instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabStrip::SetStackedLayout(bool stacked_layout) {
if (stacked_layout == stacked_layout_)
return;
stacked_layout_ = stacked_layout;
SetResetToShrinkOnExit(false);
SwapLayoutIfNecessary();
const int active_index = controller_->GetActiveIndex();
if (touch_layout_ && active_index != -1) {
touch_layout_->SetActiveTabLocation(ideal_bounds(active_index).x());
AnimateToIdealBounds();
}
for (int i = 0; i < tab_count(); ++i)
tab_at(i)->Layout();
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,205
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: archive_acl_add_entry_len_l(struct archive_acl *acl,
int type, int permset, int tag, int id, const char *name, size_t len,
struct archive_string_conv *sc)
{
struct archive_acl_entry *ap;
int r;
if (acl_special(acl, type, permset, tag) == 0)
return ARCHIVE_OK;
ap = acl_new_entry(acl, type, permset, tag, id);
if (ap == NULL) {
/* XXX Error XXX */
return ARCHIVE_FAILED;
}
if (name != NULL && *name != '\0' && len > 0) {
r = archive_mstring_copy_mbs_len_l(&ap->name, name, len, sc);
} else {
r = 0;
archive_mstring_clean(&ap->name);
}
if (r == 0)
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
else if (errno == ENOMEM)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
else
return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
Commit Message: Skip 0-length ACL fields
Currently, it is possible to create an archive that crashes bsdtar
with a malformed ACL:
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
archive_acl_from_text_l (acl=<optimised out>, text=0x7e2e92 "", want_type=<optimised out>, sc=<optimised out>) at libarchive/archive_acl.c:1726
1726 switch (*s) {
(gdb) p n
$1 = 1
(gdb) p field[n]
$2 = {start = 0x0, end = 0x0}
Stop this by checking that the length is not zero before beginning
the switch statement.
I am pretty sure this is the bug mentioned in the qsym paper [1],
and I was able to replicate it with a qsym + AFL + afl-rb setup.
[1] https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/yun
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 17,611
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentWriter::end()
{
m_frame->loader()->didEndDocument();
endIfNotLoadingMainResource();
}
Commit Message: Remove DocumentWriter::setDecoder as a grep of WebKit shows no callers
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=67803
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
Smells like dead code.
* loader/DocumentWriter.cpp:
* loader/DocumentWriter.h:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@94800 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 17,131
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MaybeActivateProfile() {
if (!profile_to_activate_)
return;
auto i = launched_profiles_.begin();
for (; i != launched_profiles_.end(); ++i) {
if (opened_profiles_.find(*i) == opened_profiles_.end())
return;
}
base::PostTask(FROM_HERE, {BrowserThread::UI},
base::BindOnce(&ProfileLaunchObserver::ActivateProfile,
base::Unretained(this)));
registrar_.RemoveAll();
BrowserList::RemoveObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Prevent regular mode session startup pref type turning to default.
When user loses past session tabs of regular mode after
invoking a new window from the incognito mode.
This was happening because the SessionStartUpPref type was being set
to default, from last, for regular user mode. This was happening in
the RestoreIfNecessary method where the restoration was taking place
for users whose SessionStartUpPref type was set to last.
The fix was to make the protocol of changing the pref type to
default more explicit to incognito users and not regular users
of pref type last.
Bug: 481373
Change-Id: I96efb4cf196949312181c83c6dcd45986ddded13
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1774441
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rohit Agarwal <roagarwal@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691726}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 16,916
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::RaisesExceptionLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_raisesExceptionLongAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::RaisesExceptionLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,732
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplDoublyLinkedList, push)
{
zval *value;
spl_dllist_object *intern;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "z", &value) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern = Z_SPLDLLIST_P(getThis());
spl_ptr_llist_push(intern->llist, value);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #71735: Double-free in SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 12,938
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned HuffmanTree_makeFromLengths2(HuffmanTree* tree)
{
uivector blcount;
uivector nextcode;
unsigned bits, n, error = 0;
uivector_init(&blcount);
uivector_init(&nextcode);
tree->tree1d = (unsigned*)calloc(tree->numcodes, sizeof(unsigned));
if(!tree->tree1d) error = 83; /*alloc fail*/
if(!uivector_resizev(&blcount, tree->maxbitlen + 1, 0)
|| !uivector_resizev(&nextcode, tree->maxbitlen + 1, 0))
error = 83; /*alloc fail*/
if(!error)
{
/*step 1: count number of instances of each code length*/
for(bits = 0; bits < tree->numcodes; bits++) blcount.data[tree->lengths[bits]]++;
/*step 2: generate the nextcode values*/
for(bits = 1; bits <= tree->maxbitlen; bits++)
{
nextcode.data[bits] = (nextcode.data[bits - 1] + blcount.data[bits - 1]) << 1;
}
/*step 3: generate all the codes*/
for(n = 0; n < tree->numcodes; n++)
{
if(tree->lengths[n] != 0) tree->tree1d[n] = nextcode.data[tree->lengths[n]]++;
}
}
uivector_cleanup(&blcount);
uivector_cleanup(&nextcode);
if(!error) return HuffmanTree_make2DTree(tree);
else return error;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 16,729
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::NotifyBeforeFormRepostWarningShow() {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.BeforeFormRepostWarningShow();
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,319
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned long long task_sched_runtime(struct task_struct *p)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct rq *rq;
u64 ns = 0;
#if defined(CONFIG_64BIT) && defined(CONFIG_SMP)
/*
* 64-bit doesn't need locks to atomically read a 64bit value.
* So we have a optimization chance when the task's delta_exec is 0.
* Reading ->on_cpu is racy, but this is ok.
*
* If we race with it leaving cpu, we'll take a lock. So we're correct.
* If we race with it entering cpu, unaccounted time is 0. This is
* indistinguishable from the read occurring a few cycles earlier.
*/
if (!p->on_cpu)
return p->se.sum_exec_runtime;
#endif
rq = task_rq_lock(p, &flags);
ns = p->se.sum_exec_runtime + do_task_delta_exec(p, rq);
task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &flags);
return ns;
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 17,097
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nl80211_valid_4addr(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
struct net_device *netdev, u8 use_4addr,
enum nl80211_iftype iftype)
{
if (!use_4addr) {
if (netdev && (netdev->priv_flags & IFF_BRIDGE_PORT))
return -EBUSY;
return 0;
}
switch (iftype) {
case NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN:
if (rdev->wiphy.flags & WIPHY_FLAG_4ADDR_AP)
return 0;
break;
case NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION:
if (rdev->wiphy.flags & WIPHY_FLAG_4ADDR_STATION)
return 0;
break;
default:
break;
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,778
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ping_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
read_unlock_bh(&ping_table.lock);
}
Commit Message: ping: prevent NULL pointer dereference on write to msg_name
A plain read() on a socket does set msg->msg_name to NULL. So check for
NULL pointer first.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,312
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AppCache::AddOrModifyEntry(const GURL& url, const AppCacheEntry& entry) {
std::pair<EntryMap::iterator, bool> ret =
entries_.insert(EntryMap::value_type(url, entry));
if (!ret.second)
ret.first->second.add_types(entry.types());
else
cache_size_ += entry.response_size(); // New entry. Add to cache size.
return ret.second;
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 26,663
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnDidDownloadImage(
int id,
int http_status_code,
const GURL& image_url,
int requested_size,
const std::vector<SkBitmap>& bitmaps) {
ImageDownloadMap::iterator iter = image_download_map_.find(id);
if (iter == image_download_map_.end()) {
return;
}
if (!iter->second.is_null()) {
iter->second.Run(id, http_status_code, image_url, requested_size, bitmaps);
}
image_download_map_.erase(id);
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 24,200
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void xacct_add_tsk(struct taskstats *stats, struct task_struct *p)
{
/* convert pages-jiffies to Mbyte-usec */
stats->coremem = jiffies_to_usecs(p->acct_rss_mem1) * PAGE_SIZE / MB;
stats->virtmem = jiffies_to_usecs(p->acct_vm_mem1) * PAGE_SIZE / MB;
if (p->mm) {
/* adjust to KB unit */
stats->hiwater_rss = p->mm->hiwater_rss * PAGE_SIZE / KB;
stats->hiwater_vm = p->mm->hiwater_vm * PAGE_SIZE / KB;
}
stats->read_char = p->rchar;
stats->write_char = p->wchar;
stats->read_syscalls = p->syscr;
stats->write_syscalls = p->syscw;
}
Commit Message: [PATCH] xacct_add_tsk: fix pure theoretical ->mm use-after-free
Paranoid fix. The task can free its ->mm after the 'if (p->mm)' check.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Shailabh Nagar <nagar@watson.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Jay Lan <jlan@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 29,655
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pcrypt_free(struct crypto_instance *inst)
{
struct pcrypt_instance_ctx *ctx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
crypto_drop_spawn(&ctx->spawn);
kfree(inst);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,256
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int find_sys_file(struct mschm_decompressor_p *self,
struct mschmd_sec_mscompressed *sec,
struct mschmd_file **f_ptr, const char *name)
{
struct mspack_system *sys = self->system;
struct mschmd_file result;
/* already loaded */
if (*f_ptr) return MSPACK_ERR_OK;
/* try using fast_find to find the file - return DATAFORMAT error if
* it fails, or successfully doesn't find the file */
if (chmd_fast_find((struct mschm_decompressor *) self, sec->base.chm,
name, &result, (int)sizeof(result)) || !result.section)
{
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
if (!(*f_ptr = (struct mschmd_file *) sys->alloc(sys, sizeof(result)))) {
return MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
}
/* copy result */
*(*f_ptr) = result;
(*f_ptr)->filename = (char *) name;
/* link file into sysfiles list */
(*f_ptr)->next = sec->base.chm->sysfiles;
sec->base.chm->sysfiles = *f_ptr;
return MSPACK_ERR_OK;
}
Commit Message: length checks when looking for control files
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,262
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sapi_globals_dtor(sapi_globals_struct *sapi_globals TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_hash_destroy(&sapi_globals->known_post_content_types);
}
Commit Message: Update header handling to RFC 7230
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 28,461
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void dwc3_gadget_exit(struct dwc3 *dwc)
{
usb_del_gadget_udc(&dwc->gadget);
dwc3_gadget_free_endpoints(dwc);
dma_free_coherent(dwc->sysdev, DWC3_BOUNCE_SIZE, dwc->bounce,
dwc->bounce_addr);
kfree(dwc->setup_buf);
dma_free_coherent(dwc->sysdev, sizeof(*dwc->ep0_trb) * 2,
dwc->ep0_trb, dwc->ep0_trb_addr);
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 6,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned char mincore_page(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t pgoff)
{
unsigned char present = 0;
struct page *page;
/*
* When tmpfs swaps out a page from a file, any process mapping that
* file will not get a swp_entry_t in its pte, but rather it is like
* any other file mapping (ie. marked !present and faulted in with
* tmpfs's .fault). So swapped out tmpfs mappings are tested here.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
if (shmem_mapping(mapping)) {
page = find_get_entry(mapping, pgoff);
/*
* shmem/tmpfs may return swap: account for swapcache
* page too.
