instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pgp_compute_signature(sc_card_t *card, const u8 *data,
size_t data_len, u8 * out, size_t outlen)
{
struct pgp_priv_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
sc_security_env_t *env = &priv->sec_env;
sc_apdu_t apdu;
u8 apdu_case = (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_OPENPGP_GNUK)
? SC_APDU_CASE_4_SHORT : SC_APDU_CASE_4;
int r;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
if (env->operation != SC_SEC_OPERATION_SIGN)
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS,
"invalid operation");
switch (env->key_ref[0]) {
case 0x00: /* signature key */
/* PSO SIGNATURE */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, apdu_case, 0x2A, 0x9E, 0x9A);
break;
case 0x02: /* authentication key */
/* INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, apdu_case, 0x88, 0, 0);
break;
case 0x01:
default:
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS,
"invalid key reference");
}
/* if card/reader does not support extended APDUs, but chaining, then set it */
if (((card->caps & SC_CARD_CAP_APDU_EXT) == 0) && (priv->ext_caps & EXT_CAP_CHAINING))
apdu.flags |= SC_APDU_FLAGS_CHAINING;
apdu.lc = data_len;
apdu.data = (u8 *)data;
apdu.datalen = data_len;
apdu.le = ((outlen >= 256) && !(card->caps & SC_CARD_CAP_APDU_EXT)) ? 256 : outlen;
apdu.resp = out;
apdu.resplen = outlen;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Card returned error");
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, (int)apdu.resplen);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,579
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
const char *str)
{
nid_cb_st ncb;
ncb.nidcnt = 0;
if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
return 0;
if (pext == NULL)
return 1;
return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL GetWindowOpenURL() {
return ui_test_utils::GetTestUrl(
base::FilePath(kTestDir),
base::FilePath(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("window_open.html")));
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,535
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TextCheckerClient* EditorClientBlackBerry::textChecker()
{
return this;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Prevent text selection inside Colour and Date/Time input fields
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111733
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
PR 305194.
Prevent selection for popup input fields as they are buttons.
Informally Reviewed Gen Mak.
* WebCoreSupport/EditorClientBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145121 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,777
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void jbd2_journal_set_triggers(struct buffer_head *bh,
struct jbd2_buffer_trigger_type *type)
{
struct journal_head *jh = bh2jh(bh);
jh->b_triggers = type;
}
Commit Message: jbd2: clear BH_Delay & BH_Unwritten in journal_unmap_buffer
journal_unmap_buffer()'s zap_buffer: code clears a lot of buffer head
state ala discard_buffer(), but does not touch _Delay or _Unwritten as
discard_buffer() does.
This can be problematic in some areas of the ext4 code which assume
that if they have found a buffer marked unwritten or delay, then it's
a live one. Perhaps those spots should check whether it is mapped
as well, but if jbd2 is going to tear down a buffer, let's really
tear it down completely.
Without this I get some fsx failures on sub-page-block filesystems
up until v3.2, at which point 4e96b2dbbf1d7e81f22047a50f862555a6cb87cb
and 189e868fa8fdca702eb9db9d8afc46b5cb9144c9 make the failures go
away, because buried within that large change is some more flag
clearing. I still think it's worth doing in jbd2, since
->invalidatepage leads here directly, and it's the right place
to clear away these flags.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,389
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int oidc_check_userid_openidc(request_rec *r, oidc_cfg *c) {
if (c->redirect_uri == NULL) {
oidc_error(r,
"configuration error: the authentication type is set to \"openid-connect\" but OIDCRedirectURI has not been set");
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
/* check if this is a sub-request or an initial request */
if (ap_is_initial_req(r)) {
int rc = OK;
/* load the session from the request state; this will be a new "empty" session if no state exists */
oidc_session_t *session = NULL;
oidc_session_load(r, &session);
/* see if the initial request is to the redirect URI; this handles potential logout too */
if (oidc_util_request_matches_url(r, c->redirect_uri)) {
/* handle request to the redirect_uri */
rc = oidc_handle_redirect_uri_request(r, c, session);
/* free resources allocated for the session */
oidc_session_free(r, session);
return rc;
/* initial request to non-redirect URI, check if we have an existing session */
} else if (session->remote_user != NULL) {
/* set the user in the main request for further (incl. sub-request) processing */
r->user = (char *) session->remote_user;
/* this is initial request and we already have a session */
rc = oidc_handle_existing_session(r, c, session);
/* free resources allocated for the session */
oidc_session_free(r, session);
/* strip any cookies that we need to */
oidc_strip_cookies(r);
return rc;
}
/* free resources allocated for the session */
oidc_session_free(r, session);
/*
* else: initial request, we have no session and it is not an authorization or
* discovery response: just hit the default flow for unauthenticated users
*/
} else {
/* not an initial request, try to recycle what we've already established in the main request */
if (r->main != NULL)
r->user = r->main->user;
else if (r->prev != NULL)
r->user = r->prev->user;
if (r->user != NULL) {
/* this is a sub-request and we have a session (headers will have been scrubbed and set already) */
oidc_debug(r,
"recycling user '%s' from initial request for sub-request",
r->user);
/*
* apparently request state can get lost in sub-requests, so let's see
* if we need to restore id_token and/or claims from the session cache
*/
const char *s_id_token = oidc_request_state_get(r,
OIDC_IDTOKEN_CLAIMS_SESSION_KEY);
if (s_id_token == NULL) {
oidc_session_t *session = NULL;
oidc_session_load(r, &session);
oidc_copy_tokens_to_request_state(r, session, NULL, NULL);
/* free resources allocated for the session */
oidc_session_free(r, session);
}
/* strip any cookies that we need to */
oidc_strip_cookies(r);
return OK;
}
/*
* else: not initial request, but we could not find a session, so:
* just hit the default flow for unauthenticated users
*/
}
/* find out which action we need to take when encountering an unauthenticated request */
switch (oidc_dir_cfg_unauth_action(r)) {
case OIDC_UNAUTH_RETURN410:
return HTTP_GONE;
case OIDC_UNAUTH_RETURN401:
return HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
case OIDC_UNAUTH_PASS:
r->user = "";
return OK;
case OIDC_UNAUTH_AUTHENTICATE:
/* if this is a Javascript path we won't redirect the user and create a state cookie */
if (apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "X-Requested-With") != NULL)
return HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
break;
}
/* else: no session (regardless of whether it is main or sub-request), go and authenticate the user */
return oidc_authenticate_user(r, c, NULL, oidc_get_current_url(r), NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
Commit Message: don't echo query params on invalid requests to redirect URI; closes #212
thanks @LukasReschke; I'm sure there's some OWASP guideline that warns
against this
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 68,287
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ptaWriteStream(FILE *fp,
PTA *pta,
l_int32 type)
{
l_int32 i, n, ix, iy;
l_float32 x, y;
PROCNAME("ptaWriteStream");
if (!fp)
return ERROR_INT("stream not defined", procName, 1);
if (!pta)
return ERROR_INT("pta not defined", procName, 1);
n = ptaGetCount(pta);
fprintf(fp, "\n Pta Version %d\n", PTA_VERSION_NUMBER);
if (type == 0)
fprintf(fp, " Number of pts = %d; format = float\n", n);
else /* type == 1 */
fprintf(fp, " Number of pts = %d; format = integer\n", n);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (type == 0) { /* data is float */
ptaGetPt(pta, i, &x, &y);
fprintf(fp, " (%f, %f)\n", x, y);
} else { /* data is integer */
ptaGetIPt(pta, i, &ix, &iy);
fprintf(fp, " (%d, %d)\n", ix, iy);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 84,184
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool valid_repne(cs_struct *h, unsigned int opcode)
{
unsigned int id;
int i = insn_find(insns, ARR_SIZE(insns), opcode, &h->insn_cache);
if (i != 0) {
id = insns[i].mapid;
switch(id) {
default:
return false;
case X86_INS_CMPSB:
case X86_INS_CMPSW:
case X86_INS_CMPSQ:
case X86_INS_SCASB:
case X86_INS_SCASW:
case X86_INS_SCASQ:
case X86_INS_MOVSB:
case X86_INS_MOVSW:
case X86_INS_MOVSD:
case X86_INS_MOVSQ:
case X86_INS_LODSB:
case X86_INS_LODSW:
case X86_INS_LODSD:
case X86_INS_LODSQ:
case X86_INS_STOSB:
case X86_INS_STOSW:
case X86_INS_STOSD:
case X86_INS_STOSQ:
case X86_INS_INSB:
case X86_INS_INSW:
case X86_INS_INSD:
case X86_INS_OUTSB:
case X86_INS_OUTSW:
case X86_INS_OUTSD:
return true;
case X86_INS_CMPSD:
if (opcode == X86_CMPSL) // REP CMPSD
return true;
return false;
case X86_INS_SCASD:
if (opcode == X86_SCASL) // REP SCASD
return true;
return false;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: x86: fast path checking for X86_insn_reg_intel()
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 94,041
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: add_lease_context(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct kvec *iov,
unsigned int *num_iovec, u8 *lease_key, __u8 *oplock)
{
struct smb2_create_req *req = iov[0].iov_base;
unsigned int num = *num_iovec;
iov[num].iov_base = server->ops->create_lease_buf(lease_key, *oplock);
if (iov[num].iov_base == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
iov[num].iov_len = server->vals->create_lease_size;
req->RequestedOplockLevel = SMB2_OPLOCK_LEVEL_LEASE;
if (!req->CreateContextsOffset)
req->CreateContextsOffset = cpu_to_le32(
sizeof(struct smb2_create_req) +
iov[num - 1].iov_len);
le32_add_cpu(&req->CreateContextsLength,
server->vals->create_lease_size);
*num_iovec = num + 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 88,110
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int em_popa(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
int reg = VCPU_REGS_RDI;
u32 val;
while (reg >= VCPU_REGS_RAX) {
if (reg == VCPU_REGS_RSP) {
rsp_increment(ctxt, ctxt->op_bytes);
--reg;
}
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &val, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
break;
assign_register(reg_rmw(ctxt, reg), val, ctxt->op_bytes);
--reg;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 47,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LocationBar* BrowserWindowGtk::GetLocationBar() const {
return toolbar_->GetLocationBar();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,938
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MediaStreamManager::FinishTabCaptureRequestSetupWithDeviceId(
const std::string& label,
const DesktopMediaID& device_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::IO);
DeviceRequest* request = FindRequest(label);
if (!request) {
DVLOG(1) << "SetUpRequest label " << label << " doesn't exist!!";
return; // This can happen if the request has been canceled.
