instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VolumeBubble::VolumeBubble()
: SettingLevelBubble(
ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().GetBitmapNamed(
IDR_VOLUME_BUBBLE_UP_ICON),
ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().GetBitmapNamed(
IDR_VOLUME_BUBBLE_DOWN_ICON),
ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().GetBitmapNamed(
IDR_VOLUME_BUBBLE_MUTE_ICON)) {
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Local<v8::FunctionTemplate> V8TestObject::DomTemplate(
v8::Isolate* isolate, const DOMWrapperWorld& world) {
return V8DOMConfiguration::DomClassTemplate(
isolate, world, const_cast<WrapperTypeInfo*>(V8TestObject::GetWrapperTypeInfo()),
InstallV8TestObjectTemplate);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,158 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppLauncherHandler::ExtensionEnableFlowFinished() {
DCHECK_EQ(extension_id_prompting_, extension_enable_flow_->extension_id());
base::StringValue app_id(extension_id_prompting_);
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction("ntp.launchAppAfterEnable", app_id);
extension_enable_flow_.reset();
extension_id_prompting_ = "";
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 16,972 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: exsltDateDayAbbreviation (const xmlChar *dateTime)
{
static const xmlChar dayAbbreviations[8][4] = {
{ 0 },
{ 'S', 'u', 'n', 0 },
{ 'M', 'o', 'n', 0 },
{ 'T', 'u', 'e', 0 },
{ 'W', 'e', 'd', 0 },
{ 'T', 'h', 'u', 0 },
{ 'F', 'r', 'i', 0 },
{ 'S', 'a', 't', 0 }
};
int day;
day = (int) exsltDateDayInWeek(dateTime);
if((day < 1) || (day > 7))
day = 0;
return dayAbbreviations[day];
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hash_hw_write_key(struct hash_device_data *device_data,
const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
u32 word = 0;
int nwords = 1;
HASH_CLEAR_BITS(&device_data->base->str, HASH_STR_NBLW_MASK);
while (keylen >= 4) {
u32 *key_word = (u32 *)key;
HASH_SET_DIN(key_word, nwords);
keylen -= 4;
key += 4;
}
/* Take care of the remaining bytes in the last word */
if (keylen) {
word = 0;
while (keylen) {
word |= (key[keylen - 1] << (8 * (keylen - 1)));
keylen--;
}
HASH_SET_DIN(&word, nwords);
}
while (readl(&device_data->base->str) & HASH_STR_DCAL_MASK)
cpu_relax();
HASH_SET_DCAL;
while (readl(&device_data->base->str) & HASH_STR_DCAL_MASK)
cpu_relax();
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 2,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_read_guest_atomic(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa, void *data,
unsigned long len)
{
int r;
unsigned long addr;
gfn_t gfn = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
int offset = offset_in_page(gpa);
addr = gfn_to_hva(kvm, gfn);
if (kvm_is_error_hva(addr))
return -EFAULT;
pagefault_disable();
r = __copy_from_user_inatomic(data, (void __user *)addr + offset, len);
pagefault_enable();
if (r)
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,357 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int max_sectors_bytes(struct request_queue *q)
{
unsigned int max_sectors = queue_max_sectors(q);
max_sectors = min_t(unsigned int, max_sectors, INT_MAX >> 9);
return max_sectors << 9;
}
Commit Message: sg_start_req(): make sure that there's not too many elements in iovec
unfortunately, allowing an arbitrary 16bit value means a possibility of
overflow in the calculation of total number of pages in bio_map_user_iov() -
we rely on there being no more than PAGE_SIZE members of sum in the
first loop there. If that sum wraps around, we end up allocating
too small array of pointers to pages and it's easy to overflow it in
the second loop.
X-Coverup: TINC (and there's no lumber cartel either)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # way, way back
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 12,029 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nvmet_fc_tgt_a_get(struct nvmet_fc_tgt_assoc *assoc)
{
return kref_get_unless_zero(&assoc->ref);
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t WriteBlobMSBULong(Image *image,const size_t value)
{
unsigned char
buffer[4];
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
buffer[0]=(unsigned char) (value >> 24);
buffer[1]=(unsigned char) (value >> 16);
buffer[2]=(unsigned char) (value >> 8);
buffer[3]=(unsigned char) value;
return((size_t) WriteBlob(image,4,buffer));
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 16,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CreateRenderbufferInfo(GLuint client_id, GLuint service_id) {
return renderbuffer_manager()->CreateRenderbufferInfo(
client_id, service_id);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,646 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: find_xml_children(xmlNode ** children, xmlNode * root,
const char *tag, const char *field, const char *value, gboolean search_matches)
{
int match_found = 0;
CRM_CHECK(root != NULL, return FALSE);
CRM_CHECK(children != NULL, return FALSE);
if (tag != NULL && safe_str_neq(tag, crm_element_name(root))) {
} else if (value != NULL && safe_str_neq(value, crm_element_value(root, field))) {
} else {
if (*children == NULL) {
*children = create_xml_node(NULL, __FUNCTION__);
}
add_node_copy(*children, root);
match_found = 1;
}
if (search_matches || match_found == 0) {
xmlNode *child = NULL;
for (child = __xml_first_child(root); child != NULL; child = __xml_next(child)) {
match_found += find_xml_children(children, child, tag, field, value, search_matches);
}
}
return match_found;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 5,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebFrame* frame() { return m_frame; }
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> R=abarth@chromium.org
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
TBR=tiger@opera.com
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport void *ResizeQuantumMemory(void *memory,const size_t count,
const size_t quantum)
{
size_t
extent;
if (CheckMemoryOverflow(count,quantum) != MagickFalse)
{
memory=RelinquishMagickMemory(memory);
return((void *) NULL);
}
extent=count*quantum;
return(ResizeMagickMemory(memory,extent));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/129
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 15,150 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnSwappedOut() {
if (!is_waiting_for_swapout_ack_)
return;
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END0("navigation", "RenderFrameHostImpl::SwapOut", this);
if (swapout_event_monitor_timeout_)
swapout_event_monitor_timeout_->Stop();
ClearAllWebUI();
if (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame() && !render_view_host_->is_active())
render_view_host_->set_is_swapped_out(true);
bool deleted =
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->DeleteFromPendingList(this);
CHECK(deleted);
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int MSG_ReadByte( msg_t *msg ) {
int c;
c = (unsigned char)MSG_ReadBits( msg, 8 );
if ( msg->readcount > msg->cursize ) {
c = -1;
}
return c;
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(str_split)
{
zend_string *str;
zend_long split_length = 1;
char *p;
size_t n_reg_segments;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "S|l", &str, &split_length) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (split_length <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "The length of each segment must be greater than zero");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (0 == ZSTR_LEN(str) || (size_t)split_length >= ZSTR_LEN(str)) {
array_init_size(return_value, 1);
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, ZSTR_VAL(str), ZSTR_LEN(str));
return;
}
array_init_size(return_value, (uint32_t)(((ZSTR_LEN(str) - 1) / split_length) + 1));
n_reg_segments = ZSTR_LEN(str) / split_length;
p = ZSTR_VAL(str);
while (n_reg_segments-- > 0) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, p, split_length);
p += split_length;
}
if (p != (ZSTR_VAL(str) + ZSTR_LEN(str))) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, p, (ZSTR_VAL(str) + ZSTR_LEN(str) - p));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 29,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err smhd_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "SoundMediaHeaderBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("SoundMediaHeaderBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 13,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void drawLayersOnCCThread(CCLayerTreeHostImpl* impl)
{
EXPECT_EQ(0, impl->sourceFrameNumber());
if (!m_numDraws)
postSetNeedsRedrawToMainThread(); // Redraw again to verify that the second redraw doesn't commit.
