instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::PaintRenderingResultsToCanvas(
SourceDrawingBuffer source_buffer) {
if (isContextLost())
return false;
bool must_clear_now = ClearIfComposited() != kSkipped;
if (!must_paint_to_canvas_ && !must_clear_now)
return false;
must_paint_to_canvas_ = false;
if (Host()->ResourceProvider() &&
Host()->ResourceProvider()->Size() != GetDrawingBuffer()->Size()) {
Host()->DiscardResourceProvider();
}
if (!Host()->GetOrCreateCanvasResourceProvider(kPreferAcceleration))
return false;
ScopedTexture2DRestorer restorer(this);
ScopedFramebufferRestorer fbo_restorer(this);
GetDrawingBuffer()->ResolveAndBindForReadAndDraw();
if (!CopyRenderingResultsFromDrawingBuffer(Host()->ResourceProvider(),
source_buffer)) {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 3,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Editor::Command Editor::CreateCommand(const String& command_name) {
return Command(InternalCommand(command_name), kCommandFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
frame_);
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dcbnl_setdcbx(struct net_device *netdev, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u32 seq, struct nlattr **tb, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u8 value;
if (!netdev->dcbnl_ops->setdcbx)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!tb[DCB_ATTR_DCBX])
return -EINVAL;
value = nla_get_u8(tb[DCB_ATTR_DCBX]);
return nla_put_u8(skb, DCB_ATTR_DCBX,
netdev->dcbnl_ops->setdcbx(netdev, value));
}
Commit Message: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 11,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int asepcos_delete_file(sc_card_t *card, const sc_path_t *path)
{
int r, ftype, atype;
sc_apdu_t apdu;
u8 buf[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE];
/* use GET DATA to determine whether it is a DF or EF */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0xca, 0x01, 0x84);
apdu.le = 256;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(buf);
apdu.resp = buf;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
if (apdu.sw1 == 0x90 && apdu.sw2 == 0x00) {
/* looks like a EF */
atype = SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT;
ftype = 0x02;
buf[0] = path->value[path->len-2];
buf[1] = path->value[path->len-1];
} else {
/* presumably a DF */
atype = SC_APDU_CASE_1;
ftype = 0x00;
}
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, atype, 0xe4, ftype, 0x00);
if (atype == SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT) {
apdu.lc = 2;
apdu.datalen = 2;
apdu.data = buf;
}
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
return sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 3,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool check_direct_spte_mmio_pf(u64 spte)
{
return __check_direct_spte_mmio_pf(spte);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u16 q922_to_dlci(u8 *hdr)
{
return ((hdr[0] & 0xFC) << 2) | ((hdr[1] & 0xF0) >> 4);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 1,119 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
debug3("%s", __func__);
(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
buffer_clear(m);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
auth_submethod = "pam";
return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt);
}
Commit Message: Don't resend username to PAM; it already has it.
Pointed out by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hardware_disable_nolock(void *junk)
{
int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, cpus_hardware_enabled))
return;
cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, cpus_hardware_enabled);
kvm_arch_hardware_disable(NULL);
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __init acpi_request_region (struct acpi_generic_address *gas,
unsigned int length, char *desc)
{
u64 addr;
/* Handle possible alignment issues */
memcpy(&addr, &gas->address, sizeof(addr));
if (!addr || !length)
return;
/* Resources are never freed */
if (gas->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_IO)
request_region(addr, length, desc);
else if (gas->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY)
request_mem_region(addr, length, desc);
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 12,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned long emulator_get_cr(int cr, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long value;
switch (cr) {
case 0:
value = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
break;
case 2:
value = vcpu->arch.cr2;
break;
case 3:
value = vcpu->arch.cr3;
break;
case 4:
value = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
break;
case 8:
value = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
break;
default:
vcpu_printf(vcpu, "%s: unexpected cr %u\n", __func__, cr);
return 0;
}
return value;
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 25,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BasePrefsChange::DismissOnPrefChange(const std::string& pref_name) {
DCHECK(!pref_observer_->IsObserved(pref_name));
pref_observer_->AddPref(pref_name);
}
Commit Message: [protector] Refactoring of --no-protector code.
*) On DSE change, new provider is not pushed to Sync.
*) Simplified code in BrowserInit.
BUG=None
TEST=protector.py
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10065016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132398 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,995 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataCache::GetCacheEntryHelper(const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5,
bool* success,
GDataCache::CacheEntry* cache_entry) {
AssertOnSequencedWorkerPool();
DCHECK(success);
DCHECK(cache_entry);
scoped_ptr<GDataCache::CacheEntry> value(GetCacheEntry(resource_id, md5));
*success = value.get();
if (*success)
*cache_entry = *value;
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u64 gf_sys_clock_high_res()
{
struct timeval now;
gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
return (now.tv_sec)*1000000 + (now.tv_usec) - sys_start_time_hr;
}
Commit Message: fix buffer overrun in gf_bin128_parse
closes #1204
closes #1205
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SessionCrashedInfoBarDelegate::SessionCrashedInfoBarDelegate(
Profile* profile,
InfoBarTabHelper* infobar_helper)
: ConfirmInfoBarDelegate(infobar_helper),
profile_(profile) {
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 15,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_cox_getcompparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate,
jas_stream_t *in, int prtflag, jpc_coxcp_t *compparms)
{
uint_fast8_t tmp;
int i;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
ms = 0;
cstate = 0;
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &compparms->numdlvls) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &compparms->cblkwidthval) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &compparms->cblkheightval) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &compparms->cblksty) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &compparms->qmfbid)) {
return -1;
}
if (compparms->numdlvls > 32) {
goto error;
}
compparms->numrlvls = compparms->numdlvls + 1;
if (compparms->numrlvls > JPC_MAXRLVLS) {
goto error;
}
if (prtflag) {
for (i = 0; i < compparms->numrlvls; ++i) {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp)) {
goto error;
}
compparms->rlvls[i].parwidthval = tmp & 0xf;
compparms->rlvls[i].parheightval = (tmp >> 4) & 0xf;
}
/* Sigh.
This bit should be in the same field in both COC and COD mrk segs. */
compparms->csty |= JPC_COX_PRT;
}
if (jas_stream_eof(in)) {
goto error;
}
return 0;
error:
if (compparms) {
jpc_cox_destroycompparms(compparms);
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 2,715 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gs_malloc_wrap(gs_memory_t **wrapped, gs_malloc_memory_t *contents)
{
# ifdef USE_RETRY_MEMORY_WRAPPER
/*
* This is deprecated since 'retry' for clist reversion/cycling
* will ONLY work for monochrome, simple PS or PCL, not for a
* color device and not for PDF or XPS with transparency
*/
{
gs_memory_retrying_t *rmem;
rmem = (gs_memory_retrying_t *)
gs_alloc_bytes_immovable((gs_memory_t *)lmem,
sizeof(gs_memory_retrying_t),
"gs_malloc_wrap(retrying)");
if (rmem == 0) {
gs_memory_locked_release(lmem);
gs_free_object(cmem, lmem, "gs_malloc_wrap(locked)");
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
}
code = gs_memory_retrying_init(rmem, (gs_memory_t *)lmem);
if (code < 0) {
gs_free_object((gs_memory_t *)lmem, rmem, "gs_malloc_wrap(retrying)");
gs_memory_locked_release(lmem);
gs_free_object(cmem, lmem, "gs_malloc_wrap(locked)");
return code;
}
*wrapped = (gs_memory_t *)rmem;
}
# endif /* retrying */
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 4,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mem_cgroup_count_swap_user(swp_entry_t ent, struct page **pagep)
{
struct page *page;
struct swap_info_struct *p;
int count = 0;
page = find_get_page(&swapper_space, ent.val);
if (page)
count += page_mapcount(page);
p = swap_info_get(ent);
if (p) {
count += swap_count(p->swap_map[swp_offset(ent)]);
spin_unlock(&swap_lock);
}
*pagep = page;
return count;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 8,215 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CStarter::RemoteHold( int )
{
if( jic ) {
jic->gotHold();
}
if ( this->Hold( ) ) {
dprintf( D_FULLDEBUG, "Got Hold when no jobs running\n" );
this->allJobsDone();
return ( true );
}
return ( false );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 29,050 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool xmp_get_property_int64(XmpPtr xmp, const char *schema, const char *name,
int64_t *property, uint32_t *propsBits)
{
CHECK_PTR(xmp, false);
RESET_ERROR;
bool ret = false;
try {
auto txmp = reinterpret_cast<const SXMPMeta *>(xmp);
XMP_OptionBits optionBits;
ret = txmp->GetProperty_Int64(schema, name, property, &optionBits);
if (propsBits) {
*propsBits = optionBits;
}
}
catch (const XMP_Error &e) {
set_error(e);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 25,682 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: crm_xml_replace(xmlNode * node, const char *name, const char *value)
{
bool dirty = FALSE;
xmlAttr *attr = NULL;
const char *old_value = NULL;
CRM_CHECK(node != NULL, return NULL);
CRM_CHECK(name != NULL && name[0] != 0, return NULL);
old_value = crm_element_value(node, name);
/* Could be re-setting the same value */
CRM_CHECK(old_value != value, return value);
if(__xml_acl_check(node, name, xpf_acl_write) == FALSE) {
/* Create a fake object linked to doc->_private instead? */
crm_trace("Cannot replace %s=%s to %s", name, value, node->name);
return NULL;
} else if (old_value != NULL && value == NULL) {
xml_remove_prop(node, name);
return NULL;
} else if (value == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if(TRACKING_CHANGES(node)) {
if(old_value == NULL || value == NULL || strcmp(old_value, value) != 0) {
dirty = TRUE;
}
}
attr = xmlSetProp(node, (const xmlChar *)name, (const xmlChar *)value);
if(dirty) {
crm_attr_dirty(attr);
}
CRM_CHECK(attr && attr->children && attr->children->content, return NULL);
return (char *)attr->children->content;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 8,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserMainLoop::RunMainMessageLoopParts() {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_BEGIN0("toplevel", "BrowserMain:MESSAGE_LOOP", this);
bool ran_main_loop = false;
if (parts_)
ran_main_loop = parts_->MainMessageLoopRun(&result_code_);
if (!ran_main_loop)
MainMessageLoopRun();
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END0("toplevel", "BrowserMain:MESSAGE_LOOP", this);
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 1,357 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HistogramEnumerate(const std::string& name, int sample, int maximum,
int out_of_range_replacement) {
if (sample < 0 || sample >= maximum) {
if (out_of_range_replacement < 0)
return;
else
sample = out_of_range_replacement;
}
const PPB_UMA_Private* ptr = GetUMAInterface();
if (ptr == NULL) return;
ptr->HistogramEnumeration(pp::Var(name).pp_var(), sample, maximum);
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,451 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagetruecolortopalette)
{
zval *IM;
zend_bool dither;
long ncolors;
gdImagePtr im;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rbl", &IM, &dither, &ncolors) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
if (ncolors <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Number of colors has to be greater than zero");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
gdImageTrueColorToPalette(im, dither, ncolors);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 14,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::prepareForAdaptivePlayback(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL enable, OMX_U32 maxFrameWidth,
OMX_U32 maxFrameHeight) {
Mutex::Autolock autolock(mLock);
CLOG_CONFIG(prepareForAdaptivePlayback, "%s:%u en=%d max=%ux%u",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, maxFrameWidth, maxFrameHeight);
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.prepareForAdaptivePlayback");
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR_IF(enable, getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams params;
InitOMXParams(¶ms);
params.nPortIndex = portIndex;
params.bEnable = enable;
params.nMaxFrameWidth = maxFrameWidth;
params.nMaxFrameHeight = maxFrameHeight;
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u en=%d max=%ux%u", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, maxFrameWidth, maxFrameHeight);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Commit Message: IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BeginDownload(
std::unique_ptr<download::DownloadUrlParameters> params,
std::unique_ptr<storage::BlobDataHandle> blob_data_handle,
content::ResourceContext* resource_context,
scoped_refptr<net::URLRequestContextGetter> url_request_context_getter,
bool is_new_download,
base::WeakPtr<DownloadManagerImpl> download_manager) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
download::UrlDownloadHandler::UniqueUrlDownloadHandlerPtr downloader(
nullptr, base::OnTaskRunnerDeleter(base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()));
params->set_blob_storage_context_getter(
base::BindOnce(&BlobStorageContextGetter, resource_context));
std::unique_ptr<net::URLRequest> url_request =
DownloadRequestCore::CreateRequestOnIOThread(
is_new_download, params.get(), std::move(url_request_context_getter));
if (blob_data_handle) {
storage::BlobProtocolHandler::SetRequestedBlobDataHandle(
url_request.get(), std::move(blob_data_handle));
}
if (params->render_process_host_id() >= 0) {
download::DownloadInterruptReason reason =
DownloadManagerImpl::BeginDownloadRequest(
std::move(url_request), resource_context, params.get());
if (reason != download::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NONE) {
CreateInterruptedDownload(std::move(params), reason, download_manager);
return;
}
} else {
downloader.reset(UrlDownloader::BeginDownload(download_manager,
std::move(url_request),
params.get(), false)
.release());
}
base::PostTaskWithTraits(
FROM_HERE, {BrowserThread::UI},
base::BindOnce(
&download::UrlDownloadHandler::Delegate::OnUrlDownloadHandlerCreated,
download_manager, std::move(downloader)));
}
Commit Message: Early return if a download Id is already used when creating a download
This is protect against download Id overflow and use-after-free
issue.
