instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cib_remote_inputfd(cib_t * cib)
{
cib_remote_opaque_t *private = cib->variant_opaque;
return private->callback.socket;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(fnmatch)
{
char *pattern, *filename;
int pattern_len, filename_len;
long flags = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "pp|l", &pattern, &pattern_len, &filename, &filename_len, &flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (filename_len >= MAXPATHLEN) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Filename exceeds the maximum allowed length of %d characters", MAXPATHLEN);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (pattern_len >= MAXPATHLEN) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Pattern exceeds the maximum allowed length of %d characters", MAXPATHLEN);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_BOOL( ! fnmatch( pattern, filename, flags ));
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72114 - int/size_t confusion in fread
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 28,567 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gs_getpattern(const gs_client_color * pcc)
{
const gs_pattern_instance_t *pinst = pcc->pattern;
return (pinst == 0 || pinst->type != &gs_pattern1_type ? 0 :
&((const gs_pattern1_instance_t *)pinst)->templat);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 14,509 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: raptor_turtle_writer_base(raptor_turtle_writer* turtle_writer,
raptor_uri* base_uri)
{
if(base_uri) {
raptor_iostream_counted_string_write("@base ", 6, turtle_writer->iostr);
raptor_turtle_writer_reference(turtle_writer, base_uri);
raptor_iostream_counted_string_write(" .\n", 3, turtle_writer->iostr);
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 9,813 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebMediaPlayerImpl::SupportsOverlayFullscreenVideo() {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
return !using_media_player_renderer_ &&
overlay_mode_ == OverlayMode::kUseContentVideoView;
#else
return false;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 18,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: openssl_dec(const EVP_CIPHER * cipher, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv,
const unsigned char *input, size_t length, unsigned char *output)
{
int r = SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX * ctx = NULL;
int outl = 0;
int outl_tmp = 0;
unsigned char iv_tmp[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH] = { 0 };
memcpy(iv_tmp, iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto out;
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv_tmp);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, output, &outl, input, length))
goto out;
if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, output + outl, &outl_tmp))
goto out;
r = SC_SUCCESS;
out:
if (ctx)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return r;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 28,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XML_SetStartElementHandler(XML_Parser parser, XML_StartElementHandler start) {
if (parser != NULL)
parser->m_startElementHandler = start;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderProcessHostImpl::FastShutdownIfPossible() {
if (run_renderer_in_process())
return false; // Single process mode never shutdown the renderer.
if (!GetContentClient()->browser()->IsFastShutdownPossible())
return false;
if (!child_process_launcher_.get() ||
child_process_launcher_->IsStarting() ||
!GetHandle())
return false; // Render process hasn't started or is probably crashed.
if (!SuddenTerminationAllowed())
return false;
ProcessDied(false /* already_dead */);
fast_shutdown_started_ = true;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::isPageBoxVisible(int pageIndex)
{
RefPtr<RenderStyle> style = styleForPage(pageIndex);
return style->visibility() != HIDDEN; // display property doesn't apply to @page.
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,221 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_xfer(struct xfer_header *xfer)
{
int r = 0;
if (xfer->use_replication) {
/* Initial non-blocking sync */
r = xfer_initialsync(xfer);
if (r) return r;
}
r = xfer_deactivate(xfer);
if (!r) {
if (xfer->use_replication) {
/* Final sync with write locks on mailboxes */
r = xfer_finalsync(xfer);
}
else {
r = xfer_localcreate(xfer);
if (!r) r = xfer_undump(xfer);
}
}
if (r) {
/* Something failed, revert back to local server */
xfer_recover(xfer);
return r;
}
/* Successful dump of all mailboxes to remote server.
* Remove them locally and activate them on remote.
* Note - we don't report errors if this fails! */
xfer_delete(xfer);
xfer_reactivate(xfer);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __cpuinit per_cpu_trap_init(void)
{
extern void *vbr_base;
/* NOTE: The VBR value should be at P1
(or P2, virtural "fixed" address space).
It's definitely should not in physical address. */
asm volatile("ldc %0, vbr"
: /* no output */
: "r" (&vbr_base)
: "memory");
/* disable exception blocking now when the vbr has been setup */
clear_bl_bit();
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 18,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsMultiProcessMash() {
return base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kMash);
}
Commit Message: [VK] Enable virtual keyboard UKM by default on M70.
Launch was approved.
Bug: 752657
Change-Id: I01ac04040b8b928c27512d203667dda234588153
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1184659
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Darren Shen <shend@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585282}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 16,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct dentry *bd_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data)
{
return mount_pseudo(fs_type, "bdev:", &bdev_sops, NULL, BDEVFS_MAGIC);
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 5,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UINT CSoundFile::GetNumPatterns() const
{
UINT i = 0;
while ((i < MAX_ORDERS) && (Order[i] < 0xFF)) i++;
return i;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dump_ah_combs(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xfrm_tmpl *t)
{
struct sadb_prop *p;
int i;
p = (struct sadb_prop*)skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct sadb_prop));
p->sadb_prop_len = sizeof(struct sadb_prop)/8;
p->sadb_prop_exttype = SADB_EXT_PROPOSAL;
p->sadb_prop_replay = 32;
memset(p->sadb_prop_reserved, 0, sizeof(p->sadb_prop_reserved));
for (i = 0; ; i++) {
const struct xfrm_algo_desc *aalg = xfrm_aalg_get_byidx(i);
if (!aalg)
break;
if (!aalg->pfkey_supported)
continue;
if (aalg_tmpl_set(t, aalg) && aalg->available) {
struct sadb_comb *c;
c = (struct sadb_comb*)skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct sadb_comb));
memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
p->sadb_prop_len += sizeof(struct sadb_comb)/8;
c->sadb_comb_auth = aalg->desc.sadb_alg_id;
c->sadb_comb_auth_minbits = aalg->desc.sadb_alg_minbits;
c->sadb_comb_auth_maxbits = aalg->desc.sadb_alg_maxbits;
c->sadb_comb_hard_addtime = 24*60*60;
c->sadb_comb_soft_addtime = 20*60*60;
c->sadb_comb_hard_usetime = 8*60*60;
c->sadb_comb_soft_usetime = 7*60*60;
}
}
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ipgre_destroy_tunnels(struct ipgre_net *ign, struct list_head *head)
{
int prio;
for (prio = 0; prio < 4; prio++) {
int h;
for (h = 0; h < HASH_SIZE; h++) {
struct ip_tunnel *t = ign->tunnels[prio][h];
while (t != NULL) {
unregister_netdevice_queue(t->dev, head);
t = t->next;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: gre: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().
This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void stroke_counters(private_stroke_socket_t *this,
stroke_msg_t *msg, FILE *out)
{
pop_string(msg, &msg->counters.name);
if (msg->counters.reset)
{
this->counter->reset(this->counter, msg->counters.name);
}
else
{
this->counter->print(this->counter, out, msg->counters.name);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 29,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct nfs4_lookup_res *res)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr;
int status;
status = decode_compound_hdr(xdr, &hdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_sequence(xdr, &res->seq_res, rqstp);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_putfh(xdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_lookup(xdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_getfh(xdr, res->fh);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_getfattr(xdr, res->fattr, res->server
,!RPC_IS_ASYNC(rqstp->rq_task));
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 14,987 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int generic_stmt_attr_get(pdo_stmt_t *stmt, zval *return_value, long attr)
{
switch (attr) {
case PDO_ATTR_EMULATE_PREPARES:
RETVAL_BOOL(stmt->supports_placeholders == PDO_PLACEHOLDER_NONE);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 11,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalFrameClientImpl::DidBlockFramebust(const KURL& url) {
web_frame_->Client()->DidBlockFramebust(url);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 25,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bdfReadHeader(FontFilePtr file, bdfFileState *pState)
{
unsigned char *line;
char namebuf[BDFLINELEN];
unsigned char lineBuf[BDFLINELEN];
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN);
if (!line || sscanf((char *) line, "STARTFONT %s", namebuf) != 1 ||
!bdfStrEqual(namebuf, "2.1")) {
bdfError("bad 'STARTFONT'\n");
return (FALSE);
}
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN);
if (!line || sscanf((char *) line, "FONT %[^\n]", pState->fontName) != 1) {
bdfError("bad 'FONT'\n");
return (FALSE);
}
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN);
if (!line || !bdfIsPrefix(line, "SIZE")) {
bdfError("missing 'SIZE'\n");
return (FALSE);
}
if (sscanf((char *) line, "SIZE %f%d%d", &pState->pointSize,
&pState->resolution_x, &pState->resolution_y) != 3) {
bdfError("bad 'SIZE'\n");
return (FALSE);
}
if (pState->pointSize < 1 ||
pState->resolution_x < 1 || pState->resolution_y < 1) {
bdfError("SIZE values must be > 0\n");
return (FALSE);
}
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN);
if (!line || !bdfIsPrefix(line, "FONTBOUNDINGBOX")) {
bdfError("missing 'FONTBOUNDINGBOX'\n");
return (FALSE);
}
return (TRUE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: find_compressor(int type)
{
struct compressor_entry *ce;
struct compressor *cp = NULL;
spin_lock(&compressor_list_lock);
ce = find_comp_entry(type);
if (ce) {
cp = ce->comp;
if (!try_module_get(cp->owner))
cp = NULL;
}
spin_unlock(&compressor_list_lock);
return cp;
}
Commit Message: ppp: take reference on channels netns
Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace.
Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their
userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they
can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from
under them.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at
addr ffff880064e217e0
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581
=============================================================================
BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906
[< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440
[< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469
[< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532
[< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574
[< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579
[< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597
[< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325
[< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360
[< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95
[< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150
[< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451
[< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274
[< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723
[< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832
[< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826
[< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631
[< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650
[< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805
[< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814
[< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341
[< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348
[< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448
[< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036
[< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170
[< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303
[< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000
flags=0x5fffc0000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200
CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300
ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054
ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654
[<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661
[< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138
[<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236
[< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293
[<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241
[<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000
[<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478
[<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744
[<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772
[<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901
[<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688
[<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115
[< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750
[<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123
[<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357
[<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550
[<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145
[<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880
[<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307
[< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113
[<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158
[<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712
[<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655
[<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165
[<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692
[< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099
[<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678
[< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807
[<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283
[<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282
[<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344
[<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 27,775 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sp<AudioFlinger::EffectModule> AudioFlinger::EffectChain::getEffectFromType_l(
const effect_uuid_t *type)
{
size_t size = mEffects.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
if (memcmp(&mEffects[i]->desc().type, type, sizeof(effect_uuid_t)) == 0) {
return mEffects[i];
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct nfs_page *nfs_page_find_request(struct page *page)
{
struct inode *inode = page_file_mapping(page)->host;
struct nfs_page *req = NULL;
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
req = nfs_page_find_request_locked(NFS_I(inode), page);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
return req;
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandlePixelStorei(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::PixelStorei& c) {
GLenum pname = c.pname;
GLenum param = c.param;
if (!validators_->pixel_store.IsValid(pname)) {
SetGLErrorInvalidEnum("glPixelStorei", pname, "pname");
return error::kNoError;
}
switch (pname) {
case GL_PACK_ALIGNMENT:
case GL_UNPACK_ALIGNMENT:
if (!validators_->pixel_store_alignment.IsValid(param)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glPixelStore", "param GL_INVALID_VALUE");
return error::kNoError;
}
break;
case GL_UNPACK_FLIP_Y_CHROMIUM:
unpack_flip_y_ = (param != 0);
return error::kNoError;
case GL_UNPACK_PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA_CHROMIUM:
unpack_premultiply_alpha_ = (param != 0);
return error::kNoError;
case GL_UNPACK_UNPREMULTIPLY_ALPHA_CHROMIUM:
unpack_unpremultiply_alpha_ = (param != 0);
return error::kNoError;
default:
break;
}
glPixelStorei(pname, param);
switch (pname) {
case GL_PACK_ALIGNMENT:
pack_alignment_ = param;
break;
case GL_PACK_REVERSE_ROW_ORDER_ANGLE:
break;
case GL_UNPACK_ALIGNMENT:
unpack_alignment_ = param;
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadItemImpl::OffThreadCancel(DownloadFileManager* file_manager) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
request_handle_->CancelRequest();
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&DownloadFileManager::CancelDownload,
file_manager, download_id_));
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,955 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceFetcher::scheduleDocumentResourcesGC()
{
if (!m_garbageCollectDocumentResourcesTimer.isActive())
m_garbageCollectDocumentResourcesTimer.startOneShot(0, FROM_HERE);
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 8,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ErrorState* GLES2DecoderImpl::GetErrorState() {
return error_state_.get();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __ip_vs_unbind_svc(struct ip_vs_dest *dest)
{
struct ip_vs_service *svc = dest->svc;
dest->svc = NULL;
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&svc->refcnt))
kfree(svc);
}
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DidGetModifiedSince(QuotaManager* manager,
const GetOriginsCallback& callback,
StorageType type,
bool success) {
if (!manager) {
callback.Run(std::set<GURL>(), type);
return;
}
manager->DidDatabaseWork(success);
callback.Run(origins_, type);
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t stream_read_cb(RedsStream *s, void *buf, size_t size)
{
return read(s->socket, buf, size);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: http_IsHdr(const txt *hh, const char *hdr)
{
unsigned l;
Tcheck(*hh);
AN(hdr);
l = hdr[0];
assert(l == strlen(hdr + 1));
assert(hdr[l] == ':');
hdr++;
return (!strncasecmp(hdr, hh->b, l));
}
Commit Message: Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests
If a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a
400 (Bad Request)
Fix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would
not fail because of that.
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,859 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int freeze_super(struct super_block *sb)
{
int ret;
atomic_inc(&sb->s_active);
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
if (sb->s_writers.frozen != SB_UNFROZEN) {
deactivate_locked_super(sb);
return -EBUSY;
}
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_BORN)) {
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
return 0; /* sic - it's "nothing to do" */
}
if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) {
/* Nothing to do really... */
sb->s_writers.frozen = SB_FREEZE_COMPLETE;
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
return 0;
}
/* From now on, no new normal writers can start */
sb->s_writers.frozen = SB_FREEZE_WRITE;
smp_wmb();
/* Release s_umount to preserve sb_start_write -> s_umount ordering */
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
sb_wait_write(sb, SB_FREEZE_WRITE);
/* Now we go and block page faults... */
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
sb->s_writers.frozen = SB_FREEZE_PAGEFAULT;
smp_wmb();
sb_wait_write(sb, SB_FREEZE_PAGEFAULT);
/* All writers are done so after syncing there won't be dirty data */
sync_filesystem(sb);
/* Now wait for internal filesystem counter */
sb->s_writers.frozen = SB_FREEZE_FS;
smp_wmb();
sb_wait_write(sb, SB_FREEZE_FS);
if (sb->s_op->freeze_fs) {
ret = sb->s_op->freeze_fs(sb);
if (ret) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"VFS:Filesystem freeze failed\n");
sb->s_writers.frozen = SB_UNFROZEN;
smp_wmb();
wake_up(&sb->s_writers.wait_unfrozen);
deactivate_locked_super(sb);
return ret;
}
}
/*
* This is just for debugging purposes so that fs can warn if it
* sees write activity when frozen is set to SB_FREEZE_COMPLETE.
*/
sb->s_writers.frozen = SB_FREEZE_COMPLETE;
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 18,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DoReplaceStateWhilePending(Shell* shell,
const GURL& start_url,
const GURL& stalled_url,
const std::string& replace_state_filename) {
NavigationControllerImpl& controller =
static_cast<NavigationControllerImpl&>(
shell->web_contents()->GetController());
FrameTreeNode* root =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(shell->web_contents())->
GetFrameTree()->root();
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell, start_url));
NavigationStallDelegate stall_delegate(stalled_url);
ResourceDispatcherHost::Get()->SetDelegate(&stall_delegate);
controller.LoadURL(
stalled_url, Referrer(), ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK, std::string());
NavigationEntryImpl* entry = controller.GetPendingEntry();
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, entry);
EXPECT_EQ(stalled_url, entry->GetURL());
{
FrameNavigateParamsCapturer capturer(root);
capturer.set_wait_for_load(false);
std::string script =
"history.replaceState({}, '', '" + replace_state_filename + "')";
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecuteScript(root, script));
capturer.Wait();
EXPECT_EQ(NAVIGATION_TYPE_EXISTING_PAGE, capturer.navigation_type());
EXPECT_TRUE(capturer.is_same_document());
}
ResourceDispatcherHost::Get()->SetDelegate(nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,451 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int skb_crc32c_csum_help(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
__le32 crc32c_csum;
int ret = 0, offset, start;
if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
goto out;
if (unlikely(skb_is_gso(skb)))
goto out;
/* Before computing a checksum, we should make sure no frag could
* be modified by an external entity : checksum could be wrong.
*/
if (unlikely(skb_has_shared_frag(skb))) {
ret = __skb_linearize(skb);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
start = skb_checksum_start_offset(skb);
offset = start + offsetof(struct sctphdr, checksum);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(offset >= skb_headlen(skb))) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (skb_cloned(skb) &&
!skb_clone_writable(skb, offset + sizeof(__le32))) {
ret = pskb_expand_head(skb, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
crc32c_csum = cpu_to_le32(~__skb_checksum(skb, start,
skb->len - start, ~(__u32)0,
crc32c_csum_stub));
*(__le32 *)(skb->data + offset) = crc32c_csum;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
skb->csum_not_inet = 0;
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 24,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __init irsock_init(void)
{
int rc = proto_register(&irda_proto, 0);
if (rc == 0)
rc = sock_register(&irda_family_ops);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: irda: Fix missing msg_namelen update in irda_recvmsg_dgram()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about irda_recvmsg_dgram() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 13,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOLEAN send_app_connect_signal(int fd, const bt_bdaddr_t* addr,
int channel, int status, int send_fd, int tx_mtu)
{
sock_connect_signal_t cs;
cs.size = sizeof(cs);
cs.bd_addr = *addr;
cs.channel = channel;
cs.status = status;
cs.max_rx_packet_size = L2CAP_MAX_SDU_LENGTH;
cs.max_tx_packet_size = tx_mtu;
if (send_fd != -1) {
if (sock_send_fd(fd, (const uint8_t*)&cs, sizeof(cs), send_fd) == sizeof(cs))
return TRUE;
else APPL_TRACE_ERROR("sock_send_fd failed, fd:%d, send_fd:%d", fd, send_fd);
} else if (sock_send_all(fd, (const uint8_t*)&cs, sizeof(cs)) == sizeof(cs)) {
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 20,135 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nested_vmx_inject_exception_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned long exit_qual)
{
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
unsigned int nr = vcpu->arch.exception.nr;
u32 intr_info = nr | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
if (vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code) {
vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.error_code;
intr_info |= INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
}
if (kvm_exception_is_soft(nr))
intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION;
else
intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION;
if (!(vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
vmx_get_nmi_mask(vcpu))
intr_info |= INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI;
nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI, intr_info, exit_qual);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void spl_filesystem_object_construct(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, long ctor_flags) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern;
char *path;
int parsed, len;
long flags;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (SPL_HAS_FLAG(ctor_flags, DIT_CTOR_FLAGS)) {
flags = SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_PATHNAME|SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO;
parsed = zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|l", &path, &len, &flags);
} else {
flags = SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_PATHNAME|SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_SELF;
parsed = zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &path, &len);
}
if (SPL_HAS_FLAG(ctor_flags, SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS)) {
flags |= SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS;
}
if (SPL_HAS_FLAG(ctor_flags, SPL_FILE_DIR_UNIXPATHS)) {
flags |= SPL_FILE_DIR_UNIXPATHS;
}
if (parsed == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
if (!len) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Directory name must not be empty.");
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern->_path) {
/* object is alreay initialized */
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Directory object is already initialized");
return;
}
intern->flags = flags;
#ifdef HAVE_GLOB
if (SPL_HAS_FLAG(ctor_flags, DIT_CTOR_GLOB) && strstr(path, "glob://") != path) {
spprintf(&path, 0, "glob://%s", path);
spl_filesystem_dir_open(intern, path TSRMLS_CC);
efree(path);
} else
#endif
{
spl_filesystem_dir_open(intern, path TSRMLS_CC);
}
intern->u.dir.is_recursive = instanceof_function(intern->std.ce, spl_ce_RecursiveDirectoryIterator TSRMLS_CC) ? 1 : 0;
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 7,172 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> mutablePointFunctionCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.mutablePointFunction");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
return toV8(WTF::getPtr(SVGPropertyTearOff<FloatPoint>::create(imp->mutablePointFunction())), args.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProgramManager::ProgramInfo* CreateProgramInfo(
GLuint client_id, GLuint service_id) {
return program_manager()->CreateProgramInfo(client_id, service_id);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,180 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int encode_close(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct nfs_closeargs *arg)
{
__be32 *p;
RESERVE_SPACE(8+NFS4_STATEID_SIZE);
WRITE32(OP_CLOSE);
WRITE32(arg->seqid->sequence->counter);
WRITEMEM(arg->stateid->data, NFS4_STATEID_SIZE);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 24,215 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void user_free_payload_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
{
struct user_key_payload *payload;
payload = container_of(head, struct user_key_payload, rcu);
kzfree(payload);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,329 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void staticLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, TestObjectPython::staticLongAttribute());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,662 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOL update_read_play_sound(wStream* s, PLAY_SOUND_UPDATE* play_sound)
{
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 8)
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, play_sound->duration); /* duration (4 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, play_sound->frequency); /* frequency (4 bytes) */
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,951 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void VRDisplay::OnPresentComplete(bool success) {
if (success) {
this->BeginPresent();
} else {
this->ForceExitPresent();
DOMException* exception = DOMException::Create(
kNotAllowedError, "Presentation request was denied.");
while (!pending_present_resolvers_.IsEmpty()) {
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = pending_present_resolvers_.TakeFirst();
resolver->Reject(exception);
}
}
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SVGElement::RemoveAllOutgoingReferences() {
if (!HasSVGRareData())
return;
SVGElementSet& outgoing_references = SvgRareData()->OutgoingReferences();
for (SVGElement* target_element : outgoing_references) {
DCHECK(target_element->HasSVGRareData());
target_element->EnsureSVGRareData()->IncomingReferences().erase(this);
}
outgoing_references.clear();
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 28,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLMediaElement::IsAutoplayingMuted() {
return autoplay_policy_->IsAutoplayingMuted();
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 20,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcRenderFreeGlyphSet (ClientPtr client)
{
GlyphSetPtr glyphSet;
int rc;
REQUEST(xRenderFreeGlyphSetReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderFreeGlyphSetReq);
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((pointer *)&glyphSet, stuff->glyphset, GlyphSetType,
client, DixDestroyAccess);
if (rc != Success)
{
client->errorValue = stuff->glyphset;
return rc;
}
FreeResource (stuff->glyphset, RT_NONE);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t StreamingProcessor::processRecordingFrame() {
ATRACE_CALL();
status_t res;
sp<Camera2Heap> recordingHeap;
size_t heapIdx = 0;
nsecs_t timestamp;
sp<Camera2Client> client = mClient.promote();
if (client == 0) {
BufferItem imgBuffer;
res = mRecordingConsumer->acquireBuffer(&imgBuffer, 0);
if (res != OK) {
if (res != BufferItemConsumer::NO_BUFFER_AVAILABLE) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Can't acquire recording buffer: %s (%d)",
__FUNCTION__, mId, strerror(-res), res);
}
return res;
}
mRecordingConsumer->releaseBuffer(imgBuffer);
return OK;
}
{
/* acquire SharedParameters before mMutex so we don't dead lock
with Camera2Client code calling into StreamingProcessor */
SharedParameters::Lock l(client->getParameters());
Mutex::Autolock m(mMutex);
BufferItem imgBuffer;
res = mRecordingConsumer->acquireBuffer(&imgBuffer, 0);
if (res != OK) {
if (res != BufferItemConsumer::NO_BUFFER_AVAILABLE) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Can't acquire recording buffer: %s (%d)",
__FUNCTION__, mId, strerror(-res), res);
}
return res;
}
timestamp = imgBuffer.mTimestamp;
mRecordingFrameCount++;
ALOGVV("OnRecordingFrame: Frame %d", mRecordingFrameCount);
if (l.mParameters.state != Parameters::RECORD &&
l.mParameters.state != Parameters::VIDEO_SNAPSHOT) {
ALOGV("%s: Camera %d: Discarding recording image buffers "
"received after recording done", __FUNCTION__,
mId);
mRecordingConsumer->releaseBuffer(imgBuffer);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (mRecordingHeap == 0) {
size_t payloadSize = sizeof(VideoNativeMetadata);
ALOGV("%s: Camera %d: Creating recording heap with %zu buffers of "
"size %zu bytes", __FUNCTION__, mId,
mRecordingHeapCount, payloadSize);
mRecordingHeap = new Camera2Heap(payloadSize, mRecordingHeapCount,
"Camera2Client::RecordingHeap");
if (mRecordingHeap->mHeap->getSize() == 0) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to allocate memory for recording",
__FUNCTION__, mId);
mRecordingConsumer->releaseBuffer(imgBuffer);
return NO_MEMORY;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < mRecordingBuffers.size(); i++) {
if (mRecordingBuffers[i].mBuf !=
BufferItemConsumer::INVALID_BUFFER_SLOT) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Non-empty recording buffers list!",
__FUNCTION__, mId);
}
}
mRecordingBuffers.clear();
mRecordingBuffers.setCapacity(mRecordingHeapCount);
mRecordingBuffers.insertAt(0, mRecordingHeapCount);
mRecordingHeapHead = 0;
mRecordingHeapFree = mRecordingHeapCount;
}
if (mRecordingHeapFree == 0) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: No free recording buffers, dropping frame",
__FUNCTION__, mId);
mRecordingConsumer->releaseBuffer(imgBuffer);
return NO_MEMORY;
}
heapIdx = mRecordingHeapHead;
mRecordingHeapHead = (mRecordingHeapHead + 1) % mRecordingHeapCount;
mRecordingHeapFree--;
ALOGVV("%s: Camera %d: Timestamp %lld",
__FUNCTION__, mId, timestamp);
ssize_t offset;
size_t size;
sp<IMemoryHeap> heap =
mRecordingHeap->mBuffers[heapIdx]->getMemory(&offset,
&size);
VideoNativeMetadata *payload = reinterpret_cast<VideoNativeMetadata*>(
(uint8_t*)heap->getBase() + offset);
payload->eType = kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer;
payload->pBuffer = imgBuffer.mGraphicBuffer->getNativeBuffer();
payload->nFenceFd = -1;
ALOGVV("%s: Camera %d: Sending out ANWBuffer %p",
__FUNCTION__, mId, payload->pBuffer);
mRecordingBuffers.replaceAt(imgBuffer, heapIdx);
recordingHeap = mRecordingHeap;
}
Camera2Client::SharedCameraCallbacks::Lock l(client->mSharedCameraCallbacks);
if (l.mRemoteCallback != 0) {
l.mRemoteCallback->dataCallbackTimestamp(timestamp,
CAMERA_MSG_VIDEO_FRAME,
recordingHeap->mBuffers[heapIdx]);
} else {
ALOGW("%s: Camera %d: Remote callback gone", __FUNCTION__, mId);
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderBox::computeBorderBoxLogicalHeight(LayoutUnit height) const
{
LayoutUnit bordersPlusPadding = borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight();
if (style()->boxSizing() == CONTENT_BOX)
return height + bordersPlusPadding;
return max(height, bordersPlusPadding);
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 26,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_os_callouts(bt_os_callouts_t *callouts) {
bt_os_callouts = callouts;
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,406 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline cputime_t cputime_div_non_zero(cputime_t time, unsigned long div)
{
cputime_t res = cputime_div(time, div);
return max_t(cputime_t, res, 1);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,070 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void i8042_controller_reset(bool s2r_wants_reset)
{
i8042_flush();
/*
* Disable both KBD and AUX interfaces so they don't get in the way
*/
i8042_ctr |= I8042_CTR_KBDDIS | I8042_CTR_AUXDIS;
i8042_ctr &= ~(I8042_CTR_KBDINT | I8042_CTR_AUXINT);
if (i8042_command(&i8042_ctr, I8042_CMD_CTL_WCTR))
pr_warn("Can't write CTR while resetting\n");
/*
* Disable MUX mode if present.
*/
if (i8042_mux_present)
i8042_set_mux_mode(false, NULL);
/*
* Reset the controller if requested.
*/
if (i8042_reset == I8042_RESET_ALWAYS ||
(i8042_reset == I8042_RESET_ON_S2RAM && s2r_wants_reset)) {
i8042_controller_selftest();
}
/*
* Restore the original control register setting.
*/
if (i8042_command(&i8042_initial_ctr, I8042_CMD_CTL_WCTR))
pr_warn("Can't restore CTR\n");
}
Commit Message: Input: i8042 - fix crash at boot time
The driver checks port->exists twice in i8042_interrupt(), first when
trying to assign temporary "serio" variable, and second time when deciding
whether it should call serio_interrupt(). The value of port->exists may
change between the 2 checks, and we may end up calling serio_interrupt()
with a NULL pointer:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050
IP: [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file:
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-358.el6.x86_64 #1 QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8150feaf>] [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
RSP: 0018:ffff880028203cc0 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000282 RSI: 0000000000000098 RDI: 0000000000000050
RBP: ffff880028203cc0 R08: ffff88013e79c000 R09: ffff880028203ee0
R10: 0000000000000298 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 0000000000000050
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000098
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000001407f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 1, threadinfo ffff88013e79c000, task ffff88013e79b500)
Stack:
ffff880028203d00 ffffffff813de186 ffffffffffffff02 0000000000000000
<d> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000098
<d> ffff880028203d70 ffffffff813e0162 ffff880028203d20 ffffffff8103b8ac
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff813de186>] serio_interrupt+0x36/0xa0
[<ffffffff813e0162>] i8042_interrupt+0x132/0x3a0
[<ffffffff8103b8ac>] ? kvm_clock_read+0x1c/0x20
[<ffffffff8103b8b9>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff810e1640>] handle_IRQ_event+0x60/0x170
[<ffffffff8103b154>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x44/0x50
[<ffffffff810e3d8e>] handle_edge_irq+0xde/0x180
[<ffffffff8100de89>] handle_irq+0x49/0xa0
[<ffffffff81516c8c>] do_IRQ+0x6c/0xf0
[<ffffffff8100b9d3>] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x11
[<ffffffff81076f63>] ? __do_softirq+0x73/0x1e0
[<ffffffff8109b75b>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x14b/0x260
[<ffffffff8100c1cc>] ? call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
[<ffffffff8100de05>] ? do_softirq+0x65/0xa0
[<ffffffff81076d95>] ? irq_exit+0x85/0x90
[<ffffffff81516d80>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x9b
[<ffffffff8100bb93>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x13/0x20
To avoid the issue let's change the second check to test whether serio is
NULL or not.