}
if (device_id.type != content::DesktopMediaID::TYPE_WEB_CONTENTS) {
FinalizeRequestFailed(label, request, MEDIA_DEVICE_TAB_CAPTURE_FAILURE);
return;
}
content::WebContentsMediaCaptureId web_id = device_id.web_contents_id;
web_id.disable_local_echo = request->controls.disable_local_echo;
request->tab_capture_device_id = web_id.ToString();
request->CreateTabCaptureUIRequest(web_id.render_process_id,
web_id.main_render_frame_id);
DVLOG(3) << "SetUpTabCaptureRequest "
<< ", {capture_device_id = " << web_id.ToString() << "}"
<< ", {target_render_process_id = " << web_id.render_process_id
<< "}"
<< ", {target_render_frame_id = " << web_id.main_render_frame_id
<< "}";
ReadOutputParamsAndPostRequestToUI(label, request, MediaDeviceEnumeration());
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: incremental_marking_phase(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_gc *gc, size_t limit)
{
size_t tried_marks = 0;
while (gc->gray_list && tried_marks < limit) {
tried_marks += gc_gray_mark(mrb, gc, gc->gray_list);
}
return tried_marks;
}
Commit Message: Clear unused stack region that may refer freed objects; fix #3596
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 64,426
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void close_all_sockets(atransport* t) {
asocket* s;
/* this is a little gross, but since s->close() *will* modify
** the list out from under you, your options are limited.
*/
adb_mutex_lock(&socket_list_lock);
restart:
for (s = local_socket_list.next; s != &local_socket_list; s = s->next) {
if (s->transport == t || (s->peer && s->peer->transport == t)) {
local_socket_close_locked(s);
goto restart;
}
}
adb_mutex_unlock(&socket_list_lock);
}
Commit Message: adb: switch the socket list mutex to a recursive_mutex.
sockets.cpp was branching on whether a socket close function was
local_socket_close in order to avoid a potential deadlock if the socket
list lock was held while closing a peer socket.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I5e56f17fa54275284787f0f1dc150d1960256ab3
(cherry picked from commit 9b587dec6d0a57c8fe1083c1c543fbeb163d65fa)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 174,150
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void usb_console_write(struct console *co,
const char *buf, unsigned count)
{
static struct usbcons_info *info = &usbcons_info;
struct usb_serial_port *port = info->port;
struct usb_serial *serial;
int retval = -ENODEV;
if (!port || port->serial->dev->state == USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED)
return;
serial = port->serial;
if (count == 0)
return;
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - %d byte(s)\n", __func__, count);
if (!port->port.console) {
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - port not opened\n", __func__);
return;
}
while (count) {
unsigned int i;
unsigned int lf;
/* search for LF so we can insert CR if necessary */
for (i = 0, lf = 0 ; i < count ; i++) {
if (*(buf + i) == 10) {
lf = 1;
i++;
break;
}
}
/* pass on to the driver specific version of this function if
it is available */
retval = serial->type->write(NULL, port, buf, i);
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - write: %d\n", __func__, retval);
if (lf) {
/* append CR after LF */
unsigned char cr = 13;
retval = serial->type->write(NULL, port, &cr, 1);
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - write cr: %d\n",
__func__, retval);
}
buf += i;
count -= i;
}
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: console: fix use-after-free after failed setup
Make sure to reset the USB-console port pointer when console setup fails
in order to avoid having the struct usb_serial be prematurely freed by
the console code when the device is later disconnected.
Fixes: 73e487fdb75f ("[PATCH] USB console: fix disconnection issues")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.18
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 60,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inf_gtk_certificate_manager_verify_error_quark(void)
{
return g_quark_from_static_string(
"INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_MANAGER_VERIFY_ERROR"
);
}
Commit Message: Fix expired certificate validation (gobby #61)
CWE ID: CWE-295
| 0
| 74,336
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnGetFileInfoForInsertGDataCachePathsPermissions(
Profile* profile,
std::vector<std::pair<FilePath, int> >* cache_paths,
const base::Closure& callback,
base::PlatformFileError error,
scoped_ptr<GDataFileProto> file_info) {
DCHECK(profile);
DCHECK(cache_paths);
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
GDataCache* cache = GetGDataCache(profile);
if (!cache || error != base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK) {
callback.Run();
return;
}
DCHECK(file_info.get());
std::string resource_id = file_info->gdata_entry().resource_id();
std::string file_md5 = file_info->file_md5();
cache_paths->push_back(std::make_pair(
cache->GetCacheFilePath(resource_id, file_md5,
GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT,
GDataCache::CACHED_FILE_FROM_SERVER),
kReadOnlyFilePermissions));
cache_paths->push_back(std::make_pair(
cache->GetCacheFilePath(resource_id, file_md5,
GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT,
GDataCache::CACHED_FILE_LOCALLY_MODIFIED),
kReadOnlyFilePermissions));
cache_paths->push_back(std::make_pair(
cache->GetCacheFilePath(resource_id, file_md5,
GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT,
GDataCache::CACHED_FILE_MOUNTED),
kReadOnlyFilePermissions));
cache_paths->push_back(std::make_pair(
cache->GetCacheFilePath(resource_id, file_md5,
GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_TMP,
GDataCache::CACHED_FILE_FROM_SERVER),
kReadOnlyFilePermissions));
callback.Run();
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 105,992
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int is_rndis(USBNetState *s)
{
return s->dev.config ?
s->dev.config->bConfigurationValue == DEV_RNDIS_CONFIG_VALUE : 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,590
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestBrowserWindowOwner::TestBrowserWindowOwner(TestBrowserWindow* window)
: window_(window) {
BrowserList::AddObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,341
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void addrconf_dad_completed(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp)
{
struct net_device *dev = ifp->idev->dev;
struct in6_addr lladdr;
bool send_rs, send_mld;
addrconf_del_dad_work(ifp);
/*
* Configure the address for reception. Now it is valid.
*/
ipv6_ifa_notify(RTM_NEWADDR, ifp);
/* If added prefix is link local and we are prepared to process
router advertisements, start sending router solicitations.
*/
read_lock_bh(&ifp->idev->lock);
send_mld = ifp->scope == IFA_LINK && ipv6_lonely_lladdr(ifp);
send_rs = send_mld &&
ipv6_accept_ra(ifp->idev) &&
ifp->idev->cnf.rtr_solicits > 0 &&
(dev->flags&IFF_LOOPBACK) == 0;
read_unlock_bh(&ifp->idev->lock);
/* While dad is in progress mld report's source address is in6_addrany.
* Resend with proper ll now.
*/
if (send_mld)
ipv6_mc_dad_complete(ifp->idev);
if (send_rs) {
/*
* If a host as already performed a random delay
* [...] as part of DAD [...] there is no need
* to delay again before sending the first RS
*/
if (ipv6_get_lladdr(dev, &lladdr, IFA_F_TENTATIVE))
return;
ndisc_send_rs(dev, &lladdr, &in6addr_linklocal_allrouters);
write_lock_bh(&ifp->idev->lock);
spin_lock(&ifp->lock);
ifp->idev->rs_probes = 1;
ifp->idev->if_flags |= IF_RS_SENT;
addrconf_mod_rs_timer(ifp->idev,
ifp->idev->cnf.rtr_solicit_interval);
spin_unlock(&ifp->lock);
write_unlock_bh(&ifp->idev->lock);
}
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 41,754
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: transform_height(png_const_structp pp, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
switch (bit_size(pp, colour_type, bit_depth))
{
case 1:
case 2:
case 4:
return 1; /* Total of 128 pixels */
case 8:
return 2; /* Total of 256 pixels/bytes */
case 16:
return 512; /* Total of 65536 pixels */
case 24:
case 32:
return 512; /* 65536 pixels */
case 48:
case 64:
return 2048;/* 4 x 65536 pixels. */
# define TRANSFORM_HEIGHTMAX 2048
default:
return 0; /* Error, will be caught later */
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,082
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: entry_guards_update_state(or_state_t *state)
{
entry_guards_dirty = 0;
entry_guards_update_guards_in_state(state);
entry_guards_dirty = 0;
if (!get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites)
or_state_mark_dirty(get_or_state(), 0);
entry_guards_dirty = 0;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 69,701
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
{
const struct cred *cred = file->f_cred;
/* Don't allow mappings that would allow anything that wouldn't
* be allowed without the establishment of unprivileged mappings.
*/
if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1) &&
uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) {
u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;
if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) {
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
if (uid_eq(uid, cred->euid))
return true;
} else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
if (!(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) &&
gid_eq(gid, cred->egid))
return true;
}
}
/* Allow anyone to set a mapping that doesn't require privilege */
if (!cap_valid(cap_setid))
return true;
/* Allow the specified ids if we have the appropriate capability
* (CAP_SETUID or CAP_SETGID) over the parent user namespace.
* And the opener of the id file also had the approprpiate capability.
*/
if (ns_capable(ns->parent, cap_setid) &&
file_ns_capable(file, ns->parent, cap_setid))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: userns: also map extents in the reverse map to kernel IDs
The current logic first clones the extent array and sorts both copies, then
maps the lower IDs of the forward mapping into the lower namespace, but
doesn't map the lower IDs of the reverse mapping.
This means that code in a nested user namespace with >5 extents will see
incorrect IDs. It also breaks some access checks, like
inode_owner_or_capable() and privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(), so a process
can incorrectly appear to be capable relative to an inode.
To fix it, we have to make sure that the "lower_first" members of extents
in both arrays are translated; and we have to make sure that the reverse
map is sorted *after* the translation (since otherwise the translation can
break the sorting).
This is CVE-2018-18955.
