instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err gnrv_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,156
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::updatePickerIndicatorVisibility()
{
if (m_pickerIndicatorIsAlwaysVisible) {
showPickerIndicator();
return;
}
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::dataListElementEnabled()) {
if (HTMLDataListElement* dataList = element()->dataList()) {
RefPtr<HTMLCollection> options = dataList->options();
for (unsigned i = 0; HTMLOptionElement* option = toHTMLOptionElement(options->item(i)); ++i) {
if (element()->isValidValue(option->value())) {
showPickerIndicator();
return;
}
}
}
hidePickerIndicator();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix reentrance of BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::destroyShadowSubtree.
destroyShadowSubtree could dispatch 'blur' event unexpectedly because
element()->focused() had incorrect information. We make sure it has
correct information by checking if the UA shadow root contains the
focused element.
BUG=257353
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19067004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154086 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,491
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit sit_cleanup(void)
{
xfrm4_tunnel_deregister(&sit_handler, AF_INET6);
unregister_pernet_device(&sit_net_ops);
rcu_barrier(); /* Wait for completion of call_rcu()'s */
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 27,456
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool is_marantz_denon_dac(unsigned int id)
{
switch (id) {
case USB_ID(0x154e, 0x1003): /* Denon DA-300USB */
case USB_ID(0x154e, 0x3005): /* Marantz HD-DAC1 */
case USB_ID(0x154e, 0x3006): /* Marantz SA-14S1 */
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix NULL dereference in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
create_fixed_stream_quirk() may cause a NULL-pointer dereference by
accessing the non-existing endpoint when a USB device with a malformed
USB descriptor is used.
This patch avoids it simply by adding a sanity check of bNumEndpoints
before the accesses.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 55,251
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SoftMPEG4::updatePortDefinitions(bool updateCrop, bool updateInputSize) {
SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::updatePortDefinitions(updateCrop, updateInputSize);
/* We have to align our width and height - this should affect stride! */
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *def = &editPortInfo(kOutputPortIndex)->mDef;
def->format.video.nStride = align(def->format.video.nStride, 16);
def->format.video.nSliceHeight = align(def->format.video.nSliceHeight, 16);
def->nBufferSize = (def->format.video.nStride * def->format.video.nSliceHeight * 3) / 2;
}
Commit Message: SoftMPEG4: Check the buffer size before writing the reference frame.
Also prevent overflow in SoftMPEG4 and division by zero in SoftMPEG4Encoder.
Bug: 30033990
Change-Id: I7701f5fc54c2670587d122330e5dc851f64ed3c2
(cherry picked from commit 695123195034402ca76169b195069c28c30342d3)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 158,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DatabaseImpl::IDBThreadHelper::RenameObjectStore(
int64_t transaction_id,
int64_t object_store_id,
const base::string16& new_name) {
DCHECK(idb_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (!connection_->IsConnected())
return;
IndexedDBTransaction* transaction =
connection_->GetTransaction(transaction_id);
if (!transaction)
return;
connection_->database()->RenameObjectStore(transaction, object_store_id,
new_name);
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 136,640
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct sctp_chunk *sctp_assoc_lookup_asconf_ack(
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
__be32 serial)
{
struct sctp_chunk *ack;
/* Walk through the list of cached ASCONF-ACKs and find the
* ack chunk whose serial number matches that of the request.
*/
list_for_each_entry(ack, &asoc->asconf_ack_list, transmitted_list) {
if (ack->subh.addip_hdr->serial == serial) {
sctp_chunk_hold(ack);
return ack;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions
Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with
SCTP authentication enabled:
Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1
task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000
PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c
LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38
pc : [<c024bb80>] lr : [<c00f32dc>] psr: 40000013
sp : c6f538e8 ip : 00000000 fp : c6f53924
r10: c6f50d80 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00010000
r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7be4000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c6f56254
r3 : c00c8170 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000008 r0 : c6f1e660
Flags: nZcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 0005397f Table: 06f28000 DAC: 00000015
Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0)
Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000)
[...]
Backtrace:
[<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8)
[<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844)
[<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28)
[<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220)
[<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4)
[<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160)
[<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74)
[<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888)
While we already had various kind of bugs in that area
ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if
we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache
auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different
kind.
Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is
needed can be found in RFC4895:
SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against
blind attackers. These values are not changed during the
lifetime of an SCTP association.
Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a
method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by
the original peer that started the association and not by a
malicious attacker.
To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between
peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to
authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO
parameters that are being negotiated among peers:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random
number and the peer's random number *after* the association
has been established. The local and peer's random number along
with the shared key are then part of the secret used for
calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk.
Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking
SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY
and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling
sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other,
thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
<--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -----------
-------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -------->
...
Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags,
the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1:
In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling
of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for
the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of
RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random
Number and the peer's Random Number after the association
has been established.
In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B:
B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an
association at about the same time but the peer endpoint
started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's
INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not
being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint.
The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED
state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from
the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may
running and send a COOKIE ACK.
In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the
same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in
Action B of section 5.2.4.
Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b()
case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the
side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over
peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created
association to update the existing one.
Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on
the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated.
However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous
asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so
that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early
return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to
authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK).
That in fact causes the server side when responding with ...
<------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK -----------------
... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in
sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is
being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the
endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses
asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key
and dereferences it in ...
crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len)
... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack()
called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1
and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking
sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over
the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize
its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks
in that case are not sent by the temporary association which
are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via
SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the
*updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated
association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state),
since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init()
was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually
throw away each time.
The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable
value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(),
so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1,
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate
the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic.
Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 36,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceFetcher::determineTargetType(ResourceRequest& request, Resource::Type type)
{
ResourceRequest::TargetType targetType = requestTargetType(this, request, type);
request.setTargetType(targetType);
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 121,227
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebExternalPopupMenu* RenderView::createExternalPopupMenu(
const WebPopupMenuInfo& popup_menu_info,
WebExternalPopupMenuClient* popup_menu_client) {
DCHECK(!external_popup_menu_.get());
external_popup_menu_.reset(
new ExternalPopupMenu(this, popup_menu_info, popup_menu_client));
return external_popup_menu_.get();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,989
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FPDF_FILEHANDLER* PDFiumEngine::Form_OpenFile(FPDF_FORMFILLINFO* param,
int file_flag,
FPDF_WIDESTRING url,
const char* mode) {
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,303
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvm_unmap_rmapp(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long *rmapp,
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, unsigned long data)
{
u64 *sptep;
struct rmap_iterator iter;
int need_tlb_flush = 0;
while ((sptep = rmap_get_first(*rmapp, &iter))) {
BUG_ON(!(*sptep & PT_PRESENT_MASK));
rmap_printk("kvm_rmap_unmap_hva: spte %p %llx\n", sptep, *sptep);
drop_spte(kvm, sptep);
need_tlb_flush = 1;
}
return need_tlb_flush;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 37,507
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserView::UpdateLoadingAnimations(bool should_animate) {
if (should_animate) {
if (!loading_animation_timer_.IsRunning()) {
last_animation_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
loading_animation_timer_.Start(FROM_HERE,
TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kLoadingAnimationFrameTimeMs), this,
&BrowserView::LoadingAnimationCallback);
}
} else {
if (loading_animation_timer_.IsRunning()) {
last_animation_time_ = base::TimeTicks();
loading_animation_timer_.Stop();
LoadingAnimationCallback();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void parse_segment_info(VP8Context *s)
{
VP56RangeCoder *c = &s->c;
int i;
s->segmentation.update_map = vp8_rac_get(c);
if (vp8_rac_get(c)) { // update segment feature data
s->segmentation.absolute_vals = vp8_rac_get(c);
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
s->segmentation.base_quant[i] = vp8_rac_get_sint(c, 7);
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
s->segmentation.filter_level[i] = vp8_rac_get_sint(c, 6);
}
if (s->segmentation.update_map)
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
s->prob->segmentid[i] = vp8_rac_get(c) ? vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 8) : 255;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,974
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ecb_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
return glue_ecb_crypt_128bit(&twofish_dec, desc, dst, src, nbytes);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void check_fat_state_bit(DOS_FS * fs, void *b)
{
if (fs->fat_bits == 32) {
struct boot_sector *b32 = b;
if (b32->reserved3 & FAT_STATE_DIRTY) {
printf("0x41: ");
if (print_fat_dirty_state() == '1') {
b32->reserved3 &= ~FAT_STATE_DIRTY;
fs_write(0, sizeof(*b32), b32);
}
}
} else {
struct boot_sector_16 *b16 = b;
if (b16->reserved2 & FAT_STATE_DIRTY) {
printf("0x25: ");
if (print_fat_dirty_state() == '1') {
b16->reserved2 &= ~FAT_STATE_DIRTY;
fs_write(0, sizeof(*b16), b16);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: read_boot(): Handle excessive FAT size specifications
The variable used for storing the FAT size (in bytes) was an unsigned
int. Since the size in sectors read from the BPB was not sufficiently
checked, this could end up being zero after multiplying it with the
sector size while some offsets still stayed excessive. Ultimately it
would cause segfaults when accessing FAT entries for which no memory
was allocated.
Make it more robust by changing the types used to store FAT size to
off_t and abort if there is no room for data clusters. Additionally
check that FAT size is not specified as zero.
Fixes #25 and fixes #26.