Also, let's take i8042_lock in i8042_start() and i8042_stop() instead of
trying to be overly smart and using memory barriers.
Signed-off-by: Chen Hong <chenhong3@huawei.com>
[dtor: take lock in i8042_start()/i8042_stop()]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 11,244 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int open_input(HLSContext *c, struct playlist *pls, struct segment *seg)
{
AVDictionary *opts = NULL;
int ret;
int is_http = 0;
av_dict_set(&opts, "user_agent", c->user_agent, 0);
av_dict_set(&opts, "cookies", c->cookies, 0);
av_dict_set(&opts, "headers", c->headers, 0);
av_dict_set(&opts, "http_proxy", c->http_proxy, 0);
av_dict_set(&opts, "seekable", "0", 0);
if (seg->size >= 0) {
/* try to restrict the HTTP request to the part we want
* (if this is in fact a HTTP request) */
av_dict_set_int(&opts, "offset", seg->url_offset, 0);
av_dict_set_int(&opts, "end_offset", seg->url_offset + seg->size, 0);
}
av_log(pls->parent, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "HLS request for url '%s', offset %"PRId64", playlist %d\n",
seg->url, seg->url_offset, pls->index);
if (seg->key_type == KEY_NONE) {
ret = open_url(pls->parent, &pls->input, seg->url, c->avio_opts, opts, &is_http);
} else if (seg->key_type == KEY_AES_128) {
AVDictionary *opts2 = NULL;
char iv[33], key[33], url[MAX_URL_SIZE];
if (strcmp(seg->key, pls->key_url)) {
AVIOContext *pb;
if (open_url(pls->parent, &pb, seg->key, c->avio_opts, opts, NULL) == 0) {
ret = avio_read(pb, pls->key, sizeof(pls->key));
if (ret != sizeof(pls->key)) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unable to read key file %s\n",
seg->key);
}
ff_format_io_close(pls->parent, &pb);
} else {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unable to open key file %s\n",
seg->key);
}
av_strlcpy(pls->key_url, seg->key, sizeof(pls->key_url));
}
ff_data_to_hex(iv, seg->iv, sizeof(seg->iv), 0);
ff_data_to_hex(key, pls->key, sizeof(pls->key), 0);
iv[32] = key[32] = '\0';
if (strstr(seg->url, "://"))
snprintf(url, sizeof(url), "crypto+%s", seg->url);
else
snprintf(url, sizeof(url), "crypto:%s", seg->url);
av_dict_copy(&opts2, c->avio_opts, 0);
av_dict_set(&opts2, "key", key, 0);
av_dict_set(&opts2, "iv", iv, 0);
ret = open_url(pls->parent, &pls->input, url, opts2, opts, &is_http);
av_dict_free(&opts2);
if (ret < 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
ret = 0;
} else if (seg->key_type == KEY_SAMPLE_AES) {
av_log(pls->parent, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"SAMPLE-AES encryption is not supported yet\n");
ret = AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
else
ret = AVERROR(ENOSYS);
/* Seek to the requested position. If this was a HTTP request, the offset
* should already be where want it to, but this allows e.g. local testing
* without a HTTP server.
*
* This is not done for HTTP at all as avio_seek() does internal bookkeeping
* of file offset which is out-of-sync with the actual offset when "offset"
* AVOption is used with http protocol, causing the seek to not be a no-op
* as would be expected. Wrong offset received from the server will not be
* noticed without the call, though.
*/
if (ret == 0 && !is_http && seg->key_type == KEY_NONE && seg->url_offset) {
int64_t seekret = avio_seek(pls->input, seg->url_offset, SEEK_SET);
if (seekret < 0) {
av_log(pls->parent, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unable to seek to offset %"PRId64" of HLS segment '%s'\n", seg->url_offset, seg->url);
ret = seekret;
ff_format_io_close(pls->parent, &pls->input);
}
}
cleanup:
av_dict_free(&opts);
pls->cur_seg_offset = 0;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <lingjiujianke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 27,519 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _setup_step_complete_msg(slurm_msg_t *msg, void *data)
{
slurm_msg_t_init(msg);
msg->msg_type = REQUEST_STEP_COMPLETE;
msg->data = data;
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 28,955 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoundPool::pause(int channelID)
{
ALOGV("pause(%d)", channelID);
Mutex::Autolock lock(&mLock);
SoundChannel* channel = findChannel(channelID);
if (channel) {
channel->pause();
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE SoundPool: add lock for findSample access from SoundPoolThread
Sample decoding still occurs in SoundPoolThread
without holding the SoundPool lock.
Bug: 25781119
Change-Id: I11fde005aa9cf5438e0390a0d2dfe0ec1dd282e8
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 5,266 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionServiceBackend::ReportExtensionLoadError(
const FilePath& extension_path, const std::string &error) {
CHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (frontend_.get())
frontend_->ReportExtensionLoadError(
extension_path, error, NotificationType::EXTENSION_INSTALL_ERROR,
true /* alert_on_error */);
}
Commit Message: Unrevert: Show the install dialog for the initial load of an unpacked extension
with plugins.
First landing broke some browser tests.
BUG=83273
TEST=in the extensions managmenet page, with developer mode enabled, Load an unpacked extension on an extension with NPAPI plugins. You should get an install dialog.
TBR=mihaip
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87738 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_reserved_cluster_alloc(struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t lblk_start,
unsigned int num_blks)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
ext4_lblk_t alloc_cluster_start, alloc_cluster_end;
ext4_lblk_t lblk_from, lblk_to, c_offset;
unsigned int allocated_clusters = 0;
alloc_cluster_start = EXT4_B2C(sbi, lblk_start);
alloc_cluster_end = EXT4_B2C(sbi, lblk_start + num_blks - 1);
/* max possible clusters for this allocation */
allocated_clusters = alloc_cluster_end - alloc_cluster_start + 1;
trace_ext4_get_reserved_cluster_alloc(inode, lblk_start, num_blks);
/* Check towards left side */
c_offset = lblk_start & (sbi->s_cluster_ratio - 1);
if (c_offset) {
lblk_from = lblk_start & (~(sbi->s_cluster_ratio - 1));
lblk_to = lblk_from + c_offset - 1;
if (ext4_find_delalloc_range(inode, lblk_from, lblk_to, 0))
allocated_clusters--;
}
/* Now check towards right. */
c_offset = (lblk_start + num_blks) & (sbi->s_cluster_ratio - 1);
if (allocated_clusters && c_offset) {
lblk_from = lblk_start + num_blks;
lblk_to = lblk_from + (sbi->s_cluster_ratio - c_offset) - 1;
if (ext4_find_delalloc_range(inode, lblk_from, lblk_to, 0))
allocated_clusters--;
}
return allocated_clusters;
}
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 5,240 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentRendererClient::DidCreateScriptContext(WebFrame* frame) {
EventBindings::HandleContextCreated(
frame, false, extension_dispatcher_.get());
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char* menu_cache_item_get_file_basename( MenuCacheItem* item )
{
return item->file_name;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,857 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnShowDisambiguationPopup(
const gfx::Rect& rect_pixels,
const gfx::Size& size,
const cc::SharedBitmapId& id) {
DCHECK(!rect_pixels.IsEmpty());
DCHECK(!size.IsEmpty());
scoped_ptr<cc::SharedBitmap> bitmap =
HostSharedBitmapManager::current()->GetSharedBitmapFromId(size, id);
if (!bitmap) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(GetProcess(),
bad_message::RWH_SHARED_BITMAP);
return;
}
DCHECK(bitmap->pixels());
SkImageInfo info = SkImageInfo::MakeN32Premul(size.width(), size.height());
SkBitmap zoomed_bitmap;
zoomed_bitmap.installPixels(info, bitmap->pixels(), info.minRowBytes());
if (view_)
view_->ShowDisambiguationPopup(rect_pixels, zoomed_bitmap);
zoomed_bitmap.setPixels(0);
Send(new ViewMsg_ReleaseDisambiguationPopupBitmap(GetRoutingID(), id));
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
{
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
}
Commit Message: apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's
(interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always
a single page was violated.
The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write()
will reject anything larger, but for the sake of robustness we can keep
it in.
SMACK and SELinux look safe to me, but somebody else should probably
have a look just in case.
Based on original patch from Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
modified for the case that apparmor provides null termination.
Fixes: bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::readUniqueFileDescriptorVector(std::vector<ScopedFd>* val) const {
return readTypedVector(val, &Parcel::readUniqueFileDescriptor);
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DevToolsAgentHostImpl::DetachClient(DevToolsAgentHostClient* client) {
if (!SessionByClient(client))
return false;
scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHostImpl> protect(this);
InnerDetachClient(client);
return true;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,331 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool check_transfer_bounds(struct vrend_resource *res,
const struct vrend_transfer_info *info)
{
int lwidth, lheight;
/* check mipmap level is in bounds */
if (info->level > res->base.last_level)
return false;
if (info->box->x < 0 || info->box->y < 0)
return false;
/* these will catch bad y/z/w/d with 1D textures etc */
lwidth = u_minify(res->base.width0, info->level);
if (info->box->width > lwidth)
return false;
if (info->box->x > lwidth)
return false;
if (info->box->width + info->box->x > lwidth)
return false;
lheight = u_minify(res->base.height0, info->level);
if (info->box->height > lheight)
return false;
if (info->box->y > lheight)
return false;
if (info->box->height + info->box->y > lheight)
return false;
if (res->base.target == PIPE_TEXTURE_3D) {
int ldepth = u_minify(res->base.depth0, info->level);
if (info->box->depth > ldepth)
return false;
if (info->box->z > ldepth)
return false;
if (info->box->z + info->box->depth > ldepth)
return false;
} else {
if (info->box->depth > res->base.array_size)
return false;
if (info->box->z > res->base.array_size)
return false;
if (info->box->z + info->box->depth > res->base.array_size)
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 18,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::SetDelegate(DownloadManagerDelegate* delegate) {
delegate_ = delegate;
}
Commit Message: Early return if a download Id is already used when creating a download
This is protect against download Id overflow and use-after-free
issue.