Fixes: 6397fac4915a ("userns: bump idmap limits to 340")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Tested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 76,191
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LocalFrame::SetDOMWindow(LocalDOMWindow* dom_window) {
if (dom_window)
GetScriptController().ClearWindowProxy();
if (this->DomWindow())
this->DomWindow()->Reset();
dom_window_ = dom_window;
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 154,883
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vlog_message(const int facility, const char* format, va_list args)
{
#if !HAVE_VSYSLOG
char buf[MAX_LOG_MSG+1];
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, args);
#endif
/* Don't write syslog if testing configuration */
if (__test_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug))
return;
if (log_file || (__test_bit(DONT_FORK_BIT, &debug) && log_console)) {
#if HAVE_VSYSLOG
va_list args1;
char buf[2 * MAX_LOG_MSG + 1];
va_copy(args1, args);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, args1);
va_end(args1);
#endif
/* timestamp setup */
time_t t = time(NULL);
struct tm tm;
localtime_r(&t, &tm);
char timestamp[64];
strftime(timestamp, sizeof(timestamp), "%c", &tm);
if (log_console && __test_bit(DONT_FORK_BIT, &debug))
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s\n", timestamp, buf);
if (log_file) {
fprintf(log_file, "%s: %s\n", timestamp, buf);
if (always_flush_log_file)
fflush(log_file);
}
}
if (!__test_bit(NO_SYSLOG_BIT, &debug))
#if HAVE_VSYSLOG
vsyslog(facility, format, args);
#else
syslog(facility, "%s", buf);
#endif
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 76,099
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ssh_free_packet(struct Packet *pkt)
{
sfree(pkt->data);
sfree(pkt);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,565
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ext4_ext_precache(struct inode *inode)
{
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
struct ext4_ext_path *path = NULL;
struct buffer_head *bh;
int i = 0, depth, ret = 0;
if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))
return 0; /* not an extent-mapped inode */
down_read(&ei->i_data_sem);
depth = ext_depth(inode);
path = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ext4_ext_path) * (depth + 1),
GFP_NOFS);
if (path == NULL) {
up_read(&ei->i_data_sem);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Don't cache anything if there are no external extent blocks */
if (depth == 0)
goto out;
path[0].p_hdr = ext_inode_hdr(inode);
ret = ext4_ext_check(inode, path[0].p_hdr, depth, 0);
if (ret)
goto out;
path[0].p_idx = EXT_FIRST_INDEX(path[0].p_hdr);
while (i >= 0) {
/*
* If this is a leaf block or we've reached the end of
* the index block, go up
*/
if ((i == depth) ||
path[i].p_idx > EXT_LAST_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr)) {
brelse(path[i].p_bh);
path[i].p_bh = NULL;
i--;
continue;
}
bh = read_extent_tree_block(inode,
ext4_idx_pblock(path[i].p_idx++),
depth - i - 1,
EXT4_EX_FORCE_CACHE);
if (IS_ERR(bh)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(bh);
break;
}
i++;
path[i].p_bh = bh;
path[i].p_hdr = ext_block_hdr(bh);
path[i].p_idx = EXT_FIRST_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr);
}
ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_EXT_PRECACHED);
out:
up_read(&ei->i_data_sem);
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
kfree(path);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: allocate entire range in zero range
Currently there is a bug in zero range code which causes zero range
calls to only allocate block aligned portion of the range, while
ignoring the rest in some cases.
In some cases, namely if the end of the range is past i_size, we do
attempt to preallocate the last nonaligned block. However this might
cause kernel to BUG() in some carefully designed zero range requests
on setups where page size > block size.
Fix this problem by first preallocating the entire range, including
the nonaligned edges and converting the written extents to unwritten
in the next step. This approach will also give us the advantage of
having the range to be as linearly contiguous as possible.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 44,874
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Undelete() {
WriteTransaction trans(FROM_HERE, UNITTEST, directory());
MutableEntry entry(&trans, GET_BY_CLIENT_TAG, client_tag_);
ASSERT_TRUE(entry.good());
EXPECT_EQ(metahandle_, entry.Get(META_HANDLE));
EXPECT_TRUE(entry.Get(IS_DEL));
entry.Put(IS_DEL, false);
entry.Put(IS_UNSYNCED, true);
entry.Put(SYNCING, false);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 105,111
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UChar TextIterator::characterAt(unsigned index) const
{
ASSERT_WITH_SECURITY_IMPLICATION(index < static_cast<unsigned>(length()));
if (!(index < static_cast<unsigned>(length())))
return 0;
if (!m_textCharacters)
return string()[startOffset() + index];
return m_textCharacters[index];
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,296
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const char* TabStrip::GetClassName() const {
static const char kViewClassName[] = "TabStrip";
return kViewClassName;
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 140,700
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderWidgetHostViewAuraOverscrollTest() : RenderWidgetHostViewAuraTest() {}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,622
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChromeContentRendererClient::ShouldPumpEventsDuringCookieMessage() {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Do not require DevTools extension resources to be white-listed in manifest.
Currently, resources used by DevTools extensions need to be white-listed as web_accessible_resources in manifest. This is quite inconvenitent and appears to be an overkill, given the fact that DevTools front-end is
(a) trusted and
(b) picky on the frames it loads.
This change adds resources that belong to DevTools extensions and are being loaded into a DevTools front-end page to the list of exceptions from web_accessible_resources check.
BUG=none
TEST=DevToolsExtensionTest.*
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9663076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126378 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 108,156
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::setLayerTreeId(int layerTreeId)
{
inspectorController()->setLayerTreeId(layerTreeId);
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,233
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: makeJsonLexContextCstringLen(char *json, int len, bool need_escapes)
{
JsonLexContext *lex = palloc0(sizeof(JsonLexContext));
lex->input = lex->token_terminator = lex->line_start = json;
lex->line_number = 1;
lex->input_length = len;
if (need_escapes)
lex->strval = makeStringInfo();
return lex;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,547
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfs_key_timeout_notify(struct file *filp, struct inode *inode)
{
struct nfs_open_context *ctx = nfs_file_open_context(filp);
struct rpc_auth *auth = NFS_SERVER(inode)->client->cl_auth;
return rpcauth_key_timeout_notify(auth, ctx->cred);
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,175
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::fillBuffer(OMX::buffer_id buffer, int fenceFd) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer, kPortIndexOutput);
if (header == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
header->nFilledLen = 0;
header->nOffset = 0;
header->nFlags = 0;
status_t res = storeFenceInMeta_l(header, fenceFd, kPortIndexOutput);
if (res != OK) {
CLOG_ERROR(fillBuffer::storeFenceInMeta, res, EMPTY_BUFFER(buffer, header, fenceFd));
return res;
}
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
mOutputBuffersWithCodec.add(header);
CLOG_BUMPED_BUFFER(fillBuffer, WITH_STATS(EMPTY_BUFFER(buffer, header, fenceFd)));
}
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_FillThisBuffer(mHandle, header);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(fillBuffer, err, EMPTY_BUFFER(buffer, header, fenceFd));
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
mOutputBuffersWithCodec.remove(header);
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Commit Message: IOMX: allow configuration after going to loaded state
This was disallowed recently but we still use it as MediaCodcec.stop
only goes to loaded state, and does not free component.
Bug: 31450460
Change-Id: I72e092e4e55c9f23b1baee3e950d76e84a5ef28d
(cherry picked from commit e03b22839d78c841ce0a1a0a1ee1960932188b0b)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 157,721
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: archive_read_format_rar_cleanup(struct archive_read *a)
{
struct rar *rar;
rar = (struct rar *)(a->format->data);
free_codes(a);
free(rar->filename);
free(rar->filename_save);
free(rar->dbo);
free(rar->unp_buffer);
free(rar->lzss.window);
__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Free(&rar->ppmd7_context);
free(rar);
(a->format->data) = NULL;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: rar: file split across multi-part archives must match
Fuzzing uncovered some UAF and memory overrun bugs where a file in a
single file archive reported that it was split across multiple
volumes. This was caused by ppmd7 operations calling
rar_br_fillup. This would invoke rar_read_ahead, which would in some
situations invoke archive_read_format_rar_read_header. That would
check the new file name against the old file name, and if they didn't
match up it would free the ppmd7 buffer and allocate a new
one. However, because the ppmd7 decoder wasn't actually done with the
buffer, it would continue to used the freed buffer. Both reads and
writes to the freed region can be observed.
This is quite tricky to solve: once the buffer has been freed it is
too late, as the ppmd7 decoder functions almost universally assume
success - there's no way for ppmd_read to signal error, nor are there
good ways for functions like Range_Normalise to propagate them. So we
can't detect after the fact that we're in an invalid state - e.g. by
checking rar->cursor, we have to prevent ourselves from ever ending up
there. So, when we are in the dangerous part or rar_read_ahead that
assumes a valid split, we set a flag force read_header to either go
down the path for split files or bail. This means that the ppmd7
decoder keeps a valid buffer and just runs out of data.
Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb and qsym.
