instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void get_timewait4_sock(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw,
struct seq_file *f, int i, int *len)
{
__be32 dest, src;
__u16 destp, srcp;
int ttd = tw->tw_ttd - jiffies;
if (ttd < 0)
ttd = 0;
dest = tw->tw_daddr;
src = tw->tw_rcv_saddr;
destp = ntohs(tw->tw_dport);
srcp = ntohs(tw->tw_sport);
seq_printf(f, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %d %d %pK%n",
i, src, srcp, dest, destp, tw->tw_substate, 0, 0,
3, jiffies_to_clock_t(ttd), 0, 0, 0, 0,
atomic_read(&tw->tw_refcnt), tw, len);
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 20,761
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_lock_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_lockdata *data = calldata;
struct nfs4_state *state = data->lsp->ls_state;
dprintk("%s: begin!\n", __func__);
if (nfs_wait_on_sequence(data->arg.lock_seqid, task) != 0)
return;
/* Do we need to do an open_to_lock_owner? */
if (!(data->arg.lock_seqid->sequence->flags & NFS_SEQID_CONFIRMED)) {
if (nfs_wait_on_sequence(data->arg.open_seqid, task) != 0)
goto out_release_lock_seqid;
data->arg.open_stateid = &state->stateid;
data->arg.new_lock_owner = 1;
data->res.open_seqid = data->arg.open_seqid;
} else
data->arg.new_lock_owner = 0;
data->timestamp = jiffies;
if (nfs4_setup_sequence(data->server,
&data->arg.seq_args,
&data->res.seq_res,
task) == 0) {
rpc_call_start(task);
return;
}
nfs_release_seqid(data->arg.open_seqid);
out_release_lock_seqid:
nfs_release_seqid(data->arg.lock_seqid);
dprintk("%s: done!, ret = %d\n", __func__, task->tk_status);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 25,149
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void walk_process_tree(struct task_struct *top, proc_visitor visitor, void *data)
{
struct task_struct *leader, *parent, *child;
int res;
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
leader = top = top->group_leader;
down:
for_each_thread(leader, parent) {
list_for_each_entry(child, &parent->children, sibling) {
res = visitor(child, data);
if (res) {
if (res < 0)
goto out;
leader = child;
goto down;
}
up:
;
}
}
if (leader != top) {
child = leader;
parent = child->real_parent;
leader = parent->group_leader;
goto up;
}
out:
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
}
Commit Message: fork: fix incorrect fput of ->exe_file causing use-after-free
Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().
However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
a reference is taken on the mm_struct's ->exe_file. Since the
->exe_file of the new mm_struct was already set to the old ->exe_file by
the memcpy() in dup_mm(), it was possible for the mmput() in the error
path of dup_mm() to drop a reference to ->exe_file which was never
taken.
This caused the struct file to later be freed prematurely.
Fix it by updating mm_init() to NULL out the ->exe_file, in the same
place it clears other things like the list of mmaps.
This bug was found by syzkaller. It can be reproduced using the
following C program:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *mmap_thread(void *_arg)
{
for (;;) {
mmap(NULL, 0x1000000, PROT_READ,
MAP_POPULATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
}
}
static void *fork_thread(void *_arg)
{
usleep(rand() % 10000);
fork();
}
int main(void)
{
fork();
fork();
fork();
for (;;) {
if (fork() == 0) {
pthread_t t;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, mmap_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t, NULL, fork_thread, NULL);
usleep(rand() % 10000);
syscall(__NR_exit_group, 0);
}
wait(NULL);
}
}
No special kernel config options are needed. It usually causes a NULL
pointer dereference in __remove_shared_vm_struct() during exit, or in
dup_mmap() (which is usually inlined into copy_process()) during fork.
Both are due to a vm_area_struct's ->vm_file being used after it's
already been freed.
Google Bug Id: 64772007
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823211408.31198-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v4.7+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 17,059
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void h2_session_ev_ngh2_done(h2_session *session, int arg, const char *msg)
{
switch (session->state) {
case H2_SESSION_ST_DONE:
/* nop */
break;
default:
transit(session, "nghttp2 done", H2_SESSION_ST_DONE);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740
mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory.
Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <naveen.tiwari@asu.edu> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 21,959
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBox::computeIntrinsicLogicalWidths(LayoutUnit& minLogicalWidth, LayoutUnit& maxLogicalWidth) const
{
minLogicalWidth = minPreferredLogicalWidth() - borderAndPaddingLogicalWidth();
maxLogicalWidth = maxPreferredLogicalWidth() - borderAndPaddingLogicalWidth();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,964
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ~OverflowEventDispatcher()
{
if (!m_shouldDispatchEvent)
return;
bool hasHorizontalLayoutOverflow = m_block->hasHorizontalLayoutOverflow();
bool hasVerticalLayoutOverflow = m_block->hasVerticalLayoutOverflow();
bool horizontalLayoutOverflowChanged = hasHorizontalLayoutOverflow != m_hadHorizontalLayoutOverflow;
bool verticalLayoutOverflowChanged = hasVerticalLayoutOverflow != m_hadVerticalLayoutOverflow;
if (!horizontalLayoutOverflowChanged && !verticalLayoutOverflowChanged)
return;
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<OverflowEvent> event = OverflowEvent::create(horizontalLayoutOverflowChanged, hasHorizontalLayoutOverflow, verticalLayoutOverflowChanged, hasVerticalLayoutOverflow);
event->setTarget(m_block->node());
m_block->document().enqueueAnimationFrameEvent(event.release());
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 990
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct btrfs_dir_item *btrfs_lookup_dir_item(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_root *root,
struct btrfs_path *path, u64 dir,
const char *name, int name_len,
int mod)
{
int ret;
struct btrfs_key key;
int ins_len = mod < 0 ? -1 : 0;
int cow = mod != 0;
key.objectid = dir;
btrfs_set_key_type(&key, BTRFS_DIR_ITEM_KEY);
key.offset = btrfs_name_hash(name, name_len);
ret = btrfs_search_slot(trans, root, &key, path, ins_len, cow);
if (ret < 0)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
if (ret > 0)
return NULL;
return btrfs_match_dir_item_name(root, path, name, name_len);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 7,077
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err rssr_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_ReceivedSsrcBox *ptr = (GF_ReceivedSsrcBox *)s;
ptr->ssrc = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 23,473
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void impeg2d_dec_pic_data(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
WORD32 i;
dec_state_multi_core_t *ps_dec_state_multi_core;
UWORD32 u4_error_code;
dec_state_t *ps_dec_thd;
WORD32 i4_status;
WORD32 i4_min_mb_y;
/* Resetting the MB address and MB coordinates at the start of the Frame */
ps_dec->u2_mb_x = ps_dec->u2_mb_y = 0;
u4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec_state_multi_core = ps_dec->ps_dec_state_multi_core;
impeg2d_get_slice_pos(ps_dec_state_multi_core);
i4_min_mb_y = 1;
for(i=0; i < ps_dec->i4_num_cores - 1; i++)
{
ps_dec_thd = ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[i+1];
ps_dec_thd->ps_disp_pic = ps_dec->ps_disp_pic;
ps_dec_thd->ps_disp_frm_buf = ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf;
i4_status = impeg2d_init_thread_dec_ctxt(ps_dec, ps_dec_thd, i4_min_mb_y);
if(i4_status == 0)
{
ithread_create(ps_dec_thd->pv_codec_thread_handle, NULL, (void *)impeg2d_dec_pic_data_thread, ps_dec_thd);
ps_dec_state_multi_core->au4_thread_launched[i + 1] = 1;
i4_min_mb_y = ps_dec_thd->u2_mb_y + 1;
}
else
{
ps_dec_state_multi_core->au4_thread_launched[i + 1] = 0;
break;
}
}
impeg2d_dec_pic_data_thread(ps_dec);
for(i=0; i < (ps_dec->i4_num_cores - 1); i++)
{
if(ps_dec_state_multi_core->au4_thread_launched[i + 1] == 1)
{
ps_dec_thd = ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[i+1];
ithread_join(ps_dec_thd->pv_codec_thread_handle, NULL);
}
}
ps_dec->u4_error_code = u4_error_code;
}
Commit Message: Fix for handling streams which resulted in negative num_mbs_left
Bug: 26070014
Change-Id: Id9f063a2c72a802d991b92abaf00ec687db5bb0f
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs_fixup_secinfo_attributes(struct nfs_fattr *fattr)
{
fattr->valid |= NFS_ATTR_FATTR_TYPE | NFS_ATTR_FATTR_MODE |
NFS_ATTR_FATTR_NLINK | NFS_ATTR_FATTR_MOUNTPOINT;
fattr->mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
fattr->nlink = 2;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,995
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void GetBucketsForArgs(const ListValue* args, BucketList* buckets) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < args->GetSize(); i++) {
int id;
ASSERT_TRUE(args->GetInteger(i, &id));
if (buckets_.find(id) == buckets_.end())
buckets_[id] = new Bucket();
buckets->push_back(buckets_[id]);
}
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,699
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rdpsnd_process(STREAM s)
{
uint16 len;
while (!s_check_end(s))
{
/* New packet */
if (packet.size == 0)
{
if ((s->end - s->p) < 4)
{
logger(Sound, Error,
"rdpsnd_process(), split at packet header, things will go south from here...");
return;
}
in_uint8(s, packet_opcode);
in_uint8s(s, 1); /* Padding */
in_uint16_le(s, len);
logger(Sound, Debug, "rdpsnd_process(), Opcode = 0x%x Length= %d",
(int) packet_opcode, (int) len);
packet.p = packet.data;
packet.end = packet.data + len;
packet.size = len;
}
else
{
len = MIN(s->end - s->p, packet.end - packet.p);
/* Microsoft's server is so broken it's not even funny... */
if (packet_opcode == SNDC_WAVE)
{
if ((packet.p - packet.data) < 12)
len = MIN(len, 12 - (packet.p - packet.data));
else if ((packet.p - packet.data) == 12)
{
logger(Sound, Debug,
"rdpsnd_process(), eating 4 bytes of %d bytes...",
len);
in_uint8s(s, 4);
len -= 4;
}
}
in_uint8a(s, packet.p, len);
packet.p += len;
}
/* Packet fully assembled */
if (packet.p == packet.end)
{
packet.p = packet.data;
rdpsnd_process_packet(packet_opcode, &packet);
packet.size = 0;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,605
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SmartScheduleTimer (int sig)
{
SmartScheduleTime += SmartScheduleInterval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 6,592
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void blk_mq_init_cpu_queues(struct request_queue *q,
unsigned int nr_hw_queues)
{
unsigned int i;
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
struct blk_mq_ctx *__ctx = per_cpu_ptr(q->queue_ctx, i);
struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx;
memset(__ctx, 0, sizeof(*__ctx));
__ctx->cpu = i;
spin_lock_init(&__ctx->lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&__ctx->rq_list);
__ctx->queue = q;
/* If the cpu isn't online, the cpu is mapped to first hctx */
if (!cpu_online(i))
continue;
hctx = q->mq_ops->map_queue(q, i);
/*
* Set local node, IFF we have more than one hw queue. If
* not, we remain on the home node of the device
*/
if (nr_hw_queues > 1 && hctx->numa_node == NUMA_NO_NODE)
hctx->numa_node = cpu_to_node(i);
}
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 8,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: auxbinFile(char *base)
{
return expandPath(Strnew_m_charp(w3m_auxbin_dir(), "/", base, NULL)->ptr);
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 8,721
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HTREEITEM TreeView::GetTreeItemForNode(TreeModelNode* node) {
NodeDetails* details = GetNodeDetails(node);
return details ? details->tree_item : NULL;
}
Commit Message: Add OVERRIDE to ui::TreeModelObserver overridden methods.
BUG=None
TEST=None
R=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7046093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88827 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,410
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void gx_ttfExport__Close(ttfExport *self)
{
gx_ttfExport *e = (gx_ttfExport *)self;
if (!e->error)
e->error = gx_path_close_subpath_notes(e->path, sn_none);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 27,549
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gpc_Gpre(Pixel *out, const Pixel *in, const Background *back)
{
(void)back;
if (in->r == in->g && in->g == in->b)
out->r = out->g = out->b = ilineara_g22(in->g, in->a);
else
out->r = out->g = out->b = u16d(in->a * 257 *
YfromRGB(g22_to_d[in->r], g22_to_d[in->g], g22_to_d[in->b]));
out->a = 257 * in->a;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,542
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ipgre_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info)
{
/* All the routers (except for Linux) return only
8 bytes of packet payload. It means, that precise relaying of
ICMP in the real Internet is absolutely infeasible.
Moreover, Cisco "wise men" put GRE key to the third word
in GRE header. It makes impossible maintaining even soft state for keyed
GRE tunnels with enabled checksum. Tell them "thank you".
Well, I wonder, rfc1812 was written by Cisco employee,
what the hell these idiots break standrads established
by themself???
*/
struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *)skb->data;
__be16 *p = (__be16*)(skb->data+(iph->ihl<<2));
int grehlen = (iph->ihl<<2) + 4;
const int type = icmp_hdr(skb)->type;
const int code = icmp_hdr(skb)->code;
struct ip_tunnel *t;
__be16 flags;
flags = p[0];
if (flags&(GRE_CSUM|GRE_KEY|GRE_SEQ|GRE_ROUTING|GRE_VERSION)) {
if (flags&(GRE_VERSION|GRE_ROUTING))
return;
if (flags&GRE_KEY) {
grehlen += 4;
if (flags&GRE_CSUM)
grehlen += 4;
}
}
/* If only 8 bytes returned, keyed message will be dropped here */
if (skb_headlen(skb) < grehlen)
return;
switch (type) {
default:
case ICMP_PARAMETERPROB:
return;
case ICMP_DEST_UNREACH:
switch (code) {
case ICMP_SR_FAILED:
case ICMP_PORT_UNREACH:
/* Impossible event. */
return;
case ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED:
/* Soft state for pmtu is maintained by IP core. */
return;
default:
/* All others are translated to HOST_UNREACH.
rfc2003 contains "deep thoughts" about NET_UNREACH,
I believe they are just ether pollution. --ANK
*/
break;
}
break;
case ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED:
if (code != ICMP_EXC_TTL)
return;
break;
}
rcu_read_lock();
t = ipgre_tunnel_lookup(skb->dev, iph->daddr, iph->saddr,
flags & GRE_KEY ?
*(((__be32 *)p) + (grehlen / 4) - 1) : 0,
p[1]);
if (t == NULL || t->parms.iph.daddr == 0 ||
ipv4_is_multicast(t->parms.iph.daddr))
goto out;
if (t->parms.iph.ttl == 0 && type == ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED)
goto out;
if (time_before(jiffies, t->err_time + IPTUNNEL_ERR_TIMEO))
t->err_count++;
else
t->err_count = 1;
t->err_time = jiffies;
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
return;
}
Commit Message: gre: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().
This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned long kvm_read_tr_base(void)
{
u16 tr;
asm("str %0" : "=g"(tr));
return segment_base(tr);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 12,571
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ftp_retrieve_list (struct url *u, struct fileinfo *f, ccon *con)
{
static int depth = 0;
uerr_t err;
struct fileinfo *orig;
wgint local_size;
time_t tml;
bool dlthis; /* Download this (file). */
const char *actual_target = NULL;
bool force_full_retrieve = false;
/* Increase the depth. */
++depth;
if (opt.reclevel != INFINITE_RECURSION && depth > opt.reclevel)
{
DEBUGP ((_("Recursion depth %d exceeded max. depth %d.\n"),
depth, opt.reclevel));
--depth;
return RECLEVELEXC;
}
assert (f != NULL);
orig = f;
con->st &= ~ON_YOUR_OWN;
if (!(con->st & DONE_CWD))
con->cmd |= DO_CWD;
else
con->cmd &= ~DO_CWD;
con->cmd |= (DO_RETR | LEAVE_PENDING);
if (con->csock < 0)
con->cmd |= DO_LOGIN;
else
con->cmd &= ~DO_LOGIN;
err = RETROK; /* in case it's not used */
while (f)
{
char *old_target, *ofile;
if (opt.quota && total_downloaded_bytes > opt.quota)
{
--depth;
return QUOTEXC;
}
old_target = con->target;
ofile = xstrdup (u->file);
url_set_file (u, f->name);
con->target = url_file_name (u, NULL);
err = RETROK;
dlthis = true;
if (opt.timestamping && f->type == FT_PLAINFILE)
{
struct_stat st;
/* If conversion of HTML files retrieved via FTP is ever implemented,
we'll need to stat() <file>.orig here when -K has been specified.
I'm not implementing it now since files on an FTP server are much
more likely than files on an HTTP server to legitimately have a
.orig suffix. */
if (!stat (con->target, &st))
{
bool eq_size;
bool cor_val;
/* Else, get it from the file. */
local_size = st.st_size;
tml = st.st_mtime;
#ifdef WINDOWS
/* Modification time granularity is 2 seconds for Windows, so
increase local time by 1 second for later comparison. */
tml++;
#endif
/* Compare file sizes only for servers that tell us correct
values. Assume sizes being equal for servers that lie
about file size. */
cor_val = (con->rs == ST_UNIX || con->rs == ST_WINNT);
eq_size = cor_val ? (local_size == f->size) : true;
if (f->tstamp <= tml && eq_size)
{
/* Remote file is older, file sizes can be compared and
are both equal. */
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\
Remote file no newer than local file %s -- not retrieving.\n"), quote (con->target));
dlthis = false;
}
else if (f->tstamp > tml)
{
/* Remote file is newer */
force_full_retrieve = true;
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\
Remote file is newer than local file %s -- retrieving.\n\n"),
quote (con->target));
}
else
{
/* Sizes do not match */
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\
The sizes do not match (local %s) -- retrieving.\n\n"),
number_to_static_string (local_size));
}
}
} /* opt.timestamping && f->type == FT_PLAINFILE */
switch (f->type)
{
case FT_SYMLINK:
/* If opt.retr_symlinks is defined, we treat symlinks as
if they were normal files. There is currently no way
to distinguish whether they might be directories, and
follow them. */
if (!opt.retr_symlinks)
{
#ifdef HAVE_SYMLINK
if (!f->linkto)
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Invalid name of the symlink, skipping.\n"));
else
{
struct_stat st;
/* Check whether we already have the correct
symbolic link. */
int rc = lstat (con->target, &st);
if (rc == 0)
{
size_t len = strlen (f->linkto) + 1;
if (S_ISLNK (st.st_mode))
{
char *link_target = (char *)alloca (len);
size_t n = readlink (con->target, link_target, len);
if ((n == len - 1)
&& (memcmp (link_target, f->linkto, n) == 0))
{
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\
Already have correct symlink %s -> %s\n\n"),
quote (con->target),
quote (f->linkto));
dlthis = false;
break;
}
}
}
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Creating symlink %s -> %s\n"),
quote (con->target), quote (f->linkto));
/* Unlink before creating symlink! */
unlink (con->target);
if (symlink (f->linkto, con->target) == -1)
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "symlink: %s\n", strerror (errno));
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
} /* have f->linkto */
#else /* not HAVE_SYMLINK */
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Symlinks not supported, skipping symlink %s.\n"),
quote (con->target));
#endif /* not HAVE_SYMLINK */
}
else /* opt.retr_symlinks */
{
if (dlthis)
err = ftp_loop_internal (u, f, con, NULL, force_full_retrieve);
} /* opt.retr_symlinks */
break;
case FT_DIRECTORY:
if (!opt.recursive)
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Skipping directory %s.\n"),
quote (f->name));
break;
case FT_PLAINFILE:
/* Call the retrieve loop. */
if (dlthis)
err = ftp_loop_internal (u, f, con, NULL, force_full_retrieve);
break;
case FT_UNKNOWN:
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("%s: unknown/unsupported file type.\n"),
quote (f->name));
break;
} /* switch */
/* 2004-12-15 SMS.
* Set permissions _before_ setting the times, as setting the
* permissions changes the modified-time, at least on VMS.
* Also, use the opt.output_document name here, too, as
* appropriate. (Do the test once, and save the result.)
