instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *__dma_alloc_coherent(struct device *dev, size_t size,
dma_addr_t *dma_handle, gfp_t flags,
struct dma_attrs *attrs)
{
if (dev == NULL) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "Use an actual device structure for DMA allocation\n");
return NULL;
}
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ZONE_DMA) &&
dev->coherent_dma_mask <= DMA_BIT_MASK(32))
flags |= GFP_DMA;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DMA_CMA) && (flags & __GFP_WAIT)) {
struct page *page;
void *addr;
size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);
page = dma_alloc_from_contiguous(dev, size >> PAGE_SHIFT,
get_order(size));
if (!page)
return NULL;
*dma_handle = phys_to_dma(dev, page_to_phys(page));
addr = page_address(page);
if (flags & __GFP_ZERO)
memset(addr, 0, size);
return addr;
} else {
return swiotlb_alloc_coherent(dev, size, dma_handle, flags);
}
}
Commit Message: arm64: dma-mapping: always clear allocated buffers
Buffers allocated by dma_alloc_coherent() are always zeroed on Alpha,
ARM (32bit), MIPS, PowerPC, x86/x86_64 and probably other architectures.
It turned out that some drivers rely on this 'feature'. Allocated buffer
might be also exposed to userspace with dma_mmap() call, so clearing it
is desired from security point of view to avoid exposing random memory
to userspace. This patch unifies dma_alloc_coherent() behavior on ARM64
architecture with other implementations by unconditionally zeroing
allocated buffer.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.14+
Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 24,085
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::PerWorldBindingsVoidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethodCallbackForMainWorld(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_perWorldBindingsVoidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArg");
test_object_v8_internal::PerWorldBindingsVoidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethodForMainWorld(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,314
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pa_data_add_pac_request(krb5_context context,
krb5_get_init_creds_ctx *ctx,
METHOD_DATA *md)
{
size_t len = 0, length;
krb5_error_code ret;
PA_PAC_REQUEST req;
void *buf;
switch (ctx->req_pac) {
case KRB5_INIT_CREDS_TRISTATE_UNSET:
return 0; /* don't bother */
case KRB5_INIT_CREDS_TRISTATE_TRUE:
req.include_pac = 1;
break;
case KRB5_INIT_CREDS_TRISTATE_FALSE:
req.include_pac = 0;
}
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_PAC_REQUEST, buf, length,
&req, &len, ret);
if (ret)
return ret;
if(len != length)
krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
ret = krb5_padata_add(context, md, KRB5_PADATA_PA_PAC_REQUEST, buf, len);
if (ret)
free(buf);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auritor.com>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
CWE ID: CWE-320
| 0
| 5,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLFormControlElement::updateAncestorDisabledState() const {
HTMLFieldSetElement* fieldSetAncestor = 0;
ContainerNode* legendAncestor = 0;
for (HTMLElement* ancestor = Traversal<HTMLElement>::firstAncestor(*this);
ancestor; ancestor = Traversal<HTMLElement>::firstAncestor(*ancestor)) {
if (!legendAncestor && isHTMLLegendElement(*ancestor))
legendAncestor = ancestor;
if (isHTMLFieldSetElement(*ancestor)) {
fieldSetAncestor = toHTMLFieldSetElement(ancestor);
break;
}
}
m_ancestorDisabledState =
(fieldSetAncestor && fieldSetAncestor->isDisabledFormControl() &&
!(legendAncestor && legendAncestor == fieldSetAncestor->legend()))
? AncestorDisabledStateDisabled
: AncestorDisabledStateEnabled;
}
Commit Message: Form validation: Do not show validation bubble if the page is invisible.
BUG=673163
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2572813003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#438476}
CWE ID: CWE-1021
| 0
| 22,875
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ath_tx_complete(struct ath_softc *sc, struct sk_buff *skb,
int tx_flags, struct ath_txq *txq)
{
struct ieee80211_tx_info *tx_info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
struct ath_common *common = ath9k_hw_common(sc->sc_ah);
struct ieee80211_hdr * hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
int padpos, padsize;
unsigned long flags;
ath_dbg(common, XMIT, "TX complete: skb: %p\n", skb);
if (sc->sc_ah->caldata)
set_bit(PAPRD_PACKET_SENT, &sc->sc_ah->caldata->cal_flags);
if (!(tx_flags & ATH_TX_ERROR))
/* Frame was ACKed */
tx_info->flags |= IEEE80211_TX_STAT_ACK;
padpos = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
padsize = padpos & 3;
if (padsize && skb->len>padpos+padsize) {
/*
* Remove MAC header padding before giving the frame back to
* mac80211.
*/
memmove(skb->data + padsize, skb->data, padpos);
skb_pull(skb, padsize);
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&sc->sc_pm_lock, flags);
if ((sc->ps_flags & PS_WAIT_FOR_TX_ACK) && !txq->axq_depth) {
sc->ps_flags &= ~PS_WAIT_FOR_TX_ACK;
ath_dbg(common, PS,
"Going back to sleep after having received TX status (0x%lx)\n",
sc->ps_flags & (PS_WAIT_FOR_BEACON |
PS_WAIT_FOR_CAB |
PS_WAIT_FOR_PSPOLL_DATA |
PS_WAIT_FOR_TX_ACK));
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sc->sc_pm_lock, flags);
__skb_queue_tail(&txq->complete_q, skb);
ath_txq_skb_done(sc, txq, skb);
}
Commit Message: ath9k: protect tid->sched check
We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:
[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998] [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083] [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177] [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258] [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346] [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437] [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578] [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787] [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897] [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009] [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104] [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182] [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266] [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358] [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445] [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]
Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko <maxim.stargazer@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 17,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cbc_aes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct aes_ctx *ctx = blk_aes_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
int err;
int ts_state;
padlock_reset_key(&ctx->cword.encrypt);
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
ts_state = irq_ts_save();
while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
u8 *iv = padlock_xcrypt_cbc(walk.src.virt.addr,
walk.dst.virt.addr, ctx->E,
walk.iv, &ctx->cword.encrypt,
nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
memcpy(walk.iv, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
}
irq_ts_restore(ts_state);
padlock_store_cword(&ctx->cword.decrypt);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 8,888
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_assign_device(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_assigned_dev_kernel *assigned_dev)
{
struct pci_dev *pdev = NULL;
struct iommu_domain *domain = kvm->arch.iommu_domain;
int r;
bool noncoherent;
/* check if iommu exists and in use */
if (!domain)
return 0;
pdev = assigned_dev->dev;
if (pdev == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
r = iommu_attach_device(domain, &pdev->dev);
if (r) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "kvm assign device failed ret %d", r);
return r;
}
noncoherent = !iommu_domain_has_cap(kvm->arch.iommu_domain,
IOMMU_CAP_CACHE_COHERENCY);
/* Check if need to update IOMMU page table for guest memory */
if (noncoherent != kvm->arch.iommu_noncoherent) {
kvm_iommu_unmap_memslots(kvm);
kvm->arch.iommu_noncoherent = noncoherent;
r = kvm_iommu_map_memslots(kvm);
if (r)
goto out_unmap;
}
pdev->dev_flags |= PCI_DEV_FLAGS_ASSIGNED;
dev_info(&pdev->dev, "kvm assign device\n");
return 0;
out_unmap:
kvm_iommu_unmap_memslots(kvm);
return r;
}
Commit Message: kvm: iommu: fix the third parameter of kvm_iommu_put_pages (CVE-2014-3601)
The third parameter of kvm_iommu_put_pages is wrong,
It should be 'gfn - slot->base_gfn'.
By making gfn very large, malicious guest or userspace can cause kvm to
go to this error path, and subsequently to pass a huge value as size.
Alternatively if gfn is small, then pages would be pinned but never
unpinned, causing host memory leak and local DOS.
Passing a reasonable but large value could be the most dangerous case,
because it would unpin a page that should have stayed pinned, and thus
allow the device to DMA into arbitrary memory. However, this cannot
happen because of the condition that can trigger the error:
- out of memory (where you can't allocate even a single page)
should not be possible for the attacker to trigger
- when exceeding the iommu's address space, guest pages after gfn
will also exceed the iommu's address space, and inside
kvm_iommu_put_pages() the iommu_iova_to_phys() will fail. The
page thus would not be unpinned at all.