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 74,950
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int em_ret(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
ctxt->dst.type = OP_REG;
ctxt->dst.addr.reg = &ctxt->_eip;
ctxt->dst.bytes = ctxt->op_bytes;
return em_pop(ctxt);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,783
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bson_iter_overwrite_double (bson_iter_t *iter, /* IN */
double value) /* IN */
{
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
if (ITER_TYPE (iter) == BSON_TYPE_DOUBLE) {
value = BSON_DOUBLE_TO_LE (value);
memcpy ((void *) (iter->raw + iter->d1), &value, sizeof (value));
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 77,851
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void btsnoop_net_open() {
#if (!defined(BT_NET_DEBUG) || (BT_NET_DEBUG != TRUE))
return; // Disable using network sockets for security reasons
#endif
listen_thread_valid_ = (pthread_create(&listen_thread_, NULL, listen_fn_, NULL) == 0);
if (!listen_thread_valid_) {
LOG_ERROR("%s pthread_create failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
} else {
LOG_DEBUG("initialized");
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,931
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint32_t get_cmd(ESPState *s, uint8_t *buf, uint8_t buflen)
{
uint32_t dmalen;
int target;
target = s->wregs[ESP_WBUSID] & BUSID_DID;
if (s->dma) {
dmalen = s->rregs[ESP_TCLO];
dmalen |= s->rregs[ESP_TCMID] << 8;
dmalen |= s->rregs[ESP_TCHI] << 16;
if (dmalen > buflen) {
return 0;
}
s->dma_memory_read(s->dma_opaque, buf, dmalen);
} else {
dmalen = s->ti_size;
if (dmalen > TI_BUFSZ) {
return 0;
}
memcpy(buf, s->ti_buf, dmalen);
buf[0] = buf[2] >> 5;
}
trace_esp_get_cmd(dmalen, target);
s->ti_size = 0;
s->ti_rptr = 0;
s->ti_wptr = 0;
if (s->current_req) {
/* Started a new command before the old one finished. Cancel it. */
scsi_req_cancel(s->current_req);
s->async_len = 0;
}
s->current_dev = scsi_device_find(&s->bus, 0, target, 0);
if (!s->current_dev) {
s->rregs[ESP_RSTAT] = 0;
s->rregs[ESP_RINTR] = INTR_DC;
s->rregs[ESP_RSEQ] = SEQ_0;
esp_raise_irq(s);
return 0;
}
return dmalen;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 9,321
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType IsVICAR(const unsigned char *magick,
const size_t length)
{
if (length < 14)
return(MagickFalse);
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) magick,"LBLSIZE",7) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) magick,"NJPL1I",6) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) magick,"PDS_VERSION_ID",14) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,778
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_spki_verify)
{
size_t spkstr_len;
int i = 0, spkstr_cleaned_len = 0;
char *spkstr = NULL, * spkstr_cleaned = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s", &spkstr, &spkstr_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETVAL_FALSE;
if (spkstr == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unable to use supplied SPKAC");
goto cleanup;
}
spkstr_cleaned = emalloc(spkstr_len + 1);
spkstr_cleaned_len = (int)(spkstr_len - openssl_spki_cleanup(spkstr, spkstr_cleaned));
if (spkstr_cleaned_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Invalid SPKAC");
goto cleanup;
}
spki = NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode(spkstr_cleaned, spkstr_cleaned_len);
if (spki == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unable to decode supplied SPKAC");
goto cleanup;
}
pkey = X509_PUBKEY_get(spki->spkac->pubkey);
if (pkey == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unable to acquire signed public key");
goto cleanup;
}
i = NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(spki, pkey);
goto cleanup;
cleanup:
if (spki != NULL) {
NETSCAPE_SPKI_free(spki);
}
if (pkey != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
if (spkstr_cleaned != NULL) {
efree(spkstr_cleaned);
}
if (i > 0) {
RETVAL_TRUE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 4,486
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cdf_unpack_summary_info(const cdf_stream_t *sst, const cdf_header_t *h,
cdf_summary_info_header_t *ssi, cdf_property_info_t **info, size_t *count)
{
size_t i, maxcount;
const cdf_summary_info_header_t *si =
CAST(const cdf_summary_info_header_t *, sst->sst_tab);
const cdf_section_declaration_t *sd =
CAST(const cdf_section_declaration_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)sst->sst_tab + CDF_SECTION_DECLARATION_OFFSET));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, si, sizeof(*si), __LINE__) == -1 ||
cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, sd, sizeof(*sd), __LINE__) == -1)
return -1;
ssi->si_byte_order = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_byte_order);
ssi->si_os_version = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_os_version);
ssi->si_os = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_os);
ssi->si_class = si->si_class;
cdf_swap_class(&ssi->si_class);
ssi->si_count = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_count);
*count = 0;
maxcount = 0;
*info = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < CDF_TOLE4(si->si_count); i++) {
if (i >= CDF_LOOP_LIMIT) {
DPRINTF(("Unpack summary info loop limit"));
errno = EFTYPE;
return -1;
}
if (cdf_read_property_info(sst, h, CDF_TOLE4(sd->sd_offset),
info, count, &maxcount) == -1) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix bounds checks again.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,950
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PlatformSensorAndroid::UpdatePlatformSensorReading(
JNIEnv*,
const base::android::JavaRef<jobject>& caller,
jdouble timestamp,
jdouble value1,
jdouble value2,
jdouble value3,
jdouble value4) {
SensorReading reading;
reading.raw.timestamp = timestamp;
reading.raw.values[0] = value1;
reading.raw.values[1] = value2;
reading.raw.values[2] = value3;
reading.raw.values[3] = value4;
UpdateSharedBufferAndNotifyClients(reading);
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 148,946
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int loop_prepare_queue(struct loop_device *lo)
{
kthread_init_worker(&lo->worker);
lo->worker_task = kthread_run(loop_kthread_worker_fn,
&lo->worker, "loop%d", lo->lo_number);
if (IS_ERR(lo->worker_task))
return -ENOMEM;
set_user_nice(lo->worker_task, MIN_NICE);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <long7573@126.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 84,737
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct ip_vs_service *ip_vs_genl_find_service(struct nlattr *nla)
{
struct ip_vs_service_user_kern usvc;
int ret;
ret = ip_vs_genl_parse_service(&usvc, nla, 0);
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
if (usvc.fwmark)
return __ip_vs_svc_fwm_get(usvc.af, usvc.fwmark);
else
return __ip_vs_service_get(usvc.af, usvc.protocol,
&usvc.addr, usvc.port);
}
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void bmap_lock(struct gfs2_inode *ip, int create)
{
if (create)
down_write(&ip->i_rw_mutex);
else
down_read(&ip->i_rw_mutex);
}
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 34,659
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void virtio_gpu_device_realize(DeviceState *qdev, Error **errp)
{
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(qdev);
VirtIOGPU *g = VIRTIO_GPU(qdev);
bool have_virgl;
int i;
if (g->conf.max_outputs > VIRTIO_GPU_MAX_SCANOUTS) {
error_setg(errp, "invalid max_outputs > %d", VIRTIO_GPU_MAX_SCANOUTS);
return;
}
g->config_size = sizeof(struct virtio_gpu_config);
g->virtio_config.num_scanouts = g->conf.max_outputs;
virtio_init(VIRTIO_DEVICE(g), "virtio-gpu", VIRTIO_ID_GPU,
g->config_size);
g->req_state[0].width = 1024;
g->req_state[0].height = 768;
g->use_virgl_renderer = false;
#if !defined(CONFIG_VIRGL) || defined(HOST_WORDS_BIGENDIAN)
have_virgl = false;
#else
have_virgl = display_opengl;
#endif
if (!have_virgl) {
g->conf.flags &= ~(1 << VIRTIO_GPU_FLAG_VIRGL_ENABLED);
}
if (virtio_gpu_virgl_enabled(g->conf)) {
/* use larger control queue in 3d mode */
g->ctrl_vq = virtio_add_queue(vdev, 256, virtio_gpu_handle_ctrl_cb);
g->cursor_vq = virtio_add_queue(vdev, 16, virtio_gpu_handle_cursor_cb);
g->virtio_config.num_capsets = 1;
} else {
g->ctrl_vq = virtio_add_queue(vdev, 64, virtio_gpu_handle_ctrl_cb);
g->cursor_vq = virtio_add_queue(vdev, 16, virtio_gpu_handle_cursor_cb);
}
g->ctrl_bh = qemu_bh_new(virtio_gpu_ctrl_bh, g);
g->cursor_bh = qemu_bh_new(virtio_gpu_cursor_bh, g);
QTAILQ_INIT(&g->reslist);
QTAILQ_INIT(&g->cmdq);
QTAILQ_INIT(&g->fenceq);
g->enabled_output_bitmask = 1;
g->qdev = qdev;
for (i = 0; i < g->conf.max_outputs; i++) {
g->scanout[i].con =
graphic_console_init(DEVICE(g), i, &virtio_gpu_ops, g);
if (i > 0) {
dpy_gfx_replace_surface(g->scanout[i].con, NULL);
}
}
if (virtio_gpu_virgl_enabled(g->conf)) {
error_setg(&g->migration_blocker, "virgl is not yet migratable");
migrate_add_blocker(g->migration_blocker);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 9,750
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: e1000e_write_hdr_to_rx_buffers(E1000ECore *core,
hwaddr (*ba)[MAX_PS_BUFFERS],
e1000e_ba_state *bastate,
const char *data,
dma_addr_t data_len)
{
assert(data_len <= core->rxbuf_sizes[0] - bastate->written[0]);
pci_dma_write(core->owner, (*ba)[0] + bastate->written[0], data, data_len);
bastate->written[0] += data_len;
bastate->cur_idx = 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 6,099
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned exp_random(double mean)
{
return -mean * log((double)rand() / RAND_MAX);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,488
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnAutoscrollEnd() {
WebGestureEvent cancel_event = SyntheticWebGestureEventBuilder::Build(
WebInputEvent::kGestureFlingCancel,
blink::kWebGestureDeviceSyntheticAutoscroll);
cancel_event.data.fling_cancel.prevent_boosting = true;
input_router_->SendGestureEvent(GestureEventWithLatencyInfo(cancel_event));
WebGestureEvent end_event = SyntheticWebGestureEventBuilder::Build(
WebInputEvent::kGestureScrollEnd,
blink::kWebGestureDeviceSyntheticAutoscroll);
input_router_->SendGestureEvent(GestureEventWithLatencyInfo(end_event));
}
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 155,586
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(session_register_shutdown)
{
php_shutdown_function_entry shutdown_function_entry;
zval *callback;
/* This function is registered itself as a shutdown function by
* session_set_save_handler($obj). The reason we now register another
* shutdown function is in case the user registered their own shutdown
* function after calling session_set_save_handler(), which expects
* the session still to be available.
*/
shutdown_function_entry.arg_count = 1;
shutdown_function_entry.arguments = (zval **) safe_emalloc(sizeof(zval *), 1, 0);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(callback);
ZVAL_STRING(callback, "session_write_close", 1);
shutdown_function_entry.arguments[0] = callback;
if (!append_user_shutdown_function(shutdown_function_entry TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&callback);
efree(shutdown_function_entry.arguments);
/* Unable to register shutdown function, presumably because of lack
* of memory, so flush the session now. It would be done in rshutdown
* anyway but the handler will have had it's dtor called by then.
* If the user does have a later shutdown function which needs the
* session then tough luck.
*/
php_session_flush(TSRMLS_C);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to register session flush function");
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,595
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: zcallendpage(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
gx_device *dev = gs_currentdevice(igs);
int code;
check_type(op[-1], t_integer);
check_type(*op, t_integer);
if ((dev = (*dev_proc(dev, get_page_device))(dev)) != 0) {
code = (*dev->page_procs.end_page)(dev, (int)op->value.intval, igs);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (code > 1)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
} else {
code = (op->value.intval == 2 ? 0 : 1);
}
make_bool(op - 1, code);
pop(1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,538
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct clk_hw *hi3660_stub_clk_hw_get(struct of_phandle_args *clkspec,
void *data)
{
unsigned int idx = clkspec->args[0];
if (idx >= HI3660_CLK_STUB_NUM) {
pr_err("%s: invalid index %u\n", __func__, idx);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
return &hi3660_stub_clks[idx].hw;
}
Commit Message: clk: hisilicon: hi3660：Fix potential NULL dereference in hi3660_stub_clk_probe()
platform_get_resource() may return NULL, add proper check to
avoid potential NULL dereferencing.
This is detected by Coccinelle semantic patch.