Reported-by: Hanno Böck
Signed-off-by: Andreas Bombe <aeb@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 52,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Gfx::opSetDash(Object args[], int numArgs) {
Array *a;
int length;
Object obj;
double *dash;
int i;
a = args[0].getArray();
length = a->getLength();
if (length == 0) {
dash = NULL;
} else {
dash = (double *)gmallocn(length, sizeof(double));
for (i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
dash[i] = a->get(i, &obj)->getNum();
obj.free();
}
}
state->setLineDash(dash, length, args[1].getNum());
out->updateLineDash(state);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,140
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderBuffer::~RenderBuffer() {
DCHECK_EQ(id_, 0u);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,337
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppResult::StartObservingExtensionRegistry() {
DCHECK(!extension_registry_);
extension_registry_ = extensions::ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile_);
extension_registry_->AddObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,981
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint32_t latmAudioMuxElement(latm_header *latm, bitfile *ld)
{
uint32_t ascLen, asc_bits=0;
uint32_t x1, y1, m, n, i;
program_config pce;
mp4AudioSpecificConfig mp4ASC;
latm->useSameStreamMux = (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, 1);
if(!latm->useSameStreamMux)
{
latm->version = (uint8_t) faad_getbits(ld, 1);
if(latm->version)
latm->versionA = (uint8_t) faad_getbits(ld, 1);
if(latm->versionA)
{
fprintf(stderr, "versionA not supported\n");
return 0;
}
if(latm->version) //read taraBufferFullness
latm_get_value(ld);
latm->allStreamsSameTimeFraming = (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, 1);
latm->numSubFrames = (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, 6) + 1;
latm->numPrograms = (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, 4) + 1;
latm->numLayers = faad_getbits(ld, 3) + 1;
if(latm->numPrograms>1 || !latm->allStreamsSameTimeFraming || latm->numSubFrames>1 || latm->numLayers>1)
{
fprintf(stderr, "\r\nUnsupported LATM configuration: %d programs/ %d subframes, %d layers, allstreams: %d\n",
latm->numPrograms, latm->numSubFrames, latm->numLayers, latm->allStreamsSameTimeFraming);
return 0;
}
ascLen = 0;
if(latm->version)
ascLen = latm_get_value(ld);
x1 = faad_get_processed_bits(ld);
if(AudioSpecificConfigFromBitfile(ld, &mp4ASC, &pce, 0, 1) < 0)
return 0;
y1 = faad_get_processed_bits(ld);
if((y1-x1) <= MAX_ASC_BYTES*8)
{
faad_rewindbits(ld);
m = x1;
while(m>0)
{
n = min(m, 32);
faad_getbits(ld, n);
m -= n;
}
i = 0;
m = latm->ASCbits = y1 - x1;
while(m > 0)
{
n = min(m, 8);
latm->ASC[i++] = (uint8_t) faad_getbits(ld, n);
m -= n;
}
}
asc_bits = y1-x1;
if(ascLen>asc_bits)
faad_getbits(ld, ascLen-asc_bits);
latm->framelen_type = (uint8_t) faad_getbits(ld, 3);
if(latm->framelen_type == 0)
{
latm->frameLength = 0;
faad_getbits(ld, 8); //buffer fullness for frame_len_type==0, useless
}
else if(latm->framelen_type == 1)
{
latm->frameLength = faad_getbits(ld, 9);
if(latm->frameLength==0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid frameLength: 0\r\n");
return 0;
}
latm->frameLength = (latm->frameLength+20)*8;
}
else
{ //hellish CELP or HCVX stuff, discard
fprintf(stderr, "Unsupported CELP/HCVX framelentype: %d\n", latm->framelen_type);
return 0;
}
latm->otherDataLenBits = 0;
if(faad_getbits(ld, 1))
{ //other data present
int esc, tmp;
if(latm->version)
latm->otherDataLenBits = latm_get_value(ld);
else do
{
esc = faad_getbits(ld, 1);
tmp = faad_getbits(ld, 8);
latm->otherDataLenBits = (latm->otherDataLenBits << 8) + tmp;
} while(esc);
}
if(faad_getbits(ld, 1)) //crc
faad_getbits(ld, 8);
latm->inited = 1;
}
if(latm->inited)
return latmParsePayload(latm, ld);
else
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a couple buffer overflows
https://hackerone.com/reports/502816
https://hackerone.com/reports/507858
https://github.com/videolan/vlc/blob/master/contrib/src/faad2/faad2-fix-overflows.patch
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 88,385
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static zend_class_entry *do_register_internal_class(zend_class_entry *orig_class_entry, zend_uint ce_flags TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zend_class_entry *class_entry = malloc(sizeof(zend_class_entry));
char *lowercase_name = emalloc(orig_class_entry->name_length + 1);
zend_ulong hash;
*class_entry = *orig_class_entry;
class_entry->type = ZEND_INTERNAL_CLASS;
zend_initialize_class_data(class_entry, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
class_entry->ce_flags = ce_flags;
class_entry->info.internal.module = EG(current_module);
if (class_entry->info.internal.builtin_functions) {
zend_register_functions(class_entry, class_entry->info.internal.builtin_functions, &class_entry->function_table, MODULE_PERSISTENT TSRMLS_CC);
}
zend_str_tolower_copy(lowercase_name, orig_class_entry->name, class_entry->name_length);
lowercase_name = (char*)zend_new_interned_string(lowercase_name, class_entry->name_length + 1, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
hash = str_hash(lowercase_name, class_entry->name_length);
zend_hash_quick_update(CG(class_table), lowercase_name, class_entry->name_length+1, hash, &class_entry, sizeof(zend_class_entry *), NULL);
str_efree(lowercase_name);
return class_entry;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,760
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lzo_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct lzo_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
ctx->lzo_comp_mem = kmalloc(LZO1X_MEM_COMPRESS,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_REPEAT);
if (!ctx->lzo_comp_mem)
ctx->lzo_comp_mem = vmalloc(LZO1X_MEM_COMPRESS);
if (!ctx->lzo_comp_mem)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,273
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int reserve_new_blocks(struct dnode_of_data *dn, blkcnt_t count)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(dn->inode);
if (!count)
return 0;
if (unlikely(is_inode_flag_set(dn->inode, FI_NO_ALLOC)))
return -EPERM;
if (unlikely(!inc_valid_block_count(sbi, dn->inode, &count)))
return -ENOSPC;
trace_f2fs_reserve_new_blocks(dn->inode, dn->nid,
dn->ofs_in_node, count);
f2fs_wait_on_page_writeback(dn->node_page, NODE, true);
for (; count > 0; dn->ofs_in_node++) {
block_t blkaddr =
datablock_addr(dn->node_page, dn->ofs_in_node);
if (blkaddr == NULL_ADDR) {
dn->data_blkaddr = NEW_ADDR;
__set_data_blkaddr(dn);
count--;
}
}
if (set_page_dirty(dn->node_page))
dn->node_changed = true;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a dead loop in f2fs_fiemap()
A dead loop can be triggered in f2fs_fiemap() using the test case
as below:
...
fd = open();
fallocate(fd, 0, 0, 4294967296);
ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FIEMAP, fiemap_buf);
...
It's caused by an overflow in __get_data_block():
...
bh->b_size = map.m_len << inode->i_blkbits;
...
map.m_len is an unsigned int, and bh->b_size is a size_t which is 64 bits
on 64 bits archtecture, type conversion from an unsigned int to a size_t
will result in an overflow.
In the above-mentioned case, bh->b_size will be zero, and f2fs_fiemap()
will call get_data_block() at block 0 again an again.
Fix this by adding a force conversion before left shift.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 85,201
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebContentsImpl::IsWebContentsOnlyAccessibilityModeForTesting() const {
return accessibility_mode_ == ui::kAXModeWebContentsOnly;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 144,993
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool MockContentSettingsClient::allowScriptFromSource(
bool enabled_per_settings,
const blink::WebURL& script_url) {
bool allowed = enabled_per_settings && flags_->scripts_allowed();
if (flags_->dump_web_content_settings_client_callbacks() && delegate_) {
delegate_->PrintMessage(
std::string("MockContentSettingsClient: allowScriptFromSource(") +
NormalizeLayoutTestURL(script_url.string().utf8()) + "): " +
(allowed ? "true" : "false") + "\n");
}
return allowed;
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 128,725
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::didFailLoad(WebFrame* frame, const WebURLError& error) {
WebDataSource* ds = frame->dataSource();
DCHECK(ds);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, observers_, DidFailLoad(frame, error));
const WebURLRequest& failed_request = ds->request();
string16 error_description;
GetContentClient()->renderer()->GetNavigationErrorStrings(
failed_request,
error,
NULL,
&error_description);
Send(new ViewHostMsg_DidFailLoadWithError(routing_id_,
frame->identifier(),
failed_request.url(),
!frame->parent(),
error.reason,
error_description));
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,625
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Resource* createResource(Resource::Type type, const ResourceRequest& request, const String& charset)
{
switch (type) {
case Resource::Image:
return new ImageResource(request);
case Resource::CSSStyleSheet:
return new CSSStyleSheetResource(request, charset);
case Resource::Script:
return new ScriptResource(request, charset);
case Resource::SVGDocument:
return new DocumentResource(request, Resource::SVGDocument);
case Resource::Font:
return new FontResource(request);
case Resource::MainResource:
case Resource::Raw:
case Resource::TextTrack:
case Resource::Media:
return new RawResource(request, type);
case Resource::XSLStyleSheet:
return new XSLStyleSheetResource(request, charset);
case Resource::LinkPrefetch:
return new Resource(request, Resource::LinkPrefetch);
case Resource::LinkSubresource:
return new Resource(request, Resource::LinkSubresource);
case Resource::ImportResource:
return new RawResource(request, type);
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 121,220
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(Array, getIteratorClass)
{
zval *object = getThis();
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_STRING(intern->ce_get_iterator->name, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,338
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pax_sparse_member_p (struct tar_sparse_file *file)
{
return file->stat_info->sparse_map_avail > 0
|| file->stat_info->sparse_major > 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 5,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt,
unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len)
{
/* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
if (frag_off == 0 && !s->d1->listen)
{
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
}
dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq,
frag_off, frag_len);
return p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 14,367
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int load_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *file)
{
FILE *in;
X509 *x = NULL;
if ((in = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL)
return (0);
for (;;) {
if (PEM_read_X509(in, &x, NULL) == NULL)
break;
SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx, x);
}
if (x != NULL)
X509_free(x);
fclose(in);
return (1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,634
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hns_xgmac_set_pausefrm_mac_addr(void *mac_drv, char *mac_addr)
{
struct mac_driver *drv = (struct mac_driver *)mac_drv;