BUG=958533
Change-Id: I2c183493cb09106686df9822b3987bfb95bcf720
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1591485
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#656910}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 29,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mov_prune_frag_info(MOVMuxContext *mov, int tracks, int max)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < mov->nb_streams; i++) {
MOVTrack *track = &mov->tracks[i];
if ((tracks >= 0 && i != tracks) || !track->entry)
continue;
if (track->nb_frag_info > max) {
memmove(track->frag_info, track->frag_info + (track->nb_frag_info - max), max * sizeof(*track->frag_info));
track->nb_frag_info = max;
}
}
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 11,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_startMultiplayer_f( void ) {
char binName[MAX_OSPATH];
#if defined(_WIN64) || defined(__WIN64__)
Com_sprintf(binName, sizeof(binName), "ioWolfMP." ARCH_STRING ".exe");
Sys_StartProcess( binName, qtrue );
#elif defined(_WIN32) || defined(__WIN32__)
Com_sprintf(binName, sizeof(binName), "ioWolfMP." ARCH_STRING ".exe");
Sys_StartProcess( binName, qtrue );
#elif defined(__i386__) && (!defined(_WIN32) || !defined(__WIN32__))
Com_sprintf(binName, sizeof(binName), "./iowolfmp." BIN_STRING );
Sys_StartProcess( binName, qtrue );
#else
Com_sprintf(binName, sizeof(binName), "./iowolfmp." ARCH_STRING );
Sys_StartProcess( binName, qtrue );
#endif
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 822 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gboolean webkit_web_view_scroll_event(GtkWidget* widget, GdkEventScroll* event)
{
WebKitWebView* webView = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW(widget);
Frame* frame = core(webView)->mainFrame();
if (!frame->view())
return FALSE;
PlatformWheelEvent wheelEvent(event);
return frame->eventHandler()->handleWheelEvent(wheelEvent);
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 28,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int lrw_camellia_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
struct camellia_lrw_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
int err;
err = __camellia_setkey(&ctx->camellia_ctx, key,
keylen - CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE,
&tfm->crt_flags);
if (err)
return err;
return lrw_init_table(&ctx->lrw_table,
key + keylen - CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 22,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long FS_FOpenFileRead(const char *filename, fileHandle_t *file, qboolean uniqueFILE)
{
searchpath_t *search;
long len;
if(!fs_searchpaths)
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Filesystem call made without initialization");
for(search = fs_searchpaths; search; search = search->next)
{
len = FS_FOpenFileReadDir(filename, search, file, uniqueFILE, qfalse);
if(file == NULL)
{
if(len > 0)
return len;
}
else
{
if(len >= 0 && *file)
return len;
}
}
#ifdef FS_MISSING
if(missingFiles)
fprintf(missingFiles, "%s\n", filename);
#endif
if(file)
{
*file = 0;
return -1;
}
else
{
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 1 | 14,733 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static socklen_t get_sockname(h2o_conn_t *_conn, struct sockaddr *sa)
{
h2o_http2_conn_t *conn = (void *)_conn;
return h2o_socket_getsockname(conn->sock, sa);
}
Commit Message: h2: use after free on premature connection close #920
lib/http2/connection.c:on_read() calls parse_input(), which might free
`conn`. It does so in particular if the connection preface isn't
the expected one in expect_preface(). `conn` is then used after the free
in `if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)`.
We fix this by adding a return value to close_connection that returns a
negative value if `conn` has been free'd and can't be used anymore.
Credits for finding the bug to Tim Newsham.
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerClient* client)
: m_client(client)
{
ASSERT_UNUSED(m_client, m_client);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 6,985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZSTD_CStream* ZSTD_createCStream(void)
{
DEBUGLOG(3, "ZSTD_createCStream");
return ZSTD_createCStream_advanced(ZSTD_defaultCMem);
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static sqlite3_index_info *allocateIndexInfo(
Parse *pParse, /* The parsing context */
WhereClause *pWC, /* The WHERE clause being analyzed */
Bitmask mUnusable, /* Ignore terms with these prereqs */
struct SrcList_item *pSrc, /* The FROM clause term that is the vtab */
ExprList *pOrderBy, /* The ORDER BY clause */
u16 *pmNoOmit /* Mask of terms not to omit */
){
int i, j;
int nTerm;
struct sqlite3_index_constraint *pIdxCons;
struct sqlite3_index_orderby *pIdxOrderBy;
struct sqlite3_index_constraint_usage *pUsage;
struct HiddenIndexInfo *pHidden;
WhereTerm *pTerm;
int nOrderBy;
sqlite3_index_info *pIdxInfo;
u16 mNoOmit = 0;
/* Count the number of possible WHERE clause constraints referring
** to this virtual table */
for(i=nTerm=0, pTerm=pWC->a; i<pWC->nTerm; i++, pTerm++){
if( pTerm->leftCursor != pSrc->iCursor ) continue;
if( pTerm->prereqRight & mUnusable ) continue;
assert( IsPowerOfTwo(pTerm->eOperator & ~WO_EQUIV) );
testcase( pTerm->eOperator & WO_IN );
testcase( pTerm->eOperator & WO_ISNULL );
testcase( pTerm->eOperator & WO_IS );
testcase( pTerm->eOperator & WO_ALL );
if( (pTerm->eOperator & ~(WO_EQUIV))==0 ) continue;
if( pTerm->wtFlags & TERM_VNULL ) continue;
assert( pTerm->u.leftColumn>=(-1) );
nTerm++;
}
/* If the ORDER BY clause contains only columns in the current
** virtual table then allocate space for the aOrderBy part of
** the sqlite3_index_info structure.
*/
nOrderBy = 0;
if( pOrderBy ){
int n = pOrderBy->nExpr;
for(i=0; i<n; i++){
Expr *pExpr = pOrderBy->a[i].pExpr;
if( pExpr->op!=TK_COLUMN || pExpr->iTable!=pSrc->iCursor ) break;
}
if( i==n){
nOrderBy = n;
}
}
/* Allocate the sqlite3_index_info structure
*/
pIdxInfo = sqlite3DbMallocZero(pParse->db, sizeof(*pIdxInfo)
+ (sizeof(*pIdxCons) + sizeof(*pUsage))*nTerm
+ sizeof(*pIdxOrderBy)*nOrderBy + sizeof(*pHidden) );
if( pIdxInfo==0 ){
sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "out of memory");
return 0;
}
/* Initialize the structure. The sqlite3_index_info structure contains
** many fields that are declared "const" to prevent xBestIndex from
** changing them. We have to do some funky casting in order to
** initialize those fields.
*/
pHidden = (struct HiddenIndexInfo*)&pIdxInfo[1];
pIdxCons = (struct sqlite3_index_constraint*)&pHidden[1];
pIdxOrderBy = (struct sqlite3_index_orderby*)&pIdxCons[nTerm];
pUsage = (struct sqlite3_index_constraint_usage*)&pIdxOrderBy[nOrderBy];
*(int*)&pIdxInfo->nConstraint = nTerm;
*(int*)&pIdxInfo->nOrderBy = nOrderBy;
*(struct sqlite3_index_constraint**)&pIdxInfo->aConstraint = pIdxCons;
*(struct sqlite3_index_orderby**)&pIdxInfo->aOrderBy = pIdxOrderBy;
*(struct sqlite3_index_constraint_usage**)&pIdxInfo->aConstraintUsage =
pUsage;
pHidden->pWC = pWC;
pHidden->pParse = pParse;
for(i=j=0, pTerm=pWC->a; i<pWC->nTerm; i++, pTerm++){
u16 op;
if( pTerm->leftCursor != pSrc->iCursor ) continue;
if( pTerm->prereqRight & mUnusable ) continue;
assert( IsPowerOfTwo(pTerm->eOperator & ~WO_EQUIV) );
testcase( pTerm->eOperator & WO_IN );
testcase( pTerm->eOperator & WO_IS );
testcase( pTerm->eOperator & WO_ISNULL );
testcase( pTerm->eOperator & WO_ALL );
if( (pTerm->eOperator & ~(WO_EQUIV))==0 ) continue;
if( pTerm->wtFlags & TERM_VNULL ) continue;
if( (pSrc->fg.jointype & JT_LEFT)!=0
&& !ExprHasProperty(pTerm->pExpr, EP_FromJoin)
&& (pTerm->eOperator & (WO_IS|WO_ISNULL))
){
/* An "IS" term in the WHERE clause where the virtual table is the rhs
** of a LEFT JOIN. Do not pass this term to the virtual table
** implementation, as this can lead to incorrect results from SQL such
** as:
**
** "LEFT JOIN vtab WHERE vtab.col IS NULL" */
testcase( pTerm->eOperator & WO_ISNULL );
testcase( pTerm->eOperator & WO_IS );
continue;
}
assert( pTerm->u.leftColumn>=(-1) );
pIdxCons[j].iColumn = pTerm->u.leftColumn;
pIdxCons[j].iTermOffset = i;
op = pTerm->eOperator & WO_ALL;
if( op==WO_IN ) op = WO_EQ;
if( op==WO_AUX ){
pIdxCons[j].op = pTerm->eMatchOp;
}else if( op & (WO_ISNULL|WO_IS) ){
if( op==WO_ISNULL ){
pIdxCons[j].op = SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_ISNULL;
}else{
pIdxCons[j].op = SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_IS;
}
}else{
pIdxCons[j].op = (u8)op;
/* The direct assignment in the previous line is possible only because
** the WO_ and SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_ codes are identical. The
** following asserts verify this fact. */
assert( WO_EQ==SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_EQ );
assert( WO_LT==SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_LT );
assert( WO_LE==SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_LE );
assert( WO_GT==SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_GT );
assert( WO_GE==SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_GE );
assert( pTerm->eOperator&(WO_IN|WO_EQ|WO_LT|WO_LE|WO_GT|WO_GE|WO_AUX) );
if( op & (WO_LT|WO_LE|WO_GT|WO_GE)
&& sqlite3ExprIsVector(pTerm->pExpr->pRight)
){
if( i<16 ) mNoOmit |= (1 << i);
if( op==WO_LT ) pIdxCons[j].op = WO_LE;
if( op==WO_GT ) pIdxCons[j].op = WO_GE;
}
}
j++;
}
for(i=0; i<nOrderBy; i++){
Expr *pExpr = pOrderBy->a[i].pExpr;
pIdxOrderBy[i].iColumn = pExpr->iColumn;
pIdxOrderBy[i].desc = pOrderBy->a[i].sortOrder;
}
*pmNoOmit = mNoOmit;
return pIdxInfo;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 4,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: icmp6_rrenum_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, const u_char *ep)
{
const struct icmp6_router_renum *rr6;
const char *cp;
const struct rr_pco_match *match;
const struct rr_pco_use *use;
char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
int n;
if (ep < bp)
return;
rr6 = (const struct icmp6_router_renum *)bp;
cp = (const char *)(rr6 + 1);
ND_TCHECK(rr6->rr_reserved);
switch (rr6->rr_code) {
case ICMP6_ROUTER_RENUMBERING_COMMAND:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"router renum: command"));
break;
case ICMP6_ROUTER_RENUMBERING_RESULT:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"router renum: result"));
break;
case ICMP6_ROUTER_RENUMBERING_SEQNUM_RESET:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"router renum: sequence number reset"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"router renum: code-#%d", rr6->rr_code));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,", seq=%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&rr6->rr_seqnum)));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
#define F(x, y) ((rr6->rr_flags) & (x) ? (y) : "")
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[")); /*]*/
if (rr6->rr_flags) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s%s%s%s%s,", F(ICMP6_RR_FLAGS_TEST, "T"),
F(ICMP6_RR_FLAGS_REQRESULT, "R"),
F(ICMP6_RR_FLAGS_FORCEAPPLY, "A"),
F(ICMP6_RR_FLAGS_SPECSITE, "S"),
F(ICMP6_RR_FLAGS_PREVDONE, "P")));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"seg=%u,", rr6->rr_segnum));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"maxdelay=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&rr6->rr_maxdelay)));
if (rr6->rr_reserved)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"rsvd=0x%x", EXTRACT_32BITS(&rr6->rr_reserved)));
/*[*/
ND_PRINT((ndo,"]"));
#undef F
}
if (rr6->rr_code == ICMP6_ROUTER_RENUMBERING_COMMAND) {
match = (const struct rr_pco_match *)cp;
cp = (const char *)(match + 1);
ND_TCHECK(match->rpm_prefix);
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n\t"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"match(")); /*)*/
switch (match->rpm_code) {
case RPM_PCO_ADD: ND_PRINT((ndo,"add")); break;
case RPM_PCO_CHANGE: ND_PRINT((ndo,"change")); break;
case RPM_PCO_SETGLOBAL: ND_PRINT((ndo,"setglobal")); break;
default: ND_PRINT((ndo,"#%u", match->rpm_code)); break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,",ord=%u", match->rpm_ordinal));
ND_PRINT((ndo,",min=%u", match->rpm_minlen));
ND_PRINT((ndo,",max=%u", match->rpm_maxlen));
}
if (addrtostr6(&match->rpm_prefix, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf)))
ND_PRINT((ndo,",%s/%u", hbuf, match->rpm_matchlen));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo,",?/%u", match->rpm_matchlen));
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
n = match->rpm_len - 3;
if (n % 4)
goto trunc;
n /= 4;
while (n-- > 0) {
use = (const struct rr_pco_use *)cp;
cp = (const char *)(use + 1);
ND_TCHECK(use->rpu_prefix);
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n\t"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"use(")); /*)*/
if (use->rpu_flags) {
#define F(x, y) ((use->rpu_flags) & (x) ? (y) : "")
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s%s,",
F(ICMP6_RR_PCOUSE_FLAGS_DECRVLTIME, "V"),
F(ICMP6_RR_PCOUSE_FLAGS_DECRPLTIME, "P")));
#undef F
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"mask=0x%x,", use->rpu_ramask));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"raflags=0x%x,", use->rpu_raflags));
if (~use->rpu_vltime == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"vltime=infty,"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo,"vltime=%u,",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&use->rpu_vltime)));
if (~use->rpu_pltime == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"pltime=infty,"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo,"pltime=%u,",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&use->rpu_pltime)));
}
if (addrtostr6(&use->rpu_prefix, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf)))
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s/%u/%u", hbuf, use->rpu_uselen,
use->rpu_keeplen));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo,"?/%u/%u", use->rpu_uselen,
use->rpu_keeplen));
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|icmp6]"));
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14882/ICMP6 RPL: Add a missing bounds check
Moreover:
Add and use *_tstr[] strings.