@@
expression pdev, res, n, t, e, e1, e2;
@@
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, t, n);
+ if (!res)
+ return -EINVAL;
... when != res == NULL
e = devm_ioremap(e1, res->start, e2);
Fixes: 4f16f7ff3bc0 ("clk: hisilicon: Add support for Hi3660 stub clocks")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 83,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint32_t GetCapacityImpl(JSObject* holder,
FixedArrayBase* backing_store) {
return backing_store->length();
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 163,089
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_msix_nr(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_assigned_msix_nr *entry_nr)
{
int r = 0;
struct kvm_assigned_dev_kernel *adev;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
adev = kvm_find_assigned_dev(&kvm->arch.assigned_dev_head,
entry_nr->assigned_dev_id);
if (!adev) {
r = -EINVAL;
goto msix_nr_out;
}
if (adev->entries_nr == 0) {
adev->entries_nr = entry_nr->entry_nr;
if (adev->entries_nr == 0 ||
adev->entries_nr > KVM_MAX_MSIX_PER_DEV) {
r = -EINVAL;
goto msix_nr_out;
}
adev->host_msix_entries = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msix_entry) *
entry_nr->entry_nr,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!adev->host_msix_entries) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto msix_nr_out;
}
adev->guest_msix_entries =
kzalloc(sizeof(struct msix_entry) * entry_nr->entry_nr,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!adev->guest_msix_entries) {
kfree(adev->host_msix_entries);
r = -ENOMEM;
goto msix_nr_out;
}
} else /* Not allowed set MSI-X number twice */
r = -EINVAL;
msix_nr_out:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Device assignment permission checks
(cherry picked from commit 3d27e23b17010c668db311140b17bbbb70c78fb9)
Only allow KVM device assignment to attach to devices which:
- Are not bridges
- Have BAR resources (assume others are special devices)
- The user has permissions to use
Assigning a bridge is a configuration error, it's not supported, and
typically doesn't result in the behavior the user is expecting anyway.
Devices without BAR resources are typically chipset components that
also don't have host drivers. We don't want users to hold such devices
captive or cause system problems by fencing them off into an iommu
domain. We determine "permission to use" by testing whether the user
has access to the PCI sysfs resource files. By default a normal user
will not have access to these files, so it provides a good indication
that an administration agent has granted the user access to the device.
[Yang Bai: add missing #include]
[avi: fix comment style]
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Bai <hamo.by@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 34,658
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cqspi_readdata_capture(struct cqspi_st *cqspi,
const unsigned int bypass,
const unsigned int delay)
{
void __iomem *reg_base = cqspi->iobase;
unsigned int reg;
reg = readl(reg_base + CQSPI_REG_READCAPTURE);
if (bypass)
reg |= (1 << CQSPI_REG_READCAPTURE_BYPASS_LSB);
else
reg &= ~(1 << CQSPI_REG_READCAPTURE_BYPASS_LSB);
reg &= ~(CQSPI_REG_READCAPTURE_DELAY_MASK
<< CQSPI_REG_READCAPTURE_DELAY_LSB);
reg |= (delay & CQSPI_REG_READCAPTURE_DELAY_MASK)
<< CQSPI_REG_READCAPTURE_DELAY_LSB;
writel(reg, reg_base + CQSPI_REG_READCAPTURE);
}
Commit Message: mtd: spi-nor: Off by one in cqspi_setup_flash()
There are CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT elements in the ->f_pdata array so the >
should be >=.
Fixes: 140623410536 ('mtd: spi-nor: Add driver for Cadence Quad SPI Flash Controller')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Cyrille Pitchen <cyrille.pitchen@atmel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 93,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderFrameImpl::GetRemoteAssociatedInterfaces() {
if (!remote_associated_interfaces_) {
ChildThreadImpl* thread = ChildThreadImpl::current();
if (thread) {
mojom::AssociatedInterfaceProviderAssociatedPtr remote_interfaces;
thread->GetRemoteRouteProvider()->GetRoute(
routing_id_, mojo::MakeRequest(&remote_interfaces));
remote_associated_interfaces_.reset(
new AssociatedInterfaceProviderImpl(std::move(remote_interfaces)));
} else {
remote_associated_interfaces_.reset(
new AssociatedInterfaceProviderImpl());
}
}
return remote_associated_interfaces_.get();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,805
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dvd_read_manufact(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi, dvd_struct *s,
struct packet_command *cgc)
{
int ret = 0, size;
u_char *buf;
const struct cdrom_device_ops *cdo = cdi->ops;
size = sizeof(s->manufact.value) + 4;
buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
init_cdrom_command(cgc, buf, size, CGC_DATA_READ);
cgc->cmd[0] = GPCMD_READ_DVD_STRUCTURE;
cgc->cmd[7] = s->type;
cgc->cmd[8] = size >> 8;
cgc->cmd[9] = size & 0xff;
ret = cdo->generic_packet(cdi, cgc);
if (ret)
goto out;
s->manufact.len = buf[0] << 8 | buf[1];
if (s->manufact.len < 0) {
cd_dbg(CD_WARNING, "Received invalid manufacture info length (%d)\n",
s->manufact.len);
ret = -EIO;
} else {
if (s->manufact.len > 2048) {
cd_dbg(CD_WARNING, "Received invalid manufacture info length (%d): truncating to 2048\n",
s->manufact.len);
s->manufact.len = 2048;
}
memcpy(s->manufact.value, &buf[4], s->manufact.len);
}
out:
kfree(buf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 76,289
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVPXEncoder::internalSetFormatParams(
const OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE* format) {
if (format->nPortIndex == kInputPortIndex) {
if (format->eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar ||
format->eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar ||
format->eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque) {
mColorFormat = format->eColorFormat;
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *def = &editPortInfo(kInputPortIndex)->mDef;
def->format.video.eColorFormat = mColorFormat;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
} else {
ALOGE("Unsupported color format %i", format->eColorFormat);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (format->nPortIndex == kOutputPortIndex) {
if (format->eCompressionFormat == OMX_VIDEO_CodingVP8) {
return OMX_ErrorNone;
} else {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
CWE ID:
| 0
| 162,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::Flush() {
VLOGF(2) << "Got flush request";
DCHECK(task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
QueueInputBuffer(media::BitstreamBuffer());
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 148,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init i8042_create_aux_port(int idx)
{
struct serio *serio;
int port_no = idx < 0 ? I8042_AUX_PORT_NO : I8042_MUX_PORT_NO + idx;
struct i8042_port *port = &i8042_ports[port_no];
serio = kzalloc(sizeof(struct serio), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!serio)
return -ENOMEM;
serio->id.type = SERIO_8042;
serio->write = i8042_aux_write;
serio->start = i8042_start;
serio->stop = i8042_stop;
serio->ps2_cmd_mutex = &i8042_mutex;
serio->port_data = port;
serio->dev.parent = &i8042_platform_device->dev;
if (idx < 0) {
strlcpy(serio->name, "i8042 AUX port", sizeof(serio->name));
strlcpy(serio->phys, I8042_AUX_PHYS_DESC, sizeof(serio->phys));
strlcpy(serio->firmware_id, i8042_aux_firmware_id,
sizeof(serio->firmware_id));
serio->close = i8042_port_close;
} else {
snprintf(serio->name, sizeof(serio->name), "i8042 AUX%d port", idx);
snprintf(serio->phys, sizeof(serio->phys), I8042_MUX_PHYS_DESC, idx + 1);
strlcpy(serio->firmware_id, i8042_aux_firmware_id,
sizeof(serio->firmware_id));
}
port->serio = serio;
port->mux = idx;
port->irq = I8042_AUX_IRQ;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Input: i8042 - fix crash at boot time
The driver checks port->exists twice in i8042_interrupt(), first when
trying to assign temporary "serio" variable, and second time when deciding
whether it should call serio_interrupt(). The value of port->exists may
change between the 2 checks, and we may end up calling serio_interrupt()
with a NULL pointer:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050
IP: [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file:
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-358.el6.x86_64 #1 QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8150feaf>] [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
RSP: 0018:ffff880028203cc0 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000282 RSI: 0000000000000098 RDI: 0000000000000050
RBP: ffff880028203cc0 R08: ffff88013e79c000 R09: ffff880028203ee0
R10: 0000000000000298 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 0000000000000050
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000098
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000001407f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 1, threadinfo ffff88013e79c000, task ffff88013e79b500)
Stack:
ffff880028203d00 ffffffff813de186 ffffffffffffff02 0000000000000000
<d> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000098
<d> ffff880028203d70 ffffffff813e0162 ffff880028203d20 ffffffff8103b8ac
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff813de186>] serio_interrupt+0x36/0xa0
[<ffffffff813e0162>] i8042_interrupt+0x132/0x3a0
[<ffffffff8103b8ac>] ? kvm_clock_read+0x1c/0x20
[<ffffffff8103b8b9>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff810e1640>] handle_IRQ_event+0x60/0x170
[<ffffffff8103b154>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x44/0x50
[<ffffffff810e3d8e>] handle_edge_irq+0xde/0x180
[<ffffffff8100de89>] handle_irq+0x49/0xa0
[<ffffffff81516c8c>] do_IRQ+0x6c/0xf0
[<ffffffff8100b9d3>] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x11
[<ffffffff81076f63>] ? __do_softirq+0x73/0x1e0
[<ffffffff8109b75b>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x14b/0x260
[<ffffffff8100c1cc>] ? call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
[<ffffffff8100de05>] ? do_softirq+0x65/0xa0
[<ffffffff81076d95>] ? irq_exit+0x85/0x90
[<ffffffff81516d80>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x9b
[<ffffffff8100bb93>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x13/0x20
To avoid the issue let's change the second check to test whether serio is
NULL or not.
Also, let's take i8042_lock in i8042_start() and i8042_stop() instead of
trying to be overly smart and using memory barriers.