Reported-by: Jack Morgenstein <jackm@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 16,023
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int send_sigqueue(struct sigqueue *q, struct task_struct *t, int group)
{
int sig = q->info.si_signo;
struct sigpending *pending;
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
BUG_ON(!(q->flags & SIGQUEUE_PREALLOC));
ret = -1;
if (!likely(lock_task_sighand(t, &flags)))
goto ret;
ret = 1; /* the signal is ignored */
if (!prepare_signal(sig, t, 0))
goto out;
ret = 0;
if (unlikely(!list_empty(&q->list))) {
/*
* If an SI_TIMER entry is already queue just increment
* the overrun count.
*/
BUG_ON(q->info.si_code != SI_TIMER);
q->info.si_overrun++;
goto out;
}
q->info.si_overrun = 0;
signalfd_notify(t, sig);
pending = group ? &t->signal->shared_pending : &t->pending;
list_add_tail(&q->list, &pending->list);
sigaddset(&pending->signal, sig);
complete_signal(sig, t, group);
out:
unlock_task_sighand(t, &flags);
ret:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 101
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: string HexDumpWithMarks(const char* data, int length,
const bool* marks, int mark_length) {
static const char kHexChars[] = "0123456789abcdef";
static const int kColumns = 4;
const int kSizeLimit = 1024;
if (length > kSizeLimit || mark_length > kSizeLimit) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Only dumping first " << kSizeLimit << " bytes.";
length = min(length, kSizeLimit);
mark_length = min(mark_length, kSizeLimit);
}
string hex;
for (const char* row = data; length > 0;
row += kColumns, length -= kColumns) {
for (const char *p = row; p < row + 4; ++p) {
if (p < row + length) {
const bool mark =
(marks && (p - data) < mark_length && marks[p - data]);
hex += mark ? '*' : ' ';
hex += kHexChars[(*p & 0xf0) >> 4];
hex += kHexChars[*p & 0x0f];
hex += mark ? '*' : ' ';
} else {
hex += " ";
}
}
hex = hex + " ";
for (const char *p = row; p < row + 4 && p < row + length; ++p)
hex += (*p >= 0x20 && *p <= 0x7f) ? (*p) : '.';
hex = hex + '\n';
}
return hex;
}
Commit Message: Add QuicStream and friends to QUIC code.
Fix bug in tests that caused failures.
Revert 165859
First Landed as 165858
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367082
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165864 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 19,684
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Extension::IsSandboxedPage(const std::string& relative_path) const {
return ResourceMatches(sandboxed_pages_, relative_path);
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 5,826
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Image *ReadTGAImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
index;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PixelPacket
pixel;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
size_t
base,
flag,
offset,
real,
skip;
ssize_t
count,
y;
TGAInfo
tga_info;
unsigned char
j,
k,
pixels[4],
runlength;
unsigned int
alpha_bits;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read TGA header information.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&tga_info.id_length);
tga_info.colormap_type=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
tga_info.image_type=(TGAImageType) ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((count != 1) ||
((tga_info.image_type != TGAColormap) &&
(tga_info.image_type != TGARGB) &&
(tga_info.image_type != TGAMonochrome) &&
(tga_info.image_type != TGARLEColormap) &&
(tga_info.image_type != TGARLERGB) &&
(tga_info.image_type != TGARLEMonochrome)) ||
(((tga_info.image_type == TGAColormap) ||
(tga_info.image_type == TGARLEColormap)) &&
(tga_info.colormap_type == 0)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
tga_info.colormap_index=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
tga_info.colormap_length=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
tga_info.colormap_size=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
tga_info.x_origin=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
tga_info.y_origin=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
tga_info.width=(unsigned short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
tga_info.height=(unsigned short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
tga_info.bits_per_pixel=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
tga_info.attributes=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
if ((((tga_info.bits_per_pixel <= 1) || (tga_info.bits_per_pixel >= 17)) &&
(tga_info.bits_per_pixel != 24) && (tga_info.bits_per_pixel != 32)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->columns=tga_info.width;
image->rows=tga_info.height;
alpha_bits=(tga_info.attributes & 0x0FU);
image->matte=(alpha_bits > 0) || (tga_info.bits_per_pixel == 32) ||
(tga_info.colormap_size == 32) ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if ((tga_info.image_type != TGAColormap) &&
(tga_info.image_type != TGARLEColormap))
image->depth=(size_t) ((tga_info.bits_per_pixel <= 8) ? 8 :
(tga_info.bits_per_pixel <= 16) ? 5 : 8);
else
image->depth=(size_t) ((tga_info.colormap_size <= 8) ? 8 :
(tga_info.colormap_size <= 16) ? 5 : 8);
if ((tga_info.image_type == TGAColormap) ||
(tga_info.image_type == TGAMonochrome) ||
(tga_info.image_type == TGARLEColormap) ||
(tga_info.image_type == TGARLEMonochrome))
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->compression=NoCompression;
if ((tga_info.image_type == TGARLEColormap) ||
(tga_info.image_type == TGARLEMonochrome) ||
(tga_info.image_type == TGARLERGB))
image->compression=RLECompression;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (tga_info.colormap_type != 0)
image->colors=tga_info.colormap_index+tga_info.colormap_length;
else
{
size_t
one;
one=1;
image->colors=one << tga_info.bits_per_pixel;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
if (tga_info.id_length != 0)
{
char
*comment;
size_t
length;
/*
TGA image comment.
*/
length=(size_t) tga_info.id_length;
comment=(char *) NULL;
if (~length >= (MaxTextExtent-1))
comment=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+MaxTextExtent,
sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ReadBlob(image,tga_info.id_length,(unsigned char *) comment);
comment[tga_info.id_length]='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
}
if (tga_info.attributes & (1UL << 4))
{
if (tga_info.attributes & (1UL << 5))
SetImageArtifact(image,"tga:image-origin","TopRight");
else
SetImageArtifact(image,"tga:image-origin","BottomRight");
}
else
{
if (tga_info.attributes & (1UL << 5))
SetImageArtifact(image,"tga:image-origin","TopLeft");
else
SetImageArtifact(image,"tga:image-origin","BottomLeft");
}
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(image);
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&pixel,0,sizeof(pixel));
pixel.opacity=(Quantum) OpaqueOpacity;
if (tga_info.colormap_type != 0)
{
/*
Read TGA raster colormap.
*/
if (image->colors < tga_info.colormap_index)
image->colors=tga_info.colormap_index;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) tga_info.colormap_index; i++)
image->colormap[i]=pixel;
for ( ; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
switch (tga_info.colormap_size)
{
case 8:
default:
{
/*
Gray scale.
*/
pixel.red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
pixel.green=pixel.red;
pixel.blue=pixel.red;
break;
}
case 15:
case 16:
{
QuantumAny
range;
/*
5 bits each of red green and blue.
*/
j=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
k=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
range=GetQuantumRange(5UL);
pixel.red=ScaleAnyToQuantum(1UL*(k & 0x7c) >> 2,range);
pixel.green=ScaleAnyToQuantum((1UL*(k & 0x03) << 3)+
(1UL*(j & 0xe0) >> 5),range);
pixel.blue=ScaleAnyToQuantum(1UL*(j & 0x1f),range);
break;
}
case 24:
{
/*
8 bits each of blue, green and red.
*/
pixel.blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
pixel.green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
pixel.red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
break;
}
case 32:
{
/*
8 bits each of blue, green, red, and alpha.
*/
pixel.blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
pixel.green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
pixel.red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
pixel.opacity=(Quantum) (QuantumRange-ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image)));
break;
}
}
image->colormap[i]=pixel;
}
}
/*
Convert TGA pixels to pixel packets.