Update four tests outputs accordingly.
Fix a space.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 5,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<ResourceHandler> DownloadResourceHandler::Create(
net::URLRequest* request) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
std::unique_ptr<ResourceHandler> handler(new DownloadResourceHandler(
request, std::string(), download::DownloadSource::NAVIGATION, true));
return handler;
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 9,828 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::BindToFrame(blink::WebNavigationControl* frame) {
DCHECK(!frame_);
std::pair<FrameMap::iterator, bool> result =
g_frame_map.Get().emplace(frame, this);
CHECK(result.second) << "Inserting a duplicate item.";
frame_ = frame;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 15,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int store_xauthority(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: invalid .Xauthority file\n");
return 0;
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 1 | 8,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::markCaptionAndSubtitleTracksAsUnconfigured() {
if (!m_textTracks)
return;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < m_textTracks->length(); ++i) {
TextTrack* textTrack = m_textTracks->anonymousIndexedGetter(i);
if (textTrack->isVisualKind())
textTrack->setHasBeenConfigured(false);
}
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeCoordinator::removeTile(WebLayerID layerID, int tileID)
{
m_shouldSyncFrame = true;
m_webPage->send(Messages::LayerTreeCoordinatorProxy::RemoveTileForLayer(layerID, tileID));
}
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PeopleHandler::OnDidClosePage(const base::ListValue* args) {
if (!args->GetList()[0].GetBool() && !IsProfileAuthNeededOrHasErrors()) {
MarkFirstSetupComplete();
}
CloseSyncSetup();
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RendererSchedulerImpl::CreateWebScopedVirtualTimePauser() {
return WebScopedVirtualTimePauser(this);
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dec2octal(int decimal)
{
int octal, pos;
octal = 0; pos = 0;
while (decimal > 0) {
octal += (decimal & 7)*(pos == 0 ? 1 : pos);
decimal /= 8;
pos += 10;
}
return octal;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 4,512 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothAdapterChromeOS::DiscoveringChanged(
bool discovering) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(BluetoothAdapter::Observer, observers_,
AdapterDiscoveringChanged(this, discovering));
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnSetIsInert(bool is_inert) {
base::PostTaskWithTraits(
FROM_HERE, {content::BrowserThread::UI},
base::BindOnce(&SetIsInertMessageFilter::OnSetIsInertOnUI, this,
is_inert));
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 15,172 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gdImageRotateNearestNeighbour(gdImagePtr src, const float degrees,
const int bgColor)
{
float _angle = ((float) (-degrees / 180.0f) * (float)M_PI);
const int src_w = gdImageSX(src);
const int src_h = gdImageSY(src);
const gdFixed f_0_5 = gd_ftofx(0.5f);
const gdFixed f_H = gd_itofx(src_h/2);
const gdFixed f_W = gd_itofx(src_w/2);
const gdFixed f_cos = gd_ftofx(cos(-_angle));
const gdFixed f_sin = gd_ftofx(sin(-_angle));
unsigned int dst_offset_x;
unsigned int dst_offset_y = 0;
unsigned int i;
gdImagePtr dst;
gdRect bbox;
int new_height, new_width;
gdRotatedImageSize(src, degrees, &bbox);
new_width = bbox.width;
new_height = bbox.height;
dst = gdImageCreateTrueColor(new_width, new_height);
if (!dst) {
return NULL;
}
dst->saveAlphaFlag = 1;
for (i = 0; i < new_height; i++) {
unsigned int j;
dst_offset_x = 0;
for (j = 0; j < new_width; j++) {
gdFixed f_i = gd_itofx((int)i - (int)new_height / 2);
gdFixed f_j = gd_itofx((int)j - (int)new_width / 2);
gdFixed f_m = gd_mulfx(f_j,f_sin) + gd_mulfx(f_i,f_cos) + f_0_5 + f_H;
gdFixed f_n = gd_mulfx(f_j,f_cos) - gd_mulfx(f_i,f_sin) + f_0_5 + f_W;
long m = gd_fxtoi(f_m);
long n = gd_fxtoi(f_n);
if ((m > 0) && (m < src_h-1) && (n > 0) && (n < src_w-1)) {
if (dst_offset_y < new_height) {
dst->tpixels[dst_offset_y][dst_offset_x++] = src->tpixels[m][n];
}
} else {
if (dst_offset_y < new_height) {
dst->tpixels[dst_offset_y][dst_offset_x++] = bgColor;
}
}
}
dst_offset_y++;
}
return dst;
}
Commit Message: Fix potential unsigned underflow
No need to decrease `u`, so we don't do it. While we're at it, we also factor
out the overflow check of the loop, what improves performance and readability.
This issue has been reported by Stefan Esser to security@libgd.org.
CWE ID: CWE-191 | 0 | 4,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Document::EventFactorySet& Document::eventFactories()
{
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(EventFactorySet, s_eventFactory, ());
return s_eventFactory;
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 1,771 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ArthurOutputDev::updateFont(GfxState *state)
{
GfxFont *gfxFont;
GfxFontType fontType;
SplashOutFontFileID *id;
SplashFontFile *fontFile;
SplashFontSrc *fontsrc;
FoFiTrueType *ff;
Ref embRef;
Object refObj, strObj;
GooString *fileName;
char *tmpBuf;
int tmpBufLen;
Gushort *codeToGID;
DisplayFontParam *dfp;
double *textMat;
double m11, m12, m21, m22, fontSize;
SplashCoord mat[4];
int substIdx, n;
int faceIndex = 0;
SplashCoord matrix[6];
m_needFontUpdate = false;
m_font = NULL;
fileName = NULL;
tmpBuf = NULL;
substIdx = -1;
if (!(gfxFont = state->getFont())) {
goto err1;
}
fontType = gfxFont->getType();
if (fontType == fontType3) {
goto err1;
}
id = new SplashOutFontFileID(gfxFont->getID());
if ((fontFile = m_fontEngine->getFontFile(id))) {
delete id;
} else {
if (gfxFont->getEmbeddedFontID(&embRef)) {
tmpBuf = gfxFont->readEmbFontFile(xref, &tmpBufLen);
if (! tmpBuf)
goto err2;
} else if (!(fileName = gfxFont->getExtFontFile())) {
dfp = NULL;
if (gfxFont->getName()) {
dfp = globalParams->getDisplayFont(gfxFont);
}
if (!dfp) {
error(-1, "Couldn't find a font for '%s'",
gfxFont->getName() ? gfxFont->getName()->getCString()
: "(unnamed)");
goto err2;
}
switch (dfp->kind) {
case displayFontT1:
fileName = dfp->t1.fileName;
fontType = gfxFont->isCIDFont() ? fontCIDType0 : fontType1;
break;
case displayFontTT:
fileName = dfp->tt.fileName;
fontType = gfxFont->isCIDFont() ? fontCIDType2 : fontTrueType;
faceIndex = dfp->tt.faceIndex;
break;
}
}
fontsrc = new SplashFontSrc;
if (fileName)
fontsrc->setFile(fileName, gFalse);
else
fontsrc->setBuf(tmpBuf, tmpBufLen, gFalse);
switch (fontType) {
case fontType1:
if (!(fontFile = m_fontEngine->loadType1Font(
id,
fontsrc,
((Gfx8BitFont *)gfxFont)->getEncoding()))) {
error(-1, "Couldn't create a font for '%s'",
gfxFont->getName() ? gfxFont->getName()->getCString()
: "(unnamed)");
goto err2;
}
break;
case fontType1C:
if (!(fontFile = m_fontEngine->loadType1CFont(
id,
fontsrc,
((Gfx8BitFont *)gfxFont)->getEncoding()))) {
error(-1, "Couldn't create a font for '%s'",
gfxFont->getName() ? gfxFont->getName()->getCString()
: "(unnamed)");
goto err2;
}
break;
case fontType1COT:
if (!(fontFile = m_fontEngine->loadOpenTypeT1CFont(
id,
fontsrc,
((Gfx8BitFont *)gfxFont)->getEncoding()))) {
error(-1, "Couldn't create a font for '%s'",
gfxFont->getName() ? gfxFont->getName()->getCString()
: "(unnamed)");
goto err2;
}
break;
case fontTrueType:
case fontTrueTypeOT:
if (fileName)
ff = FoFiTrueType::load(fileName->getCString());
else
ff = FoFiTrueType::make(tmpBuf, tmpBufLen);
if (ff) {
codeToGID = ((Gfx8BitFont *)gfxFont)->getCodeToGIDMap(ff);
n = 256;
delete ff;
} else {
codeToGID = NULL;
n = 0;
}
if (!(fontFile = m_fontEngine->loadTrueTypeFont(
id,
fontsrc,
codeToGID, n))) {
error(-1, "Couldn't create a font for '%s'",
gfxFont->getName() ? gfxFont->getName()->getCString()
: "(unnamed)");
goto err2;
}
break;
case fontCIDType0:
case fontCIDType0C:
if (!(fontFile = m_fontEngine->loadCIDFont(
id,
fontsrc))) {
error(-1, "Couldn't create a font for '%s'",
gfxFont->getName() ? gfxFont->getName()->getCString()
: "(unnamed)");
goto err2;
}
break;
case fontCIDType0COT:
if (!(fontFile = m_fontEngine->loadOpenTypeCFFFont(
id,
fontsrc))) {
error(-1, "Couldn't create a font for '%s'",
gfxFont->getName() ? gfxFont->getName()->getCString()
: "(unnamed)");
goto err2;
}
break;
case fontCIDType2:
case fontCIDType2OT:
codeToGID = NULL;
n = 0;
if (((GfxCIDFont *)gfxFont)->getCIDToGID()) {
n = ((GfxCIDFont *)gfxFont)->getCIDToGIDLen();
if (n) {
codeToGID = (Gushort *)gmallocn(n, sizeof(Gushort));
memcpy(codeToGID, ((GfxCIDFont *)gfxFont)->getCIDToGID(),
n * sizeof(Gushort));
}
} else {
if (fileName)
ff = FoFiTrueType::load(fileName->getCString());
else
ff = FoFiTrueType::make(tmpBuf, tmpBufLen);
if (! ff)
goto err2;
codeToGID = ((GfxCIDFont *)gfxFont)->getCodeToGIDMap(ff, &n);
delete ff;
}
if (!(fontFile = m_fontEngine->loadTrueTypeFont(
id,
fontsrc,
codeToGID, n, faceIndex))) {
error(-1, "Couldn't create a font for '%s'",
gfxFont->getName() ? gfxFont->getName()->getCString()
: "(unnamed)");
goto err2;
}
break;
default:
goto err2;
}
}
textMat = state->getTextMat();
fontSize = state->getFontSize();
m11 = textMat[0] * fontSize * state->getHorizScaling();
m12 = textMat[1] * fontSize * state->getHorizScaling();
m21 = textMat[2] * fontSize;
m22 = textMat[3] * fontSize;
{
QMatrix painterMatrix = m_painter->worldMatrix();
matrix[0] = painterMatrix.m11();
matrix[1] = painterMatrix.m12();
matrix[2] = painterMatrix.m21();
matrix[3] = painterMatrix.m22();
matrix[4] = painterMatrix.dx();
matrix[5] = painterMatrix.dy();
}
mat[0] = m11; mat[1] = -m12;
mat[2] = m21; mat[3] = -m22;
m_font = m_fontEngine->getFont(fontFile, mat, matrix);
return;
err2:
delete id;
err1:
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 7,469 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dump_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
struct vmcb_save_area *save = &svm->vmcb->save;
pr_err("VMCB Control Area:\n");
pr_err("%-20s%04x\n", "cr_read:", control->intercept_cr & 0xffff);
pr_err("%-20s%04x\n", "cr_write:", control->intercept_cr >> 16);
pr_err("%-20s%04x\n", "dr_read:", control->intercept_dr & 0xffff);
pr_err("%-20s%04x\n", "dr_write:", control->intercept_dr >> 16);
pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "exceptions:", control->intercept_exceptions);
pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "intercepts:", control->intercept);
pr_err("%-20s%d\n", "pause filter count:", control->pause_filter_count);
pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "iopm_base_pa:", control->iopm_base_pa);
pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "msrpm_base_pa:", control->msrpm_base_pa);
pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "tsc_offset:", control->tsc_offset);
pr_err("%-20s%d\n", "asid:", control->asid);
pr_err("%-20s%d\n", "tlb_ctl:", control->tlb_ctl);
pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "int_ctl:", control->int_ctl);
pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "int_vector:", control->int_vector);
pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "int_state:", control->int_state);
pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "exit_code:", control->exit_code);
pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "exit_info1:", control->exit_info_1);
pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "exit_info2:", control->exit_info_2);
pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "exit_int_info:", control->exit_int_info);
pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "exit_int_info_err:", control->exit_int_info_err);
pr_err("%-20s%lld\n", "nested_ctl:", control->nested_ctl);
pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "nested_cr3:", control->nested_cr3);
pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "event_inj:", control->event_inj);
pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "event_inj_err:", control->event_inj_err);
pr_err("%-20s%lld\n", "lbr_ctl:", control->lbr_ctl);
pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "next_rip:", control->next_rip);
pr_err("VMCB State Save Area:\n");
pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
"es:",
save->es.selector, save->es.attrib,
save->es.limit, save->es.base);
pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
"cs:",
save->cs.selector, save->cs.attrib,
save->cs.limit, save->cs.base);
pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
"ss:",
save->ss.selector, save->ss.attrib,
save->ss.limit, save->ss.base);
pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
"ds:",
save->ds.selector, save->ds.attrib,
save->ds.limit, save->ds.base);
pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
"fs:",
save->fs.selector, save->fs.attrib,
save->fs.limit, save->fs.base);
pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
"gs:",
save->gs.selector, save->gs.attrib,
save->gs.limit, save->gs.base);
pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
"gdtr:",
save->gdtr.selector, save->gdtr.attrib,
save->gdtr.limit, save->gdtr.base);
pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
"ldtr:",
save->ldtr.selector, save->ldtr.attrib,
save->ldtr.limit, save->ldtr.base);
pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
"idtr:",
save->idtr.selector, save->idtr.attrib,
save->idtr.limit, save->idtr.base);
pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
"tr:",
save->tr.selector, save->tr.attrib,
save->tr.limit, save->tr.base);
pr_err("cpl: %d efer: %016llx\n",
save->cpl, save->efer);
pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
"cr0:", save->cr0, "cr2:", save->cr2);
pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
"cr3:", save->cr3, "cr4:", save->cr4);
pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
"dr6:", save->dr6, "dr7:", save->dr7);
pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
"rip:", save->rip, "rflags:", save->rflags);
pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
"rsp:", save->rsp, "rax:", save->rax);
pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
"star:", save->star, "lstar:", save->lstar);
pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
"cstar:", save->cstar, "sfmask:", save->sfmask);
pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
"kernel_gs_base:", save->kernel_gs_base,
"sysenter_cs:", save->sysenter_cs);
pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
"sysenter_esp:", save->sysenter_esp,
"sysenter_eip:", save->sysenter_eip);
pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
"gpat:", save->g_pat, "dbgctl:", save->dbgctl);
pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
"br_from:", save->br_from, "br_to:", save->br_to);
pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
"excp_from:", save->last_excp_from,
"excp_to:", save->last_excp_to);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,075 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void spl_filesystem_tree_it_dtor(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_iterator *iterator = (spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter;
if (iterator->intern.data) {
zval *object = iterator->intern.data;
zval_ptr_dtor(&object);
} else {
if (iterator->current) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iterator->current);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 11,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CheckDisplayModeMQ(
const base::string16& display_mode,
content::WebContents* web_contents) {
base::string16 funtcion =
ASCIIToUTF16("(function() {return window.matchMedia('(display-mode: ") +
display_mode + ASCIIToUTF16(")').matches;})();");
JSBooleanResultGetter js_result_getter;
base::RunLoop run_loop;
web_contents->GetMainFrame()->ExecuteJavaScriptForTests(
funtcion,
base::Bind(&JSBooleanResultGetter::OnJsExecutionDone,
base::Unretained(&js_result_getter), run_loop.QuitClosure()));
run_loop.Run();
EXPECT_TRUE(js_result_getter.GetResult());
}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,371 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct vcpu_vmx *to_vmx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePixelCacheIndexes(CacheInfo *cache_info,
NexusInfo *magick_restrict nexus_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickOffsetType
count,
offset;
MagickSizeType
extent,
length;
register const IndexPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
y;
size_t
rows;
if (cache_info->active_index_channel == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
if (nexus_info->authentic_pixel_cache != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
offset=(MagickOffsetType) nexus_info->region.y*cache_info->columns+
nexus_info->region.x;
length=(MagickSizeType) nexus_info->region.width*sizeof(IndexPacket);
rows=nexus_info->region.height;
extent=(MagickSizeType) length*rows;
p=nexus_info->indexes;
y=0;
switch (cache_info->type)
{
case MemoryCache:
case MapCache:
{
register IndexPacket
*magick_restrict q;
/*
Write indexes to memory.
*/
if ((cache_info->columns == nexus_info->region.width) &&
(extent == (MagickSizeType) ((size_t) extent)))
{
length=extent;
rows=1UL;
}
q=cache_info->indexes+offset;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) rows; y++)
{
(void) memcpy(q,p,(size_t) length);
p+=nexus_info->region.width;
q+=cache_info->columns;
}
break;
}
case DiskCache:
{
/*
Write indexes to disk.
*/
LockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->file_semaphore);
if (OpenPixelCacheOnDisk(cache_info,IOMode) == MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile",
cache_info->cache_filename);
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->file_semaphore);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if ((cache_info->columns == nexus_info->region.width) &&
(extent <= MagickMaxBufferExtent))
{
length=extent;
rows=1UL;
}
extent=(MagickSizeType) cache_info->columns*cache_info->rows;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) rows; y++)
{
count=WritePixelCacheRegion(cache_info,cache_info->offset+extent*
sizeof(PixelPacket)+offset*sizeof(*p),length,(const unsigned char *)
p);
if ((MagickSizeType) count < length)
break;
p+=nexus_info->region.width;
offset+=cache_info->columns;
}
if (IsFileDescriptorLimitExceeded() != MagickFalse)
(void) ClosePixelCacheOnDisk(cache_info);
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->file_semaphore);
break;
}
case DistributedCache:
{
RectangleInfo
region;
/*
Write indexes to distributed cache.
*/
LockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->file_semaphore);
region=nexus_info->region;
if ((cache_info->columns != nexus_info->region.width) ||
(extent > MagickMaxBufferExtent))
region.height=1UL;
else
{
length=extent;
rows=1UL;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) rows; y++)
{
count=WriteDistributePixelCacheIndexes((DistributeCacheInfo *)
cache_info->server_info,®ion,length,(const unsigned char *) p);
if (count != (MagickOffsetType) length)
break;
p+=nexus_info->region.width;
region.y++;
}
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->file_semaphore);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (y < (ssize_t) rows)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CacheError,"UnableToWritePixelCache",
cache_info->cache_filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if ((cache_info->debug != MagickFalse) &&
(CacheTick(nexus_info->region.y,cache_info->rows) != MagickFalse))
(void) LogMagickEvent(CacheEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"%s[%.20gx%.20g%+.20g%+.20g]",cache_info->filename,(double)
nexus_info->region.width,(double) nexus_info->region.height,(double)
nexus_info->region.x,(double) nexus_info->region.y);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=28946
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RestartHost() {
DCHECK(context_->network_task_runner()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (restarting_ || shutting_down_)
return;
restarting_ = true;
host_->Shutdown(base::Bind(
&HostProcess::RestartOnHostShutdown, base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in CreateAuthenticatorFactory().
CreateAuthenticatorFactory() is called asynchronously, but it didn't handle
the case when it's called after host object is destroyed.
BUG=150644
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11090036
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161077 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,490 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RootWindowHostWin::SetCursor(gfx::NativeCursor native_cursor) {
if (native_cursor == ui::kCursorCustom)
return;
const wchar_t* cursor_id = GetCursorId(native_cursor);
::SetCursor(LoadCursor(NULL, cursor_id));
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,383 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int inet_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)uaddr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
unsigned short snum;
int chk_addr_ret;
u32 tb_id = RT_TABLE_LOCAL;
int err;
/* If the socket has its own bind function then use it. (RAW) */
if (sk->sk_prot->bind) {
err = sk->sk_prot->bind(sk, uaddr, addr_len);
goto out;
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
goto out;
if (addr->sin_family != AF_INET) {
/* Compatibility games : accept AF_UNSPEC (mapped to AF_INET)
* only if s_addr is INADDR_ANY.
*/
err = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if (addr->sin_family != AF_UNSPEC ||
addr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
goto out;
}
tb_id = l3mdev_fib_table_by_index(net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if) ? : tb_id;
chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type_table(net, addr->sin_addr.s_addr, tb_id);
/* Not specified by any standard per-se, however it breaks too
* many applications when removed. It is unfortunate since
* allowing applications to make a non-local bind solves
* several problems with systems using dynamic addressing.
* (ie. your servers still start up even if your ISDN link
* is temporarily down)
*/
err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_nonlocal_bind &&
!(inet->freebind || inet->transparent) &&
addr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY) &&
chk_addr_ret != RTN_LOCAL &&
chk_addr_ret != RTN_MULTICAST &&
chk_addr_ret != RTN_BROADCAST)
goto out;
snum = ntohs(addr->sin_port);
err = -EACCES;
if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
goto out;
/* We keep a pair of addresses. rcv_saddr is the one
* used by hash lookups, and saddr is used for transmit.
*
* In the BSD API these are the same except where it
* would be illegal to use them (multicast/broadcast) in
* which case the sending device address is used.