Signed-off-by: Chen Hong <chenhong3@huawei.com>
[dtor: take lock in i8042_start()/i8042_stop()]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 86,211
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void DefragTrackerInit(DefragTracker *dt, Packet *p)
{
/* copy address */
COPY_ADDRESS(&p->src, &dt->src_addr);
COPY_ADDRESS(&p->dst, &dt->dst_addr);
if (PKT_IS_IPV4(p)) {
dt->id = (int32_t)IPV4_GET_IPID(p);
dt->af = AF_INET;
} else {
dt->id = (int32_t)IPV6_EXTHDR_GET_FH_ID(p);
dt->af = AF_INET6;
}
dt->vlan_id[0] = p->vlan_id[0];
dt->vlan_id[1] = p->vlan_id[1];
dt->policy = DefragGetOsPolicy(p);
dt->host_timeout = DefragPolicyGetHostTimeout(p);
dt->remove = 0;
dt->seen_last = 0;
TAILQ_INIT(&dt->frags);
(void) DefragTrackerIncrUsecnt(dt);
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358
| 1
| 168,293
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void aes_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
struct AES_CTX *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
AES_decrypt(src, dst, &ctx->dec_key);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,595
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __glXDisp_ChangeDrawableAttributesSGIX(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
{
xGLXChangeDrawableAttributesSGIXReq *req =
(xGLXChangeDrawableAttributesSGIXReq *)pc;
return DoChangeDrawableAttributes(cl->client, req->drawable,
req->numAttribs, (CARD32 *) (req + 1));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t GLES2Util::CalcClearBufferfvDataCount(int buffer) {
switch (buffer) {
case GL_COLOR:
return 4;
case GL_DEPTH:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Validate glClearBuffer*v function |buffer| param on the client side
Otherwise we could read out-of-bounds even if an invalid |buffer| is passed
in and in theory we should not read the buffer at all.
BUG=908749
TEST=gl_tests in ASAN build
R=piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I94b69b56ce3358ff9bfc0e21f0618aec4371d1ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1354571
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#612023}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 153,335
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct dirent *local_readdir(FsContext *ctx, V9fsFidOpenState *fs)
{
struct dirent *entry;
again:
entry = readdir(fs->dir.stream);
if (!entry) {
return NULL;
}
if (ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED) {
entry->d_type = DT_UNKNOWN;
} else if (ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE) {
if (!strcmp(entry->d_name, VIRTFS_META_DIR)) {
/* skp the meta data directory */
goto again;
}
entry->d_type = DT_UNKNOWN;
}
return entry;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 17,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void put_pixels_clamped4_c(const int16_t *block, uint8_t *av_restrict pixels,
int line_size)
{
int i;
/* read the pixels */
for(i=0;i<4;i++) {
pixels[0] = av_clip_uint8(block[0]);
pixels[1] = av_clip_uint8(block[1]);
pixels[2] = av_clip_uint8(block[2]);
pixels[3] = av_clip_uint8(block[3]);
pixels += line_size;
block += 8;
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 28,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
{
/* Reset everything */
memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st));
memset(&(s->d1->next_timeout), 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0, &(s->d1->next_timeout));
/* Clear retransmission buffer */
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
}
Commit Message: Free up s->d1->buffered_app_data.q properly.
PR#3286
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 46,117
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UsbRequestAccessFunction::UsbRequestAccessFunction() {
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ipxitf_clear_primary_net(void)
{
ipx_primary_net = NULL;
if (ipxcfg_auto_select_primary)
ipx_primary_net = ipx_interfaces_head();
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,445
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init acpi_no_auto_serialize_setup(char *str)
{
acpi_gbl_auto_serialize_methods = FALSE;
pr_info("ACPI: auto-serialization disabled\n");
return 1;
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 53,831
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct sk_buff *ipxitf_adjust_skbuff(struct ipx_interface *intrfc,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sk_buff *skb2;
int in_offset = (unsigned char *)ipx_hdr(skb) - skb->head;
int out_offset = intrfc->if_ipx_offset;
int len;
/* Hopefully, most cases */
if (in_offset >= out_offset)
return skb;
/* Need new SKB */
len = skb->len + out_offset;
skb2 = alloc_skb(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb2) {
skb_reserve(skb2, out_offset);
skb_reset_network_header(skb2);
skb_reset_transport_header(skb2);
skb_put(skb2, skb->len);
memcpy(ipx_hdr(skb2), ipx_hdr(skb), skb->len);
memcpy(skb2->cb, skb->cb, sizeof(skb->cb));
}
kfree_skb(skb);
return skb2;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,442
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rtmp_packet_read_one_chunk(URLContext *h, RTMPPacket *p,
int chunk_size, RTMPPacket **prev_pkt_ptr,
int *nb_prev_pkt, uint8_t hdr)
{
uint8_t buf[16];
int channel_id, timestamp, size;
uint32_t ts_field; // non-extended timestamp or delta field
uint32_t extra = 0;
enum RTMPPacketType type;
int written = 0;
int ret, toread;
RTMPPacket *prev_pkt;
written++;
channel_id = hdr & 0x3F;
if (channel_id < 2) { //special case for channel number >= 64
buf[1] = 0;
if (ffurl_read_complete(h, buf, channel_id + 1) != channel_id + 1)
return AVERROR(EIO);
written += channel_id + 1;
channel_id = AV_RL16(buf) + 64;
}
if ((ret = ff_rtmp_check_alloc_array(prev_pkt_ptr, nb_prev_pkt,
channel_id)) < 0)
return ret;
prev_pkt = *prev_pkt_ptr;
size = prev_pkt[channel_id].size;
type = prev_pkt[channel_id].type;
extra = prev_pkt[channel_id].extra;
hdr >>= 6; // header size indicator
if (hdr == RTMP_PS_ONEBYTE) {
ts_field = prev_pkt[channel_id].ts_field;
} else {
if (ffurl_read_complete(h, buf, 3) != 3)
return AVERROR(EIO);
written += 3;
ts_field = AV_RB24(buf);
if (hdr != RTMP_PS_FOURBYTES) {
if (ffurl_read_complete(h, buf, 3) != 3)
return AVERROR(EIO);
written += 3;
size = AV_RB24(buf);
if (ffurl_read_complete(h, buf, 1) != 1)
return AVERROR(EIO);
written++;
type = buf[0];
if (hdr == RTMP_PS_TWELVEBYTES) {
if (ffurl_read_complete(h, buf, 4) != 4)
return AVERROR(EIO);
written += 4;
extra = AV_RL32(buf);
}
}
}
if (ts_field == 0xFFFFFF) {
if (ffurl_read_complete(h, buf, 4) != 4)
return AVERROR(EIO);
timestamp = AV_RB32(buf);
} else {
timestamp = ts_field;
}
if (hdr != RTMP_PS_TWELVEBYTES)
timestamp += prev_pkt[channel_id].timestamp;
if (prev_pkt[channel_id].read && size != prev_pkt[channel_id].size) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "RTMP packet size mismatch %d != %d\n",
size, prev_pkt[channel_id].size);
ff_rtmp_packet_destroy(&prev_pkt[channel_id]);
prev_pkt[channel_id].read = 0;
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (!prev_pkt[channel_id].read) {
if ((ret = ff_rtmp_packet_create(p, channel_id, type, timestamp,
size)) < 0)
return ret;
p->read = written;
p->offset = 0;
prev_pkt[channel_id].ts_field = ts_field;
prev_pkt[channel_id].timestamp = timestamp;
} else {
RTMPPacket *prev = &prev_pkt[channel_id];
p->data = prev->data;
p->size = prev->size;
p->channel_id = prev->channel_id;
p->type = prev->type;
p->ts_field = prev->ts_field;
p->extra = prev->extra;
p->offset = prev->offset;
p->read = prev->read + written;
p->timestamp = prev->timestamp;
prev->data = NULL;
}
p->extra = extra;
prev_pkt[channel_id].channel_id = channel_id;
prev_pkt[channel_id].type = type;
prev_pkt[channel_id].size = size;
prev_pkt[channel_id].extra = extra;
size = size - p->offset;
toread = FFMIN(size, chunk_size);
if (ffurl_read_complete(h, p->data + p->offset, toread) != toread) {
ff_rtmp_packet_destroy(p);
return AVERROR(EIO);
}
size -= toread;
p->read += toread;
p->offset += toread;
if (size > 0) {
RTMPPacket *prev = &prev_pkt[channel_id];
prev->data = p->data;
prev->read = p->read;
prev->offset = p->offset;
p->data = NULL;
return AVERROR(EAGAIN);
}
prev_pkt[channel_id].read = 0; // read complete; reset if needed
return p->read;
}
Commit Message: avformat/rtmppkt: Convert ff_amf_get_field_value() to bytestream2
Fixes: out of array accesses
Found-by: JunDong Xie of Ant-financial Light-Year Security Lab
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 63,214
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PPB_URLLoader_Impl::InstanceWasDeleted() {
loader_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Break path whereby AssociatedURLLoader::~AssociatedURLLoader() is re-entered on top of itself.
BUG=159429
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11359222
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168150 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 102,313
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const LayerTreeSettings& LayerTreeHost::GetSettings() const {
return settings_;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,116
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char *allocate_tempopt_if_needed(
const struct dhcp_optflag *optflag,
char *buffer,
int *length_p)
{
char *allocated = NULL;
if ((optflag->flags & OPTION_TYPE_MASK) == OPTION_BIN) {
const char *end;
allocated = xstrdup(buffer); /* more than enough */
end = hex2bin(allocated, buffer, 255);
if (errno)
bb_error_msg_and_die("malformed hex string '%s'", buffer);
*length_p = end - allocated;
}
return allocated;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,504
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_generic)
{
zval *mcryptind;
char *data;
int data_len;
php_mcrypt *pm;
unsigned char* data_s;
int block_size, data_size;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rs", &mcryptind, &data, &data_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pm, php_mcrypt *, &mcryptind, -1, "MCrypt", le_mcrypt);
PHP_MCRYPT_INIT_CHECK
if (data_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "An empty string was passed");
RETURN_FALSE
}
/* Check blocksize */
if (mcrypt_enc_is_block_mode(pm->td) == 1) { /* It's a block algorithm */
block_size = mcrypt_enc_get_block_size(pm->td);
data_size = (((data_len - 1) / block_size) + 1) * block_size;
data_s = emalloc(data_size + 1);
memset(data_s, 0, data_size);
memcpy(data_s, data, data_len);
} else { /* It's not a block algorithm */
data_size = data_len;
data_s = emalloc(data_size + 1);
memset(data_s, 0, data_size);
memcpy(data_s, data, data_len);
}
mcrypt_generic(pm->td, data_s, data_size);
data_s[data_size] = '\0';
RETVAL_STRINGL(data_s, data_size, 1);
efree(data_s);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 167,091
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltCompileLocationPathPattern(xsltParserContextPtr ctxt, int novar) {
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((CUR == '/') && (NXT(1) == '/')) {
/*
* since we reverse the query
* a leading // can be safely ignored
*/
NEXT;
NEXT;
ctxt->comp->priority = 0.5; /* '//' means not 0 priority */
xsltCompileRelativePathPattern(ctxt, NULL, novar);
} else if (CUR == '/') {
/*
* We need to find root as the parent
*/
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
PUSH(XSLT_OP_ROOT, NULL, NULL, novar);
if ((CUR != 0) && (CUR != '|')) {
PUSH(XSLT_OP_PARENT, NULL, NULL, novar);
xsltCompileRelativePathPattern(ctxt, NULL, novar);
}
} else if (CUR == '*') {
xsltCompileRelativePathPattern(ctxt, NULL, novar);
} else if (CUR == '@') {
xsltCompileRelativePathPattern(ctxt, NULL, novar);
} else {
xmlChar *name;
name = xsltScanNCName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltCompileLocationPathPattern : Name expected\n");
ctxt->error = 1;
return;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((CUR == '(') && !xmlXPathIsNodeType(name)) {
xsltCompileIdKeyPattern(ctxt, name, 1, novar, 0);
if ((CUR == '/') && (NXT(1) == '/')) {
PUSH(XSLT_OP_ANCESTOR, NULL, NULL, novar);
NEXT;
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
xsltCompileRelativePathPattern(ctxt, NULL, novar);
} else if (CUR == '/') {
PUSH(XSLT_OP_PARENT, NULL, NULL, novar);
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
xsltCompileRelativePathPattern(ctxt, NULL, novar);
}
return;
}
xsltCompileRelativePathPattern(ctxt, name, novar);
}
error:
return;
}
Commit Message: Handle a bad XSLT expression better.