else
endTest();
m_numDraws++;
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void configureV8TestObjectPythonTemplate(v8::Handle<v8::FunctionTemplate> functionTemplate, v8::Isolate* isolate)
{
functionTemplate->ReadOnlyPrototype();
v8::Local<v8::Signature> defaultSignature;
defaultSignature = V8DOMConfiguration::installDOMClassTemplate(functionTemplate, "TestObjectPython", v8::Local<v8::FunctionTemplate>(), V8TestObjectPython::internalFieldCount,
V8TestObjectPythonAttributes, WTF_ARRAY_LENGTH(V8TestObjectPythonAttributes),
V8TestObjectPythonAccessors, WTF_ARRAY_LENGTH(V8TestObjectPythonAccessors),
V8TestObjectPythonMethods, WTF_ARRAY_LENGTH(V8TestObjectPythonMethods),
isolate);
v8::Local<v8::ObjectTemplate> ALLOW_UNUSED instanceTemplate = functionTemplate->InstanceTemplate();
v8::Local<v8::ObjectTemplate> ALLOW_UNUSED prototypeTemplate = functionTemplate->PrototypeTemplate();
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::featureNameEnabled()) {
static const V8DOMConfiguration::AttributeConfiguration attributeConfiguration =\
{"runtimeEnabledLongAttribute", TestObjectPythonV8Internal::runtimeEnabledLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, TestObjectPythonV8Internal::runtimeEnabledLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, 0, 0, 0, static_cast<v8::AccessControl>(v8::DEFAULT), static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), 0 /* on instance */};
V8DOMConfiguration::installAttribute(instanceTemplate, prototypeTemplate, attributeConfiguration, isolate);
}
#if ENABLE(CONDITION)
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::featureNameEnabled()) {
static const V8DOMConfiguration::AttributeConfiguration attributeConfiguration =\
{"conditionalRuntimeEnabledLongAttribute", TestObjectPythonV8Internal::conditionalRuntimeEnabledLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, TestObjectPythonV8Internal::conditionalRuntimeEnabledLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, 0, 0, 0, static_cast<v8::AccessControl>(v8::DEFAULT), static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), 0 /* on instance */};
V8DOMConfiguration::installAttribute(instanceTemplate, prototypeTemplate, attributeConfiguration, isolate);
}
#endif // ENABLE(CONDITION)
static const V8DOMConfiguration::ConstantConfiguration V8TestObjectPythonConstants[] = {
{"CONST_VALUE_0", 0},
{"CONST_VALUE_1", 1},
{"CONST_VALUE_2", 2},
{"CONST_VALUE_4", 4},
{"CONST_VALUE_8", 8},
{"CONST_VALUE_9", -1},
{"CONST_VALUE_10", "my constant string"},
{"CONST_VALUE_11", 0xffffffff},
{"CONST_VALUE_12", 0x01},
{"CONST_VALUE_13", 0X20},
{"CONST_VALUE_14", 0x1abc},
{"CONST_VALUE_15", 010},
{"CONST_VALUE_16", -010},
{"CONST_VALUE_16", -0x1A},
{"CONST_VALUE_17", -0X1a},
{"DEPRECATED_CONSTANT", 1},
{"CONST_JAVASCRIPT", 1},
};
V8DOMConfiguration::installConstants(functionTemplate, prototypeTemplate, V8TestObjectPythonConstants, WTF_ARRAY_LENGTH(V8TestObjectPythonConstants), isolate);
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::featureNameEnabled()) {
static const V8DOMConfiguration::ConstantConfiguration constantConfiguration = {"FEATURE_ENABLED_CONST", static_cast<signed int>(1)};
V8DOMConfiguration::installConstants(functionTemplate, prototypeTemplate, &constantConfiguration, 1, isolate);
}
COMPILE_ASSERT(0 == TestObjectPython::CONST_VALUE_0, TheValueOfTestObjectPython_CONST_VALUE_0DoesntMatchWithImplementation);
COMPILE_ASSERT(1 == TestObjectPython::CONST_VALUE_1, TheValueOfTestObjectPython_CONST_VALUE_1DoesntMatchWithImplementation);
COMPILE_ASSERT(2 == TestObjectPython::CONST_VALUE_2, TheValueOfTestObjectPython_CONST_VALUE_2DoesntMatchWithImplementation);
COMPILE_ASSERT(4 == TestObjectPython::CONST_VALUE_4, TheValueOfTestObjectPython_CONST_VALUE_4DoesntMatchWithImplementation);
COMPILE_ASSERT(8 == TestObjectPython::CONST_VALUE_8, TheValueOfTestObjectPython_CONST_VALUE_8DoesntMatchWithImplementation);
COMPILE_ASSERT(-1 == TestObjectPython::CONST_VALUE_9, TheValueOfTestObjectPython_CONST_VALUE_9DoesntMatchWithImplementation);
COMPILE_ASSERT("my constant string" == TestObjectPython::CONST_VALUE_10, TheValueOfTestObjectPython_CONST_VALUE_10DoesntMatchWithImplementation);
COMPILE_ASSERT(0xffffffff == TestObjectPython::CONST_VALUE_11, TheValueOfTestObjectPython_CONST_VALUE_11DoesntMatchWithImplementation);
COMPILE_ASSERT(0x01 == TestObjectPython::CONST_VALUE_12, TheValueOfTestObjectPython_CONST_VALUE_12DoesntMatchWithImplementation);
COMPILE_ASSERT(0X20 == TestObjectPython::CONST_VALUE_13, TheValueOfTestObjectPython_CONST_VALUE_13DoesntMatchWithImplementation);
COMPILE_ASSERT(0x1abc == TestObjectPython::CONST_VALUE_14, TheValueOfTestObjectPython_CONST_VALUE_14DoesntMatchWithImplementation);
COMPILE_ASSERT(010 == TestObjectPython::CONST_VALUE_15, TheValueOfTestObjectPython_CONST_VALUE_15DoesntMatchWithImplementation);
COMPILE_ASSERT(-010 == TestObjectPython::CONST_VALUE_16, TheValueOfTestObjectPython_CONST_VALUE_16DoesntMatchWithImplementation);
COMPILE_ASSERT(-0x1A == TestObjectPython::CONST_VALUE_16, TheValueOfTestObjectPython_CONST_VALUE_16DoesntMatchWithImplementation);
COMPILE_ASSERT(-0X1a == TestObjectPython::CONST_VALUE_17, TheValueOfTestObjectPython_CONST_VALUE_17DoesntMatchWithImplementation);
COMPILE_ASSERT(1 == TestObjectPython::DEPRECATED_CONSTANT, TheValueOfTestObjectPython_DEPRECATED_CONSTANTDoesntMatchWithImplementation);
COMPILE_ASSERT(1 == TestObjectPython::FEATURE_ENABLED_CONST, TheValueOfTestObjectPython_FEATURE_ENABLED_CONSTDoesntMatchWithImplementation);
COMPILE_ASSERT(1 == TestObjectPython::CONST_IMPL, TheValueOfTestObjectPython_CONST_IMPLDoesntMatchWithImplementation);
functionTemplate->Set(v8AtomicString(isolate, "staticVoidMethod"), v8::FunctionTemplate::New(isolate, TestObjectPythonV8Internal::staticVoidMethodMethodCallback, v8Undefined(), v8::Local<v8::Signature>(), 0));
functionTemplate->Set(v8AtomicString(isolate, "overloadedStaticMethod"), v8::FunctionTemplate::New(isolate, TestObjectPythonV8Internal::overloadedStaticMethodMethodCallback, v8Undefined(), v8::Local<v8::Signature>(), 1));
#if ENABLE(CONDITION)
functionTemplate->Set(v8AtomicString(isolate, "conditionalConditionStaticVoidMethod"), v8::FunctionTemplate::New(isolate, TestObjectPythonV8Internal::conditionalConditionStaticVoidMethodMethodCallback, v8Undefined(), v8::Local<v8::Signature>(), 0));
#endif // ENABLE(CONDITION)
prototypeTemplate->Set(v8AtomicString(isolate, "doNotCheckSignatureVoidMethod"), v8::FunctionTemplate::New(isolate, TestObjectPythonV8Internal::doNotCheckSignatureVoidMethodMethodCallback, v8Undefined(), v8::Local<v8::Signature>(), 0));
prototypeTemplate->Set(v8AtomicString(isolate, "notEnumerableVoidMethod"), v8::FunctionTemplate::New(isolate, TestObjectPythonV8Internal::notEnumerableVoidMethodMethodCallback, v8Undefined(), defaultSignature, 0), static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::DontDelete | v8::DontEnum));
prototypeTemplate->Set(v8AtomicString(isolate, "readOnlyVoidMethod"), v8::FunctionTemplate::New(isolate, TestObjectPythonV8Internal::readOnlyVoidMethodMethodCallback, v8Undefined(), defaultSignature, 0), static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::DontDelete | v8::ReadOnly));
prototypeTemplate->Set(v8AtomicString(isolate, "notEnumerableReadOnlyVoidMethod"), v8::FunctionTemplate::New(isolate, TestObjectPythonV8Internal::notEnumerableReadOnlyVoidMethodMethodCallback, v8Undefined(), defaultSignature, 0), static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::DontDelete | v8::DontEnum | v8::ReadOnly));
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::featureNameEnabled())
prototypeTemplate->Set(v8AtomicString(isolate, "runtimeEnabledVoidMethod"), v8::FunctionTemplate::New(isolate, TestObjectPythonV8Internal::runtimeEnabledVoidMethodMethodCallback, v8Undefined(), defaultSignature, 0));
if (DOMWrapperWorld::current(isolate)->isMainWorld()) {
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::featureNameEnabled())
prototypeTemplate->Set(v8AtomicString(isolate, "perWorldBindingsRuntimeEnabledVoidMethod"), v8::FunctionTemplate::New(isolate, TestObjectPythonV8Internal::perWorldBindingsRuntimeEnabledVoidMethodMethodCallbackForMainWorld, v8Undefined(), defaultSignature, 0));
} else {
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::featureNameEnabled())
prototypeTemplate->Set(v8AtomicString(isolate, "perWorldBindingsRuntimeEnabledVoidMethod"), v8::FunctionTemplate::New(isolate, TestObjectPythonV8Internal::perWorldBindingsRuntimeEnabledVoidMethodMethodCallback, v8Undefined(), defaultSignature, 0));
}
instanceTemplate->Set(v8AtomicString(isolate, "unforgeableVoidMethod"), v8::FunctionTemplate::New(isolate, TestObjectPythonV8Internal::unforgeableVoidMethodMethodCallback, v8Undefined(), defaultSignature, 0));
functionTemplate->SetNativeDataProperty(v8AtomicString(isolate, "staticStringAttribute"), TestObjectPythonV8Internal::staticStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, TestObjectPythonV8Internal::staticStringAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, v8::External::New(isolate, 0), static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), v8::Handle<v8::AccessorSignature>(), static_cast<v8::AccessControl>(v8::DEFAULT));
functionTemplate->SetNativeDataProperty(v8AtomicString(isolate, "staticLongAttribute"), TestObjectPythonV8Internal::staticLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, TestObjectPythonV8Internal::staticLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, v8::External::New(isolate, 0), static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), v8::Handle<v8::AccessorSignature>(), static_cast<v8::AccessControl>(v8::DEFAULT));
functionTemplate->Set(v8AtomicString(isolate, "toString"), V8PerIsolateData::current()->toStringTemplate());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long Chapters::Atom::ParseDisplay(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
long long size)
{
if (!ExpandDisplaysArray())
return -1;
Display& d = m_displays[m_displays_count++];
d.Init();
return d.Parse(pReader, pos, size);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 11,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void virtio_gpu_device_realize(DeviceState *qdev, Error **errp)
{
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(qdev);
VirtIOGPU *g = VIRTIO_GPU(qdev);
bool have_virgl;
Error *local_err = NULL;
int i;
if (g->conf.max_outputs > VIRTIO_GPU_MAX_SCANOUTS) {