u32 high_val = mac_addr[1] | (mac_addr[0] << 8);
u32 low_val = mac_addr[5] | (mac_addr[4] << 8)
| (mac_addr[3] << 16) | (mac_addr[2] << 24);
dsaf_write_dev(drv, XGMAC_MAC_PAUSE_LOCAL_MAC_L_REG, low_val);
dsaf_write_dev(drv, XGMAC_MAC_PAUSE_LOCAL_MAC_H_REG, high_val);
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 85,646
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_setup_cgroup_limits(struct cgfs_data *d,
struct lxc_list *cgroup_settings, bool do_devices)
{
struct lxc_list *iterator, *sorted_cgroup_settings, *next;
struct lxc_cgroup *cg;
int ret = -1;
if (lxc_list_empty(cgroup_settings))
return 0;
sorted_cgroup_settings = sort_cgroup_settings(cgroup_settings);
if (!sorted_cgroup_settings) {
return -1;
}
lxc_list_for_each(iterator, sorted_cgroup_settings) {
cg = iterator->elem;
if (do_devices == !strncmp("devices", cg->subsystem, 7)) {
if (strcmp(cg->subsystem, "devices.deny") == 0 &&
cgroup_devices_has_allow_or_deny(d, cg->value, false))
continue;
if (strcmp(cg->subsystem, "devices.allow") == 0 &&
cgroup_devices_has_allow_or_deny(d, cg->value, true))
continue;
if (lxc_cgroup_set_data(cg->subsystem, cg->value, d)) {
ERROR("Error setting %s to %s for %s",
cg->subsystem, cg->value, d->name);
goto out;
}
}
DEBUG("cgroup '%s' set to '%s'", cg->subsystem, cg->value);
}
ret = 0;
INFO("cgroup has been setup");
out:
lxc_list_for_each_safe(iterator, sorted_cgroup_settings, next) {
lxc_list_del(iterator);
free(iterator);
}
free(sorted_cgroup_settings);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 44,477
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JSObject* createError(ExecState* exec, const UString& message)
{
return createError(exec->lexicalGlobalObject(), message);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,004
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const QString Smb4KGlobal::winsServer()
{
QMap<QString,QString> global_opts = p->globalSambaOptions(false);
QString wins_server;
if (global_opts.contains("wins server"))
{
wins_server = global_opts.value("wins server");
}
else
{
if (global_opts.contains("wins support") &&
(QString::compare(global_opts.value("wins support"), "yes", Qt::CaseInsensitive) == 0 ||
QString::compare(global_opts.value("wins support"), "true", Qt::CaseInsensitive) == 0))
{
wins_server = "127.0.0.1";
}
else
{
}
}
return wins_server;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,612
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~TestDelegate() { CHECK(callbacks_.empty()); }
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,385
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int DownloadFileManager::NumberOfActiveDownloads() const {
return downloads_.size();
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,040
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t MPEG4Source::read(
MediaBuffer **out, const ReadOptions *options) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
CHECK(mStarted);
if (mFirstMoofOffset > 0) {
return fragmentedRead(out, options);
}
*out = NULL;
int64_t targetSampleTimeUs = -1;
int64_t seekTimeUs;
ReadOptions::SeekMode mode;
if (options && options->getSeekTo(&seekTimeUs, &mode)) {
uint32_t findFlags = 0;
switch (mode) {
case ReadOptions::SEEK_PREVIOUS_SYNC:
findFlags = SampleTable::kFlagBefore;
break;
case ReadOptions::SEEK_NEXT_SYNC:
findFlags = SampleTable::kFlagAfter;
break;
case ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST_SYNC:
case ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST:
findFlags = SampleTable::kFlagClosest;
break;
default:
CHECK(!"Should not be here.");
break;
}
uint32_t sampleIndex;
status_t err = mSampleTable->findSampleAtTime(
seekTimeUs * mTimescale / 1000000,
&sampleIndex, findFlags);
if (mode == ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST) {
findFlags = SampleTable::kFlagBefore;
}
uint32_t syncSampleIndex;
if (err == OK) {
err = mSampleTable->findSyncSampleNear(
sampleIndex, &syncSampleIndex, findFlags);
}
uint32_t sampleTime;
if (err == OK) {
err = mSampleTable->getMetaDataForSample(
sampleIndex, NULL, NULL, &sampleTime);
}
if (err != OK) {
if (err == ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE) {
err = ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
ALOGV("end of stream");
return err;
}
if (mode == ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST) {
targetSampleTimeUs = (sampleTime * 1000000ll) / mTimescale;
}
#if 0
uint32_t syncSampleTime;
CHECK_EQ(OK, mSampleTable->getMetaDataForSample(
syncSampleIndex, NULL, NULL, &syncSampleTime));
ALOGI("seek to time %lld us => sample at time %lld us, "
"sync sample at time %lld us",
seekTimeUs,
sampleTime * 1000000ll / mTimescale,
syncSampleTime * 1000000ll / mTimescale);
#endif
mCurrentSampleIndex = syncSampleIndex;
if (mBuffer != NULL) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
}
}
off64_t offset;
size_t size;
uint32_t cts;
bool isSyncSample;
bool newBuffer = false;
if (mBuffer == NULL) {
newBuffer = true;
status_t err =
mSampleTable->getMetaDataForSample(
mCurrentSampleIndex, &offset, &size, &cts, &isSyncSample);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
err = mGroup->acquire_buffer(&mBuffer);
if (err != OK) {
CHECK(mBuffer == NULL);
return err;
}
if (size > mBuffer->size()) {
ALOGE("buffer too small: %zu > %zu", size, mBuffer->size());
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
}
if (!mIsAVC || mWantsNALFragments) {
if (newBuffer) {
ssize_t num_bytes_read =
mDataSource->readAt(offset, (uint8_t *)mBuffer->data(), size);
if (num_bytes_read < (ssize_t)size) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(0, size);
mBuffer->meta_data()->clear();
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTime, ((int64_t)cts * 1000000) / mTimescale);
if (targetSampleTimeUs >= 0) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTargetTime, targetSampleTimeUs);
}
if (isSyncSample) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyIsSyncFrame, 1);
}
++mCurrentSampleIndex;
}
if (!mIsAVC) {
*out = mBuffer;
mBuffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
CHECK(mBuffer->range_length() >= mNALLengthSize);
const uint8_t *src =
(const uint8_t *)mBuffer->data() + mBuffer->range_offset();
size_t nal_size = parseNALSize(src);
if (mNALLengthSize > SIZE_MAX - nal_size) {
ALOGE("b/24441553, b/24445122");
}
if (mBuffer->range_length() - mNALLengthSize < nal_size) {
ALOGE("incomplete NAL unit.");
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
MediaBuffer *clone = mBuffer->clone();
CHECK(clone != NULL);
clone->set_range(mBuffer->range_offset() + mNALLengthSize, nal_size);
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(
mBuffer->range_offset() + mNALLengthSize + nal_size,
mBuffer->range_length() - mNALLengthSize - nal_size);
if (mBuffer->range_length() == 0) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
}
*out = clone;
return OK;
} else {
ssize_t num_bytes_read = 0;
int32_t drm = 0;
bool usesDRM = (mFormat->findInt32(kKeyIsDRM, &drm) && drm != 0);
if (usesDRM) {
num_bytes_read =
mDataSource->readAt(offset, (uint8_t*)mBuffer->data(), size);
} else {
num_bytes_read = mDataSource->readAt(offset, mSrcBuffer, size);
}
if (num_bytes_read < (ssize_t)size) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (usesDRM) {
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(0, size);
} else {
uint8_t *dstData = (uint8_t *)mBuffer->data();
size_t srcOffset = 0;
size_t dstOffset = 0;
while (srcOffset < size) {
bool isMalFormed = !isInRange(0u, size, srcOffset, mNALLengthSize);
size_t nalLength = 0;
if (!isMalFormed) {
nalLength = parseNALSize(&mSrcBuffer[srcOffset]);
srcOffset += mNALLengthSize;
isMalFormed = !isInRange(0u, size, srcOffset, nalLength);
}
if (isMalFormed) {
ALOGE("Video is malformed");
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (nalLength == 0) {
continue;
}
CHECK(dstOffset + 4 <= mBuffer->size());
dstData[dstOffset++] = 0;
dstData[dstOffset++] = 0;
dstData[dstOffset++] = 0;
dstData[dstOffset++] = 1;
memcpy(&dstData[dstOffset], &mSrcBuffer[srcOffset], nalLength);
srcOffset += nalLength;
dstOffset += nalLength;
}
CHECK_EQ(srcOffset, size);
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(0, dstOffset);
}
mBuffer->meta_data()->clear();
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTime, ((int64_t)cts * 1000000) / mTimescale);
if (targetSampleTimeUs >= 0) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTargetTime, targetSampleTimeUs);
}
if (isSyncSample) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyIsSyncFrame, 1);
}
++mCurrentSampleIndex;
*out = mBuffer;
mBuffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix out-of-bounds write
Bug: 26365349
Change-Id: Ia363d9f8c231cf255dea852e0bbf5ca466c7990b
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 161,870
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct dentry *kern_path_locked(const char *name, struct path *path)
{
struct filename *filename;
struct dentry *d;
struct qstr last;
int type;
filename = filename_parentat(AT_FDCWD, getname_kernel(name), 0, path,
&last, &type);
if (IS_ERR(filename))
return ERR_CAST(filename);
if (unlikely(type != LAST_NORM)) {
path_put(path);
putname(filename);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
inode_lock_nested(path->dentry->d_inode, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
d = __lookup_hash(&last, path->dentry, 0);
if (IS_ERR(d)) {
inode_unlock(path->dentry->d_inode);
path_put(path);
}
putname(filename);
return d;
}
Commit Message: vfs: rename: check backing inode being equal
If a file is renamed to a hardlink of itself POSIX specifies that rename(2)
should do nothing and return success.
This condition is checked in vfs_rename(). However it won't detect hard
links on overlayfs where these are given separate inodes on the overlayfs
layer.
Overlayfs itself detects this condition and returns success without doing
anything, but then vfs_rename() will proceed as if this was a successful
rename (detach_mounts(), d_move()).
The correct thing to do is to detect this condition before even calling
into overlayfs. This patch does this by calling vfs_select_inode() to get
the underlying inodes.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 51,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutofillPopupItemView::AddIcon(gfx::ImageSkia icon) {
auto* image_view = new views::ImageView();
image_view->SetImage(icon);
AddChildView(image_view);
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 130,521
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MediaStreamManager::OnResume() {
SendMessageToNativeLog("Power state resumed.");
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,331
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct smb_iconv_handle *get_iconv_handle(void)
{
if (global_iconv_handle == NULL)
global_iconv_handle = smb_iconv_handle_reinit(talloc_autofree_context(),
"ASCII", "UTF-8", true, NULL);
return global_iconv_handle;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 2,275
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebContents* Browser::OpenURL(const OpenURLParams& params) {
return OpenURLFromTab(NULL, params);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,801
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint32_t qemu_fdt_alloc_phandle(void *fdt)
{
static int phandle = 0x0;
/*
* We need to find out if the user gave us special instruction at
* which phandle id to start allocating phandles.
*/
if (!phandle) {
phandle = machine_phandle_start(current_machine);
}
if (!phandle) {
/*
* None or invalid phandle given on the command line, so fall back to
* default starting point.