*/
lock_sock(sk);
/* Check these errors (active socket, double bind). */
err = -EINVAL;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE || inet->inet_num)
goto out_release_sock;
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = inet->inet_saddr = addr->sin_addr.s_addr;
if (chk_addr_ret == RTN_MULTICAST || chk_addr_ret == RTN_BROADCAST)
inet->inet_saddr = 0; /* Use device */
/* Make sure we are allowed to bind here. */
if ((snum || !inet->bind_address_no_port) &&
sk->sk_prot->get_port(sk, snum)) {
inet->inet_saddr = inet->inet_rcv_saddr = 0;
err = -EADDRINUSE;
goto out_release_sock;
}
if (inet->inet_rcv_saddr)
sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_BINDADDR_LOCK;
if (snum)
sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_BINDPORT_LOCK;
inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num);
inet->inet_daddr = 0;
inet->inet_dport = 0;
sk_dst_reset(sk);
err = 0;
out_release_sock:
release_sock(sk);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void H264DPB::MarkAllUnusedForRef() {
for (size_t i = 0; i < pics_.size(); ++i)
pics_[i]->ref = false;
}
Commit Message: Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
TBR=posciak@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,737 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API int r_flag_unset_glob(RFlag *f, const char *glob) {
RListIter it, *iter;
RFlagItem *flag;
int n = 0;
r_list_foreach (f->flags, iter, flag) {
if (IS_IN_SPACE (f, flag)) continue;
if (!glob || r_str_glob (flag->name, glob)) {
it.n = iter->n;
r_flag_unset (f, flag);
iter = ⁢
n++;
}
}
return n;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in wasm disassembler
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 11,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: process_line(STREAM s, LINE_ORDER * os, uint32 present, RD_BOOL delta)
{
if (present & 0x0001)
in_uint16_le(s, os->mixmode);
if (present & 0x0002)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->startx, delta);
if (present & 0x0004)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->starty, delta);
if (present & 0x0008)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->endx, delta);
if (present & 0x0010)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->endy, delta);
if (present & 0x0020)
rdp_in_colour(s, &os->bgcolour);
if (present & 0x0040)
in_uint8(s, os->opcode);
rdp_parse_pen(s, &os->pen, present >> 7);
logger(Graphics, Debug, "process_line(), op=0x%x, sx=%d, sy=%d, dx=%d, dy=%d, fg=0x%x)",
os->opcode, os->startx, os->starty, os->endx, os->endy, os->pen.colour);
if (os->opcode < 0x01 || os->opcode > 0x10)
{
logger(Graphics, Error, "process_line(), bad ROP2 0x%x", os->opcode);
return;
}
ui_line(os->opcode - 1, os->startx, os->starty, os->endx, os->endy, &os->pen);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DeliverEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, xEvent *xE, int count,
WindowPtr win, Window child, GrabPtr grab)
{
SpritePtr pSprite = dev->spriteInfo->sprite;
Mask filter;
int deliveries = 0;
if (XaceHook(XACE_SEND_ACCESS, NULL, dev, win, xE, count) == Success) {
filter = GetEventFilter(dev, xE);
FixUpEventFromWindow(pSprite, xE, win, child, FALSE);
deliveries = DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, xE, count, filter, grab);
}
return deliveries;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_pusha(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
unsigned long old_esp = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP];
int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
int reg = VCPU_REGS_RAX;
while (reg <= VCPU_REGS_RDI) {
(reg == VCPU_REGS_RSP) ?
(ctxt->src.val = old_esp) : (ctxt->src.val = ctxt->regs[reg]);
rc = em_push(ctxt);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
++reg;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void security_master_secret(const BYTE* premaster_secret, const BYTE* client_random,
const BYTE* server_random, BYTE* output)
{
/* MasterSecret = PremasterHash('A') + PremasterHash('BB') + PremasterHash('CCC') */
security_premaster_hash("A", 1, premaster_secret, client_random, server_random, &output[0]);
security_premaster_hash("BB", 2, premaster_secret, client_random, server_random, &output[16]);
security_premaster_hash("CCC", 3, premaster_secret, client_random, server_random, &output[32]);
}
Commit Message: security: add a NULL pointer check to fix a server crash.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 16,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterAVSImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("AVS");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadAVSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteAVSImage;
entry->description=ConstantString("AVS X image");
entry->module=ConstantString("AVS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_encode_aggregate_stats_reply(
const struct ofputil_aggregate_stats *stats,
const struct ofp_header *request)
{
struct ofp_aggregate_stats_reply *asr;
uint64_t packet_count;
uint64_t byte_count;
struct ofpbuf *msg;
enum ofpraw raw;
ofpraw_decode(&raw, request);
if (raw == OFPRAW_OFPST10_AGGREGATE_REQUEST) {
packet_count = unknown_to_zero(stats->packet_count);
byte_count = unknown_to_zero(stats->byte_count);
} else {
packet_count = stats->packet_count;
byte_count = stats->byte_count;
}
msg = ofpraw_alloc_stats_reply(request, 0);
asr = ofpbuf_put_zeros(msg, sizeof *asr);
put_32aligned_be64(&asr->packet_count, htonll(packet_count));
put_32aligned_be64(&asr->byte_count, htonll(byte_count));
asr->flow_count = htonl(stats->flow_count);
return msg;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 24,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *mmu_memory_cache_alloc(struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *mc)
{
void *p;
BUG_ON(!mc->nobjs);
p = mc->objects[--mc->nobjs];
return p;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSValue jsTestObjUnsignedIntSequenceAttr(ExecState* exec, JSValue slotBase, const Identifier&)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(slotBase));
UNUSED_PARAM(exec);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
JSValue result = jsArray(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), impl->unsignedIntSequenceAttr());
return result;
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fid_to_qid(V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsFidState *fidp, V9fsQID *qidp)
{
struct stat stbuf;
int err;
err = v9fs_co_lstat(pdu, &fidp->path, &stbuf);
if (err < 0) {
return err;
}
stat_to_qid(&stbuf, qidp);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void efx_netpoll(struct net_device *net_dev)
{
struct efx_nic *efx = netdev_priv(net_dev);
struct efx_channel *channel;
efx_for_each_channel(channel, efx)
efx_schedule_channel(channel);
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_run_open_task(struct nfs4_opendata *data, int isrecover)
{
struct inode *dir = data->dir->d_inode;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
struct nfs_openargs *o_arg = &data->o_arg;
struct nfs_openres *o_res = &data->o_res;
struct rpc_task *task;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_OPEN],
.rpc_argp = o_arg,
.rpc_resp = o_res,
.rpc_cred = data->owner->so_cred,
};
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = server->client,
.rpc_message = &msg,
.callback_ops = &nfs4_open_ops,
.callback_data = data,
.workqueue = nfsiod_workqueue,
.flags = RPC_TASK_ASYNC,
};
int status;
kref_get(&data->kref);
data->rpc_done = 0;
data->rpc_status = 0;
data->cancelled = 0;
if (isrecover)
task_setup_data.callback_ops = &nfs4_recover_open_ops;
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task))
return PTR_ERR(task);
status = nfs4_wait_for_completion_rpc_task(task);
if (status != 0) {
data->cancelled = 1;
smp_wmb();
} else
status = data->rpc_status;
rpc_put_task(task);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 114 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_skb_pull(struct sk_buff *skb, int len)
{
struct sk_buff *list;
int skb_len = skb_headlen(skb);
int rlen;
if (len <= skb_len) {
__skb_pull(skb, len);
return 0;
}
len -= skb_len;
__skb_pull(skb, skb_len);
skb_walk_frags(skb, list) {
rlen = sctp_skb_pull(list, len);
skb->len -= (len-rlen);
skb->data_len -= (len-rlen);
if (!rlen)
return 0;
len = rlen;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: onig_scan(regex_t* reg, const UChar* str, const UChar* end,
OnigRegion* region, OnigOptionType option,
int (*scan_callback)(int, int, OnigRegion*, void*),
void* callback_arg)
{
int r;
int n;
int rs;
const UChar* start;
if (ONIG_IS_OPTION_ON(option, ONIG_OPTION_CHECK_VALIDITY_OF_STRING)) {
if (! ONIGENC_IS_VALID_MBC_STRING(reg->enc, str, end))
return ONIGERR_INVALID_WIDE_CHAR_VALUE;
ONIG_OPTION_OFF(option, ONIG_OPTION_CHECK_VALIDITY_OF_STRING);
}
n = 0;
start = str;
while (1) {
r = onig_search(reg, str, end, start, end, region, option);
if (r >= 0) {
rs = scan_callback(n, r, region, callback_arg);
n++;
if (rs != 0)
return rs;
if (region->end[0] == start - str)
start++;
else
start = str + region->end[0];
if (start > end)
break;
}
else if (r == ONIG_MISMATCH) {
break;
}
else { /* error */
return r;
}
}
return n;
}
Commit Message: fix #58 : access to invalid address by reg->dmin value
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 17,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct array_cache *alloc_arraycache(int node, int entries,
int batchcount, gfp_t gfp)
{
size_t memsize = sizeof(void *) * entries + sizeof(struct array_cache);
struct array_cache *ac = NULL;
ac = kmalloc_node(memsize, gfp, node);
init_arraycache(ac, entries, batchcount);
return ac;
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,327 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::ConvertViewportToWindowViaWidget(blink::WebRect* rect) {
ConvertViewportToWindow(rect);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int raw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct ipcm_cookie ipc;
struct rtable *rt = NULL;
struct flowi4 fl4;
int free = 0;
__be32 daddr;
__be32 saddr;
u8 tos;
int err;
struct ip_options_data opt_copy;
struct raw_frag_vec rfv;
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (len > 0xFFFF)
goto out;
/*
* Check the flags.
*/
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB) /* Mirror BSD error message */
goto out; /* compatibility */
/*
* Get and verify the address.
*/
if (msg->msg_namelen) {
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in *, usin, msg->msg_name);
err = -EINVAL;
if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(*usin))
goto out;
if (usin->sin_family != AF_INET) {
pr_info_once("%s: %s forgot to set AF_INET. Fix it!\n",
__func__, current->comm);
err = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if (usin->sin_family)
goto out;
}
daddr = usin->sin_addr.s_addr;
/* ANK: I did not forget to get protocol from port field.
* I just do not know, who uses this weirdness.
* IP_HDRINCL is much more convenient.
*/
} else {
err = -EDESTADDRREQ;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
goto out;
daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
}
ipc.sockc.tsflags = sk->sk_tsflags;
ipc.addr = inet->inet_saddr;
ipc.opt = NULL;
ipc.tx_flags = 0;
ipc.ttl = 0;
ipc.tos = -1;
ipc.oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
err = ip_cmsg_send(sk, msg, &ipc, false);
if (unlikely(err)) {
kfree(ipc.opt);
goto out;
}
if (ipc.opt)
free = 1;
}
saddr = ipc.addr;
ipc.addr = daddr;
if (!ipc.opt) {
struct ip_options_rcu *inet_opt;
rcu_read_lock();
inet_opt = rcu_dereference(inet->inet_opt);
if (inet_opt) {
memcpy(&opt_copy, inet_opt,
sizeof(*inet_opt) + inet_opt->opt.optlen);
ipc.opt = &opt_copy.opt;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
if (ipc.opt) {
err = -EINVAL;
/* Linux does not mangle headers on raw sockets,
* so that IP options + IP_HDRINCL is non-sense.
*/
if (inet->hdrincl)
goto done;
if (ipc.opt->opt.srr) {
if (!daddr)
goto done;
daddr = ipc.opt->opt.faddr;
}
}
tos = get_rtconn_flags(&ipc, sk);
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTROUTE)
tos |= RTO_ONLINK;
if (ipv4_is_multicast(daddr)) {
if (!ipc.oif)
ipc.oif = inet->mc_index;
if (!saddr)
saddr = inet->mc_addr;
} else if (!ipc.oif)
ipc.oif = inet->uc_index;
flowi4_init_output(&fl4, ipc.oif, sk->sk_mark, tos,
RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE,
inet->hdrincl ? IPPROTO_RAW : sk->sk_protocol,
inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk) |
(inet->hdrincl ? FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH : 0),
daddr, saddr, 0, 0, sk->sk_uid);
if (!inet->hdrincl) {
rfv.msg = msg;
rfv.hlen = 0;
err = raw_probe_proto_opt(&rfv, &fl4);
if (err)
goto done;
}
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
rt = ip_route_output_flow(net, &fl4, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
err = PTR_ERR(rt);
rt = NULL;
goto done;
}
err = -EACCES;
if (rt->rt_flags & RTCF_BROADCAST && !sock_flag(sk, SOCK_BROADCAST))
goto done;
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
if (inet->hdrincl)
err = raw_send_hdrinc(sk, &fl4, msg, len,
&rt, msg->msg_flags, &ipc.sockc);
else {
sock_tx_timestamp(sk, ipc.sockc.tsflags, &ipc.tx_flags);
if (!ipc.addr)
ipc.addr = fl4.daddr;
lock_sock(sk);
err = ip_append_data(sk, &fl4, raw_getfrag,
&rfv, len, 0,
&ipc, &rt, msg->msg_flags);
if (err)
ip_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE)) {
err = ip_push_pending_frames(sk, &fl4);
if (err == -ENOBUFS && !inet->recverr)
err = 0;
}
release_sock(sk);
}
done:
if (free)
kfree(ipc.opt);
ip_rt_put(rt);
out:
if (err < 0)
return err;
return len;
do_confirm:
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_PROBE)
dst_confirm_neigh(&rt->dst, &fl4.daddr);
if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto done;
}
Commit Message: net: ipv4: fix for a race condition in raw_sendmsg
inet->hdrincl is racy, and could lead to uninitialized stack pointer
usage, so its value should be read only once.