BUG=958533
Change-Id: I2c183493cb09106686df9822b3987bfb95bcf720
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1591485
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#656910}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 8,757 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rdpCredssp* credssp_new(freerdp* instance, rdpTransport* transport, rdpSettings* settings)
{
rdpCredssp* credssp;
credssp = (rdpCredssp*) malloc(sizeof(rdpCredssp));
ZeroMemory(credssp, sizeof(rdpCredssp));
if (credssp != NULL)
{
HKEY hKey;
LONG status;
DWORD dwType;
DWORD dwSize;
credssp->instance = instance;
credssp->settings = settings;
credssp->server = settings->ServerMode;
credssp->transport = transport;
credssp->send_seq_num = 0;
credssp->recv_seq_num = 0;
ZeroMemory(&credssp->negoToken, sizeof(SecBuffer));
ZeroMemory(&credssp->pubKeyAuth, sizeof(SecBuffer));
ZeroMemory(&credssp->authInfo, sizeof(SecBuffer));
if (credssp->server)
{
status = RegOpenKeyEx(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, _T("Software\\FreeRDP\\Server"),
0, KEY_READ | KEY_WOW64_64KEY, &hKey);
if (status == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
status = RegQueryValueEx(hKey, _T("SspiModule"), NULL, &dwType, NULL, &dwSize);
if (status == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
credssp->SspiModule = (LPTSTR) malloc(dwSize + sizeof(TCHAR));
status = RegQueryValueEx(hKey, _T("SspiModule"), NULL, &dwType,
(BYTE*) credssp->SspiModule, &dwSize);
if (status == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
_tprintf(_T("Using SSPI Module: %s\n"), credssp->SspiModule);
RegCloseKey(hKey);
}
}
}
}
}
return credssp;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 27,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _gnutls_compressed2ciphertext (gnutls_session_t session,
opaque * cipher_data, int cipher_size,
gnutls_datum_t compressed,
content_type_t _type, int random_pad)
{
uint8_t MAC[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
uint16_t c_length;
uint8_t pad;
int length, ret;
digest_hd_st td;
uint8_t type = _type;
uint8_t major, minor;
int hash_size =
_gnutls_hash_get_algo_len (session->security_parameters.
write_mac_algorithm);
gnutls_protocol_t ver;
int blocksize =
_gnutls_cipher_get_block_size (session->security_parameters.
write_bulk_cipher_algorithm);
cipher_type_t block_algo =
_gnutls_cipher_is_block (session->security_parameters.
write_bulk_cipher_algorithm);
opaque *data_ptr;
ver = gnutls_protocol_get_version (session);
minor = _gnutls_version_get_minor (ver);
major = _gnutls_version_get_major (ver);
/* Initialize MAC */
ret = mac_init (&td, session->security_parameters.write_mac_algorithm,
session->connection_state.write_mac_secret.data,
session->connection_state.write_mac_secret.size, ver);
if (ret < 0 && session->security_parameters.write_mac_algorithm != GNUTLS_MAC_NULL)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
c_length = _gnutls_conv_uint16 (compressed.size);
if (session->security_parameters.write_mac_algorithm != GNUTLS_MAC_NULL)
{ /* actually when the algorithm in not the NULL one */
_gnutls_hmac (&td,
UINT64DATA (session->connection_state.
write_sequence_number), 8);
_gnutls_hmac (&td, &type, 1);
if (ver >= GNUTLS_TLS1)
{ /* TLS 1.0 or higher */
_gnutls_hmac (&td, &major, 1);
_gnutls_hmac (&td, &minor, 1);
}
_gnutls_hmac (&td, &c_length, 2);
_gnutls_hmac (&td, compressed.data, compressed.size);
mac_deinit (&td, MAC, ver);
}
/* Calculate the encrypted length (padding etc.)
*/
length =
calc_enc_length (session, compressed.size, hash_size, &pad,
random_pad, block_algo, blocksize);
if (length < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return length;
}
/* copy the encrypted data to cipher_data.
*/
if (cipher_size < length)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
}
data_ptr = cipher_data;
if (block_algo == CIPHER_BLOCK &&
session->security_parameters.version >= GNUTLS_TLS1_1)
{
/* copy the random IV.
*/
ret = _gnutls_rnd (RND_NONCE, data_ptr, blocksize);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
data_ptr += blocksize;
}
memcpy (data_ptr, compressed.data, compressed.size);
data_ptr += compressed.size;
if (hash_size > 0)
{
memcpy (data_ptr, MAC, hash_size);
data_ptr += hash_size;
}
if (block_algo == CIPHER_BLOCK && pad > 0)
{
memset (data_ptr, pad - 1, pad);
}
/* Actual encryption (inplace).
*/
ret = _gnutls_cipher_encrypt (&session->connection_state.
write_cipher_state, cipher_data, length);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
return length;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 16,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int shmctl_nolock(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int shmid,
int cmd, int version, void __user *buf)
{
int err;
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
/* preliminary security checks for *_INFO */
if (cmd == IPC_INFO || cmd == SHM_INFO) {
err = security_shm_shmctl(NULL, cmd);
if (err)
return err;
}
switch (cmd) {
case IPC_INFO:
{
struct shminfo64 shminfo;
memset(&shminfo, 0, sizeof(shminfo));
shminfo.shmmni = shminfo.shmseg = ns->shm_ctlmni;
shminfo.shmmax = ns->shm_ctlmax;
shminfo.shmall = ns->shm_ctlall;
shminfo.shmmin = SHMMIN;
if (copy_shminfo_to_user(buf, &shminfo, version))
return -EFAULT;
down_read(&shm_ids(ns).rwsem);
err = ipc_get_maxid(&shm_ids(ns));
up_read(&shm_ids(ns).rwsem);
if (err < 0)
err = 0;
goto out;
}
case SHM_INFO:
{
struct shm_info shm_info;
memset(&shm_info, 0, sizeof(shm_info));
down_read(&shm_ids(ns).rwsem);
shm_info.used_ids = shm_ids(ns).in_use;
shm_get_stat(ns, &shm_info.shm_rss, &shm_info.shm_swp);
shm_info.shm_tot = ns->shm_tot;
shm_info.swap_attempts = 0;
shm_info.swap_successes = 0;
err = ipc_get_maxid(&shm_ids(ns));
up_read(&shm_ids(ns).rwsem);
if (copy_to_user(buf, &shm_info, sizeof(shm_info))) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
err = err < 0 ? 0 : err;
goto out;
}
case SHM_STAT:
case IPC_STAT:
{
struct shmid64_ds tbuf;
int result;
rcu_read_lock();
if (cmd == SHM_STAT) {
shp = shm_obtain_object(ns, shmid);
if (IS_ERR(shp)) {
err = PTR_ERR(shp);
goto out_unlock;
}
result = shp->shm_perm.id;
} else {
shp = shm_obtain_object_check(ns, shmid);
if (IS_ERR(shp)) {
err = PTR_ERR(shp);
goto out_unlock;
}
result = 0;
}
err = -EACCES;
if (ipcperms(ns, &shp->shm_perm, S_IRUGO))
goto out_unlock;
err = security_shm_shmctl(shp, cmd);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
memset(&tbuf, 0, sizeof(tbuf));
kernel_to_ipc64_perm(&shp->shm_perm, &tbuf.shm_perm);
tbuf.shm_segsz = shp->shm_segsz;
tbuf.shm_atime = shp->shm_atim;
tbuf.shm_dtime = shp->shm_dtim;
tbuf.shm_ctime = shp->shm_ctim;
tbuf.shm_cpid = shp->shm_cprid;
tbuf.shm_lpid = shp->shm_lprid;
tbuf.shm_nattch = shp->shm_nattch;
rcu_read_unlock();
if (copy_shmid_to_user(buf, &tbuf, version))
err = -EFAULT;
else
err = result;
goto out;
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid()
As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before
having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC
object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work,
that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen.
We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329:
"ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we
clearly forgot about msg and shm.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 21,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit sha512_ssse3_mod_fini(void)
{
crypto_unregister_shashes(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs));
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 28,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int64 TypedUrlModelAssociator::GetSyncIdFromChromeId(
const std::string& typed_url) {
TypedUrlToSyncIdMap::const_iterator iter = id_map_.find(typed_url);
return iter == id_map_.end() ? sync_api::kInvalidId : iter->second;
}
Commit Message: Now ignores obsolete sync nodes without visit transitions.
Also removed assertion that was erroneously triggered by obsolete sync nodes.