*/
base=0;
flag=0;
skip=MagickFalse;
real=0;
index=(IndexPacket) 0;
runlength=0;
offset=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
real=offset;
if (((unsigned char) (tga_info.attributes & 0x20) >> 5) == 0)
real=image->rows-real-1;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,(ssize_t) real,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if ((tga_info.image_type == TGARLEColormap) ||
(tga_info.image_type == TGARLERGB) ||
(tga_info.image_type == TGARLEMonochrome))
{
if (runlength != 0)
{
runlength--;
skip=flag != 0;
}
else
{
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&runlength);
if (count != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
flag=runlength & 0x80;
if (flag != 0)
runlength-=128;
skip=MagickFalse;
}
}
if (skip == MagickFalse)
switch (tga_info.bits_per_pixel)
{
case 8:
default:
{
/*
Gray scale.
*/
index=(IndexPacket) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (tga_info.colormap_type != 0)
pixel=image->colormap[(ssize_t) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,
1UL*index)];
else
{
pixel.red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) index);
pixel.green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) index);
pixel.blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) index);
}
break;
}
case 15:
case 16:
{
QuantumAny
range;
/*
5 bits each of RGB;
*/
if (ReadBlob(image,2,pixels) != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
j=pixels[0];
k=pixels[1];
range=GetQuantumRange(5UL);
pixel.red=ScaleAnyToQuantum(1UL*(k & 0x7c) >> 2,range);
pixel.green=ScaleAnyToQuantum((1UL*(k & 0x03) << 3)+
(1UL*(j & 0xe0) >> 5),range);
pixel.blue=ScaleAnyToQuantum(1UL*(j & 0x1f),range);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
pixel.opacity=(k & 0x80) == 0 ? (Quantum) TransparentOpacity :
(Quantum) OpaqueOpacity;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,((size_t) k << 8)+j);
break;
}
case 24:
{
/*
BGR pixels.
*/
if (ReadBlob(image,3,pixels) != 3)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
pixel.blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixels[0]);
pixel.green=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixels[1]);
pixel.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixels[2]);
break;
}
case 32:
{
/*
BGRA pixels.
*/
if (ReadBlob(image,4,pixels) != 4)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
pixel.blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixels[0]);
pixel.green=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixels[1]);
pixel.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixels[2]);
pixel.opacity=(Quantum) (QuantumRange-ScaleCharToQuantum(
pixels[3]));
break;
}
}
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRed(q,pixel.red);
SetPixelGreen(q,pixel.green);
SetPixelBlue(q,pixel.blue);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelOpacity(q,pixel.opacity);
q++;
}
/*
if (((unsigned char) (tga_info.attributes & 0xc0) >> 6) == 4)
offset+=4;
else
*/
if (((unsigned char) (tga_info.attributes & 0xc0) >> 6) == 2)
offset+=2;
else
offset++;
if (offset >= image->rows)
{
base++;
offset=base;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/pull/359
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,598
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int perf_copy_attr(struct perf_event_attr __user *uattr,
struct perf_event_attr *attr)
{
u32 size;
int ret;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uattr, PERF_ATTR_SIZE_VER0))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* zero the full structure, so that a short copy will be nice.
*/
memset(attr, 0, sizeof(*attr));
ret = get_user(size, &uattr->size);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (size > PAGE_SIZE) /* silly large */
goto err_size;
if (!size) /* abi compat */
size = PERF_ATTR_SIZE_VER0;
if (size < PERF_ATTR_SIZE_VER0)
goto err_size;
/*
* If we're handed a bigger struct than we know of,
* ensure all the unknown bits are 0 - i.e. new
* user-space does not rely on any kernel feature
* extensions we dont know about yet.
*/
if (size > sizeof(*attr)) {
unsigned char __user *addr;
unsigned char __user *end;
unsigned char val;
addr = (void __user *)uattr + sizeof(*attr);
end = (void __user *)uattr + size;
for (; addr < end; addr++) {
ret = get_user(val, addr);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (val)
goto err_size;
}
size = sizeof(*attr);
}
ret = copy_from_user(attr, uattr, size);
if (ret)
return -EFAULT;
if (attr->__reserved_1)
return -EINVAL;
if (attr->sample_type & ~(PERF_SAMPLE_MAX-1))
return -EINVAL;
if (attr->read_format & ~(PERF_FORMAT_MAX-1))
return -EINVAL;
if (attr->sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_STACK) {
u64 mask = attr->branch_sample_type;
/* only using defined bits */
if (mask & ~(PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX-1))
return -EINVAL;
/* at least one branch bit must be set */
if (!(mask & ~PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PLM_ALL))
return -EINVAL;
/* propagate priv level, when not set for branch */
if (!(mask & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PLM_ALL)) {
/* exclude_kernel checked on syscall entry */
if (!attr->exclude_kernel)
mask |= PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL;
if (!attr->exclude_user)
mask |= PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER;
if (!attr->exclude_hv)
mask |= PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_HV;
/*
* adjust user setting (for HW filter setup)
*/
attr->branch_sample_type = mask;
}
/* privileged levels capture (kernel, hv): check permissions */
if ((mask & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PERM_PLM)
&& perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
}
if (attr->sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER) {
ret = perf_reg_validate(attr->sample_regs_user);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
if (attr->sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER) {
if (!arch_perf_have_user_stack_dump())
return -ENOSYS;
/*
* We have __u32 type for the size, but so far
* we can only use __u16 as maximum due to the
* __u16 sample size limit.
*/
if (attr->sample_stack_user >= USHRT_MAX)
ret = -EINVAL;
else if (!IS_ALIGNED(attr->sample_stack_user, sizeof(u64)))
ret = -EINVAL;
}
if (attr->sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR)
ret = perf_reg_validate(attr->sample_regs_intr);
out:
return ret;
err_size:
put_user(sizeof(*attr), &uattr->size);
ret = -E2BIG;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,131
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::MoveRangeSelectionExtent(const WebPoint& point) {
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "WebLocalFrameImpl::moveRangeSelectionExtent");
GetFrame()->GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
GetFrame()->Selection().MoveRangeSelectionExtent(
GetFrame()->View()->ViewportToFrame(point));
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,309
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nft_ctx_init(struct nft_ctx *ctx,
const struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nft_af_info *afi,
struct nft_table *table,
struct nft_chain *chain,
const struct nlattr * const *nla)
{
ctx->net = sock_net(skb->sk);
ctx->afi = afi;
ctx->table = table;
ctx->chain = chain;
ctx->nla = nla;
ctx->portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid;
ctx->report = nlmsg_report(nlh);
ctx->seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 1,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnInputMethodChanged() {
if (!host_)
return;
if (GetInputMethod())
host_->SetInputMethodActive(GetInputMethod()->IsActive());
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,155
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CLASS wavelet_denoise()
{
float *fimg=0, *temp, thold, mul[2], avg, diff;
int scale=1, size, lev, hpass, lpass, row, col, nc, c, i, wlast, blk[2];
ushort *window[4];
static const float noise[] =
{ 0.8002,0.2735,0.1202,0.0585,0.0291,0.0152,0.0080,0.0044 };
dcraw_message (DCRAW_VERBOSE,_("Wavelet denoising...\n"));
while (maximum << scale < 0x10000) scale++;
maximum <<= --scale;
black <<= scale;
FORC4 cblack[c] <<= scale;
if ((size = iheight*iwidth) < 0x15550000)
fimg = (float *) malloc ((size*3 + iheight + iwidth) * sizeof *fimg);
merror (fimg, "wavelet_denoise()");
temp = fimg + size*3;
if ((nc = colors) == 3 && filters) nc++;
FORC(nc) { /* denoise R,G1,B,G3 individually */
for (i=0; i < size; i++)
fimg[i] = 256 * sqrt((float) (image[i][c] << scale));
for (hpass=lev=0; lev < 5; lev++) {
lpass = size*((lev & 1)+1);
for (row=0; row < iheight; row++) {
hat_transform (temp, fimg+hpass+row*iwidth, 1, iwidth, 1 << lev);
for (col=0; col < iwidth; col++)
fimg[lpass + row*iwidth + col] = temp[col] * 0.25;
}
for (col=0; col < iwidth; col++) {
hat_transform (temp, fimg+lpass+col, iwidth, iheight, 1 << lev);
for (row=0; row < iheight; row++)
fimg[lpass + row*iwidth + col] = temp[row] * 0.25;
}
thold = threshold * noise[lev];
for (i=0; i < size; i++) {
fimg[hpass+i] -= fimg[lpass+i];
if (fimg[hpass+i] < -thold) fimg[hpass+i] += thold;