*/
phandle = 0x8000;
}
return phandle++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,099
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OMXCodec::setComponentRole(
const sp<IOMX> &omx, IOMX::node_id node, bool isEncoder,
const char *mime) {
struct MimeToRole {
const char *mime;
const char *decoderRole;
const char *encoderRole;
};
static const MimeToRole kMimeToRole[] = {
{ MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_MPEG,
"audio_decoder.mp3", "audio_encoder.mp3" },
{ MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_MPEG_LAYER_I,
"audio_decoder.mp1", "audio_encoder.mp1" },
{ MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_MPEG_LAYER_II,
"audio_decoder.mp2", "audio_encoder.mp2" },
{ MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_AMR_NB,
"audio_decoder.amrnb", "audio_encoder.amrnb" },
{ MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_AMR_WB,
"audio_decoder.amrwb", "audio_encoder.amrwb" },
{ MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_AAC,
"audio_decoder.aac", "audio_encoder.aac" },
{ MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_VORBIS,
"audio_decoder.vorbis", "audio_encoder.vorbis" },
{ MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_OPUS,
"audio_decoder.opus", "audio_encoder.opus" },
{ MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_G711_MLAW,
"audio_decoder.g711mlaw", "audio_encoder.g711mlaw" },
{ MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_G711_ALAW,
"audio_decoder.g711alaw", "audio_encoder.g711alaw" },
{ MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC,
"video_decoder.avc", "video_encoder.avc" },
{ MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_HEVC,
"video_decoder.hevc", "video_encoder.hevc" },
{ MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_MPEG4,
"video_decoder.mpeg4", "video_encoder.mpeg4" },
{ MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_H263,
"video_decoder.h263", "video_encoder.h263" },
{ MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_VP8,
"video_decoder.vp8", "video_encoder.vp8" },
{ MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_VP9,
"video_decoder.vp9", "video_encoder.vp9" },
{ MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_RAW,
"audio_decoder.raw", "audio_encoder.raw" },
{ MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_FLAC,
"audio_decoder.flac", "audio_encoder.flac" },
{ MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_MSGSM,
"audio_decoder.gsm", "audio_encoder.gsm" },
{ MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_MPEG2,
"video_decoder.mpeg2", "video_encoder.mpeg2" },
{ MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_AC3,
"audio_decoder.ac3", "audio_encoder.ac3" },
};
static const size_t kNumMimeToRole =
sizeof(kMimeToRole) / sizeof(kMimeToRole[0]);
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < kNumMimeToRole; ++i) {
if (!strcasecmp(mime, kMimeToRole[i].mime)) {
break;
}
}
if (i == kNumMimeToRole) {
return;
}
const char *role =
isEncoder ? kMimeToRole[i].encoderRole
: kMimeToRole[i].decoderRole;
if (role != NULL) {
OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE roleParams;
InitOMXParams(&roleParams);
strncpy((char *)roleParams.cRole,
role, OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1);
roleParams.cRole[OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1] = '\0';
status_t err = omx->setParameter(
node, OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole,
&roleParams, sizeof(roleParams));
if (err != OK) {
ALOGW("Failed to set standard component role '%s'.", role);
}
}
}
Commit Message: OMXCodec: check IMemory::pointer() before using allocation
Bug: 29421811
Change-Id: I0a73ba12bae4122f1d89fc92e5ea4f6a96cd1ed1
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,192
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int git_pkt_buffer_wants(
const git_remote_head * const *refs,
size_t count,
transport_smart_caps *caps,
git_buf *buf)
{
size_t i = 0;
const git_remote_head *head;
if (caps->common) {
for (; i < count; ++i) {
head = refs[i];
if (!head->local)
break;
}
if (buffer_want_with_caps(refs[i], caps, buf) < 0)
return -1;
i++;
}
for (; i < count; ++i) {
char oid[GIT_OID_HEXSZ];
head = refs[i];
if (head->local)
continue;
git_oid_fmt(oid, &head->oid);
git_buf_put(buf, pkt_want_prefix, strlen(pkt_want_prefix));
git_buf_put(buf, oid, GIT_OID_HEXSZ);
git_buf_putc(buf, '\n');
if (git_buf_oom(buf))
return -1;
}
return git_pkt_buffer_flush(buf);
}
Commit Message: smart_pkt: treat empty packet lines as error
The Git protocol does not specify what should happen in the case
of an empty packet line (that is a packet line "0004"). We
currently indicate success, but do not return a packet in the
case where we hit an empty line. The smart protocol was not
prepared to handle such packets in all cases, though, resulting
in a `NULL` pointer dereference.
Fix the issue by returning an error instead. As such kind of
packets is not even specified by upstream, this is the right
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 71,351
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(get_thread_area, struct user_desc __user *, u_info)
{
return do_get_thread_area(current, -1, u_info);
}
Commit Message: x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix
Installing a 16-bit RW data segment into the GDT defeats espfix.
AFAICT this will not affect glibc, Wine, or dosemu at all.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: security@kernel.org <security@kernel.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,624
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CLASS phase_one_load_raw_c()
{
static const int length[] = { 8,7,6,9,11,10,5,12,14,13 };
int *offset, len[2], pred[2], row, col, i, j;
ushort *pixel;
short (*black)[2];
pixel = (ushort *) calloc (raw_width + raw_height*4, 2);
merror (pixel, "phase_one_load_raw_c()");
offset = (int *) (pixel + raw_width);
fseek (ifp, strip_offset, SEEK_SET);
for (row=0; row < raw_height; row++)
offset[row] = get4();
black = (short (*)[2]) offset + raw_height;
fseek (ifp, ph1.black_off, SEEK_SET);
if (ph1.black_off)
read_shorts ((ushort *) black[0], raw_height*2);
for (i=0; i < 256; i++)
curve[i] = i*i / 3.969 + 0.5;
for (row=0; row < raw_height; row++) {
fseek (ifp, data_offset + offset[row], SEEK_SET);
ph1_bits(-1);
pred[0] = pred[1] = 0;
for (col=0; col < raw_width; col++) {
if (col >= (raw_width & -8))
len[0] = len[1] = 14;
else if ((col & 7) == 0)
for (i=0; i < 2; i++) {
for (j=0; j < 5 && !ph1_bits(1); j++);
if (j--) len[i] = length[j*2 + ph1_bits(1)];
}
if ((i = len[col & 1]) == 14)
pixel[col] = pred[col & 1] = ph1_bits(16);
else
pixel[col] = pred[col & 1] += ph1_bits(i) + 1 - (1 << (i - 1));
if (pred[col & 1] >> 16) derror();
if (ph1.format == 5 && pixel[col] < 256)
pixel[col] = curve[pixel[col]];
}
if ((unsigned) (row-top_margin) < height)
for (col=0; col < width; col++) {
i = (pixel[col+left_margin] << 2)
- ph1.black + black[row][col >= ph1.split_col];
if (i > 0) BAYER(row-top_margin,col) = i;
}
}
free (pixel);
phase_one_correct();
maximum = 0xfffc - ph1.black;
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 43,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int len, r, ms_remain, cont;
fd_set *setp;
char buf[8192];
struct timeval timeout, start, *timeoutp = NULL;
DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_in + 1,
NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
if (setp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/*
* Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have
* been sent.
*/
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
for (;;) {
/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
if (r != 0)
break;
if (!compat20 && (
*typep == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS
|| *typep == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE
|| *typep == SSH_CMSG_EOF
|| *typep == SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION))
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
break;
/* If we got a packet, return it. */
if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
break;
/*
* Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the
* buffer, and try again.
*/
memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_in + 1,
NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
FD_SET(state->connection_in, setp);
if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms;
timeoutp = &timeout;
}
/* Wait for some data to arrive. */
for (;;) {
if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
}
if ((r = select(state->connection_in + 1, setp,
NULL, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
break;
if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
break;
if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
continue;
ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
if (ms_remain <= 0) {
r = 0;
break;
}
}
if (r == 0)
return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
/* Read data from the socket. */
do {
cont = 0;
len = roaming_read(state->connection_in, buf,
sizeof(buf), &cont);
} while (len == 0 && cont);
if (len == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
goto out;
}
if (len < 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/* Append it to the buffer. */
if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
out:
free(setp);
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::HasAppCacheManifest() const {
return isHTMLHtmlElement(documentElement()) &&
documentElement()->hasAttribute(manifestAttr);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,085
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vnc_dpy_switch(DisplayChangeListener *dcl,
DisplaySurface *surface)
{
VncDisplay *vd = container_of(dcl, VncDisplay, dcl);
VncState *vs;
int width, height;
vnc_abort_display_jobs(vd);
/* server surface */
qemu_pixman_image_unref(vd->server);
vd->ds = surface;
width = MIN(VNC_MAX_WIDTH, ROUND_UP(surface_width(vd->ds),
VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT));
height = MIN(VNC_MAX_HEIGHT, surface_height(vd->ds));
vd->server = pixman_image_create_bits(VNC_SERVER_FB_FORMAT,
width, height, NULL, 0);
/* guest surface */
#if 0 /* FIXME */
if (ds_get_bytes_per_pixel(ds) != vd->guest.ds->pf.bytes_per_pixel)
console_color_init(ds);
#endif
qemu_pixman_image_unref(vd->guest.fb);
vd->guest.fb = pixman_image_ref(surface->image);
vd->guest.format = surface->format;
memset(vd->guest.dirty, 0x00, sizeof(vd->guest.dirty));
vnc_set_area_dirty(vd->guest.dirty, width, height, 0, 0,
width, height);
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
vnc_colordepth(vs);
vnc_desktop_resize(vs);
if (vs->vd->cursor) {
vnc_cursor_define(vs);
}
memset(vs->dirty, 0x00, sizeof(vs->dirty));
vnc_set_area_dirty(vs->dirty, width, height, 0, 0,
width, height);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 8,023
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsPathHomePageBase(base::StringPiece path) {
return (path == "/") || (path == "/webhp");
}
Commit Message: Fix ChromeResourceDispatcherHostDelegateMirrorBrowserTest.MirrorRequestHeader with network service.
The functionality worked, as part of converting DICE, however the test code didn't work since it
depended on accessing the net objects directly. Switch the tests to use the EmbeddedTestServer, to
better match production, which removes the dependency on net/.
