size */
{
T42_Size size = (T42_Size)t42size;
FT_Face face = t42size->face;
T42_Face t42face = (T42_Face)face;
FT_ListNode node;
node = FT_List_Find( &t42face->ttf_face->sizes_list, size->ttsize );
if ( node )
{
FT_Done_Size( size->ttsize );
size->ttsize = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,125
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DevToolsWindow::DevToolsWindow(Profile* profile,
WebContents* main_web_contents,
DevToolsUIBindings* bindings,
WebContents* inspected_web_contents,
bool can_dock)
: profile_(profile),
main_web_contents_(main_web_contents),
toolbox_web_contents_(nullptr),
bindings_(bindings),
browser_(nullptr),
is_docked_(true),
can_dock_(can_dock),
close_on_detach_(true),
life_stage_(can_dock ? kNotLoaded : kIsDockedSet),
action_on_load_(DevToolsToggleAction::NoOp()),
intercepted_page_beforeunload_(false),
ready_for_test_(false) {
main_web_contents_->SetDelegate(this);
bindings_->SetDelegate(this);
data_use_measurement::DataUseWebContentsObserver::CreateForWebContents(
main_web_contents_);
zoom::ZoomController::CreateForWebContents(main_web_contents_);
zoom::ZoomController::FromWebContents(main_web_contents_)
->SetShowsNotificationBubble(false);
g_instances.Get().push_back(this);
if (inspected_web_contents)
inspected_contents_observer_.reset(
new ObserverWithAccessor(inspected_web_contents));
if (can_dock_ && inspected_web_contents) {
content::RenderWidgetHostView* inspected_view =
inspected_web_contents->GetRenderWidgetHostView();
if (inspected_view && main_web_contents_->GetRenderWidgetHostView()) {
gfx::Size size = inspected_view->GetViewBounds().size();
main_web_contents_->GetRenderWidgetHostView()->SetSize(size);
}
}
event_forwarder_.reset(new DevToolsEventForwarder(this));
task_manager::WebContentsTags::CreateForDevToolsContents(main_web_contents_);
std::vector<base::Callback<void(DevToolsWindow*)>> copy(
g_creation_callbacks.Get());
for (const auto& callback : copy)
callback.Run(this);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 138,385
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void UnsignedLongLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValue(info, static_cast<double>(impl->unsignedLongLongAttribute()));
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,304
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void H264DPB::GetNotOutputtedPicsAppending(H264Picture::PtrVector& out) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < pics_.size(); ++i) {
H264Picture* pic = pics_[i];
if (!pic->outputted)
out.push_back(pic);
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
TBR=posciak@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 103,003
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: header_put_le_8byte (SF_PRIVATE *psf, sf_count_t x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 8)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
} ;
} /* header_put_le_8byte */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 170,055
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __local_bh_enable(unsigned int cnt)
{
lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
if (softirq_count() == (cnt & SOFTIRQ_MASK))
trace_softirqs_on(_RET_IP_);
preempt_count_sub(cnt);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 169,184
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct vm_area_struct *prev;
int error;
address &= PAGE_MASK;
error = security_mmap_addr(address);
if (error)
return error;
/* Enforce stack_guard_gap */
prev = vma->vm_prev;
/* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */
if (prev && !(prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN) &&
(prev->vm_flags & (VM_WRITE|VM_READ|VM_EXEC))) {
if (address - prev->vm_end < stack_guard_gap)
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* We must make sure the anon_vma is allocated. */
if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma)))
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* vma->vm_start/vm_end cannot change under us because the caller
* is required to hold the mmap_sem in read mode. We need the
* anon_vma lock to serialize against concurrent expand_stacks.
*/
anon_vma_lock_write(vma->anon_vma);
/* Somebody else might have raced and expanded it already */
if (address < vma->vm_start) {
unsigned long size, grow;
size = vma->vm_end - address;
grow = (vma->vm_start - address) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
error = -ENOMEM;
if (grow <= vma->vm_pgoff) {
error = acct_stack_growth(vma, size, grow);
if (!error) {
/*
* vma_gap_update() doesn't support concurrent
* updates, but we only hold a shared mmap_sem
* lock here, so we need to protect against
* concurrent vma expansions.
* anon_vma_lock_write() doesn't help here, as
* we don't guarantee that all growable vmas
* in a mm share the same root anon vma.
* So, we reuse mm->page_table_lock to guard
* against concurrent vma expansions.
*/
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
mm->locked_vm += grow;
vm_stat_account(mm, vma->vm_flags, grow);
anon_vma_interval_tree_pre_update_vma(vma);
vma->vm_start = address;
vma->vm_pgoff -= grow;
anon_vma_interval_tree_post_update_vma(vma);
vma_gap_update(vma);
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
perf_event_mmap(vma);
}
}
}
anon_vma_unlock_write(vma->anon_vma);
khugepaged_enter_vma_merge(vma, vma->vm_flags);
validate_mm(mm);
return error;
}
Commit Message: mm: enforce min addr even if capable() in expand_downwards()
security_mmap_addr() does a capability check with current_cred(), but
we can reach this code from contexts like a VFS write handler where
current_cred() must not be used.
