instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _dbus_atomic_dec (DBusAtomic *atomic)
{
return InterlockedDecrement (&atomic->value) + 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptPromise ReadableStreamReader::cancel(ScriptState* scriptState)
{
return cancel(scriptState, ScriptValue(scriptState, v8::Undefined(scriptState->isolate())));
}
Commit Message: Remove blink::ReadableStream
This CL removes two stable runtime enabled flags
- ResponseConstructedWithReadableStream
- ResponseBodyWithV8ExtraStream
and related code including blink::ReadableStream.
BUG=613435
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2227403002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#411014}
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,342 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __dev_change_flags(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int flags)
{
unsigned int old_flags = dev->flags;
int ret;
ASSERT_RTNL();
/*
* Set the flags on our device.
*/
dev->flags = (flags & (IFF_DEBUG | IFF_NOTRAILERS | IFF_NOARP |
IFF_DYNAMIC | IFF_MULTICAST | IFF_PORTSEL |
IFF_AUTOMEDIA)) |
(dev->flags & (IFF_UP | IFF_VOLATILE | IFF_PROMISC |
IFF_ALLMULTI));
/*
* Load in the correct multicast list now the flags have changed.
*/
if ((old_flags ^ flags) & IFF_MULTICAST)
dev_change_rx_flags(dev, IFF_MULTICAST);
dev_set_rx_mode(dev);
/*
* Have we downed the interface. We handle IFF_UP ourselves
* according to user attempts to set it, rather than blindly
* setting it.
*/
ret = 0;
if ((old_flags ^ flags) & IFF_UP)
ret = ((old_flags & IFF_UP) ? __dev_close : __dev_open)(dev);
if ((flags ^ dev->gflags) & IFF_PROMISC) {
int inc = (flags & IFF_PROMISC) ? 1 : -1;
unsigned int old_flags = dev->flags;
dev->gflags ^= IFF_PROMISC;
if (__dev_set_promiscuity(dev, inc, false) >= 0)
if (dev->flags != old_flags)
dev_set_rx_mode(dev);
}
/* NOTE: order of synchronization of IFF_PROMISC and IFF_ALLMULTI
is important. Some (broken) drivers set IFF_PROMISC, when
IFF_ALLMULTI is requested not asking us and not reporting.
*/
if ((flags ^ dev->gflags) & IFF_ALLMULTI) {
int inc = (flags & IFF_ALLMULTI) ? 1 : -1;
dev->gflags ^= IFF_ALLMULTI;
__dev_set_allmulti(dev, inc, false);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 7,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void webkit_web_view_load_uri(WebKitWebView* webView, const gchar* uri)
{
g_return_if_fail(WEBKIT_IS_WEB_VIEW(webView));
g_return_if_fail(uri);
WebKitWebFrame* frame = webView->priv->mainFrame;
webkit_web_frame_load_uri(frame, uri);
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 23,406 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cm_cleanup_timewait(struct cm_timewait_info *timewait_info)
{
if (timewait_info->inserted_remote_id) {
rb_erase(&timewait_info->remote_id_node, &cm.remote_id_table);
timewait_info->inserted_remote_id = 0;
}
if (timewait_info->inserted_remote_qp) {
rb_erase(&timewait_info->remote_qp_node, &cm.remote_qp_table);
timewait_info->inserted_remote_qp = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(explode)
{
zend_string *str, *delim;
zend_long limit = ZEND_LONG_MAX; /* No limit */
zval tmp;
#ifndef FAST_ZPP
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "SS|l", &delim, &str, &limit) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
#else
ZEND_PARSE_PARAMETERS_START(2, 3)
Z_PARAM_STR(delim)
Z_PARAM_STR(str)
Z_PARAM_OPTIONAL
Z_PARAM_LONG(limit)
ZEND_PARSE_PARAMETERS_END();
#endif
if (ZSTR_LEN(delim) == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Empty delimiter");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
array_init(return_value);
if (ZSTR_LEN(str) == 0) {
if (limit >= 0) {
ZVAL_EMPTY_STRING(&tmp);
zend_hash_index_add_new(Z_ARRVAL_P(return_value), 0, &tmp);
}
return;
}
if (limit > 1) {
php_explode(delim, str, return_value, limit);
} else if (limit < 0) {
php_explode_negative_limit(delim, str, return_value, limit);
} else {
ZVAL_STR_COPY(&tmp, str);
zend_hash_index_add_new(Z_ARRVAL_P(return_value), 0, &tmp);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 22,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int btif_hl_select_close_connected(void){
char sig_on = btif_hl_signal_select_close_connected;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_close_connected");
return send(signal_fds[1], &sig_on, sizeof(sig_on), 0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 3,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderThreadImpl::CreateOffscreenContext3d() {
blink::WebGraphicsContext3D::Attributes attributes(GetOffscreenAttribs());
bool lose_context_when_out_of_memory = true;
scoped_refptr<GpuChannelHost> gpu_channel_host(EstablishGpuChannelSync(
CAUSE_FOR_GPU_LAUNCH_WEBGRAPHICSCONTEXT3DCOMMANDBUFFERIMPL_INITIALIZE));
return make_scoped_ptr(
WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::CreateOffscreenContext(
gpu_channel_host.get(),
attributes,
lose_context_when_out_of_memory,
GURL("chrome://gpu/RenderThreadImpl::CreateOffscreenContext3d"),
WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::SharedMemoryLimits(),
NULL));
}
Commit Message: Disable forwarding tasks to the Blink scheduler
Disable forwarding tasks to the Blink scheduler to avoid some
regressions which it has introduced.
BUG=391005,415758,415478,412714,416362,416827,417608
TBR=jamesr@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/609483002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#296916}
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int port_fops_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int mode)
{
struct port *port;
port = filp->private_data;
return fasync_helper(fd, filp, mode, &port->async_queue);
}
Commit Message: virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SplashOutputDev::beginTransparencyGroup(GfxState *state, double *bbox,
GfxColorSpace *blendingColorSpace,
GBool isolated, GBool /*knockout*/,
GBool /*forSoftMask*/) {
SplashTransparencyGroup *transpGroup;
SplashColor color;
double xMin, yMin, xMax, yMax, x, y;
int tx, ty, w, h;
state->transform(bbox[0], bbox[1], &x, &y);
xMin = xMax = x;
yMin = yMax = y;
state->transform(bbox[0], bbox[3], &x, &y);
if (x < xMin) {
xMin = x;
} else if (x > xMax) {
xMax = x;
}
if (y < yMin) {
yMin = y;
} else if (y > yMax) {
yMax = y;
}
state->transform(bbox[2], bbox[1], &x, &y);
if (x < xMin) {
xMin = x;
} else if (x > xMax) {
xMax = x;
}
if (y < yMin) {
yMin = y;
} else if (y > yMax) {
yMax = y;
}
state->transform(bbox[2], bbox[3], &x, &y);
if (x < xMin) {
xMin = x;
} else if (x > xMax) {
xMax = x;
}
if (y < yMin) {
yMin = y;
} else if (y > yMax) {
yMax = y;
}
tx = (int)floor(xMin);
if (tx < 0) {
tx = 0;
} else if (tx > bitmap->getWidth()) {
tx = bitmap->getWidth();
}
ty = (int)floor(yMin);
if (ty < 0) {
ty = 0;
} else if (ty > bitmap->getHeight()) {
ty = bitmap->getHeight();
}
w = (int)ceil(xMax) - tx + 1;
if (tx + w > bitmap->getWidth()) {
w = bitmap->getWidth() - tx;
}
if (w < 1) {
w = 1;
}
h = (int)ceil(yMax) - ty + 1;
if (ty + h > bitmap->getHeight()) {
h = bitmap->getHeight() - ty;
}
if (h < 1) {
h = 1;
}
transpGroup = new SplashTransparencyGroup();
transpGroup->tx = tx;
transpGroup->ty = ty;
transpGroup->blendingColorSpace = blendingColorSpace;
transpGroup->isolated = isolated;
transpGroup->next = transpGroupStack;
transpGroupStack = transpGroup;
transpGroup->origBitmap = bitmap;
transpGroup->origSplash = splash;
bitmap = new SplashBitmap(w, h, bitmapRowPad, colorMode, gTrue,
bitmapTopDown);
splash = new Splash(bitmap, vectorAntialias,
transpGroup->origSplash->getScreen());
if (isolated) {
switch (colorMode) {
case splashModeMono1:
case splashModeMono8:
color[0] = 0;
break;
case splashModeXBGR8:
color[3] = 255;
case splashModeRGB8:
case splashModeBGR8:
color[0] = color[1] = color[2] = 0;
break;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
case splashModeCMYK8:
color[0] = color[1] = color[2] = color[3] = 0;
break;
#endif
default:
break;
}
splash->clear(color, 0);
} else {
splash->blitTransparent(transpGroup->origBitmap, tx, ty, 0, 0, w, h);
splash->setInNonIsolatedGroup(transpGroup->origBitmap, tx, ty);
}
transpGroup->tBitmap = bitmap;
state->shiftCTM(-tx, -ty);
updateCTM(state, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void flush_dpb(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
H264Context *h = avctx->priv_data;
int i;
for (i = 0; i <= MAX_DELAYED_PIC_COUNT; i++) {
if (h->delayed_pic[i])
h->delayed_pic[i]->reference = 0;
h->delayed_pic[i] = NULL;
}
flush_change(h);
if (h->DPB)
for (i = 0; i < MAX_PICTURE_COUNT; i++)
unref_picture(h, &h->DPB[i]);
h->cur_pic_ptr = NULL;
unref_picture(h, &h->cur_pic);
h->mb_x = h->mb_y = 0;
h->parse_context.state = -1;
h->parse_context.frame_start_found = 0;
h->parse_context.overread = 0;
h->parse_context.overread_index = 0;
h->parse_context.index = 0;
h->parse_context.last_index = 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: do not trust last_pic_droppable when marking pictures as done
This simplifies the code and fixes a deadlock
Fixes Ticket2927
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,993 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit TestInterstitialPage(WebContents* tab) {
base::FilePath file_path;
bool success = PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_TEST_DATA, &file_path);
EXPECT_TRUE(success);
file_path = file_path.AppendASCII("focus/typical_page.html");
success = base::ReadFileToString(file_path, &html_contents_);
EXPECT_TRUE(success);
interstitial_page_ = content::InterstitialPage::Create(
tab, true, GURL("http://interstitial.com"), this);
interstitial_page_->Show();
content::WaitForInterstitialAttach(tab);
EXPECT_TRUE(tab->ShowingInterstitialPage());
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderObject* HTMLButtonElement::createRenderer(RenderStyle*)
{
return new RenderButton(this);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int exitcode = 0;
int ii = 0, num_cases = 0;
for (num_cases = 0; testcases[num_cases].description; num_cases++) {
/* Just counting */
}
printf("1..%d\n", num_cases);
for (ii = 0; testcases[ii].description != NULL; ++ii) {
fflush(stdout);
#ifndef DEBUG
/* the test program shouldn't run longer than 10 minutes... */
alarm(600);
#endif
enum test_return ret = testcases[ii].function();
if (ret == TEST_SKIP) {
fprintf(stdout, "ok # SKIP %d - %s\n", ii + 1, testcases[ii].description);
} else if (ret == TEST_PASS) {
fprintf(stdout, "ok %d - %s\n", ii + 1, testcases[ii].description);
} else {
fprintf(stdout, "not ok %d - %s\n", ii + 1, testcases[ii].description);
exitcode = 1;
}
fflush(stdout);
}
return exitcode;
}
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: find_variable(uschar *name, BOOL exists_only, BOOL skipping, int *newsize)
{
var_entry * vp;
uschar *s, *domain;
uschar **ss;
void * val;
/* Handle ACL variables, whose names are of the form acl_cxxx or acl_mxxx.