*/
set_local_file (&actual_target, con->target);
/* If downloading a plain file, and the user requested it, then
set valid (non-zero) permissions. */
if (dlthis && (actual_target != NULL) &&
(f->type == FT_PLAINFILE) && opt.preserve_perm)
{
if (f->perms)
chmod (actual_target, f->perms);
else
DEBUGP (("Unrecognized permissions for %s.\n", actual_target));
}
/* Set the time-stamp information to the local file. Symlinks
are not to be stamped because it sets the stamp on the
original. :( */
if (actual_target != NULL)
{
if (opt.useservertimestamps
&& !(f->type == FT_SYMLINK && !opt.retr_symlinks)
&& f->tstamp != -1
&& dlthis
&& file_exists_p (con->target))
{
touch (actual_target, f->tstamp);
}
else if (f->tstamp == -1)
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("%s: corrupt time-stamp.\n"),
actual_target);
}
xfree (con->target);
con->target = old_target;
url_set_file (u, ofile);
xfree (ofile);
/* Break on fatals. */
if (err == QUOTEXC || err == HOSTERR || err == FWRITEERR
|| err == WARC_ERR || err == WARC_TMP_FOPENERR
|| err == WARC_TMP_FWRITEERR)
break;
con->cmd &= ~ (DO_CWD | DO_LOGIN);
f = f->next;
}
/* We do not want to call ftp_retrieve_dirs here */
if (opt.recursive &&
!(opt.reclevel != INFINITE_RECURSION && depth >= opt.reclevel))
err = ftp_retrieve_dirs (u, orig, con);
else if (opt.recursive)
DEBUGP ((_("Will not retrieve dirs since depth is %d (max %d).\n"),
depth, opt.reclevel));
--depth;
return err;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 20,856
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void conditionalOrLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, imp->conditionalOrLongAttribute());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 15,362
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType MaskPixelCacheNexus(Image *image,NexusInfo *nexus_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheInfo
*restrict cache_info;
MagickPixelPacket
alpha,
beta;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
NexusInfo
**restrict clip_nexus,
**restrict image_nexus;
register const PixelPacket
*restrict r;
register IndexPacket
*restrict nexus_indexes,
*restrict indexes;
register PixelPacket
*restrict p,
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
i;
/*
Apply clip mask.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if ((image->mask == (Image *) NULL) ||
(image->storage_class == PseudoClass))
return(MagickTrue);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
if (cache_info == (Cache) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
image_nexus=AcquirePixelCacheNexus(1);
clip_nexus=AcquirePixelCacheNexus(1);
if ((image_nexus == (NexusInfo **) NULL) ||
(clip_nexus == (NexusInfo **) NULL))
ThrowBinaryException(CacheError,"UnableToGetCacheNexus",image->filename);
p=GetAuthenticPixelCacheNexus(image,nexus_info->region.x,
nexus_info->region.y,nexus_info->region.width,nexus_info->region.height,
image_nexus[0],exception);
indexes=image_nexus[0]->indexes;
q=nexus_info->pixels;
nexus_indexes=nexus_info->indexes;
r=GetVirtualPixelsFromNexus(image->mask,MaskVirtualPixelMethod,
nexus_info->region.x,nexus_info->region.y,nexus_info->region.width,
nexus_info->region.height,clip_nexus[0],&image->exception);
GetMagickPixelPacket(image,&alpha);
GetMagickPixelPacket(image,&beta);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) nexus_info->region.width*
nexus_info->region.height;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_pixels; i++)
{
if ((p == (PixelPacket *) NULL) || (r == (const PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
SetMagickPixelPacket(image,p,indexes+i,&alpha);
SetMagickPixelPacket(image,q,nexus_indexes+i,&beta);
MagickPixelCompositeMask(&beta,GetPixelIntensity(image,r),&alpha,
alpha.opacity,&beta);
SetPixelRed(q,ClampToQuantum(beta.red));
SetPixelGreen(q,ClampToQuantum(beta.green));
SetPixelBlue(q,ClampToQuantum(beta.blue));
SetPixelOpacity(q,ClampToQuantum(beta.opacity));
if (cache_info->active_index_channel != MagickFalse)
SetPixelIndex(nexus_indexes+i,GetPixelIndex(indexes+i));
p++;
q++;
r++;
}
clip_nexus=DestroyPixelCacheNexus(clip_nexus,1);
image_nexus=DestroyPixelCacheNexus(image_nexus,1);
if (i < (ssize_t) number_pixels)
return(MagickFalse);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,815
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: match_at(regex_t* reg, const UChar* str, const UChar* end,
#ifdef USE_MATCH_RANGE_MUST_BE_INSIDE_OF_SPECIFIED_RANGE
const UChar* right_range,
#endif
const UChar* sstart, UChar* sprev, OnigMatchArg* msa)
{
static UChar FinishCode[] = { OP_FINISH };
int i, n, num_mem, best_len, pop_level;
LengthType tlen, tlen2;
MemNumType mem;
RelAddrType addr;
UChar *s, *q, *sbegin;
int is_alloca;
char *alloc_base;
OnigStackType *stk_base, *stk, *stk_end;
OnigStackType *stkp; /* used as any purpose. */
OnigStackIndex si;
OnigStackIndex *repeat_stk;
OnigStackIndex *mem_start_stk, *mem_end_stk;
#ifdef USE_COMBINATION_EXPLOSION_CHECK
int scv;
unsigned char* state_check_buff = msa->state_check_buff;
int num_comb_exp_check = reg->num_comb_exp_check;
#endif
UChar *p = reg->p;
OnigOptionType option = reg->options;
OnigEncoding encode = reg->enc;
OnigCaseFoldType case_fold_flag = reg->case_fold_flag;
pop_level = reg->stack_pop_level;
num_mem = reg->num_mem;
STACK_INIT(INIT_MATCH_STACK_SIZE);
UPDATE_FOR_STACK_REALLOC;
for (i = 1; i <= num_mem; i++) {
mem_start_stk[i] = mem_end_stk[i] = INVALID_STACK_INDEX;
}
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG_MATCH
fprintf(stderr, "match_at: str: %d, end: %d, start: %d, sprev: %d\n",
(int )str, (int )end, (int )sstart, (int )sprev);
fprintf(stderr, "size: %d, start offset: %d\n",
(int )(end - str), (int )(sstart - str));
#endif
STACK_PUSH_ENSURED(STK_ALT, FinishCode); /* bottom stack */
best_len = ONIG_MISMATCH;
s = (UChar* )sstart;
while (1) {
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG_MATCH
{
UChar *q, *bp, buf[50];
int len;
fprintf(stderr, "%4d> \"", (int )(s - str));
bp = buf;
for (i = 0, q = s; i < 7 && q < end; i++) {
len = enclen(encode, q);
while (len-- > 0) *bp++ = *q++;
}
if (q < end) { xmemcpy(bp, "...\"", 4); bp += 4; }
else { xmemcpy(bp, "\"", 1); bp += 1; }
*bp = 0;
fputs((char* )buf, stderr);
for (i = 0; i < 20 - (bp - buf); i++) fputc(' ', stderr);
onig_print_compiled_byte_code(stderr, p, NULL, encode);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
#endif
sbegin = s;
switch (*p++) {
case OP_END: MOP_IN(OP_END);
n = s - sstart;
if (n > best_len) {
OnigRegion* region;
#ifdef USE_FIND_LONGEST_SEARCH_ALL_OF_RANGE
if (IS_FIND_LONGEST(option)) {
if (n > msa->best_len) {
msa->best_len = n;
msa->best_s = (UChar* )sstart;
}
else
goto end_best_len;
}
#endif
best_len = n;
region = msa->region;
if (region) {
#ifdef USE_POSIX_API_REGION_OPTION
if (IS_POSIX_REGION(msa->options)) {
posix_regmatch_t* rmt = (posix_regmatch_t* )region;
rmt[0].rm_so = sstart - str;
rmt[0].rm_eo = s - str;
for (i = 1; i <= num_mem; i++) {
if (mem_end_stk[i] != INVALID_STACK_INDEX) {
if (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_start, i))
rmt[i].rm_so = STACK_AT(mem_start_stk[i])->u.mem.pstr - str;
else
rmt[i].rm_so = (UChar* )((void* )(mem_start_stk[i])) - str;
rmt[i].rm_eo = (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_end, i)
? STACK_AT(mem_end_stk[i])->u.mem.pstr
: (UChar* )((void* )mem_end_stk[i])) - str;
}
else {
rmt[i].rm_so = rmt[i].rm_eo = ONIG_REGION_NOTPOS;
}
}
}
else {
#endif /* USE_POSIX_API_REGION_OPTION */
region->beg[0] = sstart - str;
region->end[0] = s - str;
for (i = 1; i <= num_mem; i++) {
if (mem_end_stk[i] != INVALID_STACK_INDEX) {
if (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_start, i))
region->beg[i] = STACK_AT(mem_start_stk[i])->u.mem.pstr - str;
else
region->beg[i] = (UChar* )((void* )mem_start_stk[i]) - str;
region->end[i] = (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_end, i)
? STACK_AT(mem_end_stk[i])->u.mem.pstr
: (UChar* )((void* )mem_end_stk[i])) - str;
}
else {
region->beg[i] = region->end[i] = ONIG_REGION_NOTPOS;
}
}
#ifdef USE_CAPTURE_HISTORY
if (reg->capture_history != 0) {
int r;
OnigCaptureTreeNode* node;
if (IS_NULL(region->history_root)) {
region->history_root = node = history_node_new();
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(node);
}
else {
node = region->history_root;
history_tree_clear(node);
}
node->group = 0;
node->beg = sstart - str;
node->end = s - str;
stkp = stk_base;
r = make_capture_history_tree(region->history_root, &stkp,
stk, (UChar* )str, reg);
if (r < 0) {
best_len = r; /* error code */
goto finish;
}
}
#endif /* USE_CAPTURE_HISTORY */
#ifdef USE_POSIX_API_REGION_OPTION
} /* else IS_POSIX_REGION() */
#endif
} /* if (region) */
} /* n > best_len */
#ifdef USE_FIND_LONGEST_SEARCH_ALL_OF_RANGE
end_best_len:
#endif
MOP_OUT;
if (IS_FIND_CONDITION(option)) {
if (IS_FIND_NOT_EMPTY(option) && s == sstart) {
best_len = ONIG_MISMATCH;
goto fail; /* for retry */
}
if (IS_FIND_LONGEST(option) && DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
goto fail; /* for retry */
}
}
/* default behavior: return first-matching result. */
goto finish;
break;
case OP_EXACT1: MOP_IN(OP_EXACT1);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_EXACT1_IC: MOP_IN(OP_EXACT1_IC);
{
int len;
UChar *q, lowbuf[ONIGENC_MBC_CASE_FOLD_MAXLEN];
DATA_ENSURE(1);
len = ONIGENC_MBC_CASE_FOLD(encode,
/* DISABLE_CASE_FOLD_MULTI_CHAR(case_fold_flag), */
case_fold_flag,
&s, end, lowbuf);
DATA_ENSURE(0);
q = lowbuf;
while (len-- > 0) {
if (*p != *q) {
goto fail;
}
p++; q++;
}
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_EXACT2: MOP_IN(OP_EXACT2);
DATA_ENSURE(2);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
sprev = s;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACT3: MOP_IN(OP_EXACT3);
DATA_ENSURE(3);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
sprev = s;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACT4: MOP_IN(OP_EXACT4);
DATA_ENSURE(4);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
sprev = s;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACT5: MOP_IN(OP_EXACT5);
DATA_ENSURE(5);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
sprev = s;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACTN: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTN);
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
DATA_ENSURE(tlen);
while (tlen-- > 0) {
if (*p++ != *s++) goto fail;
}
sprev = s - 1;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACTN_IC: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTN_IC);
{
int len;
UChar *q, *endp, lowbuf[ONIGENC_MBC_CASE_FOLD_MAXLEN];
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
endp = p + tlen;
while (p < endp) {
sprev = s;
DATA_ENSURE(1);
len = ONIGENC_MBC_CASE_FOLD(encode,
/* DISABLE_CASE_FOLD_MULTI_CHAR(case_fold_flag), */
case_fold_flag,
&s, end, lowbuf);
DATA_ENSURE(0);
q = lowbuf;
while (len-- > 0) {
if (*p != *q) goto fail;
p++; q++;
}
}
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACTMB2N1: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTMB2N1);
DATA_ENSURE(2);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_EXACTMB2N2: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTMB2N2);
DATA_ENSURE(4);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
sprev = s;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACTMB2N3: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTMB2N3);
DATA_ENSURE(6);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
sprev = s;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACTMB2N: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTMB2N);
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
DATA_ENSURE(tlen * 2);
while (tlen-- > 0) {
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
}
sprev = s - 2;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACTMB3N: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTMB3N);
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
DATA_ENSURE(tlen * 3);
while (tlen-- > 0) {
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
}
sprev = s - 3;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACTMBN: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTMBN);
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p); /* mb-len */
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen2, p); /* string len */
tlen2 *= tlen;
DATA_ENSURE(tlen2);
while (tlen2-- > 0) {
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
}
sprev = s - tlen;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_CCLASS: MOP_IN(OP_CCLASS);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (BITSET_AT(((BitSetRef )p), *s) == 0) goto fail;
p += SIZE_BITSET;
s += enclen(encode, s); /* OP_CCLASS can match mb-code. \D, \S */
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_CCLASS_MB: MOP_IN(OP_CCLASS_MB);
if (! ONIGENC_IS_MBC_HEAD(encode, s)) goto fail;
cclass_mb:
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
{
OnigCodePoint code;
UChar *ss;
int mb_len;
DATA_ENSURE(1);
mb_len = enclen(encode, s);
DATA_ENSURE(mb_len);
ss = s;
s += mb_len;
code = ONIGENC_MBC_TO_CODE(encode, ss, s);
#ifdef PLATFORM_UNALIGNED_WORD_ACCESS
if (! onig_is_in_code_range(p, code)) goto fail;
#else
q = p;
ALIGNMENT_RIGHT(q);
if (! onig_is_in_code_range(q, code)) goto fail;
#endif
}
p += tlen;
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_CCLASS_MIX: MOP_IN(OP_CCLASS_MIX);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_HEAD(encode, s)) {
p += SIZE_BITSET;
goto cclass_mb;
}
else {
if (BITSET_AT(((BitSetRef )p), *s) == 0)
goto fail;
p += SIZE_BITSET;
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
p += tlen;
s++;
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_CCLASS_NOT: MOP_IN(OP_CCLASS_NOT);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (BITSET_AT(((BitSetRef )p), *s) != 0) goto fail;
p += SIZE_BITSET;
s += enclen(encode, s);
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_CCLASS_MB_NOT: MOP_IN(OP_CCLASS_MB_NOT);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (! ONIGENC_IS_MBC_HEAD(encode, s)) {
s++;
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
p += tlen;
goto cc_mb_not_success;
}
cclass_mb_not:
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
{
OnigCodePoint code;
UChar *ss;
int mb_len = enclen(encode, s);
if (! DATA_ENSURE_CHECK(mb_len)) {
DATA_ENSURE(1);
s = (UChar* )end;
p += tlen;
goto cc_mb_not_success;
}
ss = s;
s += mb_len;
code = ONIGENC_MBC_TO_CODE(encode, ss, s);
#ifdef PLATFORM_UNALIGNED_WORD_ACCESS
if (onig_is_in_code_range(p, code)) goto fail;
#else
q = p;
ALIGNMENT_RIGHT(q);
if (onig_is_in_code_range(q, code)) goto fail;
#endif
}
p += tlen;
cc_mb_not_success:
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_CCLASS_MIX_NOT: MOP_IN(OP_CCLASS_MIX_NOT);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_HEAD(encode, s)) {
p += SIZE_BITSET;
goto cclass_mb_not;
}
else {
if (BITSET_AT(((BitSetRef )p), *s) != 0)
goto fail;
p += SIZE_BITSET;
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
p += tlen;
s++;
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_CCLASS_NODE: MOP_IN(OP_CCLASS_NODE);
{
OnigCodePoint code;
void *node;
int mb_len;
UChar *ss;
DATA_ENSURE(1);
GET_POINTER_INC(node, p);
mb_len = enclen(encode, s);
ss = s;
s += mb_len;
DATA_ENSURE(0);
code = ONIGENC_MBC_TO_CODE(encode, ss, s);
if (onig_is_code_in_cc_len(mb_len, code, node) == 0) goto fail;
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_ANYCHAR: MOP_IN(OP_ANYCHAR);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
n = enclen(encode, s);
DATA_ENSURE(n);
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, s, end)) goto fail;
s += n;
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_ANYCHAR_ML: MOP_IN(OP_ANYCHAR_ML);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
n = enclen(encode, s);
DATA_ENSURE(n);
s += n;
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_ANYCHAR_STAR: MOP_IN(OP_ANYCHAR_STAR);
while (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p, s, sprev);
n = enclen(encode, s);
DATA_ENSURE(n);
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, s, end)) goto fail;
sprev = s;
s += n;
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_ANYCHAR_ML_STAR: MOP_IN(OP_ANYCHAR_ML_STAR);
while (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p, s, sprev);
n = enclen(encode, s);
if (n > 1) {
DATA_ENSURE(n);
sprev = s;
s += n;
}
else {
sprev = s;
s++;
}
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_ANYCHAR_STAR_PEEK_NEXT: MOP_IN(OP_ANYCHAR_STAR_PEEK_NEXT);
while (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
if (*p == *s) {
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p + 1, s, sprev);
}
n = enclen(encode, s);
DATA_ENSURE(n);
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, s, end)) goto fail;
sprev = s;
s += n;
}
p++;
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_ANYCHAR_ML_STAR_PEEK_NEXT:MOP_IN(OP_ANYCHAR_ML_STAR_PEEK_NEXT);
while (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
if (*p == *s) {
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p + 1, s, sprev);
}
n = enclen(encode, s);
if (n > 1) {
DATA_ENSURE(n);
sprev = s;
s += n;
}
else {
sprev = s;
s++;
}
}
p++;
MOP_OUT;
break;
#ifdef USE_COMBINATION_EXPLOSION_CHECK
case OP_STATE_CHECK_ANYCHAR_STAR: MOP_IN(OP_STATE_CHECK_ANYCHAR_STAR);
GET_STATE_CHECK_NUM_INC(mem, p);
while (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
STATE_CHECK_VAL(scv, mem);
if (scv) goto fail;
STACK_PUSH_ALT_WITH_STATE_CHECK(p, s, sprev, mem);
n = enclen(encode, s);
DATA_ENSURE(n);
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, s, end)) goto fail;
sprev = s;
s += n;
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_STATE_CHECK_ANYCHAR_ML_STAR:
MOP_IN(OP_STATE_CHECK_ANYCHAR_ML_STAR);
GET_STATE_CHECK_NUM_INC(mem, p);
while (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
STATE_CHECK_VAL(scv, mem);
if (scv) goto fail;
STACK_PUSH_ALT_WITH_STATE_CHECK(p, s, sprev, mem);
n = enclen(encode, s);
if (n > 1) {
DATA_ENSURE(n);
sprev = s;
s += n;
}
else {
sprev = s;
s++;
}
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
#endif /* USE_COMBINATION_EXPLOSION_CHECK */
case OP_WORD: MOP_IN(OP_WORD);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (! ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end))
goto fail;
s += enclen(encode, s);
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_NOT_WORD: MOP_IN(OP_NOT_WORD);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end))
goto fail;
s += enclen(encode, s);
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_WORD_BOUND: MOP_IN(OP_WORD_BOUND);
if (ON_STR_BEGIN(s)) {
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (! ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end))
goto fail;
}
else if (ON_STR_END(s)) {
if (! ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, sprev, end))
goto fail;
}
else {
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end)
== ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, sprev, end))
goto fail;
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_NOT_WORD_BOUND: MOP_IN(OP_NOT_WORD_BOUND);
if (ON_STR_BEGIN(s)) {
if (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1 && ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end))
goto fail;
}
else if (ON_STR_END(s)) {
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, sprev, end))
goto fail;
}
else {
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end)
!= ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, sprev, end))
goto fail;
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#ifdef USE_WORD_BEGIN_END
case OP_WORD_BEGIN: MOP_IN(OP_WORD_BEGIN);
if (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1 && ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end)) {
if (ON_STR_BEGIN(s) || !ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, sprev, end)) {
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
}
goto fail;
break;