Also:
-make GetFilePathWithReplacements replace strings in the mock headers if they're present
-add a global to google_util to ignore ports; that way other tests can be converted without having
to modify each callsite to google_util
Bug: 881976
Change-Id: Ic52023495c1c98c1248025c11cdf37f433fef058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1328142
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607652}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 143,294
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int yr_arena_duplicate(
YR_ARENA* arena,
YR_ARENA** duplicated)
{
YR_RELOC* reloc;
YR_RELOC* new_reloc;
YR_ARENA_PAGE* page;
YR_ARENA_PAGE* new_page;
YR_ARENA* new_arena;
uint8_t** reloc_address;
uint8_t* reloc_target;
assert(arena->flags & ARENA_FLAGS_COALESCED);
page = arena->page_list_head;
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_create(page->size, arena->flags, &new_arena));
new_page = new_arena->current_page;
new_page->used = page->used;
memcpy(new_page->address, page->address, page->size);
reloc = page->reloc_list_head;
while (reloc != NULL)
{
new_reloc = (YR_RELOC*) yr_malloc(sizeof(YR_RELOC));
if (new_reloc == NULL)
{
yr_arena_destroy(new_arena);
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
}
new_reloc->offset = reloc->offset;
new_reloc->next = NULL;
if (new_page->reloc_list_head == NULL)
new_page->reloc_list_head = new_reloc;
if (new_page->reloc_list_tail != NULL)
new_page->reloc_list_tail->next = new_reloc;
new_page->reloc_list_tail = new_reloc;
reloc_address = (uint8_t**) (new_page->address + new_reloc->offset);
reloc_target = *reloc_address;
if (reloc_target != NULL)
{
assert(reloc_target >= page->address);
assert(reloc_target < page->address + page->used);
*reloc_address = reloc_target - \
page->address + \
new_page->address;
}
reloc = reloc->next;
}
*duplicated = new_arena;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #658
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 66,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void uat_umts_fp_record_free_cb(void*r) {
uat_umts_fp_ep_and_ch_record_t *rec = (uat_umts_fp_ep_and_ch_record_t *)r;
g_free(rec->srcIP);
g_free(rec->dstIP);
}
Commit Message: UMTS_FP: fix handling reserved C/T value
The spec puts the reserved value at 0xf but our internal table has 'unknown' at
0; since all the other values seem to be offset-by-one, just take the modulus
0xf to avoid running off the end of the table.
Bug: 12191
Change-Id: I83c8fb66797bbdee52a2246fb1eea6e37cbc7eb0
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15722
Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 51,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int load_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu, unsigned long cr3)
{
gfn_t pdpt_gfn = cr3 >> PAGE_SHIFT;
unsigned offset = ((cr3 & (PAGE_SIZE-1)) >> 5) << 2;
int i;
int ret;
u64 pdpte[ARRAY_SIZE(mmu->pdptrs)];
ret = kvm_read_guest_page_mmu(vcpu, mmu, pdpt_gfn, pdpte,
offset * sizeof(u64), sizeof(pdpte),
PFERR_USER_MASK|PFERR_WRITE_MASK);
if (ret < 0) {
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pdpte); ++i) {
if (is_present_gpte(pdpte[i]) &&
(pdpte[i] & vcpu->arch.mmu.rsvd_bits_mask[0][2])) {
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
}
ret = 1;
memcpy(mmu->pdptrs, pdpte, sizeof(mmu->pdptrs));
__set_bit(VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR,
(unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_avail);
__set_bit(VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR,
(unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_dirty);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: asmlinkage __visible void __sched notrace preempt_schedule(void)
{
/*
* If there is a non-zero preempt_count or interrupts are disabled,
* we do not want to preempt the current task. Just return..
*/
if (likely(!preemptible()))
return;
preempt_schedule_common();
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,577
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: free_httpd_server( httpd_server* hs )
{
free(hs->binding_hostname);
free(hs->cwd);
free(hs->cgi_pattern);
free(hs->charset);
free(hs->p3p);
free(hs->url_pattern);
free(hs->local_pattern);
free(hs);
}
Commit Message: Fix heap buffer overflow in de_dotdot
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,803
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static gboolean webkit_web_view_key_press_event(GtkWidget* widget, GdkEventKey* event)
{
WebKitWebView* webView = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW(widget);
Frame* frame = core(webView)->focusController()->focusedOrMainFrame();
PlatformKeyboardEvent keyboardEvent(event);
if (!frame->view())
return FALSE;
if (frame->eventHandler()->keyEvent(keyboardEvent))
return TRUE;
/* Chain up to our parent class for binding activation */
return GTK_WIDGET_CLASS(webkit_web_view_parent_class)->key_press_event(widget, event);
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,590
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: image_pixel_convert_PLTE(image_pixel *this)
{
if (this->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
if (this->have_tRNS)
{
this->colour_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA;
this->have_tRNS = 0;
}
else
this->colour_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB;
/* The bit depth of the row changes at this point too (notice that this is
* the row format, not the sample depth, which is separate.)
*/
this->bit_depth = 8;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 159,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t portio_name_show(struct uio_port *port, char *buf)
{
if (unlikely(!port->name))
port->name = "";
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", port->name);
}
Commit Message: Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPR_GetCPS2(struct rx_call *call, afs_int32 aid, afs_int32 ahost,
prlist *alist, afs_int32 *over)
{
afs_int32 code;
afs_int32 cid = ANONYMOUSID;
code = getCPS2(call, aid, ahost, alist, over, &cid);
osi_auditU(call, PTS_GetCPS2Event, code, AUD_ID, aid, AUD_HOST, htonl(ahost),
AUD_END);
ViceLog(125, ("PTS_GetCPS2: code %d cid %d aid %d ahost %d\n", code, cid, aid, ahost));
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 12,511
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long __munlock_pagevec_fill(struct pagevec *pvec,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, int zoneid, unsigned long start,
unsigned long end)
{
pte_t *pte;
spinlock_t *ptl;
/*
* Initialize pte walk starting at the already pinned page where we
* are sure that there is a pte, as it was pinned under the same
* mmap_sem write op.
*/
pte = get_locked_pte(vma->vm_mm, start, &ptl);
/* Make sure we do not cross the page table boundary */
end = pgd_addr_end(start, end);
end = p4d_addr_end(start, end);
end = pud_addr_end(start, end);
end = pmd_addr_end(start, end);
/* The page next to the pinned page is the first we will try to get */
start += PAGE_SIZE;
while (start < end) {
struct page *page = NULL;
pte++;
if (pte_present(*pte))
page = vm_normal_page(vma, start, *pte);
/*
* Break if page could not be obtained or the page's node+zone does not
* match
*/
if (!page || page_zone_id(page) != zoneid)
break;
/*
* Do not use pagevec for PTE-mapped THP,
* munlock_vma_pages_range() will handle them.
*/
if (PageTransCompound(page))
break;
get_page(page);
/*
* Increase the address that will be returned *before* the
* eventual break due to pvec becoming full by adding the page
*/
start += PAGE_SIZE;
if (pagevec_add(pvec, page) == 0)
break;
}
pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
return start;
}
Commit Message: mlock: fix mlock count can not decrease in race condition
Kefeng reported that when running the follow test, the mlock count in
meminfo will increase permanently:
[1] testcase
linux:~ # cat test_mlockal
grep Mlocked /proc/meminfo
for j in `seq 0 10`
do
for i in `seq 4 15`
do
./p_mlockall >> log &
done
sleep 0.2
done
# wait some time to let mlock counter decrease and 5s may not enough
sleep 5
grep Mlocked /proc/meminfo
linux:~ # cat p_mlockall.c
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#define SPACE_LEN 4096
int main(int argc, char ** argv)
{
int ret;
void *adr = malloc(SPACE_LEN);
if (!adr)
return -1;
ret = mlockall(MCL_CURRENT | MCL_FUTURE);
printf("mlcokall ret = %d\n", ret);
ret = munlockall();
printf("munlcokall ret = %d\n", ret);
free(adr);
return 0;
}
In __munlock_pagevec() we should decrement NR_MLOCK for each page where
we clear the PageMlocked flag. Commit 1ebb7cc6a583 ("mm: munlock: batch
NR_MLOCK zone state updates") has introduced a bug where we don't
decrement NR_MLOCK for pages where we clear the flag, but fail to
isolate them from the lru list (e.g. when the pages are on some other
cpu's percpu pagevec). Since PageMlocked stays cleared, the NR_MLOCK
accounting gets permanently disrupted by this.
Fix it by counting the number of page whose PageMlock flag is cleared.
Fixes: 1ebb7cc6a583 (" mm: munlock: batch NR_MLOCK zone state updates")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1495678405-54569-1-git-send-email-xieyisheng1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Joern Engel <joern@logfs.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Cc: zhongjiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 85,658
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BlockPainter::PaintAllChildPhasesAtomically(
const LayoutBox& child,
const PaintInfo& paint_info,
const LayoutPoint& paint_offset) {
LayoutPoint child_point =
layout_block_.FlipForWritingModeForChildForPaint(&child, paint_offset);
if (!child.HasSelfPaintingLayer() && !child.IsFloating())
ObjectPainter(child).PaintAllPhasesAtomically(paint_info, child_point);
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int get_ctty_devnr(pid_t pid, dev_t *d) {
int r;
_cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL;
const char *p;
unsigned long ttynr;
assert(pid >= 0);
p = procfs_file_alloca(pid, "stat");
r = read_one_line_file(p, &line);
if (r < 0)
return r;
p = strrchr(line, ')');
if (!p)
return -EIO;
p++;
if (sscanf(p, " "
"%*c " /* state */
"%*d " /* ppid */
"%*d " /* pgrp */
"%*d " /* session */
"%lu ", /* ttynr */
&ttynr) != 1)
return -EIO;
if (major(ttynr) == 0 && minor(ttynr) == 0)
return -ENXIO;
if (d)
*d = (dev_t) ttynr;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255
| 0
| 92,390
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: reportProcessingInstruction(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc,
const char *start, const char *end)
{
const XML_Char *target;
XML_Char *data;
const char *tem;
if (!parser->m_processingInstructionHandler) {
if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, start, end);
return 1;
}
start += enc->minBytesPerChar * 2;
tem = start + XmlNameLength(enc, start);
target = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc, start, tem);
if (!target)
return 0;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
data = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc,
XmlSkipS(enc, tem),
end - enc->minBytesPerChar*2);
if (!data)
return 0;
normalizeLines(data);
parser->m_processingInstructionHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, target, data);
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 92,367
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WindowDestroyer(content::WebContents* web_contents, TabStripModel* model)
: content::WebContentsObserver(web_contents),
tab_strip_model_(model),
browser_closed_observer_(chrome::NOTIFICATION_BROWSER_CLOSED,
content::NotificationService::AllSources()) {}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 154,469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::readBuffer(GLenum mode) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
switch (mode) {
case GL_BACK:
case GL_NONE:
case GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0:
break;
default:
if (mode > GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 &&
mode <
static_cast<GLenum>(GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 + MaxColorAttachments()))
break;
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "readBuffer", "invalid read buffer");
return;
}
WebGLFramebuffer* read_framebuffer_binding =
GetFramebufferBinding(GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER);
if (!read_framebuffer_binding) {
DCHECK(GetDrawingBuffer());
if (mode != GL_BACK && mode != GL_NONE) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "readBuffer",
"invalid read buffer");
return;
}
read_buffer_of_default_framebuffer_ = mode;
if (mode == GL_BACK)
mode = GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0;
} else {
if (mode == GL_BACK) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "readBuffer",
"invalid read buffer");
return;
}
read_framebuffer_binding->ReadBuffer(mode);
}
ContextGL()->ReadBuffer(mode);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,441
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: print_ipc(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *param, int paramlen, const u_char *data, int datalen)
{
if (paramlen)
smb_fdata(ndo, param, "Command=[w]\nStr1=[S]\nStr2=[S]\n", param + paramlen,
unicodestr);
if (datalen)
smb_fdata(ndo, data, "IPC ", data + datalen, unicodestr);
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) SMB: Add two missing bounds checks
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 93,143
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jsonb_each(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
return each_worker_jsonb(fcinfo, "jsonb_each", false);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,623
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tipc_wait_for_connect(struct socket *sock, long *timeo_p)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
int done;
do {
int err = sock_error(sk);
if (err)
return err;
if (!*timeo_p)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
if (signal_pending(current))
return sock_intr_errno(*timeo_p);
prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
done = sk_wait_event(sk, timeo_p, sock->state != SS_CONNECTING);
finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
} while (!done);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.cm>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 52,517
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static CURLcode smtp_done(struct connectdata *conn, CURLcode status,
bool premature)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
struct SMTP *smtp = data->req.protop;
struct pingpong *pp = &conn->proto.smtpc.pp;
char *eob;
ssize_t len;
ssize_t bytes_written;
(void)premature;
if(!smtp || !pp->conn)
return CURLE_OK;
/* Cleanup our per-request based variables */
Curl_safefree(smtp->custom);
if(status) {
connclose(conn, "SMTP done with bad status"); /* marked for closure */
result = status; /* use the already set error code */
}
else if(!data->set.connect_only && data->set.mail_rcpt &&
(data->set.upload || data->set.mimepost.kind)) {
/* Calculate the EOB taking into account any terminating CRLF from the
previous line of the email or the CRLF of the DATA command when there
is "no mail data". RFC-5321, sect. 4.1.1.4.