*/
if (xa_is_value(page)) {
swp_entry_t swp = radix_to_swp_entry(page);
page = find_get_page(swap_address_space(swp),
swp_offset(swp));
}
} else
page = find_get_page(mapping, pgoff);
#else
page = find_get_page(mapping, pgoff);
#endif
if (page) {
present = PageUptodate(page);
put_page(page);
}
return present;
}
Commit Message: Change mincore() to count "mapped" pages rather than "cached" pages
The semantics of what "in core" means for the mincore() system call are
somewhat unclear, but Linux has always (since 2.3.52, which is when
mincore() was initially done) treated it as "page is available in page
cache" rather than "page is mapped in the mapping".
The problem with that traditional semantic is that it exposes a lot of
system cache state that it really probably shouldn't, and that users
shouldn't really even care about.
So let's try to avoid that information leak by simply changing the
semantics to be that mincore() counts actual mapped pages, not pages
that might be cheaply mapped if they were faulted (note the "might be"
part of the old semantics: being in the cache doesn't actually guarantee
that you can access them without IO anyway, since things like network
filesystems may have to revalidate the cache before use).
In many ways the old semantics were somewhat insane even aside from the
information leak issue. From the very beginning (and that beginning is
a long time ago: 2.3.52 was released in March 2000, I think), the code
had a comment saying
Later we can get more picky about what "in core" means precisely.
and this is that "later". Admittedly it is much later than is really
comfortable.
NOTE! This is a real semantic change, and it is for example known to
change the output of "fincore", since that program literally does a
mmmap without populating it, and then doing "mincore()" on that mapping
that doesn't actually have any pages in it.
I'm hoping that nobody actually has any workflow that cares, and the
info leak is real.
We may have to do something different if it turns out that people have
valid reasons to want the old semantics, and if we can limit the
information leak sanely.
Cc: Kevin Easton <kevin@guarana.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Masatake YAMATO <yamato@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 19,328
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: krb5_gss_process_context_token(minor_status, context_handle,
token_buffer)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_buffer_t token_buffer;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
OM_uint32 majerr;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
/* "unseal" the token */
if (GSS_ERROR(majerr = kg_unseal(minor_status, context_handle,
token_buffer,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, NULL, NULL,
KG_TOK_DEL_CTX)))
return(majerr);
/* that's it. delete the context */
return(krb5_gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status, &context_handle,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER));
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
| 1
| 329
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _exsltDateParseGMonth (exsltDateValDatePtr dt, const xmlChar **str)
{
const xmlChar *cur = *str;
int ret = 0;
PARSE_2_DIGITS(dt->mon, cur, VALID_MONTH, ret);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
*str = cur;
#ifdef DEBUG_EXSLT_DATE
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Parsed month %02i\n", dt->mon);
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,938
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: crm_ipc_send(crm_ipc_t * client, xmlNode * message, enum crm_ipc_flags flags, int32_t ms_timeout,
xmlNode ** reply)
{
long rc = 0;
struct iovec *iov;
static uint32_t id = 0;
static int factor = 8;
struct crm_ipc_response_header *header;
crm_ipc_init();
if (client == NULL) {
crm_notice("Invalid connection");
return -ENOTCONN;
} else if (crm_ipc_connected(client) == FALSE) {
/* Don't even bother */
crm_notice("Connection to %s closed", client->name);
return -ENOTCONN;
}
if (ms_timeout == 0) {
ms_timeout = 5000;
}
if (client->need_reply) {
crm_trace("Trying again to obtain pending reply from %s", client->name);
rc = qb_ipcc_recv(client->ipc, client->buffer, client->buf_size, ms_timeout);
if (rc < 0) {
crm_warn("Sending to %s (%p) is disabled until pending reply is received", client->name,
client->ipc);
return -EALREADY;
} else {
crm_notice("Lost reply from %s (%p) finally arrived, sending re-enabled", client->name,
client->ipc);
client->need_reply = FALSE;
}
}
id++;
CRM_LOG_ASSERT(id != 0); /* Crude wrap-around detection */
rc = crm_ipc_prepare(id, message, &iov, client->max_buf_size);
if(rc < 0) {
return rc;
}
header = iov[0].iov_base;
header->flags |= flags;
if(is_set(flags, crm_ipc_proxied)) {
/* Don't look for a synchronous response */
clear_bit(flags, crm_ipc_client_response);
}
if(header->size_compressed) {
if(factor < 10 && (client->max_buf_size / 10) < (rc / factor)) {
crm_notice("Compressed message exceeds %d0%% of the configured ipc limit (%u bytes), "
"consider setting PCMK_ipc_buffer to %u or higher",
factor, client->max_buf_size, 2 * client->max_buf_size);
factor++;
}
}
crm_trace("Sending from client: %s request id: %d bytes: %u timeout:%d msg...",
client->name, header->qb.id, header->qb.size, ms_timeout);
if (ms_timeout > 0 || is_not_set(flags, crm_ipc_client_response)) {
rc = internal_ipc_send_request(client, iov, ms_timeout);
if (rc <= 0) {
crm_trace("Failed to send from client %s request %d with %u bytes...",
client->name, header->qb.id, header->qb.size);
goto send_cleanup;
} else if (is_not_set(flags, crm_ipc_client_response)) {
crm_trace("Message sent, not waiting for reply to %d from %s to %u bytes...",
header->qb.id, client->name, header->qb.size);
goto send_cleanup;
}
rc = internal_ipc_get_reply(client, header->qb.id, ms_timeout);
if (rc < 0) {
/* No reply, for now, disable sending
*
* The alternative is to close the connection since we don't know
* how to detect and discard out-of-sequence replies
*
* TODO - implement the above
*/
client->need_reply = TRUE;
}
} else {
rc = internal_ipc_send_recv(client, iov);
}
if (rc > 0) {
struct crm_ipc_response_header *hdr = (struct crm_ipc_response_header *)(void*)client->buffer;
crm_trace("Received response %d, size=%u, rc=%ld, text: %.200s", hdr->qb.id, hdr->qb.size,
rc, crm_ipc_buffer(client));
if (reply) {
*reply = string2xml(crm_ipc_buffer(client));
}
} else {
crm_trace("Response not received: rc=%ld, errno=%d", rc, errno);
}
send_cleanup:
if (crm_ipc_connected(client) == FALSE) {
crm_notice("Connection to %s closed: %s (%ld)", client->name, pcmk_strerror(rc), rc);
} else if (rc == -ETIMEDOUT) {
crm_warn("Request %d to %s (%p) failed: %s (%ld) after %dms",
header->qb.id, client->name, client->ipc, pcmk_strerror(rc), rc, ms_timeout);
crm_write_blackbox(0, NULL);
} else if (rc <= 0) {
crm_warn("Request %d to %s (%p) failed: %s (%ld)",
header->qb.id, client->name, client->ipc, pcmk_strerror(rc), rc);
}
free(header);
free(iov[1].iov_base);
free(iov);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: High: libcrmcommon: fix CVE-2016-7035 (improper IPC guarding)
It was discovered that at some not so uncommon circumstances, some
pacemaker daemons could be talked to, via libqb-facilitated IPC, by
unprivileged clients due to flawed authorization decision. Depending
on the capabilities of affected daemons, this might equip unauthorized
user with local privilege escalation or up to cluster-wide remote
execution of possibly arbitrary commands when such user happens to
reside at standard or remote/guest cluster node, respectively.
The original vulnerability was introduced in an attempt to allow
unprivileged IPC clients to clean up the file system materialized
leftovers in case the server (otherwise responsible for the lifecycle
of these files) crashes. While the intended part of such behavior is
now effectively voided (along with the unintended one), a best-effort
fix to address this corner case systemically at libqb is coming along
(https://github.com/ClusterLabs/libqb/pull/231).
Affected versions: 1.1.10-rc1 (2013-04-17) - 1.1.15 (2016-06-21)
Impact: Important
CVSSv3 ranking: 8.8 : AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Credits for independent findings, in chronological order:
Jan "poki" Pokorný, of Red Hat
Alain Moulle, of ATOS/BULL
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 6,887
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CompileKeymap(XkbFile *file, struct xkb_keymap *keymap, enum merge_mode merge)
{
bool ok;
XkbFile *files[LAST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE + 1] = { NULL };
enum xkb_file_type type;
struct xkb_context *ctx = keymap->ctx;
/* Collect section files and check for duplicates. */
for (file = (XkbFile *) file->defs; file;
file = (XkbFile *) file->common.next) {
if (file->file_type < FIRST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE ||
file->file_type > LAST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE) {
log_err(ctx, "Cannot define %s in a keymap file\n",
xkb_file_type_to_string(file->file_type));
continue;
}
if (files[file->file_type]) {
log_err(ctx,
"More than one %s section in keymap file; "
"All sections after the first ignored\n",
xkb_file_type_to_string(file->file_type));
continue;
}
files[file->file_type] = file;
}
/*
* Check that all required section were provided.