case OP_WORD_END: MOP_IN(OP_WORD_END);
if (!ON_STR_BEGIN(s) && ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, sprev, end)) {
if (ON_STR_END(s) || !ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end)) {
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
}
goto fail;
break;
#endif
case OP_BEGIN_BUF: MOP_IN(OP_BEGIN_BUF);
if (! ON_STR_BEGIN(s)) goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_END_BUF: MOP_IN(OP_END_BUF);
if (! ON_STR_END(s)) goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_BEGIN_LINE: MOP_IN(OP_BEGIN_LINE);
if (ON_STR_BEGIN(s)) {
if (IS_NOTBOL(msa->options)) goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
else if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, sprev, end) && !ON_STR_END(s)) {
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
goto fail;
break;
case OP_END_LINE: MOP_IN(OP_END_LINE);
if (ON_STR_END(s)) {
#ifndef USE_NEWLINE_AT_END_OF_STRING_HAS_EMPTY_LINE
if (IS_EMPTY_STR || !ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, sprev, end)) {
#endif
if (IS_NOTEOL(msa->options)) goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
#ifndef USE_NEWLINE_AT_END_OF_STRING_HAS_EMPTY_LINE
}
#endif
}
else if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, s, end)) {
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
#ifdef USE_CRNL_AS_LINE_TERMINATOR
else if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_CRNL(encode, s, end)) {
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
#endif
goto fail;
break;
case OP_SEMI_END_BUF: MOP_IN(OP_SEMI_END_BUF);
if (ON_STR_END(s)) {
#ifndef USE_NEWLINE_AT_END_OF_STRING_HAS_EMPTY_LINE
if (IS_EMPTY_STR || !ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, sprev, end)) {
#endif
if (IS_NOTEOL(msa->options)) goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
#ifndef USE_NEWLINE_AT_END_OF_STRING_HAS_EMPTY_LINE
}
#endif
}
else if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, s, end) &&
ON_STR_END(s + enclen(encode, s))) {
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
#ifdef USE_CRNL_AS_LINE_TERMINATOR
else if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_CRNL(encode, s, end)) {
UChar* ss = s + enclen(encode, s);
ss += enclen(encode, ss);
if (ON_STR_END(ss)) {
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
}
#endif
goto fail;
break;
case OP_BEGIN_POSITION: MOP_IN(OP_BEGIN_POSITION);
if (s != msa->start)
goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_MEMORY_START_PUSH: MOP_IN(OP_MEMORY_START_PUSH);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
STACK_PUSH_MEM_START(mem, s);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_MEMORY_START: MOP_IN(OP_MEMORY_START);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
mem_start_stk[mem] = (OnigStackIndex )((void* )s);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_MEMORY_END_PUSH: MOP_IN(OP_MEMORY_END_PUSH);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
STACK_PUSH_MEM_END(mem, s);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_MEMORY_END: MOP_IN(OP_MEMORY_END);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
mem_end_stk[mem] = (OnigStackIndex )((void* )s);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#ifdef USE_SUBEXP_CALL
case OP_MEMORY_END_PUSH_REC: MOP_IN(OP_MEMORY_END_PUSH_REC);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
STACK_GET_MEM_START(mem, stkp); /* should be before push mem-end. */
STACK_PUSH_MEM_END(mem, s);
mem_start_stk[mem] = GET_STACK_INDEX(stkp);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_MEMORY_END_REC: MOP_IN(OP_MEMORY_END_REC);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
mem_end_stk[mem] = (OnigStackIndex )((void* )s);
STACK_GET_MEM_START(mem, stkp);
if (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_start, mem))
mem_start_stk[mem] = GET_STACK_INDEX(stkp);
else
mem_start_stk[mem] = (OnigStackIndex )((void* )stkp->u.mem.pstr);
STACK_PUSH_MEM_END_MARK(mem);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#endif
case OP_BACKREF1: MOP_IN(OP_BACKREF1);
mem = 1;
goto backref;
break;
case OP_BACKREF2: MOP_IN(OP_BACKREF2);
mem = 2;
goto backref;
break;
case OP_BACKREFN: MOP_IN(OP_BACKREFN);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
backref:
{
int len;
UChar *pstart, *pend;
/* if you want to remove following line,
you should check in parse and compile time. */
if (mem > num_mem) goto fail;
if (mem_end_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) goto fail;
if (mem_start_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) goto fail;
if (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_start, mem))
pstart = STACK_AT(mem_start_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr;
else
pstart = (UChar* )((void* )mem_start_stk[mem]);
pend = (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_end, mem)
? STACK_AT(mem_end_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr
: (UChar* )((void* )mem_end_stk[mem]));
n = pend - pstart;
DATA_ENSURE(n);
sprev = s;
STRING_CMP(pstart, s, n);
while (sprev + (len = enclen(encode, sprev)) < s)
sprev += len;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
break;
case OP_BACKREFN_IC: MOP_IN(OP_BACKREFN_IC);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
{
int len;
UChar *pstart, *pend;
/* if you want to remove following line,
you should check in parse and compile time. */
if (mem > num_mem) goto fail;
if (mem_end_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) goto fail;
if (mem_start_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) goto fail;
if (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_start, mem))
pstart = STACK_AT(mem_start_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr;
else
pstart = (UChar* )((void* )mem_start_stk[mem]);
pend = (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_end, mem)
? STACK_AT(mem_end_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr
: (UChar* )((void* )mem_end_stk[mem]));
n = pend - pstart;
DATA_ENSURE(n);
sprev = s;
STRING_CMP_IC(case_fold_flag, pstart, &s, n);
while (sprev + (len = enclen(encode, sprev)) < s)
sprev += len;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
break;
case OP_BACKREF_MULTI: MOP_IN(OP_BACKREF_MULTI);
{
int len, is_fail;
UChar *pstart, *pend, *swork;
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
if (mem_end_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) continue;
if (mem_start_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) continue;
if (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_start, mem))
pstart = STACK_AT(mem_start_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr;
else
pstart = (UChar* )((void* )mem_start_stk[mem]);
pend = (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_end, mem)
? STACK_AT(mem_end_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr
: (UChar* )((void* )mem_end_stk[mem]));
n = pend - pstart;
DATA_ENSURE(n);
sprev = s;
swork = s;
STRING_CMP_VALUE(pstart, swork, n, is_fail);
if (is_fail) continue;
s = swork;
while (sprev + (len = enclen(encode, sprev)) < s)
sprev += len;
p += (SIZE_MEMNUM * (tlen - i - 1));
break; /* success */
}
if (i == tlen) goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
break;
case OP_BACKREF_MULTI_IC: MOP_IN(OP_BACKREF_MULTI_IC);
{
int len, is_fail;
UChar *pstart, *pend, *swork;
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
if (mem_end_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) continue;
if (mem_start_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) continue;
if (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_start, mem))
pstart = STACK_AT(mem_start_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr;
else
pstart = (UChar* )((void* )mem_start_stk[mem]);
pend = (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_end, mem)
? STACK_AT(mem_end_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr
: (UChar* )((void* )mem_end_stk[mem]));
n = pend - pstart;
DATA_ENSURE(n);
sprev = s;
swork = s;
STRING_CMP_VALUE_IC(case_fold_flag, pstart, &swork, n, is_fail);
if (is_fail) continue;
s = swork;
while (sprev + (len = enclen(encode, sprev)) < s)
sprev += len;
p += (SIZE_MEMNUM * (tlen - i - 1));
break; /* success */
}
if (i == tlen) goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
break;
#ifdef USE_BACKREF_WITH_LEVEL
case OP_BACKREF_WITH_LEVEL:
{
int len;
OnigOptionType ic;
LengthType level;
GET_OPTION_INC(ic, p);
GET_LENGTH_INC(level, p);
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
sprev = s;
if (backref_match_at_nested_level(reg, stk, stk_base, ic
, case_fold_flag, (int )level, (int )tlen, p, &s, end)) {
while (sprev + (len = enclen(encode, sprev)) < s)
sprev += len;
p += (SIZE_MEMNUM * tlen);
}
else
goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
break;
#endif
#if 0 /* no need: IS_DYNAMIC_OPTION() == 0 */
case OP_SET_OPTION_PUSH: MOP_IN(OP_SET_OPTION_PUSH);
GET_OPTION_INC(option, p);
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p, s, sprev);
p += SIZE_OP_SET_OPTION + SIZE_OP_FAIL;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_SET_OPTION: MOP_IN(OP_SET_OPTION);
GET_OPTION_INC(option, p);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#endif
case OP_NULL_CHECK_START: MOP_IN(OP_NULL_CHECK_START);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: null check id */
STACK_PUSH_NULL_CHECK_START(mem, s);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_NULL_CHECK_END: MOP_IN(OP_NULL_CHECK_END);
{
int isnull;
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: null check id */
STACK_NULL_CHECK(isnull, mem, s);
if (isnull) {
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG_MATCH
fprintf(stderr, "NULL_CHECK_END: skip id:%d, s:%d\n",
(int )mem, (int )s);
#endif
null_check_found:
/* empty loop founded, skip next instruction */
switch (*p++) {
case OP_JUMP:
case OP_PUSH:
p += SIZE_RELADDR;
break;
case OP_REPEAT_INC:
case OP_REPEAT_INC_NG:
case OP_REPEAT_INC_SG:
case OP_REPEAT_INC_NG_SG:
p += SIZE_MEMNUM;
break;
default:
goto unexpected_bytecode_error;
break;
}
}
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#ifdef USE_MONOMANIAC_CHECK_CAPTURES_IN_ENDLESS_REPEAT
case OP_NULL_CHECK_END_MEMST: MOP_IN(OP_NULL_CHECK_END_MEMST);
{
int isnull;
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: null check id */
STACK_NULL_CHECK_MEMST(isnull, mem, s, reg);
if (isnull) {
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG_MATCH
fprintf(stderr, "NULL_CHECK_END_MEMST: skip id:%d, s:%d\n",
(int )mem, (int )s);
#endif
if (isnull == -1) goto fail;
goto null_check_found;
}
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_SUBEXP_CALL
case OP_NULL_CHECK_END_MEMST_PUSH:
MOP_IN(OP_NULL_CHECK_END_MEMST_PUSH);
{
int isnull;
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: null check id */
#ifdef USE_MONOMANIAC_CHECK_CAPTURES_IN_ENDLESS_REPEAT
STACK_NULL_CHECK_MEMST_REC(isnull, mem, s, reg);
#else
STACK_NULL_CHECK_REC(isnull, mem, s);
#endif
if (isnull) {
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG_MATCH
fprintf(stderr, "NULL_CHECK_END_MEMST_PUSH: skip id:%d, s:%d\n",
(int )mem, (int )s);
#endif
if (isnull == -1) goto fail;
goto null_check_found;
}
else {
STACK_PUSH_NULL_CHECK_END(mem);
}
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#endif
case OP_JUMP: MOP_IN(OP_JUMP);
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
p += addr;
MOP_OUT;
CHECK_INTERRUPT_IN_MATCH_AT;
continue;
break;
case OP_PUSH: MOP_IN(OP_PUSH);
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p + addr, s, sprev);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#ifdef USE_COMBINATION_EXPLOSION_CHECK
case OP_STATE_CHECK_PUSH: MOP_IN(OP_STATE_CHECK_PUSH);
GET_STATE_CHECK_NUM_INC(mem, p);
STATE_CHECK_VAL(scv, mem);
if (scv) goto fail;
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
STACK_PUSH_ALT_WITH_STATE_CHECK(p + addr, s, sprev, mem);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_STATE_CHECK_PUSH_OR_JUMP: MOP_IN(OP_STATE_CHECK_PUSH_OR_JUMP);
GET_STATE_CHECK_NUM_INC(mem, p);
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
STATE_CHECK_VAL(scv, mem);
if (scv) {
p += addr;
}
else {
STACK_PUSH_ALT_WITH_STATE_CHECK(p + addr, s, sprev, mem);
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_STATE_CHECK: MOP_IN(OP_STATE_CHECK);
GET_STATE_CHECK_NUM_INC(mem, p);
STATE_CHECK_VAL(scv, mem);
if (scv) goto fail;
STACK_PUSH_STATE_CHECK(s, mem);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#endif /* USE_COMBINATION_EXPLOSION_CHECK */
case OP_POP: MOP_IN(OP_POP);
STACK_POP_ONE;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_PUSH_OR_JUMP_EXACT1: MOP_IN(OP_PUSH_OR_JUMP_EXACT1);
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
if (*p == *s && DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
p++;
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p + addr, s, sprev);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
p += (addr + 1);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_PUSH_IF_PEEK_NEXT: MOP_IN(OP_PUSH_IF_PEEK_NEXT);
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
if (*p == *s) {
p++;
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p + addr, s, sprev);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
p++;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_REPEAT: MOP_IN(OP_REPEAT);
{
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: OP_REPEAT ID */
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
STACK_ENSURE(1);
repeat_stk[mem] = GET_STACK_INDEX(stk);
STACK_PUSH_REPEAT(mem, p);
if (reg->repeat_range[mem].lower == 0) {
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p + addr, s, sprev);
}
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_REPEAT_NG: MOP_IN(OP_REPEAT_NG);
{
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: OP_REPEAT ID */
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
STACK_ENSURE(1);
repeat_stk[mem] = GET_STACK_INDEX(stk);
STACK_PUSH_REPEAT(mem, p);
if (reg->repeat_range[mem].lower == 0) {
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p, s, sprev);
p += addr;
}
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_REPEAT_INC: MOP_IN(OP_REPEAT_INC);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: OP_REPEAT ID */
si = repeat_stk[mem];
stkp = STACK_AT(si);
repeat_inc:
stkp->u.repeat.count++;
if (stkp->u.repeat.count >= reg->repeat_range[mem].upper) {
/* end of repeat. Nothing to do. */
}
else if (stkp->u.repeat.count >= reg->repeat_range[mem].lower) {
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p, s, sprev);
p = STACK_AT(si)->u.repeat.pcode; /* Don't use stkp after PUSH. */
}
else {
p = stkp->u.repeat.pcode;
}
STACK_PUSH_REPEAT_INC(si);
MOP_OUT;
CHECK_INTERRUPT_IN_MATCH_AT;
continue;
break;
case OP_REPEAT_INC_SG: MOP_IN(OP_REPEAT_INC_SG);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: OP_REPEAT ID */
STACK_GET_REPEAT(mem, stkp);
si = GET_STACK_INDEX(stkp);
goto repeat_inc;
break;
case OP_REPEAT_INC_NG: MOP_IN(OP_REPEAT_INC_NG);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: OP_REPEAT ID */
si = repeat_stk[mem];
stkp = STACK_AT(si);
repeat_inc_ng:
stkp->u.repeat.count++;
if (stkp->u.repeat.count < reg->repeat_range[mem].upper) {
if (stkp->u.repeat.count >= reg->repeat_range[mem].lower) {
UChar* pcode = stkp->u.repeat.pcode;
STACK_PUSH_REPEAT_INC(si);
STACK_PUSH_ALT(pcode, s, sprev);
}
else {
p = stkp->u.repeat.pcode;
STACK_PUSH_REPEAT_INC(si);
}
}
else if (stkp->u.repeat.count == reg->repeat_range[mem].upper) {
STACK_PUSH_REPEAT_INC(si);
}
MOP_OUT;
CHECK_INTERRUPT_IN_MATCH_AT;
continue;
break;
case OP_REPEAT_INC_NG_SG: MOP_IN(OP_REPEAT_INC_NG_SG);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: OP_REPEAT ID */
STACK_GET_REPEAT(mem, stkp);
si = GET_STACK_INDEX(stkp);
goto repeat_inc_ng;
break;
case OP_PUSH_POS: MOP_IN(OP_PUSH_POS);
STACK_PUSH_POS(s, sprev);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_POP_POS: MOP_IN(OP_POP_POS);
{
STACK_POS_END(stkp);
s = stkp->u.state.pstr;
sprev = stkp->u.state.pstr_prev;
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_PUSH_POS_NOT: MOP_IN(OP_PUSH_POS_NOT);
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
STACK_PUSH_POS_NOT(p + addr, s, sprev);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_FAIL_POS: MOP_IN(OP_FAIL_POS);
STACK_POP_TIL_POS_NOT;
goto fail;
break;
case OP_PUSH_STOP_BT: MOP_IN(OP_PUSH_STOP_BT);
STACK_PUSH_STOP_BT;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_POP_STOP_BT: MOP_IN(OP_POP_STOP_BT);
STACK_STOP_BT_END;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_LOOK_BEHIND: MOP_IN(OP_LOOK_BEHIND);
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
s = (UChar* )ONIGENC_STEP_BACK(encode, str, s, (int )tlen);
if (IS_NULL(s)) goto fail;
sprev = (UChar* )onigenc_get_prev_char_head(encode, str, s);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_PUSH_LOOK_BEHIND_NOT: MOP_IN(OP_PUSH_LOOK_BEHIND_NOT);
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
q = (UChar* )ONIGENC_STEP_BACK(encode, str, s, (int )tlen);
if (IS_NULL(q)) {
/* too short case -> success. ex. /(?<!XXX)a/.match("a")
If you want to change to fail, replace following line. */
p += addr;
/* goto fail; */
}
else {
STACK_PUSH_LOOK_BEHIND_NOT(p + addr, s, sprev);
s = q;
sprev = (UChar* )onigenc_get_prev_char_head(encode, str, s);
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_FAIL_LOOK_BEHIND_NOT: MOP_IN(OP_FAIL_LOOK_BEHIND_NOT);
STACK_POP_TIL_LOOK_BEHIND_NOT;
goto fail;
break;
#ifdef USE_SUBEXP_CALL
case OP_CALL: MOP_IN(OP_CALL);
GET_ABSADDR_INC(addr, p);
STACK_PUSH_CALL_FRAME(p);
p = reg->p + addr;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_RETURN: MOP_IN(OP_RETURN);
STACK_RETURN(p);
STACK_PUSH_RETURN;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#endif
case OP_FINISH:
goto finish;
break;
fail:
MOP_OUT;
/* fall */
case OP_FAIL: MOP_IN(OP_FAIL);
STACK_POP;
p = stk->u.state.pcode;
s = stk->u.state.pstr;
sprev = stk->u.state.pstr_prev;
#ifdef USE_COMBINATION_EXPLOSION_CHECK
if (stk->u.state.state_check != 0) {
stk->type = STK_STATE_CHECK_MARK;
stk++;
}
#endif
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
default:
goto bytecode_error;
} /* end of switch */
sprev = sbegin;
} /* end of while(1) */
finish:
STACK_SAVE;
return best_len;
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG
stack_error:
STACK_SAVE;
return ONIGERR_STACK_BUG;
#endif
bytecode_error:
STACK_SAVE;
return ONIGERR_UNDEFINED_BYTECODE;
unexpected_bytecode_error:
STACK_SAVE;
return ONIGERR_UNEXPECTED_BYTECODE;
}
Commit Message: fix #59 : access to invalid address by reg->dmax value
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 20,348
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::UpdateReloadStopState(bool is_loading, bool force) {
window_->UpdateReloadStopState(is_loading, force);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_STOP, is_loading);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 25,280
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Guint JBIG2MMRDecoder::get24Bits() {
while (bufLen < 24) {
buf = (buf << 8) | (str->getChar() & 0xff);
bufLen += 8;
++nBytesRead;
}
return (buf >> (bufLen - 24)) & 0xffffff;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 7,961
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport void AcquireNextImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
/*
Allocate image structure.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
image->next=AcquireImage(image_info);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return;
(void) CopyMagickString(GetNextImageInList(image)->filename,image->filename,
MaxTextExtent);
if (image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(GetNextImageInList(image)->filename,
image_info->filename,MaxTextExtent);
DestroyBlob(GetNextImageInList(image));
image->next->blob=ReferenceBlob(image->blob);
image->next->endian=image->endian;
image->next->scene=image->scene+1;
image->next->previous=image;
}
Commit Message: Fixed incorrect call to DestroyImage reported in #491.