error_setg(errp, "invalid max_outputs > %d", VIRTIO_GPU_MAX_SCANOUTS);
return;
}
g->use_virgl_renderer = false;
#if !defined(CONFIG_VIRGL) || defined(HOST_WORDS_BIGENDIAN)
have_virgl = false;
#else
have_virgl = display_opengl;
#endif
if (!have_virgl) {
g->conf.flags &= ~(1 << VIRTIO_GPU_FLAG_VIRGL_ENABLED);
}
if (virtio_gpu_virgl_enabled(g->conf)) {
error_setg(&g->migration_blocker, "virgl is not yet migratable");
migrate_add_blocker(g->migration_blocker, &local_err);
if (local_err) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
error_free(g->migration_blocker);
return;
}
}
g->config_size = sizeof(struct virtio_gpu_config);
g->virtio_config.num_scanouts = g->conf.max_outputs;
virtio_init(VIRTIO_DEVICE(g), "virtio-gpu", VIRTIO_ID_GPU,
g->config_size);
g->req_state[0].width = 1024;
g->req_state[0].height = 768;
if (virtio_gpu_virgl_enabled(g->conf)) {
/* use larger control queue in 3d mode */
g->ctrl_vq = virtio_add_queue(vdev, 256, virtio_gpu_handle_ctrl_cb);
g->cursor_vq = virtio_add_queue(vdev, 16, virtio_gpu_handle_cursor_cb);
g->virtio_config.num_capsets = 1;
} else {
g->ctrl_vq = virtio_add_queue(vdev, 64, virtio_gpu_handle_ctrl_cb);
g->cursor_vq = virtio_add_queue(vdev, 16, virtio_gpu_handle_cursor_cb);
}
g->ctrl_bh = qemu_bh_new(virtio_gpu_ctrl_bh, g);
g->cursor_bh = qemu_bh_new(virtio_gpu_cursor_bh, g);
QTAILQ_INIT(&g->reslist);
QTAILQ_INIT(&g->cmdq);
QTAILQ_INIT(&g->fenceq);
g->enabled_output_bitmask = 1;
g->qdev = qdev;
for (i = 0; i < g->conf.max_outputs; i++) {
g->scanout[i].con =
graphic_console_init(DEVICE(g), i, &virtio_gpu_ops, g);
if (i > 0) {
dpy_gfx_replace_surface(g->scanout[i].con, NULL);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 26,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bson_iter_init_find (bson_iter_t *iter, /* INOUT */
const bson_t *bson, /* IN */
const char *key) /* IN */
{
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
BSON_ASSERT (bson);
BSON_ASSERT (key);
return bson_iter_init (iter, bson) && bson_iter_find (iter, key);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 3,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline NPIdentifierInfo *npidentifier_info_new(void)
{
return NPW_MemNew(NPIdentifierInfo, 1);
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 8,040 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MediaRecorderHandler::Start(int timeslice) {
DCHECK(main_render_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(!recording_);
DCHECK(!media_stream_.IsNull());
DCHECK(timeslice_.is_zero());
DCHECK(!webm_muxer_);
timeslice_ = TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(timeslice);
slice_origin_timestamp_ = TimeTicks::Now();
video_tracks_ = media_stream_.VideoTracks();
audio_tracks_ = media_stream_.AudioTracks();
if (video_tracks_.IsEmpty() && audio_tracks_.IsEmpty()) {
LOG(WARNING) << __func__ << ": no media tracks.";
return false;
}
const bool use_video_tracks =
!video_tracks_.IsEmpty() && video_tracks_[0].IsEnabled() &&
video_tracks_[0].Source().GetReadyState() !=
blink::WebMediaStreamSource::kReadyStateEnded;
const bool use_audio_tracks =
!audio_tracks_.IsEmpty() &&
MediaStreamAudioTrack::From(audio_tracks_[0]) &&
audio_tracks_[0].IsEnabled() &&
audio_tracks_[0].Source().GetReadyState() !=
blink::WebMediaStreamSource::kReadyStateEnded;
if (!use_video_tracks && !use_audio_tracks) {
LOG(WARNING) << __func__ << ": no tracks to be recorded.";
return false;
}
webm_muxer_.reset(
new media::WebmMuxer(CodecIdToMediaVideoCodec(video_codec_id_),
CodecIdToMediaAudioCodec(audio_codec_id_),
use_video_tracks, use_audio_tracks,
base::Bind(&MediaRecorderHandler::WriteData,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr())));
if (use_video_tracks) {
LOG_IF(WARNING, video_tracks_.size() > 1u)
<< "Recording multiple video tracks is not implemented. "
<< "Only recording first video track.";
const blink::WebMediaStreamTrack& video_track = video_tracks_[0];
if (video_track.IsNull())
return false;
const VideoTrackRecorder::OnEncodedVideoCB on_encoded_video_cb =
media::BindToCurrentLoop(base::Bind(
&MediaRecorderHandler::OnEncodedVideo, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
video_recorders_.emplace_back(new VideoTrackRecorder(
video_codec_id_, video_track, on_encoded_video_cb,
video_bits_per_second_, task_runner_));
}
if (use_audio_tracks) {
LOG_IF(WARNING, audio_tracks_.size() > 1u)
<< "Recording multiple audio"
<< " tracks is not implemented. Only recording first audio track.";
const blink::WebMediaStreamTrack& audio_track = audio_tracks_[0];
if (audio_track.IsNull())
return false;
const AudioTrackRecorder::OnEncodedAudioCB on_encoded_audio_cb =
media::BindToCurrentLoop(base::Bind(
&MediaRecorderHandler::OnEncodedAudio, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
audio_recorders_.emplace_back(new AudioTrackRecorder(
audio_codec_id_, audio_track, std::move(on_encoded_audio_cb),
audio_bits_per_second_));
}
recording_ = true;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Check context is attached before creating MediaRecorder
Bug: 896736
Change-Id: I3ccfd2188fb15704af14c8af050e0a5667855d34
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324231
Commit-Queue: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606242}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLMediaElement::hasAudio() const {
return webMediaPlayer() && webMediaPlayer()->hasAudio();
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,536 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void warning(char *str)
{
fprintf(stderr, "warning: %s\n", str);
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::clearWeakMembers(Visitor* visitor) {
if (!ThreadHeap::isHeapObjectAlive(m_audioSourceNode)) {
getAudioSourceProvider().setClient(nullptr);
m_audioSourceNode = nullptr;
}
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,626 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_inet_af_supported(sa_family_t family, struct sctp_sock *sp)
{
/* PF_INET only supports AF_INET addresses. */
return AF_INET == family;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: known_authentication_scheme_p (const char *hdrbeg, const char *hdrend)
{
return STARTS ("Basic", hdrbeg, hdrend)
#ifdef ENABLE_DIGEST
|| STARTS ("Digest", hdrbeg, hdrend)
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_NTLM
|| STARTS ("NTLM", hdrbeg, hdrend)
#endif
;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DOMWindow* HTMLFrameOwnerElement::contentWindow() const {
return content_frame_ ? content_frame_->DomWindow() : nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Resource Timing: Do not report subsequent navigations within subframes
We only want to record resource timing for the load that was initiated
by parent document. We filter out subsequent navigations for <iframe>,
but we should do it for other types of subframes too.
Bug: 780312
Change-Id: I3a7b9e1a365c99e24bb8dac190e88c7099fc3da5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/750487
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513665}
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 8,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FS_ForceFlush( fileHandle_t f ) {
FILE *file;
file = FS_FileForHandle( f );
setvbuf( file, NULL, _IONBF, 0 );
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 11,172 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void gdImageCopy (gdImagePtr dst, gdImagePtr src, int dstX, int dstY, int srcX, int srcY, int w, int h)
{
int c;
int x, y;
int tox, toy;
int i;
int colorMap[gdMaxColors];
if (dst->trueColor) {
/* 2.0: much easier when the destination is truecolor. */
/* 2.0.10: needs a transparent-index check that is still valid if
* the source is not truecolor. Thanks to Frank Warmerdam.
*/
if (src->trueColor) {
for (y = 0; (y < h); y++) {
for (x = 0; (x < w); x++) {
int c = gdImageGetTrueColorPixel (src, srcX + x, srcY + y);
gdImageSetPixel (dst, dstX + x, dstY + y, c);
}
}
} else {
/* source is palette based */
for (y = 0; (y < h); y++) {
for (x = 0; (x < w); x++) {
int c = gdImageGetPixel (src, srcX + x, srcY + y);
if (c != src->transparent) {
gdImageSetPixel(dst, dstX + x, dstY + y, gdTrueColorAlpha(src->red[c], src->green[c], src->blue[c], src->alpha[c]));
}
}
}
}
return;
}
/* Destination is palette based */
if (src->trueColor) { /* But source is truecolor (Ouch!) */
toy = dstY;
for (y = srcY; (y < (srcY + h)); y++) {
tox = dstX;
for (x = srcX; x < (srcX + w); x++) {
int nc;
c = gdImageGetPixel (src, x, y);
/* Get best match possible. */
nc = gdImageColorResolveAlpha(dst, gdTrueColorGetRed(c), gdTrueColorGetGreen(c), gdTrueColorGetBlue(c), gdTrueColorGetAlpha(c));
gdImageSetPixel(dst, tox, toy, nc);
tox++;
}
toy++;
}
return;
}
/* Palette based to palette based */
for (i = 0; i < gdMaxColors; i++) {
colorMap[i] = (-1);
}
toy = dstY;
for (y = srcY; y < (srcY + h); y++) {
tox = dstX;
for (x = srcX; x < (srcX + w); x++) {
int nc;
int mapTo;
c = gdImageGetPixel (src, x, y);
/* Added 7/24/95: support transparent copies */
if (gdImageGetTransparent (src) == c) {
tox++;
continue;
}
/* Have we established a mapping for this color? */
if (src->trueColor) {
/* 2.05: remap to the palette available in the destination image. This is slow and
* works badly, but it beats crashing! Thanks to Padhrig McCarthy.
*/
mapTo = gdImageColorResolveAlpha (dst, gdTrueColorGetRed (c), gdTrueColorGetGreen (c), gdTrueColorGetBlue (c), gdTrueColorGetAlpha (c));
} else if (colorMap[c] == (-1)) {
/* If it's the same image, mapping is trivial */
if (dst == src) {
nc = c;
} else {
/* Get best match possible. This function never returns error. */
nc = gdImageColorResolveAlpha (dst, src->red[c], src->green[c], src->blue[c], src->alpha[c]);
}
colorMap[c] = nc;
mapTo = colorMap[c];
} else {
mapTo = colorMap[c];
}
gdImageSetPixel (dst, tox, toy, mapTo);
tox++;
}
toy++;
}
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 10,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::LoadEntry(
std::unique_ptr<NavigationEntryImpl> entry) {
last_pending_entry_ = pending_entry_;
last_pending_entry_index_ = pending_entry_index_;
last_transient_entry_index_ = transient_entry_index_;
pending_entry_ = nullptr;
SetPendingEntry(std::move(entry));
NavigateToPendingEntry(ReloadType::NONE);
}
Commit Message: Add DumpWithoutCrashing in RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage
This is intended to be reverted after investigating the linked bug.