Originally, xxx had to be a number in the range 0-9 (later 0-19), but from
release 4.64 onwards arbitrary names are permitted, as long as the first 5
characters are acl_c or acl_m and the sixth is either a digit or an underscore
(this gave backwards compatibility at the changeover). There may be built-in
variables whose names start acl_ but they should never start in this way. This
slightly messy specification is a consequence of the history, needless to say.
If an ACL variable does not exist, treat it as empty, unless strict_acl_vars is
set, in which case give an error. */
if ((Ustrncmp(name, "acl_c", 5) == 0 || Ustrncmp(name, "acl_m", 5) == 0) &&
!isalpha(name[5]))
{
tree_node *node =
tree_search((name[4] == 'c')? acl_var_c : acl_var_m, name + 4);
return (node == NULL)? (strict_acl_vars? NULL : US"") : node->data.ptr;
}
/* Handle $auth<n> variables. */
if (Ustrncmp(name, "auth", 4) == 0)
{
uschar *endptr;
int n = Ustrtoul(name + 4, &endptr, 10);
if (*endptr == 0 && n != 0 && n <= AUTH_VARS)
return (auth_vars[n-1] == NULL)? US"" : auth_vars[n-1];
}
/* For all other variables, search the table */
if (!(vp = find_var_ent(name)))
return NULL; /* Unknown variable name */
/* Found an existing variable. If in skipping state, the value isn't needed,
and we want to avoid processing (such as looking up the host name). */
if (skipping)
return US"";
val = vp->value;
switch (vp->type)
{
case vtype_filter_int:
if (!filter_running) return NULL;
/* Fall through */
/* VVVVVVVVVVVV */
case vtype_int:
sprintf(CS var_buffer, "%d", *(int *)(val)); /* Integer */
return var_buffer;
case vtype_ino:
sprintf(CS var_buffer, "%ld", (long int)(*(ino_t *)(val))); /* Inode */
return var_buffer;
case vtype_gid:
sprintf(CS var_buffer, "%ld", (long int)(*(gid_t *)(val))); /* gid */
return var_buffer;
case vtype_uid:
sprintf(CS var_buffer, "%ld", (long int)(*(uid_t *)(val))); /* uid */
return var_buffer;
case vtype_bool:
sprintf(CS var_buffer, "%s", *(BOOL *)(val) ? "yes" : "no"); /* bool */
return var_buffer;
case vtype_stringptr: /* Pointer to string */
s = *((uschar **)(val));
return (s == NULL)? US"" : s;
case vtype_pid:
sprintf(CS var_buffer, "%d", (int)getpid()); /* pid */
return var_buffer;
case vtype_load_avg:
sprintf(CS var_buffer, "%d", OS_GETLOADAVG()); /* load_average */
return var_buffer;
case vtype_host_lookup: /* Lookup if not done so */
if (sender_host_name == NULL && sender_host_address != NULL &&
!host_lookup_failed && host_name_lookup() == OK)
host_build_sender_fullhost();
return (sender_host_name == NULL)? US"" : sender_host_name;
case vtype_localpart: /* Get local part from address */
s = *((uschar **)(val));
if (s == NULL) return US"";
domain = Ustrrchr(s, '@');
if (domain == NULL) return s;
if (domain - s > sizeof(var_buffer) - 1)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "local part longer than " SIZE_T_FMT
" in string expansion", sizeof(var_buffer));
Ustrncpy(var_buffer, s, domain - s);
var_buffer[domain - s] = 0;
return var_buffer;
case vtype_domain: /* Get domain from address */
s = *((uschar **)(val));
if (s == NULL) return US"";
domain = Ustrrchr(s, '@');
return (domain == NULL)? US"" : domain + 1;
case vtype_msgheaders:
return find_header(NULL, exists_only, newsize, FALSE, NULL);
case vtype_msgheaders_raw:
return find_header(NULL, exists_only, newsize, TRUE, NULL);
case vtype_msgbody: /* Pointer to msgbody string */
case vtype_msgbody_end: /* Ditto, the end of the msg */
ss = (uschar **)(val);
if (*ss == NULL && deliver_datafile >= 0) /* Read body when needed */
{
uschar *body;
off_t start_offset = SPOOL_DATA_START_OFFSET;
int len = message_body_visible;
if (len > message_size) len = message_size;
*ss = body = store_malloc(len+1);
body[0] = 0;
if (vp->type == vtype_msgbody_end)
{
struct stat statbuf;
if (fstat(deliver_datafile, &statbuf) == 0)
{
start_offset = statbuf.st_size - len;
if (start_offset < SPOOL_DATA_START_OFFSET)
start_offset = SPOOL_DATA_START_OFFSET;
}
}
lseek(deliver_datafile, start_offset, SEEK_SET);
len = read(deliver_datafile, body, len);
if (len > 0)
{
body[len] = 0;
if (message_body_newlines) /* Separate loops for efficiency */
{
while (len > 0)
{ if (body[--len] == 0) body[len] = ' '; }
}
else
{
while (len > 0)
{ if (body[--len] == '\n' || body[len] == 0) body[len] = ' '; }
}
}
}
return (*ss == NULL)? US"" : *ss;
case vtype_todbsdin: /* BSD inbox time of day */
return tod_stamp(tod_bsdin);
case vtype_tode: /* Unix epoch time of day */
return tod_stamp(tod_epoch);
case vtype_todel: /* Unix epoch/usec time of day */
return tod_stamp(tod_epoch_l);
case vtype_todf: /* Full time of day */
return tod_stamp(tod_full);
case vtype_todl: /* Log format time of day */
return tod_stamp(tod_log_bare); /* (without timezone) */
case vtype_todzone: /* Time zone offset only */
return tod_stamp(tod_zone);
case vtype_todzulu: /* Zulu time */
return tod_stamp(tod_zulu);
case vtype_todlf: /* Log file datestamp tod */
return tod_stamp(tod_log_datestamp_daily);
case vtype_reply: /* Get reply address */
s = find_header(US"reply-to:", exists_only, newsize, TRUE,
headers_charset);
if (s != NULL) while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (s == NULL || *s == 0)
{
*newsize = 0; /* For the *s==0 case */
s = find_header(US"from:", exists_only, newsize, TRUE, headers_charset);
}
if (s != NULL)
{
uschar *t;
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
for (t = s; *t != 0; t++) if (*t == '\n') *t = ' ';
while (t > s && isspace(t[-1])) t--;
*t = 0;
}
return (s == NULL)? US"" : s;
case vtype_string_func:
{
uschar * (*fn)() = val;
return fn();
}
case vtype_pspace:
{
int inodes;
sprintf(CS var_buffer, "%d",
receive_statvfs(val == (void *)TRUE, &inodes));
}
return var_buffer;
case vtype_pinodes:
{
int inodes;
(void) receive_statvfs(val == (void *)TRUE, &inodes);
sprintf(CS var_buffer, "%d", inodes);
}
return var_buffer;
case vtype_cert:
return *(void **)val ? US"<cert>" : US"";
#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
case vtype_dkim:
return dkim_exim_expand_query((int)(long)val);
#endif
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 15,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void pud_clear_bad(pud_t *pud)
{
pud_ERROR(*pud);
pud_clear(pud);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 9,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: METHODDEF(JDIMENSION)
get_8bit_row(j_compress_ptr cinfo, cjpeg_source_ptr sinfo)
/* This version is for reading 8-bit colormap indexes */
{
bmp_source_ptr source = (bmp_source_ptr)sinfo;
register JSAMPARRAY colormap = source->colormap;
JSAMPARRAY image_ptr;
register int t;
register JSAMPROW inptr, outptr;
register JDIMENSION col;
if (source->use_inversion_array) {
/* Fetch next row from virtual array */
source->source_row--;
image_ptr = (*cinfo->mem->access_virt_sarray)
((j_common_ptr)cinfo, source->whole_image,
source->source_row, (JDIMENSION)1, FALSE);
inptr = image_ptr[0];
} else {
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, source->iobuffer, source->row_width))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
inptr = source->iobuffer;
}
/* Expand the colormap indexes to real data */
outptr = source->pub.buffer[0];
if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_GRAYSCALE) {
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
t = GETJSAMPLE(*inptr++);
*outptr++ = colormap[0][t];
}
} else if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_CMYK) {
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
t = GETJSAMPLE(*inptr++);
rgb_to_cmyk(colormap[0][t], colormap[1][t], colormap[2][t], outptr,
outptr + 1, outptr + 2, outptr + 3);
outptr += 4;
}
} else {
register int rindex = rgb_red[cinfo->in_color_space];
register int gindex = rgb_green[cinfo->in_color_space];
register int bindex = rgb_blue[cinfo->in_color_space];
register int aindex = alpha_index[cinfo->in_color_space];
register int ps = rgb_pixelsize[cinfo->in_color_space];
if (aindex >= 0) {
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
t = GETJSAMPLE(*inptr++);
outptr[rindex] = colormap[0][t];
outptr[gindex] = colormap[1][t];
outptr[bindex] = colormap[2][t];
outptr[aindex] = 0xFF;
outptr += ps;
}
} else {
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
t = GETJSAMPLE(*inptr++);
outptr[rindex] = colormap[0][t];
outptr[gindex] = colormap[1][t];
outptr[bindex] = colormap[2][t];
outptr += ps;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: tjLoadImage(): Fix FPE triggered by malformed BMP
In rdbmp.c, it is necessary to guard against 32-bit overflow/wraparound
when allocating the row buffer, because since BMP files have 32-bit
width and height fields, the value of biWidth can be up to 4294967295.
Specifically, if biWidth is 1073741824 and cinfo->input_components = 4,
then the samplesperrow argument in alloc_sarray() would wrap around to
0, and a division by zero error would occur at line 458 in jmemmgr.c.
If biWidth is set to a higher value, then samplesperrow would wrap
around to a small number, which would likely cause a buffer overflow
(this has not been tested or verified.)
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 25,823 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int iscsi_decode_text_input(
u8 phase,
u8 sender,
char *textbuf,
u32 length,
struct iscsi_conn *conn)
{
struct iscsi_param_list *param_list = conn->param_list;
char *tmpbuf, *start = NULL, *end = NULL;
tmpbuf = kzalloc(length + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tmpbuf) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate memory for tmpbuf.\n");
return -1;
}
memcpy(tmpbuf, textbuf, length);
tmpbuf[length] = '\0';
start = tmpbuf;
end = (start + length);
while (start < end) {
char *key, *value;
struct iscsi_param *param;
if (iscsi_extract_key_value(start, &key, &value) < 0) {
kfree(tmpbuf);
return -1;
}
pr_debug("Got key: %s=%s\n", key, value);
if (phase & PHASE_SECURITY) {
if (iscsi_check_for_auth_key(key) > 0) {
char *tmpptr = key + strlen(key);
*tmpptr = '=';
kfree(tmpbuf);
return 1;
}
}
param = iscsi_check_key(key, phase, sender, param_list);
if (!param) {
if (iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(key,
value, param_list) < 0) {
kfree(tmpbuf);
return -1;
}
start += strlen(key) + strlen(value) + 2;
continue;
}
if (iscsi_check_value(param, value) < 0) {
kfree(tmpbuf);
return -1;
}
start += strlen(key) + strlen(value) + 2;
if (IS_PSTATE_PROPOSER(param)) {
if (iscsi_check_proposer_state(param, value) < 0) {
kfree(tmpbuf);
return -1;
}
SET_PSTATE_RESPONSE_GOT(param);
} else {
if (iscsi_check_acceptor_state(param, value, conn) < 0) {
kfree(tmpbuf);
return -1;
}
SET_PSTATE_ACCEPTOR(param);
}
}
kfree(tmpbuf);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication kernel memory corruption was possible if a
target was configured and listening on the network.