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 26,781
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int Equalizer_setParameter (EffectContext *pContext, void *pParam, void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int32_t preset;
int32_t band;
int32_t level;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
preset = (int32_t)(*(uint16_t *)pValue);
if ((preset >= EqualizerGetNumPresets())||(preset < 0)) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, preset);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
band = *pParamTemp;
level = (int32_t)(*(int16_t *)pValue);
if (band >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, band, level);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES: {
int16_t *p = (int16_t *)pValue;
if ((int)p[0] >= EqualizerGetNumPresets()) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (p[0] >= 0) {
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, (int)p[0]);
} else {
if ((int)p[1] != FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
for (int i = 0; i < FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS; i++) {
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, i, (int)p[2 + i]);
}
}
} break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_setParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Equalizer_setParameter */
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,908
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void send_message(struct ifsock *ifs, char *type, struct sockaddr *sa)
{
int s;
size_t i, len, note = 0;
ssize_t num;
char host[NI_MAXHOST];
char buf[MAX_PKT_SIZE];
struct sockaddr dest;
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname));
s = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&ifs->addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in), host, sizeof(host), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
if (s) {
logit(LOG_WARNING, "Failed getnameinfo(): %s", gai_strerror(s));
return;
}
if (ifs->addr.sin_addr.s_addr == htonl(INADDR_ANY))
return;
if (ifs->out == -1)
return;
if (!strcmp(type, SSDP_ST_ALL))
type = NULL;
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
if (sin)
compose_response(type, host, buf, sizeof(buf));
else
compose_notify(type, host, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (!sin) {
note = 1;
compose_addr((struct sockaddr_in *)&dest, MC_SSDP_GROUP, MC_SSDP_PORT);
sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&dest;
}
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "Sending %s from %s ...", !note ? "reply" : "notify", host);
num = sendto(ifs->out, buf, strlen(buf), 0, sin, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
if (num < 0)
logit(LOG_WARNING, "Failed sending SSDP %s, type: %s: %s", !note ? "reply" : "notify", type, strerror(errno));
}
Commit Message: Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <troglobit@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,036
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: kadm5_chpass_principal(void *server_handle,
krb5_principal principal, char *password)
{
return
kadm5_chpass_principal_3(server_handle, principal, FALSE,
0, NULL, password);
}
Commit Message: Null pointer deref in kadmind [CVE-2012-1013]
The fix for #6626 could cause kadmind to dereference a null pointer if
a create-principal request contains no password but does contain the
KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX flag (e.g. "addprinc -randkey -allow_tix
name"). Only clients authorized to create principals can trigger the
bug. Fix the bug by testing for a null password in check_1_6_dummy.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: Minor style change and commit message]
ticket: 7152
target_version: 1.10.2
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,687
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dbus_send_reload_signal(void)
{
gchar *path;
if (global_connection == NULL)
return;
path = dbus_object_create_path_vrrp();
dbus_emit_signal(global_connection, path, DBUS_VRRP_INTERFACE, "VrrpReloaded", NULL);
g_free(path);
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 2,728
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rtnl_newlink(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void *arg)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
const struct rtnl_link_ops *ops;
struct net_device *dev;
struct ifinfomsg *ifm;
char kind[MODULE_NAME_LEN];
char ifname[IFNAMSIZ];
struct nlattr *tb[IFLA_MAX+1];
struct nlattr *linkinfo[IFLA_INFO_MAX+1];
int err;
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
replay:
#endif
err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(*ifm), tb, IFLA_MAX, ifla_policy);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (tb[IFLA_IFNAME])
nla_strlcpy(ifname, tb[IFLA_IFNAME], IFNAMSIZ);
else
ifname[0] = '\0';
ifm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
if (ifm->ifi_index > 0)
dev = __dev_get_by_index(net, ifm->ifi_index);
else {
if (ifname[0])
dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifname);
else
dev = NULL;
}
err = validate_linkmsg(dev, tb);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (tb[IFLA_LINKINFO]) {
err = nla_parse_nested(linkinfo, IFLA_INFO_MAX,
tb[IFLA_LINKINFO], ifla_info_policy);
if (err < 0)
return err;
} else
memset(linkinfo, 0, sizeof(linkinfo));
if (linkinfo[IFLA_INFO_KIND]) {
nla_strlcpy(kind, linkinfo[IFLA_INFO_KIND], sizeof(kind));
ops = rtnl_link_ops_get(kind);
} else {
kind[0] = '\0';
ops = NULL;
}
if (1) {
struct nlattr *attr[ops ? ops->maxtype + 1 : 0], **data = NULL;
struct net *dest_net;
if (ops) {
if (ops->maxtype && linkinfo[IFLA_INFO_DATA]) {
err = nla_parse_nested(attr, ops->maxtype,
linkinfo[IFLA_INFO_DATA],
ops->policy);
if (err < 0)
return err;
data = attr;
}
if (ops->validate) {
err = ops->validate(tb, data);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
}
if (dev) {
int modified = 0;
if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_EXCL)
return -EEXIST;
if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REPLACE)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (linkinfo[IFLA_INFO_DATA]) {
if (!ops || ops != dev->rtnl_link_ops ||
!ops->changelink)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
err = ops->changelink(dev, tb, data);
if (err < 0)
return err;
modified = 1;
}
return do_setlink(dev, ifm, tb, ifname, modified);
}
if (!(nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_CREATE)) {
if (ifm->ifi_index == 0 && tb[IFLA_GROUP])
return rtnl_group_changelink(net,
nla_get_u32(tb[IFLA_GROUP]),
ifm, tb);
return -ENODEV;
}
if (tb[IFLA_MAP] || tb[IFLA_MASTER] || tb[IFLA_PROTINFO])
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!ops) {
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
if (kind[0]) {
__rtnl_unlock();
request_module("rtnl-link-%s", kind);
rtnl_lock();
ops = rtnl_link_ops_get(kind);
if (ops)
goto replay;
}
#endif
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
if (!ifname[0])
snprintf(ifname, IFNAMSIZ, "%s%%d", ops->kind);
dest_net = rtnl_link_get_net(net, tb);
if (IS_ERR(dest_net))
return PTR_ERR(dest_net);
dev = rtnl_create_link(dest_net, ifname, ops, tb);
if (IS_ERR(dev)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dev);
goto out;
}
dev->ifindex = ifm->ifi_index;
if (ops->newlink)
err = ops->newlink(net, dev, tb, data);
else
err = register_netdevice(dev);
if (err < 0 && !IS_ERR(dev))
free_netdev(dev);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
err = rtnl_configure_link(dev, ifm);
if (err < 0)
unregister_netdevice(dev);
out:
put_net(dest_net);
return err;
}
}
Commit Message: rtnl: fix info leak on RTM_GETLINK request for VF devices
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 1,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rend_service_receive_introduction(origin_circuit_t *circuit,
const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len)
{
/* Global status stuff */
int status = 0, result;
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
char *err_msg = NULL;
int err_msg_severity = LOG_WARN;
const char *stage_descr = NULL, *rend_pk_digest;
int reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
/* Service/circuit/key stuff we can learn before parsing */
char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
rend_service_t *service = NULL;
rend_intro_point_t *intro_point = NULL;
crypto_pk_t *intro_key = NULL;
/* Parsed cell */
rend_intro_cell_t *parsed_req = NULL;
/* Rendezvous point */
extend_info_t *rp = NULL;
/* XXX not handled yet */
char buf[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
char keys[DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN]; /* Holds KH, Df, Db, Kf, Kb */
int i;
crypto_dh_t *dh = NULL;
origin_circuit_t *launched = NULL;
crypt_path_t *cpath = NULL;
char hexcookie[9];
int circ_needs_uptime;
time_t now = time(NULL);
time_t elapsed;
int replay;
/* Do some initial validation and logging before we parse the cell */
if (circuit->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
"Got an INTRODUCE2 over a non-introduction circuit %u.",
(unsigned) circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
goto err;
}
assert_circ_anonymity_ok(circuit, options);
tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
/* XXX: This is version 2 specific (only one supported). */
rend_pk_digest = (char *) rend_data_get_pk_digest(circuit->rend_data, NULL);
/* We'll use this in a bazillion log messages */
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
/* look up service depending on circuit. */
service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(rend_pk_digest);
if (!service) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,
"Internal error: Got an INTRODUCE2 cell on an intro "
"circ for an unrecognized service %s.",
escaped(serviceid));
goto err;
}
intro_point = find_intro_point(circuit);
if (intro_point == NULL) {
intro_point = find_expiring_intro_point(service, circuit);
if (intro_point == NULL) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,
"Internal error: Got an INTRODUCE2 cell on an "
"intro circ (for service %s) with no corresponding "
"rend_intro_point_t.",
escaped(serviceid));
goto err;
}
}
log_info(LD_REND, "Received INTRODUCE2 cell for service %s on circ %u.",
escaped(serviceid), (unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
/* use intro key instead of service key. */
intro_key = circuit->intro_key;
tor_free(err_msg);
stage_descr = NULL;
stage_descr = "early parsing";
/* Early parsing pass (get pk, ciphertext); type 2 is INTRODUCE2 */
parsed_req =
rend_service_begin_parse_intro(request, request_len, 2, &err_msg);
if (!parsed_req) {
goto log_error;
} else if (err_msg) {
log_info(LD_REND, "%s on circ %u.", err_msg,
(unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
tor_free(err_msg);
}
/* make sure service replay caches are present */
if (!service->accepted_intro_dh_parts) {
service->accepted_intro_dh_parts =
replaycache_new(REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL,
REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL);
}
if (!intro_point->accepted_intro_rsa_parts) {
intro_point->accepted_intro_rsa_parts = replaycache_new(0, 0);
}
/* check for replay of PK-encrypted portion. */
replay = replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed(
intro_point->accepted_intro_rsa_parts,
parsed_req->ciphertext, parsed_req->ciphertext_len,
&elapsed);
if (replay) {
log_warn(LD_REND,
"Possible replay detected! We received an "
"INTRODUCE2 cell with same PK-encrypted part %d "
"seconds ago. Dropping cell.",
(int)elapsed);
goto err;
}
stage_descr = "decryption";
/* Now try to decrypt it */
result = rend_service_decrypt_intro(parsed_req, intro_key, &err_msg);
if (result < 0) {
goto log_error;
} else if (err_msg) {
log_info(LD_REND, "%s on circ %u.", err_msg,
(unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
tor_free(err_msg);
}
stage_descr = "late parsing";
/* Parse the plaintext */
result = rend_service_parse_intro_plaintext(parsed_req, &err_msg);
if (result < 0) {
goto log_error;
} else if (err_msg) {
log_info(LD_REND, "%s on circ %u.", err_msg,
(unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
tor_free(err_msg);
}
stage_descr = "late validation";
/* Validate the parsed plaintext parts */
result = rend_service_validate_intro_late(parsed_req, &err_msg);
if (result < 0) {
goto log_error;
} else if (err_msg) {
log_info(LD_REND, "%s on circ %u.", err_msg,
(unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
tor_free(err_msg);
}
stage_descr = NULL;
/* Increment INTRODUCE2 counter */
++(intro_point->accepted_introduce2_count);
/* Find the rendezvous point */
rp = find_rp_for_intro(parsed_req, &err_msg);
if (!rp) {
err_msg_severity = LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN;
goto log_error;
}
/* Check if we'd refuse to talk to this router */
if (options->StrictNodes &&
routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, rp)) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Client asked to rendezvous at a relay that we "
"exclude, and StrictNodes is set. Refusing service.");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; /* XXX might leak why we refused */
goto err;
}
base16_encode(hexcookie, 9, (const char *)(parsed_req->rc), 4);
/* Check whether there is a past request with the same Diffie-Hellman,
* part 1. */
replay = replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed(
service->accepted_intro_dh_parts,
parsed_req->dh, DH_KEY_LEN,
&elapsed);
if (replay) {
/* A Tor client will send a new INTRODUCE1 cell with the same rend
* cookie and DH public key as its previous one if its intro circ
* times out while in state CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT .
* If we received the first INTRODUCE1 cell (the intro-point relay
* converts it into an INTRODUCE2 cell), we are already trying to
* connect to that rend point (and may have already succeeded);
* drop this cell. */
log_info(LD_REND, "We received an "
"INTRODUCE2 cell with same first part of "
"Diffie-Hellman handshake %d seconds ago. Dropping "
"cell.",
(int) elapsed);
goto err;
}
/* If the service performs client authorization, check included auth data. */
if (service->clients) {
if (parsed_req->version == 3 && parsed_req->u.v3.auth_len > 0) {
if (rend_check_authorization(service,
(const char*)parsed_req->u.v3.auth_data,
parsed_req->u.v3.auth_len)) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Authorization data in INTRODUCE2 cell are valid.");
} else {
log_info(LD_REND, "The authorization data that are contained in "
"the INTRODUCE2 cell are invalid. Dropping cell.");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED;
goto err;
}
} else {
log_info(LD_REND, "INTRODUCE2 cell does not contain authentication "
"data, but we require client authorization. Dropping cell.");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED;
goto err;
}
}
/* Try DH handshake... */
dh = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_REND);
if (!dh || crypto_dh_generate_public(dh)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Internal error: couldn't build DH state "
"or generate public key.");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
goto err;
}
if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, dh,
(char *)(parsed_req->dh),
DH_KEY_LEN, keys,
DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't complete DH handshake");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
goto err;
}
circ_needs_uptime = rend_service_requires_uptime(service);
/* help predict this next time */
rep_hist_note_used_internal(now, circ_needs_uptime, 1);
/* Launch a circuit to the client's chosen rendezvous point.
*/
for (i=0;i<MAX_REND_FAILURES;i++) {
int flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY | CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL;
if (circ_needs_uptime) flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME;
/* A Single Onion Service only uses a direct connection if its
* firewall rules permit direct connections to the address. */
if (rend_service_use_direct_connection(options, rp)) {
flags = flags | CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL;
}
launched = circuit_launch_by_extend_info(
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND, rp, flags);
if (launched)
break;
}
if (!launched) { /* give up */
log_warn(LD_REND, "Giving up launching first hop of circuit to rendezvous "
"point %s for service %s.",
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(rp)),
serviceid);
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED;
goto err;
}
log_info(LD_REND,
"Accepted intro; launching circuit to %s "
"(cookie %s) for service %s.",
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(rp)),
hexcookie, serviceid);
tor_assert(launched->build_state);
/* Fill in the circuit's state. */
launched->rend_data =
rend_data_service_create(service->service_id, rend_pk_digest,
parsed_req->rc, service->auth_type);
launched->build_state->service_pending_final_cpath_ref =
tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_reference_t));
launched->build_state->service_pending_final_cpath_ref->refcount = 1;
launched->build_state->service_pending_final_cpath_ref->cpath = cpath =
tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
cpath->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
launched->build_state->expiry_time = now + MAX_REND_TIMEOUT;
cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state = dh;
dh = NULL;
if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(cpath,keys+DIGEST_LEN,1)<0)
goto err;
memcpy(cpath->rend_circ_nonce, keys, DIGEST_LEN);
goto done;
log_error:
if (!err_msg) {
if (stage_descr) {
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
"unknown %s error for INTRODUCE2", stage_descr);
} else {
err_msg = tor_strdup("unknown error for INTRODUCE2");
}
}
log_fn(err_msg_severity, LD_REND, "%s on circ %u", err_msg,
(unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
err:
status = -1;
if (dh) crypto_dh_free(dh);
if (launched) {
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(launched), reason);
}
tor_free(err_msg);
done:
memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
memwipe(serviceid, 0, sizeof(serviceid));
memwipe(hexcookie, 0, sizeof(hexcookie));
/* Free the parsed cell */
rend_service_free_intro(parsed_req);
/* Free rp */
extend_info_free(rp);
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
CWE ID: CWE-532
| 0
| 18,749
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hns_gmac_get_strings(u32 stringset, u8 *data)
{
char *buff = (char *)data;
u32 i;
if (stringset != ETH_SS_STATS)
return;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(g_gmac_stats_string); i++) {
snprintf(buff, ETH_GSTRING_LEN, "%s",
g_gmac_stats_string[i].desc);
buff = buff + ETH_GSTRING_LEN;
}
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_gigantic_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
{
free_contig_range(page_to_pfn(page), 1 << order);
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,006
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int CopyBaseDriveSpecIfNecessary(const char* base_url,
int base_path_begin,
int base_path_end,
const CHAR* relative_url,
int path_start,
int relative_url_len,
CanonOutput* output) {
if (base_path_begin >= base_path_end)
return base_path_begin; // No path.
if (url_parse::DoesBeginWindowsDriveSpec(relative_url,
path_start, relative_url_len)) {
return base_path_begin; // Relative URL path is "C:/foo"
}
if (DoesBeginSlashWindowsDriveSpec(base_url,
base_path_begin,
base_path_end)) {
output->push_back('/');
output->push_back(base_url[base_path_begin + 1]);
output->push_back(base_url[base_path_begin + 2]);
return base_path_begin + 3;
}
return base_path_begin;
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB read when parsing protocol-relative URLs
BUG=285742
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23902014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@223735 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,991
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int emulate_popcntb_inst(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 instword)
{
u32 ra,rs;
unsigned long tmp;
ra = (instword >> 16) & 0x1f;
rs = (instword >> 21) & 0x1f;
tmp = regs->gpr[rs];
tmp = tmp - ((tmp >> 1) & 0x5555555555555555ULL);
tmp = (tmp & 0x3333333333333333ULL) + ((tmp >> 2) & 0x3333333333333333ULL);
tmp = (tmp + (tmp >> 4)) & 0x0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0fULL;
regs->gpr[ra] = tmp;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [POWERPC] Never panic when taking altivec exceptions from userspace
At the moment we rely on a cpu feature bit or a firmware property to
detect altivec. If we dont have either of these and the cpu does in fact
support altivec we can cause a panic from userspace.
It seems safer to always send a signal if we manage to get an 0xf20
exception from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 6,501
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_loopback(struct path *path, const char *old_name,
int recurse)
{
struct path old_path;
struct mount *mnt = NULL, *old, *parent;
struct mountpoint *mp;
int err;
if (!old_name || !*old_name)
return -EINVAL;
err = kern_path(old_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path);
if (err)
return err;
err = -EINVAL;
if (mnt_ns_loop(old_path.dentry))
goto out;
mp = lock_mount(path);
err = PTR_ERR(mp);
if (IS_ERR(mp))
goto out;
old = real_mount(old_path.mnt);
parent = real_mount(path->mnt);
err = -EINVAL;
if (IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(old))
goto out2;
if (!check_mnt(parent) || !check_mnt(old))
goto out2;
if (!recurse && has_locked_children(old, old_path.dentry))
goto out2;
if (recurse)
mnt = copy_tree(old, old_path.dentry, CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE);
else
mnt = clone_mnt(old, old_path.dentry, 0);
if (IS_ERR(mnt)) {
err = PTR_ERR(mnt);
goto out2;
}
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags &= ~MNT_LOCKED;
err = graft_tree(mnt, parent, mp);
if (err) {
lock_mount_hash();
umount_tree(mnt, 0);
unlock_mount_hash();
}
out2:
unlock_mount(mp);
out:
path_put(&old_path);
return err;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,743
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void br_multicast_disable_port(struct net_bridge_port *port)
{
struct net_bridge *br = port->br;
struct net_bridge_port_group *pg;
struct hlist_node *p, *n;
spin_lock(&br->multicast_lock);
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(pg, p, n, &port->mglist, mglist)
br_multicast_del_pg(br, pg);
if (!hlist_unhashed(&port->rlist))
hlist_del_init_rcu(&port->rlist);
del_timer(&port->multicast_router_timer);
del_timer(&port->multicast_query_timer);
spin_unlock(&br->multicast_lock);
}
Commit Message: bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <ihands@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 23,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: json_object_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
text *json = PG_GETARG_TEXT_P(0);
text *fname = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(1);
char *fnamestr = text_to_cstring(fname);
text *result;
result = get_worker(json, &fnamestr, NULL, 1, false);
if (result != NULL)
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(result);
else
PG_RETURN_NULL();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 536
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Browser::Browser(Type type, Profile* profile)
: type_(type),
profile_(profile),
window_(NULL),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(
tab_handler_(TabHandler::CreateTabHandler(this))),
command_updater_(this),
toolbar_model_(this),
chrome_updater_factory_(this),
is_attempting_to_close_browser_(false),
cancel_download_confirmation_state_(NOT_PROMPTED),
maximized_state_(MAXIMIZED_STATE_DEFAULT),
method_factory_(this),
block_command_execution_(false),
last_blocked_command_id_(-1),
last_blocked_command_disposition_(CURRENT_TAB),
pending_web_app_action_(NONE),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(
tab_restore_service_delegate_(
new BrowserTabRestoreServiceDelegate(this))) {
registrar_.Add(this, NotificationType::SSL_VISIBLE_STATE_CHANGED,
NotificationService::AllSources());
registrar_.Add(this, NotificationType::EXTENSION_UPDATE_DISABLED,
NotificationService::AllSources());
registrar_.Add(this, NotificationType::EXTENSION_LOADED,
NotificationService::AllSources());
registrar_.Add(this, NotificationType::EXTENSION_UNLOADED,
NotificationService::AllSources());
registrar_.Add(this, NotificationType::EXTENSION_UNINSTALLED,
NotificationService::AllSources());
registrar_.Add(this, NotificationType::EXTENSION_PROCESS_TERMINATED,
NotificationService::AllSources());
registrar_.Add(this, NotificationType::BROWSER_THEME_CHANGED,
NotificationService::AllSources());
registrar_.Add(this, NotificationType::EXTENSION_READY_FOR_INSTALL,
NotificationService::AllSources());
PrefService* local_state = g_browser_process->local_state();
if (local_state)
printing_enabled_.Init(prefs::kPrintingEnabled, local_state, this);
dev_tools_disabled_.Init(prefs::kDevToolsDisabled,
profile_->GetPrefs(), this);
incognito_mode_allowed_.Init(prefs::kIncognitoEnabled,
profile_->GetPrefs(), this);
edit_bookmarks_enabled_.Init(prefs::kEditBookmarksEnabled,
profile_->GetPrefs(), this);
InitCommandState();
BrowserList::AddBrowser(this);
encoding_auto_detect_.Init(prefs::kWebKitUsesUniversalDetector,
profile_->GetPrefs(), NULL);
use_vertical_tabs_.Init(prefs::kUseVerticalTabs, profile_->GetPrefs(), this);
instant_enabled_.Init(prefs::kInstantEnabled, profile_->GetPrefs(), this);
if (!TabMenuModel::AreVerticalTabsEnabled()) {
use_vertical_tabs_.SetValue(false);
}
UpdateTabStripModelInsertionPolicy();
tab_restore_service_ = profile->GetTabRestoreService();
if (tab_restore_service_) {
tab_restore_service_->AddObserver(this);
TabRestoreServiceChanged(tab_restore_service_);
}
if (profile_->GetProfileSyncService())
profile_->GetProfileSyncService()->AddObserver(this);
CreateInstantIfNecessary();
TabFinder::GetInstance();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,202
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int stb_vorbis_seek(stb_vorbis *f, unsigned int sample_number)
{
if (!stb_vorbis_seek_frame(f, sample_number))
return 0;
if (sample_number != f->current_loc) {
int n;
uint32 frame_start = f->current_loc;
stb_vorbis_get_frame_float(f, &n, NULL);
assert(sample_number > frame_start);
assert(f->channel_buffer_start + (int) (sample_number-frame_start) <= f->channel_buffer_end);
f->channel_buffer_start += (sample_number - frame_start);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SoftVPX::outputBuffers(bool flushDecoder, bool display, bool eos, bool *portWillReset) {
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
BufferInfo *outInfo = NULL;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = NULL;
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
if (flushDecoder && mFrameParallelMode) {
if (vpx_codec_decode((vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
ALOGE("Failed to flush on2 decoder.");
return false;
}
}
if (!display) {
if (!flushDecoder) {
ALOGE("Invalid operation.");
return false;
}
while ((mImg = vpx_codec_get_frame((vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx, &iter))) {
}
return true;
}
while (!outQueue.empty()) {
if (mImg == NULL) {
mImg = vpx_codec_get_frame((vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx, &iter);
if (mImg == NULL) {
break;
}
}
uint32_t width = mImg->d_w;
uint32_t height = mImg->d_h;
outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
CHECK_EQ(mImg->fmt, VPX_IMG_FMT_I420);
handlePortSettingsChange(portWillReset, width, height);
if (*portWillReset) {
return true;
}
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = (outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight() * 3) / 2;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = *(OMX_TICKS *)mImg->user_priv;
if (outHeader->nAllocLen >= outHeader->nFilledLen) {
uint8_t *dst = outHeader->pBuffer;
const uint8_t *srcY = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[VPX_PLANE_Y];
const uint8_t *srcU = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[VPX_PLANE_U];
const uint8_t *srcV = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[VPX_PLANE_V];
size_t srcYStride = mImg->stride[VPX_PLANE_Y];
size_t srcUStride = mImg->stride[VPX_PLANE_U];
size_t srcVStride = mImg->stride[VPX_PLANE_V];
copyYV12FrameToOutputBuffer(dst, srcY, srcU, srcV, srcYStride, srcUStride, srcVStride);
} else {
ALOGE("b/27597103, buffer too small");
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27597103");
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
}
mImg = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
if (!eos) {
return true;
}
if (!outQueue.empty()) {
outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
mEOSStatus = OUTPUT_FRAMES_FLUSHED;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: SoftVPX: fix nFilledLen overflow
Bug: 29421675
Change-Id: I25d4cf54a5df22c2130c37e95c7c7f75063111f3
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 10,152
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int Browser::active_index() const {
return tab_strip_model_->active_index();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,659
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PaintArtifactCompositor::ExtraDataForTesting::ScrollHitTestWebLayerAt(
unsigned index) {
return scroll_hit_test_layers[index].get();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,750
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void skb_insert(struct sk_buff *old, struct sk_buff *newsk, struct sk_buff_head *list)
{
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&list->lock, flags);
__skb_insert(newsk, old->prev, old, list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&list->lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 19,213
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t MediaPlayerService::Client::setAudioStreamType(audio_stream_type_t type)
{
ALOGV("[%d] setAudioStreamType(%d)", mConnId, type);
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
if (mAudioOutput != 0) mAudioOutput->setAudioStreamType(type);
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 12,984
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: psh_hint_table_align_hints( PSH_Hint_Table table,
PSH_Globals globals,
FT_Int dimension,
PSH_Glyph glyph )
{
PSH_Hint hint;
FT_UInt count;
#ifdef DEBUG_HINTER
PSH_Dimension dim = &globals->dimension[dimension];
FT_Fixed scale = dim->scale_mult;
FT_Fixed delta = dim->scale_delta;
if ( ps_debug_no_vert_hints && dimension == 0 )
{
ps_simple_scale( table, scale, delta, dimension );
return;
}
if ( ps_debug_no_horz_hints && dimension == 1 )
{
ps_simple_scale( table, scale, delta, dimension );
return;
}
#endif /* DEBUG_HINTER*/
hint = table->hints;
count = table->max_hints;
for ( ; count > 0; count--, hint++ )
psh_hint_align( hint, globals, dimension, glyph );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 14,741
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pppol2tp_backlog_recv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int rc;
rc = l2tp_udp_encap_recv(sk, skb);
if (rc)
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: net/l2tp: don't fall back on UDP [get|set]sockopt
The l2tp [get|set]sockopt() code has fallen back to the UDP functions
for socket option levels != SOL_PPPOL2TP since day one, but that has
never actually worked, since the l2tp socket isn't an inet socket.