BUG=688425
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2701523004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450900}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 17,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kvm_gen_kvmclock_update(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
{
int i;
struct kvm *kvm = v->kvm;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
set_bit(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, &vcpu->requests);
kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 23,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ib_uverbs_release_file(struct kref *ref)
{
struct ib_uverbs_file *file =
container_of(ref, struct ib_uverbs_file, ref);
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
int srcu_key;
srcu_key = srcu_read_lock(&file->device->disassociate_srcu);
ib_dev = srcu_dereference(file->device->ib_dev,
&file->device->disassociate_srcu);
if (ib_dev && !ib_dev->disassociate_ucontext)
module_put(ib_dev->owner);
srcu_read_unlock(&file->device->disassociate_srcu, srcu_key);
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&file->device->refcount))
ib_uverbs_comp_dev(file->device);
kfree(file);
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 25,207 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_usb_cm106_boot_quirk(struct usb_device *dev)
{
/*
* Enable line-out driver mode, set headphone source to front
* channels, enable stereo mic.
*/
return snd_usb_cm106_write_int_reg(dev, 2, 0x8004);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix NULL dereference in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
create_fixed_stream_quirk() may cause a NULL-pointer dereference by
accessing the non-existing endpoint when a USB device with a malformed
USB descriptor is used.
This patch avoids it simply by adding a sanity check of bNumEndpoints
before the accesses.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 24,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoHint(GLenum target, GLenum mode) {
api()->glHintFn(target, mode);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 11,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: internal_warning (const char *format, ...)
#else
internal_warning (format, va_alist)
const char *format;
va_dcl
#endif
{
va_list args;
error_prolog (1);
fprintf (stderr, _("warning: "));
SH_VA_START (args, format);
vfprintf (stderr, format, args);
fprintf (stderr, "\n");
va_end (args);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint16 BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::GetProductID() const {
uint16 product_id = 0;
ParseModalias(object_path_, NULL, &product_id, NULL);
return product_id;
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 24,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IW_IMPL(void) iw_set_resize_alg(struct iw_context *ctx, int dimension, int family,
double blur, double param1, double param2)
{
struct iw_resize_settings *rs;
if(dimension<0 || dimension>1) dimension=0;
rs=&ctx->resize_settings[dimension];
rs->family = family;
rs->blur_factor = blur;
rs->param1 = param1;
rs->param2 = param2;
}
Commit Message: Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 1,787 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long vhost_net_set_owner(struct vhost_net *n)
{
int r;
mutex_lock(&n->dev.mutex);
if (vhost_dev_has_owner(&n->dev)) {
r = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
r = vhost_net_set_ubuf_info(n);
if (r)
goto out;
r = vhost_dev_set_owner(&n->dev);
if (r)
vhost_net_clear_ubuf_info(n);
vhost_net_flush(n);
out:
mutex_unlock(&n->dev.mutex);
return r;
}
Commit Message: vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <asias@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 7,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void SetUpCommandLine(CommandLine* command_line) {
GpuFeatureTest::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableGLMultisampling);
}
Commit Message: Revert 124346 - Add basic threaded compositor test to gpu_feature_browsertest.cc
BUG=113159
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9509001
TBR=jbates@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9561011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@124356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 10,088 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long cuse_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data;
struct cuse_conn *cc = fc_to_cc(ff->fc);
unsigned int flags = 0;
if (cc->unrestricted_ioctl)
flags |= FUSE_IOCTL_UNRESTRICTED;
return fuse_do_ioctl(file, cmd, arg, flags);
}
Commit Message: cuse: fix memory leak
The problem is that fuse_dev_alloc() acquires an extra reference to cc.fc,
and the original ref count is never dropped.
Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: cc080e9e9be1 ("fuse: introduce per-instance fuse_dev structure")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 10,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_event_switch(struct task_struct *task,
struct task_struct *next_prev, bool sched_in)
{
struct perf_switch_event switch_event;
/* N.B. caller checks nr_switch_events != 0 */
switch_event = (struct perf_switch_event){
.task = task,
.next_prev = next_prev,
.event_id = {
.header = {
/* .type */
.misc = sched_in ? 0 : PERF_RECORD_MISC_SWITCH_OUT,
/* .size */
},
/* .next_prev_pid */
/* .next_prev_tid */
},
};
perf_event_aux(perf_event_switch_output,
&switch_event,
NULL);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const SkBitmap* ImageDataNaClBackend::GetMappedBitmap() const {
if (!IsMapped())
return NULL;
return &skia_bitmap_;
}
Commit Message: Security fix: integer overflow on checking image size
Test is left in another CL (codereview.chromiu,.org/11274036) to avoid conflict there. Hope it's fine.
BUG=160926
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11410081
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167882 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 17,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MediaHTTP::reconnectAtOffset(off64_t offset) {
return connect(mLastURI.c_str(), &mLastHeaders, offset);
}
Commit Message: Fix free-after-use for MediaHTTP
fix free-after-use when we reconnect to an HTTP media source.
Change-Id: I96da5a79f5382409a545f8b4e22a24523f287464
Tests: compilation and eyeballs
Bug: 31373622
(cherry picked from commit dd81e1592ffa77812998b05761eb840b70fed121)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Browser* GetBrowserForDisposition(browser::NavigateParams* params) {
if (!params->source_contents && params->browser)
params->source_contents =
params->browser->GetSelectedTabContentsWrapper();
Profile* profile =
params->browser ? params->browser->profile() : params->profile;
switch (params->disposition) {
case CURRENT_TAB:
if (!params->browser && profile) {
params->browser = Browser::GetOrCreateTabbedBrowser(profile);
}
return params->browser;
case SINGLETON_TAB:
case NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB:
case NEW_BACKGROUND_TAB:
if (params->browser && WindowCanOpenTabs(params->browser))
return params->browser;
if (profile)
return GetOrCreateBrowser(profile);
return NULL;
case NEW_POPUP: {
if (profile) {
std::string app_name;
if (!params->extension_app_id.empty()) {
app_name = web_app::GenerateApplicationNameFromExtensionId(
params->extension_app_id);
} else if (params->browser && !params->browser->app_name().empty()) {
app_name = params->browser->app_name();
} else if (params->source_contents &&
params->source_contents->extension_tab_helper()->is_app()) {
app_name = web_app::GenerateApplicationNameFromExtensionId(
params->source_contents->extension_tab_helper()->
extension_app()->id());
}
if (app_name.empty()) {
Browser::CreateParams browser_params(Browser::TYPE_POPUP, profile);
browser_params.initial_bounds = params->window_bounds;
return Browser::CreateWithParams(browser_params);
} else {
return Browser::CreateForApp(Browser::TYPE_POPUP, app_name,
params->window_bounds, profile);
}
}
return NULL;
}
case NEW_WINDOW:
if (profile) {
Browser* browser = new Browser(Browser::TYPE_TABBED, profile);
browser->InitBrowserWindow();
return browser;
}
return NULL;
case OFF_THE_RECORD:
if (profile)
return GetOrCreateBrowser(profile->GetOffTheRecordProfile());
return NULL;
case SUPPRESS_OPEN:
case SAVE_TO_DISK:
case IGNORE_ACTION:
return NULL;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix memory error in previous CL.