CVE-2013-2850
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 22,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void rxrpc_remove_user_ID(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct rxrpc_call *call)
{
_debug("RELEASE CALL %d", call->debug_id);
if (test_bit(RXRPC_CALL_HAS_USERID, &call->flags)) {
write_lock_bh(&rx->call_lock);
rb_erase(&call->sock_node, &call->socket->calls);
clear_bit(RXRPC_CALL_HAS_USERID, &call->flags);
write_unlock_bh(&rx->call_lock);
}
read_lock_bh(&call->state_lock);
if (!test_bit(RXRPC_CALL_RELEASED, &call->flags) &&
!test_and_set_bit(RXRPC_CALL_RELEASE, &call->events))
rxrpc_queue_call(call);
read_unlock_bh(&call->state_lock);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *stripoff_last_component(char *path)
{
char *p = path ? strrchr(path, '/') : NULL;
if (!p)
return NULL;
*p = '\0';
return p + 1;
}
Commit Message: chsh, chfn, vipw: fix filenames collision
The utils when compiled WITHOUT libuser then mkostemp()ing
"/etc/%s.XXXXXX" where the filename prefix is argv[0] basename.
An attacker could repeatedly execute the util with modified argv[0]
and after many many attempts mkostemp() may generate suffix which
makes sense. The result maybe temporary file with name like rc.status
ld.so.preload or krb5.keytab, etc.
Note that distros usually use libuser based ch{sh,fn} or stuff from
shadow-utils.
It's probably very minor security bug.
Addresses: CVE-2015-5224
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PacketUpdateEngineEventCounters(ThreadVars *tv,
DecodeThreadVars *dtv, Packet *p)
{
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < p->events.cnt; i++) {
const uint8_t e = p->events.events[i];
if (e <= DECODE_EVENT_PACKET_MAX && !stats_decoder_events)
continue;
if (e > DECODE_EVENT_PACKET_MAX && !stats_stream_events)
continue;
StatsIncr(tv, dtv->counter_engine_events[e]);
}
}
Commit Message: teredo: be stricter on what to consider valid teredo
Invalid Teredo can lead to valid DNS traffic (or other UDP traffic)
being misdetected as Teredo. This leads to false negatives in the
UDP payload inspection.
Make the teredo code only consider a packet teredo if the encapsulated
data was decoded without any 'invalid' events being set.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,903 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SniffMPEG4(
const sp<DataSource> &source, String8 *mimeType, float *confidence,
sp<AMessage> *meta) {
if (BetterSniffMPEG4(source, mimeType, confidence, meta)) {
return true;
}
if (LegacySniffMPEG4(source, mimeType, confidence)) {
ALOGW("Identified supported mpeg4 through LegacySniffMPEG4.");
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor.cpp: handle chunk_size > SIZE_MAX
chunk_size is a uint64_t, so it can legitimately be bigger
than SIZE_MAX, which would cause the subtraction to underflow.
https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=182251
Bug: 23034759
Change-Id: Ic1637fb26bf6edb0feb1bcf2876fd370db1ed547
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 22,132 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> FrameLoader::ToTracedValue() const {
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> traced_value = TracedValue::Create();
traced_value->BeginDictionary("frame");
traced_value->SetString("id_ref", IdentifiersFactory::FrameId(frame_.Get()));
traced_value->EndDictionary();
traced_value->SetBoolean("isLoadingMainFrame", IsLoadingMainFrame());
traced_value->SetString("stateMachine", state_machine_.ToString());
traced_value->SetString("provisionalDocumentLoaderURL",
provisional_document_loader_
? provisional_document_loader_->Url().GetString()
: String());
traced_value->SetString(
"documentLoaderURL",
document_loader_ ? document_loader_->Url().GetString() : String());
return traced_value;
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ProcRenderCreateRadialGradient (ClientPtr client)
{
PicturePtr pPicture;
int len;
int error = 0;
xFixed *stops;
xRenderColor *colors;
REQUEST(xRenderCreateRadialGradientReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderCreateRadialGradientReq);
LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(stuff->pid, client);
len = (client->req_len << 2) - sizeof(xRenderCreateRadialGradientReq);
if (len != stuff->nStops*(sizeof(xFixed) + sizeof(xRenderColor)))
return BadLength;
stops = (xFixed *)(stuff + 1);
colors = (xRenderColor *)(stops + stuff->nStops);
pPicture = CreateRadialGradientPicture (stuff->pid, &stuff->inner, &stuff->outer,
stuff->inner_radius, stuff->outer_radius,
stuff->nStops, stops, colors, &error);
if (!pPicture)
return error;
/* security creation/labeling check */
error = XaceHook(XACE_RESOURCE_ACCESS, client, stuff->pid, PictureType,
pPicture, RT_NONE, NULL, DixCreateAccess);
if (error != Success)
return error;
if (!AddResource (stuff->pid, PictureType, (pointer)pPicture))
return BadAlloc;
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionInstallPrompt::ConfirmStandaloneInstall(
Delegate* delegate,
const Extension* extension,
SkBitmap* icon,
scoped_refptr<Prompt> prompt) {
DCHECK(ui_loop_ == base::MessageLoop::current());
extension_ = extension;
delegate_ = delegate;
prompt_ = prompt;
SetIcon(icon);
ShowConfirmation();
}
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 22,153 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AXObject::setSequentialFocusNavigationStartingPoint() {
if (parentObject())
parentObject()->setSequentialFocusNavigationStartingPoint();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 2,078 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PS_SERIALIZER_ENCODE_FUNC(wddx)
{
wddx_packet *packet;
PS_ENCODE_VARS;
packet = php_wddx_constructor();
php_wddx_packet_start(packet, NULL, 0);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_S);
PS_ENCODE_LOOP(
php_wddx_serialize_var(packet, *struc, key, key_length TSRMLS_CC);
);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_E);
php_wddx_packet_end(packet);
*newstr = php_wddx_gather(packet);
php_wddx_destructor(packet);
if (newlen) {
*newlen = strlen(*newstr);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-502 | 0 | 10,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WT_Interpolate (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 phaseFrac;
EAS_I32 acc0;
const EAS_SAMPLE *pSamples;
const EAS_SAMPLE *loopEnd;
EAS_I32 samp1;
EAS_I32 samp2;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
loopEnd = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopEnd + 1;
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->phaseAccum;
/*lint -e{713} truncation is OK */
phaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
/* fetch adjacent samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
while (numSamples--) {
/* linear interpolation */
acc0 = samp2 - samp1;
acc0 = acc0 * phaseFrac;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = samp1 + (acc0 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
/* save new output sample in buffer */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_I16)(acc0 >> 2);
/* increment phase */
phaseFrac += phaseInc;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = phaseFrac >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS;
/* next sample */
if (acc0 > 0) {
/* advance sample pointer */
pSamples += acc0;
phaseFrac = (EAS_I32)((EAS_U32)phaseFrac & PHASE_FRAC_MASK);
/* check for loop end */
acc0 = (EAS_I32) (pSamples - loopEnd);
if (acc0 >= 0)
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopStart + acc0;
/* fetch new samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
}
}
/* save pointer and phase */
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = (EAS_U32) pSamples;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = (EAS_U32) phaseFrac;
}
Commit Message: Sonivox: add SafetyNet log.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: Ief72e01b7cc6d87a015105af847a99d3d9b03cb0
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 16,536 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: compression_name(const int compression)
{
static const int num_compression_methods =
sizeof(compression_methods)/sizeof(compression_methods[0]);
int i=0;
while(compression >= 0 && i < num_compression_methods) {
if (compression_methods[i].id == compression)
return compression_methods[i].name;
i++;
}
return "??";
}
Commit Message: Issue #656: Fix CVE-2016-1541, VU#862384
When reading OS X metadata entries in Zip archives that were stored
without compression, libarchive would use the uncompressed entry size
to allocate a buffer but would use the compressed entry size to limit
the amount of data copied into that buffer. Since the compressed
and uncompressed sizes are provided by data in the archive itself,
an attacker could manipulate these values to write data beyond
the end of the allocated buffer.
This fix provides three new checks to guard against such
manipulation and to make libarchive generally more robust when
handling this type of entry:
1. If an OS X metadata entry is stored without compression,
abort the entire archive if the compressed and uncompressed
data sizes do not match.
2. When sanity-checking the size of an OS X metadata entry,
abort this entry if either the compressed or uncompressed
size is larger than 4MB.
3. When copying data into the allocated buffer, check the copy
size against both the compressed entry size and uncompressed
entry size.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,229 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert)
{
STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
int i, r, ri_type;
int debug = 0;
ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
if (ris)
debug = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug;
ri_type = cms_pkey_get_ri_type(pk);
if (ri_type == CMS_RECIPINFO_NONE)
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY,
CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++)
{
ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) != ri_type)
continue;
if (ri_type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
{
r = cms_kari_set1_pkey(cms, ri, pk, cert);
if (r > 0)
return 1;
if (r < 0)
return 0;
}
/* If we have a cert try matching RecipientInfo
* otherwise try them all.
*/
else if (!cert || !CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp(ri, cert))
{
CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, pk);
r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, NULL);
if (cert)
{
/* If not debugging clear any error and
* return success to avoid leaking of
* information useful to MMA
*/
if (!debug)
{
ERR_clear_error();
return 1;
}
if (r > 0)
return 1;
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY,
CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* If no cert and not debugging don't leave loop
* after first successful decrypt. Always attempt
* to decrypt all recipients to avoid leaking timing
* of a successful decrypt.
*/
else if (r > 0 && debug)
return 1;
}
}
/* If no cert and not debugging always return success */
if (!cert && !debug)
{
ERR_clear_error();
return 1;
}
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Canonicalise input in CMS_verify.