else if (fimg[hpass+i] > thold) fimg[hpass+i] -= thold;
else fimg[hpass+i] = 0;
if (hpass) fimg[i] += fimg[hpass+i];
}
hpass = lpass;
}
for (i=0; i < size; i++)
image[i][c] = CLIP(SQR(fimg[i]+fimg[lpass+i])/0x10000);
}
if (filters && colors == 3) { /* pull G1 and G3 closer together */
for (row=0; row < 2; row++) {
mul[row] = 0.125 * pre_mul[FC(row+1,0) | 1] / pre_mul[FC(row,0) | 1];
blk[row] = cblack[FC(row,0) | 1];
}
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
window[i] = (ushort *) fimg + width*i;
for (wlast=-1, row=1; row < height-1; row++) {
while (wlast < row+1) {
for (wlast++, i=0; i < 4; i++)
window[(i+3) & 3] = window[i];
for (col = FC(wlast,1) & 1; col < width; col+=2)
window[2][col] = BAYER(wlast,col);
}
thold = threshold/512;
for (col = (FC(row,0) & 1)+1; col < width-1; col+=2) {
avg = ( window[0][col-1] + window[0][col+1] +
window[2][col-1] + window[2][col+1] - blk[~row & 1]*4 )
* mul[row & 1] + (window[1][col] + blk[row & 1]) * 0.5;
avg = avg < 0 ? 0 : sqrt(avg);
diff = sqrt((float) BAYER(row,col)) - avg;
if (diff < -thold) diff += thold;
else if (diff > thold) diff -= thold;
else diff = 0;
BAYER(row,col) = CLIP(SQR(avg+diff) + 0.5);
}
}
}
free (fimg);
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 28,929
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint32_t user_ta_get_instance_id(struct tee_ta_ctx *ctx)
{
return to_user_ta_ctx(ctx)->vm_info->asid;
}
Commit Message: core: clear the entire TA area
Previously we cleared (memset to zero) the size corresponding to code
and data segments, however the allocation for the TA is made on the
granularity of the memory pool, meaning that we did not clear all memory
and because of that we could potentially leak code and data of a
previous loaded TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0006: "Potential disclosure of previously loaded TA
code and data"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Suggested-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 5,300
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int msr_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1)
return wrmsr_interception(svm);
else
return rdmsr_interception(svm);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 25,751
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_relfile_envaddr(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, const char *file_path,
const char *envaddr_name)
{
unsigned long file_addr;
char *envaddr;
envaddr = from_env(envaddr_name);
if (!envaddr)
return -ENOENT;
if (strict_strtoul(envaddr, 16, &file_addr) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
return get_relfile(cmdtp, file_path, file_addr);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 16,801
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PluginModule::~PluginModule() {
CHECK(!is_in_destructor_);
is_in_destructor_ = true;
DCHECK(instances_.empty());
GetLivePluginSet()->erase(this);
callback_tracker_->AbortAll();
if (entry_points_.shutdown_module)
entry_points_.shutdown_module();
if (library_)
base::UnloadNativeLibrary(library_);
HostGlobals::Get()->ModuleDeleted(pp_module_);
if (!is_crashed_ && lifetime_delegate_) {
lifetime_delegate_->PluginModuleDead(this);
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,007
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void HandleBadMessage() { }
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,290
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CustomElementRegistry* LocalDOMWindow::customElements(
ScriptState* script_state) const {
if (!script_state->World().IsMainWorld())
return nullptr;
return customElements();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,988
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf_show_string(fz_context *ctx, pdf_run_processor *pr, unsigned char *buf, int len)
{
pdf_gstate *gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
pdf_font_desc *fontdesc = gstate->text.font;
if (!fontdesc)
{
fz_warn(ctx, "cannot draw text since font and size not set");
return;
}
show_string(ctx, pr, buf, len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 29,816
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ask (char const *format, ...)
{
static int ttyfd = -2;
ssize_t r;
va_list args;
va_start (args, format);
vfprintf (stdout, format, args);
va_end (args);
fflush (stdout);
if (ttyfd == -2)
{
/* If standard output is not a tty, don't bother opening /dev/tty,
since it's unlikely that stdout will be seen by the tty user.
The isatty test also works around a bug in GNU Emacs 19.34 under Linux
which makes a call-process `patch' hang when it reads from /dev/tty.
POSIX.1-2001 XCU line 26599 requires that we read /dev/tty,
though. */
ttyfd = (posixly_correct || isatty (STDOUT_FILENO)
? open (TTY_DEVICE, O_RDONLY)
: -1);
}
if (ttyfd < 0)
{
/* No terminal at all -- default it. */
printf ("\n");
buf[0] = '\n';
buf[1] = '\0';
}
else
{
size_t s = 0;
while ((r = read (ttyfd, buf + s, bufsize - 1 - s)) == bufsize - 1 - s
&& buf[bufsize - 2] != '\n')
{
s = bufsize - 1;
bufsize *= 2;
buf = realloc (buf, bufsize);
if (!buf)
xalloc_die ();
}
if (r == 0)
printf ("EOF\n");
else if (r < 0)
{
perror ("tty read");
fflush (stderr);
close (ttyfd);
ttyfd = -1;
r = 0;
}
buf[s + r] = '\0';
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 3,769
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs4_reclaim_locks(struct nfs4_state *state, const struct nfs4_state_recovery_ops *ops)
{
struct inode *inode = state->inode;
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(inode);
struct file_lock *fl;
int status = 0;
down_write(&nfsi->rwsem);
for (fl = inode->i_flock; fl != NULL; fl = fl->fl_next) {
if (!(fl->fl_flags & (FL_POSIX|FL_FLOCK)))
continue;
if (nfs_file_open_context(fl->fl_file)->state != state)
continue;
status = ops->recover_lock(state, fl);
if (status >= 0)
continue;
switch (status) {
default:
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: unhandled error %d. Zeroing state\n",
__func__, status);
case -NFS4ERR_EXPIRED:
case -NFS4ERR_NO_GRACE:
case -NFS4ERR_RECLAIM_BAD:
case -NFS4ERR_RECLAIM_CONFLICT:
/* kill_proc(fl->fl_pid, SIGLOST, 1); */
break;
case -NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID:
goto out_err;
}
}
up_write(&nfsi->rwsem);
return 0;
out_err:
up_write(&nfsi->rwsem);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 24,370
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t nw_buf_size(nw_buf *buf)
{
return buf->wpos - buf->rpos;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #131 from benjaminchodroff/master
fix memory corruption and other 32bit overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 26,178
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_delta(uint8 * buffer, int *offset)
{
int value = buffer[(*offset)++];
int two_byte = value & 0x80;
if (value & 0x40) /* sign bit */
value |= ~0x3f;
else
value &= 0x3f;
if (two_byte)
value = (value << 8) | buffer[(*offset)++];
return value;
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 23,528
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t MediaPlayerService::AudioOutput::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args) const
{
const size_t SIZE = 256;
char buffer[SIZE];
String8 result;
result.append(" AudioOutput\n");
snprintf(buffer, 255, " stream type(%d), left - right volume(%f, %f)\n",
mStreamType, mLeftVolume, mRightVolume);
result.append(buffer);
snprintf(buffer, 255, " msec per frame(%f), latency (%d)\n",
mMsecsPerFrame, (mTrack != 0) ? mTrack->latency() : -1);
result.append(buffer);
snprintf(buffer, 255, " aux effect id(%d), send level (%f)\n",
mAuxEffectId, mSendLevel);
result.append(buffer);
::write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
if (mTrack != 0) {
mTrack->dump(fd, args);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LauncherView::UpdateFirstButtonPadding() {
if (view_model_->view_size() > 0) {
view_model_->view_at(0)->set_border(views::Border::CreateEmptyBorder(
primary_axis_coordinate(0, kLeadingInset),
primary_axis_coordinate(kLeadingInset, 0),
0,
0));
}
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 26,481
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vrrp_thread_add_read(vrrp_t *vrrp)
{
vrrp->sockets->thread = thread_add_read_sands(master, vrrp_read_dispatcher_thread,
vrrp->sockets, vrrp->sockets->fd_in, vrrp_compute_timer(vrrp->sockets));
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 12,475
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BrowserMainParts* ShellContentBrowserClient::CreateBrowserMainParts(
const MainFunctionParams& parameters) {
shell_browser_main_parts_ = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kRunLayoutTest)
? new LayoutTestBrowserMainParts(parameters)
: new ShellBrowserMainParts(parameters);
return shell_browser_main_parts_;
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 9,982
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: resp_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
int ret_len = 0, length_cur = length;
if(!bp || length <= 0)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": RESP"));
while (length_cur > 0) {
/*
* This block supports redis pipelining.