BUG=100315
BUG=99016
TEST=Memory bots go green
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8302001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@105577 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,148 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::isText() const
{
return m_inputType->isTextType();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::FocusedNodeChangedForAccessibility(const WebNode& node) {
if (render_accessibility())
render_accessibility()->AccessibilityFocusedNodeChanged(node);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 25,026 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: T1_Set_MM_Design( T1_Face face,
FT_UInt num_coords,
FT_Long* coords )
{
PS_Blend blend = face->blend;
FT_Error error;
FT_UInt n, p;
error = FT_ERR( Invalid_Argument );
if ( blend && blend->num_axis == num_coords )
{
/* compute the blend coordinates through the blend design map */
FT_Fixed final_blends[T1_MAX_MM_DESIGNS];
for ( n = 0; n < blend->num_axis; n++ )
{
FT_Long design = coords[n];
FT_Fixed the_blend;
PS_DesignMap map = blend->design_map + n;
FT_Long* designs = map->design_points;
FT_Fixed* blends = map->blend_points;
FT_Int before = -1, after = -1;
for ( p = 0; p < (FT_UInt)map->num_points; p++ )
{
FT_Long p_design = designs[p];
/* exact match? */
if ( design == p_design )
{
the_blend = blends[p];
goto Found;
}
if ( design < p_design )
{
after = p;
break;
}
before = p;
}
/* now interpolate if necessary */
if ( before < 0 )
the_blend = blends[0];
else if ( after < 0 )
the_blend = blends[map->num_points - 1];
else
the_blend = FT_MulDiv( design - designs[before],
blends [after] - blends [before],
designs[after] - designs[before] );
Found:
final_blends[n] = the_blend;
}
error = T1_Set_MM_Blend( face, num_coords, final_blends );
}
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 28,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cbc_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
return glue_cbc_encrypt_128bit(GLUE_FUNC_CAST(twofish_enc_blk), desc,
dst, src, nbytes);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void guess_dc(ERContext *s, int16_t *dc, int w,
int h, ptrdiff_t stride, int is_luma)
{
int b_x, b_y;
int16_t (*col )[4] = av_malloc_array(stride, h*sizeof( int16_t)*4);
uint32_t (*dist)[4] = av_malloc_array(stride, h*sizeof(uint32_t)*4);
if(!col || !dist) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "guess_dc() is out of memory\n");
goto fail;
}
for(b_y=0; b_y<h; b_y++){
int color= 1024;
int distance= -1;
for(b_x=0; b_x<w; b_x++){
int mb_index_j= (b_x>>is_luma) + (b_y>>is_luma)*s->mb_stride;
int error_j= s->error_status_table[mb_index_j];
int intra_j = IS_INTRA(s->cur_pic.mb_type[mb_index_j]);
if(intra_j==0 || !(error_j&ER_DC_ERROR)){
color= dc[b_x + b_y*stride];
distance= b_x;
}
col [b_x + b_y*stride][1]= color;
dist[b_x + b_y*stride][1]= distance >= 0 ? b_x-distance : 9999;
}
color= 1024;
distance= -1;
for(b_x=w-1; b_x>=0; b_x--){
int mb_index_j= (b_x>>is_luma) + (b_y>>is_luma)*s->mb_stride;
int error_j= s->error_status_table[mb_index_j];
int intra_j = IS_INTRA(s->cur_pic.mb_type[mb_index_j]);
if(intra_j==0 || !(error_j&ER_DC_ERROR)){
color= dc[b_x + b_y*stride];
distance= b_x;
}
col [b_x + b_y*stride][0]= color;
dist[b_x + b_y*stride][0]= distance >= 0 ? distance-b_x : 9999;
}
}
for(b_x=0; b_x<w; b_x++){
int color= 1024;
int distance= -1;
for(b_y=0; b_y<h; b_y++){
int mb_index_j= (b_x>>is_luma) + (b_y>>is_luma)*s->mb_stride;
int error_j= s->error_status_table[mb_index_j];
int intra_j = IS_INTRA(s->cur_pic.mb_type[mb_index_j]);
if(intra_j==0 || !(error_j&ER_DC_ERROR)){
color= dc[b_x + b_y*stride];
distance= b_y;
}
col [b_x + b_y*stride][3]= color;
dist[b_x + b_y*stride][3]= distance >= 0 ? b_y-distance : 9999;
}
color= 1024;
distance= -1;
for(b_y=h-1; b_y>=0; b_y--){
int mb_index_j= (b_x>>is_luma) + (b_y>>is_luma)*s->mb_stride;
int error_j= s->error_status_table[mb_index_j];
int intra_j = IS_INTRA(s->cur_pic.mb_type[mb_index_j]);
if(intra_j==0 || !(error_j&ER_DC_ERROR)){
color= dc[b_x + b_y*stride];
distance= b_y;
}
col [b_x + b_y*stride][2]= color;
dist[b_x + b_y*stride][2]= distance >= 0 ? distance-b_y : 9999;
}
}
for (b_y = 0; b_y < h; b_y++) {
for (b_x = 0; b_x < w; b_x++) {
int mb_index, error, j;
int64_t guess, weight_sum;
mb_index = (b_x >> is_luma) + (b_y >> is_luma) * s->mb_stride;
error = s->error_status_table[mb_index];
if (IS_INTER(s->cur_pic.mb_type[mb_index]))
continue; // inter
if (!(error & ER_DC_ERROR))
continue; // dc-ok
weight_sum = 0;
guess = 0;
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
int64_t weight = 256 * 256 * 256 * 16 / FFMAX(dist[b_x + b_y*stride][j], 1);
guess += weight*(int64_t)col[b_x + b_y*stride][j];
weight_sum += weight;
}
guess = (guess + weight_sum / 2) / weight_sum;
dc[b_x + b_y * stride] = guess;
}
}
fail:
av_freep(&col);
av_freep(&dist);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Remove use of FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO as indicator of studio profile
The profile field is changed by code inside and outside the decoder,
its not a reliable indicator of the internal codec state.
Maintaining it consistency with studio_profile is messy.
Its easier to just avoid it and use only studio_profile
Fixes: assertion failure
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_9.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 11,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reflectedBooleanAttrAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::reflectedBooleanAttrAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 10,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void * gdImageWebpPtr (gdImagePtr im, int *size)
{
void *rv;
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewDynamicCtx(2048, NULL);
gdImageWebpCtx(im, out, -1);
rv = gdDPExtractData(out, size);
out->gd_free(out);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'PHP-5.6' into PHP-7.0
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 6,180 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void tfxd_del(GF_Box *s)
{
gf_free(s);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 14,290 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nameNsPush(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar * value,
const xmlChar *prefix, const xmlChar *URI, int nsNr)
{
if (ctxt->nameNr >= ctxt->nameMax) {
const xmlChar * *tmp;
void **tmp2;
ctxt->nameMax *= 2;
tmp = (const xmlChar * *) xmlRealloc((xmlChar * *)ctxt->nameTab,
ctxt->nameMax *
sizeof(ctxt->nameTab[0]));
if (tmp == NULL) {
ctxt->nameMax /= 2;
goto mem_error;
}
ctxt->nameTab = tmp;
tmp2 = (void **) xmlRealloc((void * *)ctxt->pushTab,
ctxt->nameMax * 3 *
sizeof(ctxt->pushTab[0]));
if (tmp2 == NULL) {
ctxt->nameMax /= 2;
goto mem_error;
}
ctxt->pushTab = tmp2;
}
ctxt->nameTab[ctxt->nameNr] = value;
ctxt->name = value;
ctxt->pushTab[ctxt->nameNr * 3] = (void *) prefix;
ctxt->pushTab[ctxt->nameNr * 3 + 1] = (void *) URI;
ctxt->pushTab[ctxt->nameNr * 3 + 2] = (void *) (long) nsNr;
return (ctxt->nameNr++);
mem_error:
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return (-1);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 10,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::DetachDelegate() {
delegate_ = nullptr;
latency_tracker_.reset_delegate();
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,627 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_compr_allocate_buffer(struct snd_compr_stream *stream,
struct snd_compr_params *params)
{
unsigned int buffer_size;
void *buffer;
buffer_size = params->buffer.fragment_size * params->buffer.fragments;
if (stream->ops->copy) {
buffer = NULL;
/* if copy is defined the driver will be required to copy
* the data from core
*/
} else {
buffer = kmalloc(buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
}
stream->runtime->fragment_size = params->buffer.fragment_size;
stream->runtime->fragments = params->buffer.fragments;
stream->runtime->buffer = buffer;
stream->runtime->buffer_size = buffer_size;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress: fix an integer overflow check
I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now,
it's still buggy.
The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer(). We multiply
".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we
save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we
allocate a smaller than expected size.
Fixes: b35cc8225845 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cleanup_xml_node(xmlNodePtr node)
{
xmlNodePtr trav;
xmlNodePtr del = NULL;
trav = node->children;
while (trav != NULL) {
if (del != NULL) {
xmlUnlinkNode(del);
xmlFreeNode(del);
del = NULL;
}
if (trav->type == XML_TEXT_NODE) {
if (is_blank(trav->content)) {
del = trav;
}
} else if ((trav->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(trav->type != XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE)) {
del = trav;
} else if (trav->children != NULL) {
cleanup_xml_node(trav);
}
trav = trav->next;
}
if (del != NULL) {
xmlUnlinkNode(del);
xmlFreeNode(del);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 28,857 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __net_exit ip_tables_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
xt_proto_fini(net, NFPROTO_IPV4);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,966 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __ap_recv(ap_qid_t qid, unsigned long long *psmid, void *msg, size_t length)
{
typedef struct { char _[length]; } msgblock;
register unsigned long reg0 asm("0") = qid | 0x80000000UL;
register struct ap_queue_status reg1 asm ("1");
register unsigned long reg2 asm("2") = 0UL;
register unsigned long reg4 asm("4") = (unsigned long) msg;
register unsigned long reg5 asm("5") = (unsigned long) length;
register unsigned long reg6 asm("6") = 0UL;
register unsigned long reg7 asm("7") = 0UL;
asm volatile(
"0: .long 0xb2ae0064\n" /* DQAP */
" brc 6,0b\n"
: "+d" (reg0), "=d" (reg1), "+d" (reg2),
"+d" (reg4), "+d" (reg5), "+d" (reg6), "+d" (reg7),
"=m" (*(msgblock *) msg) : : "cc" );
*psmid = (((unsigned long long) reg6) << 32) + reg7;
return reg1;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 25,838 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static UINT dvcman_open_channel(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc,
IWTSVirtualChannelManager* pChannelMgr,
UINT32 ChannelId)
{
DVCMAN_CHANNEL* channel;
IWTSVirtualChannelCallback* pCallback;
UINT error;
channel = (DVCMAN_CHANNEL*) dvcman_find_channel_by_id(pChannelMgr, ChannelId);
if (!channel)
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "ChannelId %"PRIu32" not found!", ChannelId);
return ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (channel->status == CHANNEL_RC_OK)
{
pCallback = channel->channel_callback;
if ((pCallback->OnOpen) && (error = pCallback->OnOpen(pCallback)))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "OnOpen failed with error %"PRIu32"!", error);
return error;
}
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_DEBUG, "open_channel: ChannelId %"PRIu32"", ChannelId);
}
return CHANNEL_RC_OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void urlStringAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
imp->setAttribute(HTMLNames::ReflectUrlAttributeAttr, cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int udf_load_logicalvol(struct super_block *sb, sector_t block,
struct kernel_lb_addr *fileset)
{
struct logicalVolDesc *lvd;
int i, j, offset;
uint8_t type;
struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(sb);
struct genericPartitionMap *gpm;
uint16_t ident;
struct buffer_head *bh;
unsigned int table_len;
int ret = 0;
bh = udf_read_tagged(sb, block, block, &ident);
if (!bh)
return 1;
BUG_ON(ident != TAG_IDENT_LVD);
lvd = (struct logicalVolDesc *)bh->b_data;
table_len = le32_to_cpu(lvd->mapTableLength);
if (sizeof(*lvd) + table_len > sb->s_blocksize) {
udf_err(sb, "error loading logical volume descriptor: "
"Partition table too long (%u > %lu)\n", table_len,
sb->s_blocksize - sizeof(*lvd));
goto out_bh;
}
ret = udf_sb_alloc_partition_maps(sb, le32_to_cpu(lvd->numPartitionMaps));
if (ret)
goto out_bh;
for (i = 0, offset = 0;
i < sbi->s_partitions && offset < table_len;
i++, offset += gpm->partitionMapLength) {
struct udf_part_map *map = &sbi->s_partmaps[i];
gpm = (struct genericPartitionMap *)
&(lvd->partitionMaps[offset]);
type = gpm->partitionMapType;
if (type == 1) {
struct genericPartitionMap1 *gpm1 =
(struct genericPartitionMap1 *)gpm;
map->s_partition_type = UDF_TYPE1_MAP15;
map->s_volumeseqnum = le16_to_cpu(gpm1->volSeqNum);
map->s_partition_num = le16_to_cpu(gpm1->partitionNum);
map->s_partition_func = NULL;
} else if (type == 2) {
struct udfPartitionMap2 *upm2 =
(struct udfPartitionMap2 *)gpm;
if (!strncmp(upm2->partIdent.ident, UDF_ID_VIRTUAL,
strlen(UDF_ID_VIRTUAL))) {
u16 suf =
le16_to_cpu(((__le16 *)upm2->partIdent.