If content is detached and not binary mode translate the input to
CRLF format. Before this change the input was verified verbatim
which lead to a discrepancy between sign and verify.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::readMetaData() {
if (mInitCheck != NO_INIT) {
return mInitCheck;
}
off64_t offset = 0;
status_t err;
bool sawMoovOrSidx = false;
while (!(sawMoovOrSidx && (mMdatFound || mMoofFound))) {
off64_t orig_offset = offset;
err = parseChunk(&offset, 0);
if (err != OK && err != UNKNOWN_ERROR) {
break;
} else if (offset <= orig_offset) {
ALOGE("did not advance: %lld->%lld", (long long)orig_offset, (long long)offset);
err = ERROR_MALFORMED;
break;
} else if (err == UNKNOWN_ERROR) {
sawMoovOrSidx = true;
}
}
if (mInitCheck == OK) {
if (mHasVideo) {
mFileMetaData->setCString(
kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_CONTAINER_MPEG4);
} else {
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "audio/mp4");
}
} else {
mInitCheck = err;
}
CHECK_NE(err, (status_t)NO_INIT);
uint64_t psshsize = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mPssh.size(); i++) {
psshsize += 20 + mPssh[i].datalen;
}
if (psshsize > 0 && psshsize <= UINT32_MAX) {
char *buf = (char*)malloc(psshsize);
if (!buf) {
ALOGE("b/28471206");
return NO_MEMORY;
}
char *ptr = buf;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mPssh.size(); i++) {
memcpy(ptr, mPssh[i].uuid, 20); // uuid + length
memcpy(ptr + 20, mPssh[i].data, mPssh[i].datalen);
ptr += (20 + mPssh[i].datalen);
}
mFileMetaData->setData(kKeyPssh, 'pssh', buf, psshsize);
free(buf);
}
return mInitCheck;
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FrameSelection::IsCaretBlinkingSuspended() const {
return frame_caret_->IsCaretBlinkingSuspended();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,684 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _asn1_cpy_name (asn1_node dst, asn1_node src)
{
if (dst == NULL)
return dst;
if (src == NULL)
{
dst->name[0] = 0;
dst->name_hash = hash_pjw_bare (dst->name, 0);
return dst;
}
_asn1_str_cpy (dst->name, sizeof (dst->name), src->name);
dst->name_hash = src->name_hash;
return dst;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,541 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssize_t pcnet_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_)
{
PCNetState *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
int is_padr = 0, is_bcast = 0, is_ladr = 0;
uint8_t buf1[60];
int remaining;
int crc_err = 0;
int size = size_;
if (CSR_DRX(s) || CSR_STOP(s) || CSR_SPND(s) || !size ||
(CSR_LOOP(s) && !s->looptest)) {
return -1;
}
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG
printf("pcnet_receive size=%d\n", size);
#endif
/* if too small buffer, then expand it */
if (size < MIN_BUF_SIZE) {
memcpy(buf1, buf, size);
memset(buf1 + size, 0, MIN_BUF_SIZE - size);
buf = buf1;
size = MIN_BUF_SIZE;
}
if (CSR_PROM(s)
|| (is_padr=padr_match(s, buf, size))
|| (is_bcast=padr_bcast(s, buf, size))
|| (is_ladr=ladr_match(s, buf, size))) {
pcnet_rdte_poll(s);
if (!(CSR_CRST(s) & 0x8000) && s->rdra) {
struct pcnet_RMD rmd;
int rcvrc = CSR_RCVRC(s)-1,i;
hwaddr nrda;
for (i = CSR_RCVRL(s)-1; i > 0; i--, rcvrc--) {
if (rcvrc <= 1)
rcvrc = CSR_RCVRL(s);
nrda = s->rdra +
(CSR_RCVRL(s) - rcvrc) *
(BCR_SWSTYLE(s) ? 16 : 8 );
RMDLOAD(&rmd, nrda);
if (GET_FIELD(rmd.status, RMDS, OWN)) {
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_RMD
printf("pcnet - scan buffer: RCVRC=%d PREV_RCVRC=%d\n",
rcvrc, CSR_RCVRC(s));
#endif
CSR_RCVRC(s) = rcvrc;
pcnet_rdte_poll(s);
break;
}
}
}
if (!(CSR_CRST(s) & 0x8000)) {
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_RMD
printf("pcnet - no buffer: RCVRC=%d\n", CSR_RCVRC(s));
#endif
s->csr[0] |= 0x1000; /* Set MISS flag */
CSR_MISSC(s)++;
} else {
uint8_t *src = s->buffer;
hwaddr crda = CSR_CRDA(s);
struct pcnet_RMD rmd;
int pktcount = 0;
if (!s->looptest) {
memcpy(src, buf, size);
/* no need to compute the CRC */
src[size] = 0;
uint32_t fcs = ~0;
uint8_t *p = src;
while (p != &src[size])
CRC(fcs, *p++);
*(uint32_t *)p = htonl(fcs);
size += 4;
} else {
uint32_t fcs = ~0;
uint8_t *p = src;
while (p != &src[size])
CRC(fcs, *p++);
crc_err = (*(uint32_t *)p != htonl(fcs));
}
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_MATCH
PRINT_PKTHDR(buf);
#endif
RMDLOAD(&rmd, PHYSADDR(s,crda));
/*if (!CSR_LAPPEN(s))*/
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, STP, 1);
#define PCNET_RECV_STORE() do { \
int count = MIN(4096 - GET_FIELD(rmd.buf_length, RMDL, BCNT),remaining); \
hwaddr rbadr = PHYSADDR(s, rmd.rbadr); \
s->phys_mem_write(s->dma_opaque, rbadr, src, count, CSR_BSWP(s)); \
src += count; remaining -= count; \
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, OWN, 0); \
RMDSTORE(&rmd, PHYSADDR(s,crda)); \
pktcount++; \
} while (0)
remaining = size;
PCNET_RECV_STORE();
if ((remaining > 0) && CSR_NRDA(s)) {
hwaddr nrda = CSR_NRDA(s);
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_RMD
PRINT_RMD(&rmd);
#endif
RMDLOAD(&rmd, PHYSADDR(s,nrda));
if (GET_FIELD(rmd.status, RMDS, OWN)) {
crda = nrda;
PCNET_RECV_STORE();
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_RMD
PRINT_RMD(&rmd);
#endif
if ((remaining > 0) && (nrda=CSR_NNRD(s))) {
RMDLOAD(&rmd, PHYSADDR(s,nrda));
if (GET_FIELD(rmd.status, RMDS, OWN)) {
crda = nrda;
PCNET_RECV_STORE();
}
}
}
}
#undef PCNET_RECV_STORE
RMDLOAD(&rmd, PHYSADDR(s,crda));
if (remaining == 0) {
SET_FIELD(&rmd.msg_length, RMDM, MCNT, size);
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, ENP, 1);
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, PAM, !CSR_PROM(s) && is_padr);
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, LFAM, !CSR_PROM(s) && is_ladr);
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, BAM, !CSR_PROM(s) && is_bcast);
if (crc_err) {
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, CRC, 1);
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, ERR, 1);
}
} else {
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, OFLO, 1);
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, BUFF, 1);
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, ERR, 1);
}
RMDSTORE(&rmd, PHYSADDR(s,crda));
s->csr[0] |= 0x0400;
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG
printf("RCVRC=%d CRDA=0x%08x BLKS=%d\n",
CSR_RCVRC(s), PHYSADDR(s,CSR_CRDA(s)), pktcount);
#endif
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_RMD
PRINT_RMD(&rmd);
#endif
while (pktcount--) {
if (CSR_RCVRC(s) <= 1)
CSR_RCVRC(s) = CSR_RCVRL(s);
else
CSR_RCVRC(s)--;
}
pcnet_rdte_poll(s);
}
}
pcnet_poll(s);
pcnet_update_irq(s);
return size_;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 26,426 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SVGDocumentExtensions::serviceAnimations(double monotonicAnimationStartTime)
{
WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> > timeContainers;
timeContainers.appendRange(m_timeContainers.begin(), m_timeContainers.end());
WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> >::iterator end = timeContainers.end();
for (WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> >::iterator itr = timeContainers.begin(); itr != end; ++itr)
(*itr)->timeContainer()->serviceAnimations(monotonicAnimationStartTime);
}
Commit Message: SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int btrfs_subio_endio_read(struct inode *inode,
struct btrfs_io_bio *io_bio, int err)
{
bool skip_csum = BTRFS_I(inode)->flags & BTRFS_INODE_NODATASUM;
if (skip_csum) {
if (unlikely(err))
return __btrfs_correct_data_nocsum(inode, io_bio);
else
return 0;
} else {
return __btrfs_subio_endio_read(inode, io_bio, err);
}
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 2,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sctp_for_each_transport(int (*cb)(struct sctp_transport *, void *),
struct net *net, int pos, void *p) {
struct rhashtable_iter hti;
void *obj;
int err;
err = sctp_transport_walk_start(&hti);
if (err)
return err;
sctp_transport_get_idx(net, &hti, pos);
obj = sctp_transport_get_next(net, &hti);
for (; obj && !IS_ERR(obj); obj = sctp_transport_get_next(net, &hti)) {
struct sctp_transport *transport = obj;
if (!sctp_transport_hold(transport))
continue;
err = cb(transport, p);
sctp_transport_put(transport);
if (err)
break;
}
sctp_transport_walk_stop(&hti);
return err;
}
Commit Message: sctp: deny peeloff operation on asocs with threads sleeping on it
commit 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
attempted to avoid a BUG_ON call when the association being used for a
sendmsg() is blocked waiting for more sndbuf and another thread did a
peeloff operation on such asoc, moving it to another socket.
As Ben Hutchings noticed, then in such case it would return without
locking back the socket and would cause two unlocks in a row.
Further analysis also revealed that it could allow a double free if the
application managed to peeloff the asoc that is created during the
sendmsg call, because then sctp_sendmsg() would try to free the asoc
that was created only for that call.
This patch takes another approach. It will deny the peeloff operation
if there is a thread sleeping on the asoc, so this situation doesn't
exist anymore. This avoids the issues described above and also honors
the syscalls that are already being handled (it can be multiple sendmsg
calls).
Joint work with Xin Long.
Fixes: 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void tcp_v4_err(struct sk_buff *icmp_skb, u32 info)
{
const struct iphdr *iph = (const struct iphdr *)icmp_skb->data;
struct tcphdr *th = (struct tcphdr *)(icmp_skb->data + (iph->ihl << 2));
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk;
struct tcp_sock *tp;
struct inet_sock *inet;
const int type = icmp_hdr(icmp_skb)->type;
const int code = icmp_hdr(icmp_skb)->code;
struct sock *sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct request_sock *fastopen;
__u32 seq, snd_una;
__u32 remaining;
int err;
struct net *net = dev_net(icmp_skb->dev);
sk = __inet_lookup_established(net, &tcp_hashinfo, iph->daddr,
th->dest, iph->saddr, ntohs(th->source),
inet_iif(icmp_skb));
if (!sk) {
__ICMP_INC_STATS(net, ICMP_MIB_INERRORS);
return;
}
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) {
inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk));
return;
}
seq = ntohl(th->seq);
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV)
return tcp_req_err(sk, seq,
type == ICMP_PARAMETERPROB ||
type == ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED ||
(type == ICMP_DEST_UNREACH &&
(code == ICMP_NET_UNREACH ||
code == ICMP_HOST_UNREACH)));
bh_lock_sock(sk);
/* If too many ICMPs get dropped on busy
* servers this needs to be solved differently.
* We do take care of PMTU discovery (RFC1191) special case :
* we can receive locally generated ICMP messages while socket is held.
*/
if (sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
if (!(type == ICMP_DEST_UNREACH && code == ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED))
__NET_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_LOCKDROPPEDICMPS);
}
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE)
goto out;
if (unlikely(iph->ttl < inet_sk(sk)->min_ttl)) {
__NET_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_TCPMINTTLDROP);
goto out;
}
icsk = inet_csk(sk);
tp = tcp_sk(sk);
/* XXX (TFO) - tp->snd_una should be ISN (tcp_create_openreq_child() */
fastopen = tp->fastopen_rsk;
snd_una = fastopen ? tcp_rsk(fastopen)->snt_isn : tp->snd_una;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN &&
!between(seq, snd_una, tp->snd_nxt)) {
__NET_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_OUTOFWINDOWICMPS);
goto out;
}
switch (type) {
case ICMP_REDIRECT:
do_redirect(icmp_skb, sk);
goto out;
case ICMP_SOURCE_QUENCH:
/* Just silently ignore these. */
goto out;
case ICMP_PARAMETERPROB:
err = EPROTO;
break;
case ICMP_DEST_UNREACH:
if (code > NR_ICMP_UNREACH)
goto out;
if (code == ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED) { /* PMTU discovery (RFC1191) */
/* We are not interested in TCP_LISTEN and open_requests
* (SYN-ACKs send out by Linux are always <576bytes so
* they should go through unfragmented).