* Report everything before failing.
*/
ok = true;
for (type = FIRST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE;
type <= LAST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE;
type++) {
if (files[type] == NULL) {
log_err(ctx, "Required section %s missing from keymap\n",
xkb_file_type_to_string(type));
ok = false;
}
}
if (!ok)
return false;
/* Compile sections. */
for (type = FIRST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE;
type <= LAST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE;
type++) {
log_dbg(ctx, "Compiling %s \"%s\"\n",
xkb_file_type_to_string(type), files[type]->name);
ok = compile_file_fns[type](files[type], keymap, merge);
if (!ok) {
log_err(ctx, "Failed to compile %s\n",
xkb_file_type_to_string(type));
return false;
}
}
return UpdateDerivedKeymapFields(keymap);
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: fix crash when parsing an xkb_geometry section
xkb_geometry sections are ignored; previously the had done so by
returning NULL for the section's XkbFile, however some sections of the
code do not expect this. Instead, create an XkbFile for it, it will
never be processes and discarded later.
Caught with the afl fuzzer.
Signed-off-by: Ran Benita <ran234@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 5,751
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void enable_kernel_spe(void)
{
WARN_ON(preemptible());
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
if (current->thread.regs && (current->thread.regs->msr & MSR_SPE))
giveup_spe(current);
else
giveup_spe(NULL); /* just enable SPE for kernel - force */
#else
giveup_spe(last_task_used_spe);
#endif /* __SMP __ */
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,225
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Element::createRendererIfNeeded(const AttachContext& context)
{
NodeRenderingContext(this, context).createRendererForElementIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,575
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: create_string_node(
char *str
)
{
string_node *sn;
sn = emalloc_zero(sizeof(*sn));
sn->s = str;
return sn;
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: verify_destination (CommonJob *job,
GFile *dest,
char **dest_fs_id,
goffset required_size)
{
GFileInfo *info, *fsinfo;
GError *error;
guint64 free_size;
guint64 size_difference;
char *primary, *secondary, *details;
int response;
GFileType file_type;
gboolean dest_is_symlink = FALSE;
if (dest_fs_id)
{
*dest_fs_id = NULL;
}
retry:
error = NULL;
info = g_file_query_info (dest,
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_TYPE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ID_FILESYSTEM,
dest_is_symlink ? G_FILE_QUERY_INFO_NONE : G_FILE_QUERY_INFO_NOFOLLOW_SYMLINKS,
job->cancellable,
&error);
if (info == NULL)
{
if (IS_IO_ERROR (error, CANCELLED))
{
g_error_free (error);
return;
}
primary = f (_("Error while copying to “%B”."), dest);
details = NULL;
if (IS_IO_ERROR (error, PERMISSION_DENIED))
{
secondary = f (_("You do not have permissions to access the destination folder."));
}
else
{
secondary = f (_("There was an error getting information about the destination."));
details = error->message;
}
response = run_error (job,
primary,
secondary,
details,
FALSE,
CANCEL, RETRY,
NULL);
g_error_free (error);
if (response == 0 || response == GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT)
{
abort_job (job);
}
else if (response == 1)
{
goto retry;
}
else
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
return;
}
file_type = g_file_info_get_file_type (info);
if (!dest_is_symlink && file_type == G_FILE_TYPE_SYMBOLIC_LINK)
{
/* Record that destination is a symlink and do real stat() once again */
dest_is_symlink = TRUE;
g_object_unref (info);
goto retry;
}
if (dest_fs_id)
{
*dest_fs_id =
g_strdup (g_file_info_get_attribute_string (info,
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ID_FILESYSTEM));
}
g_object_unref (info);
if (file_type != G_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY)
{
primary = f (_("Error while copying to “%B”."), dest);
secondary = f (_("The destination is not a folder."));
run_error (job,
primary,
secondary,
NULL,
FALSE,
CANCEL,
NULL);
abort_job (job);
return;
}
if (dest_is_symlink)
{
/* We can't reliably statfs() destination if it's a symlink, thus not doing any further checks. */
return;
}
fsinfo = g_file_query_filesystem_info (dest,
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_FILESYSTEM_FREE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_FILESYSTEM_READONLY,
job->cancellable,
NULL);
if (fsinfo == NULL)
{
/* All sorts of things can go wrong getting the fs info (like not supported)
* only check these things if the fs returns them
*/
return;
}
if (required_size > 0 &&
g_file_info_has_attribute (fsinfo, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_FILESYSTEM_FREE))
{
free_size = g_file_info_get_attribute_uint64 (fsinfo,
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_FILESYSTEM_FREE);
if (free_size < required_size)
{
size_difference = required_size - free_size;
primary = f (_("Error while copying to “%B”."), dest);
secondary = f (_("There is not enough space on the destination. Try to remove files to make space."));
details = f (_("%S more space is required to copy to the destination."), size_difference);
response = run_warning (job,
primary,
secondary,
details,
FALSE,
CANCEL,
COPY_FORCE,
RETRY,
NULL);
if (response == 0 || response == GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT)
{
abort_job (job);
}
else if (response == 2)
{
goto retry;
}
else if (response == 1)
{
/* We are forced to copy - just fall through ... */
}
else
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
}
}
if (!job_aborted (job) &&
g_file_info_get_attribute_boolean (fsinfo,
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_FILESYSTEM_READONLY))
{
primary = f (_("Error while copying to “%B”."), dest);
secondary = f (_("The destination is read-only."));
run_error (job,
primary,
secondary,
NULL,
FALSE,
CANCEL,
NULL);
g_error_free (error);
abort_job (job);
}
g_object_unref (fsinfo);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,859
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static future_t *shut_down(void) {
btif_config_flush();
return future_new_immediate(FUTURE_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,249
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void atalk_destroy_socket(struct sock *sk)
{
atalk_remove_socket(sk);
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
if (sk_has_allocations(sk)) {
setup_timer(&sk->sk_timer, atalk_destroy_timer,
(unsigned long)sk);
sk->sk_timer.expires = jiffies + SOCK_DESTROY_TIME;
add_timer(&sk->sk_timer);
} else
sock_put(sk);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,992
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LvmEffect_free(EffectContext *pContext){
LVM_ReturnStatus_en LvmStatus=LVM_SUCCESS; /* Function call status */
LVM_ControlParams_t params; /* Control Parameters */
LVM_MemTab_t MemTab;
/* Free the algorithm memory */
LvmStatus = LVM_GetMemoryTable(pContext->pBundledContext->hInstance,
&MemTab,
LVM_NULL);
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVM_GetMemoryTable", "LvmEffect_free")
for (int i=0; i<LVM_NR_MEMORY_REGIONS; i++){
if (MemTab.Region[i].Size != 0){
if (MemTab.Region[i].pBaseAddress != NULL){
ALOGV("\tLvmEffect_free - START freeing %ld bytes for region %u at %p\n",
MemTab.Region[i].Size, i, MemTab.Region[i].pBaseAddress);
free(MemTab.Region[i].pBaseAddress);
ALOGV("\tLvmEffect_free - END freeing %ld bytes for region %u at %p\n",
MemTab.Region[i].Size, i, MemTab.Region[i].pBaseAddress);
}else{
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : LvmEffect_free - trying to free with NULL pointer %ld bytes "
"for region %u at %p ERROR\n",
MemTab.Region[i].Size, i, MemTab.Region[i].pBaseAddress);
}
}
}
} /* end LvmEffect_free */
Commit Message: fix possible overflow in effect wrappers.
Add checks on parameter size field in effect command handlers
to avoid overflow leading to invalid comparison with min allowed
size for command and reply buffers.
Bug: 26347509.
Change-Id: I20e6a9b6de8e5172b957caa1ac9410b9752efa4d
(cherry picked from commit ad1bd92a49d78df6bc6e75bee68c517c1326f3cf)
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 20,503
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __receive_buf(struct tty_struct *tty, const unsigned char *cp,
char *fp, int count)
{
struct n_tty_data *ldata = tty->disc_data;
bool preops = I_ISTRIP(tty) || (I_IUCLC(tty) && L_IEXTEN(tty));
if (ldata->real_raw)
n_tty_receive_buf_real_raw(tty, cp, fp, count);
else if (ldata->raw || (L_EXTPROC(tty) && !preops))
n_tty_receive_buf_raw(tty, cp, fp, count);
else if (tty->closing && !L_EXTPROC(tty))
n_tty_receive_buf_closing(tty, cp, fp, count);
else {
if (ldata->lnext) {
char flag = TTY_NORMAL;
if (fp)
flag = *fp++;
n_tty_receive_char_lnext(tty, *cp++, flag);
count--;
}
if (!preops && !I_PARMRK(tty))
n_tty_receive_buf_fast(tty, cp, fp, count);
else
n_tty_receive_buf_standard(tty, cp, fp, count);
flush_echoes(tty);
if (tty->ops->flush_chars)
tty->ops->flush_chars(tty);
}
if ((!ldata->icanon && (read_cnt(ldata) >= ldata->minimum_to_wake)) ||
L_EXTPROC(tty)) {
kill_fasync(&tty->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
if (waitqueue_active(&tty->read_wait))
wake_up_interruptible(&tty->read_wait);
}
}
Commit Message: n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode
The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.
If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
...
memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
...
tb->used += space;
so the race of the two can result in something like this:
A B
__tty_buffer_request_room
__tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM
B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.
Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.
Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.
js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call
References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 15,917
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dcbnl_ieee_set(struct net_device *netdev, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u32 seq, struct nlattr **tb, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct dcbnl_rtnl_ops *ops = netdev->dcbnl_ops;
struct nlattr *ieee[DCB_ATTR_IEEE_MAX + 1];
int err;
if (!ops)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!tb[DCB_ATTR_IEEE])
return -EINVAL;
err = nla_parse_nested(ieee, DCB_ATTR_IEEE_MAX,
tb[DCB_ATTR_IEEE], dcbnl_ieee_policy);
if (err)
return err;
if (ieee[DCB_ATTR_IEEE_ETS] && ops->ieee_setets) {
struct ieee_ets *ets = nla_data(ieee[DCB_ATTR_IEEE_ETS]);
err = ops->ieee_setets(netdev, ets);
if (err)
goto err;
}
if (ieee[DCB_ATTR_IEEE_MAXRATE] && ops->ieee_setmaxrate) {
struct ieee_maxrate *maxrate =
nla_data(ieee[DCB_ATTR_IEEE_MAXRATE]);
err = ops->ieee_setmaxrate(netdev, maxrate);
if (err)
goto err;
}
if (ieee[DCB_ATTR_IEEE_PFC] && ops->ieee_setpfc) {
struct ieee_pfc *pfc = nla_data(ieee[DCB_ATTR_IEEE_PFC]);
err = ops->ieee_setpfc(netdev, pfc);
if (err)
goto err;
}
if (ieee[DCB_ATTR_IEEE_APP_TABLE]) {
struct nlattr *attr;
int rem;
nla_for_each_nested(attr, ieee[DCB_ATTR_IEEE_APP_TABLE], rem) {
struct dcb_app *app_data;
if (nla_type(attr) != DCB_ATTR_IEEE_APP)
continue;
app_data = nla_data(attr);
if (ops->ieee_setapp)
err = ops->ieee_setapp(netdev, app_data);
else
err = dcb_ieee_setapp(netdev, app_data);
if (err)
goto err;
}
}
err:
err = nla_put_u8(skb, DCB_ATTR_IEEE, err);
dcbnl_ieee_notify(netdev, RTM_SETDCB, DCB_CMD_IEEE_SET, seq, 0);
return err;
}
Commit Message: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 22,729
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void activityLoggedInIsolatedWorldsAttrSetterAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "activityLoggedInIsolatedWorldsAttrSetter", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setActivityLoggedInIsolatedWorldsAttrSetter(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 28,663
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,j,nl,off,n;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
X509_NAME *name;
BUF_MEM *buf;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
{
buf=s->init_buf;
d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
p++;
n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
d[0]=n;
p+=n;
n++;
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
const unsigned char *psigs;
unsigned char *etmp = p;
nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
/* Skip over length for now */
p += 2;
nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
/* Now fill in length */
s2n(nl, etmp);
p += nl;
n += nl + 2;
}
off=n;
p+=2;
n+=2;
sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
nl=0;
if (sk != NULL)
{
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
{
name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
{
s2n(j,p);
i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
n+=2+j;
nl+=2+j;
}
else
{
d=p;
i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
n+=j;
nl+=j;
}
}
}
/* else no CA names */
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
s2n(nl,p);
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
{
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
/* do the header */
*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
s->init_num += 4;
}
#endif
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
return(-1);
}
Commit Message: Unauthenticated DH client certificate fix.
Fix to prevent use of DH client certificates without sending
certificate verify message.
If we've used a client certificate to generate the premaster secret
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange returns 2 and ssl3_get_cert_verify is
never called.
We can only skip the certificate verify message in
ssl3_get_cert_verify if the client didn't send a certificate.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2015-0205
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 7,986
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnFindMatchRectsReply(
RenderFrameHostImpl* source,
int version,
const std::vector<gfx::RectF>& rects,
const gfx::RectF& active_rect) {
GetOrCreateFindRequestManager()->OnFindMatchRectsReply(source, version, rects,
active_rect);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,453
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_push_read_IDAT(png_structp png_ptr)
{
#ifdef PNG_USE_LOCAL_ARRAYS
PNG_CONST PNG_IDAT;
#endif
if (!(png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_CHUNK_HEADER))
{
png_byte chunk_length[4];
if (png_ptr->buffer_size < 8)
{
png_push_save_buffer(png_ptr);
return;
}
png_push_fill_buffer(png_ptr, chunk_length, 4);
png_ptr->push_length = png_get_uint_31(png_ptr, chunk_length);
png_reset_crc(png_ptr);
png_crc_read(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunk_name, 4);
png_ptr->mode |= PNG_HAVE_CHUNK_HEADER;
if (png_memcmp(png_ptr->chunk_name, png_IDAT, 4))
{
png_ptr->process_mode = PNG_READ_CHUNK_MODE;
if (!(png_ptr->flags & PNG_FLAG_ZLIB_FINISHED))
png_error(png_ptr, "Not enough compressed data");
return;
}
png_ptr->idat_size = png_ptr->push_length;
}
if (png_ptr->idat_size && png_ptr->save_buffer_size)
{
png_size_t save_size;
if (png_ptr->idat_size < (png_uint_32)png_ptr->save_buffer_size)
{
save_size = (png_size_t)png_ptr->idat_size;
/* Check for overflow */
if ((png_uint_32)save_size != png_ptr->idat_size)
png_error(png_ptr, "save_size overflowed in pngpread");
}
else
save_size = png_ptr->save_buffer_size;
png_calculate_crc(png_ptr, png_ptr->save_buffer_ptr, save_size);
png_process_IDAT_data(png_ptr, png_ptr->save_buffer_ptr, save_size);
png_ptr->idat_size -= save_size;
png_ptr->buffer_size -= save_size;
png_ptr->save_buffer_size -= save_size;
png_ptr->save_buffer_ptr += save_size;
}
if (png_ptr->idat_size && png_ptr->current_buffer_size)
{
png_size_t save_size;
if (png_ptr->idat_size < (png_uint_32)png_ptr->current_buffer_size)
{
save_size = (png_size_t)png_ptr->idat_size;
/* Check for overflow */
if ((png_uint_32)save_size != png_ptr->idat_size)
png_error(png_ptr, "save_size overflowed in pngpread");
}
else
save_size = png_ptr->current_buffer_size;
png_calculate_crc(png_ptr, png_ptr->current_buffer_ptr, save_size);
png_process_IDAT_data(png_ptr, png_ptr->current_buffer_ptr, save_size);
png_ptr->idat_size -= save_size;
png_ptr->buffer_size -= save_size;
png_ptr->current_buffer_size -= save_size;
png_ptr->current_buffer_ptr += save_size;
}
if (!png_ptr->idat_size)
{
if (png_ptr->buffer_size < 4)
{
png_push_save_buffer(png_ptr);
return;
}
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, 0);
png_ptr->mode &= ~PNG_HAVE_CHUNK_HEADER;
png_ptr->mode |= PNG_AFTER_IDAT;
}
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void addReply(client *c, robj *obj) {
if (prepareClientToWrite(c) != C_OK) return;
/* This is an important place where we can avoid copy-on-write
* when there is a saving child running, avoiding touching the
* refcount field of the object if it's not needed.
*
* If the encoding is RAW and there is room in the static buffer
* we'll be able to send the object to the client without
* messing with its page. */
if (sdsEncodedObject(obj)) {
if (_addReplyToBuffer(c,obj->ptr,sdslen(obj->ptr)) != C_OK)
_addReplyObjectToList(c,obj);
} else if (obj->encoding == OBJ_ENCODING_INT) {
/* Optimization: if there is room in the static buffer for 32 bytes
* (more than the max chars a 64 bit integer can take as string) we
* avoid decoding the object and go for the lower level approach. */
if (listLength(c->reply) == 0 && (sizeof(c->buf) - c->bufpos) >= 32) {
char buf[32];
int len;
len = ll2string(buf,sizeof(buf),(long)obj->ptr);
if (_addReplyToBuffer(c,buf,len) == C_OK)
return;
/* else... continue with the normal code path, but should never
* happen actually since we verified there is room. */
}
obj = getDecodedObject(obj);
if (_addReplyToBuffer(c,obj->ptr,sdslen(obj->ptr)) != C_OK)
_addReplyObjectToList(c,obj);
decrRefCount(obj);
} else {
serverPanic("Wrong obj->encoding in addReply()");
}
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 26,388
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ConstructType JSFloat64ArrayConstructor::getConstructData(JSCell*, ConstructData& constructData)
{
constructData.native.function = constructJSFloat64Array;
return ConstructTypeHost;
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,885
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void SetterCallWithExecutionContextStringAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8StringResource<> cpp_value = v8_value;
if (!cpp_value.Prepare())
return;
ExecutionContext* execution_context = ExecutionContext::ForRelevantRealm(info);
impl->setSetterCallWithExecutionContextStringAttribute(execution_context, cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uarb_mult32(uarb acc, int a_digits, uarb num, int n_digits, png_uint_32 val)
/* calculate acc += num * val, 'val' may be any 32-bit value, 'acc' and 'num'
* may be any value, returns the number of digits in 'acc'.