BUG=none
TEST=run chrome against a database that contains obsolete typed url sync nodes.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7129069
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88846 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseDrmSINF(
off64_t * /* offset */, off64_t data_offset) {
uint8_t updateIdTag;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &updateIdTag, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset ++;
if (0x01/*OBJECT_DESCRIPTOR_UPDATE_ID_TAG*/ != updateIdTag) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t numOfBytes;
int32_t size = readSize(data_offset, mDataSource, &numOfBytes);
if (size < 0) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
int32_t classSize = size;
data_offset += numOfBytes;
while(size >= 11 ) {
uint8_t descriptorTag;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &descriptorTag, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset ++;
if (0x11/*OBJECT_DESCRIPTOR_ID_TAG*/ != descriptorTag) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, buffer, 2) < 2) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset += 2;
if ((buffer[1] >> 5) & 0x0001) { //url flag is set
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, buffer, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset += 8;
if ((0x0F/*ES_ID_REF_TAG*/ != buffer[1])
|| ( 0x0A/*IPMP_DESCRIPTOR_POINTER_ID_TAG*/ != buffer[5])) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
SINF *sinf = new SINF;
sinf->trackID = U16_AT(&buffer[3]);
sinf->IPMPDescriptorID = buffer[7];
sinf->next = mFirstSINF;
mFirstSINF = sinf;
size -= (8 + 2 + 1);
}
if (size != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &updateIdTag, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset ++;
if(0x05/*IPMP_DESCRIPTOR_UPDATE_ID_TAG*/ != updateIdTag) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
size = readSize(data_offset, mDataSource, &numOfBytes);
if (size < 0) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
classSize = size;
data_offset += numOfBytes;
while (size > 0) {
uint8_t tag;
int32_t dataLen;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &tag, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset ++;
if (0x0B/*IPMP_DESCRIPTOR_ID_TAG*/ == tag) {
uint8_t id;
dataLen = readSize(data_offset, mDataSource, &numOfBytes);
if (dataLen < 0) {
return ERROR_IO;
} else if (dataLen < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
data_offset += numOfBytes;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &id, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset ++;
SINF *sinf = mFirstSINF;
while (sinf && (sinf->IPMPDescriptorID != id)) {
sinf = sinf->next;
}
if (sinf == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
sinf->len = dataLen - 3;
sinf->IPMPData = new (std::nothrow) char[sinf->len];
if (sinf->IPMPData == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
data_offset += 2;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, sinf->IPMPData, sinf->len) < sinf->len) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset += sinf->len;
size -= (dataLen + numOfBytes + 1);
}
}
if (size != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // Return a dummy error.
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor.cpp: handle chunk_size > SIZE_MAX
chunk_size is a uint64_t, so it can legitimately be bigger
than SIZE_MAX, which would cause the subtraction to underflow.
https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=182251
Bug: 23034759
Change-Id: Ic1637fb26bf6edb0feb1bcf2876fd370db1ed547
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tcp_reset(struct sock *sk)
{
/* We want the right error as BSD sees it (and indeed as we do). */
switch (sk->sk_state) {
case TCP_SYN_SENT:
sk->sk_err = ECONNREFUSED;
break;
case TCP_CLOSE_WAIT:
sk->sk_err = EPIPE;
break;
case TCP_CLOSE:
return;
default:
sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET;
}
/* This barrier is coupled with smp_rmb() in tcp_poll() */
smp_wmb();
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
tcp_done(sk);
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,577 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Bluetooth::Bluetooth(ExecutionContext* context)
: ContextLifecycleObserver(context),
PageVisibilityObserver(To<Document>(context)->GetPage()) {}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double Performance::ClampTimeResolution(double time_seconds) {
DEFINE_THREAD_SAFE_STATIC_LOCAL(TimeClamper, clamper, ());
return clamper.ClampTimeResolution(time_seconds);
}
Commit Message: Fix timing allow check algorithm for service workers
This CL uses the OriginalURLViaServiceWorker() in the timing allow check
algorithm if the response WasFetchedViaServiceWorker(). This way, if a
service worker changes a same origin request to become cross origin,
then the timing allow check algorithm will still fail.
resource-timing-worker.js is changed so it avoids an empty Response,
which is an odd case in terms of same origin checks.
Bug: 837275
Change-Id: I7e497a6fcc2ee14244121b915ca5f5cceded417a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1038229
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <npm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>
Reviewed-by: Timothy Dresser <tdresser@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#555476}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 17,675 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(session_id)
{
char *name = NULL;
int name_len, argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "|s", &name, &name_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (PS(id)) {
RETVAL_STRING(PS(id), 1);
} else {
RETVAL_EMPTY_STRING();
}
if (name) {
if (PS(id)) {
efree(PS(id));
}
PS(id) = estrndup(name, name_len);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 24,789 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppCacheHost::OnGroupLoaded(AppCacheGroup* group,
const GURL& manifest_url) {
DCHECK(manifest_url == pending_selected_manifest_url_);
pending_selected_manifest_url_ = GURL();
FinishCacheSelection(NULL, group);
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Widget::MoveLoopResult DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::RunMoveLoop(
const gfx::Vector2d& drag_offset,
Widget::MoveLoopSource source,
Widget::MoveLoopEscapeBehavior escape_behavior) {
wm::WindowMoveSource window_move_source =
source == Widget::MOVE_LOOP_SOURCE_MOUSE ? wm::WINDOW_MOVE_SOURCE_MOUSE
: wm::WINDOW_MOVE_SOURCE_TOUCH;
if (x11_window_move_client_->RunMoveLoop(content_window(), drag_offset,
window_move_source) ==
wm::MOVE_SUCCESSFUL)
return Widget::MOVE_LOOP_SUCCESSFUL;
return Widget::MOVE_LOOP_CANCELED;
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 10,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void JSTestEventTarget::getOwnPropertyNames(JSObject* object, ExecState* exec, PropertyNameArray& propertyNames, EnumerationMode mode)
{
JSTestEventTarget* thisObject = jsCast<JSTestEventTarget*>(object);
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(thisObject, &s_info);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < static_cast<TestEventTarget*>(thisObject->impl())->length(); ++i)
propertyNames.add(Identifier::from(exec, i));
Base::getOwnPropertyNames(thisObject, exec, propertyNames, mode);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unistr(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *s, uint32_t *len, int use_unicode)
{
static char buf[MAX_UNISTR_SIZE+1];
size_t l = 0;
uint32_t strsize;
const u_char *sp;
if (use_unicode) {
/*
* Skip padding that puts the string on an even boundary.
*/
if (((s - startbuf) % 2) != 0) {
ND_TCHECK(s[0]);
s++;
}
}
if (*len == 0) {
/*
* Null-terminated string.
*/
strsize = 0;
sp = s;
if (!use_unicode) {
for (;;) {
ND_TCHECK(sp[0]);
*len += 1;
if (sp[0] == 0)
break;
sp++;
}
strsize = *len - 1;
} else {
for (;;) {
ND_TCHECK2(sp[0], 2);
*len += 2;
if (sp[0] == 0 && sp[1] == 0)
break;
sp += 2;
}
strsize = *len - 2;
}
} else {
/*
* Counted string.
*/
strsize = *len;
}
if (!use_unicode) {
while (strsize != 0) {
ND_TCHECK(s[0]);
if (l >= MAX_UNISTR_SIZE)
break;
if (ND_ISPRINT(s[0]))
buf[l] = s[0];
else {
if (s[0] == 0)
break;
buf[l] = '.';
}
l++;
s++;
strsize--;
}
} else {
while (strsize != 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(s[0], 2);
if (l >= MAX_UNISTR_SIZE)
break;
if (s[1] == 0 && ND_ISPRINT(s[0])) {
/* It's a printable ASCII character */
buf[l] = s[0];
} else {
/* It's a non-ASCII character or a non-printable ASCII character */
if (s[0] == 0 && s[1] == 0)
break;
buf[l] = '.';
}
l++;
s += 2;
if (strsize == 1)
break;
strsize -= 2;
}
}
buf[l] = 0;
return buf;
trunc:
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12893/SMB/CIFS: Add a bounds check in name_len().
After we advance the pointer by the length value in the buffer, make
sure it points to something in the captured data.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 16,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: htmlAutoCloseTag(htmlDocPtr doc, const xmlChar *name, htmlNodePtr elem) {
htmlNodePtr child;
if (elem == NULL) return(1);
if (xmlStrEqual(name, elem->name)) return(0);
if (htmlCheckAutoClose(elem->name, name)) return(1);
child = elem->children;
while (child != NULL) {
if (htmlAutoCloseTag(doc, name, child)) return(1);
child = child->next;
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 11,515 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nested_get_vmcs12_pages(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct page *page;
u64 hpa;
if (nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)) {
/*
* Translate L1 physical address to host physical
* address for vmcs02. Keep the page pinned, so this
* physical address remains valid. We keep a reference
* to it so we can release it later.
*/
if (vmx->nested.apic_access_page) { /* shouldn't happen */
kvm_release_page_dirty(vmx->nested.apic_access_page);
vmx->nested.apic_access_page = NULL;
}
page = kvm_vcpu_gpa_to_page(vcpu, vmcs12->apic_access_addr);
/*
* If translation failed, no matter: This feature asks
* to exit when accessing the given address, and if it
* can never be accessed, this feature won't do
* anything anyway.
*/
if (!is_error_page(page)) {
vmx->nested.apic_access_page = page;
hpa = page_to_phys(vmx->nested.apic_access_page);
vmcs_write64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR, hpa);
} else {
vmcs_clear_bits(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES);
}
}
if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)) {
if (vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page) { /* shouldn't happen */
kvm_release_page_dirty(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page);
vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page = NULL;
}
page = kvm_vcpu_gpa_to_page(vcpu, vmcs12->virtual_apic_page_addr);
/*
* If translation failed, VM entry will fail because
* prepare_vmcs02 set VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR to -1ull.
* Failing the vm entry is _not_ what the processor
* does but it's basically the only possibility we
* have. We could still enter the guest if CR8 load
* exits are enabled, CR8 store exits are enabled, and
* virtualize APIC access is disabled; in this case
* the processor would never use the TPR shadow and we
* could simply clear the bit from the execution
* control. But such a configuration is useless, so
* let's keep the code simple.