* For example, multiple operations can be pipelined within the same string:
* "*2\r\n\$4\r\nINCR\r\n\$1\r\nz\r\n*2\r\n\$4\r\nINCR\r\n\$1\r\nz\r\n*2\r\n\$4\r\nINCR\r\n\$1\r\nz\r\n"
* or
* "PING\r\nPING\r\nPING\r\n"
* In order to handle this case, we must try and parse 'bp' until
* 'length' bytes have been processed or we reach a trunc condition.
*/
ret_len = resp_parse(ndo, bp, length_cur);
TEST_RET_LEN_NORETURN(ret_len);
bp += ret_len;
length_cur -= ret_len;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12989/RESP: Make sure resp_get_length() advances the pointer for invalid lengths.
Make sure that it always sends *endp before returning and that, for
invalid lengths where we don't like a character in the length string,
what it sets *endp to is past the character in question, so we don't
run the risk of infinitely looping (or doing something else random) if a
character in the length is invalid.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 26,172
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int iwl_send_lq_cmd(struct iwl_priv *priv, struct iwl_rxon_context *ctx,
struct iwl_link_quality_cmd *lq, u8 flags, bool init)
{
int ret = 0;
unsigned long flags_spin;
struct iwl_host_cmd cmd = {
.id = REPLY_TX_LINK_QUALITY_CMD,
.len = { sizeof(struct iwl_link_quality_cmd), },
.flags = flags,
.data = { lq, },
};
if (WARN_ON(lq->sta_id == IWL_INVALID_STATION))
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags_spin);
if (!(priv->stations[lq->sta_id].used & IWL_STA_DRIVER_ACTIVE)) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags_spin);
return -EINVAL;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags_spin);
iwl_dump_lq_cmd(priv, lq);
if (WARN_ON(init && (cmd.flags & CMD_ASYNC)))
return -EINVAL;
if (is_lq_table_valid(priv, ctx, lq))
ret = iwl_trans_send_cmd(trans(priv), &cmd);
else
ret = -EINVAL;
if (cmd.flags & CMD_ASYNC)
return ret;
if (init) {
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "init LQ command complete, "
"clearing sta addition status for sta %d\n",
lq->sta_id);
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags_spin);
priv->stations[lq->sta_id].used &= ~IWL_STA_UCODE_INPROGRESS;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags_spin);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: iwlwifi: Sanity check for sta_id
On my testing, I saw some strange behavior
[ 421.739708] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: ACTIVATE a non DRIVER active station id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00
[ 421.739719] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: iwl_sta_ucode_activate Added STA id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00 to uCode
not sure how it happen, but adding the sanity check to prevent memory
corruption
Signed-off-by: Wey-Yi Guy <wey-yi.w.guy@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static SegmentInfo AffineEdge(const Image *image,const AffineMatrix *affine,
const double y,const SegmentInfo *edge)
{
double
intercept,
z;
register double
x;
SegmentInfo
inverse_edge;
/*
Determine left and right edges.
*/
inverse_edge.x1=edge->x1;
inverse_edge.y1=edge->y1;
inverse_edge.x2=edge->x2;
inverse_edge.y2=edge->y2;
z=affine->ry*y+affine->tx;
if (affine->sx >= DrawEpsilon)
{
intercept=(-z/affine->sx);
x=intercept;
if (x > inverse_edge.x1)
inverse_edge.x1=x;
intercept=(-z+(double) image->columns)/affine->sx;
x=intercept;
if (x < inverse_edge.x2)
inverse_edge.x2=x;
}
else
if (affine->sx < -DrawEpsilon)
{
intercept=(-z+(double) image->columns)/affine->sx;
x=intercept;
if (x > inverse_edge.x1)
inverse_edge.x1=x;
intercept=(-z/affine->sx);
x=intercept;
if (x < inverse_edge.x2)
inverse_edge.x2=x;
}
else
if ((z < 0.0) || ((size_t) floor(z+0.5) >= image->columns))
{
inverse_edge.x2=edge->x1;
return(inverse_edge);
}
/*
Determine top and bottom edges.
*/
z=affine->sy*y+affine->ty;
if (affine->rx >= DrawEpsilon)
{
intercept=(-z/affine->rx);
x=intercept;
if (x > inverse_edge.x1)
inverse_edge.x1=x;
intercept=(-z+(double) image->rows)/affine->rx;
x=intercept;
if (x < inverse_edge.x2)
inverse_edge.x2=x;
}
else
if (affine->rx < -DrawEpsilon)
{
intercept=(-z+(double) image->rows)/affine->rx;
x=intercept;
if (x > inverse_edge.x1)
inverse_edge.x1=x;
intercept=(-z/affine->rx);
x=intercept;
if (x < inverse_edge.x2)
inverse_edge.x2=x;
}
else
if ((z < 0.0) || ((size_t) floor(z+0.5) >= image->rows))
{
inverse_edge.x2=edge->x2;
return(inverse_edge);
}
return(inverse_edge);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Max Thrane)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExpectFieldValue(const std::string& field_name,
const std::string& expected_value) {
std::string value;
ASSERT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScriptAndExtractString(
GetWebContents(),
"window.domAutomationController.send("
" document.getElementById('" + field_name + "').value);",
&value));
EXPECT_EQ(expected_value, value);
}
Commit Message: Disable AutofillInteractiveTest.OnChangeAfterAutofill test.
Failing due to http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=revision&revision=170278.
BUG=353691
TBR=isherman@chromium.org, dbeam@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/216853002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260106 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,699
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsWindow::ToggleDevToolsWindow(
Browser* browser,
const DevToolsToggleAction& action) {
if (action.type() == DevToolsToggleAction::kToggle &&
browser->is_devtools()) {
browser->tab_strip_model()->CloseAllTabs();
return;
}
ToggleDevToolsWindow(
browser->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents(),
action.type() == DevToolsToggleAction::kInspect,
action, "");
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 10,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AP_DECLARE(int) ap_should_client_block(request_rec *r)
{
/* First check if we have already read the request body */
if (r->read_length || (!r->read_chunked && (r->remaining <= 0))) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Limit accepted chunk-size to 2^63-1 and be strict about chunk-ext
authorized characters.