*/
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
goto out;
tp->mtu_info = info;
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
tcp_v4_mtu_reduced(sk);
} else {
if (!test_and_set_bit(TCP_MTU_REDUCED_DEFERRED, &tp->tsq_flags))
sock_hold(sk);
}
goto out;
}
err = icmp_err_convert[code].errno;
/* check if icmp_skb allows revert of backoff
* (see draft-zimmermann-tcp-lcd) */
if (code != ICMP_NET_UNREACH && code != ICMP_HOST_UNREACH)
break;
if (seq != tp->snd_una || !icsk->icsk_retransmits ||
!icsk->icsk_backoff || fastopen)
break;
if (sock_owned_by_user(sk))
break;
icsk->icsk_backoff--;
icsk->icsk_rto = tp->srtt_us ? __tcp_set_rto(tp) :
TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT;
icsk->icsk_rto = inet_csk_rto_backoff(icsk, TCP_RTO_MAX);
skb = tcp_write_queue_head(sk);
BUG_ON(!skb);
remaining = icsk->icsk_rto -
min(icsk->icsk_rto,
tcp_time_stamp - tcp_skb_timestamp(skb));
if (remaining) {
inet_csk_reset_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_RETRANS,
remaining, TCP_RTO_MAX);
} else {
/* RTO revert clocked out retransmission.
* Will retransmit now */
tcp_retransmit_timer(sk);
}
break;
case ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED:
err = EHOSTUNREACH;
break;
default:
goto out;
}
switch (sk->sk_state) {
case TCP_SYN_SENT:
case TCP_SYN_RECV:
/* Only in fast or simultaneous open. If a fast open socket is
* is already accepted it is treated as a connected one below.
*/
if (fastopen && !fastopen->sk)
break;
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
sk->sk_err = err;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
tcp_done(sk);
} else {
sk->sk_err_soft = err;
}
goto out;
}
/* If we've already connected we will keep trying
* until we time out, or the user gives up.
*
* rfc1122 4.2.3.9 allows to consider as hard errors
* only PROTO_UNREACH and PORT_UNREACH (well, FRAG_FAILED too,
* but it is obsoleted by pmtu discovery).
*
* Note, that in modern internet, where routing is unreliable
* and in each dark corner broken firewalls sit, sending random
* errors ordered by their masters even this two messages finally lose
* their original sense (even Linux sends invalid PORT_UNREACHs)
*
* Now we are in compliance with RFCs.
* --ANK (980905)
*/
inet = inet_sk(sk);
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk) && inet->recverr) {
sk->sk_err = err;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
} else { /* Only an error on timeout */
sk->sk_err_soft = err;
}
out:
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
sock_put(sk);
}
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 18,125 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sco_sock_cleanup_listen(struct sock *parent)
{
struct sock *sk;
BT_DBG("parent %p", parent);
/* Close not yet accepted channels */
while ((sk = bt_accept_dequeue(parent, NULL))) {
sco_sock_close(sk);
sco_sock_kill(sk);
}
parent->sk_state = BT_CLOSED;
sock_set_flag(parent, SOCK_ZAPPED);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: sco: fix information leak to userspace
struct sco_conninfo has one padding byte in the end. Local variable
cinfo of type sco_conninfo is copied to userspace with this uninizialized
one byte, leading to old stack contents leak.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 21,457 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int debugMutexTry(sqlite3_mutex *pX){
sqlite3_debug_mutex *p = (sqlite3_debug_mutex*)pX;
assert( p->id==SQLITE_MUTEX_RECURSIVE || debugMutexNotheld(pX) );
p->cnt++;
return SQLITE_OK;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RendererSchedulerImpl::DidAnimateForInputOnCompositorThread() {
TRACE_EVENT0(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("renderer.scheduler"),
"RendererSchedulerImpl::DidAnimateForInputOnCompositorThread");
base::AutoLock lock(any_thread_lock_);
any_thread().fling_compositor_escalation_deadline =
helper_.NowTicks() +
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kFlingEscalationLimitMillis);
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,915 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API void r_bin_info_free(RBinInfo *rb) {
if (!rb) {
return;
}
free (rb->intrp);
free (rb->file);
free (rb->type);
free (rb->bclass);
free (rb->rclass);
free (rb->arch);
free (rb->cpu);
free (rb->machine);
free (rb->os);
free (rb->subsystem);
free (rb->rpath);
free (rb->guid);
free (rb->debug_file_name);
free (rb);
}
Commit Message: Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 12,716 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string WebUILoginView::GetClassName() const {
return kViewClassName;
}
Commit Message: [cros] Allow media streaming for OOBE WebUI.
BUG=122764
TEST=Manual with --enable-html5-camera
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144899 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vrend_destroy_so_target_object(void *obj_ptr)
{
struct vrend_so_target *target = obj_ptr;
struct vrend_sub_context *sub_ctx = target->sub_ctx;
struct vrend_streamout_object *obj, *tmp;
bool found;
int i;
LIST_FOR_EACH_ENTRY_SAFE(obj, tmp, &sub_ctx->streamout_list, head) {
found = false;
for (i = 0; i < obj->num_targets; i++) {
if (obj->so_targets[i] == target) {
found = true;
break;
}
}
if (found) {
if (obj == sub_ctx->current_so)
sub_ctx->current_so = NULL;
if (obj->xfb_state == XFB_STATE_PAUSED) {
if (vrend_state.have_tf2)
glBindTransformFeedback(GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK, obj->id);
glEndTransformFeedback();
if (sub_ctx->current_so && vrend_state.have_tf2)
glBindTransformFeedback(GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK, sub_ctx->current_so->id);
}
vrend_destroy_streamout_object(obj);
}
}
vrend_so_target_reference(&target, NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 3,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string16 ExtensionGlobalError::GenerateMessage() {
if (extension_service_.get()) {
return
GenerateMessageSection(external_extension_ids_.get(),
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL) +
GenerateMessageSection(blacklisted_extension_ids_.get(),
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL) +
GenerateMessageSection(orphaned_extension_ids_.get(),
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL);
} else {
return string16();
}
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,412 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline unsigned int shash_align_buffer_size(unsigned len,
unsigned long mask)
{
typedef u8 __aligned_largest u8_aligned;
return len + (mask & ~(__alignof__(u8_aligned) - 1));
}
Commit Message: crypto: hmac - require that the underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed
Because the HMAC template didn't check that its underlying hash
algorithm is unkeyed, trying to use "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))"
through AF_ALG or through KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE resulted in the inner HMAC
being used without having been keyed, resulting in sha3_update() being
called without sha3_init(), causing a stack buffer overflow.
This is a very old bug, but it seems to have only started causing real
problems when SHA-3 support was added (requires CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3)
because the innermost hash's state is ->import()ed from a zeroed buffer,
and it just so happens that other hash algorithms are fine with that,
but SHA-3 is not. However, there could be arch or hardware-dependent
hash algorithms also affected; I couldn't test everything.
Fix the bug by introducing a function crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey()
which tests whether a shash algorithm is keyed. Then update the HMAC
template to require that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed.
Here is a reproducer:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int main()
{
int algfd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "hash",
.salg_name = "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))",
};
char key[4096] = { 0 };
algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(algfd, (const struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key));
}
Here was the KASAN report from syzbot:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8801cca07c40 by task syzkaller076574/3044
CPU: 1 PID: 3044 Comm: syzkaller076574 Not tainted 4.14.0-mm1+ #25
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303
memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
crypto_shash_update+0xcb/0x220 crypto/shash.c:109
shash_finup_unaligned+0x2a/0x60 crypto/shash.c:151
crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
hmac_finup+0x182/0x330 crypto/hmac.c:152
crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
shash_digest_unaligned+0x9e/0xd0 crypto/shash.c:172
crypto_shash_digest+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:186
hmac_setkey+0x36a/0x690 crypto/hmac.c:66
crypto_shash_setkey+0xad/0x190 crypto/shash.c:64
shash_async_setkey+0x47/0x60 crypto/shash.c:207
crypto_ahash_setkey+0xaf/0x180 crypto/ahash.c:200
hash_setkey+0x40/0x90 crypto/algif_hash.c:446
alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:221 [inline]
alg_setsockopt+0x2a1/0x350 crypto/af_alg.c:254
SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1851 [inline]
SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1830
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 14,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuProcessHost::ConnectFrameSinkManager(
viz::mojom::FrameSinkManagerRequest request,
viz::mojom::FrameSinkManagerClientPtrInfo client) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuProcessHost::ConnectFrameSinkManager");
viz::mojom::FrameSinkManagerParamsPtr params =
viz::mojom::FrameSinkManagerParams::New();
params->restart_id = host_id_;
base::Optional<uint32_t> activation_deadline_in_frames =
switches::GetDeadlineToSynchronizeSurfaces();
params->use_activation_deadline = activation_deadline_in_frames.has_value();
params->activation_deadline_in_frames =
activation_deadline_in_frames.value_or(0u);
params->frame_sink_manager = std::move(request);
params->frame_sink_manager_client = std::move(client);
gpu_main_ptr_->CreateFrameSinkManager(std::move(params));
}
Commit Message: Fix GPU process fallback logic.
1. In GpuProcessHost::OnProcessCrashed() record the process crash first.
This means the GPU mode fallback will happen before a new GPU process
is started.
2. Don't call FallBackToNextGpuMode() if GPU process initialization
fails for an unsandboxed GPU process. The unsandboxed GPU is only
used for collect information and it's failure doesn't indicate a need
to change GPU modes.