*/
{
if (n_digits > 0 && val > 0)
{
a_digits = uarb_mult_digit(acc, a_digits, num, n_digits,
(png_uint_16)(val & 0xffff));
/* Because n_digits and val are >0 the following must be true: */
assert(a_digits > 0);
val >>= 16;
if (val > 0)
a_digits = uarb_mult_digit(acc+1, a_digits-1, num, n_digits,
(png_uint_16)val) + 1;
}
return a_digits;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,383
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void zend_exception_restore(TSRMLS_D) /* {{{ */
{
if (EG(prev_exception)) {
if (EG(exception)) {
zend_exception_set_previous(EG(exception), EG(prev_exception) TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
EG(exception) = EG(prev_exception);
}
EG(prev_exception) = NULL;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,895
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void inode_add_lru(struct inode *inode)
{
if (!(inode->i_state & (I_DIRTY_ALL | I_SYNC |
I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE)) &&
!atomic_read(&inode->i_count) && inode->i_sb->s_flags & SB_ACTIVE)
inode_lru_list_add(inode);
}
Commit Message: Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 27,148
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u16 tun_select_queue(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb,
void *accel_priv, select_queue_fallback_t fallback)
{
struct tun_struct *tun = netdev_priv(dev);
struct tun_flow_entry *e;
u32 txq = 0;
u32 numqueues = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
numqueues = ACCESS_ONCE(tun->numqueues);
txq = __skb_get_hash_symmetric(skb);
if (txq) {
e = tun_flow_find(&tun->flows[tun_hashfn(txq)], txq);
if (e) {
tun_flow_save_rps_rxhash(e, txq);
txq = e->queue_index;
} else
/* use multiply and shift instead of expensive divide */
txq = ((u64)txq * numqueues) >> 32;
} else if (likely(skb_rx_queue_recorded(skb))) {
txq = skb_get_rx_queue(skb);
while (unlikely(txq >= numqueues))
txq -= numqueues;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return txq;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 6,614
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::Value* reference_value() const { return reference_value_.get(); }
Commit Message: V8ValueConverter::ToV8Value should not trigger setters
BUG=606390
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1918793003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390045}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,009
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void php_simple_ini_parser_cb(zval *arg1, zval *arg2, zval *arg3, int callback_type, zval *arr TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval *element;
switch (callback_type) {
case ZEND_INI_PARSER_ENTRY:
if (!arg2) {
/* bare string - nothing to do */
break;
}
ALLOC_ZVAL(element);
MAKE_COPY_ZVAL(&arg2, element);
zend_symtable_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(arr), Z_STRVAL_P(arg1), Z_STRLEN_P(arg1) + 1, &element, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
break;
case ZEND_INI_PARSER_POP_ENTRY:
{
zval *hash, **find_hash;
if (!arg2) {
/* bare string - nothing to do */
break;
}
if (!(Z_STRLEN_P(arg1) > 1 && Z_STRVAL_P(arg1)[0] == '0') && is_numeric_string(Z_STRVAL_P(arg1), Z_STRLEN_P(arg1), NULL, NULL, 0) == IS_LONG) {
ulong key = (ulong) zend_atol(Z_STRVAL_P(arg1), Z_STRLEN_P(arg1));
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(arr), key, (void **) &find_hash) == FAILURE) {
ALLOC_ZVAL(hash);
INIT_PZVAL(hash);
array_init(hash);
zend_hash_index_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(arr), key, &hash, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
} else {
hash = *find_hash;
}
} else {
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(arr), Z_STRVAL_P(arg1), Z_STRLEN_P(arg1) + 1, (void **) &find_hash) == FAILURE) {
ALLOC_ZVAL(hash);
INIT_PZVAL(hash);
array_init(hash);
zend_hash_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(arr), Z_STRVAL_P(arg1), Z_STRLEN_P(arg1) + 1, &hash, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
} else {
hash = *find_hash;
}
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(hash) != IS_ARRAY) {
zval_dtor(hash);
INIT_PZVAL(hash);
array_init(hash);
}
ALLOC_ZVAL(element);
MAKE_COPY_ZVAL(&arg2, element);
if (arg3 && Z_STRLEN_P(arg3) > 0) {
add_assoc_zval_ex(hash, Z_STRVAL_P(arg3), Z_STRLEN_P(arg3) + 1, element);
} else {
add_next_index_zval(hash, element);
}
}
break;
case ZEND_INI_PARSER_SECTION:
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 5,083
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::MakeCurrent() {
if (!context_.get())
return false;
if (WasContextLost()) {
LOG(ERROR) << " GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl: Trying to make lost context "
"current.";
return false;
}
if (!context_->MakeCurrent(surface_.get())) {
LOG(ERROR)
<< " GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl: Context lost during MakeCurrent.";
MarkContextLost(error::kMakeCurrentFailed);
group_->LoseContexts(error::kUnknown);
return false;
}
DCHECK_EQ(api(), gl::g_current_gl_context);
if (CheckResetStatus()) {
LOG(ERROR) << " GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl: Context reset detected after "
"MakeCurrent.";
group_->LoseContexts(error::kUnknown);
return false;
}
ProcessReadPixels(false);
ProcessQueries(false);
resources_->DestroyPendingTextures(/*has_context=*/true);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 4,507
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cmdproc_thread_cleanup(void *arg)
{
struct tcmu_device *dev = arg;
struct tcmur_handler *rhandler = tcmu_get_runner_handler(dev);
rhandler->close(dev);
}
Commit Message: fixed local DoS when UnregisterHandler was called for a not existing handler
Any user with DBUS access could cause a SEGFAULT in tcmu-runner by
running something like this:
dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.kernel.TCMUService1 /org/kernel/TCMUService1/HandlerManager1 org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.UnregisterHandler string:123
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,734
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err dmax_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_DMAXBox *ptr = (GF_DMAXBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
e = gf_isom_box_write_header(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->maxDur);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 9,435
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int regs_cmp(const void *a, const void *b)
{
uint16_t l = ((struct insn_reg *)a)->insn;
uint16_t r = ((struct insn_reg *)b)->insn;
return (l - r);
}
Commit Message: x86: fast path checking for X86_insn_reg_intel()
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 7,859
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void fastcgi_cleanup(int signal)
{
#ifdef DEBUG_FASTCGI
fprintf(stderr, "FastCGI shutdown, pid %d\n", getpid());
#endif
sigaction(SIGTERM, &old_term, 0);
/* Kill all the processes in our process group */
kill(-pgroup, SIGTERM);
if (parent && parent_waiting) {
exit_signal = 1;
} else {
exit(0);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Editor::appliedEditing(CompositeEditCommand* cmd) {
DCHECK(!cmd->isCommandGroupWrapper());
EventQueueScope scope;
spellChecker().markMisspellingsAfterApplyingCommand(*cmd);
UndoStep* undoStep = cmd->undoStep();
DCHECK(undoStep);
dispatchEditableContentChangedEvents(undoStep->startingRootEditableElement(),
undoStep->endingRootEditableElement());
dispatchInputEventEditableContentChanged(
undoStep->startingRootEditableElement(),
undoStep->endingRootEditableElement(), cmd->inputType(),
cmd->textDataForInputEvent(), isComposingFromCommand(cmd));
frame().document()->updateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const VisibleSelection& newSelection =
correctedVisibleSelection(cmd->endingSelection());
changeSelectionAfterCommand(newSelection.asSelection(), 0);
if (!cmd->preservesTypingStyle())
clearTypingStyle();
if (m_lastEditCommand.get() == cmd) {
DCHECK(cmd->isTypingCommand());
} else if (m_lastEditCommand && m_lastEditCommand->isDragAndDropCommand() &&
(cmd->inputType() == InputEvent::InputType::DeleteByDrag ||
cmd->inputType() == InputEvent::InputType::InsertFromDrop)) {
if (!m_lastEditCommand->undoStep())
m_undoStack->registerUndoStep(m_lastEditCommand->ensureUndoStep());
m_lastEditCommand->appendCommandToUndoStep(cmd);
} else {
m_lastEditCommand = cmd;
m_undoStack->registerUndoStep(m_lastEditCommand->ensureUndoStep());
}
respondToChangedContents(newSelection.start());
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,680
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned int vb2_fop_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
struct video_device *vdev = video_devdata(file);
struct vb2_queue *q = vdev->queue;
struct mutex *lock = q->lock ? q->lock : vdev->lock;
unsigned res;
void *fileio;
/*
* If this helper doesn't know how to lock, then you shouldn't be using
* it but you should write your own.
*/
WARN_ON(!lock);
if (lock && mutex_lock_interruptible(lock))
return POLLERR;
fileio = q->fileio;
res = vb2_poll(vdev->queue, file, wait);
/* If fileio was started, then we have a new queue owner. */
if (!fileio && q->fileio)
q->owner = file->private_data;
if (lock)
mutex_unlock(lock);
return res;
}
Commit Message: [media] videobuf2-v4l2: Verify planes array in buffer dequeueing
When a buffer is being dequeued using VIDIOC_DQBUF IOCTL, the exact buffer
which will be dequeued is not known until the buffer has been removed from
the queue. The number of planes is specific to a buffer, not to the queue.
This does lead to the situation where multi-plane buffers may be requested
and queued with n planes, but VIDIOC_DQBUF IOCTL may be passed an argument
struct with fewer planes.
__fill_v4l2_buffer() however uses the number of planes from the dequeued
videobuf2 buffer, overwriting kernel memory (the m.planes array allocated
in video_usercopy() in v4l2-ioctl.c) if the user provided fewer
planes than the dequeued buffer had. Oops!