Submitted by: Yann Ylavic
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1684513 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,581
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: establish_connection (const struct url *u, const struct url **conn_ref,
struct http_stat *hs, struct url *proxy,
char **proxyauth,
struct request **req_ref, bool *using_ssl,
bool inhibit_keep_alive,
int *sock_ref)
{
bool host_lookup_failed = false;
int sock = *sock_ref;
struct request *req = *req_ref;
const struct url *conn = *conn_ref;
struct response *resp;
int write_error;
int statcode;
if (! inhibit_keep_alive)
{
/* Look for a persistent connection to target host, unless a
proxy is used. The exception is when SSL is in use, in which
case the proxy is nothing but a passthrough to the target
host, registered as a connection to the latter. */
const struct url *relevant = conn;
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
if (u->scheme == SCHEME_HTTPS)
relevant = u;
#endif
if (persistent_available_p (relevant->host, relevant->port,
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
relevant->scheme == SCHEME_HTTPS,
#else
0,
#endif
&host_lookup_failed))
{
int family = socket_family (pconn.socket, ENDPOINT_PEER);
sock = pconn.socket;
*using_ssl = pconn.ssl;
#if ENABLE_IPV6
if (family == AF_INET6)
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Reusing existing connection to [%s]:%d.\n"),
quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, pconn.host),
pconn.port);
else
#endif
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Reusing existing connection to %s:%d.\n"),
quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, pconn.host),
pconn.port);
DEBUGP (("Reusing fd %d.\n", sock));
if (pconn.authorized)
/* If the connection is already authorized, the "Basic"
authorization added by code above is unnecessary and
only hurts us. */
request_remove_header (req, "Authorization");
}
else if (host_lookup_failed)
{
logprintf(LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("%s: unable to resolve host address %s\n"),
exec_name, quote (relevant->host));
return HOSTERR;
}
else if (sock != -1)
{
sock = -1;
}
}
if (sock < 0)
{
sock = connect_to_host (conn->host, conn->port);
if (sock == E_HOST)
return HOSTERR;
else if (sock < 0)
return (retryable_socket_connect_error (errno)
? CONERROR : CONIMPOSSIBLE);
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
if (proxy && u->scheme == SCHEME_HTTPS)
{
char *head;
char *message;
/* When requesting SSL URLs through proxies, use the
CONNECT method to request passthrough. */
struct request *connreq = request_new ("CONNECT",
aprintf ("%s:%d", u->host, u->port));
SET_USER_AGENT (connreq);
if (proxyauth)
{
request_set_header (connreq, "Proxy-Authorization",
*proxyauth, rel_value);
/* Now that PROXYAUTH is part of the CONNECT request,
zero it out so we don't send proxy authorization with
the regular request below. */
*proxyauth = NULL;
}
request_set_header (connreq, "Host",
aprintf ("%s:%d", u->host, u->port),
rel_value);
write_error = request_send (connreq, sock, 0);
request_free (&connreq);
if (write_error < 0)
{
CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock);
return WRITEFAILED;
}
head = read_http_response_head (sock);
if (!head)
{
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Failed reading proxy response: %s\n"),
fd_errstr (sock));
CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock);
return HERR;
}
message = NULL;
if (!*head)
{
xfree (head);
goto failed_tunnel;
}
DEBUGP (("proxy responded with: [%s]\n", head));
resp = resp_new (head);
statcode = resp_status (resp, &message);
if (statcode < 0)
{
char *tms = datetime_str (time (NULL));
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "%d\n", statcode);
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("%s ERROR %d: %s.\n"), tms, statcode,
quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style,
_("Malformed status line")));
xfree (head);
return HERR;
}
xfree (hs->message);
hs->message = xstrdup (message);
resp_free (&resp);
xfree (head);
if (statcode != 200)
{
failed_tunnel:
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Proxy tunneling failed: %s"),
message ? quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, message) : "?");
xfree (message);
return CONSSLERR;
}
xfree (message);
/* SOCK is now *really* connected to u->host, so update CONN
to reflect this. That way register_persistent will
register SOCK as being connected to u->host:u->port. */
conn = u;
}
if (conn->scheme == SCHEME_HTTPS)
{
if (!ssl_connect_wget (sock, u->host, NULL))
{
CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock);
return CONSSLERR;
}
else if (!ssl_check_certificate (sock, u->host))
{
CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock);
return VERIFCERTERR;
}
*using_ssl = true;
}
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
}
*conn_ref = conn;
*req_ref = req;
*sock_ref = sock;
return RETROK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,084
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void tcp_req_err(struct sock *sk, u32 seq, bool abort)
{
struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk);
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
/* ICMPs are not backlogged, hence we cannot get
* an established socket here.
*/
if (seq != tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn) {
__NET_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_OUTOFWINDOWICMPS);
} else if (abort) {
/*
* Still in SYN_RECV, just remove it silently.
* There is no good way to pass the error to the newly
* created socket, and POSIX does not want network
* errors returned from accept().
*/
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(req->rsk_listener, req);
tcp_listendrop(req->rsk_listener);
}
reqsk_put(req);
}
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 15,969
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cma_accept_ib(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv,
struct rdma_conn_param *conn_param)
{
struct ib_cm_rep_param rep;
int ret;
ret = cma_modify_qp_rtr(id_priv, conn_param);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = cma_modify_qp_rts(id_priv, conn_param);
if (ret)
goto out;
memset(&rep, 0, sizeof rep);
rep.qp_num = id_priv->qp_num;
rep.starting_psn = id_priv->seq_num;
rep.private_data = conn_param->private_data;
rep.private_data_len = conn_param->private_data_len;
rep.responder_resources = conn_param->responder_resources;
rep.initiator_depth = conn_param->initiator_depth;
rep.failover_accepted = 0;
rep.flow_control = conn_param->flow_control;
rep.rnr_retry_count = min_t(u8, 7, conn_param->rnr_retry_count);
rep.srq = id_priv->srq ? 1 : 0;
ret = ib_send_cm_rep(id_priv->cm_id.ib, &rep);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 22,588
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IPC::PlatformFileForTransit CreateFileForProcess(base::FilePath file_path) {
base::File dump_file(file_path,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN_ALWAYS | base::File::FLAG_APPEND);
if (!dump_file.IsValid()) {
VLOG(1) << "Could not open AEC dump file, error="
<< dump_file.error_details();
return IPC::InvalidPlatformFileForTransit();
}
return IPC::TakePlatformFileForTransit(std::move(dump_file));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 16,134
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLInputElement::setDefaultValue(const String &value)
{
setAttribute(valueAttr, value);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,579
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutofillManager::OnFocusNoLongerOnForm() {
ProcessPendingFormForUpload();
if (external_delegate_->HasActiveScreenReader())
external_delegate_->OnAutofillAvailabilityEvent(false);
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,535
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_REQ_get_extensions(X509_REQ *req)
{
X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr;
ASN1_TYPE *ext = NULL;
int idx, *pnid;
const unsigned char *p;
if ((req == NULL) || (req->req_info == NULL) || !ext_nids)
return (NULL);
for (pnid = ext_nids; *pnid != NID_undef; pnid++) {
idx = X509_REQ_get_attr_by_NID(req, *pnid, -1);
if (idx == -1)
continue;
attr = X509_REQ_get_attr(req, idx);
if (attr->single)
ext = attr->value.single;
else if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(attr->value.set))
ext = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(attr->value.set, 0);
break;
}
if (!ext || (ext->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE))
return NULL;
p = ext->value.sequence->data;
return (STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *)
ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &p, ext->value.sequence->length,
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_EXTENSIONS));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_blend_design_map( T1_Face face,
T1_Loader loader )
{
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
T1_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
PS_Blend blend;
T1_TokenRec axis_tokens[T1_MAX_MM_AXIS];
FT_Int n, num_axis;
FT_Byte* old_cursor;
FT_Byte* old_limit;
FT_Memory memory = face->root.memory;
T1_ToTokenArray( parser, axis_tokens,
T1_MAX_MM_AXIS, &num_axis );
if ( num_axis < 0 )
{
error = FT_ERR( Ignore );
goto Exit;
}
if ( num_axis == 0 || num_axis > T1_MAX_MM_AXIS )
{
FT_ERROR(( "parse_blend_design_map: incorrect number of axes: %d\n",
num_axis ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
old_cursor = parser->root.cursor;
old_limit = parser->root.limit;
error = t1_allocate_blend( face, 0, num_axis );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
blend = face->blend;
/* now read each axis design map */
for ( n = 0; n < num_axis; n++ )
{
PS_DesignMap map = blend->design_map + n;
T1_Token axis_token;
T1_TokenRec point_tokens[T1_MAX_MM_MAP_POINTS];
FT_Int p, num_points;
axis_token = axis_tokens + n;
parser->root.cursor = axis_token->start;
parser->root.limit = axis_token->limit;
T1_ToTokenArray( parser, point_tokens,
T1_MAX_MM_MAP_POINTS, &num_points );
if ( num_points <= 0 || num_points > T1_MAX_MM_MAP_POINTS )
{
FT_ERROR(( "parse_blend_design_map: incorrect table\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
/* allocate design map data */
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( map->design_points, num_points * 2 ) )
goto Exit;
map->blend_points = map->design_points + num_points;
map->num_points = (FT_Byte)num_points;
for ( p = 0; p < num_points; p++ )
{
T1_Token point_token;
point_token = point_tokens + p;
/* don't include delimiting brackets */
parser->root.cursor = point_token->start + 1;
parser->root.limit = point_token->limit - 1;
map->design_points[p] = T1_ToInt( parser );
map->blend_points [p] = T1_ToFixed( parser, 0 );
}
}
parser->root.cursor = old_cursor;
parser->root.limit = old_limit;
Exit:
parser->root.error = error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 6,305
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *DisposeImages(const Image *images,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*dispose_image,
*dispose_images;
RectangleInfo
bounds;
register Image
*image,
*next;
/*
Run the image through the animation sequence
*/
assert(images != (Image *) NULL);
assert(images->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (images->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",images->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=GetFirstImageInList(images);
dispose_image=CloneImage(image,image->page.width,image->page.height,
MagickTrue,exception);
if (dispose_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
dispose_image->page=image->page;
dispose_image->page.x=0;
dispose_image->page.y=0;
dispose_image->dispose=NoneDispose;
dispose_image->background_color.opacity=(Quantum) TransparentOpacity;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(dispose_image);
dispose_images=NewImageList();
for (next=image; next != (Image *) NULL; next=GetNextImageInList(next))
{
Image
*current_image;
/*
Overlay this frame's image over the previous disposal image.