Note: As some SSL backends, such as OpenSSL, will cause Curl_write() to
fail when using a different pointer following a previous write, that
returned CURLE_AGAIN, we duplicate the EOB now rather than when the
bytes written doesn't equal len. */
if(smtp->trailing_crlf || !conn->data->state.infilesize) {
eob = strdup(SMTP_EOB + 2);
len = SMTP_EOB_LEN - 2;
}
else {
eob = strdup(SMTP_EOB);
len = SMTP_EOB_LEN;
}
if(!eob)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
/* Send the end of block data */
result = Curl_write(conn, conn->writesockfd, eob, len, &bytes_written);
if(result) {
free(eob);
return result;
}
if(bytes_written != len) {
/* The whole chunk was not sent so keep it around and adjust the
pingpong structure accordingly */
pp->sendthis = eob;
pp->sendsize = len;
pp->sendleft = len - bytes_written;
}
else {
/* Successfully sent so adjust the response timeout relative to now */
pp->response = Curl_now();
free(eob);
}
state(conn, SMTP_POSTDATA);
/* Run the state-machine
TODO: when the multi interface is used, this _really_ should be using
the smtp_multi_statemach function but we have no general support for
non-blocking DONE operations!
*/
result = smtp_block_statemach(conn);
}
/* Clear the transfer mode for the next request */
smtp->transfer = FTPTRANSFER_BODY;
return result;
}
Commit Message: smtp: use the upload buffer size for scratch buffer malloc
... not the read buffer size, as that can be set smaller and thus cause
a buffer overflow! CVE-2018-0500
Reported-by: Peter Wu
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2018-70a2.html
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 85,042
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: reinit_special_variables ()
{
#if defined (READLINE)
sv_comp_wordbreaks ("COMP_WORDBREAKS");
#endif
sv_globignore ("GLOBIGNORE");
sv_opterr ("OPTERR");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,357
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void complicated_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct transfer_context *ctx = urb->context;
spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
ctx->count--;
ctx->packet_count += urb->number_of_packets;
if (urb->error_count > 0)
ctx->errors += urb->error_count;
else if (urb->status != 0)
ctx->errors += (ctx->is_iso ? urb->number_of_packets : 1);
else if (urb->actual_length != urb->transfer_buffer_length)
ctx->errors++;
else if (check_guard_bytes(ctx->dev, urb) != 0)
ctx->errors++;
if (urb->status == 0 && ctx->count > (ctx->pending - 1)
&& !ctx->submit_error) {
int status = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
switch (status) {
case 0:
goto done;
default:
dev_err(&ctx->dev->intf->dev,
"resubmit err %d\n",
status);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case -ENODEV: /* disconnected */
case -ESHUTDOWN: /* endpoint disabled */
ctx->submit_error = 1;
break;
}
}
ctx->pending--;
if (ctx->pending == 0) {
if (ctx->errors)
dev_err(&ctx->dev->intf->dev,
"during the test, %lu errors out of %lu\n",
ctx->errors, ctx->packet_count);
complete(&ctx->done);
}
done:
spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
}
Commit Message: usb: usbtest: fix NULL pointer dereference
If the usbtest driver encounters a device with an IN bulk endpoint but
no OUT bulk endpoint, it will try to dereference a NULL pointer
(out->desc.bEndpointAddress). The problem can be solved by adding a
missing test.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 59,846
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pndisc_destructor(struct pneigh_entry *n)
{
struct in6_addr *addr = (struct in6_addr *)&n->key;
struct in6_addr maddr;
struct net_device *dev = n->dev;
if (dev == NULL || __in6_dev_get(dev) == NULL)
return;
addrconf_addr_solict_mult(addr, &maddr);
ipv6_dev_mc_dec(dev, &maddr);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface
A local route may have a lower hop_limit set than global routes do.
RFC 3756, Section 4.2.7, "Parameter Spoofing"
> 1. The attacker includes a Current Hop Limit of one or another small
> number which the attacker knows will cause legitimate packets to
> be dropped before they reach their destination.
> As an example, one possible approach to mitigate this threat is to
> ignore very small hop limits. The nodes could implement a
> configurable minimum hop limit, and ignore attempts to set it below
> said limit.
Signed-off-by: D.S. Ljungmark <ljungmark@modio.se>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 43,731
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ff_reset_entries(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 67,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OxideQQuickWebView::setFilePicker(QQmlComponent* filePicker) {
Q_D(OxideQQuickWebView);
if (d->file_picker_ == filePicker) {
return;
}
d->file_picker_ = filePicker;
emit filePickerChanged();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,163
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_cookie_ack(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ACK, 0, 0);
/* RFC 2960 6.4 Multi-homed SCTP Endpoints
*
* An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., SACK,
* HEARTBEAT ACK, * etc.) to the same destination transport
* address from which it * received the DATA or control chunk
* to which it is replying.
*
* [COOKIE ACK back to where the COOKIE ECHO came from.]
*/
if (retval && chunk)
retval->transport = chunk->transport;
return retval;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in af->from_addr_param on malformed packet
An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:
------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.
So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
The trace for the log:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]
A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.
Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,860
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tcp_add_reno_sack(struct sock *sk)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
tp->sacked_out++;
tcp_check_reno_reordering(sk, 0);
tcp_verify_left_out(tp);
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 41,115
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tx_complete (struct urb *urb)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = (struct sk_buff *) urb->context;
struct skb_data *entry = (struct skb_data *) skb->cb;
struct usbnet *dev = entry->dev;
if (urb->status == 0) {
dev->net->stats.tx_packets += entry->packets;
dev->net->stats.tx_bytes += entry->length;
} else {
dev->net->stats.tx_errors++;
switch (urb->status) {
case -EPIPE:
usbnet_defer_kevent (dev, EVENT_TX_HALT);
break;
/* software-driven interface shutdown */
case -ECONNRESET: // async unlink
case -ESHUTDOWN: // hardware gone
break;
/* like rx, tx gets controller i/o faults during hub_wq
* delays and so it uses the same throttling mechanism.
*/
case -EPROTO:
case -ETIME:
case -EILSEQ:
usb_mark_last_busy(dev->udev);
if (!timer_pending (&dev->delay)) {
mod_timer (&dev->delay,
jiffies + THROTTLE_JIFFIES);
netif_dbg(dev, link, dev->net,
"tx throttle %d\n", urb->status);
}
netif_stop_queue (dev->net);
break;
default:
netif_dbg(dev, tx_err, dev->net,
"tx err %d\n", entry->urb->status);
break;
}
}
usb_autopm_put_interface_async(dev->intf);
(void) defer_bh(dev, skb, &dev->txq, tx_done);
}
Commit Message: usbnet: cleanup after bind() in probe()
In case bind() works, but a later error forces bailing
in probe() in error cases work and a timer may be scheduled.
They must be killed. This fixes an error case related to
the double free reported in
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367669.html
and needs to go on top of Linus' fix to cdc-ncm.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 94,887
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PeopleHandler::OnPrimaryAccountSet(
const AccountInfo& primary_account_info) {
UpdateSyncStatus();
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,214
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool QueryManager::HavePendingQueries() {
return !pending_queries_.empty();
}
Commit Message: Add bounds validation to AsyncPixelTransfersCompletedQuery::End
BUG=351852
R=jbauman@chromium.org, jorgelo@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/198253002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@256723 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 121,454
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool IsAudible(const AudioBus* rendered_data) {
float energy = 0;
unsigned data_size = rendered_data->length();
for (unsigned k = 0; k < rendered_data->NumberOfChannels(); ++k) {
const float* data = rendered_data->Channel(k)->Data();
float channel_energy;
VectorMath::Vsvesq(data, 1, &channel_energy, data_size);
energy += channel_energy;
}
return energy > 0;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,610
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vmac_update(struct shash_desc *pdesc, const u8 *p,
unsigned int len)
{
struct crypto_shash *parent = pdesc->tfm;
struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent);
int expand;
int min;
expand = VMAC_NHBYTES - ctx->partial_size > 0 ?