Fixes: b0e0e1f83de3 ("[media] media: videobuf2: Prepare to divide videobuf2")
Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # for v4.4 and later
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 23,589
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void qemu_put_virtqueue_element(QEMUFile *f, VirtQueueElement *elem)
{
VirtQueueElementOld data;
int i;
memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
data.index = elem->index;
data.in_num = elem->in_num;
data.out_num = elem->out_num;
for (i = 0; i < elem->in_num; i++) {
data.in_addr[i] = elem->in_addr[i];
}
for (i = 0; i < elem->out_num; i++) {
data.out_addr[i] = elem->out_addr[i];
}
for (i = 0; i < elem->in_num; i++) {
/* Base is overwritten by virtqueue_map when loading. Do not
* save it, as it would leak the QEMU address space layout. */
data.in_sg[i].iov_len = elem->in_sg[i].iov_len;
}
for (i = 0; i < elem->out_num; i++) {
/* Do not save iov_base as above. */
data.out_sg[i].iov_len = elem->out_sg[i].iov_len;
}
qemu_put_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)&data, sizeof(VirtQueueElementOld));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 22,567
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_write_extradata_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVTrack *track)
{
avio_write(pb, track->par->extradata, track->par->extradata_size);
return track->par->extradata_size;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 22,533
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: decode_multicast_vpn(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, char *buf, u_int buflen)
{
uint8_t route_type, route_length, addr_length, sg_length;
u_int offset;
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], 2);
route_type = *pptr++;
route_length = *pptr++;
snprintf(buf, buflen, "Route-Type: %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_multicast_vpn_route_type_values,
"Unknown", route_type),
route_type, route_length);
switch(route_type) {
case BGP_MULTICAST_VPN_ROUTE_TYPE_INTRA_AS_I_PMSI:
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
offset = strlen(buf);
snprintf(buf + offset, buflen - offset, ", RD: %s, Originator %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, pptr),
bgp_vpn_ip_print(ndo, pptr + BGP_VPN_RD_LEN,
(route_length - BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) << 3));
break;
case BGP_MULTICAST_VPN_ROUTE_TYPE_INTER_AS_I_PMSI:
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], BGP_VPN_RD_LEN + 4);
offset = strlen(buf);
snprintf(buf + offset, buflen - offset, ", RD: %s, Source-AS %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, pptr),
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(pptr + BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
break;
case BGP_MULTICAST_VPN_ROUTE_TYPE_S_PMSI:
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
offset = strlen(buf);
snprintf(buf + offset, buflen - offset, ", RD: %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, pptr));
pptr += BGP_VPN_RD_LEN;
sg_length = bgp_vpn_sg_print(ndo, pptr, buf, buflen);
addr_length = route_length - sg_length;
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], addr_length);
offset = strlen(buf);
snprintf(buf + offset, buflen - offset, ", Originator %s",
bgp_vpn_ip_print(ndo, pptr, addr_length << 3));
break;
case BGP_MULTICAST_VPN_ROUTE_TYPE_SOURCE_ACTIVE:
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
offset = strlen(buf);
snprintf(buf + offset, buflen - offset, ", RD: %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, pptr));
pptr += BGP_VPN_RD_LEN;
bgp_vpn_sg_print(ndo, pptr, buf, buflen);
break;
case BGP_MULTICAST_VPN_ROUTE_TYPE_SHARED_TREE_JOIN: /* fall through */
case BGP_MULTICAST_VPN_ROUTE_TYPE_SOURCE_TREE_JOIN:
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
offset = strlen(buf);
snprintf(buf + offset, buflen - offset, ", RD: %s, Source-AS %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, pptr),
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(pptr + BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
pptr += BGP_VPN_RD_LEN;
bgp_vpn_sg_print(ndo, pptr, buf, buflen);
break;
/*
* no per route-type printing yet.
*/
case BGP_MULTICAST_VPN_ROUTE_TYPE_INTRA_AS_SEG_LEAF:
default:
break;
}
return route_length + 2;
trunc:
return -2;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13046/BGP: fix an existing bounds check for PMSI Tunnel
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,285
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void RemoveResolutionFromResourceBlock(StringInfo *bim_profile)
{
register const unsigned char
*p;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*datum;
unsigned int
count,
long_sans;
unsigned short
id,
short_sans;
length=GetStringInfoLength(bim_profile);
if (length < 16)
return;
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(bim_profile);
for (p=datum; (p >= datum) && (p < (datum+length-16)); )
{
register unsigned char
*q;
q=(unsigned char *) p;
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) p,"8BIM",4) != 0)
break;
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&long_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&id);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&count);
if ((id == 0x000003ed) && (PSDQuantum(count) < (ssize_t) (length-12)))
{
(void) CopyMagickMemory(q,q+PSDQuantum(count)+12,length-
(PSDQuantum(count)+12)-(q-datum));
SetStringInfoLength(bim_profile,length-(PSDQuantum(count)+12));
break;
}
p+=count;
if ((count & 0x01) != 0)
p++;
}
}
Commit Message: Added check for out of bounds read (https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/108).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 1,889
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vp8_decode_mv_mb_modes(AVCodecContext *avctx, VP8Frame *cur_frame,
VP8Frame *prev_frame)
{
vp78_decode_mv_mb_modes(avctx, cur_frame, prev_frame, IS_VP8);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int get_compat_mq_attr(struct mq_attr *attr,
const struct compat_mq_attr __user *uattr)
{
struct compat_mq_attr v;
if (copy_from_user(&v, uattr, sizeof(*uattr)))
return -EFAULT;
memset(attr, 0, sizeof(*attr));
attr->mq_flags = v.mq_flags;
attr->mq_maxmsg = v.mq_maxmsg;
attr->mq_msgsize = v.mq_msgsize;
attr->mq_curmsgs = v.mq_curmsgs;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mqueue: fix a use-after-free in sys_mq_notify()
The retry logic for netlink_attachskb() inside sys_mq_notify()
is nasty and vulnerable:
1) The sock refcnt is already released when retry is needed
2) The fd is controllable by user-space because we already
release the file refcnt
so we when retry but the fd has been just closed by user-space
during this small window, we end up calling netlink_detachskb()
on the error path which releases the sock again, later when
the user-space closes this socket a use-after-free could be
triggered.
Setting 'sock' to NULL here should be sufficient to fix it.
Reported-by: GeneBlue <geneblue.mail@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 17,906
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssize_t tpm_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t size, loff_t *off)
{
struct tpm_chip *chip = file->private_data;
ssize_t ret_size;
del_singleshot_timer_sync(&chip->user_read_timer);
flush_work_sync(&chip->work);
ret_size = atomic_read(&chip->data_pending);
atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, 0);
if (ret_size > 0) { /* relay data */
if (size < ret_size)
ret_size = size;
mutex_lock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
if (copy_to_user(buf, chip->data_buffer, ret_size))
ret_size = -EFAULT;
mutex_unlock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
}
return ret_size;
}
Commit Message: char/tpm: Fix unitialized usage of data buffer
This patch fixes information leakage to the userspace by initializing
the data buffer to zero.
Reported-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Selhorst <m.selhorst@sirrix.com>
[ Also removed the silly "* sizeof(u8)". If that isn't 1, we have way
deeper problems than a simple multiplication can fix. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 20,163
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct page *alloc_fresh_gigantic_page_node(struct hstate *h, int nid)
{
struct page *page;
page = alloc_gigantic_page(nid, h);
if (page) {
prep_compound_gigantic_page(page, huge_page_order(h));
prep_new_huge_page(h, page, nid);
}
return page;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,790
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerClient* client)
: m_client(client)
{
ASSERT_UNUSED(m_client, m_client);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 28,439
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void virtio_device_class_init(ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
{
/* Set the default value here. */
DeviceClass *dc = DEVICE_CLASS(klass);
dc->realize = virtio_device_realize;
dc->unrealize = virtio_device_unrealize;
dc->bus_type = TYPE_VIRTIO_BUS;
dc->props = virtio_properties;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,081
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Camera2Client::setPreviewCallbackFlagL(Parameters ¶ms, int flag) {
status_t res = OK;
switch(params.state) {
case Parameters::STOPPED:
case Parameters::WAITING_FOR_PREVIEW_WINDOW:
case Parameters::PREVIEW:
case Parameters::STILL_CAPTURE:
break;
default:
if (flag & CAMERA_FRAME_CALLBACK_FLAG_ENABLE_MASK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Can't use preview callbacks "
"in state %d", __FUNCTION__, mCameraId, params.state);
return;
}
}
if (flag & CAMERA_FRAME_CALLBACK_FLAG_ONE_SHOT_MASK) {
ALOGV("%s: setting oneshot", __FUNCTION__);
params.previewCallbackOneShot = true;
}
if (params.previewCallbackFlags != (uint32_t)flag) {
if (params.previewCallbackSurface && flag != CAMERA_FRAME_CALLBACK_FLAG_NOOP) {
res = mCallbackProcessor->setCallbackWindow(NULL);
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to clear preview callback surface:"
" %s (%d)", __FUNCTION__, mCameraId, strerror(-res), res);
return;
}
params.previewCallbackSurface = false;
}
params.previewCallbackFlags = flag;
if (params.state == Parameters::PREVIEW) {
res = startPreviewL(params, true);
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to refresh request in state %s",
__FUNCTION__, mCameraId,
Parameters::getStateName(params.state));
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AXNodeObject::canSetSelectedAttribute() const {
if (ariaRoleAttribute() == ListBoxOptionRole &&
ancestorExposesActiveDescendant())
return true;
return AXObject::canSetSelectedAttribute();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 12,812
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPage::clearCredentials()
{
#if ENABLE(BLACKBERRY_CREDENTIAL_PERSIST)
if (d->m_webSettings->isCredentialAutofillEnabled())
credentialManager().clearCredentials();
#endif
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 15,498
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IDAT_init(struct IDAT * const idat, struct file * const file)
/* When the chunk is png_IDAT instantiate an IDAT control structure in place
* of a chunk control structure. The IDAT will instantiate a chunk control
* structure using the file alloc routine.
*
* NOTE: this routine must only be called from the file alloc routine!
*/
{
assert(file->chunk == NULL);
assert(file->idat == NULL);
CLEAR(*idat);
idat->file = file;
idat->global = file->global;
/* Initialize the tail to the pre-allocated buffer and set the count to 0
* (empty.)
*/
idat->global->idat_cache.count = 0;
idat->idat_list_head = idat->idat_list_tail = &idat->global->idat_cache;
/* Now the chunk. The allocator calls the initializer of the new chunk and
* stores the result in file->chunk:
*/
file->alloc(file, 0/*chunk*/);
assert(file->chunk != NULL);
/* And store this for cleanup (and to check for double alloc or failure to
* free.)