*/
current_image=CloneImage(dispose_image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (current_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
dispose_images=DestroyImageList(dispose_images);
dispose_image=DestroyImage(dispose_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CompositeImage(current_image,next->matte != MagickFalse ?
OverCompositeOp : CopyCompositeOp,next,next->page.x,next->page.y);
/*
Handle Background dispose: image is displayed for the delay period.
*/
if (next->dispose == BackgroundDispose)
{
bounds=next->page;
bounds.width=next->columns;
bounds.height=next->rows;
if (bounds.x < 0)
{
bounds.width+=bounds.x;
bounds.x=0;
}
if ((ssize_t) (bounds.x+bounds.width) > (ssize_t) current_image->columns)
bounds.width=current_image->columns-bounds.x;
if (bounds.y < 0)
{
bounds.height+=bounds.y;
bounds.y=0;
}
if ((ssize_t) (bounds.y+bounds.height) > (ssize_t) current_image->rows)
bounds.height=current_image->rows-bounds.y;
ClearBounds(current_image,&bounds);
}
/*
Select the appropriate previous/disposed image.
*/
if (next->dispose == PreviousDispose)
current_image=DestroyImage(current_image);
else
{
dispose_image=DestroyImage(dispose_image);
dispose_image=current_image;
current_image=(Image *) NULL;
}
/*
Save the dispose image just calculated for return.
*/
{
Image
*dispose;
dispose=CloneImage(dispose_image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (dispose == (Image *) NULL)
{
dispose_images=DestroyImageList(dispose_images);
dispose_image=DestroyImage(dispose_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CloneImageProfiles(dispose,next);
(void) CloneImageProperties(dispose,next);
(void) CloneImageArtifacts(dispose,next);
dispose->page.x=0;
dispose->page.y=0;
dispose->dispose=next->dispose;
AppendImageToList(&dispose_images,dispose);
}
}
dispose_image=DestroyImage(dispose_image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(dispose_images));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1629
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 29,630
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: copy_to_fd (const char *from, int tofd)
{
int fromfd;
ssize_t i;
if ((fromfd = open (from, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY)) < 0)
pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (from));
while ((i = read (fromfd, buf, bufsize)) != 0)
{
if (i == (ssize_t) -1)
read_fatal ();
if (full_write (tofd, buf, i) != i)
write_fatal ();
}
if (close (fromfd) != 0)
read_fatal ();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 10,062
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnFirstFrame(base::TimeTicks frame_time) {
DCHECK(!load_start_time_.is_null());
DCHECK(!skip_metrics_due_to_startup_suspend_);
has_first_frame_ = true;
const base::TimeDelta elapsed = frame_time - load_start_time_;
media_metrics_provider_->SetTimeToFirstFrame(elapsed);
RecordTimingUMA("Media.TimeToFirstFrame", elapsed);
}
Commit Message: Fix HasSingleSecurityOrigin for HLS
HLS manifests can request segments from a different origin than the
original manifest's origin. We do not inspect HLS manifests within
Chromium, and instead delegate to Android's MediaPlayer. This means we
need to be conservative, and always assume segments might come from a
different origin. HasSingleSecurityOrigin should always return false
when decoding HLS.
Bug: 864283
Change-Id: Ie16849ac6f29ae7eaa9caf342ad0509a226228ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142691
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Thomas Guilbert <tguilbert@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576378}
CWE ID: CWE-346
| 0
| 15,597
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nf_tables_set_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
const struct nft_set *set,
int event, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
u32 portid = ctx->portid;
int err;
if (!ctx->report &&
!nfnetlink_has_listeners(ctx->net, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES))
return 0;
err = -ENOBUFS;
skb = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, gfp_flags);
if (skb == NULL)
goto err;
err = nf_tables_fill_set(skb, ctx, set, event, 0);
if (err < 0) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto err;
}
err = nfnetlink_send(skb, ctx->net, portid, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES,
ctx->report, gfp_flags);
err:
if (err < 0)
nfnetlink_set_err(ctx->net, portid, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES, err);
return err;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 8,128
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlStopParser(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
if (ctxt == NULL)
return;
xmlHaltParser(ctxt);
ctxt->errNo = XML_ERR_USER_STOP;
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 21,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static xmlNodePtr check_and_resolve_href(xmlNodePtr data)
{
if (data && data->properties) {
xmlAttrPtr href;
href = data->properties;
while (1) {
href = get_attribute(href, "href");
if (href == NULL || href->ns == NULL) {break;}
href = href->next;
}
if (href) {
/* Internal href try and find node */
if (href->children->content[0] == '#') {
xmlNodePtr ret = get_node_with_attribute_recursive(data->doc->children, NULL, "id", (char*)&href->children->content[1]);
if (!ret) {
soap_error1(E_ERROR, "Encoding: Unresolved reference '%s'", href->children->content);
}
return ret;
} else {
/* TODO: External href....? */
soap_error1(E_ERROR, "Encoding: External reference '%s'", href->children->content);
}
}
/* SOAP 1.2 enc:id enc:ref */
href = get_attribute_ex(data->properties, "ref", SOAP_1_2_ENC_NAMESPACE);
if (href) {
xmlChar* id;
xmlNodePtr ret;
if (href->children->content[0] == '#') {
id = href->children->content+1;
} else {
id = href->children->content;
}
ret = get_node_with_attribute_recursive_ex(data->doc->children, NULL, NULL, "id", (char*)id, SOAP_1_2_ENC_NAMESPACE);
if (!ret) {
soap_error1(E_ERROR, "Encoding: Unresolved reference '%s'", href->children->content);
} else if (ret == data) {
soap_error1(E_ERROR, "Encoding: Violation of id and ref information items '%s'", href->children->content);
}
return ret;
}
}
return data;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,230
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: archive_read_support_format_zip_seekable(struct archive *_a)
{
struct archive_read *a = (struct archive_read *)_a;
struct zip *zip;
int r;
archive_check_magic(_a, ARCHIVE_READ_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_NEW, "archive_read_support_format_zip_seekable");
zip = (struct zip *)calloc(1, sizeof(*zip));
if (zip == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate zip data");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
#ifdef HAVE_COPYFILE_H
/* Set this by default on Mac OS. */
zip->process_mac_extensions = 1;
#endif
/*
* Until enough data has been read, we cannot tell about
* any encrypted entries yet.