As David Miller points out:
"If we wanted this to work, it'd have to look up the tunnel and then
use tunnel->sk, but I wonder how useful that would be"
Since this can never have worked so nobody could possibly have depended
on that functionality, just remove the broken code and return -EINVAL.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,478
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cached_h_advance(hb_font_t *font, void *font_data, hb_codepoint_t glyph,
void *user_data)
{
FT_Face face = font_data;
struct ass_shaper_metrics_data *metrics_priv = user_data;
GlyphMetricsHashValue *metrics = get_cached_metrics(metrics_priv, face, 0, glyph);
if (!metrics)
return 0;
hb_position_t advance = metrics->metrics.horiAdvance;
ass_cache_dec_ref(metrics);
return advance;
}
Commit Message: shaper: fix reallocation
Update the variable that tracks the allocated size. This potentially
improves performance and avoid some side effects, which lead to
undefined behavior in some cases.
Fixes fuzzer test case id:000051,sig:11,sync:fuzzer3,src:004221.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 14,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int _nfs4_proc_readdir(struct dentry *dentry, struct rpc_cred *cred,
u64 cookie, struct page **pages, unsigned int count, int plus)
{
struct inode *dir = dentry->d_inode;
struct nfs4_readdir_arg args = {
.fh = NFS_FH(dir),
.pages = pages,
.pgbase = 0,
.count = count,
.bitmask = NFS_SERVER(dentry->d_inode)->attr_bitmask,
.plus = plus,
};
struct nfs4_readdir_res res;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_READDIR],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
.rpc_cred = cred,
};
int status;
dprintk("%s: dentry = %s/%s, cookie = %Lu\n", __func__,
dentry->d_parent->d_name.name,
dentry->d_name.name,
(unsigned long long)cookie);
nfs4_setup_readdir(cookie, NFS_I(dir)->cookieverf, dentry, &args);
res.pgbase = args.pgbase;
status = nfs4_call_sync(NFS_SERVER(dir)->client, NFS_SERVER(dir), &msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
if (status >= 0) {
memcpy(NFS_I(dir)->cookieverf, res.verifier.data, NFS4_VERIFIER_SIZE);
status += args.pgbase;
}
nfs_invalidate_atime(dir);
dprintk("%s: returns %d\n", __func__, status);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,937
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int io_submit_one(struct kioctx *ctx, struct iocb __user *user_iocb,
struct iocb *iocb, struct kiocb_batch *batch,
bool compat)
{
struct kiocb *req;
struct file *file;
ssize_t ret;
/* enforce forwards compatibility on users */
if (unlikely(iocb->aio_reserved1 || iocb->aio_reserved2)) {
pr_debug("EINVAL: io_submit: reserve field set\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* prevent overflows */
if (unlikely(
(iocb->aio_buf != (unsigned long)iocb->aio_buf) ||
(iocb->aio_nbytes != (size_t)iocb->aio_nbytes) ||
((ssize_t)iocb->aio_nbytes < 0)
)) {
pr_debug("EINVAL: io_submit: overflow check\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
file = fget(iocb->aio_fildes);
if (unlikely(!file))
return -EBADF;
req = aio_get_req(ctx, batch); /* returns with 2 references to req */
if (unlikely(!req)) {
fput(file);
return -EAGAIN;
}
req->ki_filp = file;
if (iocb->aio_flags & IOCB_FLAG_RESFD) {
/*
* If the IOCB_FLAG_RESFD flag of aio_flags is set, get an
* instance of the file* now. The file descriptor must be
* an eventfd() fd, and will be signaled for each completed
* event using the eventfd_signal() function.
*/
req->ki_eventfd = eventfd_ctx_fdget((int) iocb->aio_resfd);
if (IS_ERR(req->ki_eventfd)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(req->ki_eventfd);
req->ki_eventfd = NULL;
goto out_put_req;
}
}
ret = put_user(req->ki_key, &user_iocb->aio_key);
if (unlikely(ret)) {
dprintk("EFAULT: aio_key\n");
goto out_put_req;
}
req->ki_obj.user = user_iocb;
req->ki_user_data = iocb->aio_data;
req->ki_pos = iocb->aio_offset;
req->ki_buf = (char __user *)(unsigned long)iocb->aio_buf;
req->ki_left = req->ki_nbytes = iocb->aio_nbytes;
req->ki_opcode = iocb->aio_lio_opcode;
ret = aio_setup_iocb(req, compat);
if (ret)
goto out_put_req;
spin_lock_irq(&ctx->ctx_lock);
/*
* We could have raced with io_destroy() and are currently holding a
* reference to ctx which should be destroyed. We cannot submit IO
* since ctx gets freed as soon as io_submit() puts its reference. The
* check here is reliable: io_destroy() sets ctx->dead before waiting
* for outstanding IO and the barrier between these two is realized by
* unlock of mm->ioctx_lock and lock of ctx->ctx_lock. Analogously we
* increment ctx->reqs_active before checking for ctx->dead and the
* barrier is realized by unlock and lock of ctx->ctx_lock. Thus if we
* don't see ctx->dead set here, io_destroy() waits for our IO to
* finish.
*/
if (ctx->dead) {
spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->ctx_lock);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_put_req;
}
aio_run_iocb(req);
if (!list_empty(&ctx->run_list)) {
/* drain the run list */
while (__aio_run_iocbs(ctx))
;
}
spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->ctx_lock);
aio_put_req(req); /* drop extra ref to req */
return 0;
out_put_req:
aio_put_req(req); /* drop extra ref to req */
aio_put_req(req); /* drop i/o ref to req */
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Unused iocbs in a batch should not be accounted as active.
commit 69e4747ee9727d660b88d7e1efe0f4afcb35db1b upstream.
Since commit 080d676de095 ("aio: allocate kiocbs in batches") iocbs are
allocated in a batch during processing of first iocbs. All iocbs in a
batch are automatically added to ctx->active_reqs list and accounted in
ctx->reqs_active.
If one (not the last one) of iocbs submitted by an user fails, further
iocbs are not processed, but they are still present in ctx->active_reqs
and accounted in ctx->reqs_active. This causes process to stuck in a D
state in wait_for_all_aios() on exit since ctx->reqs_active will never
go down to zero. Furthermore since kiocb_batch_free() frees iocb
without removing it from active_reqs list the list become corrupted
which may cause oops.
Fix this by removing iocb from ctx->active_reqs and updating
ctx->reqs_active in kiocb_batch_free().
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 4,568
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: local void fixedtables(state)
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
{
#ifdef BUILDFIXED
static int virgin = 1;
static code *lenfix, *distfix;
static code fixed[544];
/* build fixed huffman tables if first call (may not be thread safe) */
if (virgin) {
unsigned sym, bits;
static code *next;
/* literal/length table */
sym = 0;
while (sym < 144) state->lens[sym++] = 8;
while (sym < 256) state->lens[sym++] = 9;
while (sym < 280) state->lens[sym++] = 7;
while (sym < 288) state->lens[sym++] = 8;
next = fixed;
lenfix = next;
bits = 9;
inflate_table(LENS, state->lens, 288, &(next), &(bits), state->work);
/* distance table */
sym = 0;
while (sym < 32) state->lens[sym++] = 5;
distfix = next;
bits = 5;
inflate_table(DISTS, state->lens, 32, &(next), &(bits), state->work);
/* do this just once */
virgin = 0;
}
#else /* !BUILDFIXED */
# include "inffixed.h"
#endif /* BUILDFIXED */
state->lencode = lenfix;
state->lenbits = 9;
state->distcode = distfix;
state->distbits = 5;
}
Commit Message: Avoid shifts of negative values inflateMark().
The C standard says that bit shifts of negative integers is
undefined. This casts to unsigned values to assure a known
result.
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 6,345
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JNI_ChromeFeatureList_GetFieldTrialParamByFeature(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& jfeature_name,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& jparam_name) {
const base::Feature* feature =
FindFeatureExposedToJava(ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, jfeature_name));
const std::string& param_name = ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, jparam_name);
const std::string& param_value =
base::GetFieldTrialParamValueByFeature(*feature, param_name);
return ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, param_value);
}
Commit Message: Add feature and flag to enable incognito Chrome Custom Tabs
kCCTIncognito feature and flag are added to enable/disable incognito
Chrome Custom Tabs. The default is set to disabled.
Bug: 1023759
Change-Id: If32d256e3e9eaa94bcc09f7538c85e2dab53c589
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1911201
Reviewed-by: Peter Conn <peconn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714849}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,381
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int newseg(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_params *params)
{
key_t key = params->key;
int shmflg = params->flg;
size_t size = params->u.size;
int error;
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
size_t numpages = (size + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
struct file * file;
char name[13];
int id;
vm_flags_t acctflag = 0;
if (size < SHMMIN || size > ns->shm_ctlmax)
return -EINVAL;
if (ns->shm_tot + numpages > ns->shm_ctlall)
return -ENOSPC;
shp = ipc_rcu_alloc(sizeof(*shp));
if (!shp)
return -ENOMEM;
shp->shm_perm.key = key;
shp->shm_perm.mode = (shmflg & S_IRWXUGO);
shp->mlock_user = NULL;
shp->shm_perm.security = NULL;
error = security_shm_alloc(shp);
if (error) {
ipc_rcu_putref(shp, ipc_rcu_free);
return error;
}
sprintf (name, "SYSV%08x", key);
if (shmflg & SHM_HUGETLB) {
struct hstate *hs;
size_t hugesize;
hs = hstate_sizelog((shmflg >> SHM_HUGE_SHIFT) & SHM_HUGE_MASK);
if (!hs) {
error = -EINVAL;
goto no_file;
}
hugesize = ALIGN(size, huge_page_size(hs));
/* hugetlb_file_setup applies strict accounting */
if (shmflg & SHM_NORESERVE)
acctflag = VM_NORESERVE;
file = hugetlb_file_setup(name, hugesize, acctflag,
&shp->mlock_user, HUGETLB_SHMFS_INODE,
(shmflg >> SHM_HUGE_SHIFT) & SHM_HUGE_MASK);
} else {
/*
* Do not allow no accounting for OVERCOMMIT_NEVER, even
* if it's asked for.
*/
if ((shmflg & SHM_NORESERVE) &&
sysctl_overcommit_memory != OVERCOMMIT_NEVER)
acctflag = VM_NORESERVE;
file = shmem_file_setup(name, size, acctflag);
}
error = PTR_ERR(file);
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto no_file;
id = ipc_addid(&shm_ids(ns), &shp->shm_perm, ns->shm_ctlmni);
if (id < 0) {
error = id;
goto no_id;
}
shp->shm_cprid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
shp->shm_lprid = 0;
shp->shm_atim = shp->shm_dtim = 0;
shp->shm_ctim = get_seconds();
shp->shm_segsz = size;
shp->shm_nattch = 0;
shp->shm_file = file;
shp->shm_creator = current;
/*
* shmid gets reported as "inode#" in /proc/pid/maps.
* proc-ps tools use this. Changing this will break them.
*/
file_inode(file)->i_ino = shp->shm_perm.id;
ns->shm_tot += numpages;
error = shp->shm_perm.id;
ipc_unlock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
rcu_read_unlock();
return error;
no_id:
if (is_file_hugepages(file) && shp->mlock_user)
user_shm_unlock(size, shp->mlock_user);
fput(file);
no_file:
ipc_rcu_putref(shp, shm_rcu_free);
return error;
}
Commit Message: ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races
When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).
Here's the race before this patch:
TASK 1 TASK 2
------ ------
shm_rmid()
ipc_lock_object()
shmctl()
shp = shm_obtain_object_check()
shm_destroy()
shum_unlock()
fput(shp->shm_file)
ipc_lock_object()
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
<OOPS>
The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock. fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2. I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu
This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
ipc_object_lock().
Example workloads, which each trigger oops...
Workload 1:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shm_rmid $id &
shmlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
_raw_spin_lock
shmem_lock
SyS_shmctl
Workload 2:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmat $id 4096 &
shm_rmid $id &
wait
done
The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
touch_atime
shmem_mmap
shm_mmap
mmap_region
do_mmap_pgoff
do_shmat
SyS_shmat
Workload 3:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmlock $id
shm_rmid $id &
shmunlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode. The
first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
a get_file() and queued this fput():
locks_remove_flock
__fput
____fput
task_work_run
do_notify_resume
int_signal
Fixes: c2c737a0461e ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10.17+ 3.11.6+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 28,693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void SetUpTestCase() {
source_data_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(
vpx_memalign(kDataAlignment, kDataBlockSize));
reference_data_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(
vpx_memalign(kDataAlignment, kDataBufferSize));
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 14,754
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const MXFCodecUL *mxf_get_codec_ul(const MXFCodecUL *uls, UID *uid)
{
while (uls->uid[0]) {
if(mxf_match_uid(uls->uid, *uid, uls->matching_len))
break;
uls++;
}
return uls;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix DoS issues in mxf_read_index_entry_array()
Fixes: 20170829A.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <wangchu.zhl@alibaba-inc.com>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 23,438
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TriggerReloadPromptOnClose() const {
PageInfoBubbleView* const page_info_bubble_view =
static_cast<PageInfoBubbleView*>(
PageInfoBubbleView::GetPageInfoBubble());
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, page_info_bubble_view);
PageInfoUI::PermissionInfo permission;
permission.type = ContentSettingsType::CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_NOTIFICATIONS;
permission.setting = ContentSetting::CONTENT_SETTING_BLOCK;
permission.default_setting = ContentSetting::CONTENT_SETTING_ASK;
permission.source = content_settings::SettingSource::SETTING_SOURCE_USER;
permission.is_incognito = false;
page_info_bubble_view->OnPermissionChanged(permission);
}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 14,460
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkey_new)
{
struct php_x509_request req;
zval * args = NULL;
zval *data;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "|a!", &args) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETVAL_FALSE;
if (args && Z_TYPE_P(args) == IS_ARRAY) {
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
if ((data = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(args), "rsa", sizeof("rsa")-1)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(data) == IS_ARRAY) {
pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (pkey) {
RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
if (rsa) {
if (php_openssl_pkey_init_and_assign_rsa(pkey, rsa, data)) {
RETURN_RES(zend_register_resource(pkey, le_key));
}
RSA_free(rsa);
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
RETURN_FALSE;
} else if ((data = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(args), "dsa", sizeof("dsa") - 1)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(data) == IS_ARRAY) {
pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (pkey) {
DSA *dsa = DSA_new();
if (dsa) {
if (php_openssl_pkey_init_dsa(dsa, data)) {
if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa)) {
RETURN_RES(zend_register_resource(pkey, le_key));
}
}
DSA_free(dsa);
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
RETURN_FALSE;
} else if ((data = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(args), "dh", sizeof("dh") - 1)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(data) == IS_ARRAY) {
pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (pkey) {
DH *dh = DH_new();
if (dh) {
if (php_openssl_pkey_init_dh(dh, data)) {
if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkey, dh)) {
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(return_value, zend_list_insert(pkey, le_key));
return;
}
}
DH_free(dh);
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
PHP_SSL_REQ_INIT(&req);
if (PHP_SSL_REQ_PARSE(&req, args) == SUCCESS)
{
if (php_openssl_generate_private_key(&req)) {
/* pass back a key resource */
RETVAL_RES(zend_register_resource(req.priv_key, le_key));
/* make sure the cleanup code doesn't zap it! */
req.priv_key = NULL;
}
}
PHP_SSL_REQ_DISPOSE(&req);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 21,260
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tty_ldisc_setup(struct tty_struct *tty, struct tty_struct *o_tty)
{
struct tty_ldisc *ld = tty->ldisc;
int retval;
retval = tty_ldisc_open(tty, ld);
if (retval)
return retval;
if (o_tty) {
retval = tty_ldisc_open(o_tty, o_tty->ldisc);
if (retval) {
tty_ldisc_close(tty, ld);
return retval;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tty: Prevent ldisc drivers from re-using stale tty fields
Line discipline drivers may mistakenly misuse ldisc-related fields
when initializing. For example, a failure to initialize tty->receive_room
in the N_GIGASET_M101 line discipline was recently found and fixed [1].
Now, the N_X25 line discipline has been discovered accessing the previous
line discipline's already-freed private data [2].
Harden the ldisc interface against misuse by initializing revelant
tty fields before instancing the new line discipline.
[1]
commit fd98e9419d8d622a4de91f76b306af6aa627aa9c
Author: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Date: Tue Jul 14 00:37:13 2015 +0200
isdn/gigaset: reset tty->receive_room when attaching ser_gigaset
[2] Report from Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
[ 634.336761] ==================================================================
[ 634.338226] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in x25_asy_open_tty+0x13d/0x490 at addr ffff8800a743efd0
[ 634.339558] Read of size 4 by task syzkaller_execu/8981
[ 634.340359] =============================================================================
[ 634.341598] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
...