identSuffix)[0]);
if (suf < 0x0200) {
map->s_partition_type =
UDF_VIRTUAL_MAP15;
map->s_partition_func =
udf_get_pblock_virt15;
} else {
map->s_partition_type =
UDF_VIRTUAL_MAP20;
map->s_partition_func =
udf_get_pblock_virt20;
}
} else if (!strncmp(upm2->partIdent.ident,
UDF_ID_SPARABLE,
strlen(UDF_ID_SPARABLE))) {
uint32_t loc;
struct sparingTable *st;
struct sparablePartitionMap *spm =
(struct sparablePartitionMap *)gpm;
map->s_partition_type = UDF_SPARABLE_MAP15;
map->s_type_specific.s_sparing.s_packet_len =
le16_to_cpu(spm->packetLength);
for (j = 0; j < spm->numSparingTables; j++) {
struct buffer_head *bh2;
loc = le32_to_cpu(
spm->locSparingTable[j]);
bh2 = udf_read_tagged(sb, loc, loc,
&ident);
map->s_type_specific.s_sparing.
s_spar_map[j] = bh2;
if (bh2 == NULL)
continue;
st = (struct sparingTable *)bh2->b_data;
if (ident != 0 || strncmp(
st->sparingIdent.ident,
UDF_ID_SPARING,
strlen(UDF_ID_SPARING))) {
brelse(bh2);
map->s_type_specific.s_sparing.
s_spar_map[j] = NULL;
}
}
map->s_partition_func = udf_get_pblock_spar15;
} else if (!strncmp(upm2->partIdent.ident,
UDF_ID_METADATA,
strlen(UDF_ID_METADATA))) {
struct udf_meta_data *mdata =
&map->s_type_specific.s_metadata;
struct metadataPartitionMap *mdm =
(struct metadataPartitionMap *)
&(lvd->partitionMaps[offset]);
udf_debug("Parsing Logical vol part %d type %d id=%s\n",
i, type, UDF_ID_METADATA);
map->s_partition_type = UDF_METADATA_MAP25;
map->s_partition_func = udf_get_pblock_meta25;
mdata->s_meta_file_loc =
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataFileLoc);
mdata->s_mirror_file_loc =
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataMirrorFileLoc);
mdata->s_bitmap_file_loc =
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataBitmapFileLoc);
mdata->s_alloc_unit_size =
le32_to_cpu(mdm->allocUnitSize);
mdata->s_align_unit_size =
le16_to_cpu(mdm->alignUnitSize);
if (mdm->flags & 0x01)
mdata->s_flags |= MF_DUPLICATE_MD;
udf_debug("Metadata Ident suffix=0x%x\n",
le16_to_cpu(*(__le16 *)
mdm->partIdent.identSuffix));
udf_debug("Metadata part num=%d\n",
le16_to_cpu(mdm->partitionNum));
udf_debug("Metadata part alloc unit size=%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(mdm->allocUnitSize));
udf_debug("Metadata file loc=%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataFileLoc));
udf_debug("Mirror file loc=%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataMirrorFileLoc));
udf_debug("Bitmap file loc=%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataBitmapFileLoc));
udf_debug("Flags: %d %d\n",
mdata->s_flags, mdm->flags);
} else {
udf_debug("Unknown ident: %s\n",
upm2->partIdent.ident);
continue;
}
map->s_volumeseqnum = le16_to_cpu(upm2->volSeqNum);
map->s_partition_num = le16_to_cpu(upm2->partitionNum);
}
udf_debug("Partition (%d:%d) type %d on volume %d\n",
i, map->s_partition_num, type, map->s_volumeseqnum);
}
if (fileset) {
struct long_ad *la = (struct long_ad *)&(lvd->logicalVolContentsUse[0]);
*fileset = lelb_to_cpu(la->extLocation);
udf_debug("FileSet found in LogicalVolDesc at block=%d, partition=%d\n",
fileset->logicalBlockNum,
fileset->partitionReferenceNum);
}
if (lvd->integritySeqExt.extLength)
udf_load_logicalvolint(sb, leea_to_cpu(lvd->integritySeqExt));
out_bh:
brelse(bh);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: udf: Fortify loading of sparing table
Add sanity checks when loading sparing table from disk to avoid accessing
unallocated memory or writing to it.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 8,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Rect DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::ToPixelRect(
const gfx::Rect& rect_in_dip) const {
gfx::RectF rect_in_pixels = gfx::RectF(rect_in_dip);
GetRootTransform().TransformRect(&rect_in_pixels);
return gfx::ToEnclosingRect(rect_in_pixels);
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 10,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport QuantumInfo *AcquireQuantumInfo(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
quantum_info=(QuantumInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*quantum_info));
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
quantum_info->signature=MagickSignature;
GetQuantumInfo(image_info,quantum_info);
if (image == (const Image *) NULL)
return(quantum_info);
status=SetQuantumDepth(image,quantum_info,image->depth);
quantum_info->endian=image->endian;
if (status == MagickFalse)
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(quantum_info);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/110
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 26,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DefaultTabHandler::CanBookmarkAllTabs() const {
return delegate_->AsBrowser()->CanBookmarkAllTabs();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,860 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: midi_outc(int midi_dev, int data)
{
int timeout;
for (timeout = 0; timeout < 3200; timeout++)
if (midi_devs[midi_dev]->outputc(midi_dev, (unsigned char) (data & 0xff)))
{
if (data & 0x80) /*
* Status byte
*/
prev_out_status[midi_dev] =
(unsigned char) (data & 0xff); /*
* Store for running status
*/
return; /*
* Mission complete
*/
}
/*
* Sorry! No space on buffers.
*/
printk("Midi send timed out\n");
}
Commit Message: sound/oss: remove offset from load_patch callbacks
Was: [PATCH] sound/oss/midi_synth: prevent underflow, use of
uninitialized value, and signedness issue
The offset passed to midi_synth_load_patch() can be essentially
arbitrary. If it's greater than the header length, this will result in
a copy_from_user(dst, src, negative_val). While this will just return
-EFAULT on x86, on other architectures this may cause memory corruption.
Additionally, the length field of the sysex_info structure may not be
initialized prior to its use. Finally, a signed comparison may result
in an unintentionally large loop.
On suggestion by Takashi Iwai, version two removes the offset argument
from the load_patch callbacks entirely, which also resolves similar
issues in opl3. Compile tested only.
v3 adjusts comments and hopefully gets copy offsets right.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,675 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltFreeStackElem(xsltStackElemPtr elem) {
if (elem == NULL)
return;
if (elem->value != NULL)
xmlXPathFreeObject(elem->value);
/*
* Release the list of temporary Result Tree Fragments.
*/
if (elem->fragment) {
xmlDocPtr cur;
while (elem->fragment != NULL) {
cur = elem->fragment;
elem->fragment = (xmlDocPtr) cur->next;
if (elem->context &&
(cur->psvi == (void *) ((long) 1)))
{
/*
* This fragment is a result of an extension instruction
* (e.g. XSLT's function) and needs to be preserved until
* the instruction exits.
* Example: The fragment of the variable must not be freed
* since it is returned by the EXSLT function:
* <f:function name="foo">
* <xsl:variable name="bar">
* <bar/>
* </xsl:variable>
* <f:result select="$bar"/>
* </f:function>
*
*/
xsltRegisterLocalRVT(elem->context, cur);
} else {
xsltReleaseRVT((xsltTransformContextPtr) elem->context,
cur);
}
}
}
/*
* Cache or free the variable structure.
*/
if (elem->context && (elem->context->cache->nbStackItems < 50)) {
/*
* Store the item in the cache.
*/
xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt = elem->context;
memset(elem, 0, sizeof(xsltStackElem));
elem->context = ctxt;
elem->next = ctxt->cache->stackItems;
ctxt->cache->stackItems = elem;
ctxt->cache->nbStackItems++;
#ifdef XSLT_DEBUG_PROFILE_CACHE
ctxt->cache->dbgCachedVars++;
#endif
return;
}
xmlFree(elem);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,441 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sched_ttwu_pending(void)
{
struct rq *rq = this_rq();
struct llist_node *llist = llist_del_all(&rq->wake_list);
struct task_struct *p;
raw_spin_lock(&rq->lock);
while (llist) {
p = llist_entry(llist, struct task_struct, wake_entry);
llist = llist_next(llist);
ttwu_do_activate(rq, p, 0);
}
raw_spin_unlock(&rq->lock);
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void my_term_destination_fn(j_compress_ptr cinfo)
{
struct iwjpegwcontext *wctx = (struct iwjpegwcontext*)cinfo->dest;
size_t bytesleft;
bytesleft = wctx->buffer_len - wctx->pub.free_in_buffer;
if(bytesleft>0) {
(*wctx->iodescr->write_fn)(wctx->ctx,wctx->iodescr,
wctx->buffer,bytesleft);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed invalid memory access bugs when decoding JPEG Exif data
Fixes issues #22, #23, #24, #25
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 15,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fz_set_default_output_intent(fz_context *ctx, fz_default_colorspaces *default_cs, fz_colorspace *cs)
{
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, default_cs->oi);
default_cs->oi = fz_keep_colorspace(ctx, cs);
switch (cs->n)
{
case 1:
if (default_cs->gray == fz_device_gray(ctx))
{
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, default_cs->gray);
default_cs->gray = fz_keep_colorspace(ctx, cs);
}
break;
case 3:
if (default_cs->rgb == fz_device_rgb(ctx))
{
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, default_cs->rgb);
default_cs->rgb = fz_keep_colorspace(ctx, cs);
}
break;
case 4:
if (default_cs->cmyk == fz_device_cmyk(ctx))
{
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, default_cs->cmyk);
default_cs->cmyk = fz_keep_colorspace(ctx, cs);
}
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,451 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void LimitedWithMissingDefaultAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V0CustomElementProcessingStack::CallbackDeliveryScope delivery_scope;
V8StringResource<> cpp_value = v8_value;
if (!cpp_value.Prepare())
return;
impl->setAttribute(html_names::kLimitedwithmissingdefaultattributeAttr, cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,143 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::RestoreActiveTexture() const {}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int t_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
long i;
int size;
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
seq_printf(m, " Depth Size Location"
" (%d entries)\n"
" ----- ---- --------\n",
max_stack_trace.nr_entries - 1);
if (!stack_tracer_enabled && !max_stack_size)
print_disabled(m);
return 0;
}
i = *(long *)v;
if (i >= max_stack_trace.nr_entries ||
stack_dump_trace[i] == ULONG_MAX)
return 0;
if (i+1 == max_stack_trace.nr_entries ||
stack_dump_trace[i+1] == ULONG_MAX)
size = stack_dump_index[i];
else
size = stack_dump_index[i] - stack_dump_index[i+1];
seq_printf(m, "%3ld) %8d %5d ", i, stack_dump_index[i], size);
trace_lookup_stack(m, i);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Offliner* offliner() { return offliner_; }
Commit Message: Remove unused histograms from the background loader offliner.