Fixes: c008ba5bdc9f ("ipv4: Avoid reading user iov twice after raw_probe_proto_opt")
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 7,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static AppProto AppLayerProtoDetectPEGetProto(Flow *f, uint8_t ipproto,
uint8_t direction)
{
AppProto alproto = ALPROTO_UNKNOWN;
SCLogDebug("expectation check for %p (dir %d)", f, direction);
FLOW_SET_PE_DONE(f, direction);
alproto = AppLayerExpectationHandle(f, direction);
return alproto;
}
Commit Message: proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,036 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
InitializeConfig();
SetMode(GET_PARAM(1));
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,507 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Cues::~Cues() {
const long n = m_count + m_preload_count;
CuePoint** p = m_cue_points;
CuePoint** const q = p + n;
while (p != q) {
CuePoint* const pCP = *p++;
assert(pCP);
delete pCP;
}
delete[] m_cue_points;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,784 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ihevcd_decode(iv_obj_t *ps_codec_obj, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
WORD32 ret = IV_SUCCESS;
codec_t *ps_codec = (codec_t *)(ps_codec_obj->pv_codec_handle);
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op;
WORD32 proc_idx = 0;
WORD32 prev_proc_idx = 0;
/* Initialize error code */
ps_codec->i4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec_ip = (ivd_video_decode_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_dec_op = (ivd_video_decode_op_t *)pv_api_op;
{
UWORD32 u4_size = ps_dec_op->u4_size;
memset(ps_dec_op, 0, sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t));
ps_dec_op->u4_size = u4_size; //Restore size field
}
if(ps_codec->i4_init_done != 1)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IHEVCD_INIT_NOT_DONE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt >= NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IHEVCD_NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT_REACHED;
return IV_FAIL;
}
/* If reset flag is set, flush the existing buffers */
if(ps_codec->i4_reset_flag)
{
ps_codec->i4_flush_mode = 1;
}
/*Data memory barries instruction,so that bitstream write by the application is complete*/
/* In case the decoder is not in flush mode check for input buffer validity */
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_flush_mode)
{
if(ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_FRM_BS_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes <= MIN_START_CODE_LEN)
{
if((WORD32)ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes > 0)
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes;
else
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_NUMBYTES_INV;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
#ifdef APPLY_CONCEALMENT
{
WORD32 num_mbs;
num_mbs = (ps_codec->i4_wd * ps_codec->i4_ht + 255) >> 8;
/* Reset MB Count at the beginning of every process call */
ps_codec->mb_count = 0;
memset(ps_codec->mb_map, 0, ((num_mbs + 7) >> 3));
}
#endif
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf && ps_codec->i4_header_mode == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
if(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_num_bufs == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUFS;
return IV_FAIL;
}
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_num_bufs; i++)
{
if(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[i] == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_OP_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[i] == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUF_SIZE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
}
ps_codec->ps_out_buffer = &ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer;
ps_codec->u4_ts = ps_dec_ip->u4_ts;
if(ps_codec->i4_flush_mode)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = ps_codec->i4_disp_wd;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht;
ps_dec_op->u4_new_seq = 0;
ps_codec->ps_disp_buf = (pic_buf_t *)ihevc_disp_mgr_get(
(disp_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_disp_buf_mgr, &ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id);
/* In case of non-shared mode, then convert/copy the frame to output buffer */
/* Only if the codec is in non-shared mode or in shared mode but needs 420P output */
if((ps_codec->ps_disp_buf)
&& ((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf)
|| (IV_YUV_420P
== ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt)))
{
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[prev_proc_idx];
if(0 == ps_proc->i4_init_done)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, 0);
}
/* Set remaining number of rows to be processed */
ret = ihevcd_fmt_conv(ps_codec, &ps_codec->as_process[prev_proc_idx],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2], 0,
ps_codec->i4_disp_ht);
ihevc_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
}
ihevcd_fill_outargs(ps_codec, ps_dec_ip, ps_dec_op);
if(1 == ps_dec_op->u4_output_present)
{
WORD32 xpos = ps_codec->i4_disp_wd - 32 - LOGO_WD;
WORD32 ypos = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht - 32 - LOGO_HT;
if(ypos < 0)
ypos = 0;
if(xpos < 0)
xpos = 0;
INSERT_LOGO(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2], ps_codec->i4_disp_strd,
xpos,
ypos,
ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt,
ps_codec->i4_disp_wd,
ps_codec->i4_disp_ht);
}
if(NULL == ps_codec->ps_disp_buf)
{
/* If in flush mode and there are no more buffers to flush,
* check for the reset flag and reset the decoder */
if(ps_codec->i4_reset_flag)
{
ihevcd_init(ps_codec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
return (IV_SUCCESS);
}
/* In case of shared mode, check if there is a free buffer for reconstruction */
if((0 == ps_codec->i4_header_mode) && (1 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf))
{
WORD32 buf_status;
buf_status = 1;
if(ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr)
buf_status = ihevc_buf_mgr_check_free((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr);
/* If there is no free buffer, then return with an error code */
if(0 == buf_status)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining = ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes;
ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame = 0;
ps_codec->i4_pic_present = 0;
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 0;
ps_codec->ps_disp_buf = NULL;
if(ps_codec->i4_num_cores > 1)
{
ithread_set_affinity(0);
}
while(MIN_START_CODE_LEN < ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining)
{
WORD32 nal_len;
WORD32 nal_ofst;
WORD32 bits_len;
if(ps_codec->i4_slice_error)
{
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr_next = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr_base + (ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1));
WORD32 next_slice_addr = ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_x +
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_y * ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_next_ctb_indx == next_slice_addr)
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 0;
}
if(ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf_dynamic)
{
ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf = ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf_dynamic;
ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size = ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size_dynamic;
}
else
{
ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf = ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf_static;
ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size = ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size_static;
}
nal_ofst = ihevcd_nal_search_start_code(ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf,
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining);
ps_codec->i4_nal_ofst = nal_ofst;
{
WORD32 bytes_remaining = ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining - nal_ofst;
bytes_remaining = MIN((UWORD32)bytes_remaining, ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size);
ihevcd_nal_remv_emuln_bytes(ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf + nal_ofst,
ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf,
bytes_remaining,
&nal_len, &bits_len);
/* Decoder may read upto 8 extra bytes at the end of frame */
/* These are not used, but still set them to zero to avoid uninitialized reads */
if(bits_len < (WORD32)(ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size - 8))
{
memset(ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf + bits_len, 0, 2 * sizeof(UWORD32));
}
}
/* This may be used to update the offsets for tiles and entropy sync row offsets */
ps_codec->i4_num_emln_bytes = nal_len - bits_len;
ps_codec->i4_nal_len = nal_len;
ihevcd_bits_init(&ps_codec->s_parse.s_bitstrm, ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf,
bits_len);
ret = ihevcd_nal_unit(ps_codec);
/* If the frame is incomplete and
* the bytes remaining is zero or a header is received,
* complete the frame treating it to be in error */
if(ps_codec->i4_pic_present &&
(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_next_ctb_indx != ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i4_pic_size_in_ctb))
{
if((ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining - (nal_len + nal_ofst) <= MIN_START_CODE_LEN) ||
(ps_codec->i4_header_in_slice_mode))
{
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr_next;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx--;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx < 0)
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_next = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr_base + ((ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx + 1) & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1));
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_x = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_y = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb;
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 1;
continue;
}
}
if(IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE == ret)
{
ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf += (nal_ofst + nal_len);
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining -= (nal_ofst + nal_len);
continue;
}
if((IVD_RES_CHANGED == ret) ||
(IHEVCD_UNSUPPORTED_DIMENSIONS == ret))
{
break;
}
/* Update bytes remaining and bytes consumed and input bitstream pointer */
/* Do not consume the NAL in the following cases */
/* Slice header reached during header decode mode */
/* TODO: Next picture's slice reached */
if(ret != IHEVCD_SLICE_IN_HEADER_MODE)
{
if((0 == ps_codec->i4_slice_error) ||
(ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining - (nal_len + nal_ofst) <= MIN_START_CODE_LEN))
{
ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf += (nal_ofst + nal_len);
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining -= (nal_ofst + nal_len);
}
if(ret != IHEVCD_SUCCESS)
break;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame)
break;
}
else
{
ret = IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
break;
}
/* Allocate dynamic bitstream buffer once SPS is decoded */
if((ps_codec->u4_allocate_dynamic_done == 0) && ps_codec->i4_sps_done)
{
WORD32 ret;
ret = ihevcd_allocate_dynamic_bufs(ps_codec);
if(ret != IV_SUCCESS)
{
/* Free any dynamic buffers that are allocated */
ihevcd_free_dynamic_bufs(ps_codec);
ps_codec->i4_error_code = IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
BREAK_AFTER_SLICE_NAL();
}
if((ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt == 0) && (ret != IHEVCD_SUCCESS))
{
ps_codec->i4_error_code = ret;
ihevcd_fill_outargs(ps_codec, ps_dec_ip, ps_dec_op);
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(1 == ps_codec->i4_pic_present)
{
WORD32 i;
sps_t *ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps;
ps_codec->i4_first_pic_done = 1;
/*TODO temporary fix: end_of_frame is checked before adding format conversion to job queue */
if(ps_codec->i4_num_cores > 1 && ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame)
{
/* Add job queue for format conversion / frame copy for each ctb row */
/* Only if the codec is in non-shared mode or in shared mode but needs 420P output */
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc;
/* i4_num_cores - 1 contexts are currently being used by other threads */
ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[ps_codec->i4_num_cores - 1];
if((ps_codec->ps_disp_buf) &&
((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf) || (IV_YUV_420P == ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt)))
{
/* If format conversion jobs were not issued in pic_init() add them here */
if((0 == ps_codec->u4_enable_fmt_conv_ahead) ||
(ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id == ps_proc->i4_cur_pic_buf_id))
for(i = 0; i < ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb; i++)
{
proc_job_t s_job;
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret;
s_job.i4_cmd = CMD_FMTCONV;
s_job.i2_ctb_cnt = 0;
s_job.i2_ctb_x = 0;
s_job.i2_ctb_y = i;
s_job.i2_slice_idx = 0;
s_job.i4_tu_coeff_data_ofst = 0;
ret = ihevcd_jobq_queue((jobq_t *)ps_codec->s_parse.pv_proc_jobq,
&s_job, sizeof(proc_job_t), 1);
if(ret != (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS)
return (WORD32)ret;
}
}
/* Reached end of frame : Signal terminate */
/* The terminate flag is checked only after all the jobs are dequeued */
ret = ihevcd_jobq_terminate((jobq_t *)ps_codec->s_parse.pv_proc_jobq);
while(1)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret;
proc_job_t s_job;
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc;
/* i4_num_cores - 1 contexts are currently being used by other threads */
ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[ps_codec->i4_num_cores - 1];
ret = ihevcd_jobq_dequeue((jobq_t *)ps_proc->pv_proc_jobq, &s_job,
sizeof(proc_job_t), 1);
if((IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS != ret)
break;
ps_proc->i4_ctb_cnt = s_job.i2_ctb_cnt;
ps_proc->i4_ctb_x = s_job.i2_ctb_x;
ps_proc->i4_ctb_y = s_job.i2_ctb_y;
ps_proc->i4_cur_slice_idx = s_job.i2_slice_idx;
if(CMD_PROCESS == s_job.i4_cmd)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, s_job.i4_tu_coeff_data_ofst);
ihevcd_process(ps_proc);
}
else if(CMD_FMTCONV == s_job.i4_cmd)
{
sps_t *ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps;
WORD32 num_rows = 1 << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size;
if(0 == ps_proc->i4_init_done)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, 0);
}
num_rows = MIN(num_rows, (ps_codec->i4_disp_ht - (s_job.i2_ctb_y << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size)));
if(num_rows < 0)
num_rows = 0;
ihevcd_fmt_conv(ps_codec, ps_proc,
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2],
s_job.i2_ctb_y << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size,
num_rows);
}
}
}
/* In case of non-shared mode and while running in single core mode, then convert/copy the frame to output buffer */
/* Only if the codec is in non-shared mode or in shared mode but needs 420P output */
else if((ps_codec->ps_disp_buf) && ((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf) ||
(IV_YUV_420P == ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt)) &&
(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame))
{
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx];
/* Set remaining number of rows to be processed */
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht
- ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_cur_row;
if(0 == ps_proc->i4_init_done)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, 0);
}
if(ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows < 0)
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows = 0;
ret = ihevcd_fmt_conv(ps_codec, ps_proc,
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2],
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_cur_row,
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows);
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_cur_row += ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows;
}
DEBUG_DUMP_MV_MAP(ps_codec);
/* Mark MV Buf as needed for reference */
ihevc_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_mv_bank_buf_id,
BUF_MGR_REF);
/* Mark pic buf as needed for reference */
ihevc_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_pic_buf_id,
BUF_MGR_REF);
/* Mark pic buf as needed for display */
ihevc_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_pic_buf_id,
BUF_MGR_DISP);
/* Insert the current picture as short term reference */
ihevc_dpb_mgr_insert_ref((dpb_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_dpb_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].ps_cur_pic,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_pic_buf_id);
/* If a frame was displayed (in non-shared mode), then release it from display manager */
if((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf) && (ps_codec->ps_disp_buf))
ihevc_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
/* Wait for threads */
for(i = 0; i < (ps_codec->i4_num_cores - 1); i++)
{
if(ps_codec->ai4_process_thread_created[i])
{
ithread_join(ps_codec->apv_process_thread_handle[i], NULL);
ps_codec->ai4_process_thread_created[i] = 0;
}
}
DEBUG_VALIDATE_PADDED_REGION(&ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx]);
if(ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt > 0)
{
DEBUG_DUMP_PIC_PU(ps_codec);
}
DEBUG_DUMP_PIC_BUFFERS(ps_codec);
/* Increment the number of pictures decoded */
ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt++;
}
ihevcd_fill_outargs(ps_codec, ps_dec_ip, ps_dec_op);
if(1 == ps_dec_op->u4_output_present)
{
WORD32 xpos = ps_codec->i4_disp_wd - 32 - LOGO_WD;
WORD32 ypos = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht - 32 - LOGO_HT;
if(ypos < 0)
ypos = 0;
if(xpos < 0)
xpos = 0;
INSERT_LOGO(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2], ps_codec->i4_disp_strd,
xpos,
ypos,
ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt,
ps_codec->i4_disp_wd,
ps_codec->i4_disp_ht);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Handle invalid slice_address in slice header
If an invalid slice_address was parsed, it was resulting in an incomplete
slice header during decode stage. Fix this by not incrementing slice_idx
for ignore slice error
Bug: 32322258
Change-Id: I8638d7094d65f4409faa9b9e337ef7e7b64505de
(cherry picked from commit f4f3556e04a9776bcc776523ae0763e7d0d5c668)
CWE ID: | 1 | 16,660 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_seq_ioctl_get_client_pool(struct snd_seq_client *client,
void __user *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_client_pool info;
struct snd_seq_client *cptr;
if (copy_from_user(&info, arg, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
cptr = snd_seq_client_use_ptr(info.client);
if (cptr == NULL)
return -ENOENT;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
info.client = cptr->number;
info.output_pool = cptr->pool->size;
info.output_room = cptr->pool->room;
info.output_free = info.output_pool;
info.output_free = snd_seq_unused_cells(cptr->pool);
if (cptr->type == USER_CLIENT) {
info.input_pool = cptr->data.user.fifo_pool_size;
info.input_free = info.input_pool;
if (cptr->data.user.fifo)
info.input_free = snd_seq_unused_cells(cptr->data.user.fifo->pool);
} else {
info.input_pool = 0;
info.input_free = 0;
}
snd_seq_client_unlock(cptr);
if (copy_to_user(arg, &info, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u64 get_extent_allocation_hint(struct inode *inode, u64 start,
u64 num_bytes)
{
struct extent_map_tree *em_tree = &BTRFS_I(inode)->extent_tree;
struct extent_map *em;
u64 alloc_hint = 0;
read_lock(&em_tree->lock);
em = search_extent_mapping(em_tree, start, num_bytes);
if (em) {
/*
* if block start isn't an actual block number then find the
* first block in this inode and use that as a hint. If that
* block is also bogus then just don't worry about it.