This can be abused on systems without SMAP to make NULL pointer
dereferences exploitable again.
Fixes: 8869477a49c3 ("security: protect from stack expansion into low vm addresses")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 169,722
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PPB_URLLoader_Impl::PPB_URLLoader_Impl(PluginInstance* instance,
bool main_document_loader)
: Resource(instance),
main_document_loader_(main_document_loader),
pending_callback_(),
bytes_sent_(0),
total_bytes_to_be_sent_(-1),
bytes_received_(0),
total_bytes_to_be_received_(-1),
user_buffer_(NULL),
user_buffer_size_(0),
done_status_(PP_OK_COMPLETIONPENDING),
is_streaming_to_file_(false),
is_asynchronous_load_suspended_(false),
has_universal_access_(false),
status_callback_(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,016
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int64_t coroutine_fn iscsi_co_get_block_status(BlockDriverState *bs,
int64_t sector_num,
int nb_sectors, int *pnum,
BlockDriverState **file)
{
IscsiLun *iscsilun = bs->opaque;
struct scsi_get_lba_status *lbas = NULL;
struct scsi_lba_status_descriptor *lbasd = NULL;
struct IscsiTask iTask;
int64_t ret;
iscsi_co_init_iscsitask(iscsilun, &iTask);
if (!is_request_lun_aligned(sector_num, nb_sectors, iscsilun)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* default to all sectors allocated */
ret = BDRV_BLOCK_DATA;
ret |= (sector_num << BDRV_SECTOR_BITS) | BDRV_BLOCK_OFFSET_VALID;
*pnum = nb_sectors;
/* LUN does not support logical block provisioning */
if (!iscsilun->lbpme) {
goto out;
}
retry:
if (iscsi_get_lba_status_task(iscsilun->iscsi, iscsilun->lun,
sector_qemu2lun(sector_num, iscsilun),
8 + 16, iscsi_co_generic_cb,
&iTask) == NULL) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
while (!iTask.complete) {
iscsi_set_events(iscsilun);
qemu_coroutine_yield();
}
if (iTask.do_retry) {
if (iTask.task != NULL) {
scsi_free_scsi_task(iTask.task);
iTask.task = NULL;
}
iTask.complete = 0;
goto retry;
}
if (iTask.status != SCSI_STATUS_GOOD) {
/* in case the get_lba_status_callout fails (i.e.
* because the device is busy or the cmd is not
* supported) we pretend all blocks are allocated
* for backwards compatibility */
goto out;
}
lbas = scsi_datain_unmarshall(iTask.task);
if (lbas == NULL) {
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
lbasd = &lbas->descriptors[0];
if (sector_qemu2lun(sector_num, iscsilun) != lbasd->lba) {
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
*pnum = sector_lun2qemu(lbasd->num_blocks, iscsilun);
if (lbasd->provisioning == SCSI_PROVISIONING_TYPE_DEALLOCATED ||
lbasd->provisioning == SCSI_PROVISIONING_TYPE_ANCHORED) {
ret &= ~BDRV_BLOCK_DATA;
if (iscsilun->lbprz) {
ret |= BDRV_BLOCK_ZERO;
}
}
if (ret & BDRV_BLOCK_ZERO) {
iscsi_allocationmap_clear(iscsilun, sector_num, *pnum);
} else {
iscsi_allocationmap_set(iscsilun, sector_num, *pnum);
}
if (*pnum > nb_sectors) {
*pnum = nb_sectors;
}
out:
if (iTask.task != NULL) {
scsi_free_scsi_task(iTask.task);
}
if (ret > 0 && ret & BDRV_BLOCK_OFFSET_VALID) {
*file = bs;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,505
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hls_cross_component_pred(HEVCContext *s, int idx) {
HEVCLocalContext *lc = s->HEVClc;
int log2_res_scale_abs_plus1 = ff_hevc_log2_res_scale_abs(s, idx);
if (log2_res_scale_abs_plus1 != 0) {
int res_scale_sign_flag = ff_hevc_res_scale_sign_flag(s, idx);
lc->tu.res_scale_val = (1 << (log2_res_scale_abs_plus1 - 1)) *
(1 - 2 * res_scale_sign_flag);
} else {
lc->tu.res_scale_val = 0;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/hevcdec: Avoid only partly skiping duplicate first slices
Fixes: NULL pointer dereference and out of array access
Fixes: 13871/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5746167087890432
Fixes: 13845/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5650370728034304
This also fixes the return code for explode mode
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 90,769
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: walk_string(fz_context *ctx, int uni, int remove, editable_str *str)
{
int rune;
if (str->utf8 == NULL)
return;
do
{
char *s = &str->utf8[str->pos];
size_t len;
int n = fz_chartorune(&rune, s);
if (rune == uni)
{
/* Match. Skip over that one. */
str->pos += n;
}
else if (uni == 32) {
/* We don't care if we're given whitespace
* and it doesn't match the string. Don't
* skip forward. Nothing to remove. */
break;
}
else if (rune == 32) {
/* The string has a whitespace, and we
* don't match it; that's forgivable as
* PDF often misses out spaces. Remove this
* if we are removing stuff. */
}
else
{
/* Mismatch. No point in tracking through any more. */
str->pos = -1;
break;
}
if (remove)
{
len = strlen(s+n);
memmove(s, s+n, len+1);
str->edited = 1;
}
}
while (rune != uni);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 164,660
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void setup_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
int save_nmsrs, index;
save_nmsrs = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (is_long_mode(&vmx->vcpu)) {
index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_SYSCALL_MASK);
if (index >= 0)
move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_LSTAR);
if (index >= 0)
move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_CSTAR);
if (index >= 0)
move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_TSC_AUX);
if (index >= 0 && vmx->rdtscp_enabled)
move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
/*
* MSR_STAR is only needed on long mode guests, and only
* if efer.sce is enabled.