VMAC_NHBYTES - ctx->partial_size : 0;
min = len < expand ? len : expand;
memcpy(ctx->partial + ctx->partial_size, p, min);
ctx->partial_size += min;
if (len < expand)
return 0;
vhash_update(ctx->partial, VMAC_NHBYTES, &ctx->__vmac_ctx);
ctx->partial_size = 0;
len -= expand;
p += expand;
if (len % VMAC_NHBYTES) {
memcpy(ctx->partial, p + len - (len % VMAC_NHBYTES),
len % VMAC_NHBYTES);
ctx->partial_size = len % VMAC_NHBYTES;
}
vhash_update(p, len - len % VMAC_NHBYTES, &ctx->__vmac_ctx);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,916
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int len, padding_len;
unsigned char *d;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A)
{
len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
d[4] = len;
memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
d[5 + len] = padding_len;
memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
s->init_off = 0;
}
return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,763
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parserCreate(const XML_Char *encodingName,
const XML_Memory_Handling_Suite *memsuite, const XML_Char *nameSep,
DTD *dtd) {
XML_Parser parser;
if (memsuite) {
XML_Memory_Handling_Suite *mtemp;
parser = (XML_Parser)memsuite->malloc_fcn(sizeof(struct XML_ParserStruct));
if (parser != NULL) {
mtemp = (XML_Memory_Handling_Suite *)&(parser->m_mem);
mtemp->malloc_fcn = memsuite->malloc_fcn;
mtemp->realloc_fcn = memsuite->realloc_fcn;
mtemp->free_fcn = memsuite->free_fcn;
}
} else {
XML_Memory_Handling_Suite *mtemp;
parser = (XML_Parser)malloc(sizeof(struct XML_ParserStruct));
if (parser != NULL) {
mtemp = (XML_Memory_Handling_Suite *)&(parser->m_mem);
mtemp->malloc_fcn = malloc;
mtemp->realloc_fcn = realloc;
mtemp->free_fcn = free;
}
}
if (! parser)
return parser;
parser->m_buffer = NULL;
parser->m_bufferLim = NULL;
parser->m_attsSize = INIT_ATTS_SIZE;
parser->m_atts
= (ATTRIBUTE *)MALLOC(parser, parser->m_attsSize * sizeof(ATTRIBUTE));
if (parser->m_atts == NULL) {
FREE(parser, parser);
return NULL;
}
#ifdef XML_ATTR_INFO
parser->m_attInfo = (XML_AttrInfo *)MALLOC(
parser, parser->m_attsSize * sizeof(XML_AttrInfo));
if (parser->m_attInfo == NULL) {
FREE(parser, parser->m_atts);
FREE(parser, parser);
return NULL;
}
#endif
parser->m_dataBuf
= (XML_Char *)MALLOC(parser, INIT_DATA_BUF_SIZE * sizeof(XML_Char));
if (parser->m_dataBuf == NULL) {
FREE(parser, parser->m_atts);
#ifdef XML_ATTR_INFO
FREE(parser, parser->m_attInfo);
#endif
FREE(parser, parser);
return NULL;
}
parser->m_dataBufEnd = parser->m_dataBuf + INIT_DATA_BUF_SIZE;
if (dtd)
parser->m_dtd = dtd;
else {
parser->m_dtd = dtdCreate(&parser->m_mem);
if (parser->m_dtd == NULL) {
FREE(parser, parser->m_dataBuf);
FREE(parser, parser->m_atts);
#ifdef XML_ATTR_INFO
FREE(parser, parser->m_attInfo);
#endif
FREE(parser, parser);
return NULL;
}
}
parser->m_freeBindingList = NULL;
parser->m_freeTagList = NULL;
parser->m_freeInternalEntities = NULL;
parser->m_groupSize = 0;
parser->m_groupConnector = NULL;
parser->m_unknownEncodingHandler = NULL;
parser->m_unknownEncodingHandlerData = NULL;
parser->m_namespaceSeparator = ASCII_EXCL;
parser->m_ns = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_ns_triplets = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_nsAtts = NULL;
parser->m_nsAttsVersion = 0;
parser->m_nsAttsPower = 0;
parser->m_protocolEncodingName = NULL;
poolInit(&parser->m_tempPool, &(parser->m_mem));
poolInit(&parser->m_temp2Pool, &(parser->m_mem));
parserInit(parser, encodingName);
if (encodingName && ! parser->m_protocolEncodingName) {
XML_ParserFree(parser);
return NULL;
}
if (nameSep) {
parser->m_ns = XML_TRUE;
parser->m_internalEncoding = XmlGetInternalEncodingNS();
parser->m_namespaceSeparator = *nameSep;
} else {
parser->m_internalEncoding = XmlGetInternalEncoding();
}
return parser;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 88,289
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ActivityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsLongAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "activityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsLongAttribute");
int32_t cpp_value = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setActivityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsLongAttribute(cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,467
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __enqueue_entity(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se)
{
struct rb_node **link = &cfs_rq->tasks_timeline.rb_root.rb_node;
struct rb_node *parent = NULL;
struct sched_entity *entry;
bool leftmost = true;
/*
* Find the right place in the rbtree:
*/
while (*link) {
parent = *link;
entry = rb_entry(parent, struct sched_entity, run_node);
/*
* We dont care about collisions. Nodes with
* the same key stay together.
*/
if (entity_before(se, entry)) {
link = &parent->rb_left;
} else {
link = &parent->rb_right;
leftmost = false;
}
}
rb_link_node(&se->run_node, parent, link);
rb_insert_color_cached(&se->run_node,
&cfs_rq->tasks_timeline, leftmost);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ass_pre_blur2_vert_c(int16_t *dst, const int16_t *src,
uintptr_t src_width, uintptr_t src_height)
{
uintptr_t dst_height = src_height + 4;
uintptr_t step = STRIPE_WIDTH * src_height;
for (uintptr_t x = 0; x < src_width; x += STRIPE_WIDTH) {
uintptr_t offs = 0;
for (uintptr_t y = 0; y < dst_height; ++y) {
const int16_t *p2 = get_line(src, offs - 4 * STRIPE_WIDTH, step);
const int16_t *p1 = get_line(src, offs - 3 * STRIPE_WIDTH, step);
const int16_t *z0 = get_line(src, offs - 2 * STRIPE_WIDTH, step);
const int16_t *n1 = get_line(src, offs - 1 * STRIPE_WIDTH, step);
const int16_t *n2 = get_line(src, offs - 0 * STRIPE_WIDTH, step);
for (int k = 0; k < STRIPE_WIDTH; ++k)
dst[k] = pre_blur2_func(p2[k], p1[k], z0[k], n1[k], n2[k]);
dst += STRIPE_WIDTH;
offs += STRIPE_WIDTH;
}
src += step;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix blur coefficient calculation buffer overflow
Found by fuzzer test case id:000082,sig:11,src:002579,op:havoc,rep:8.
Correctness should be checked, but this fixes the overflow for good.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 73,319
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t ctor_show(struct kmem_cache *s, char *buf)
{
if (s->ctor) {
int n = sprint_symbol(buf, (unsigned long)s->ctor);
return n + sprintf(buf + n, "\n");
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,782
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *alloc_ctxt(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt,
gfp_t flags)
{
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt;
ctxt = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctxt), flags);
if (ctxt) {
ctxt->xprt = xprt;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctxt->list);
}
return ctxt;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,981
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::stepDown()
{
if (hasValue()) {
if (!indexIsInRange(--m_selectedIndex))
m_selectedIndex = m_maximumIndex;
} else
m_selectedIndex = m_maximumIndex;
updateVisibleValue(DispatchEvent);
}
Commit Message: INPUT_MULTIPLE_FIELDS_UI: Inconsistent value of aria-valuetext attribute
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107897
Reviewed by Kentaro Hara.
Source/WebCore:
aria-valuetext and aria-valuenow attributes had inconsistent values in
a case of initial empty state and a case that a user clears a field.
- aria-valuetext attribute should have "blank" message in the initial
empty state.
- aria-valuenow attribute should be removed in the cleared empty state.
Also, we have a bug that aira-valuenow had a symbolic value such as "AM"
"January". It should always have a numeric value according to the
specification.
http://www.w3.org/TR/wai-aria/states_and_properties#aria-valuenow
No new tests. Updates fast/forms/*-multiple-fields/*-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::DateTimeFieldElement):
Set "blank" message to aria-valuetext attribute.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::updateVisibleValue):
aria-valuenow attribute should be a numeric value. Apply String::number
to the return value of valueForARIAValueNow.
Remove aria-valuenow attribute if nothing is selected.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added. Returns 1 + internal selection index.
For example, the function returns 1 for January.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
LayoutTests:
Fix existing tests to show aria-valuenow attribute values.
* fast/forms/resources/multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js: Added.
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
Add tests for initial empty-value state.
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@140803 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 103,252
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ConcludeInteraction(ConcludeReason conclude_reason) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(
"DefaultBrowser.SettingsInteraction.ConcludeReason", conclude_reason,
NUM_CONCLUDE_REASON_TYPES);
on_finished_callback_.Run();
delete instance_;
instance_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Validate external protocols before launching on Windows
Bug: 889459
Change-Id: Id33ca6444bff1e6dd71b6000823cf6fec09746ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1256208
Reviewed-by: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597611}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 144,656
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char gf_prompt_get_char() {
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix buffer overrun in gf_bin128_parse
closes #1204
closes #1205
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 90,824
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PrintMsg_Print_Params GetCssPrintParams(
WebFrame* frame,
int page_index,
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& page_params) {
PrintMsg_Print_Params page_css_params = page_params;
int dpi = GetDPI(&page_params);
WebSize page_size_in_pixels(
ConvertUnit(page_params.page_size.width(),
dpi, printing::kPixelsPerInch),
ConvertUnit(page_params.page_size.height(),
dpi, printing::kPixelsPerInch));
int margin_top_in_pixels = ConvertUnit(
page_params.margin_top,
dpi, printing::kPixelsPerInch);
int margin_right_in_pixels = ConvertUnit(
page_params.page_size.width() -
page_params.content_size.width() - page_params.margin_left,
dpi, printing::kPixelsPerInch);
int margin_bottom_in_pixels = ConvertUnit(
page_params.page_size.height() -
page_params.content_size.height() - page_params.margin_top,
dpi, printing::kPixelsPerInch);
int margin_left_in_pixels = ConvertUnit(
page_params.margin_left,
dpi, printing::kPixelsPerInch);
WebSize original_page_size_in_pixels = page_size_in_pixels;
if (frame) {
frame->pageSizeAndMarginsInPixels(page_index,
page_size_in_pixels,
margin_top_in_pixels,
margin_right_in_pixels,
margin_bottom_in_pixels,
margin_left_in_pixels);
}
int new_content_width = page_size_in_pixels.width -
margin_left_in_pixels - margin_right_in_pixels;
int new_content_height = page_size_in_pixels.height -
margin_top_in_pixels - margin_bottom_in_pixels;
if (new_content_width < 1 || new_content_height < 1) {
CHECK(frame != NULL);
page_css_params = GetCssPrintParams(NULL, page_index, page_params);
return page_css_params;
}
page_css_params.content_size = gfx::Size(
static_cast<int>(ConvertUnit(new_content_width,
printing::kPixelsPerInch, dpi)),
static_cast<int>(ConvertUnit(new_content_height,
printing::kPixelsPerInch, dpi)));
if (original_page_size_in_pixels != page_size_in_pixels) {
page_css_params.page_size = gfx::Size(
static_cast<int>(ConvertUnit(page_size_in_pixels.width,
printing::kPixelsPerInch, dpi)),
static_cast<int>(ConvertUnit(page_size_in_pixels.height,
printing::kPixelsPerInch, dpi)));
} else {
page_css_params.page_size = page_params.page_size;
}
page_css_params.margin_top =
static_cast<int>(ConvertUnit(margin_top_in_pixels,
printing::kPixelsPerInch, dpi));
page_css_params.margin_left =
static_cast<int>(ConvertUnit(margin_left_in_pixels,
printing::kPixelsPerInch, dpi));
return page_css_params;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 105,876
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err stdp_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 entry;
GF_DegradationPriorityBox *ptr = (GF_DegradationPriorityBox *)s;
/*out-of-order stdp, assume no padding at the end and take the entire remaining data for entries*/
if (!ptr->nb_entries) ptr->nb_entries = (u32) ptr->size / 2;
else if (ptr->nb_entries > ptr->size / 2) return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
ptr->priorities = (u16 *) gf_malloc(ptr->nb_entries * sizeof(u16));
if (ptr->priorities == NULL) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
for (entry = 0; entry < ptr->nb_entries; entry++) {
ptr->priorities[entry] = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
}
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, (2*ptr->nb_entries) );
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,446
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tt_cmap6_get_info( TT_CMap cmap,
TT_CMapInfo *cmap_info )
{
FT_Byte* p = cmap->data + 4;
cmap_info->format = 6;
cmap_info->language = (FT_ULong)TT_PEEK_USHORT( p );
return FT_Err_Ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 6,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DownloadPathReservationTrackerTest::DownloadPathReservationTrackerTest()
: ui_thread_(BrowserThread::UI, &message_loop_),
file_thread_(BrowserThread::FILE, &message_loop_) {
}
Commit Message: Fix OS_MACOS typos. Should be OS_MACOSX.