Bug: 869419
Change-Id: I8bd0a03268f0ea8809f3df8458d4e6a92db9391f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1157164
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#579625}
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void set_needs_configure() { needs_configure_ = true; }
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 11,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PredictorDecodeRow(TIFF* tif, uint8* op0, tmsize_t occ0, uint16 s)
{
TIFFPredictorState *sp = PredictorState(tif);
assert(sp != NULL);
assert(sp->decoderow != NULL);
assert(sp->decodepfunc != NULL);
if ((*sp->decoderow)(tif, op0, occ0, s)) {
return (*sp->decodepfunc)(tif, op0, occ0);
} else
return 0;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predic.c: fix memory leaks in error code paths added in
previous commit (fix for MSVR 35105)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PermissionMessages PermissionsData::GetNewPermissionMessages(
const PermissionSet& granted_permissions) const {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_lock_);
std::unique_ptr<const PermissionSet> new_permissions =
PermissionSet::CreateDifference(*active_permissions_unsafe_,
granted_permissions);
return PermissionMessageProvider::Get()->GetPermissionMessages(
PermissionMessageProvider::Get()->GetAllPermissionIDs(*new_permissions,
manifest_type_));
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 26,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int smacker_decode_header_tree(SmackVContext *smk, BitstreamContext *bc,
int **recodes, int *last, int size)
{
int res;
HuffContext huff;
HuffContext tmp1, tmp2;
VLC vlc[2] = { { 0 } };
int escapes[3];
DBCtx ctx;
int err = 0;
if(size >= UINT_MAX>>4){ // (((size + 3) >> 2) + 3) << 2 must not overflow
av_log(smk->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "size too large\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
tmp1.length = 256;
tmp1.maxlength = 0;
tmp1.current = 0;
tmp1.bits = av_mallocz(256 * 4);
tmp1.lengths = av_mallocz(256 * sizeof(int));
tmp1.values = av_mallocz(256 * sizeof(int));
tmp2.length = 256;
tmp2.maxlength = 0;
tmp2.current = 0;
tmp2.bits = av_mallocz(256 * 4);
tmp2.lengths = av_mallocz(256 * sizeof(int));
tmp2.values = av_mallocz(256 * sizeof(int));
if (!tmp1.bits || !tmp1.lengths || !tmp1.values ||
!tmp2.bits || !tmp2.lengths || !tmp2.values) {
err = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto error;
}
if (bitstream_read_bit(bc)) {
smacker_decode_tree(bc, &tmp1, 0, 0);
bitstream_skip(bc, 1);
res = init_vlc(&vlc[0], SMKTREE_BITS, tmp1.length,
tmp1.lengths, sizeof(int), sizeof(int),
tmp1.bits, sizeof(uint32_t), sizeof(uint32_t), INIT_VLC_LE);
if(res < 0) {
av_log(smk->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Cannot build VLC table\n");
err = res;
goto error;
}
} else {
av_log(smk->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Skipping low bytes tree\n");
}
if (bitstream_read_bit(bc)) {
smacker_decode_tree(bc, &tmp2, 0, 0);
bitstream_skip(bc, 1);
res = init_vlc(&vlc[1], SMKTREE_BITS, tmp2.length,
tmp2.lengths, sizeof(int), sizeof(int),
tmp2.bits, sizeof(uint32_t), sizeof(uint32_t), INIT_VLC_LE);
if(res < 0) {
av_log(smk->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Cannot build VLC table\n");
err = res;
goto error;
}
} else {
av_log(smk->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Skipping high bytes tree\n");
}
escapes[0] = bitstream_read(bc, 8);
escapes[0] |= bitstream_read(bc, 8) << 8;
escapes[1] = bitstream_read(bc, 8);
escapes[1] |= bitstream_read(bc, 8) << 8;
escapes[2] = bitstream_read(bc, 8);
escapes[2] |= bitstream_read(bc, 8) << 8;
last[0] = last[1] = last[2] = -1;
ctx.escapes[0] = escapes[0];
ctx.escapes[1] = escapes[1];
ctx.escapes[2] = escapes[2];
ctx.v1 = &vlc[0];
ctx.v2 = &vlc[1];
ctx.recode1 = tmp1.values;
ctx.recode2 = tmp2.values;
ctx.last = last;
huff.length = ((size + 3) >> 2) + 4;
huff.maxlength = 0;
huff.current = 0;
huff.values = av_mallocz(huff.length * sizeof(int));
if (!huff.values) {
err = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto error;
}
if ((res = smacker_decode_bigtree(bc, &huff, &ctx)) < 0)
err = res;
bitstream_skip(bc, 1);
if(ctx.last[0] == -1) ctx.last[0] = huff.current++;
if(ctx.last[1] == -1) ctx.last[1] = huff.current++;
if(ctx.last[2] == -1) ctx.last[2] = huff.current++;
if (ctx.last[0] >= huff.length ||
ctx.last[1] >= huff.length ||
ctx.last[2] >= huff.length) {
av_log(smk->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Huffman codes out of range\n");
err = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
*recodes = huff.values;
error:
if(vlc[0].table)
ff_free_vlc(&vlc[0]);
if(vlc[1].table)
ff_free_vlc(&vlc[1]);
av_free(tmp1.bits);
av_free(tmp1.lengths);
av_free(tmp1.values);
av_free(tmp2.bits);
av_free(tmp2.lengths);
av_free(tmp2.values);
return err;
}
Commit Message: smacker: add sanity check for length in smacker_decode_tree()
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
Bug-Id: 1098
Cc: libav-stable@libav.org
Signed-off-by: Sean McGovern <gseanmcg@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void timerfd_remove_cancel(struct timerfd_ctx *ctx)
{
if (ctx->might_cancel) {
ctx->might_cancel = false;
spin_lock(&cancel_lock);
list_del_rcu(&ctx->clist);
spin_unlock(&cancel_lock);
}
}
Commit Message: timerfd: Protect the might cancel mechanism proper
The handling of the might_cancel queueing is not properly protected, so
parallel operations on the file descriptor can race with each other and
lead to list corruptions or use after free.
Protect the context for these operations with a seperate lock.
The wait queue lock cannot be reused for this because that would create a
lock inversion scenario vs. the cancel lock. Replacing might_cancel with an
atomic (atomic_t or atomic bit) does not help either because it still can
race vs. the actual list operation.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org"
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1701311521430.3457@nanos
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 5,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct gs_tx_context *gs_alloc_tx_context(struct gs_can *dev)
{
int i = 0;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->tx_ctx_lock, flags);
for (; i < GS_MAX_TX_URBS; i++) {
if (dev->tx_context[i].echo_id == GS_MAX_TX_URBS) {
dev->tx_context[i].echo_id = i;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->tx_ctx_lock, flags);
return &dev->tx_context[i];
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->tx_ctx_lock, flags);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: can: gs_usb: Don't use stack memory for USB transfers
Fixes: 05ca5270005c can: gs_usb: add ethtool set_phys_id callback to locate physical device
The gs_usb driver is performing USB transfers using buffers allocated on
the stack. This causes the driver to not function with vmapped stacks.
Instead, allocate memory for the transfer buffers.
Signed-off-by: Ethan Zonca <e@ethanzonca.com>
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # >= v4.8
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_set_ex_flags(struct nfs4_client *new, struct nfsd4_exchange_id *clid)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_PNFS
new->cl_exchange_flags |= EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_MDS;
#else
new->cl_exchange_flags |= EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_NON_PNFS;
#endif
/* Referrals are supported, Migration is not. */
new->cl_exchange_flags |= EXCHGID4_FLAG_SUPP_MOVED_REFER;
/* set the wire flags to return to client. */
clid->flags = new->cl_exchange_flags;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 6,538 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int accelerator_pressed_count() const {
return accelerator_pressed_count_;
}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,702 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_config)
{
int ret = openssl_config_int(conf_settings);
config_inited = 1;
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330 | 0 | 24,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::BoundFramebufferHasDepthAttachment() {
Framebuffer* framebuffer =
GetFramebufferInfoForTarget(GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT);
if (framebuffer) {
return framebuffer->HasDepthAttachment();
}
if (offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get()) {
return offscreen_target_depth_format_ != 0;
}
return back_buffer_has_depth_;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameLoader::detachDocumentLoader(Member<DocumentLoader>& loader)
{
if (!loader)
return;
loader->detachFromFrame();
loader = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Disable frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach in FrameLoader::startLoad
BUG=613266
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2006033002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#396241}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 29,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs_fixup_secinfo_attributes(struct nfs_fattr *fattr)
{
fattr->valid |= NFS_ATTR_FATTR_TYPE | NFS_ATTR_FATTR_MODE |
NFS_ATTR_FATTR_NLINK | NFS_ATTR_FATTR_MOUNTPOINT;
fattr->mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
fattr->nlink = 2;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: snd_pcm_sframes_t snd_pcm_lib_write(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, const void __user *buf, snd_pcm_uframes_t size)
{
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime;
int nonblock;
int err;
err = pcm_sanity_check(substream);
if (err < 0)
return err;
runtime = substream->runtime;
nonblock = !!(substream->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK);
if (runtime->access != SNDRV_PCM_ACCESS_RW_INTERLEAVED &&
runtime->channels > 1)
return -EINVAL;
return snd_pcm_lib_write1(substream, (unsigned long)buf, size, nonblock,
snd_pcm_lib_write_transfer);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 29,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int store_xauthority(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: invalid .Xauthority file\n");
return 0;
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 1 | 13,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool CanUpcastTo(const PropertyTreeState& guest,
const PropertyTreeState& home) {
DCHECK_EQ(home.Effect(), guest.Effect());
if (IsBackfaceHidden(home.Transform()) != IsBackfaceHidden(guest.Transform()))
return false;
for (const ClipPaintPropertyNode* current_clip = guest.Clip();
current_clip != home.Clip(); current_clip = current_clip->Parent()) {
if (!current_clip || current_clip->HasDirectCompositingReasons())
return false;
if (!IsNonCompositingAncestorOf(home.Transform(),
current_clip->LocalTransformSpace()))
return false;
}
return IsNonCompositingAncestorOf(home.Transform(), guest.Transform());
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mp_encode_double(lua_State *L, mp_buf *buf, double d) {
unsigned char b[9];
float f = d;
assert(sizeof(f) == 4 && sizeof(d) == 8);
if (d == (double)f) {
b[0] = 0xca; /* float IEEE 754 */
memcpy(b+1,&f,4);
memrevifle(b+1,4);
mp_buf_append(L,buf,b,5);
} else if (sizeof(d) == 8) {
b[0] = 0xcb; /* double IEEE 754 */
memcpy(b+1,&d,8);
memrevifle(b+1,8);
mp_buf_append(L,buf,b,9);
}
}
Commit Message: Security: more cmsgpack fixes by @soloestoy.
@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_libxml_node_free_list(xmlNodePtr node TSRMLS_DC)
{
xmlNodePtr curnode;
if (node != NULL) {
curnode = node;
while (curnode != NULL) {
node = curnode;
switch (node->type) {
/* Skip property freeing for the following types */
case XML_NOTATION_NODE:
case XML_ENTITY_DECL:
break;
case XML_ENTITY_REF_NODE:
php_libxml_node_free_list((xmlNodePtr) node->properties TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
if ((node->doc != NULL) && (((xmlAttrPtr) node)->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID)) {
xmlRemoveID(node->doc, (xmlAttrPtr) node);
}
case XML_ATTRIBUTE_DECL:
case XML_DTD_NODE:
case XML_DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE:
case XML_NAMESPACE_DECL:
case XML_TEXT_NODE:
php_libxml_node_free_list(node->children TSRMLS_CC);
break;
default:
php_libxml_node_free_list(node->children TSRMLS_CC);
php_libxml_node_free_list((xmlNodePtr) node->properties TSRMLS_CC);
}
curnode = node->next;
xmlUnlinkNode(node);
if (php_libxml_unregister_node(node TSRMLS_CC) == 0) {
node->doc = NULL;
}
php_libxml_node_free(node);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 26,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xhci_ep_nuke_one_xfer(XHCITransfer *t, TRBCCode report)
{
int killed = 0;
if (report && (t->running_async || t->running_retry)) {
t->status = report;
xhci_xfer_report(t);
}
if (t->running_async) {
usb_cancel_packet(&t->packet);
t->running_async = 0;
killed = 1;
}
if (t->running_retry) {
XHCIEPContext *epctx = t->xhci->slots[t->slotid-1].eps[t->epid-1];
if (epctx) {
epctx->retry = NULL;
timer_del(epctx->kick_timer);
}
t->running_retry = 0;
killed = 1;
}
g_free(t->trbs);
t->trbs = NULL;
t->trb_count = t->trb_alloced = 0;
return killed;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 13,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int iscsi_update_param_value(struct iscsi_param *param, char *value)
{
kfree(param->value);
param->value = kstrdup(value, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!param->value) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate memory for value.\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
pr_debug("iSCSI Parameter updated to %s=%s\n",
param->name, param->value);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication kernel memory corruption was possible if a
target was configured and listening on the network.