[ 634.405018] Call Trace:
[ 634.405277] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52)
[ 634.405775] print_trailer (mm/slub.c:655)
[ 634.406361] object_err (mm/slub.c:662)
[ 634.406824] kasan_report_error (mm/kasan/report.c:138 mm/kasan/report.c:236)
[ 634.409581] __asan_report_load4_noabort (mm/kasan/report.c:279)
[ 634.411355] x25_asy_open_tty (drivers/net/wan/x25_asy.c:559 (discriminator 1))
[ 634.413997] tty_ldisc_open.isra.2 (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:447)
[ 634.414549] tty_set_ldisc (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:567)
[ 634.415057] tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2646 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2879)
[ 634.423524] do_vfs_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:43 fs/ioctl.c:607)
[ 634.427491] SyS_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:622 fs/ioctl.c:613)
[ 634.427945] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:188)
Cc: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 25,780
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MemoryInstrumentation::BindCoordinatorRequestOnConnectorThread(
mojom::CoordinatorRequest coordinator_request) {
connector_->BindInterface(service_name_, std::move(coordinator_request));
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 19,592
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: invoke_NPN_IdentifierIsString(NPIdentifier identifier)
{
npw_return_val_if_fail(rpc_method_invoke_possible(g_rpc_connection), false);
int error = rpc_method_invoke(g_rpc_connection,
RPC_METHOD_NPN_IDENTIFIER_IS_STRING,
RPC_TYPE_NP_IDENTIFIER, &identifier,
RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR) {
npw_perror("NPN_IdentifierIsString() invoke", error);
return false;
}
uint32_t ret;
error = rpc_method_wait_for_reply(g_rpc_connection,
RPC_TYPE_UINT32, &ret,
RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR) {
npw_perror("NPN_IdentifierIsString() wait for reply", error);
return false;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 19,826
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ImageCapture::ClearMediaTrackConstraints() {
current_constraints_ = MediaTrackConstraintSet();
}
Commit Message: Convert MediaTrackConstraints to a ScriptValue
IDLDictionaries such as MediaTrackConstraints should not be stored on
the heap which would happen when binding one as a parameter to a
callback. This change converts the object to a ScriptValue ahead of
time. This is fine because the value will be passed to a
ScriptPromiseResolver that will converted it to a V8 value if it
isn't already.
Bug: 759457
Change-Id: I3009a0f7711cc264aeaae07a36c18a6db8c915c8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/701358
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507177}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 17,512
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RunAccuracyCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
uint32_t max_error = 0;
int64_t total_error = 0;
const int count_test_block = 10000;
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_input_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_temp_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, dst, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, src, kNumCoeffs);
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8();
dst[j] = rnd.Rand8();
test_input_block[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
}
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(test_input_block,
test_temp_block, pitch_));
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunInvTxfm(test_temp_block, dst, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
const uint32_t diff = dst[j] - src[j];
const uint32_t error = diff * diff;
if (max_error < error)
max_error = error;
total_error += error;
}
}
EXPECT_GE(1u, max_error)
<< "Error: 4x4 FHT/IHT has an individual round trip error > 1";
EXPECT_GE(count_test_block , total_error)
<< "Error: 4x4 FHT/IHT has average round trip error > 1 per block";
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 24,318
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::OnCompositingLockStateChanged(
ui::Compositor* compositor) {
if (!compositor->IsLocked() && can_lock_compositor_ == YES_DID_LOCK) {
can_lock_compositor_ = NO_PENDING_RENDERER_FRAME;
}
}
Commit Message: repairs CopyFromCompositingSurface in HighDPI
This CL removes the DIP=>Pixel transform in
DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurface(), because said
transformation seems to be happening later in the copy logic
and is currently being applied twice.
BUG=397708
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/421293002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286414 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,994
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_level3_header(LHAFileHeader **header, LHAInputStream *stream)
{
unsigned int header_len;
if (lha_decode_uint16(&RAW_DATA(header, 0)) != 4) {
return 0;
}
if (!extend_raw_data(header, stream,
LEVEL_3_HEADER_LEN - RAW_DATA_LEN(header))) {
return 0;
}
header_len = lha_decode_uint32(&RAW_DATA(header, 24));
if (header_len > LEVEL_3_MAX_HEADER_LEN) {
return 0;
}
if (!extend_raw_data(header, stream,
header_len - RAW_DATA_LEN(header))) {
return 0;
}
memcpy((*header)->compress_method, &RAW_DATA(header, 2), 5);
(*header)->compress_method[5] = '\0';
(*header)->compressed_length = lha_decode_uint32(&RAW_DATA(header, 7));
(*header)->length = lha_decode_uint32(&RAW_DATA(header, 11));
(*header)->timestamp = lha_decode_uint32(&RAW_DATA(header, 15));
(*header)->crc = lha_decode_uint16(&RAW_DATA(header, 21));
(*header)->os_type = RAW_DATA(header, 23);
if (!decode_extended_headers(header, 28)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer underflow vulnerability in L3 decode.
Marcin 'Icewall' Noga of Cisco TALOS discovered that the level 3 header
decoding routines were vulnerable to an integer underflow, if the 32-bit
header length was less than the base level 3 header length. This could
lead to an exploitable heap corruption condition.
Thanks go to Marcin Noga and Regina Wilson of Cisco TALOS for reporting
this vulnerability.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 29,903
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_init_boot_verifier(const struct nfs_client *clp,
nfs4_verifier *bootverf)
{
__be32 verf[2];
if (test_bit(NFS4CLNT_PURGE_STATE, &clp->cl_state)) {
/* An impossible timestamp guarantees this value
* will never match a generated boot time. */
verf[0] = 0;
verf[1] = cpu_to_be32(NSEC_PER_SEC + 1);
} else {
struct nfs_net *nn = net_generic(clp->cl_net, nfs_net_id);
verf[0] = cpu_to_be32(nn->boot_time.tv_sec);
verf[1] = cpu_to_be32(nn->boot_time.tv_nsec);
}
memcpy(bootverf->data, verf, sizeof(bootverf->data));
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,414
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int iwl_set_default_wep_key(struct iwl_priv *priv,
struct iwl_rxon_context *ctx,
struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf)
{
int ret;
lockdep_assert_held(&priv->shrd->mutex);
if (keyconf->keylen != WEP_KEY_LEN_128 &&
keyconf->keylen != WEP_KEY_LEN_64) {
IWL_DEBUG_WEP(priv,
"Bad WEP key length %d\n", keyconf->keylen);
return -EINVAL;
}
keyconf->hw_key_idx = IWLAGN_HW_KEY_DEFAULT;
ctx->wep_keys[keyconf->keyidx].key_size = keyconf->keylen;
memcpy(&ctx->wep_keys[keyconf->keyidx].key, &keyconf->key,
keyconf->keylen);
ret = iwl_send_static_wepkey_cmd(priv, ctx, false);
IWL_DEBUG_WEP(priv, "Set default WEP key: len=%d idx=%d ret=%d\n",
keyconf->keylen, keyconf->keyidx, ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: iwlwifi: Sanity check for sta_id
On my testing, I saw some strange behavior
[ 421.739708] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: ACTIVATE a non DRIVER active station id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00
[ 421.739719] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: iwl_sta_ucode_activate Added STA id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00 to uCode
not sure how it happen, but adding the sanity check to prevent memory
corruption
Signed-off-by: Wey-Yi Guy <wey-yi.w.guy@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,096
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned git_index_version(git_index *index)
{
assert(index);
return index->version;
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 20,094
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XML_SetCharacterDataHandler(XML_Parser parser,
XML_CharacterDataHandler handler) {
if (parser != NULL)
parser->m_characterDataHandler = handler;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 4,486
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int icmpv6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;
struct inet6_dev *idev = __in6_dev_get(dev);
const struct in6_addr *saddr, *daddr;
struct icmp6hdr *hdr;
u8 type;
bool success = false;
if (!xfrm6_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) {
struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
int nh;
if (!(sp && sp->xvec[sp->len - 1]->props.flags &
XFRM_STATE_ICMP))
goto drop_no_count;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*hdr) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)))
goto drop_no_count;
nh = skb_network_offset(skb);
skb_set_network_header(skb, sizeof(*hdr));
if (!xfrm6_policy_check_reverse(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
goto drop_no_count;
skb_set_network_header(skb, nh);
}
__ICMP6_INC_STATS(dev_net(dev), idev, ICMP6_MIB_INMSGS);
saddr = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
daddr = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr;
if (skb_checksum_validate(skb, IPPROTO_ICMPV6, ip6_compute_pseudo)) {
net_dbg_ratelimited("ICMPv6 checksum failed [%pI6c > %pI6c]\n",
saddr, daddr);
goto csum_error;
}
if (!pskb_pull(skb, sizeof(*hdr)))
goto discard_it;
hdr = icmp6_hdr(skb);
type = hdr->icmp6_type;
ICMP6MSGIN_INC_STATS(dev_net(dev), idev, type);
switch (type) {
case ICMPV6_ECHO_REQUEST:
icmpv6_echo_reply(skb);
break;
case ICMPV6_ECHO_REPLY:
success = ping_rcv(skb);
break;
case ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG:
/* BUGGG_FUTURE: if packet contains rthdr, we cannot update
standard destination cache. Seems, only "advanced"
destination cache will allow to solve this problem
--ANK (980726)
*/
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)))
goto discard_it;
hdr = icmp6_hdr(skb);
/*
* Drop through to notify
*/
case ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH:
case ICMPV6_TIME_EXCEED:
case ICMPV6_PARAMPROB:
icmpv6_notify(skb, type, hdr->icmp6_code, hdr->icmp6_mtu);
break;
case NDISC_ROUTER_SOLICITATION:
case NDISC_ROUTER_ADVERTISEMENT:
case NDISC_NEIGHBOUR_SOLICITATION:
case NDISC_NEIGHBOUR_ADVERTISEMENT:
case NDISC_REDIRECT:
ndisc_rcv(skb);
break;
case ICMPV6_MGM_QUERY:
igmp6_event_query(skb);
break;
case ICMPV6_MGM_REPORT:
igmp6_event_report(skb);
break;
case ICMPV6_MGM_REDUCTION:
case ICMPV6_NI_QUERY:
case ICMPV6_NI_REPLY:
case ICMPV6_MLD2_REPORT:
case ICMPV6_DHAAD_REQUEST:
case ICMPV6_DHAAD_REPLY:
case ICMPV6_MOBILE_PREFIX_SOL:
case ICMPV6_MOBILE_PREFIX_ADV:
break;
default:
/* informational */
if (type & ICMPV6_INFOMSG_MASK)
break;
net_dbg_ratelimited("icmpv6: msg of unknown type [%pI6c > %pI6c]\n",
saddr, daddr);
/*
* error of unknown type.
* must pass to upper level
*/
icmpv6_notify(skb, type, hdr->icmp6_code, hdr->icmp6_mtu);
}
/* until the v6 path can be better sorted assume failure and
* preserve the status quo behaviour for the rest of the paths to here
*/
if (success)
consume_skb(skb);
else
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
csum_error:
__ICMP6_INC_STATS(dev_net(dev), idev, ICMP6_MIB_CSUMERRORS);
discard_it:
__ICMP6_INC_STATS(dev_net(dev), idev, ICMP6_MIB_INERRORS);
drop_no_count:
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: handle no dst on skb in icmp6_send
Andrey reported the following while fuzzing the kernel with syzkaller:
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3859 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.9.0-rc6+ #429
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff8800666d4200 task.stack: ffff880067348000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff833617ec>] [<ffffffff833617ec>]
icmp6_send+0x5fc/0x1e30 net/ipv6/icmp.c:451
RSP: 0018:ffff88006734f2c0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: ffff8800666d4200 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: 0000000000000018
RBP: ffff88006734f630 R08: ffff880064138418 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffff84e7e200 R14: ffff880064138484 R15: ffff8800641383c0
FS: 00007fb3887a07c0(0000) GS:ffff88006cc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 000000006b040000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Stack:
ffff8800666d4200 ffff8800666d49f8 ffff8800666d4200 ffffffff84c02460
ffff8800666d4a1a 1ffff1000ccdaa2f ffff88006734f498 0000000000000046
ffff88006734f440 ffffffff832f4269 ffff880064ba7456 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff83364ddc>] icmpv6_param_prob+0x2c/0x40 net/ipv6/icmp.c:557
[< inline >] ip6_tlvopt_unknown net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:88
[<ffffffff83394405>] ip6_parse_tlv+0x555/0x670 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:157
[<ffffffff8339a759>] ipv6_parse_hopopts+0x199/0x460 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:663
[<ffffffff832ee773>] ipv6_rcv+0xfa3/0x1dc0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:191
...
icmp6_send / icmpv6_send is invoked for both rx and tx paths. In both
cases the dst->dev should be preferred for determining the L3 domain
if the dst has been set on the skb. Fallback to the skb->dev if it has
not. This covers the case reported here where icmp6_send is invoked on
Rx before the route lookup.
Fixes: 5d41ce29e ("net: icmp6_send should use dst dev to determine L3 domain")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,278
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void wc_ecc_fp_free_cache(void)
{
unsigned x, y;
for (x = 0; x < FP_ENTRIES; x++) {
if (fp_cache[x].g != NULL) {
for (y = 0; y < (1U<<FP_LUT); y++) {
wc_ecc_del_point(fp_cache[x].LUT[y]);
fp_cache[x].LUT[y] = NULL;
}
wc_ecc_del_point(fp_cache[x].g);
fp_cache[x].g = NULL;
mp_clear(&fp_cache[x].mu);
fp_cache[x].lru_count = 0;
fp_cache[x].lock = 0;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 24,309
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileAPIMessageFilter::OnCopy(
int request_id, const GURL& src_path, const GURL& dest_path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
base::PlatformFileError error;
FileSystemURL src_url(src_path);
FileSystemURL dest_url(dest_path);
if (!HasPermissionsForFile(src_url, kReadFilePermissions, &error) ||
!HasPermissionsForFile(dest_url, kCreateFilePermissions, &error)) {
Send(new FileSystemMsg_DidFail(request_id, error));
return;
}
FileSystemOperation* operation = GetNewOperation(src_url, request_id);
if (!operation)
return;
operation->Copy(
src_url, dest_url,
base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::DidFinish, this, request_id));
}
Commit Message: File permission fix: now we selectively grant read permission for Sandboxed files
We also need to check the read permission and call GrantReadFile() for
sandboxed files for CreateSnapshotFile().
BUG=162114
TEST=manual
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11280231
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@170181 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 13,880
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InFlightBackendIO::FlushQueue(const net::CompletionCallback& callback) {
scoped_refptr<BackendIO> operation(new BackendIO(this, backend_, callback));
operation->FlushQueue();
PostOperation(FROM_HERE, operation.get());
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 4,353
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void JSTestObj::put(JSCell* cell, ExecState* exec, const Identifier& propertyName, JSValue value, PutPropertySlot& slot)
{
JSTestObj* thisObject = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(cell);
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(thisObject, &s_info);
lookupPut<JSTestObj, Base>(exec, propertyName, value, &JSTestObjTable, thisObject, slot);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,444
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
int len, int peek)
{
if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
/* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
{
unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
unsigned char *dst = buf;
unsigned int k,n;
/* peek == 0 */
n = 0;
while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
{
*dst++ = *src++;
len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
n++;
}
/* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
return n;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: A memory leak can occur in dtls1_buffer_record if either of the calls to
ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.
CVE-2015-0206
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,034
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ring_buffer_wakeup(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct ring_buffer *rb;
rcu_read_lock();
rb = rcu_dereference(event->rb);
if (rb) {
list_for_each_entry_rcu(event, &rb->event_list, rb_entry)
wake_up_all(&event->waitq);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 10,543
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> FrameLoader::ToTracedValue() const {
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> traced_value = TracedValue::Create();
traced_value->BeginDictionary("frame");
traced_value->SetString(
"id_ref", String::Format("0x%" PRIx64,
static_cast<uint64_t>(
reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(frame_.Get()))));
traced_value->EndDictionary();
traced_value->SetBoolean("isLoadingMainFrame", IsLoadingMainFrame());
traced_value->SetString("stateMachine", state_machine_.ToString());
traced_value->SetString("provisionalDocumentLoaderURL",
provisional_document_loader_
? provisional_document_loader_->Url().GetString()
: String());
traced_value->SetString(
"documentLoaderURL",
document_loader_ ? document_loader_->Url().GetString() : String());
return traced_value;
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 10,657
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: session_by_tty(char *tty)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) {
debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty);
return s;
}
}
debug("session_by_tty: unknown tty %.100s", tty);
session_dump();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 8,820
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gs_devicename(const gx_device * dev)
{
return dev->dname;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 23,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void _noLibzError (void)
{
gd_error("GD2 support is not available - no libz\n");
}
Commit Message: gd2: handle corrupt images better (CVE-2016-3074)
Make sure we do some range checking on corrupted chunks.
Thanks to Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com> for indepth report
and reproducer information. Made for easy test case writing :).
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 5,978
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UrlFetcher::Core::SetUploadData(const std::string& upload_content_type,
const std::string& upload_content) {
upload_content_type_ = upload_content_type;
upload_content_ = upload_content;
}
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,468
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int btreeGetPage(
BtShared *pBt, /* The btree */
Pgno pgno, /* Number of the page to fetch */
MemPage **ppPage, /* Return the page in this parameter */
int flags /* PAGER_GET_NOCONTENT or PAGER_GET_READONLY */
){
int rc;
DbPage *pDbPage;
assert( flags==0 || flags==PAGER_GET_NOCONTENT || flags==PAGER_GET_READONLY );
assert( sqlite3_mutex_held(pBt->mutex) );
rc = sqlite3PagerGet(pBt->pPager, pgno, (DbPage**)&pDbPage, flags);
if( rc ) return rc;
*ppPage = btreePageFromDbPage(pDbPage, pgno, pBt);
return SQLITE_OK;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,456
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void *tcp_v4_tw_get_peer(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_timewait_sock *tw = inet_twsk(sk);
return inet_getpeer_v4(tw->tw_daddr, 1);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 21,050
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_usbmidi_detect_endpoints(struct snd_usb_midi *umidi,
struct snd_usb_midi_endpoint_info *endpoint,
int max_endpoints)
{
struct usb_interface *intf;
struct usb_host_interface *hostif;
struct usb_interface_descriptor *intfd;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epd;
int i, out_eps = 0, in_eps = 0;
if (USB_ID_VENDOR(umidi->usb_id) == 0x0582)
snd_usbmidi_switch_roland_altsetting(umidi);
if (endpoint[0].out_ep || endpoint[0].in_ep)
return 0;
intf = umidi->iface;
if (!intf || intf->num_altsetting < 1)
return -ENOENT;
hostif = intf->cur_altsetting;
intfd = get_iface_desc(hostif);
for (i = 0; i < intfd->bNumEndpoints; ++i) {
epd = get_endpoint(hostif, i);
if (!usb_endpoint_xfer_bulk(epd) &&
!usb_endpoint_xfer_int(epd))
continue;
if (out_eps < max_endpoints &&
usb_endpoint_dir_out(epd)) {
endpoint[out_eps].out_ep = usb_endpoint_num(epd);
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_int(epd))
endpoint[out_eps].out_interval = epd->bInterval;
++out_eps;
}
if (in_eps < max_endpoints &&
usb_endpoint_dir_in(epd)) {
endpoint[in_eps].in_ep = usb_endpoint_num(epd);
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_int(epd))
endpoint[in_eps].in_interval = epd->bInterval;
++in_eps;
}
}
return (out_eps || in_eps) ? 0 : -ENOENT;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: avoid freeing umidi object twice
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void unregister_rt_sched_group(struct task_group *tg, int cpu)
{
list_del_rcu(&tg->rt_rq[cpu]->leaf_rt_rq_list);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,617
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void paintWebView(Frame* frame, gboolean transparent, GraphicsContext& context, const IntRect& clipRect, const Vector<IntRect>& rects)
{
bool coalesce = true;
if (rects.size() > 0)
coalesce = shouldCoalesce(clipRect, rects);
if (coalesce) {
context.clip(clipRect);
if (transparent)
context.clearRect(clipRect);
frame->view()->paint(&context, clipRect);
} else {
for (size_t i = 0; i < rects.size(); i++) {
IntRect rect = rects[i];
context.save();
context.clip(rect);
if (transparent)
context.clearRect(rect);
frame->view()->paint(&context, rect);
context.restore();
}
}
context.save();
context.clip(clipRect);
frame->page()->inspectorController()->drawNodeHighlight(context);
context.restore();
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 692
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void seqiv_aead_complete2(struct aead_givcrypt_request *req, int err)
{
struct aead_request *subreq = aead_givcrypt_reqctx(req);
struct crypto_aead *geniv;
if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
return;
if (err)
goto out;
geniv = aead_givcrypt_reqtfm(req);
memcpy(req->areq.iv, subreq->iv, crypto_aead_ivsize(geniv));
out:
kfree(subreq->iv);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,729
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::Size rwhv_create_size() const { return rwhv_create_size_; }
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 13,848
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int BlackPreservingGrayOnlySampler(register const cmsUInt16Number In[], register cmsUInt16Number Out[], register void* Cargo)
{
GrayOnlyParams* bp = (GrayOnlyParams*) Cargo;
if (In[0] == 0 && In[1] == 0 && In[2] == 0) {
Out[0] = Out[1] = Out[2] = 0;
Out[3] = cmsEvalToneCurve16(bp->KTone, In[3]);
return TRUE;
}
bp ->cmyk2cmyk ->Eval16Fn(In, Out, bp ->cmyk2cmyk->Data);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix a double free on error recovering
CWE ID:
| 0
| 9,539
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err import_file(GF_ISOFile *dest, char *inName, u32 import_flags, Double force_fps, u32 frames_per_sample)
{
u32 track_id, i, j, timescale, track, stype, profile, level, new_timescale, rescale, svc_mode, txt_flags, split_tile_mode, temporal_mode;
s32 par_d, par_n, prog_id, delay, force_rate;
s32 tw, th, tx, ty, txtw, txth, txtx, txty;
Bool do_audio, do_video, do_auxv,do_pict, do_all, disable, track_layout, text_layout, chap_ref, is_chap, is_chap_file, keep_handler, negative_cts_offset, rap_only, refs_only;
u32 group, handler, rvc_predefined, check_track_for_svc, check_track_for_lhvc, check_track_for_hevc;
const char *szLan;
GF_Err e;
GF_MediaImporter import;
char *ext, szName[1000], *handler_name, *rvc_config, *chapter_name;
GF_List *kinds;
GF_TextFlagsMode txt_mode = GF_ISOM_TEXT_FLAGS_OVERWRITE;
u8 max_layer_id_plus_one, max_temporal_id_plus_one;
rvc_predefined = 0;
chapter_name = NULL;
new_timescale = 1;
rescale = 0;
text_layout = 0;
/*0: merge all
1: split base and all SVC in two tracks
2: split all base and SVC layers in dedicated tracks
*/
svc_mode = 0;
memset(&import, 0, sizeof(GF_MediaImporter));
strcpy(szName, inName);
#ifdef WIN32
/*dirty hack for msys&mingw: when we use import options, the ':' separator used prevents msys from translating the path
we do this for regular cases where the path starts with the drive letter. If the path start with anything else (/home , /opt, ...) we're screwed :( */
if ( (szName[0]=='/') && (szName[2]=='/')) {
szName[0] = szName[1];
szName[1] = ':';
}
#endif
is_chap_file = 0;
handler = 0;
disable = 0;
chap_ref = 0;
is_chap = 0;
kinds = gf_list_new();
track_layout = 0;
szLan = NULL;
delay = 0;
group = 0;
stype = 0;
profile = level = 0;
negative_cts_offset = 0;
split_tile_mode = 0;
temporal_mode = 0;
rap_only = 0;
refs_only = 0;
txt_flags = 0;
max_layer_id_plus_one = max_temporal_id_plus_one = 0;
force_rate = -1;
tw = th = tx = ty = txtw = txth = txtx = txty = 0;
par_d = par_n = -2;
/*use ':' as separator, but beware DOS paths...*/
ext = strchr(szName, ':');
if (ext && ext[1]=='\\') ext = strchr(szName+2, ':');
handler_name = NULL;
rvc_config = NULL;
while (ext) {
char *ext2 = strchr(ext+1, ':');
if (ext2 && !strncmp(ext2, "://", 3) ) {
ext2[0] = ':';
ext2 = strchr(ext2+1, ':');
}
if (ext2 && ( !strncmp(ext2, ":\\", 2) || !strncmp(ext2, ":/", 2) ) ) {
ext2[0] = ':';
ext2 = strchr(ext2+1, ':');
}
if (ext2) ext2[0] = 0;
/*all extensions for track-based importing*/
if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "dur=", 4)) import.duration = (u32)( (atof(ext+5) * 1000) + 0.5 );
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "lang=", 5)) {
/* prevent leak if param is set twice */
if (szLan)
gf_free((char*) szLan);
szLan = gf_strdup(ext+6);
}
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "delay=", 6)) delay = atoi(ext+7);
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "par=", 4)) {
if (!stricmp(ext+5, "none")) {
par_n = par_d = -1;
} else {
if (ext2) ext2[0] = ':';
if (ext2) ext2 = strchr(ext2+1, ':');
if (ext2) ext2[0] = 0;
sscanf(ext+5, "%d:%d", &par_n, &par_d);
}
}
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "name=", 5)) {
handler_name = gf_strdup(ext+6);
}
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "ext=", 4)) {
/*extensions begin with '.'*/
if (*(ext+5) == '.')