*/
if (!is_error_page(page)) {
vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page = page;
hpa = page_to_phys(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page);
vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR, hpa);
}
}
if (nested_cpu_has_posted_intr(vmcs12)) {
if (vmx->nested.pi_desc_page) { /* shouldn't happen */
kunmap(vmx->nested.pi_desc_page);
kvm_release_page_dirty(vmx->nested.pi_desc_page);
vmx->nested.pi_desc_page = NULL;
}
page = kvm_vcpu_gpa_to_page(vcpu, vmcs12->posted_intr_desc_addr);
if (is_error_page(page))
return;
vmx->nested.pi_desc_page = page;
vmx->nested.pi_desc = kmap(vmx->nested.pi_desc_page);
vmx->nested.pi_desc =
(struct pi_desc *)((void *)vmx->nested.pi_desc +
(unsigned long)(vmcs12->posted_intr_desc_addr &
(PAGE_SIZE - 1)));
vmcs_write64(POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR,
page_to_phys(vmx->nested.pi_desc_page) +
(unsigned long)(vmcs12->posted_intr_desc_addr &
(PAGE_SIZE - 1)));
}
if (nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap(vcpu, vmcs12))
vmcs_set_bits(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS);
else
vmcs_clear_bits(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLButtonElement::isInteractiveContent() const
{
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *columnTypeImpl(
NameContext *pNC,
#ifndef SQLITE_ENABLE_COLUMN_METADATA
Expr *pExpr
#else
Expr *pExpr,
const char **pzOrigDb,
const char **pzOrigTab,
const char **pzOrigCol
#endif
){
char const *zType = 0;
int j;
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_COLUMN_METADATA
char const *zOrigDb = 0;
char const *zOrigTab = 0;
char const *zOrigCol = 0;
#endif
assert( pExpr!=0 );
assert( pNC->pSrcList!=0 );
assert( pExpr->op!=TK_AGG_COLUMN ); /* This routine runes before aggregates
** are processed */
switch( pExpr->op ){
case TK_COLUMN: {
/* The expression is a column. Locate the table the column is being
** extracted from in NameContext.pSrcList. This table may be real
** database table or a subquery.
*/
Table *pTab = 0; /* Table structure column is extracted from */
Select *pS = 0; /* Select the column is extracted from */
int iCol = pExpr->iColumn; /* Index of column in pTab */
while( pNC && !pTab ){
SrcList *pTabList = pNC->pSrcList;
for(j=0;j<pTabList->nSrc && pTabList->a[j].iCursor!=pExpr->iTable;j++);
if( j<pTabList->nSrc ){
pTab = pTabList->a[j].pTab;
pS = pTabList->a[j].pSelect;
}else{
pNC = pNC->pNext;
}
}
if( pTab==0 ){
/* At one time, code such as "SELECT new.x" within a trigger would
** cause this condition to run. Since then, we have restructured how
** trigger code is generated and so this condition is no longer
** possible. However, it can still be true for statements like
** the following:
**
** CREATE TABLE t1(col INTEGER);
** SELECT (SELECT t1.col) FROM FROM t1;
**
** when columnType() is called on the expression "t1.col" in the
** sub-select. In this case, set the column type to NULL, even
** though it should really be "INTEGER".
**
** This is not a problem, as the column type of "t1.col" is never
** used. When columnType() is called on the expression
** "(SELECT t1.col)", the correct type is returned (see the TK_SELECT
** branch below. */
break;
}
assert( pTab && pExpr->y.pTab==pTab );
if( pS ){
/* The "table" is actually a sub-select or a view in the FROM clause
** of the SELECT statement. Return the declaration type and origin
** data for the result-set column of the sub-select.
*/
if( iCol>=0 && iCol<pS->pEList->nExpr ){
/* If iCol is less than zero, then the expression requests the
** rowid of the sub-select or view. This expression is legal (see
** test case misc2.2.2) - it always evaluates to NULL.
*/
NameContext sNC;
Expr *p = pS->pEList->a[iCol].pExpr;
sNC.pSrcList = pS->pSrc;
sNC.pNext = pNC;
sNC.pParse = pNC->pParse;
zType = columnType(&sNC, p,&zOrigDb,&zOrigTab,&zOrigCol);
}
}else{
/* A real table or a CTE table */
assert( !pS );
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_COLUMN_METADATA
if( iCol<0 ) iCol = pTab->iPKey;
assert( iCol==XN_ROWID || (iCol>=0 && iCol<pTab->nCol) );
if( iCol<0 ){
zType = "INTEGER";
zOrigCol = "rowid";
}else{
zOrigCol = pTab->aCol[iCol].zName;
zType = sqlite3ColumnType(&pTab->aCol[iCol],0);
}
zOrigTab = pTab->zName;
if( pNC->pParse && pTab->pSchema ){
int iDb = sqlite3SchemaToIndex(pNC->pParse->db, pTab->pSchema);
zOrigDb = pNC->pParse->db->aDb[iDb].zDbSName;
}
#else
assert( iCol==XN_ROWID || (iCol>=0 && iCol<pTab->nCol) );
if( iCol<0 ){
zType = "INTEGER";
}else{
zType = sqlite3ColumnType(&pTab->aCol[iCol],0);
}
#endif
}
break;
}
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_SUBQUERY
case TK_SELECT: {
/* The expression is a sub-select. Return the declaration type and
** origin info for the single column in the result set of the SELECT
** statement.
*/
NameContext sNC;
Select *pS = pExpr->x.pSelect;
Expr *p = pS->pEList->a[0].pExpr;
assert( ExprHasProperty(pExpr, EP_xIsSelect) );
sNC.pSrcList = pS->pSrc;
sNC.pNext = pNC;
sNC.pParse = pNC->pParse;
zType = columnType(&sNC, p, &zOrigDb, &zOrigTab, &zOrigCol);
break;
}
#endif
}
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_COLUMN_METADATA
if( pzOrigDb ){
assert( pzOrigTab && pzOrigCol );
*pzOrigDb = zOrigDb;
*pzOrigTab = zOrigTab;
*pzOrigCol = zOrigCol;
}
#endif
return zType;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 14,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t read_extension(git_index *index, const char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
struct index_extension dest;
size_t total_size;
/* buffer is not guaranteed to be aligned */
memcpy(&dest, buffer, sizeof(struct index_extension));
dest.extension_size = ntohl(dest.extension_size);
total_size = dest.extension_size + sizeof(struct index_extension);
if (dest.extension_size > total_size ||
buffer_size < total_size ||
buffer_size - total_size < INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE)
return 0;
/* optional extension */
if (dest.signature[0] >= 'A' && dest.signature[0] <= 'Z') {
/* tree cache */
if (memcmp(dest.signature, INDEX_EXT_TREECACHE_SIG, 4) == 0) {
if (git_tree_cache_read(&index->tree, buffer + 8, dest.extension_size, &index->tree_pool) < 0)
return 0;
} else if (memcmp(dest.signature, INDEX_EXT_UNMERGED_SIG, 4) == 0) {
if (read_reuc(index, buffer + 8, dest.extension_size) < 0)
return 0;
} else if (memcmp(dest.signature, INDEX_EXT_CONFLICT_NAME_SIG, 4) == 0) {
if (read_conflict_names(index, buffer + 8, dest.extension_size) < 0)
return 0;
}
/* else, unsupported extension. We cannot parse this, but we can skip
* it by returning `total_size */
} else {
/* we cannot handle non-ignorable extensions;
* in fact they aren't even defined in the standard */
return 0;
}
return total_size;
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 24,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: getconfig(
int argc,
char ** argv
)
{
char line[MAXLINE];
#ifdef DEBUG
atexit(free_all_config_trees);
#endif
#ifndef SYS_WINNT
config_file = CONFIG_FILE;
#else
temp = CONFIG_FILE;
if (!ExpandEnvironmentStrings((LPCTSTR)temp, (LPTSTR)config_file_storage, (DWORD)sizeof(config_file_storage))) {
msyslog(LOG_ERR, "ExpandEnvironmentStrings CONFIG_FILE failed: %m\n");
exit(1);
}
config_file = config_file_storage;
temp = ALT_CONFIG_FILE;
if (!ExpandEnvironmentStrings((LPCTSTR)temp, (LPTSTR)alt_config_file_storage, (DWORD)sizeof(alt_config_file_storage))) {
msyslog(LOG_ERR, "ExpandEnvironmentStrings ALT_CONFIG_FILE failed: %m\n");
exit(1);
}
alt_config_file = alt_config_file_storage;
#endif /* SYS_WINNT */
/*
* install a non default variable with this daemon version
*/
snprintf(line, sizeof(line), "daemon_version=\"%s\"", Version);
set_sys_var(line, strlen(line)+1, RO);
/*
* Set up for the first time step to install a variable showing
* which syscall is being used to step.
*/
set_tod_using = &ntpd_set_tod_using;
/*
* On Windows, the variable has already been set, on the rest,
* initialize it to "UNKNOWN".
*/
#ifndef SYS_WINNT
strncpy(line, "settimeofday=\"UNKNOWN\"", sizeof(line));
set_sys_var(line, strlen(line) + 1, RO);
#endif
getCmdOpts(argc, argv);
init_syntax_tree(&cfgt);
curr_include_level = 0;
if (
(fp[curr_include_level] = F_OPEN(FindConfig(config_file), "r")) == NULL
#ifdef HAVE_NETINFO
/* If there is no config_file, try NetInfo. */
&& check_netinfo && !(config_netinfo = get_netinfo_config())
#endif /* HAVE_NETINFO */
) {
msyslog(LOG_INFO, "getconfig: Couldn't open <%s>", FindConfig(config_file));
#ifndef SYS_WINNT
io_open_sockets();
return;
#else
/* Under WinNT try alternate_config_file name, first NTP.CONF, then NTP.INI */
if ((fp[curr_include_level] = F_OPEN(FindConfig(alt_config_file), "r")) == NULL) {
/*
* Broadcast clients can sometimes run without
* a configuration file.
*/
msyslog(LOG_INFO, "getconfig: Couldn't open <%s>", FindConfig(alt_config_file));
io_open_sockets();
return;
}
cfgt.source.value.s = estrdup(alt_config_file);
#endif /* SYS_WINNT */
} else
cfgt.source.value.s = estrdup(config_file);
/*** BULK OF THE PARSER ***/
#ifdef DEBUG
yydebug = !!(debug >= 5);
#endif
ip_file = fp[curr_include_level];
yyparse();
DPRINTF(1, ("Finished Parsing!!\n"));
cfgt.source.attr = CONF_SOURCE_FILE;
cfgt.timestamp = time(NULL);
save_and_apply_config_tree();
while (curr_include_level != -1)
FCLOSE(fp[curr_include_level--]);
#ifdef HAVE_NETINFO
if (config_netinfo)
free_netinfo_config(config_netinfo);
#endif /* HAVE_NETINFO */
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void tcp_replace_ts_recent(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 seq)
{
if (tp->rx_opt.saw_tstamp && !after(seq, tp->rcv_wup)) {
/* PAWS bug workaround wrt. ACK frames, the PAWS discard
* extra check below makes sure this can only happen
* for pure ACK frames. -DaveM
*
* Not only, also it occurs for expired timestamps.