BUG=138672
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10830177
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@150123 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 170,902
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: camellia_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
unsigned int key_len)
{
struct camellia_ctx *cctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
const unsigned char *key = (const unsigned char *)in_key;
u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
if (key_len != 16 && key_len != 24 && key_len != 32) {
*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
return -EINVAL;
}
cctx->key_length = key_len;
switch (key_len) {
case 16:
camellia_setup128(key, cctx->key_table);
break;
case 24:
camellia_setup192(key, cctx->key_table);
break;
case 32:
camellia_setup256(key, cctx->key_table);
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,163
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: event_create(void)
{
return (void *)CreateEvent(NULL, FALSE, FALSE, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Check length of memcmp
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 81,655
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool xmp_files_put_xmp_xmpstring(XmpFilePtr xf, XmpStringPtr xmp_packet)
{
CHECK_PTR(xf, false);
CHECK_PTR(xmp_packet, false);
RESET_ERROR;
SXMPFiles *txf = reinterpret_cast<SXMPFiles*>(xf);
try {
txf->PutXMP(*reinterpret_cast<const std::string*>(xmp_packet));
}
catch(const XMP_Error & e) {
set_error(e);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 16,024
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Browser::ShouldCloseWindow() {
if (!CanCloseWithInProgressDownloads())
return false;
return unload_controller_->ShouldCloseWindow();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,820
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ati_remote2_set_channel_mask(const char *val,
const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
pr_debug("%s()\n", __func__);
return ati_remote2_set_mask(val, kp, ATI_REMOTE2_MAX_CHANNEL_MASK);
}
Commit Message: Input: ati_remote2 - fix crashes on detecting device with invalid descriptor
The ati_remote2 driver expects at least two interfaces with one
endpoint each. If given malicious descriptor that specify one
interface or no endpoints, it will crash in the probe function.
Ensure there is at least two interfaces and one endpoint for each
interface before using it.
The full disclosure: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/90
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 55,224
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static request_rec *make_sub_request(const request_rec *r,
ap_filter_t *next_filter)
{
apr_pool_t *rrp;
request_rec *rnew;
apr_pool_create(&rrp, r->pool);
apr_pool_tag(rrp, "subrequest");
rnew = apr_pcalloc(rrp, sizeof(request_rec));
rnew->pool = rrp;
rnew->hostname = r->hostname;
rnew->request_time = r->request_time;
rnew->connection = r->connection;
rnew->server = r->server;
rnew->log = r->log;
rnew->request_config = ap_create_request_config(rnew->pool);
/* Start a clean config from this subrequest's vhost. Optimization in
* Location/File/Dir walks from the parent request assure that if the
* config blocks of the subrequest match the parent request, no merges
* will actually occur (and generally a minimal number of merges are
* required, even if the parent and subrequest aren't quite identical.)
*/
rnew->per_dir_config = r->server->lookup_defaults;
rnew->htaccess = r->htaccess;
rnew->allowed_methods = ap_make_method_list(rnew->pool, 2);
/* make a copy of the allowed-methods list */
ap_copy_method_list(rnew->allowed_methods, r->allowed_methods);
/* start with the same set of output filters */
if (next_filter) {
/* while there are no input filters for a subrequest, we will
* try to insert some, so if we don't have valid data, the code
* will seg fault.
*/
rnew->input_filters = r->input_filters;
rnew->proto_input_filters = r->proto_input_filters;
rnew->output_filters = next_filter;
rnew->proto_output_filters = r->proto_output_filters;
ap_add_output_filter_handle(ap_subreq_core_filter_handle,
NULL, rnew, rnew->connection);
}
else {
/* If NULL - we are expecting to be internal_fast_redirect'ed
* to this subrequest - or this request will never be invoked.
* Ignore the original request filter stack entirely, and
* drill the input and output stacks back to the connection.
*/
rnew->proto_input_filters = r->proto_input_filters;
rnew->proto_output_filters = r->proto_output_filters;
rnew->input_filters = r->proto_input_filters;
rnew->output_filters = r->proto_output_filters;
}
rnew->useragent_addr = r->useragent_addr;
rnew->useragent_ip = r->useragent_ip;
/* no input filters for a subrequest */
ap_set_sub_req_protocol(rnew, r);
/* We have to run this after we fill in sub req vars,
* or the r->main pointer won't be setup
*/
ap_run_create_request(rnew);
/* Begin by presuming any module can make its own path_info assumptions,
* until some module interjects and changes the value.
*/
rnew->used_path_info = AP_REQ_DEFAULT_PATH_INFO;
/* Pass on the kept body (if any) into the new request. */
rnew->kept_body = r->kept_body;
return rnew;
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2015-3183 (cve.mitre.org)
Replacement of ap_some_auth_required (unusable in Apache httpd 2.4)
with new ap_some_authn_required and ap_force_authn hook.
Submitted by: breser
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1684524 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 43,616
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: P2PQuicStreamImpl* P2PQuicTransportImpl::CreateStreamInternal(
quic::QuicStreamId id) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(crypto_stream_);
DCHECK(IsEncryptionEstablished());
DCHECK(!IsClosed());
return new P2PQuicStreamImpl(id, this);
}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 1
| 172,265
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
{
if (!ctx->in_syscall)
return 0;
if (!ctx->serial)
ctx->serial = audit_serial();
t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
*serial = ctx->serial;
if (!ctx->prio) {
ctx->prio = 1;
ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1]. Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.
This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s). In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).
As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25
[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.
[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data. I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation). The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 51,172
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsClient::OnDispatchOnInspectorFrontend(const std::string& message) {
web_tools_frontend_->dispatchOnInspectorFrontend(
WebString::fromUTF8(message));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,851
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void vsock_remove_pending(struct sock *listener, struct sock *pending)
{
struct vsock_sock *vpending = vsock_sk(pending);
list_del_init(&vpending->pending_links);
sock_put(listener);
sock_put(pending);
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: Fix missing msg_namelen update in vsock_stream_recvmsg()
The code misses to update the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage
variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,357
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct file *filp_open(const char *filename, int flags, umode_t mode)
{
struct filename name = {.name = filename};
return file_open_name(&name, flags, mode);
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 46,167
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ReportUsageAndQuotaDataOnUIThread(
std::unique_ptr<StorageHandler::GetUsageAndQuotaCallback> callback,
blink::mojom::QuotaStatusCode code,
int64_t usage,
int64_t quota,
base::flat_map<storage::QuotaClient::ID, int64_t> usage_breakdown) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (code != blink::mojom::QuotaStatusCode::kOk) {
return callback->sendFailure(
Response::Error("Quota information is not available"));
}
std::unique_ptr<Array<Storage::UsageForType>> usageList =
Array<Storage::UsageForType>::create();
for (const auto& specific_usage : usage_breakdown) {
std::unique_ptr<Storage::UsageForType> entry =
Storage::UsageForType::Create()
.SetStorageType(GetTypeName(specific_usage.first))
.SetUsage(specific_usage.second)
.Build();
usageList->addItem(std::move(entry));
}
callback->sendSuccess(usage, quota, std::move(usageList));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,632
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HistoryController::RecursiveGoToEntry(
WebFrame* frame,
HistoryFrameLoadVector& same_document_loads,
HistoryFrameLoadVector& different_document_loads) {
DCHECK(provisional_entry_);
DCHECK(current_entry_);
RenderFrameImpl* render_frame = RenderFrameImpl::FromWebFrame(frame);
const WebHistoryItem& new_item =
provisional_entry_->GetItemForFrame(render_frame);
const WebHistoryItem& old_item =
current_entry_->GetItemForFrame(render_frame);
if (new_item.isNull())
return;
if (old_item.isNull() ||
new_item.itemSequenceNumber() != old_item.itemSequenceNumber()) {
if (!old_item.isNull() &&
new_item.documentSequenceNumber() ==
old_item.documentSequenceNumber()) {
same_document_loads.push_back(std::make_pair(frame, new_item));
} else {
different_document_loads.push_back(std::make_pair(frame, new_item));
return;
}
}
for (WebFrame* child = frame->firstChild(); child;
child = child->nextSibling()) {
RecursiveGoToEntry(child, same_document_loads, different_document_loads);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix HistoryEntry corruption when commit isn't for provisional entry.