Bug: 975512
Change-Id: I87b0a91bed60e3a9e8a1fd9ae9b18cac27a0859f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1683361
Reviewed-by: Cathy Li <chili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Holte <holte@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Williamson <petewil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#675332}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLButtonElement::appendFormData(FormDataList& formData, bool)
{
if (m_type != SUBMIT || name().isEmpty() || !m_isActivatedSubmit)
return false;
formData.appendData(name(), value());
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,367 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static IntPoint getLocationForKeyboardGeneratedContextMenu(Frame* frame)
{
FrameSelection* selection = frame->selection();
if (!selection->selection().isNonOrphanedCaretOrRange()
|| (selection->selection().isCaret() && !selection->selection().isContentEditable())) {
if (Node* focusedNode = getFocusedNode(frame))
return focusedNode->getRect().location();
return IntPoint(gContextMenuMargin, gContextMenuMargin);
}
IntRect firstRect = frame->editor()->firstRectForRange(selection->selection().firstRange().get());
return IntPoint(firstRect.x(), firstRect.maxY());
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 17,042 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smb2_lockv(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
const __u64 persist_fid, const __u64 volatile_fid, const __u32 pid,
const __u32 num_lock, struct smb2_lock_element *buf)
{
int rc = 0;
struct smb2_lock_req *req = NULL;
struct kvec iov[2];
int resp_buf_type;
unsigned int count;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "smb2_lockv num lock %d\n", num_lock);
rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_LOCK, tcon, (void **) &req);
if (rc)
return rc;
req->hdr.ProcessId = cpu_to_le32(pid);
req->LockCount = cpu_to_le16(num_lock);
req->PersistentFileId = persist_fid;
req->VolatileFileId = volatile_fid;
count = num_lock * sizeof(struct smb2_lock_element);
inc_rfc1001_len(req, count - sizeof(struct smb2_lock_element));
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
/* 4 for rfc1002 length field and count for all locks */
iov[0].iov_len = get_rfc1002_length(req) + 4 - count;
iov[1].iov_base = (char *)buf;
iov[1].iov_len = count;
cifs_stats_inc(&tcon->stats.cifs_stats.num_locks);
rc = SendReceive2(xid, tcon->ses, iov, 2, &resp_buf_type, CIFS_NO_RESP);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Send error in smb2_lockv = %d\n", rc);
cifs_stats_fail_inc(tcon, SMB2_LOCK_HE);
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: [CIFS] Possible null ptr deref in SMB2_tcon
As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon
and there is one path in which tcon can be null.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Reported-by: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void virtcons_remove(struct virtio_device *vdev)
{
struct ports_device *portdev;
struct port *port, *port2;
portdev = vdev->priv;
spin_lock_irq(&pdrvdata_lock);
list_del(&portdev->list);
spin_unlock_irq(&pdrvdata_lock);
/* Disable interrupts for vqs */
vdev->config->reset(vdev);
/* Finish up work that's lined up */
if (use_multiport(portdev))
cancel_work_sync(&portdev->control_work);
else
cancel_work_sync(&portdev->config_work);
list_for_each_entry_safe(port, port2, &portdev->ports, list)
unplug_port(port);
unregister_chrdev(portdev->chr_major, "virtio-portsdev");
/*
* When yanking out a device, we immediately lose the
* (device-side) queues. So there's no point in keeping the
* guest side around till we drop our final reference. This
* also means that any ports which are in an open state will
* have to just stop using the port, as the vqs are going
* away.
*/
remove_controlq_data(portdev);
remove_vqs(portdev);
kfree(portdev);
}
Commit Message: virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: file_path_add(gs_main_instance * minst, gs_file_path * pfp, const char *dirs)
{
uint len = r_size(&pfp->list);
const char *dpath = dirs;
int code;
if (dirs == 0)
return 0;
for (;;) { /* Find the end of the next directory name. */
const char *npath = dpath;
while (*npath != 0 && *npath != gp_file_name_list_separator)
npath++;
if (npath > dpath) {
if (len == r_size(&pfp->container)) {
code = extend_path_list_container(minst, pfp);
if (code < 0) {
emprintf(minst->heap, "\nAdding path to search paths failed.\n");
return(code);
}
}
make_const_string(&pfp->container.value.refs[len],
avm_foreign | a_readonly,
npath - dpath, (const byte *)dpath);
++len;
}
if (!*npath)
break;
dpath = npath + 1;
}
r_set_size(&pfp->list, len);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 3,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int br_mdb_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct net_device *dev;
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct nlmsghdr *nlh = NULL;
int idx = 0, s_idx;
s_idx = cb->args[0];
rcu_read_lock();
/* In theory this could be wrapped to 0... */
cb->seq = net->dev_base_seq + br_mdb_rehash_seq;
for_each_netdev_rcu(net, dev) {
if (dev->priv_flags & IFF_EBRIDGE) {
struct br_port_msg *bpm;
if (idx < s_idx)
goto skip;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, RTM_GETMDB,
sizeof(*bpm), NLM_F_MULTI);
if (nlh == NULL)
break;
bpm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
memset(bpm, 0, sizeof(*bpm));
bpm->ifindex = dev->ifindex;
if (br_mdb_fill_info(skb, cb, dev) < 0)
goto out;
if (br_rports_fill_info(skb, cb, dev) < 0)
goto out;
cb->args[1] = 0;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
skip:
idx++;
}
}
out:
if (nlh)
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
rcu_read_unlock();
cb->args[0] = idx;
return skb->len;
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:
#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292
this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b6 (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).
Same for __br_mdb_del().
Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <809674045@qq.com>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <hancockrwd@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct gnttab_copy *xen_netbk_get_requests(struct xen_netbk *netbk,
struct xenvif *vif,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp,
struct gnttab_copy *gop)
{
struct skb_shared_info *shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
skb_frag_t *frags = shinfo->frags;
u16 pending_idx = *((u16 *)skb->data);
int i, start;
/* Skip first skb fragment if it is on same page as header fragment. */
start = (frag_get_pending_idx(&shinfo->frags[0]) == pending_idx);
for (i = start; i < shinfo->nr_frags; i++, txp++) {
struct page *page;
pending_ring_idx_t index;
struct pending_tx_info *pending_tx_info =
netbk->pending_tx_info;
index = pending_index(netbk->pending_cons++);
pending_idx = netbk->pending_ring[index];
page = xen_netbk_alloc_page(netbk, skb, pending_idx);
if (!page)
return NULL;
gop->source.u.ref = txp->gref;
gop->source.domid = vif->domid;
gop->source.offset = txp->offset;
gop->dest.u.gmfn = virt_to_mfn(page_address(page));
gop->dest.domid = DOMID_SELF;
gop->dest.offset = txp->offset;
gop->len = txp->size;
gop->flags = GNTCOPY_source_gref;
gop++;
memcpy(&pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req, txp, sizeof(*txp));
xenvif_get(vif);
pending_tx_info[pending_idx].vif = vif;
frag_set_pending_idx(&frags[i], pending_idx);
}
return gop;
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 18,315 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __save_error_info(struct super_block *sb, const char *func,
unsigned int line)
{
struct ext4_super_block *es = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es;
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state |= EXT4_ERROR_FS;
es->s_state |= cpu_to_le16(EXT4_ERROR_FS);
es->s_last_error_time = cpu_to_le32(get_seconds());
strncpy(es->s_last_error_func, func, sizeof(es->s_last_error_func));
es->s_last_error_line = cpu_to_le32(line);
if (!es->s_first_error_time) {
es->s_first_error_time = es->s_last_error_time;
strncpy(es->s_first_error_func, func,
sizeof(es->s_first_error_func));
es->s_first_error_line = cpu_to_le32(line);
es->s_first_error_ino = es->s_last_error_ino;
es->s_first_error_block = es->s_last_error_block;
}
/*
* Start the daily error reporting function if it hasn't been
* started already
*/
if (!es->s_error_count)
mod_timer(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_err_report, jiffies + 24*60*60*HZ);
es->s_error_count = cpu_to_le32(le32_to_cpu(es->s_error_count) + 1);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void btif_hl_proc_dereg_cfm(tBTA_HL *p_data)
{
btif_hl_app_cb_t *p_acb;
UINT8 app_idx;
int app_id = 0;
bthl_app_reg_state_t state = BTHL_APP_REG_STATE_DEREG_SUCCESS;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s de-reg status=%d app_handle=%d", __FUNCTION__,
p_data->dereg_cfm.status, p_data->dereg_cfm.app_handle);
if (btif_hl_find_app_idx_using_app_id(p_data->dereg_cfm.app_id, &app_idx))
{
p_acb = BTIF_HL_GET_APP_CB_PTR(app_idx);
app_id = (int) p_acb->app_id;
if (p_data->dereg_cfm.status == BTA_HL_STATUS_OK)
{
btif_hl_clean_mdls_using_app_idx(app_idx);
memset(p_acb, 0,sizeof(btif_hl_app_cb_t));
}
else
state = BTHL_APP_REG_STATE_DEREG_FAILED;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("call reg state callback app_id=%d state=%d", app_id, state);
BTIF_HL_CALL_CBACK(bt_hl_callbacks, app_reg_state_cb, app_id, state );
if (btif_hl_is_no_active_app())
{
btif_hl_disable();
}
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 15,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tg3_mem_tx_release(struct tg3 *tp)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < tp->irq_max; i++) {
struct tg3_napi *tnapi = &tp->napi[i];
if (tnapi->tx_ring) {
dma_free_coherent(&tp->pdev->dev, TG3_TX_RING_BYTES,
tnapi->tx_ring, tnapi->tx_desc_mapping);
tnapi->tx_ring = NULL;
}
kfree(tnapi->tx_buffers);
tnapi->tx_buffers = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabLifecycleUnitSource::TabLifecycleUnit::~TabLifecycleUnit() {