*/
if (tcp_paws_check(&tp->rx_opt, 0))
tcp_store_ts_recent(tp);
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void region16_clear(REGION16* region)
{
assert(region);
assert(region->data);
if ((region->data->size > 0) && (region->data != &empty_region))
free(region->data);
region->data = &empty_region;
ZeroMemory(®ion->extents, sizeof(region->extents));
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 15,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsCreditCardExpirationType(ServerFieldType type) {
return type == CREDIT_CARD_EXP_MONTH ||
type == CREDIT_CARD_EXP_2_DIGIT_YEAR ||
type == CREDIT_CARD_EXP_4_DIGIT_YEAR ||
type == CREDIT_CARD_EXP_DATE_2_DIGIT_YEAR ||
type == CREDIT_CARD_EXP_DATE_4_DIGIT_YEAR;
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int setcos_getdata(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_cardctl_setcos_data_obj* data_obj)
{
int r;
struct sc_apdu apdu;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
memset(&apdu, 0, sizeof(apdu));
apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT;
apdu.cla = 0x00;
apdu.ins = 0xCA; /* GET DATA */
apdu.p1 = data_obj->P1;
apdu.p2 = data_obj->P2;
apdu.lc = 0;
apdu.datalen = 0;
apdu.data = data_obj->Data;
apdu.le = 256;
apdu.resp = data_obj->Data;
apdu.resplen = data_obj->DataLen;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "GET_DATA returned error");
if (apdu.resplen > data_obj->DataLen)
r = SC_ERROR_WRONG_LENGTH;
else
data_obj->DataLen = apdu.resplen;
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 1,131 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HitTestCanvasResult* HTMLCanvasElement::GetControlAndIdIfHitRegionExists(
const LayoutPoint& location) {
if (Is2d())
return context_->GetControlAndIdIfHitRegionExists(location);
return HitTestCanvasResult::Create(String(), nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 1,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderProcessHost::run_renderer_in_process() {
return g_run_renderer_in_process_;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void edge_send(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = tty->driver_data;
int count, result;
struct edgeport_port *edge_port = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&edge_port->ep_lock, flags);
if (edge_port->ep_write_urb_in_use) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&edge_port->ep_lock, flags);
return;
}
count = kfifo_out(&edge_port->write_fifo,
port->write_urb->transfer_buffer,
port->bulk_out_size);
if (count == 0) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&edge_port->ep_lock, flags);
return;
}
edge_port->ep_write_urb_in_use = 1;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&edge_port->ep_lock, flags);
usb_serial_debug_data(&port->dev, __func__, count, port->write_urb->transfer_buffer);
/* set up our urb */
port->write_urb->transfer_buffer_length = count;
/* send the data out the bulk port */
result = usb_submit_urb(port->write_urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (result) {
dev_err_console(port,
"%s - failed submitting write urb, error %d\n",
__func__, result);
edge_port->ep_write_urb_in_use = 0;
/* TODO: reschedule edge_send */
} else
edge_port->icount.tx += count;
/* wakeup any process waiting for writes to complete */
/* there is now more room in the buffer for new writes */
if (tty)
tty_wakeup(tty);
}
Commit Message: USB: io_ti: Fix NULL dereference in chase_port()
The tty is NULL when the port is hanging up.
chase_port() needs to check for this.
This patch is intended for stable series.
The behavior was observed and tested in Linux 3.2 and 3.7.1.
Johan Hovold submitted a more elaborate patch for the mainline kernel.
[ 56.277883] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - nonzero read bulk status received: -84
[ 56.278811] usb 1-1: USB disconnect, device number 3
[ 56.278856] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - stopping read!
[ 56.279562] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8
[ 56.280536] IP: [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.281212] PGD 1dc1b067 PUD 1e0f7067 PMD 0
[ 56.282085] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 56.282744] Modules linked in:
[ 56.283512] CPU 1
[ 56.283512] Pid: 25, comm: khubd Not tainted 3.7.1 #1 innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox
[ 56.283512] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8144e62a>] [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP: 0018:ffff88001fa99ab0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 56.283512] RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: 00000000000001c8 RCX: 0000000000640064
[ 56.283512] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: ffff88001fa99b20 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] RBP: ffff88001fa99b20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff812fcb4c R12: ffff88001ddf53c0
[ 56.283512] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000001c8 R15: ffff88001e19b9f4
[ 56.283512] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8 CR3: 000000001dc51000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 56.283512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 56.283512] Process khubd (pid: 25, threadinfo ffff88001fa98000, task ffff88001fa94f80)
[ 56.283512] Stack:
[ 56.283512] 0000000000000046 00000000000001c8 ffffffff810578ec ffffffff812fcb4c
[ 56.283512] ffff88001e19b980 0000000000002710 ffffffff812ffe81 0000000000000001
[ 56.283512] ffff88001fa94f80 0000000000000202 ffffffff00000001 0000000000000296
[ 56.283512] Call Trace:
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810578ec>] ? add_wait_queue+0x12/0x3c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ffe81>] ? chase_port+0x84/0x2d6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81063f27>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x199/0x199
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81263a5c>] ? tty_ldisc_hangup+0x222/0x298
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81300171>] ? edge_close+0x64/0x129
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810612f7>] ? __wake_up+0x35/0x46
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8106135b>] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81264916>] ? tty_port_shutdown+0x39/0x44
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8125d38c>] ? __tty_hangup+0x307/0x351
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e6ddc>] ? usb_hcd_flush_endpoint+0xde/0xed
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144e625>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x14/0x35
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fd361>] ? usb_serial_disconnect+0x57/0xc2
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ea99b>] ? usb_unbind_interface+0x5c/0x131
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d738>] ? __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xd5
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d9cd>] ? device_release_driver+0x1a/0x25
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d393>] ? bus_remove_device+0xd2/0xe7
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128b7a3>] ? device_del+0x119/0x167
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e8d9d>] ? usb_disable_device+0x6a/0x180
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e2ae0>] ? usb_disconnect+0x81/0xe6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e4435>] ? hub_thread+0x577/0xe82
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144daa7>] ? __schedule+0x490/0x4be
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8105798f>] ? abort_exclusive_wait+0x79/0x79
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810570b4>] ? kthread+0x81/0x89
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8145387c>] ? ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] Code: 8b 7c 24 08 e8 17 0b c3 ff 48 8b 04 24 48 83 c4 10 c3 53 48 89 fb 41 50 e8 e0 0a c3 ff 48 89 04 24 e8 e7 0a c3 ff ba 00 00 01 00
<f0> 0f c1 13 48 8b 04 24 89 d1 c1 ea 10 66 39 d1 74 07 f3 90 66
[ 56.283512] RIP [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP <ffff88001fa99ab0>
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] ---[ end trace 49714df27e1679ce ]---
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Frisch <wfpub@roembden.net>
Cc: Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 19,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XRRScreenSize *XRRSizes(Display *dpy, int screen, int *nsizes)
{
XRRScreenConfiguration *config;
XExtDisplayInfo *info = XRRFindDisplay(dpy);
XRRScreenSize *sizes;
LockDisplay(dpy);
if ((config = _XRRValidateCache(dpy, info, screen))) {
*nsizes = config->nsizes;
sizes = config->sizes;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
return sizes;
}
else {
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
*nsizes = 0;
return NULL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 26,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rdp_send_input(uint32 time, uint16 message_type, uint16 device_flags, uint16 param1, uint16 param2)
{
STREAM s;
logger(Protocol, Debug, "%s()", __func__);
s = rdp_init_data(16);
out_uint16_le(s, 1); /* number of events */
out_uint16(s, 0); /* pad */
out_uint32_le(s, time);
out_uint16_le(s, message_type);
out_uint16_le(s, device_flags);
out_uint16_le(s, param1);
out_uint16_le(s, param2);
s_mark_end(s);
rdp_send_data(s, RDP_DATA_PDU_INPUT);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserViewRenderer::SetWindowVisibility(bool window_visible) {
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT1("android_webview",
"BrowserViewRenderer::SetWindowVisibility",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD,
"window_visible",
window_visible);
window_visible_ = window_visible;
UpdateCompositorIsActive();
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 23,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestFlashMessageLoop::DestroyMessageLoopResourceTask(int32_t unused) {
if (message_loop_) {
delete message_loop_;
message_loop_ = NULL;
} else {
PP_NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 3,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init hugetlb_nrpages_setup(char *s)
{
unsigned long *mhp;
static unsigned long *last_mhp;
if (!parsed_valid_hugepagesz) {
pr_warn("hugepages = %s preceded by "
"an unsupported hugepagesz, ignoring\n", s);
parsed_valid_hugepagesz = true;
return 1;
}
/*
* !hugetlb_max_hstate means we haven't parsed a hugepagesz= parameter yet,
* so this hugepages= parameter goes to the "default hstate".
*/
else if (!hugetlb_max_hstate)
mhp = &default_hstate_max_huge_pages;
else
mhp = &parsed_hstate->max_huge_pages;
if (mhp == last_mhp) {
pr_warn("hugepages= specified twice without interleaving hugepagesz=, ignoring\n");
return 1;
}
if (sscanf(s, "%lu", mhp) <= 0)
*mhp = 0;
/*
* Global state is always initialized later in hugetlb_init.
* But we need to allocate >= MAX_ORDER hstates here early to still
* use the bootmem allocator.
*/
if (hugetlb_max_hstate && parsed_hstate->order >= MAX_ORDER)
hugetlb_hstate_alloc_pages(parsed_hstate);
last_mhp = mhp;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,555 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ReadableStream::didSourceStart()
{
m_isStarted = true;
callPullIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: Remove blink::ReadableStream
This CL removes two stable runtime enabled flags
- ResponseConstructedWithReadableStream
- ResponseBodyWithV8ExtraStream
and related code including blink::ReadableStream.
BUG=613435
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2227403002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#411014}
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,564 |
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