*/
if (em->block_start >= EXTENT_MAP_LAST_BYTE) {
free_extent_map(em);
em = search_extent_mapping(em_tree, 0, 0);
if (em && em->block_start < EXTENT_MAP_LAST_BYTE)
alloc_hint = em->block_start;
if (em)
free_extent_map(em);
} else {
alloc_hint = em->block_start;
free_extent_map(em);
}
}
read_unlock(&em_tree->lock);
return alloc_hint;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 25,114 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static SelectionInFlatTree AdjustEndpointsAtBidiBoundary(
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& visible_base,
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& visible_extent) {
DCHECK(visible_base.IsValid());
DCHECK(visible_extent.IsValid());
RenderedPosition base(visible_base);
RenderedPosition extent(visible_extent);
const SelectionInFlatTree& unchanged_selection =
SelectionInFlatTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(visible_base.DeepEquivalent(),
visible_extent.DeepEquivalent())
.Build();
if (base.IsNull() || extent.IsNull() || base.IsEquivalent(extent))
return unchanged_selection;
if (base.AtLeftBoundaryOfBidiRun()) {
if (!extent.AtRightBoundaryOfBidiRun(base.BidiLevelOnRight()) &&
base.IsEquivalent(
extent.LeftBoundaryOfBidiRun(base.BidiLevelOnRight()))) {
return SelectionInFlatTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(
CreateVisiblePosition(
ToPositionInFlatTree(base.PositionAtLeftBoundaryOfBiDiRun()))
.DeepEquivalent(),
visible_extent.DeepEquivalent())
.Build();
}
return unchanged_selection;
}
if (base.AtRightBoundaryOfBidiRun()) {
if (!extent.AtLeftBoundaryOfBidiRun(base.BidiLevelOnLeft()) &&
base.IsEquivalent(
extent.RightBoundaryOfBidiRun(base.BidiLevelOnLeft()))) {
return SelectionInFlatTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(
CreateVisiblePosition(
ToPositionInFlatTree(base.PositionAtRightBoundaryOfBiDiRun()))
.DeepEquivalent(),
visible_extent.DeepEquivalent())
.Build();
}
return unchanged_selection;
}
if (extent.AtLeftBoundaryOfBidiRun() &&
extent.IsEquivalent(
base.LeftBoundaryOfBidiRun(extent.BidiLevelOnRight()))) {
return SelectionInFlatTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(
visible_base.DeepEquivalent(),
CreateVisiblePosition(
ToPositionInFlatTree(extent.PositionAtLeftBoundaryOfBiDiRun()))
.DeepEquivalent())
.Build();
}
if (extent.AtRightBoundaryOfBidiRun() &&
extent.IsEquivalent(
base.RightBoundaryOfBidiRun(extent.BidiLevelOnLeft()))) {
return SelectionInFlatTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(
visible_base.DeepEquivalent(),
CreateVisiblePosition(
ToPositionInFlatTree(extent.PositionAtRightBoundaryOfBiDiRun()))
.DeepEquivalent())
.Build();
}
return unchanged_selection;
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void release_proto_idx(struct proto *prot)
{
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void MSLUnparsedEntityDeclaration(void *context,const xmlChar *name,
const xmlChar *public_id,const xmlChar *system_id,const xmlChar *notation)
{
MSLInfo
*msl_info;
/*
What to do when an unparsed entity declaration is parsed.
*/
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" SAX.unparsedEntityDecl(%s, %s, %s, %s)",name,
public_id != (const xmlChar *) NULL ? (const char *) public_id : "none",
system_id != (const xmlChar *) NULL ? (const char *) system_id : "none",
notation);
msl_info=(MSLInfo *) context;
(void) xmlAddDocEntity(msl_info->document,name,
XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_UNPARSED_ENTITY,public_id,system_id,notation);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/636
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 20,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct page *mc_handle_present_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long addr, pte_t ptent)
{
struct page *page = vm_normal_page(vma, addr, ptent);
if (!page || !page_mapped(page))
return NULL;
if (PageAnon(page)) {
/* we don't move shared anon */
if (!move_anon() || page_mapcount(page) > 2)
return NULL;
} else if (!move_file())
/* we ignore mapcount for file pages */
return NULL;
if (!get_page_unless_zero(page))
return NULL;
return page;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __net_exit tcp_sk_exit_batch(struct list_head *net_exit_list)
{
inet_twsk_purge(&tcp_hashinfo, &tcp_death_row, AF_INET);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 28,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_request(struct mg_connection *conn, char *ebuf, size_t ebuf_len, int *err)
{
const char *cl;
if (!get_message(conn, ebuf, ebuf_len, err)) {
return 0;
}
if (parse_http_request(conn->buf, conn->buf_size, &conn->request_info)
<= 0) {
mg_snprintf(conn,
NULL, /* No truncation check for ebuf */
ebuf,
ebuf_len,
"%s",
"Bad request");
*err = 400;
return 0;
}
/* Message is a valid request */
/* Is there a "host" ? */
conn->host = alloc_get_host(conn);
if (!conn->host) {
mg_snprintf(conn,
NULL, /* No truncation check for ebuf */
ebuf,
ebuf_len,
"%s",
"Bad request: Host mismatch");
*err = 400;
return 0;
}
/* Do we know the content length? */
if ((cl = get_header(conn->request_info.http_headers,
conn->request_info.num_headers,
"Content-Length")) != NULL) {
/* Request/response has content length set */
char *endptr = NULL;
conn->content_len = strtoll(cl, &endptr, 10);
if (endptr == cl) {
mg_snprintf(conn,
NULL, /* No truncation check for ebuf */
ebuf,
ebuf_len,
"%s",
"Bad request");
*err = 411;
return 0;
}
/* Publish the content length back to the request info. */
conn->request_info.content_length = conn->content_len;
} else if ((cl = get_header(conn->request_info.http_headers,
conn->request_info.num_headers,
"Transfer-Encoding")) != NULL
&& !mg_strcasecmp(cl, "chunked")) {
conn->is_chunked = 1;
conn->content_len = -1; /* unknown content length */
} else {
const struct mg_http_method_info *meth =
get_http_method_info(conn->request_info.request_method);
if (!meth) {
/* No valid HTTP method */
mg_snprintf(conn,
NULL, /* No truncation check for ebuf */
ebuf,
ebuf_len,
"%s",
"Bad request");
*err = 411;
return 0;
}
if (meth->request_has_body) {
/* POST or PUT request without content length set */
conn->content_len = -1; /* unknown content length */
} else {
/* Other request */
conn->content_len = 0; /* No content */
}
}
conn->connection_type = CONNECTION_TYPE_REQUEST; /* Valid request */
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Check length of memcmp
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 8,089 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rmap_walk_file(struct page *page, struct rmap_walk_control *rwc)
{
struct address_space *mapping = page->mapping;
pgoff_t pgoff = page->index << compound_order(page);
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
int ret = SWAP_AGAIN;
/*
* The page lock not only makes sure that page->mapping cannot
* suddenly be NULLified by truncation, it makes sure that the
* structure at mapping cannot be freed and reused yet,
* so we can safely take mapping->i_mmap_mutex.
*/
VM_BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));
if (!mapping)
return ret;
mutex_lock(&mapping->i_mmap_mutex);
vma_interval_tree_foreach(vma, &mapping->i_mmap, pgoff, pgoff) {
unsigned long address = vma_address(page, vma);
if (rwc->invalid_vma && rwc->invalid_vma(vma, rwc->arg))
continue;
ret = rwc->rmap_one(page, vma, address, rwc->arg);
if (ret != SWAP_AGAIN)
goto done;
if (rwc->done && rwc->done(page))
goto done;
}
if (!rwc->file_nonlinear)
goto done;
if (list_empty(&mapping->i_mmap_nonlinear))
goto done;
ret = rwc->file_nonlinear(page, mapping, rwc->arg);
done:
mutex_unlock(&mapping->i_mmap_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 12,401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PostScript_MetaHandler::TokenLocation& PostScript_MetaHandler::getTokenInfo(TokenFlag tFlag)
{
if ((docInfoFlags&tFlag)&&tFlag>=kPS_ADOContainsXMP && tFlag<=kPS_EndPostScript)
{
size_t index=0;
XMP_Uns64 flag=tFlag;
while(flag>>=1) index++;
return fileTokenInfo[index];
}
return fileTokenInfo[kPS_NoData];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 11,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionService::SetBackgroundPageReady(const Extension* extension) {
DCHECK(!extension->background_url().is_empty());
extension_runtime_data_[extension->id()].background_page_ready = true;
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NotificationType::EXTENSION_BACKGROUND_PAGE_READY,
Source<const Extension>(extension),
NotificationService::NoDetails());
}
Commit Message: Unrevert: Show the install dialog for the initial load of an unpacked extension
with plugins.
First landing broke some browser tests.
BUG=83273
TEST=in the extensions managmenet page, with developer mode enabled, Load an unpacked extension on an extension with NPAPI plugins. You should get an install dialog.