CVE-2013-2850
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,708 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_stream_idx(const unsigned *d)
{
if (d[0] >= '0' && d[0] <= '9' &&
d[1] >= '0' && d[1] <= '9') {
return (d[0] - '0') * 10 + (d[1] - '0');
} else {
return 100; // invalid stream ID
}
}
Commit Message: avformat/avidec: Limit formats in gab2 to srt and ass/ssa
This prevents part of one exploit leading to an information leak
Found-by: Emil Lerner and Pavel Cheremushkin
Reported-by: Thierry Foucu <tfoucu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 19,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxViewWin::OnWindowPosChanging(WINDOWPOS* window_pos) {
if (force_hidden_)
window_pos->flags &= ~SWP_SHOWWINDOW;
SetMsgHandled(true);
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserMainLoop::GetCompositingModeReporter(
viz::mojom::CompositingModeReporterRequest request) {
bool use_viz =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableViz);
if (IsUsingMus() || use_viz) {
} else {
compositing_mode_reporter_bindings_.AddBinding(
compositing_mode_reporter_impl_.get(), std::move(request));
}
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 8,509 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nf_tables_gettable(struct sock *nlsk, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
const struct nlattr * const nla[])
{
const struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
const struct nft_af_info *afi;
const struct nft_table *table;
struct sk_buff *skb2;
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
int family = nfmsg->nfgen_family;
int err;
if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) {
struct netlink_dump_control c = {
.dump = nf_tables_dump_tables,
};
return netlink_dump_start(nlsk, skb, nlh, &c);
}
afi = nf_tables_afinfo_lookup(net, family, false);
if (IS_ERR(afi))
return PTR_ERR(afi);
table = nf_tables_table_lookup(afi, nla[NFTA_TABLE_NAME]);
if (IS_ERR(table))
return PTR_ERR(table);
if (table->flags & NFT_TABLE_INACTIVE)
return -ENOENT;
skb2 = alloc_skb(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb2)
return -ENOMEM;
err = nf_tables_fill_table_info(skb2, net, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid,
nlh->nlmsg_seq, NFT_MSG_NEWTABLE, 0,
family, table);
if (err < 0)
goto err;
return nlmsg_unicast(nlsk, skb2, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
err:
kfree_skb(skb2);
return err;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 29,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void pud_clear_bad(pud_t *pud)
{
pud_ERROR(*pud);
pud_clear(pud);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 28,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UnwrapAndVerifyMojoHandle(mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle buffer_handle,
size_t expected_size,
bool expected_read_only_flag) {
base::SharedMemoryHandle memory_handle;
size_t memory_size = 0;
bool read_only_flag = false;
const MojoResult result =
mojo::UnwrapSharedMemoryHandle(std::move(buffer_handle), &memory_handle,
&memory_size, &read_only_flag);
EXPECT_EQ(MOJO_RESULT_OK, result);
EXPECT_EQ(expected_size, memory_size);
EXPECT_EQ(expected_read_only_flag, read_only_flag);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 14,337 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gx_dc_binary_masked_equal(const gx_device_color * pdevc1,
const gx_device_color * pdevc2)
{
return (*gx_dc_type_ht_binary->equal) (pdevc1, pdevc2) &&
pdevc1->mask.id == pdevc2->mask.id;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 7,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AccessibilityUIElement::attributedStringForTextMarkerRangeContainsAttribute(JSStringRef attribute, AccessibilityTextMarkerRange* range)
{
return false;
}
Commit Message: [GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 20,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void AddImpl(Handle<JSObject> object, uint32_t index,
Handle<Object> value, PropertyAttributes attributes,
uint32_t new_capacity) {
DCHECK_EQ(NONE, attributes);
Handle<FixedArray> parameter_map(FixedArray::cast(object->elements()));
Handle<FixedArrayBase> old_elements(
FixedArrayBase::cast(parameter_map->get(1)));
if (old_elements->IsSeededNumberDictionary() ||
static_cast<uint32_t>(old_elements->length()) < new_capacity) {
GrowCapacityAndConvertImpl(object, new_capacity);
}
FixedArray* arguments = FixedArray::cast(parameter_map->get(1));
FastHoleyObjectElementsAccessor::SetImpl(arguments, index, *value);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 13,034 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool mkvparser::Match(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos, unsigned long id_,
unsigned char*& buf, size_t& buflen) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
long long total, available;
long status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
assert(status >= 0);
assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
if (status < 0)
return false;
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0);
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
assert((pos + len) <= available);
if ((unsigned long)id != id_)
return false;
pos += len; // consume id
const long long size_ = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size_ >= 0);
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
assert((pos + len) <= available);
pos += len; // consume length of size of payload
assert((pos + size_) <= available);
const long buflen_ = static_cast<long>(size_);
buf = new (std::nothrow) unsigned char[buflen_];
assert(buf); // TODO
status = pReader->Read(pos, buflen_, buf);
assert(status == 0); // TODO
buflen = buflen_;
pos += size_; // consume size of payload
return true;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 15 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vips_foreign_load_gif_is_a_buffer( const void *buf, size_t len )
{
const guchar *str = (const guchar *) buf;
if( len >= 4 &&
str[0] == 'G' &&
str[1] == 'I' &&
str[2] == 'F' &&
str[3] == '8' )
return( 1 );
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: fetch map after DGifGetImageDesc()
Earlier refactoring broke GIF map fetch.
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(int flags[MAXDEVICES])
{
xXIHierarchyEvent *ev;
xXIHierarchyInfo *info;
DeviceIntRec dummyDev;
DeviceIntPtr dev;
int i;
if (!flags)
return;
ev = calloc(1, sizeof(xXIHierarchyEvent) +
MAXDEVICES * sizeof(xXIHierarchyInfo));
if (!ev)
return;
ev->type = GenericEvent;
ev->extension = IReqCode;
ev->evtype = XI_HierarchyChanged;
ev->time = GetTimeInMillis();
ev->flags = 0;
ev->num_info = inputInfo.numDevices;
info = (xXIHierarchyInfo *) &ev[1];
for (dev = inputInfo.devices; dev; dev = dev->next) {
info->deviceid = dev->id;
info->enabled = dev->enabled;
info->use = GetDeviceUse(dev, &info->attachment);
info->flags = flags[dev->id];
ev->flags |= info->flags;
info++;
}
for (dev = inputInfo.off_devices; dev; dev = dev->next) {
info->deviceid = dev->id;
info->enabled = dev->enabled;
info->use = GetDeviceUse(dev, &info->attachment);
info->flags = flags[dev->id];
ev->flags |= info->flags;
info++;
}
for (i = 0; i < MAXDEVICES; i++) {
if (flags[i] & (XIMasterRemoved | XISlaveRemoved)) {
info->deviceid = i;
info->enabled = FALSE;
info->flags = flags[i];
info->use = 0;
ev->flags |= info->flags;
ev->num_info++;
info++;
}
}
ev->length = bytes_to_int32(ev->num_info * sizeof(xXIHierarchyInfo));
memset(&dummyDev, 0, sizeof(dummyDev));
dummyDev.id = XIAllDevices;
dummyDev.type = SLAVE;
SendEventToAllWindows(&dummyDev, (XI_HierarchyChangedMask >> 8),
(xEvent *) ev, 1);
free(ev);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
{
int i,al;
int enc_err;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
unsigned int mac_size;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
sess = s->session;
/* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
* and we have that many bytes in s->packet
*/
rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
/* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
* rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
* need to be copied into rr->data by either
* the decryption or by the decompression
* When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
* rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
/* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
* rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
/* check is not needed I believe */
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
rr->data=rr->input;
rr->orig_len=rr->length;
enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
/* enc_err is:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
* 1: if the padding is valid
* -1: if the padding is invalid */
if (enc_err == 0)
{
/* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto err;
}
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
printf("\n");
#endif
/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
if ((sess != NULL) &&
(s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
(EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
{
/* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
unsigned char *mac = NULL;
unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
/* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
* removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
* therefore we can safely process the record in a different
* amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
*/
if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
/* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
{
/* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
* can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
* the MAC in constant time from within the record,
* without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
* */
mac = mac_tmp;
ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
rr->length -= mac_size;
}
else
{
/* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
* equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
* enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
rr->length -= mac_size;
mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
}
i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
enc_err = -1;
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
enc_err = -1;
}
if (enc_err < 0)
{
/* decryption failed, silently discard message */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto err;
}
/* r->length is now just compressed */
if (s->expand != NULL)
{
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
}
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
rr->off=0;
/*-
* So at this point the following is true
* ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
* ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
* ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
* ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
* after use :-).
*/
/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
s->packet_length=0;
dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
return(0);
}
Commit Message: A memory leak can occur in dtls1_buffer_record if either of the calls to
ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.
CVE-2015-0206
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 28,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool propertyMissingOrEqualToNone(StylePropertySet* style, CSSPropertyID propertyID)
{
if (!style)
return false;
RefPtr<CSSValue> value = style->getPropertyCSSValue(propertyID);
if (!value)
return true;
if (!value->isPrimitiveValue())
return false;
return static_cast<CSSPrimitiveValue*>(value.get())->getIdent() == CSSValueNone;
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 8,727 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt, unsigned long *len)
{
struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned long msg_len;
int ok;
long tmplen;
msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
memset(msg_hdr, 0, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
again:
ok = dtls_get_reassembled_message(s, &tmplen);
if (tmplen == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT || tmplen == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) {
/* bad fragment received */
goto again;
} else if (tmplen <= 0 && !ok) {
return 0;
}
*mt = s->s3->tmp.message_type;
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (*mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
if (s->msg_callback) {
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
p, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
}
/*
* This isn't a real handshake message so skip the processing below.
*/
*len = (unsigned long)tmplen;
return 1;
}
msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
/* reconstruct message header */
*(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
l2n3(msg_len, p);
s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
l2n3(0, p);
l2n3(msg_len, p);
if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
}
if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len))
return 0;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
p, msg_len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
memset(msg_hdr, 0, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
*len = s->init_num;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 22,566 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FT_Lookup_Renderer( FT_Library library,
FT_Glyph_Format format,
FT_ListNode* node )
{
FT_ListNode cur;
FT_Renderer result = 0;
if ( !library )
goto Exit;
cur = library->renderers.head;
if ( node )
{
if ( *node )
cur = (*node)->next;
*node = 0;
}
while ( cur )
{
FT_Renderer renderer = FT_RENDERER( cur->data );
if ( renderer->glyph_format == format )
{
if ( node )
*node = cur;
result = renderer;
break;
}
cur = cur->next;
}
Exit:
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHost> DevToolsAgentHost::CreateForBrowser(
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> tethering_task_runner,
const CreateServerSocketCallback& socket_callback) {
return new BrowserDevToolsAgentHost(
tethering_task_runner, socket_callback, false);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PDFiumEngine::OnMouseUp(const pp::MouseInputEvent& event) {
if (event.GetButton() != PP_INPUTEVENT_MOUSEBUTTON_LEFT &&
event.GetButton() != PP_INPUTEVENT_MOUSEBUTTON_MIDDLE) {
return false;
}
int page_index = -1;
int char_index = -1;
int form_type = FPDF_FORMFIELD_UNKNOWN;
PDFiumPage::LinkTarget target;
PDFiumPage::Area area =
GetCharIndex(event, &page_index, &char_index, &form_type, &target);
if (mouse_down_state_.Matches(area, target)) {
if (area == PDFiumPage::WEBLINK_AREA) {
uint32_t modifiers = event.GetModifiers();
bool middle_button =
!!(modifiers & PP_INPUTEVENT_MODIFIER_MIDDLEBUTTONDOWN);
bool alt_key = !!(modifiers & PP_INPUTEVENT_MODIFIER_ALTKEY);
bool ctrl_key = !!(modifiers & PP_INPUTEVENT_MODIFIER_CONTROLKEY);
bool meta_key = !!(modifiers & PP_INPUTEVENT_MODIFIER_METAKEY);
bool shift_key = !!(modifiers & PP_INPUTEVENT_MODIFIER_SHIFTKEY);
WindowOpenDisposition disposition =
ui::DispositionFromClick(middle_button, alt_key, ctrl_key, meta_key,
shift_key);
client_->NavigateTo(target.url, disposition);
client_->FormTextFieldFocusChange(false);
return true;
}
}
if (event.GetButton() == PP_INPUTEVENT_MOUSEBUTTON_MIDDLE)
return false;
if (page_index != -1) {
double page_x, page_y;
pp::Point point = event.GetPosition();
DeviceToPage(page_index, point.x(), point.y(), &page_x, &page_y);
FORM_OnLButtonUp(
form_, pages_[page_index]->GetPage(), 0, page_x, page_y);
}
if (!selecting_)
return false;
SetSelecting(false);
return true;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 29,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType IsMVG(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
if (length < 20)
return(MagickFalse);
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) magick,"push graphic-context",20) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __xmlGenericError(void) {
if (IS_MAIN_THREAD)
return (&xmlGenericError);
else
return (&xmlGetGlobalState()->xmlGenericError);
}
Commit Message: Attempt to address libxml crash.