import.force_ext = gf_strdup(ext+5);
else {
import.force_ext = gf_calloc(1+strlen(ext+5)+1, 1);
import.force_ext[0] = '.';
strcat(import.force_ext+1, ext+5);
}
}
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "hdlr=", 5)) handler = GF_4CC(ext[6], ext[7], ext[8], ext[9]);
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "disable", 7)) disable = 1;
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "group=", 6)) {
group = atoi(ext+7);
if (!group) group = gf_isom_get_next_alternate_group_id(dest);
}
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "fps=", 4)) {
if (!strcmp(ext+5, "auto")) force_fps = GF_IMPORT_AUTO_FPS;
else if (strchr(ext+5, '-')) {
u32 ticks, dts_inc;
sscanf(ext+5, "%u-%u", &ticks, &dts_inc);
if (!dts_inc) dts_inc=1;
force_fps = ticks;
force_fps /= dts_inc;
}
else force_fps = atof(ext+5);
}
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "rap")) rap_only = 1;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "refs")) refs_only = 1;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "trailing")) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_KEEP_TRAILING;
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "agg=", 4)) frames_per_sample = atoi(ext+5);
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "dref")) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_USE_DATAREF;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "keep_refs")) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_KEEP_REFS;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "nodrop")) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_NO_FRAME_DROP;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "packed")) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_FORCE_PACKED;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "sbr")) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_SBR_IMPLICIT;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "sbrx")) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_SBR_EXPLICIT;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "ovsbr")) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_OVSBR;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "ps")) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_PS_IMPLICIT;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "psx")) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_PS_EXPLICIT;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "mpeg4")) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_FORCE_MPEG4;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "nosei")) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_NO_SEI;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "svc") || !stricmp(ext+1, "lhvc") ) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_SVC_EXPLICIT;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "nosvc") || !stricmp(ext+1, "nolhvc")) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_SVC_NONE;
/*split SVC layers*/
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "svcmode=", 8) || !strnicmp(ext+1, "lhvcmode=", 9)) {
char *mode = ext+9;
if (mode[0]=='=') mode = ext+10;
if (!stricmp(mode, "splitnox"))
svc_mode = 3;
else if (!stricmp(mode, "splitnoxib"))
svc_mode = 4;
else if (!stricmp(mode, "splitall") || !stricmp(mode, "split"))
svc_mode = 2;
else if (!stricmp(mode, "splitbase"))
svc_mode = 1;
else if (!stricmp(mode, "merged"))
svc_mode = 0;
}
/*split SVC layers*/
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "temporal=", 9)) {
char *mode = ext+10;
if (!stricmp(mode, "split"))
temporal_mode = 2;
else if (!stricmp(mode, "splitnox"))
temporal_mode = 3;
else if (!stricmp(mode, "splitbase"))
temporal_mode = 1;
else {
fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognized temporal mode %s, ignoring\n", mode);
temporal_mode = 0;
}
}
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "subsamples")) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_SET_SUBSAMPLES;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "deps")) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_SAMPLE_DEPS;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "forcesync")) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_FORCE_SYNC;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "xps_inband")) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_FORCE_XPS_INBAND;
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "max_lid=", 8) || !strnicmp(ext+1, "max_tid=", 8)) {
s32 val = atoi(ext+9);
if (val < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: request max layer/temporal id is negative - ignoring\n");
} else {
if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "max_lid=", 8))
max_layer_id_plus_one = 1 + (u8) val;
else
max_temporal_id_plus_one = 1 + (u8) val;
}
}
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "tiles")) split_tile_mode = 2;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "tiles_rle")) split_tile_mode = 3;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "split_tiles")) split_tile_mode = 1;
/*force all composition offsets to be positive*/
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "negctts", 7)) negative_cts_offset = 1;
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "stype=", 6)) {
stype = GF_4CC(ext[7], ext[8], ext[9], ext[10]);
}
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "chap")) is_chap = 1;
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "chapter=", 8)) {
chapter_name = gf_strdup(ext+9);
}
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "chapfile=", 9)) {
chapter_name = gf_strdup(ext+10);
is_chap_file=1;
}
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "layout=", 7)) {
if ( sscanf(ext+8, "%dx%dx%dx%d", &tw, &th, &tx, &ty)==4) {
track_layout = 1;
} else if ( sscanf(ext+8, "%dx%d", &tw, &th)==2) {
track_layout = 1;
tx = ty = 0;
}
}
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "rescale=", 8)) {
rescale = atoi(ext+9);
}
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "timescale=", 10)) {
new_timescale = atoi(ext+11);
}
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "noedit")) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_NO_EDIT_LIST;
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "rvc=", 4)) {
if (sscanf(ext+5, "%d", &rvc_predefined) != 1) {
rvc_config = gf_strdup(ext+5);
}
}
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "fmt=", 4)) import.streamFormat = gf_strdup(ext+5);
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "profile=", 8)) profile = atoi(ext+9);
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "level=", 6)) level = atoi(ext+7);
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "novpsext", 8)) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_NO_VPS_EXTENSIONS;
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "keepav1t", 8)) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_KEEP_AV1_TEMPORAL_OBU;
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "font=", 5)) import.fontName = gf_strdup(ext+6);
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "size=", 5)) import.fontSize = atoi(ext+6);
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "text_layout=", 12)) {
if ( sscanf(ext+13, "%dx%dx%dx%d", &txtw, &txth, &txtx, &txty)==4) {
text_layout = 1;
} else if ( sscanf(ext+8, "%dx%d", &txtw, &txth)==2) {
track_layout = 1;
txtx = txty = 0;
}
}
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_SWF_IMPORT
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "swf-global")) import.swf_flags |= GF_SM_SWF_STATIC_DICT;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "swf-no-ctrl")) import.swf_flags &= ~GF_SM_SWF_SPLIT_TIMELINE;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "swf-no-text")) import.swf_flags |= GF_SM_SWF_NO_TEXT;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "swf-no-font")) import.swf_flags |= GF_SM_SWF_NO_FONT;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "swf-no-line")) import.swf_flags |= GF_SM_SWF_NO_LINE;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "swf-no-grad")) import.swf_flags |= GF_SM_SWF_NO_GRADIENT;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "swf-quad")) import.swf_flags |= GF_SM_SWF_QUAD_CURVE;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "swf-xlp")) import.swf_flags |= GF_SM_SWF_SCALABLE_LINE;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "swf-ic2d")) import.swf_flags |= GF_SM_SWF_USE_IC2D;
else if (!stricmp(ext+1, "swf-same-app")) import.swf_flags |= GF_SM_SWF_REUSE_APPEARANCE;
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "swf-flatten=", 12)) import.swf_flatten_angle = (Float) atof(ext+13);
#endif
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "kind=", 5)) {
char *kind_scheme, *kind_value;
char *kind_data = ext+6;
char *sep = strchr(kind_data, '=');
if (sep) {
*sep = 0;
}
kind_scheme = gf_strdup(kind_data);
if (sep) {
*sep = '=';
kind_value = gf_strdup(sep+1);
} else {
kind_value = NULL;
}
gf_list_add(kinds, kind_scheme);
gf_list_add(kinds, kind_value);
}
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "txtflags", 8)) {
if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "txtflags=", 9)) {
sscanf(ext+10, "%x", &txt_flags);
}
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "txtflags+=", 10)) {
sscanf(ext+11, "%x", &txt_flags);
txt_mode = GF_ISOM_TEXT_FLAGS_TOGGLE;
}
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "txtflags-=", 10)) {
sscanf(ext+11, "%x", &txt_flags);
txt_mode = GF_ISOM_TEXT_FLAGS_UNTOGGLE;
}
}
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "rate=", 5)) {
force_rate = atoi(ext+6);
}
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "asemode=", 8)){
char *mode = ext+9;
if (!stricmp(mode, "v0-bs"))
import.asemode = GF_IMPORT_AUDIO_SAMPLE_ENTRY_v0_BS;
else if (!stricmp(mode, "v0-2"))
import.asemode = GF_IMPORT_AUDIO_SAMPLE_ENTRY_v0_2;
else if (!stricmp(mode, "v1"))
import.asemode = GF_IMPORT_AUDIO_SAMPLE_ENTRY_v1_MPEG;
else if (!stricmp(mode, "v1-qt"))
import.asemode = GF_IMPORT_AUDIO_SAMPLE_ENTRY_v1_QTFF;
}
else if (!strnicmp(ext+1, "audio_roll=", 11)) {
import.audio_roll_change = GF_TRUE;
import.audio_roll = atoi(ext+12);
}
/*unrecognized, assume name has colon in it*/
else {
fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognized import option %s, ignoring\n", ext+1);
ext = ext2;
continue;
}
if (ext2) ext2[0] = ':';
ext[0] = 0;
/* restart from where we stopped
* if we didn't stop (ext2 null) then the end has been reached
* so we can stop the whole thing */
ext = ext2;
}
/*check duration import (old syntax)*/
ext = strrchr(szName, '%');
if (ext) {
import.duration = (u32) (atof(ext+1) * 1000);
ext[0] = 0;
}
/*select switches for av containers import*/
do_audio = do_video = do_auxv = do_pict = 0;
track_id = prog_id = 0;
do_all = 1;
ext = strrchr(szName, '#');
if (ext) ext[0] = 0;
keep_handler = gf_isom_probe_file(szName);
import.in_name = szName;
import.flags = GF_IMPORT_PROBE_ONLY;
e = gf_media_import(&import);
if (e) goto exit;
if (ext) {
ext++;
if (!strnicmp(ext, "audio", 5)) do_audio = 1;
else if (!strnicmp(ext, "video", 5)) do_video = 1;
else if (!strnicmp(ext, "auxv", 4)) do_auxv = 1;
else if (!strnicmp(ext, "pict", 4)) do_pict = 1;
else if (!strnicmp(ext, "trackID=", 8)) track_id = atoi(&ext[8]);
else if (!strnicmp(ext, "PID=", 4)) track_id = atoi(&ext[4]);
else if (!strnicmp(ext, "program=", 8)) {
for (i=0; i<import.nb_progs; i++) {
if (!stricmp(import.pg_info[i].name, ext+8)) {
prog_id = import.pg_info[i].number;
do_all = 0;
break;
}
}
}
else if (!strnicmp(ext, "prog_id=", 8)) {
prog_id = atoi(ext+8);
do_all = 0;
}
else track_id = atoi(ext);
}
if (do_audio || do_video || do_auxv || do_pict || track_id) do_all = 0;
if (track_layout || is_chap) {
u32 w, h, sw, sh, fw, fh, i;
w = h = sw = sh = fw = fh = 0;
chap_ref = 0;
for (i=0; i<gf_isom_get_track_count(dest); i++) {
switch (gf_isom_get_media_type(dest, i+1)) {
case GF_ISOM_MEDIA_SCENE:
case GF_ISOM_MEDIA_VISUAL:
case GF_ISOM_MEDIA_AUXV:
case GF_ISOM_MEDIA_PICT:
if (!chap_ref && gf_isom_is_track_enabled(dest, i+1) ) chap_ref = i+1;
gf_isom_get_visual_info(dest, i+1, 1, &sw, &sh);
gf_isom_get_track_layout_info(dest, i+1, &fw, &fh, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (w<sw) w = sw;
if (w<fw) w = fw;
if (h<sh) h = sh;
if (h<fh) h = fh;
break;
case GF_ISOM_MEDIA_AUDIO:
if (!chap_ref && gf_isom_is_track_enabled(dest, i+1) ) chap_ref = i+1;
break;
}
}
if (track_layout) {
if (!tw) tw = w;
if (!th) th = h;
if (ty==-1) ty = (h>(u32)th) ? h-th : 0;
import.text_width = tw;
import.text_height = th;
}
if (is_chap && chap_ref) import_flags |= GF_IMPORT_NO_TEXT_FLUSH;
}
if (text_layout && txtw && txth) {
import.text_track_width = import.text_width ? import.text_width : txtw;
import.text_track_height = import.text_height ? import.text_height : txth;
import.text_width = txtw;
import.text_height = txth;
import.text_x = txtx;
import.text_y = txty;
}
check_track_for_svc = check_track_for_lhvc = check_track_for_hevc = 0;
import.dest = dest;
import.video_fps = force_fps;
import.frames_per_sample = frames_per_sample;
import.flags = import_flags;
if (!import.nb_tracks) {
u32 count, o_count;
o_count = gf_isom_get_track_count(import.dest);
e = gf_media_import(&import);
if (e) return e;
count = gf_isom_get_track_count(import.dest);
timescale = gf_isom_get_timescale(dest);
for (i=o_count; i<count; i++) {
if (szLan) gf_isom_set_media_language(import.dest, i+1, (char *) szLan);
if (delay) {
u64 tk_dur;
gf_isom_remove_edit_segments(import.dest, i+1);
tk_dur = gf_isom_get_track_duration(import.dest, i+1);
if (delay>0) {
gf_isom_append_edit_segment(import.dest, i+1, (timescale*delay)/1000, 0, GF_ISOM_EDIT_EMPTY);
gf_isom_append_edit_segment(import.dest, i+1, tk_dur, 0, GF_ISOM_EDIT_NORMAL);
} else if (delay<0) {
u64 to_skip = (timescale*(-delay))/1000;
if (to_skip<tk_dur) {
gf_isom_append_edit_segment(import.dest, i+1, tk_dur-to_skip, to_skip, GF_ISOM_EDIT_NORMAL);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: request negative delay longer than track duration - ignoring\n");
}
}
}
if ((par_n>=0) && (par_d>=0)) {
e = gf_media_change_par(import.dest, i+1, par_n, par_d);
}
if (rap_only || refs_only) {
e = gf_media_remove_non_rap(import.dest, i+1, refs_only);
}
if (handler_name) gf_isom_set_handler_name(import.dest, i+1, handler_name);
else if (!keep_handler) {
char szHName[1024];
const char *fName = gf_url_get_resource_name((const char *)inName);
fName = strchr(fName, '.');
if (fName) fName += 1;
else fName = "?";
sprintf(szHName, "*%s@GPAC%s", fName, GPAC_FULL_VERSION);
gf_isom_set_handler_name(import.dest, i+1, szHName);
}
if (handler) gf_isom_set_media_type(import.dest, i+1, handler);
if (disable) gf_isom_set_track_enabled(import.dest, i+1, 0);
if (group) {
gf_isom_set_alternate_group_id(import.dest, i+1, group);
}
if (track_layout) {
gf_isom_set_track_layout_info(import.dest, i+1, tw<<16, th<<16, tx<<16, ty<<16, 0);
}
if (stype)
gf_isom_set_media_subtype(import.dest, i+1, 1, stype);
if (is_chap && chap_ref) {
set_chapter_track(import.dest, i+1, chap_ref);
}
for (j = 0; j < gf_list_count(kinds); j+=2) {
char *kind_scheme = (char *)gf_list_get(kinds, j);
char *kind_value = (char *)gf_list_get(kinds, j+1);
gf_isom_add_track_kind(import.dest, i+1, kind_scheme, kind_value);
}
if (profile || level)
gf_media_change_pl(import.dest, i+1, profile, level);
if (gf_isom_get_media_subtype(import.dest, i+1, 1)== GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_MP4S)
keep_sys_tracks = 1;
gf_isom_set_composition_offset_mode(import.dest, i+1, negative_cts_offset);
if (gf_isom_get_avc_svc_type(import.dest, i+1, 1)>=GF_ISOM_AVCTYPE_AVC_SVC)
check_track_for_svc = i+1;
switch (gf_isom_get_hevc_lhvc_type(import.dest, i+1, 1)) {
case GF_ISOM_HEVCTYPE_HEVC_LHVC:
case GF_ISOM_HEVCTYPE_LHVC_ONLY:
check_track_for_lhvc = i+1;
break;
case GF_ISOM_HEVCTYPE_HEVC_ONLY:
check_track_for_hevc=1;
break;
}
if (txt_flags) {
gf_isom_text_set_display_flags(import.dest, i+1, 0, txt_flags, txt_mode);
}
if (force_rate>=0) {
gf_isom_update_bitrate(import.dest, i+1, 1, force_rate, force_rate, 0);
}
if (split_tile_mode) {
switch (gf_isom_get_media_subtype(import.dest, i+1, 1)) {
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_HVC1:
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_HEV1:
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_HVC2:
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_HEV2:
break;
default:
split_tile_mode = 0;
break;
}
}
}
} else {
if (do_all)
import.flags |= GF_IMPORT_KEEP_REFS;
for (i=0; i<import.nb_tracks; i++) {
import.trackID = import.tk_info[i].track_num;
if (prog_id) {
if (import.tk_info[i].prog_num!=prog_id) continue;
e = gf_media_import(&import);
}
else if (do_all) e = gf_media_import(&import);
else if (track_id && (track_id==import.trackID)) {
track_id = 0;
e = gf_media_import(&import);
}
else if (do_audio && (import.tk_info[i].type==GF_ISOM_MEDIA_AUDIO)) {
do_audio = 0;
e = gf_media_import(&import);
}
else if (do_video && (import.tk_info[i].type==GF_ISOM_MEDIA_VISUAL)) {
do_video = 0;
e = gf_media_import(&import);
}
else if (do_auxv && (import.tk_info[i].type==GF_ISOM_MEDIA_AUXV)) {
do_auxv = 0;
e = gf_media_import(&import);
}
else if (do_pict && (import.tk_info[i].type==GF_ISOM_MEDIA_PICT)) {
do_pict = 0;
e = gf_media_import(&import);
}
else continue;
if (e) goto exit;
timescale = gf_isom_get_timescale(dest);
track = gf_isom_get_track_by_id(import.dest, import.final_trackID);
if (szLan) gf_isom_set_media_language(import.dest, track, (char *) szLan);
if (disable) gf_isom_set_track_enabled(import.dest, track, 0);
if (delay) {
u64 tk_dur;
gf_isom_remove_edit_segments(import.dest, track);
tk_dur = gf_isom_get_track_duration(import.dest, track);
if (delay>0) {
gf_isom_append_edit_segment(import.dest, track, (timescale*delay)/1000, 0, GF_ISOM_EDIT_EMPTY);
gf_isom_append_edit_segment(import.dest, track, tk_dur, 0, GF_ISOM_EDIT_NORMAL);
} else {
u64 to_skip = (timescale*(-delay))/1000;
if (to_skip<tk_dur) {
u64 media_time = (-delay)*gf_isom_get_media_timescale(import.dest, track) / 1000;
gf_isom_append_edit_segment(import.dest, track, tk_dur-to_skip, media_time, GF_ISOM_EDIT_NORMAL);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: request negative delay longer than track duration - ignoring\n");
}
}
}
if (gf_isom_is_video_subtype(import.tk_info[i].type) && (par_n>=-1) && (par_d>=-1)) {
e = gf_media_change_par(import.dest, track, par_n, par_d);
}
if (rap_only || refs_only) {
e = gf_media_remove_non_rap(import.dest, track, refs_only);
}
if (handler_name) gf_isom_set_handler_name(import.dest, track, handler_name);
else if (!keep_handler) {
char szHName[1024];
const char *fName = gf_url_get_resource_name((const char *)inName);
fName = strchr(fName, '.');
if (fName) fName += 1;
else fName = "?";
sprintf(szHName, "%s@GPAC%s", fName, GPAC_FULL_VERSION);