BUG=163208
TEST=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12829005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@189130 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 118,744
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MockPluginProcessHostClient(ResourceContext* context, bool expect_fail)
: context_(context),
channel_(NULL),
set_plugin_info_called_(false),
expect_fail_(expect_fail) {
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 116,814
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::InstrumentDidBeginFrame() {
if (!webview())
return;
if (!webview()->devToolsAgent())
return;
webview()->devToolsAgent()->didComposite();
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,522
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Gfx::fillPatch(GfxPatch *patch, int nComps, int depth) {
GfxPatch patch00, patch01, patch10, patch11;
double xx[4][8], yy[4][8];
double xxm, yym;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nComps; ++i) {
if (abs(patch->color[0][0].c[i] - patch->color[0][1].c[i])
> patchColorDelta ||
abs(patch->color[0][1].c[i] - patch->color[1][1].c[i])
> patchColorDelta ||
abs(patch->color[1][1].c[i] - patch->color[1][0].c[i])
> patchColorDelta ||
abs(patch->color[1][0].c[i] - patch->color[0][0].c[i])
> patchColorDelta) {
break;
}
}
if (i == nComps || depth == patchMaxDepth) {
state->setFillColor(&patch->color[0][0]);
out->updateFillColor(state);
state->moveTo(patch->x[0][0], patch->y[0][0]);
state->curveTo(patch->x[0][1], patch->y[0][1],
patch->x[0][2], patch->y[0][2],
patch->x[0][3], patch->y[0][3]);
state->curveTo(patch->x[1][3], patch->y[1][3],
patch->x[2][3], patch->y[2][3],
patch->x[3][3], patch->y[3][3]);
state->curveTo(patch->x[3][2], patch->y[3][2],
patch->x[3][1], patch->y[3][1],
patch->x[3][0], patch->y[3][0]);
state->curveTo(patch->x[2][0], patch->y[2][0],
patch->x[1][0], patch->y[1][0],
patch->x[0][0], patch->y[0][0]);
state->closePath();
if (!contentIsHidden())
out->fill(state);
state->clearPath();
} else {
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
xx[i][0] = patch->x[i][0];
yy[i][0] = patch->y[i][0];
xx[i][1] = 0.5 * (patch->x[i][0] + patch->x[i][1]);
yy[i][1] = 0.5 * (patch->y[i][0] + patch->y[i][1]);
xxm = 0.5 * (patch->x[i][1] + patch->x[i][2]);
yym = 0.5 * (patch->y[i][1] + patch->y[i][2]);
xx[i][6] = 0.5 * (patch->x[i][2] + patch->x[i][3]);
yy[i][6] = 0.5 * (patch->y[i][2] + patch->y[i][3]);
xx[i][2] = 0.5 * (xx[i][1] + xxm);
yy[i][2] = 0.5 * (yy[i][1] + yym);
xx[i][5] = 0.5 * (xxm + xx[i][6]);
yy[i][5] = 0.5 * (yym + yy[i][6]);
xx[i][3] = xx[i][4] = 0.5 * (xx[i][2] + xx[i][5]);
yy[i][3] = yy[i][4] = 0.5 * (yy[i][2] + yy[i][5]);
xx[i][7] = patch->x[i][3];
yy[i][7] = patch->y[i][3];
}
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
patch00.x[0][i] = xx[0][i];
patch00.y[0][i] = yy[0][i];
patch00.x[1][i] = 0.5 * (xx[0][i] + xx[1][i]);
patch00.y[1][i] = 0.5 * (yy[0][i] + yy[1][i]);
xxm = 0.5 * (xx[1][i] + xx[2][i]);
yym = 0.5 * (yy[1][i] + yy[2][i]);
patch10.x[2][i] = 0.5 * (xx[2][i] + xx[3][i]);
patch10.y[2][i] = 0.5 * (yy[2][i] + yy[3][i]);
patch00.x[2][i] = 0.5 * (patch00.x[1][i] + xxm);
patch00.y[2][i] = 0.5 * (patch00.y[1][i] + yym);
patch10.x[1][i] = 0.5 * (xxm + patch10.x[2][i]);
patch10.y[1][i] = 0.5 * (yym + patch10.y[2][i]);
patch00.x[3][i] = 0.5 * (patch00.x[2][i] + patch10.x[1][i]);
patch00.y[3][i] = 0.5 * (patch00.y[2][i] + patch10.y[1][i]);
patch10.x[0][i] = patch00.x[3][i];
patch10.y[0][i] = patch00.y[3][i];
patch10.x[3][i] = xx[3][i];
patch10.y[3][i] = yy[3][i];
}
for (i = 4; i < 8; ++i) {
patch01.x[0][i-4] = xx[0][i];
patch01.y[0][i-4] = yy[0][i];
patch01.x[1][i-4] = 0.5 * (xx[0][i] + xx[1][i]);
patch01.y[1][i-4] = 0.5 * (yy[0][i] + yy[1][i]);
xxm = 0.5 * (xx[1][i] + xx[2][i]);
yym = 0.5 * (yy[1][i] + yy[2][i]);
patch11.x[2][i-4] = 0.5 * (xx[2][i] + xx[3][i]);
patch11.y[2][i-4] = 0.5 * (yy[2][i] + yy[3][i]);
patch01.x[2][i-4] = 0.5 * (patch01.x[1][i-4] + xxm);
patch01.y[2][i-4] = 0.5 * (patch01.y[1][i-4] + yym);
patch11.x[1][i-4] = 0.5 * (xxm + patch11.x[2][i-4]);
patch11.y[1][i-4] = 0.5 * (yym + patch11.y[2][i-4]);
patch01.x[3][i-4] = 0.5 * (patch01.x[2][i-4] + patch11.x[1][i-4]);
patch01.y[3][i-4] = 0.5 * (patch01.y[2][i-4] + patch11.y[1][i-4]);
patch11.x[0][i-4] = patch01.x[3][i-4];
patch11.y[0][i-4] = patch01.y[3][i-4];
patch11.x[3][i-4] = xx[3][i];
patch11.y[3][i-4] = yy[3][i];
}
for (i = 0; i < nComps; ++i) {
patch00.color[0][0].c[i] = patch->color[0][0].c[i];
patch00.color[0][1].c[i] = (patch->color[0][0].c[i] +
patch->color[0][1].c[i]) / 2;
patch01.color[0][0].c[i] = patch00.color[0][1].c[i];
patch01.color[0][1].c[i] = patch->color[0][1].c[i];
patch01.color[1][1].c[i] = (patch->color[0][1].c[i] +
patch->color[1][1].c[i]) / 2;
patch11.color[0][1].c[i] = patch01.color[1][1].c[i];
patch11.color[1][1].c[i] = patch->color[1][1].c[i];
patch11.color[1][0].c[i] = (patch->color[1][1].c[i] +
patch->color[1][0].c[i]) / 2;
patch10.color[1][1].c[i] = patch11.color[1][0].c[i];
patch10.color[1][0].c[i] = patch->color[1][0].c[i];
patch10.color[0][0].c[i] = (patch->color[1][0].c[i] +
patch->color[0][0].c[i]) / 2;
patch00.color[1][0].c[i] = patch10.color[0][0].c[i];
patch00.color[1][1].c[i] = (patch00.color[1][0].c[i] +
patch01.color[1][1].c[i]) / 2;
patch01.color[1][0].c[i] = patch00.color[1][1].c[i];
patch11.color[0][0].c[i] = patch00.color[1][1].c[i];
patch10.color[0][1].c[i] = patch00.color[1][1].c[i];
}
fillPatch(&patch00, nComps, depth + 1);
fillPatch(&patch10, nComps, depth + 1);
fillPatch(&patch01, nComps, depth + 1);
fillPatch(&patch11, nComps, depth + 1);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,090
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: path_add(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
PATH *p1 = PG_GETARG_PATH_P(0);
PATH *p2 = PG_GETARG_PATH_P(1);
PATH *result;
int size,
base_size;
int i;
if (p1->closed || p2->closed)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
base_size = sizeof(p1->p[0]) * (p1->npts + p2->npts);
size = offsetof(PATH, p[0]) +base_size;
/* Check for integer overflow */
if (base_size / sizeof(p1->p[0]) != (p1->npts + p2->npts) ||
size <= base_size)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROGRAM_LIMIT_EXCEEDED),
errmsg("too many points requested")));
result = (PATH *) palloc(size);
SET_VARSIZE(result, size);
result->npts = (p1->npts + p2->npts);
result->closed = p1->closed;
/* prevent instability in unused pad bytes */
result->dummy = 0;
for (i = 0; i < p1->npts; i++)
{
result->p[i].x = p1->p[i].x;
result->p[i].y = p1->p[i].y;
}
for (i = 0; i < p2->npts; i++)
{
result->p[i + p1->npts].x = p2->p[i].x;
result->p[i + p1->npts].y = p2->p[i].y;
}
PG_RETURN_PATH_P(result);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,946
|
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