*/
file->idat = idat;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,408
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction WindowsGetCurrentFunction::Run() {
std::unique_ptr<windows::GetCurrent::Params> params(
windows::GetCurrent::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params.get());
ApiParameterExtractor<windows::GetCurrent::Params> extractor(params.get());
Browser* browser = nullptr;
std::string error;
if (!windows_util::GetBrowserFromWindowID(
this, extension_misc::kCurrentWindowId, extractor.type_filters(),
&browser, &error)) {
return RespondNow(Error(error));
}
ExtensionTabUtil::PopulateTabBehavior populate_tab_behavior =
extractor.populate_tabs() ? ExtensionTabUtil::kPopulateTabs
: ExtensionTabUtil::kDontPopulateTabs;
std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> windows =
ExtensionTabUtil::CreateWindowValueForExtension(*browser, extension(),
populate_tab_behavior);
return RespondNow(OneArgument(std::move(windows)));
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,367
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Editor::reappliedEditing(UndoStep* cmd) {
EventQueueScope scope;
dispatchEditableContentChangedEvents(cmd->startingRootEditableElement(),
cmd->endingRootEditableElement());
dispatchInputEventEditableContentChanged(
cmd->startingRootEditableElement(), cmd->endingRootEditableElement(),
InputEvent::InputType::HistoryRedo, nullAtom,
InputEvent::EventIsComposing::NotComposing);
frame().document()->updateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const VisibleSelection& newSelection =
correctedVisibleSelection(cmd->endingSelection());
DCHECK(newSelection.isValidFor(*frame().document())) << newSelection;
changeSelectionAfterCommand(
newSelection.asSelection(),
FrameSelection::CloseTyping | FrameSelection::ClearTypingStyle);
m_lastEditCommand = nullptr;
m_undoStack->registerUndoStep(cmd);
respondToChangedContents(newSelection.start());
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 15,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BTM_PINCodeReply (BD_ADDR bd_addr, UINT8 res, UINT8 pin_len, UINT8 *p_pin, UINT32 trusted_mask[])
{
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec;
BTM_TRACE_API ("BTM_PINCodeReply(): PairState: %s PairFlags: 0x%02x PinLen:%d Result:%d",
btm_pair_state_descr(btm_cb.pairing_state), btm_cb.pairing_flags, pin_len, res);
/* If timeout already expired or has been canceled, ignore the reply */
if (btm_cb.pairing_state != BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_LOCAL_PIN)
{
BTM_TRACE_WARNING ("BTM_PINCodeReply() - Wrong State: %d", btm_cb.pairing_state);
return;
}
if (memcmp (bd_addr, btm_cb.pairing_bda, BD_ADDR_LEN) != 0)
{
BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("BTM_PINCodeReply() - Wrong BD Addr");
return;
}
if ((p_dev_rec = btm_find_dev (bd_addr)) == NULL)
{
BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("BTM_PINCodeReply() - no dev CB");
return;
}
if ( (pin_len > PIN_CODE_LEN) || (pin_len == 0) || (p_pin == NULL) )
res = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
if (res != BTM_SUCCESS)
{
/* if peer started dd OR we started dd and pre-fetch pin was not used send negative reply */
if ((btm_cb.pairing_flags & BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_PEER_STARTED_DD) ||
((btm_cb.pairing_flags & BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_WE_STARTED_DD) &&
(btm_cb.pairing_flags & BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_DISC_WHEN_DONE)) )
{
/* use BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_AUTH_COMPLETE to report authentication failed event */
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_AUTH_COMPLETE);
btm_cb.acl_disc_reason = HCI_ERR_HOST_REJECT_SECURITY;
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_neg_reply (bd_addr);
}
else
{
p_dev_rec->security_required = BTM_SEC_NONE;
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_IDLE);
}
return;
}
if (trusted_mask)
BTM_SEC_COPY_TRUSTED_DEVICE(trusted_mask, p_dev_rec->trusted_mask);
p_dev_rec->sec_flags |= BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_AUTHED;
if ( (btm_cb.pairing_flags & BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_WE_STARTED_DD)
&& (p_dev_rec->hci_handle == BTM_SEC_INVALID_HANDLE)
&& (btm_cb.security_mode_changed == FALSE) )
{
/* This is start of the dedicated bonding if local device is 2.0 */
btm_cb.pin_code_len = pin_len;
memcpy (btm_cb.pin_code, p_pin, pin_len);
btm_cb.security_mode_changed = TRUE;
#ifdef APPL_AUTH_WRITE_EXCEPTION
if(!(APPL_AUTH_WRITE_EXCEPTION)(p_dev_rec->bd_addr))
#endif
btsnd_hcic_write_auth_enable (TRUE);
btm_cb.acl_disc_reason = 0xff ;
/* if we rejected incoming connection request, we have to wait HCI_Connection_Complete event */
/* before originating */
if (btm_cb.pairing_flags & BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_REJECTED_CONNECT)
{
BTM_TRACE_WARNING ("BTM_PINCodeReply(): waiting HCI_Connection_Complete after rejected incoming connection");
/* we change state little bit early so btm_sec_connected() will originate connection */
/* when existing ACL link is down completely */
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_PIN_REQ);
}
/* if we already accepted incoming connection from pairing device */
else if (p_dev_rec->sm4 & BTM_SM4_CONN_PEND)
{
BTM_TRACE_WARNING ("BTM_PINCodeReply(): link is connecting so wait pin code request from peer");
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_PIN_REQ);
}
else if (btm_sec_dd_create_conn(p_dev_rec) != BTM_CMD_STARTED)
{
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_IDLE);
p_dev_rec->sec_flags &= ~BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_AUTHED;
if (btm_cb.api.p_auth_complete_callback)
(*btm_cb.api.p_auth_complete_callback) (p_dev_rec->bd_addr, p_dev_rec->dev_class,
p_dev_rec->sec_bd_name, HCI_ERR_AUTH_FAILURE);
}
return;
}
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_AUTH_COMPLETE);
btm_cb.acl_disc_reason = HCI_SUCCESS;
#ifdef PORCHE_PAIRING_CONFLICT
BTM_TRACE_EVENT("BTM_PINCodeReply(): Saving pin_len: %d btm_cb.pin_code_len: %d", pin_len, btm_cb.pin_code_len);
/* if this was not pre-fetched, save the PIN */
if (btm_cb.pin_code_len == 0)
memcpy (btm_cb.pin_code, p_pin, pin_len);
btm_cb.pin_code_len_saved = pin_len;
#endif
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_req_reply (bd_addr, pin_len, p_pin);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 1,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long long Block::GetTime(const Cluster* pCluster) const
{
assert(pCluster);
const long long tc = GetTimeCode(pCluster);
const Segment* const pSegment = pCluster->m_pSegment;
const SegmentInfo* const pInfo = pSegment->GetInfo();
assert(pInfo);
const long long scale = pInfo->GetTimeCodeScale();
assert(scale >= 1);
const long long ns = tc * scale;
return ns;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 16,146
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool HasChildTags(Element& element, const QualifiedName& tag_name) {
return !element.getElementsByTagName(tag_name.LocalName())->IsEmpty();
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,875
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ExtensionFunctionDispatcher::OverrideFunction(
const std::string& name, ExtensionFunctionFactory factory) {
return FactoryRegistry::GetInstance()->OverrideFunction(name, factory);
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,468
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::WasHidden() {
frame_evictor_->SetVisible(false);
released_front_lock_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: mac: Make RWHVMac::ClearCompositorFrame clear locks
Ensure that the BrowserCompositorMac not hold on to a compositor lock
when requested to clear its compositor frame. This lock may be held
indefinitely (if the renderer hangs) and so the frame will never be
cleared.
Bug: 739621
Change-Id: I15d0e82bdf632f3379a48e959f198afb8a4ac218
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/608239
Commit-Queue: ccameron chromium <ccameron@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#493563}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,270
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err tssy_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
s->size += 1;
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 28,127
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *baseFilename(const char *filename) {
const char *cur;
if (filename == NULL)
return(NULL);
cur = &filename[strlen(filename)];
while ((cur > filename) && (*cur != '/'))
cur--;
if (*cur == '/')
return(cur + 1);
return(cur);
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,458
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::GetPrintFrame(WebKit::WebFrame** frame) {
DCHECK(frame);
DCHECK(render_view()->webview());
if (!render_view()->webview())
return false;
*frame = render_view()->webview()->focusedFrame()->hasSelection() ?
render_view()->webview()->focusedFrame() :
render_view()->webview()->mainFrame();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 10,743
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __clone_and_map_simple_bio(struct clone_info *ci,
struct dm_target *ti,
unsigned target_bio_nr, unsigned *len)
{
struct dm_target_io *tio = alloc_tio(ci, ti, target_bio_nr);
struct bio *clone = &tio->clone;
tio->len_ptr = len;
__bio_clone_fast(clone, ci->bio);
if (len)
bio_setup_sector(clone, ci->sector, *len);
__map_bio(tio);
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 3,531
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void pdo_row_free_storage(pdo_stmt_t *stmt TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (stmt) {
ZVAL_NULL(&stmt->lazy_object_ref);
if (--stmt->refcount == 0) {
free_statement(stmt TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 14,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void StyleResolver::matchUARules(ElementRuleCollector& collector)
{
collector.setMatchingUARules(true);
if (CSSDefaultStyleSheets::simpleDefaultStyleSheet)
collector.matchedResult().isCacheable = false;
RuleSet* userAgentStyleSheet = m_medium->mediaTypeMatchSpecific("print")
? CSSDefaultStyleSheets::defaultPrintStyle : CSSDefaultStyleSheets::defaultStyle;
matchUARules(collector, userAgentStyleSheet);
if (document().inQuirksMode())
matchUARules(collector, CSSDefaultStyleSheets::defaultQuirksStyle);
if (document().isViewSource())
matchUARules(collector, CSSDefaultStyleSheets::viewSourceStyle());
collector.setMatchingUARules(false);
matchWatchSelectorRules(collector);
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 4,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::FileSystemRemoved(
const std::string& file_system_path) {
base::StringValue file_system_path_value(file_system_path);
CallClientFunction("DevToolsAPI.fileSystemRemoved",
&file_system_path_value, NULL, NULL);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 6,446
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::MouseLeave() {
for (auto& pair : scrollbar_animation_controllers_)
pair.second->DidMouseLeave();
scroll_layer_id_mouse_currently_over_ = Layer::INVALID_ID;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 13,401
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void _WM_do_meta_text(struct _mdi *mdi, struct _event_data *data) {
/* placeholder function so we can record tempo in the event stream
* for conversion function _WM_Event2Midi */
#ifdef DEBUG_MIDI
uint8_t ch = data->channel;
MIDI_EVENT_SDEBUG(__FUNCTION__, ch, data->data.string);
#endif
if (mdi->extra_info.mixer_options & WM_MO_TEXTASLYRIC) {
mdi->lyric = data->data.string;
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 27,086
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __end_block_io_op(struct pending_req *pending_req, int error)
{
/* An error fails the entire request. */
if ((pending_req->operation == BLKIF_OP_FLUSH_DISKCACHE) &&
(error == -EOPNOTSUPP)) {
pr_debug("flush diskcache op failed, not supported\n");
xen_blkbk_flush_diskcache(XBT_NIL, pending_req->ring->blkif->be, 0);
pending_req->status = BLKIF_RSP_EOPNOTSUPP;
} else if ((pending_req->operation == BLKIF_OP_WRITE_BARRIER) &&
(error == -EOPNOTSUPP)) {
pr_debug("write barrier op failed, not supported\n");
xen_blkbk_barrier(XBT_NIL, pending_req->ring->blkif->be, 0);
pending_req->status = BLKIF_RSP_EOPNOTSUPP;
} else if (error) {
pr_debug("Buffer not up-to-date at end of operation,"
" error=%d\n", error);
pending_req->status = BLKIF_RSP_ERROR;
}
/*
* If all of the bio's have completed it is time to unmap
* the grant references associated with 'request' and provide
* the proper response on the ring.