OnLifecycleUnitDestroyed();
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::PluginCrashed(const base::FilePath& plugin_path,
base::ProcessId plugin_pid) {
Send(new FrameHostMsg_PluginCrashed(routing_id_, plugin_path, plugin_pid));
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cryptd_blkcipher_crypt(struct ablkcipher_request *req,
struct crypto_blkcipher *child,
int err,
int (*crypt)(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int len))
{
struct cryptd_blkcipher_request_ctx *rctx;
struct blkcipher_desc desc;
rctx = ablkcipher_request_ctx(req);
if (unlikely(err == -EINPROGRESS))
goto out;
desc.tfm = child;
desc.info = req->info;
desc.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
err = crypt(&desc, req->dst, req->src, req->nbytes);
req->base.complete = rctx->complete;
out:
local_bh_disable();
rctx->complete(&req->base, err);
local_bh_enable();
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
{
unsigned add_flags = d_flags_for_inode(inode);
WARN_ON(d_in_lookup(dentry));
spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
hlist_add_head(&dentry->d_u.d_alias, &inode->i_dentry);
raw_write_seqcount_begin(&dentry->d_seq);
__d_set_inode_and_type(dentry, inode, add_flags);
raw_write_seqcount_end(&dentry->d_seq);
fsnotify_update_flags(dentry);
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,564 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tcos_list_files(sc_card_t *card, u8 *buf, size_t buflen)
{
sc_context_t *ctx;
sc_apdu_t apdu;
u8 rbuf[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE], p1;
int r, count = 0;
assert(card != NULL);
ctx = card->ctx;
for (p1=1; p1<=2; p1++) {
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0xAA, p1, 0);
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.resp = rbuf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(rbuf);
apdu.le = 256;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
if (apdu.sw1==0x6A && (apdu.sw2==0x82 || apdu.sw2==0x88)) continue;
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
SC_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "List Dir failed");
if (apdu.resplen > buflen) return SC_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"got %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u %s-FileIDs\n",
apdu.resplen / 2, p1 == 1 ? "DF" : "EF");
memcpy(buf, apdu.resp, apdu.resplen);
buf += apdu.resplen;
buflen -= apdu.resplen;
count += apdu.resplen;
}
return count;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 4,172 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sk_buff *netlink_trim(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t allocation)
{
int delta;
WARN_ON(skb->sk != NULL);
delta = skb->end - skb->tail;
if (is_vmalloc_addr(skb->head) || delta * 2 < skb->truesize)
return skb;
if (skb_shared(skb)) {
struct sk_buff *nskb = skb_clone(skb, allocation);
if (!nskb)
return skb;
consume_skb(skb);
skb = nskb;
}
if (!pskb_expand_head(skb, 0, -delta, allocation))
skb->truesize -= delta;
return skb;
}
Commit Message: netlink: Fix dump skb leak/double free
When we free cb->skb after a dump, we do it after releasing the
lock. This means that a new dump could have started in the time
being and we'll end up freeing their skb instead of ours.
This patch saves the skb and module before we unlock so we free
the right memory.
Fixes: 16b304f3404f ("netlink: Eliminate kmalloc in netlink dump operation.")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 7,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void maybe_add_creds(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct socket *sock,
const struct sock *other)
{
if (UNIXCB(skb).pid)
return;
if (unix_passcred_enabled(sock, other)) {
UNIXCB(skb).pid = get_pid(task_tgid(current));
current_uid_gid(&UNIXCB(skb).uid, &UNIXCB(skb).gid);
}
}
Commit Message: unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_STACK_PUSH(char *arg, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
enum ofputil_protocol *usable_protocols OVS_UNUSED)
{
return nxm_parse_stack_action(ofpact_put_STACK_PUSH(ofpacts), arg);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 9,013 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool XSSAuditor::FilterInputToken(const FilterTokenRequest& request) {
DCHECK_EQ(request.token.GetType(), HTMLToken::kStartTag);
DCHECK(HasName(request.token, inputTag));
return EraseAttributeIfInjected(request, formactionAttr, kURLWithUniqueOrigin,
kSrcLikeAttributeTruncation);
}
Commit Message: Restrict the xss audit report URL to same origin
BUG=441275
R=tsepez@chromium.org,mkwst@chromium.org
Change-Id: I27bc8e251b9ad962c3b4fdebf084a2b9152f915d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768367
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516666}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 15,437 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkcs7_verify)
{
X509_STORE * store = NULL;
zval * cainfo = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *signers= NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *others = NULL;
PKCS7 * p7 = NULL;
BIO * in = NULL, * datain = NULL, * dataout = NULL;
zend_long flags = 0;
char * filename;
size_t filename_len;
char * extracerts = NULL;
size_t extracerts_len = 0;
char * signersfilename = NULL;
size_t signersfilename_len = 0;
char * datafilename = NULL;
size_t datafilename_len = 0;
RETVAL_LONG(-1);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "pl|papp", &filename, &filename_len,
&flags, &signersfilename, &signersfilename_len, &cainfo,
&extracerts, &extracerts_len, &datafilename, &datafilename_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (extracerts) {
others = load_all_certs_from_file(extracerts);
if (others == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
}
flags = flags & ~PKCS7_DETACHED;
store = setup_verify(cainfo);
if (!store) {
goto clean_exit;
}
if (php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(filename)) {
goto clean_exit;
}
in = BIO_new_file(filename, (flags & PKCS7_BINARY) ? "rb" : "r");
if (in == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
p7 = SMIME_read_PKCS7(in, &datain);
if (p7 == NULL) {
#if DEBUG_SMIME
zend_printf("SMIME_read_PKCS7 failed\n");
#endif
goto clean_exit;
}
if (datafilename) {
if (php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(datafilename)) {
goto clean_exit;
}
dataout = BIO_new_file(datafilename, "w");
if (dataout == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
}
#if DEBUG_SMIME
zend_printf("Calling PKCS7 verify\n");
#endif
if (PKCS7_verify(p7, others, store, datain, dataout, (int)flags)) {
RETVAL_TRUE;
if (signersfilename) {
BIO *certout;
if (php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(signersfilename)) {
goto clean_exit;
}
certout = BIO_new_file(signersfilename, "w");
if (certout) {
int i;
signers = PKCS7_get0_signers(p7, NULL, (int)flags);
for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(signers); i++) {
PEM_write_bio_X509(certout, sk_X509_value(signers, i));
}
BIO_free(certout);
sk_X509_free(signers);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "signature OK, but cannot open %s for writing", signersfilename);
RETVAL_LONG(-1);
}
}
goto clean_exit;
} else {
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
clean_exit:
X509_STORE_free(store);
BIO_free(datain);
BIO_free(in);
BIO_free(dataout);
PKCS7_free(p7);
sk_X509_free(others);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 26,088 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandler::OnDataChannel(
std::unique_ptr<RtcDataChannelHandler> handler) {
DCHECK(task_runner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
TRACE_EVENT0("webrtc", "RTCPeerConnectionHandler::OnDataChannelImpl");
if (peer_connection_tracker_) {
peer_connection_tracker_->TrackCreateDataChannel(
this, handler->channel().get(), PeerConnectionTracker::SOURCE_REMOTE);
}
if (!is_closed_)
client_->DidAddRemoteDataChannel(handler.release());
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 21,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_port)
{
php_pgsql_get_link_info(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU,PHP_PG_PORT);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int32_t parse_len(const char *line)
{
char num[PKT_LEN_SIZE + 1];
int i, k, error;
int32_t len;
const char *num_end;
memcpy(num, line, PKT_LEN_SIZE);
num[PKT_LEN_SIZE] = '\0';
for (i = 0; i < PKT_LEN_SIZE; ++i) {
if (!isxdigit(num[i])) {
/* Make sure there are no special characters before passing to error message */
for (k = 0; k < PKT_LEN_SIZE; ++k) {
if(!isprint(num[k])) {
num[k] = '.';
}
}
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "invalid hex digit in length: '%s'", num);
return -1;
}
}
if ((error = git__strtol32(&len, num, &num_end, 16)) < 0)
return error;
return len;
}
Commit Message: smart_pkt: treat empty packet lines as error
The Git protocol does not specify what should happen in the case
of an empty packet line (that is a packet line "0004"). We
currently indicate success, but do not return a packet in the
case where we hit an empty line. The smart protocol was not
prepared to handle such packets in all cases, though, resulting
in a `NULL` pointer dereference.
Fix the issue by returning an error instead. As such kind of
packets is not even specified by upstream, this is the right
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 27,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: QString IRCView::openTags(TextHtmlData* data, int from)
{
QString ret, tag;
int i = from;
for ( ; i < data->openHtmlTags.count(); ++i)
{
tag = data->openHtmlTags.at(i);
if (data->reverse)
{
ret += fontColorOpenTag(Preferences::self()->color(Preferences::TextViewBackground).name());
}
else
{
ret += fontColorOpenTag(data->lastFgColor);
}
}
else if (tag == QLatin1String("span"))
{
if (data->reverse)
{
ret += spanColorOpenTag(data->defaultColor);
}
else
{
ret += spanColorOpenTag(data->lastBgColor);
}
}
else
{
ret += QLatin1Char('<') + tag + QLatin1Char('>');
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 1 | 12,909 |
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