TBR=mihaip
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87738 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleCompressedTexImage2DBucket(
uint32_t immediate_data_size, const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile gles2::cmds::CompressedTexImage2DBucket& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::CompressedTexImage2DBucket*>(
cmd_data);
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLint level = static_cast<GLint>(c.level);
GLenum internal_format = static_cast<GLenum>(c.internalformat);
GLsizei width = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.width);
GLsizei height = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.height);
GLuint bucket_id = static_cast<GLuint>(c.bucket_id);
GLint border = static_cast<GLint>(c.border);
if (state_.bound_pixel_unpack_buffer.get()) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
Bucket* bucket = GetBucket(bucket_id);
if (!bucket)
return error::kInvalidArguments;
uint32_t image_size = bucket->size();
const void* data = bucket->GetData(0, image_size);
DCHECK(data || !image_size);
return DoCompressedTexImage(target, level, internal_format, width, height, 1,
border, image_size, data, ContextState::k2D);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 23,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void file_change_deleteall(struct branch *b)
{
release_tree_content_recursive(b->branch_tree.tree);
hashclr(b->branch_tree.versions[0].sha1);
hashclr(b->branch_tree.versions[1].sha1);
load_tree(&b->branch_tree);
b->num_notes = 0;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: handle_features_request(struct ofconn *ofconn, const struct ofp_header *oh)
{
struct ofproto *ofproto = ofconn_get_ofproto(ofconn);
struct ofputil_switch_features features;
struct ofport *port;
bool arp_match_ip;
struct ofpbuf *b;
query_switch_features(ofproto, &arp_match_ip, &features.ofpacts);
features.datapath_id = ofproto->datapath_id;
features.n_buffers = 0;
features.n_tables = ofproto_get_n_visible_tables(ofproto);
features.capabilities = (OFPUTIL_C_FLOW_STATS | OFPUTIL_C_TABLE_STATS |
OFPUTIL_C_PORT_STATS | OFPUTIL_C_QUEUE_STATS |
OFPUTIL_C_GROUP_STATS | OFPUTIL_C_BUNDLES);
if (arp_match_ip) {
features.capabilities |= OFPUTIL_C_ARP_MATCH_IP;
}
/* FIXME: Fill in proper features.auxiliary_id for auxiliary connections */
features.auxiliary_id = 0;
b = ofputil_encode_switch_features(&features, ofconn_get_protocol(ofconn),
oh->xid);
HMAP_FOR_EACH (port, hmap_node, &ofproto->ports) {
ofputil_put_switch_features_port(&port->pp, b);
}
ofconn_send_reply(ofconn, b);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 22,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u8 tcp_sacktag_one(struct sock *sk,
struct tcp_sacktag_state *state, u8 sacked,
u32 start_seq, u32 end_seq,
int dup_sack, int pcount,
const struct skb_mstamp *xmit_time)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int fack_count = state->fack_count;
/* Account D-SACK for retransmitted packet. */
if (dup_sack && (sacked & TCPCB_RETRANS)) {
if (tp->undo_marker && tp->undo_retrans > 0 &&
after(end_seq, tp->undo_marker))
tp->undo_retrans--;
if (sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED)
state->reord = min(fack_count, state->reord);
}
/* Nothing to do; acked frame is about to be dropped (was ACKed). */
if (!after(end_seq, tp->snd_una))
return sacked;
if (!(sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED)) {
tcp_rack_advance(tp, xmit_time, sacked);
if (sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_RETRANS) {
/* If the segment is not tagged as lost,
* we do not clear RETRANS, believing
* that retransmission is still in flight.
*/
if (sacked & TCPCB_LOST) {
sacked &= ~(TCPCB_LOST|TCPCB_SACKED_RETRANS);
tp->lost_out -= pcount;
tp->retrans_out -= pcount;
}
} else {
if (!(sacked & TCPCB_RETRANS)) {
/* New sack for not retransmitted frame,
* which was in hole. It is reordering.
*/
if (before(start_seq,
tcp_highest_sack_seq(tp)))
state->reord = min(fack_count,
state->reord);
if (!after(end_seq, tp->high_seq))
state->flag |= FLAG_ORIG_SACK_ACKED;
if (state->first_sackt.v64 == 0)
state->first_sackt = *xmit_time;
state->last_sackt = *xmit_time;
}
if (sacked & TCPCB_LOST) {
sacked &= ~TCPCB_LOST;
tp->lost_out -= pcount;
}
}
sacked |= TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED;
state->flag |= FLAG_DATA_SACKED;
tp->sacked_out += pcount;
fack_count += pcount;
/* Lost marker hint past SACKed? Tweak RFC3517 cnt */
if (!tcp_is_fack(tp) && tp->lost_skb_hint &&
before(start_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(tp->lost_skb_hint)->seq))
tp->lost_cnt_hint += pcount;
if (fack_count > tp->fackets_out)
tp->fackets_out = fack_count;
}
/* D-SACK. We can detect redundant retransmission in S|R and plain R
* frames and clear it. undo_retrans is decreased above, L|R frames
* are accounted above as well.
*/
if (dup_sack && (sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_RETRANS)) {
sacked &= ~TCPCB_SACKED_RETRANS;
tp->retrans_out -= pcount;
}
return sacked;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction
Patch 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode
conditionally") introduced a bug that cwnd may become 0 when both
inflight and sndcnt are 0 (cwnd = inflight + sndcnt). This may lead
to a div-by-zero if the connection starts another cwnd reduction
phase by setting tp->prior_cwnd to the current cwnd (0) in
tcp_init_cwnd_reduction().
To prevent this we skip PRR operation when nothing is acked or
sacked. Then cwnd must be positive in all cases as long as ssthresh
is positive:
1) The proportional reduction mode
inflight > ssthresh > 0
2) The reduction bound mode
a) inflight == ssthresh > 0
b) inflight < ssthresh
sndcnt > 0 since newly_acked_sacked > 0 and inflight < ssthresh
Therefore in all cases inflight and sndcnt can not both be 0.
We check invalid tp->prior_cwnd to avoid potential div0 bugs.
In reality this bug is triggered only with a sequence of less common
events. For example, the connection is terminating an ECN-triggered
cwnd reduction with an inflight 0, then it receives reordered/old
ACKs or DSACKs from prior transmission (which acks nothing). Or the
connection is in fast recovery stage that marks everything lost,
but fails to retransmit due to local issues, then receives data
packets from other end which acks nothing.
Fixes: 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally")
Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: evdns_getaddrinfo(struct evdns_base *dns_base,
const char *nodename, const char *servname,
const struct evutil_addrinfo *hints_in,
evdns_getaddrinfo_cb cb, void *arg)
{
struct evdns_getaddrinfo_request *data;
struct evutil_addrinfo hints;
struct evutil_addrinfo *res = NULL;
int err;
int port = 0;
int want_cname = 0;
if (!dns_base) {
dns_base = current_base;
if (!dns_base) {
log(EVDNS_LOG_WARN,
"Call to getaddrinfo_async with no "
"evdns_base configured.");
cb(EVUTIL_EAI_FAIL, NULL, arg); /* ??? better error? */
return NULL;
}
}
/* If we _must_ answer this immediately, do so. */
if ((hints_in && (hints_in->ai_flags & EVUTIL_AI_NUMERICHOST))) {
res = NULL;
err = evutil_getaddrinfo(nodename, servname, hints_in, &res);
cb(err, res, arg);
return NULL;
}
if (hints_in) {
memcpy(&hints, hints_in, sizeof(hints));
} else {
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
}
evutil_adjust_hints_for_addrconfig_(&hints);
/* Now try to see if we _can_ answer immediately. */
/* (It would be nice to do this by calling getaddrinfo directly, with
* AI_NUMERICHOST, on plaforms that have it, but we can't: there isn't
* a reliable way to distinguish the "that wasn't a numeric host!" case
* from any other EAI_NONAME cases.) */
err = evutil_getaddrinfo_common_(nodename, servname, &hints, &res, &port);
if (err != EVUTIL_EAI_NEED_RESOLVE) {
cb(err, res, arg);
return NULL;
}
/* If there is an entry in the hosts file, we should give it now. */
if (!evdns_getaddrinfo_fromhosts(dns_base, nodename, &hints, port, &res)) {
cb(0, res, arg);
return NULL;
}
/* Okay, things are serious now. We're going to need to actually
* launch a request.
*/
data = mm_calloc(1,sizeof(struct evdns_getaddrinfo_request));
if (!data) {
cb(EVUTIL_EAI_MEMORY, NULL, arg);
return NULL;
}
memcpy(&data->hints, &hints, sizeof(data->hints));
data->port = (ev_uint16_t)port;
data->ipv4_request.type = DNS_IPv4_A;
data->ipv6_request.type = DNS_IPv6_AAAA;
data->user_cb = cb;
data->user_data = arg;
data->evdns_base = dns_base;
want_cname = (hints.ai_flags & EVUTIL_AI_CANONNAME);
/* If we are asked for a PF_UNSPEC address, we launch two requests in
* parallel: one for an A address and one for an AAAA address. We
* can't send just one request, since many servers only answer one
* question per DNS request.
*
* Once we have the answer to one request, we allow for a short
* timeout before we report it, to see if the other one arrives. If
* they both show up in time, then we report both the answers.
*
* If too many addresses of one type time out or fail, we should stop
* launching those requests. (XXX we don't do that yet.)
*/
if (hints.ai_family != PF_INET6) {
log(EVDNS_LOG_DEBUG, "Sending request for %s on ipv4 as %p",
nodename, &data->ipv4_request);
data->ipv4_request.r = evdns_base_resolve_ipv4(dns_base,
nodename, 0, evdns_getaddrinfo_gotresolve,
&data->ipv4_request);
if (want_cname && data->ipv4_request.r)
data->ipv4_request.r->current_req->put_cname_in_ptr =
&data->cname_result;
}
if (hints.ai_family != PF_INET) {
log(EVDNS_LOG_DEBUG, "Sending request for %s on ipv6 as %p",
nodename, &data->ipv6_request);
data->ipv6_request.r = evdns_base_resolve_ipv6(dns_base,
nodename, 0, evdns_getaddrinfo_gotresolve,
&data->ipv6_request);
if (want_cname && data->ipv6_request.r)
data->ipv6_request.r->current_req->put_cname_in_ptr =
&data->cname_result;
}
evtimer_assign(&data->timeout, dns_base->event_base,
evdns_getaddrinfo_timeout_cb, data);
if (data->ipv4_request.r || data->ipv6_request.r) {
return data;
} else {
mm_free(data);
cb(EVUTIL_EAI_FAIL, NULL, arg);
return NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 1,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: copy_entries_to_user(unsigned int total_size,
const struct xt_table *table,
void __user *userptr)
{
unsigned int off, num;
const struct ipt_entry *e;
struct xt_counters *counters;
const struct xt_table_info *private = table->private;
int ret = 0;
const void *loc_cpu_entry;
counters = alloc_counters(table);
if (IS_ERR(counters))
return PTR_ERR(counters);
loc_cpu_entry = private->entries;
/* FIXME: use iterator macros --RR */
/* ... then go back and fix counters and names */
for (off = 0, num = 0; off < total_size; off += e->next_offset, num++){
unsigned int i;
const struct xt_entry_match *m;
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
e = loc_cpu_entry + off;
if (copy_to_user(userptr + off, e, sizeof(*e))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
if (copy_to_user(userptr + off
+ offsetof(struct ipt_entry, counters),
&counters[num],
sizeof(counters[num])) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
for (i = sizeof(struct ipt_entry);
i < e->target_offset;
i += m->u.match_size) {
m = (void *)e + i;
if (xt_match_to_user(m, userptr + off + i)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
}
t = ipt_get_target_c(e);
if (xt_target_to_user(t, userptr + off + e->target_offset)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
}
free_counters:
vfree(counters);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks
The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.
In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.
However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.
IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.
If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.
Fixes: 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: syzbot+e783f671527912cd9403@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 7,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::bufferData(GLenum target,
DOMArrayBuffer* data,
GLenum usage) {
WebGLRenderingContextBase::bufferData(target, data, usage);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,426 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::OnGpuVSync(base::TimeTicks timebase,
base::TimeDelta interval) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (gpu_vsync_callback_)
gpu_vsync_callback_.Run(timebase, interval);
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 24,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reset_cmd_handler(conn *c) {
c->cmd = -1;
c->substate = bin_no_state;
if(c->item != NULL) {
item_remove(c->item);
c->item = NULL;
}
conn_shrink(c);
if (c->rbytes > 0) {
conn_set_state(c, conn_parse_cmd);
} else {
conn_set_state(c, conn_waiting);
}
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_disable_tdp(void)
{
tdp_enabled = false;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,789 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t ElementData::getAttributeItemIndexSlowCase(const AtomicString& name, bool shouldIgnoreAttributeCase) const
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < length(); ++i) {
const Attribute* attribute = attributeItem(i);
if (!attribute->name().hasPrefix()) {
if (shouldIgnoreAttributeCase && equalIgnoringCase(name, attribute->localName()))
return i;
} else {
if (equalPossiblyIgnoringCase(name, attribute->name().toString(), shouldIgnoreAttributeCase))
return i;
}
}
return notFound;
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,362 |
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