*/
index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_STAR);
if ((index >= 0) && (vmx->vcpu.arch.efer & EFER_SCE))
move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
}
#endif
index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_EFER);
if (index >= 0 && update_transition_efer(vmx, index))
move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
vmx->save_nmsrs = save_nmsrs;
if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
vmx_set_msr_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,175
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeGeolocationPermissionContext::RequestGeolocationPermission(
int render_process_id, int render_view_id, int bridge_id,
const GURL& requesting_frame, base::Callback<void(bool)> callback) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(
&ChromeGeolocationPermissionContext::RequestGeolocationPermission,
this, render_process_id, render_view_id, bridge_id,
requesting_frame, callback));
return;
}
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (!profile_->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kGeolocationEnabled)) {
NotifyPermissionSet(render_process_id, render_view_id, bridge_id,
requesting_frame, callback, false);
return;
}
#endif
ExtensionService* extension_service = profile_->GetExtensionService();
if (extension_service) {
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extension_service->extensions()->GetExtensionOrAppByURL(
ExtensionURLInfo(
WebSecurityOrigin::createFromString(
UTF8ToUTF16(requesting_frame.spec())),
requesting_frame));
if (extension &&
extension->HasAPIPermission(extensions::APIPermission::kGeolocation)) {
if (extension_service->process_map()->Contains(
extension->id(), render_process_id)) {
NotifyPermissionSet(render_process_id, render_view_id, bridge_id,
requesting_frame, callback, true);
return;
}
}
}
WebContents* web_contents =
tab_util::GetWebContentsByID(render_process_id, render_view_id);
if (chrome::GetViewType(web_contents) != chrome::VIEW_TYPE_TAB_CONTENTS) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Attempt to use geolocation tabless renderer: "
<< render_process_id << "," << render_view_id << ","
<< bridge_id << " (can't prompt user without a visible tab)";
NotifyPermissionSet(render_process_id, render_view_id, bridge_id,
requesting_frame, callback, false);
return;
}
GURL embedder = web_contents->GetURL();
if (!requesting_frame.is_valid() || !embedder.is_valid()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Attempt to use geolocation from an invalid URL: "
<< requesting_frame << "," << embedder
<< " (geolocation is not supported in popups)";
NotifyPermissionSet(render_process_id, render_view_id, bridge_id,
requesting_frame, callback, false);
return;
}
ContentSetting content_setting =
profile_->GetHostContentSettingsMap()->GetContentSetting(
requesting_frame,
embedder,
CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_GEOLOCATION,
std::string());
if (content_setting == CONTENT_SETTING_BLOCK) {
NotifyPermissionSet(render_process_id, render_view_id, bridge_id,
requesting_frame, callback, false);
} else if (content_setting == CONTENT_SETTING_ALLOW) {
NotifyPermissionSet(render_process_id, render_view_id, bridge_id,
requesting_frame, callback, true);
} else { // setting == ask. Prompt the user.
geolocation_infobar_queue_controller_->CreateInfoBarRequest(
render_process_id, render_view_id, bridge_id, requesting_frame,
embedder, callback);
}
}
Commit Message: Don't retain reference to ChromeGeolocationPermissionContext
ChromeGeolocationPermissionContext owns
GeolocationInfoBarQueueController, so make sure that the callback
passed to GeolocationInfoBarQueueController doesn't increase the
reference count on ChromeGeolocationPermissionContext (which
https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11072012 accidentally does).
TBR=bulach
BUG=152921
TEST=unittest:chrome_geolocation_permission_context on memory.fyi bot
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087030
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@160881 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 119,053
|
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