*/
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&pending_req->pendcnt))
xen_blkbk_unmap_and_respond(pending_req);
}
Commit Message: xen-blkback: don't leak stack data via response ring
Rather than constructing a local structure instance on the stack, fill
the fields directly on the shared ring, just like other backends do.
Build on the fact that all response structure flavors are actually
identical (the old code did make this assumption too).
This is XSA-216.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 14,026
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dev_set_allmulti(struct net_device *dev, int inc)
{
unsigned short old_flags = dev->flags;
ASSERT_RTNL();
dev->flags |= IFF_ALLMULTI;
dev->allmulti += inc;
if (dev->allmulti == 0) {
/*
* Avoid overflow.
* If inc causes overflow, untouch allmulti and return error.
*/
if (inc < 0)
dev->flags &= ~IFF_ALLMULTI;
else {
dev->allmulti -= inc;
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: allmulti touches roof, "
"set allmulti failed, allmulti feature of "
"device might be broken.\n", dev->name);
return -EOVERFLOW;
}
}
if (dev->flags ^ old_flags) {
dev_change_rx_flags(dev, IFF_ALLMULTI);
dev_set_rx_mode(dev);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 744
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void walk_splay(cmap_splay *tree, unsigned int node, void (*fn)(cmap_splay *, void *), void *arg)
{
int from = TOP;
while (node != EMPTY)
{
switch (from)
{
case TOP:
if (tree[node].left != EMPTY)
{
node = tree[node].left;
from = TOP;
break;
}
/* fallthrough */
case LEFT:
fn(&tree[node], arg);
if (tree[node].right != EMPTY)
{
node = tree[node].right;
from = TOP;
break;
}
/* fallthrough */
case RIGHT:
{
unsigned int parent = tree[node].parent;
if (parent == EMPTY)
return;
if (tree[parent].left == node)
from = LEFT;
else
{
assert(tree[parent].right == node);
from = RIGHT;
}
node = parent;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 29,508
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PageInfo* page_info() {
if (!page_info_.get()) {
page_info_.reset(new PageInfo(
mock_ui(), profile(), tab_specific_content_settings(), web_contents(),
url(), security_level(), visible_security_state()));
}
return page_info_.get();
}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 1,248
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::DisableResizeAckCheckForTesting() {
g_check_for_pending_resize_ack = false;
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,725
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dest_write_back_narrow (pixman_iter_t *iter)
{
bits_image_t * image = &iter->image->bits;
int x = iter->x;
int y = iter->y;
int width = iter->width;
const uint32_t *buffer = iter->buffer;
image->store_scanline_32 (image, x, y, width, buffer);
if (image->common.alpha_map)
{
x -= image->common.alpha_origin_x;
y -= image->common.alpha_origin_y;
image->common.alpha_map->store_scanline_32 (
image->common.alpha_map, x, y, width, buffer);
}
iter->y++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 29,441
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NTSTATUS TCStartThread (PKSTART_ROUTINE threadProc, PVOID threadArg, PKTHREAD *kThread)
{
return TCStartThreadInProcess (threadProc, threadArg, kThread, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Windows: fix low severity vulnerability in driver that allowed reading 3 bytes of kernel stack memory (with a rare possibility of 25 additional bytes). Reported by Tim Harrison.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,491
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void account_system_vtime(struct task_struct *curr)
{
unsigned long flags;
s64 delta;
int cpu;
if (!sched_clock_irqtime)
return;
local_irq_save(flags);
cpu = smp_processor_id();
delta = sched_clock_cpu(cpu) - __this_cpu_read(irq_start_time);
__this_cpu_add(irq_start_time, delta);
irq_time_write_begin();
/*
* We do not account for softirq time from ksoftirqd here.
* We want to continue accounting softirq time to ksoftirqd thread
* in that case, so as not to confuse scheduler with a special task
* that do not consume any time, but still wants to run.
*/
if (hardirq_count())
__this_cpu_add(cpu_hardirq_time, delta);
else if (in_serving_softirq() && curr != this_cpu_ksoftirqd())
__this_cpu_add(cpu_softirq_time, delta);
irq_time_write_end();
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 5,736
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: event_index_change( int delta )
{
int num_indices = handle->current_font->num_indices;
status.Num += delta;
if ( status.Num < 0 )
status.Num = 0;
else if ( status.Num >= num_indices )
status.Num = num_indices - 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 23,258
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HasExpiredFaviconForPageURL(const GURL& page_url) {
RequestFaviconSyncForPageURL(page_url);
return got_expired_favicon_;
}
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 18,424
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int h2c_send_window_update(struct h2c *h2c, int sid, uint32_t increment)
{
struct buffer *res;
char str[13];
int ret = -1;
if (h2c_mux_busy(h2c, NULL)) {
h2c->flags |= H2_CF_DEM_MBUSY;
return 0;
}
res = h2_get_buf(h2c, &h2c->mbuf);
if (!res) {
h2c->flags |= H2_CF_MUX_MALLOC;
h2c->flags |= H2_CF_DEM_MROOM;
return 0;
}
/* length: 4, type: 8, flags: none */
memcpy(str, "\x00\x00\x04\x08\x00", 5);
write_n32(str + 5, sid);
write_n32(str + 9, increment);
ret = bo_istput(res, ist2(str, 13));
if (unlikely(ret <= 0)) {
if (!ret) {
h2c->flags |= H2_CF_MUX_MFULL;
h2c->flags |= H2_CF_DEM_MROOM;
return 0;
}
else {
h2c_error(h2c, H2_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void show_edge(struct commit *commit)
{
add_preferred_base(commit->object.oid.hash);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,692
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::SurfaceReady(
const scoped_refptr<VaapiDecodeSurface>& dec_surface) {
if (!task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread()) {
task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::SurfaceReady,
weak_this_, dec_surface));
return;
}
DCHECK(!awaiting_va_surfaces_recycle_);
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
if (state_ == kResetting || state_ == kDestroying)
return;
}
pending_output_cbs_.push(
base::Bind(&VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::OutputPicture, weak_this_,
dec_surface->va_surface(), dec_surface->bitstream_id(),
dec_surface->visible_rect()));
TryOutputSurface();
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 13,173
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cms_copy_content(BIO *out, BIO *in, unsigned int flags)
{
unsigned char buf[4096];
int r = 0, i;
BIO *tmpout = NULL;
if (out == NULL)
tmpout = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
else if (flags & CMS_TEXT) {
tmpout = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
BIO_set_mem_eof_return(tmpout, 0);
} else
tmpout = out;
if (!tmpout) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_CONTENT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Read all content through chain to process digest, decrypt etc */
for (;;) {
i = BIO_read(in, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (i <= 0) {
if (BIO_method_type(in) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER) {
if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(in))
goto err;
}
if (i < 0)
goto err;
break;
}
if (tmpout && (BIO_write(tmpout, buf, i) != i))
goto err;
}
if (flags & CMS_TEXT) {
if (!SMIME_text(tmpout, out)) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_CONTENT, CMS_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
r = 1;
err:
if (tmpout && (tmpout != out))
BIO_free(tmpout);
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 9,005
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int speed_min(struct mddev *mddev)
{
return mddev->sync_speed_min ?
mddev->sync_speed_min : sysctl_speed_limit_min;
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 23,050
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: convert(void)
{
int ch;
char* mode = "w";
if (!checksignature())
return (-1);
readscreen();
while ((ch = getc(infile)) != ';' && ch != EOF) {
switch (ch) {
case '\0': break; /* this kludge for non-standard files */
case ',': if (!readgifimage(mode))
return (-1);
mode = "a"; /* subsequent images append */
break;
case '!': readextension();
break;
default: fprintf(stderr, "illegal GIF block type\n");
return (-1);
}
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: fix possible OOB write in gif2tiff.c
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,897
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnNotifyStreamCreated(
int stream_id,
base::SharedMemoryHandle handle,
base::SyncSocket::TransitDescriptor socket_descriptor,
uint32_t length) {
shared_memory_.reset(new base::SharedMemory(handle, false));
CHECK(shared_memory_->Map(length));
CHECK(shared_memory_->memory());
shared_memory_length_ = length;
base::SyncSocket::Handle sync_socket_handle =
base::SyncSocket::UnwrapHandle(socket_descriptor);
sync_socket_.reset(new base::SyncSocket(sync_socket_handle));
WasNotifiedOfCreation(stream_id, length);
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 285
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_meaningful_restriction_threshold(void)
{
int32_t pct = networkstatus_get_param(NULL,
"guard-meaningful-restriction-percent",
DFLT_MEANINGFUL_RESTRICTION_PERCENT,
1, INT32_MAX);
return pct / 100.0;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 1,036
|
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