BUG=597322
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1848103004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#384659}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 143,037
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void coroutine_fn virtfs_reset(V9fsPDU *pdu)
{
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
V9fsFidState *fidp = NULL;
/* Free all fids */
while (s->fid_list) {
fidp = s->fid_list;
s->fid_list = fidp->next;
if (fidp->ref) {
fidp->clunked = 1;
} else {
free_fid(pdu, fidp);
}
}
if (fidp) {
/* One or more unclunked fids found... */
error_report("9pfs:%s: One or more uncluncked fids "
"found during reset", __func__);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,195
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int media_changed(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi, int queue)
{
unsigned int mask = (1 << (queue & 1));
int ret = !!(cdi->mc_flags & mask);
bool changed;
if (!CDROM_CAN(CDC_MEDIA_CHANGED))
return ret;
/* changed since last call? */
if (cdi->ops->check_events) {
BUG_ON(!queue); /* shouldn't be called from VFS path */
cdrom_update_events(cdi, DISK_EVENT_MEDIA_CHANGE);
changed = cdi->ioctl_events & DISK_EVENT_MEDIA_CHANGE;
cdi->ioctl_events = 0;
} else
changed = cdi->ops->media_changed(cdi, CDSL_CURRENT);
if (changed) {
cdi->mc_flags = 0x3; /* set bit on both queues */
ret |= 1;
cdi->media_written = 0;
}
cdi->mc_flags &= ~mask; /* clear bit */
return ret;
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 76,293
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vrend_decode_set_framebuffer_state(struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx, int length)
{
if (length < 2)
return EINVAL;
uint32_t nr_cbufs = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_SET_FRAMEBUFFER_STATE_NR_CBUFS);
uint32_t zsurf_handle = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_SET_FRAMEBUFFER_STATE_NR_ZSURF_HANDLE);
uint32_t surf_handle[8];
int i;
if (length != (2 + nr_cbufs))
return EINVAL;
if (nr_cbufs > 8)
return EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < nr_cbufs; i++)
surf_handle[i] = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_SET_FRAMEBUFFER_STATE_CBUF_HANDLE(i));
vrend_set_framebuffer_state(ctx->grctx, nr_cbufs, surf_handle, zsurf_handle);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 9,116
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int OmniboxViewWin::GetIcon() const {
return IsEditingOrEmpty() ?
AutocompleteMatch::TypeToIcon(model_->CurrentTextType()) :
toolbar_model_->GetIcon();
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,442
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: StyleResolver& Document::ensureStyleResolver() const
{
return m_styleEngine->ensureResolver();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,369
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: QQuickWebViewAttached* QQuickWebView::qmlAttachedProperties(QObject* object)
{
return new QQuickWebViewAttached(object);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 101,760
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rmd256_transform(u32 *state, const __le32 *in)
{
u32 aa, bb, cc, dd, aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, tmp;
/* Initialize left lane */
aa = state[0];
bb = state[1];
cc = state[2];
dd = state[3];
/* Initialize right lane */
aaa = state[4];
bbb = state[5];
ccc = state[6];
ddd = state[7];
/* round 1: left lane */
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, F1, K1, in[0], 11);
ROUND(dd, aa, bb, cc, F1, K1, in[1], 14);
ROUND(cc, dd, aa, bb, F1, K1, in[2], 15);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, aa, F1, K1, in[3], 12);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, F1, K1, in[4], 5);
ROUND(dd, aa, bb, cc, F1, K1, in[5], 8);
ROUND(cc, dd, aa, bb, F1, K1, in[6], 7);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, aa, F1, K1, in[7], 9);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, F1, K1, in[8], 11);
ROUND(dd, aa, bb, cc, F1, K1, in[9], 13);
ROUND(cc, dd, aa, bb, F1, K1, in[10], 14);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, aa, F1, K1, in[11], 15);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, F1, K1, in[12], 6);
ROUND(dd, aa, bb, cc, F1, K1, in[13], 7);
ROUND(cc, dd, aa, bb, F1, K1, in[14], 9);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, aa, F1, K1, in[15], 8);
/* round 1: right lane */
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F4, KK1, in[5], 8);
ROUND(ddd, aaa, bbb, ccc, F4, KK1, in[14], 9);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, aaa, bbb, F4, KK1, in[7], 9);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, aaa, F4, KK1, in[0], 11);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F4, KK1, in[9], 13);
ROUND(ddd, aaa, bbb, ccc, F4, KK1, in[2], 15);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, aaa, bbb, F4, KK1, in[11], 15);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, aaa, F4, KK1, in[4], 5);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F4, KK1, in[13], 7);
ROUND(ddd, aaa, bbb, ccc, F4, KK1, in[6], 7);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, aaa, bbb, F4, KK1, in[15], 8);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, aaa, F4, KK1, in[8], 11);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F4, KK1, in[1], 14);
ROUND(ddd, aaa, bbb, ccc, F4, KK1, in[10], 14);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, aaa, bbb, F4, KK1, in[3], 12);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, aaa, F4, KK1, in[12], 6);
/* Swap contents of "a" registers */
tmp = aa; aa = aaa; aaa = tmp;
/* round 2: left lane */
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, F2, K2, in[7], 7);
ROUND(dd, aa, bb, cc, F2, K2, in[4], 6);
ROUND(cc, dd, aa, bb, F2, K2, in[13], 8);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, aa, F2, K2, in[1], 13);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, F2, K2, in[10], 11);
ROUND(dd, aa, bb, cc, F2, K2, in[6], 9);
ROUND(cc, dd, aa, bb, F2, K2, in[15], 7);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, aa, F2, K2, in[3], 15);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, F2, K2, in[12], 7);
ROUND(dd, aa, bb, cc, F2, K2, in[0], 12);
ROUND(cc, dd, aa, bb, F2, K2, in[9], 15);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, aa, F2, K2, in[5], 9);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, F2, K2, in[2], 11);
ROUND(dd, aa, bb, cc, F2, K2, in[14], 7);
ROUND(cc, dd, aa, bb, F2, K2, in[11], 13);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, aa, F2, K2, in[8], 12);
/* round 2: right lane */
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F3, KK2, in[6], 9);
ROUND(ddd, aaa, bbb, ccc, F3, KK2, in[11], 13);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, aaa, bbb, F3, KK2, in[3], 15);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, aaa, F3, KK2, in[7], 7);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F3, KK2, in[0], 12);
ROUND(ddd, aaa, bbb, ccc, F3, KK2, in[13], 8);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, aaa, bbb, F3, KK2, in[5], 9);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, aaa, F3, KK2, in[10], 11);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F3, KK2, in[14], 7);
ROUND(ddd, aaa, bbb, ccc, F3, KK2, in[15], 7);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, aaa, bbb, F3, KK2, in[8], 12);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, aaa, F3, KK2, in[12], 7);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F3, KK2, in[4], 6);
ROUND(ddd, aaa, bbb, ccc, F3, KK2, in[9], 15);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, aaa, bbb, F3, KK2, in[1], 13);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, aaa, F3, KK2, in[2], 11);
/* Swap contents of "b" registers */
tmp = bb; bb = bbb; bbb = tmp;
/* round 3: left lane */
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, F3, K3, in[3], 11);
ROUND(dd, aa, bb, cc, F3, K3, in[10], 13);
ROUND(cc, dd, aa, bb, F3, K3, in[14], 6);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, aa, F3, K3, in[4], 7);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, F3, K3, in[9], 14);
ROUND(dd, aa, bb, cc, F3, K3, in[15], 9);
ROUND(cc, dd, aa, bb, F3, K3, in[8], 13);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, aa, F3, K3, in[1], 15);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, F3, K3, in[2], 14);
ROUND(dd, aa, bb, cc, F3, K3, in[7], 8);
ROUND(cc, dd, aa, bb, F3, K3, in[0], 13);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, aa, F3, K3, in[6], 6);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, F3, K3, in[13], 5);
ROUND(dd, aa, bb, cc, F3, K3, in[11], 12);
ROUND(cc, dd, aa, bb, F3, K3, in[5], 7);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, aa, F3, K3, in[12], 5);
/* round 3: right lane */
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F2, KK3, in[15], 9);
ROUND(ddd, aaa, bbb, ccc, F2, KK3, in[5], 7);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, aaa, bbb, F2, KK3, in[1], 15);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, aaa, F2, KK3, in[3], 11);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F2, KK3, in[7], 8);
ROUND(ddd, aaa, bbb, ccc, F2, KK3, in[14], 6);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, aaa, bbb, F2, KK3, in[6], 6);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, aaa, F2, KK3, in[9], 14);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F2, KK3, in[11], 12);
ROUND(ddd, aaa, bbb, ccc, F2, KK3, in[8], 13);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, aaa, bbb, F2, KK3, in[12], 5);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, aaa, F2, KK3, in[2], 14);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F2, KK3, in[10], 13);
ROUND(ddd, aaa, bbb, ccc, F2, KK3, in[0], 13);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, aaa, bbb, F2, KK3, in[4], 7);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, aaa, F2, KK3, in[13], 5);
/* Swap contents of "c" registers */
tmp = cc; cc = ccc; ccc = tmp;
/* round 4: left lane */
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, F4, K4, in[1], 11);
ROUND(dd, aa, bb, cc, F4, K4, in[9], 12);
ROUND(cc, dd, aa, bb, F4, K4, in[11], 14);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, aa, F4, K4, in[10], 15);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, F4, K4, in[0], 14);
ROUND(dd, aa, bb, cc, F4, K4, in[8], 15);
ROUND(cc, dd, aa, bb, F4, K4, in[12], 9);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, aa, F4, K4, in[4], 8);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, F4, K4, in[13], 9);
ROUND(dd, aa, bb, cc, F4, K4, in[3], 14);
ROUND(cc, dd, aa, bb, F4, K4, in[7], 5);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, aa, F4, K4, in[15], 6);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, F4, K4, in[14], 8);
ROUND(dd, aa, bb, cc, F4, K4, in[5], 6);
ROUND(cc, dd, aa, bb, F4, K4, in[6], 5);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, aa, F4, K4, in[2], 12);
/* round 4: right lane */
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F1, KK4, in[8], 15);
ROUND(ddd, aaa, bbb, ccc, F1, KK4, in[6], 5);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, aaa, bbb, F1, KK4, in[4], 8);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, aaa, F1, KK4, in[1], 11);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F1, KK4, in[3], 14);
ROUND(ddd, aaa, bbb, ccc, F1, KK4, in[11], 14);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, aaa, bbb, F1, KK4, in[15], 6);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, aaa, F1, KK4, in[0], 14);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F1, KK4, in[5], 6);
ROUND(ddd, aaa, bbb, ccc, F1, KK4, in[12], 9);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, aaa, bbb, F1, KK4, in[2], 12);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, aaa, F1, KK4, in[13], 9);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F1, KK4, in[9], 12);
ROUND(ddd, aaa, bbb, ccc, F1, KK4, in[7], 5);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, aaa, bbb, F1, KK4, in[10], 15);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, aaa, F1, KK4, in[14], 8);
/* Swap contents of "d" registers */
tmp = dd; dd = ddd; ddd = tmp;
/* combine results */
state[0] += aa;
state[1] += bb;
state[2] += cc;
state[3] += dd;
state[4] += aaa;
state[5] += bbb;
state[6] += ccc;
state[7] += ddd;
return;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,317
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