BUG=129930
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10458051
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@142822 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 5,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
{
enum ssb_mitigation mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
return mode;
cmd = ssb_parse_cmdline();
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS) &&
(cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE ||
cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO))
return mode;
switch (cmd) {
case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO:
case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP:
/*
* Choose prctl+seccomp as the default mode if seccomp is
* enabled.
*/
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP;
else
mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
break;
case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON:
mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE;
break;
case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL:
mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
break;
case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE:
break;
}
/*
* We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
* - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
* - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
* - X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE - engage the mitigation
*/
if (mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE);
/*
* Intel uses the SPEC CTRL MSR Bit(2) for this, while AMD may
* use a completely different MSR and bit dependent on family.
*/
if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) &&
!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
x86_amd_ssb_disable();
} else {
x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
}
}
return mode;
}
Commit Message: x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB
The article "Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack
Buffer" [1] describes two new (sub-)variants of spectrev2-like attacks,
making use solely of the RSB contents even on CPUs that don't fallback to
BTB on RSB underflow (Skylake+).
Mitigate userspace-userspace attacks by always unconditionally filling RSB on
context switch when the generic spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled.
[1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.07940.pdf
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1807261308190.997@cbobk.fhfr.pm
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,966 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::RenderWidgetHostViewGuest(
RenderWidgetHost* widget_host,
BrowserPluginGuest* guest)
: host_(RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(widget_host)),
is_hidden_(false),
guest_(guest) {
host_->SetView(this);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,766 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ipxcfg_get_config_data(struct ipx_config_data __user *arg)
{
struct ipx_config_data vals;
vals.ipxcfg_auto_create_interfaces = ipxcfg_auto_create_interfaces;
vals.ipxcfg_auto_select_primary = ipxcfg_auto_select_primary;
return copy_to_user(arg, &vals, sizeof(vals)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_mmu_unload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
mmu_free_roots(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SProcXvQueryAdaptors(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xvQueryAdaptorsReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvQueryAdaptorsReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->window);
return XvProcVector[xv_QueryAdaptors] (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __vmx_load_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
if (!vmx->host_state.loaded)
return;
++vmx->vcpu.stat.host_state_reload;
vmx->host_state.loaded = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (is_long_mode(&vmx->vcpu))
rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
#endif
if (vmx->host_state.gs_ldt_reload_needed) {
kvm_load_ldt(vmx->host_state.ldt_sel);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
load_gs_index(vmx->host_state.gs_sel);
#else
loadsegment(gs, vmx->host_state.gs_sel);
#endif
}
if (vmx->host_state.fs_reload_needed)
loadsegment(fs, vmx->host_state.fs_sel);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (unlikely(vmx->host_state.ds_sel | vmx->host_state.es_sel)) {
loadsegment(ds, vmx->host_state.ds_sel);
loadsegment(es, vmx->host_state.es_sel);
}
#endif
reload_tss();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base);
#endif
if (vmx->host_state.msr_host_bndcfgs)
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, vmx->host_state.msr_host_bndcfgs);
/*
* If the FPU is not active (through the host task or
* the guest vcpu), then restore the cr0.TS bit.
*/
if (!fpregs_active() && !vmx->vcpu.guest_fpu_loaded)
stts();
load_gdt(this_cpu_ptr(&host_gdt));
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 10,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SkipObserverRegistrationForTesting() {
g_skip_observer_registration_for_testing = true;
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: av_cold int avcodec_close(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
int i;
if (!avctx)
return 0;
if (avcodec_is_open(avctx)) {
FramePool *pool = avctx->internal->pool;
if (CONFIG_FRAME_THREAD_ENCODER &&
avctx->internal->frame_thread_encoder && avctx->thread_count > 1) {
ff_frame_thread_encoder_free(avctx);
}
if (HAVE_THREADS && avctx->internal->thread_ctx)
ff_thread_free(avctx);
if (avctx->codec && avctx->codec->close)
avctx->codec->close(avctx);
avctx->internal->byte_buffer_size = 0;
av_freep(&avctx->internal->byte_buffer);
av_frame_free(&avctx->internal->to_free);
av_frame_free(&avctx->internal->buffer_frame);
av_packet_free(&avctx->internal->buffer_pkt);
for (i = 0; i < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(pool->pools); i++)
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&pool->pools[i]);
av_freep(&avctx->internal->pool);
if (avctx->hwaccel && avctx->hwaccel->uninit)
avctx->hwaccel->uninit(avctx);
av_freep(&avctx->internal->hwaccel_priv_data);
av_freep(&avctx->internal);
}
for (i = 0; i < avctx->nb_coded_side_data; i++)
av_freep(&avctx->coded_side_data[i].data);
av_freep(&avctx->coded_side_data);
avctx->nb_coded_side_data = 0;
av_buffer_unref(&avctx->hw_frames_ctx);
if (avctx->priv_data && avctx->codec && avctx->codec->priv_class)
av_opt_free(avctx->priv_data);
av_opt_free(avctx);
av_freep(&avctx->priv_data);
if (av_codec_is_encoder(avctx->codec)) {
av_freep(&avctx->extradata);
#if FF_API_CODED_FRAME
FF_DISABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
av_frame_free(&avctx->coded_frame);
FF_ENABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
#endif
}
avctx->codec = NULL;
avctx->active_thread_type = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 4,311 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<SendTabToSelfEntry> SendTabToSelfEntry::FromLocalProto(
const SendTabToSelfLocal& local_entry,
base::Time now) {
std::unique_ptr<SendTabToSelfEntry> to_return =
FromProto(local_entry.specifics(), now);
if (to_return) {
to_return->SetNotificationDismissed(local_entry.notification_dismissed());
}
return to_return;
}
Commit Message: [SendTabToSelf] Added logic to display an infobar for the feature.
This CL is one of many to come. It covers:
* Creation of the infobar from the SendTabToSelfInfoBarController
* Plumbed the call to create the infobar to the native code.
* Open the link when user taps on the link
In follow-up CLs, the following will be done:
* Instantiate the InfobarController in the ChromeActivity
* Listen for Model changes in the Controller
Bug: 949233,963193
Change-Id: I5df1359debb5f0f35c32c2df3b691bf9129cdeb8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1604406
Reviewed-by: Tommy Nyquist <nyquist@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mikel Astiz <mastiz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: sebsg <sebsg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Cohen <jeffreycohen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Jones <mdjones@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Tanya Gupta <tgupta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660854}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 5,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *eval_map_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
union trace_eval_map_item *v;
loff_t l = 0;
mutex_lock(&trace_eval_mutex);
v = trace_eval_maps;
if (v)
v++;
while (v && l < *pos) {
v = eval_map_next(m, v, &l);
}
return v;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 20,383 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ndp_sock_open(struct ndp *ndp)
{
int sock;
int ret;
int err;
int val;
sock = socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_ICMPV6);
if (sock == -1) {
err(ndp, "Failed to create ICMP6 socket.");
return -errno;
}
val = 1;
ret = setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_RECVPKTINFO,
&val, sizeof(val));
if (ret == -1) {
err(ndp, "Failed to setsockopt IPV6_RECVPKTINFO.");
err = -errno;
goto close_sock;
}
val = 255;
ret = setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_MULTICAST_HOPS,
&val, sizeof(val));
if (ret == -1) {
err(ndp, "Failed to setsockopt IPV6_MULTICAST_HOPS.");
err = -errno;
goto close_sock;
}
val = 1;
ret = setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_RECVHOPLIMIT,
&val, sizeof(val));
if (ret == -1) {
err(ndp, "Failed to setsockopt IPV6_RECVHOPLIMIT,.");
err = -errno;
goto close_sock;
}
ndp->sock = sock;
return 0;
close_sock:
close(sock);
return err;
}
Commit Message: libndb: reject redirect and router advertisements from non-link-local
RFC4861 suggests that these messages should only originate from
link-local addresses in 6.1.2 (RA) and 8.1. (redirect):
Mitigates CVE-2016-3698.
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 26,080 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_buf_get_map(
struct xfs_buftarg *target,
struct xfs_buf_map *map,
int nmaps,
xfs_buf_flags_t flags)
{
struct xfs_buf *bp;
struct xfs_buf *new_bp;
int error = 0;
bp = _xfs_buf_find(target, map, nmaps, flags, NULL);
if (likely(bp))
goto found;
new_bp = _xfs_buf_alloc(target, map, nmaps, flags);
if (unlikely(!new_bp))
return NULL;
error = xfs_buf_allocate_memory(new_bp, flags);
if (error) {
xfs_buf_free(new_bp);
return NULL;
}
bp = _xfs_buf_find(target, map, nmaps, flags, new_bp);
if (!bp) {
xfs_buf_free(new_bp);
return NULL;
}
if (bp != new_bp)
xfs_buf_free(new_bp);
found:
if (!bp->b_addr) {
error = _xfs_buf_map_pages(bp, flags);
if (unlikely(error)) {
xfs_warn(target->bt_mount,
"%s: failed to map pages\n", __func__);
xfs_buf_relse(bp);
return NULL;
}
}
XFS_STATS_INC(xb_get);
trace_xfs_buf_get(bp, flags, _RET_IP_);
return bp;
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix _xfs_buf_find oops on blocks beyond the filesystem end
When _xfs_buf_find is passed an out of range address, it will fail
to find a relevant struct xfs_perag and oops with a null
dereference. This can happen when trying to walk a filesystem with a
metadata inode that has a partially corrupted extent map (i.e. the
block number returned is corrupt, but is otherwise intact) and we
try to read from the corrupted block address.
In this case, just fail the lookup. If it is readahead being issued,
it will simply not be done, but if it is real read that fails we
will get an error being reported. Ideally this case should result
in an EFSCORRUPTED error being reported, but we cannot return an
error through xfs_buf_read() or xfs_buf_get() so this lookup failure
may result in ENOMEM or EIO errors being reported instead.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 25,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ShellWindow::Observe(int type,
const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
switch (type) {
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_UNLOADED: {
const extensions::Extension* unloaded_extension =
content::Details<extensions::UnloadedExtensionInfo>(
details)->extension;
if (extension_ == unloaded_extension)
Close();
break;
}
case content::NOTIFICATION_APP_TERMINATING:
Close();
break;
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Received unexpected notification";
}
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 6,507 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderBlockFlow::clearFloatsIfNeeded(RenderBox* child, MarginInfo& marginInfo, LayoutUnit oldTopPosMargin, LayoutUnit oldTopNegMargin, LayoutUnit yPos, bool childIsSelfCollapsing)
{
LayoutUnit heightIncrease = getClearDelta(child, yPos);
if (!heightIncrease)
return yPos;
if (childIsSelfCollapsing) {
bool childDiscardMargin = mustDiscardMarginBeforeForChild(child) || mustDiscardMarginAfterForChild(child);
RenderBlockFlow::MarginValues childMargins = marginValuesForChild(child);
if (!childDiscardMargin) {
marginInfo.setPositiveMargin(max(childMargins.positiveMarginBefore(), childMargins.positiveMarginAfter()));
marginInfo.setNegativeMargin(max(childMargins.negativeMarginBefore(), childMargins.negativeMarginAfter()));
} else {
marginInfo.clearMargin();
}
marginInfo.setDiscardMargin(childDiscardMargin);
marginInfo.setCanCollapseMarginAfterWithLastChild(false);
setLogicalHeight(child->logicalTop() + childMargins.negativeMarginBefore());
} else {
setLogicalHeight(logicalHeight() + heightIncrease);
}
if (marginInfo.canCollapseWithMarginBefore()) {
setMaxMarginBeforeValues(oldTopPosMargin, oldTopNegMargin);
marginInfo.setAtBeforeSideOfBlock(false);
setMustDiscardMarginBefore(style()->marginBeforeCollapse() == MDISCARD);
}
return yPos + heightIncrease;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,961 |
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