gf_isom_set_handler_name(import.dest, track, szHName);
}
if (handler) gf_isom_set_media_type(import.dest, track, handler);
if (group) {
gf_isom_set_alternate_group_id(import.dest, track, group);
}
if (track_layout) {
gf_isom_set_track_layout_info(import.dest, track, tw<<16, th<<16, tx<<16, ty<<16, 0);
}
if (stype)
gf_isom_set_media_subtype(import.dest, track, 1, stype);
if (is_chap && chap_ref) {
set_chapter_track(import.dest, track, chap_ref);
}
for (j = 0; j < gf_list_count(kinds); j+=2) {
char *kind_scheme = (char *)gf_list_get(kinds, j);
char *kind_value = (char *)gf_list_get(kinds, j+1);
gf_isom_add_track_kind(import.dest, i+1, kind_scheme, kind_value);
}
if (profile || level)
gf_media_change_pl(import.dest, track, profile, level);
if (gf_isom_get_mpeg4_subtype(import.dest, track, 1))
keep_sys_tracks = 1;
if (new_timescale>1) {
gf_isom_set_media_timescale(import.dest, track, new_timescale, 0);
}
if (rescale>1) {
switch (gf_isom_get_media_type(import.dest, track)) {
case GF_ISOM_MEDIA_AUDIO:
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot force media timescale for audio media types - ignoring\n");
break;
default:
gf_isom_set_media_timescale(import.dest, track, rescale, 1);
break;
}
}
if (rvc_config) {
FILE *f = gf_fopen(rvc_config, "rb");
if (f) {
char *data;
u32 size;
size_t read;
gf_fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END);
size = (u32) gf_ftell(f);
gf_fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET);
data = gf_malloc(sizeof(char)*size);
read = fread(data, 1, size, f);
gf_fclose(f);
if (read != size) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: could not read rvc config from %s\n", rvc_config);
e = GF_IO_ERR;
goto exit;
}
#ifdef GPAC_DISABLE_ZLIB
fprintf(stderr, "Error: no zlib support - RVC not available\n");
e = GF_NOT_SUPPORTED;
goto exit;
#else
gf_gz_compress_payload(&data, size, &size);
#endif
gf_isom_set_rvc_config(import.dest, track, 1, 0, "application/rvc-config+xml+gz", data, size);
gf_free(data);
}
} else if (rvc_predefined>0) {
gf_isom_set_rvc_config(import.dest, track, 1, rvc_predefined, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
gf_isom_set_composition_offset_mode(import.dest, track, negative_cts_offset);
if (gf_isom_get_avc_svc_type(import.dest, track, 1)>=GF_ISOM_AVCTYPE_AVC_SVC)
check_track_for_svc = track;
switch (gf_isom_get_hevc_lhvc_type(import.dest, track, 1)) {
case GF_ISOM_HEVCTYPE_HEVC_LHVC:
case GF_ISOM_HEVCTYPE_LHVC_ONLY:
check_track_for_lhvc = i+1;
break;
case GF_ISOM_HEVCTYPE_HEVC_ONLY:
check_track_for_hevc=1;
break;
}
if (txt_flags) {
gf_isom_text_set_display_flags(import.dest, track, 0, txt_flags, txt_mode);
}
if (force_rate>=0) {
gf_isom_update_bitrate(import.dest, i+1, 1, force_rate, force_rate, 0);
}
if (split_tile_mode) {
switch (gf_isom_get_media_subtype(import.dest, track, 1)) {
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_HVC1:
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_HEV1:
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_HVC2:
case GF_ISOM_SUBTYPE_HEV2:
break;
default:
split_tile_mode = 0;
break;
}
}
}
if (track_id) fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Track ID %d not found in file\n", track_id);
else if (do_video) fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Video track not found\n");
else if (do_auxv) fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Auxiliary Video track not found\n");
else if (do_pict) fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Picture sequence track not found\n");
else if (do_audio) fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Audio track not found\n");
}
if (chapter_name) {
if (is_chap_file) {
e = gf_media_import_chapters(import.dest, chapter_name, 0);
} else {
e = gf_isom_add_chapter(import.dest, 0, 0, chapter_name);
}
}
/*force to rewrite all dependencies*/
for (i = 1; i <= gf_isom_get_track_count(import.dest); i++)
{
e = gf_isom_rewrite_track_dependencies(import.dest, i);
if (e) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("Warning: track ID %d has references to a track not imported\n", gf_isom_get_track_id(import.dest, i) ));
e = GF_OK;
}
}
if (max_layer_id_plus_one || max_temporal_id_plus_one) {
for (i = 1; i <= gf_isom_get_track_count(import.dest); i++)
{
e = gf_media_filter_hevc(import.dest, i, max_temporal_id_plus_one, max_layer_id_plus_one);
if (e) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: track ID %d: error while filtering LHVC layers\n", gf_isom_get_track_id(import.dest, i));
e = GF_OK;
}
}
}
if (check_track_for_svc) {
if (svc_mode) {
e = gf_media_split_svc(import.dest, check_track_for_svc, (svc_mode==2) ? 1 : 0);
if (e) goto exit;
} else {
e = gf_media_merge_svc(import.dest, check_track_for_svc, 1);
if (e) goto exit;
}
}
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_HEVC
if (check_track_for_lhvc) {
if (svc_mode) {
GF_LHVCExtractoreMode xmode = GF_LHVC_EXTRACTORS_ON;
if (svc_mode==3) xmode = GF_LHVC_EXTRACTORS_OFF;
else if (svc_mode==4) xmode = GF_LHVC_EXTRACTORS_OFF_FORCE_INBAND;
e = gf_media_split_lhvc(import.dest, check_track_for_lhvc, GF_FALSE, (svc_mode==1) ? 0 : 1, xmode );
if (e) goto exit;
} else {
}
}
if (check_track_for_hevc) {
if (split_tile_mode) {
e = gf_media_split_hevc_tiles(import.dest, split_tile_mode - 1);
if (e) goto exit;
}
if (temporal_mode) {
GF_LHVCExtractoreMode xmode = (temporal_mode==3) ? GF_LHVC_EXTRACTORS_OFF : GF_LHVC_EXTRACTORS_ON;
e = gf_media_split_lhvc(import.dest, check_track_for_hevc, GF_TRUE, (temporal_mode==1) ? GF_FALSE : GF_TRUE, xmode );
if (e) goto exit;
}
}
#endif /*GPAC_DISABLE_HEVC*/
exit:
while (gf_list_count(kinds)) {
char *kind = (char *)gf_list_get(kinds, 0);
gf_list_rem(kinds, 0);
if (kind) gf_free(kind);
}
gf_list_del(kinds);
if (handler_name) gf_free(handler_name);
if (chapter_name ) gf_free(chapter_name);
if (import.fontName) gf_free(import.fontName);
if (import.streamFormat) gf_free(import.streamFormat);
if (import.force_ext) gf_free(import.force_ext);
if (rvc_config) gf_free(rvc_config);
if (szLan) gf_free((char *)szLan);
return e;
}
Commit Message: fix some overflows due to strcpy
fixes #1184, #1186, #1187 among other things
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,347
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _dbus_path_is_absolute (const DBusString *filename)
{
if (_dbus_string_get_length (filename) > 0)
return _dbus_string_get_byte (filename, 1) == ':'
|| _dbus_string_get_byte (filename, 0) == '\\'
|| _dbus_string_get_byte (filename, 0) == '/';
else
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,562
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gpgsm_set_locale (void *engine, int category, const char *value)
{
engine_gpgsm_t gpgsm = engine;
gpgme_error_t err;
char *optstr;
char *catstr;
/* FIXME: If value is NULL, we need to reset the option to default.
But we can't do this. So we error out here. GPGSM needs support
for this. */
if (0)
;
#ifdef LC_CTYPE
else if (category == LC_CTYPE)
{
catstr = "lc-ctype";
if (!value && gpgsm->lc_ctype_set)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
if (value)
gpgsm->lc_ctype_set = 1;
}
#endif
#ifdef LC_MESSAGES
else if (category == LC_MESSAGES)
{
catstr = "lc-messages";
if (!value && gpgsm->lc_messages_set)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
if (value)
gpgsm->lc_messages_set = 1;
}
#endif /* LC_MESSAGES */
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
/* FIXME: Reset value to default. */
if (!value)
return 0;
if (asprintf (&optstr, "OPTION %s=%s", catstr, value) < 0)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
{
err = assuan_transact (gpgsm->assuan_ctx, optstr, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
free (optstr);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,912
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: json_t *json_string_nocheck(const char *value)
{
json_string_t *string;
if(!value)
return NULL;
string = jsonp_malloc(sizeof(json_string_t));
if(!string)
return NULL;
json_init(&string->json, JSON_STRING);
string->value = jsonp_strdup(value);
if(!string->value) {
jsonp_free(string);
return NULL;
}
return &string->json;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 14,847
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __f2fs_replace_block(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct f2fs_summary *sum,
block_t old_blkaddr, block_t new_blkaddr,
bool recover_curseg, bool recover_newaddr)
{
struct sit_info *sit_i = SIT_I(sbi);
struct curseg_info *curseg;
unsigned int segno, old_cursegno;
struct seg_entry *se;
int type;
unsigned short old_blkoff;
segno = GET_SEGNO(sbi, new_blkaddr);
se = get_seg_entry(sbi, segno);
type = se->type;
if (!recover_curseg) {
/* for recovery flow */
if (se->valid_blocks == 0 && !IS_CURSEG(sbi, segno)) {
if (old_blkaddr == NULL_ADDR)
type = CURSEG_COLD_DATA;
else
type = CURSEG_WARM_DATA;
}
} else {
if (!IS_CURSEG(sbi, segno))
type = CURSEG_WARM_DATA;
}
curseg = CURSEG_I(sbi, type);
mutex_lock(&curseg->curseg_mutex);
mutex_lock(&sit_i->sentry_lock);
old_cursegno = curseg->segno;
old_blkoff = curseg->next_blkoff;
/* change the current segment */
if (segno != curseg->segno) {
curseg->next_segno = segno;
change_curseg(sbi, type, true);
}
curseg->next_blkoff = GET_BLKOFF_FROM_SEG0(sbi, new_blkaddr);
__add_sum_entry(sbi, type, sum);
if (!recover_curseg || recover_newaddr)
update_sit_entry(sbi, new_blkaddr, 1);
if (GET_SEGNO(sbi, old_blkaddr) != NULL_SEGNO)
update_sit_entry(sbi, old_blkaddr, -1);
locate_dirty_segment(sbi, GET_SEGNO(sbi, old_blkaddr));
locate_dirty_segment(sbi, GET_SEGNO(sbi, new_blkaddr));
locate_dirty_segment(sbi, old_cursegno);
if (recover_curseg) {
if (old_cursegno != curseg->segno) {
curseg->next_segno = old_cursegno;
change_curseg(sbi, type, true);
}
curseg->next_blkoff = old_blkoff;
}
mutex_unlock(&sit_i->sentry_lock);
mutex_unlock(&curseg->curseg_mutex);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 25,272
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CameraClient::~CameraClient() {
Mutex* lock = mCameraService->getClientLockById(mCameraId);
lock->lock();
mDestructionStarted = true;
lock->unlock();
int callingPid = getCallingPid();
LOG1("CameraClient::~CameraClient E (pid %d, this %p)", callingPid, this);
disconnect();
LOG1("CameraClient::~CameraClient X (pid %d, this %p)", callingPid, this);
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,509
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int should_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *link,
int follow,
struct inode *inode, unsigned seq)
{
if (likely(!d_is_symlink(link->dentry)))
return 0;
if (!follow)
return 0;
/* make sure that d_is_symlink above matches inode */
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
if (read_seqcount_retry(&link->dentry->d_seq, seq))
return -ECHILD;
}
return pick_link(nd, link, inode, seq);
}
Commit Message: vfs: rename: check backing inode being equal
If a file is renamed to a hardlink of itself POSIX specifies that rename(2)
should do nothing and return success.
This condition is checked in vfs_rename(). However it won't detect hard
links on overlayfs where these are given separate inodes on the overlayfs
layer.
Overlayfs itself detects this condition and returns success without doing
anything, but then vfs_rename() will proceed as if this was a successful
rename (detach_mounts(), d_move()).
The correct thing to do is to detect this condition before even calling
into overlayfs. This patch does this by calling vfs_select_inode() to get
the underlying inodes.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 1
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: http_DissectRequest(struct sess *sp)
{
struct http_conn *htc;
struct http *hp;
uint16_t retval;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(sp, SESS_MAGIC);
htc = sp->htc;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(htc, HTTP_CONN_MAGIC);
hp = sp->http;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(hp, HTTP_MAGIC);
hp->logtag = HTTP_Rx;
retval = http_splitline(sp->wrk, sp->fd, hp, htc,
HTTP_HDR_REQ, HTTP_HDR_URL, HTTP_HDR_PROTO);
if (retval != 0) {
WSPR(sp, SLT_HttpGarbage, htc->rxbuf);
return (retval);
}
http_ProtoVer(hp);
retval = htc_request_check_host_hdr(hp);
if (retval != 0) {
WSP(sp, SLT_Error, "Duplicated Host header");
return (retval);
}
return (retval);
}
Commit Message: Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests
If a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a
400 (Bad Request)
Fix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would
not fail because of that.
CWE ID:
| 1
| 90
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: doshn(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off, int num,
size_t size, off_t fsize, int mach, int strtab, int *flags,
uint16_t *notecount)
{
Elf32_Shdr sh32;
Elf64_Shdr sh64;
int stripped = 1;
size_t nbadcap = 0;
void *nbuf;
off_t noff, coff, name_off;
uint64_t cap_hw1 = 0; /* SunOS 5.x hardware capabilites */
uint64_t cap_sf1 = 0; /* SunOS 5.x software capabilites */
char name[50];
ssize_t namesize;
if (size != xsh_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted section header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/* Read offset of name section to be able to read section names later */
if (pread(fd, xsh_addr, xsh_sizeof, CAST(off_t, (off + size * strtab)))
< (ssize_t)xsh_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
name_off = xsh_offset;
for ( ; num; num--) {
/* Read the name of this section. */
if ((namesize = pread(fd, name, sizeof(name) - 1, name_off + xsh_name)) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
name[namesize] = '\0';
if (strcmp(name, ".debug_info") == 0)
stripped = 0;
if (pread(fd, xsh_addr, xsh_sizeof, off) < (ssize_t)xsh_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
/* Things we can determine before we seek */
switch (xsh_type) {
case SHT_SYMTAB:
#if 0
case SHT_DYNSYM:
#endif
stripped = 0;
break;
default:
if (fsize != SIZE_UNKNOWN && xsh_offset > fsize) {
/* Perhaps warn here */
continue;
}
break;
}
/* Things we can determine when we seek */
switch (xsh_type) {
case SHT_NOTE:
if ((uintmax_t)(xsh_size + xsh_offset) >
(uintmax_t)fsize) {
if (file_printf(ms,
", note offset/size 0x%" INTMAX_T_FORMAT
"x+0x%" INTMAX_T_FORMAT "x exceeds"
" file size 0x%" INTMAX_T_FORMAT "x",
(uintmax_t)xsh_offset, (uintmax_t)xsh_size,
(uintmax_t)fsize) == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
if ((nbuf = malloc(xsh_size)) == NULL) {
file_error(ms, errno, "Cannot allocate memory"
" for note");
return -1;
}
if (pread(fd, nbuf, xsh_size, xsh_offset) <
(ssize_t)xsh_size) {
file_badread(ms);
free(nbuf);
return -1;
}
noff = 0;
for (;;) {
if (noff >= (off_t)xsh_size)
break;
noff = donote(ms, nbuf, (size_t)noff,
xsh_size, clazz, swap, 4, flags, notecount,
fd, 0, 0, 0);
if (noff == 0)
break;
}
free(nbuf);
break;
case SHT_SUNW_cap:
switch (mach) {
case EM_SPARC:
case EM_SPARCV9:
case EM_IA_64:
case EM_386:
case EM_AMD64:
break;
default:
goto skip;
}
if (nbadcap > 5)
break;
if (lseek(fd, xsh_offset, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) {
file_badseek(ms);
return -1;
}
coff = 0;
for (;;) {
Elf32_Cap cap32;
Elf64_Cap cap64;
char cbuf[/*CONSTCOND*/
MAX(sizeof cap32, sizeof cap64)];
if ((coff += xcap_sizeof) > (off_t)xsh_size)
break;
if (read(fd, cbuf, (size_t)xcap_sizeof) !=
(ssize_t)xcap_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
if (cbuf[0] == 'A') {
#ifdef notyet
char *p = cbuf + 1;
uint32_t len, tag;
memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
p += 4;
len = getu32(swap, len);
if (memcmp("gnu", p, 3) != 0) {
if (file_printf(ms,
", unknown capability %.3s", p)
== -1)
return -1;
break;
}
p += strlen(p) + 1;
tag = *p++;
memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
p += 4;
len = getu32(swap, len);
if (tag != 1) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", unknown gnu"
" capability tag %d", tag)
== -1)
return -1;
break;
}
#endif
break;
}
(void)memcpy(xcap_addr, cbuf, xcap_sizeof);
switch (xcap_tag) {
case CA_SUNW_NULL:
break;
case CA_SUNW_HW_1:
cap_hw1 |= xcap_val;
break;
case CA_SUNW_SF_1:
cap_sf1 |= xcap_val;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms,
", with unknown capability "
"0x%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x = 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)xcap_tag,
(unsigned long long)xcap_val) == -1)
return -1;
if (nbadcap++ > 2)
coff = xsh_size;
break;
}
}
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
skip:
default:
break;
}
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", %sstripped", stripped ? "" : "not ") == -1)
return -1;
if (cap_hw1) {
const cap_desc_t *cdp;
switch (mach) {
case EM_SPARC:
case EM_SPARC32PLUS:
case EM_SPARCV9:
cdp = cap_desc_sparc;
break;
case EM_386:
case EM_IA_64:
case EM_AMD64:
cdp = cap_desc_386;
break;
default:
cdp = NULL;
break;
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", uses") == -1)
return -1;
if (cdp) {
while (cdp->cd_name) {
if (cap_hw1 & cdp->cd_mask) {
if (file_printf(ms,
" %s", cdp->cd_name) == -1)
return -1;
cap_hw1 &= ~cdp->cd_mask;
}
++cdp;
}
if (cap_hw1)
if (file_printf(ms,
" unknown hardware capability 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_hw1) == -1)
return -1;
} else {
if (file_printf(ms,
" hardware capability 0x%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_hw1) == -1)
return -1;
}
}
if (cap_sf1) {
if (cap_sf1 & SF1_SUNW_FPUSED) {
if (file_printf(ms,
(cap_sf1 & SF1_SUNW_FPKNWN)
? ", uses frame pointer"
: ", not known to use frame pointer") == -1)
return -1;
}
cap_sf1 &= ~SF1_SUNW_MASK;
if (cap_sf1)
if (file_printf(ms,
", with unknown software capability 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_sf1) == -1)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Extend build-id reporting to 8-byte IDs that lld can generate (Ed Maste)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 23,183
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::ResetCompositorFrameSinkSupport() {
if (!support_)
return;
if (compositor_)
compositor_->RemoveFrameSink(frame_sink_id_);
support_.reset();
}
Commit Message: mac: Make RWHVMac::ClearCompositorFrame clear locks
Ensure that the BrowserCompositorMac not hold on to a compositor lock
when requested to clear its compositor frame. This lock may be held
indefinitely (if the renderer hangs) and so the frame will never be
cleared.
Bug: 739621
Change-Id: I15d0e82bdf632f3379a48e959f198afb8a4ac218
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/608239
Commit-Queue: ccameron chromium <ccameron@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#493563}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,615
|
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