*/
zip->has_encrypted_entries = ARCHIVE_READ_FORMAT_ENCRYPTION_DONT_KNOW;
zip->crc32func = real_crc32;
r = __archive_read_register_format(a,
zip,
"zip",
archive_read_format_zip_seekable_bid,
archive_read_format_zip_options,
archive_read_format_zip_seekable_read_header,
archive_read_format_zip_read_data,
archive_read_format_zip_read_data_skip_seekable,
NULL,
archive_read_format_zip_cleanup,
archive_read_support_format_zip_capabilities_seekable,
archive_read_format_zip_has_encrypted_entries);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
free(zip);
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Issue #656: Fix CVE-2016-1541, VU#862384
When reading OS X metadata entries in Zip archives that were stored
without compression, libarchive would use the uncompressed entry size
to allocate a buffer but would use the compressed entry size to limit
the amount of data copied into that buffer. Since the compressed
and uncompressed sizes are provided by data in the archive itself,
an attacker could manipulate these values to write data beyond
the end of the allocated buffer.
This fix provides three new checks to guard against such
manipulation and to make libarchive generally more robust when
handling this type of entry:
1. If an OS X metadata entry is stored without compression,
abort the entire archive if the compressed and uncompressed
data sizes do not match.
2. When sanity-checking the size of an OS X metadata entry,
abort this entry if either the compressed or uncompressed
size is larger than 4MB.
3. When copying data into the allocated buffer, check the copy
size against both the compressed entry size and uncompressed
entry size.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 22,562
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: convert_to_icc_base(fz_context *ctx, fz_colorspace *srcs, float *src_f, float *des_f)
{
float temp_f[FZ_MAX_COLORS];
fz_colorspace *base_cs = srcs->get_base(srcs);
if (fz_colorspace_is_icc(ctx, base_cs) || fz_colorspace_is_cal(ctx, base_cs) || fz_colorspace_is_lab(ctx, base_cs))
srcs->to_ccs(ctx, srcs, src_f, des_f);
else
{
srcs->to_ccs(ctx, srcs, src_f, temp_f);
convert_to_icc_base(ctx, base_cs, temp_f, des_f);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,232
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _warc_rdver(const char *buf, size_t bsz)
{
static const char magic[] = "WARC/";
const char *c;
unsigned int ver = 0U;
unsigned int end = 0U;
if (bsz < 12 || memcmp(buf, magic, sizeof(magic) - 1U) != 0) {
/* buffer too small or invalid magic */
return ver;
}
/* looks good so far, read the version number for a laugh */
buf += sizeof(magic) - 1U;
if (isdigit((unsigned char)buf[0U]) && (buf[1U] == '.') &&
isdigit((unsigned char)buf[2U])) {
/* we support a maximum of 2 digits in the minor version */
if (isdigit((unsigned char)buf[3U]))
end = 1U;
/* set up major version */
ver = (buf[0U] - '0') * 10000U;
/* set up minor version */
if (end == 1U) {
ver += (buf[2U] - '0') * 1000U;
ver += (buf[3U] - '0') * 100U;
} else
ver += (buf[2U] - '0') * 100U;
/*
* WARC below version 0.12 has a space-separated header
* WARC 0.12 and above terminates the version with a CRLF
*/
c = buf + 3U + end;
if (ver >= 1200U) {
if (memcmp(c, "\r\n", 2U) != 0)
ver = 0U;
} else if (ver < 1200U) {
if (*c != ' ' && *c != '\t')
ver = 0U;
}
}
return ver;
}
Commit Message: warc: consume data once read
The warc decoder only used read ahead, it wouldn't actually consume
data that had previously been printed. This means that if you specify
an invalid content length, it will just reprint the same data over
and over and over again until it hits the desired length.
This means that a WARC resource with e.g.
Content-Length: 666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666665
but only a few hundred bytes of data, causes a quasi-infinite loop.
Consume data in subsequent calls to _warc_read.
Found with an AFL + afl-rb + qsym setup.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 9,581
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int StreamTcpTest06 (void)
{
Packet *p = SCMalloc(SIZE_OF_PACKET);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return 0;
Flow f;
TcpSession ssn;
ThreadVars tv;
StreamTcpThread stt;
TCPHdr tcph;
memset(p, 0, SIZE_OF_PACKET);
PacketQueue pq;
memset(&pq,0,sizeof(PacketQueue));
memset (&f, 0, sizeof(Flow));
memset(&ssn, 0, sizeof (TcpSession));
memset(&tv, 0, sizeof (ThreadVars));
memset(&stt, 0, sizeof (StreamTcpThread));
memset(&tcph, 0, sizeof (TCPHdr));
FLOW_INITIALIZE(&f);
p->flow = &f;
int ret = 0;
StreamTcpUTInit(&stt.ra_ctx);
tcph.th_flags = TH_FIN;
p->tcph = &tcph;
/* StreamTcpPacket returns -1 on unsolicited FIN */
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) != -1) {
printf("StreamTcpPacket failed: ");
goto end;
}
if (((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx)) != NULL) {
printf("we have a ssn while we shouldn't: ");
goto end;
}
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_RST;
/* StreamTcpPacket returns -1 on unsolicited RST */
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) != -1) {
printf("StreamTcpPacket failed (2): ");
goto end;
}
if (((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx)) != NULL) {
printf("we have a ssn while we shouldn't (2): ");
goto end;
}
ret = 1;
end:
SCFree(p);
FLOW_DESTROY(&f);
StreamTcpUTDeinit(stt.ra_ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,624
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dev_match_devt(struct device *dev, void *data)
{
dev_t *devt = data;
return dev->devt == *devt;
}
Commit Message: TTY: drop driver reference in tty_open fail path
When tty_driver_lookup_tty fails in tty_open, we forget to drop a
reference to the tty driver. This was added by commit 4a2b5fddd5 (Move
tty lookup/reopen to caller).
Fix that by adding tty_driver_kref_put to the fail path.
I will refactor the code later. This is for the ease of backporting to
stable.
Introduced-in: v2.6.28-rc2
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 16,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Response TargetHandler::SetAttachToFrames(bool value) {
auto_attacher_.SetAttachToFrames(value);
if (!auto_attacher_.ShouldThrottleFramesNavigation())
ClearThrottles();
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,641
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline void HarfBuzzShaper::HarfBuzzRun::applyShapeResult(hb_buffer_t* harfBuzzBuffer)
{
m_numGlyphs = hb_buffer_get_length(harfBuzzBuffer);
m_glyphs.resize(m_numGlyphs);
m_advances.resize(m_numGlyphs);
m_glyphToCharacterIndexes.resize(m_numGlyphs);
m_offsets.resize(m_numGlyphs);
}
Commit Message: Always initialize |m_totalWidth| in HarfBuzzShaper::shape.
R=leviw@chromium.org
BUG=476647
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1108663003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@194541 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,341
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int move_iovec_hdr(struct iovec *from, struct iovec *to,
size_t len, int iov_count)
{
int seg = 0;
size_t size;
while (len && seg < iov_count) {
size = min(from->iov_len, len);
to->iov_base = from->iov_base;
to->iov_len = size;
from->iov_len -= size;
from->iov_base += size;
len -= size;
++from;
++to;
++seg;
}
return seg;
}
Commit Message: vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <asias@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,386
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fetchmode (char const *str)
{
const char *s;
mode_t mode;
while (ISSPACE ((unsigned char) *str))
str++;
for (s = str, mode = 0; s < str + 6; s++)
{
if (*s >= '0' && *s <= '7')
mode = (mode << 3) + (*s - '0');
else
{
mode = 0;
break;
}
}
if (*s == '\r')
s++;
if (*s != '\n')
mode = 0;
/* NOTE: The "diff --git" format always sets the file mode permission
bits of symlinks to 0. (On Linux, symlinks actually always have
0777 permissions, so this is not even consistent.) */
return mode;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 29,317
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _PUBLIC_ codepoint_t next_codepoint_ext(const char *str, size_t len,
charset_t src_charset, size_t *size)
{
return next_codepoint_handle_ext(get_iconv_handle(), str, len,
src_charset, size);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 24,833
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_ioc_bulkstat(
xfs_mount_t *mp,
unsigned int cmd,
void __user *arg)
{
xfs_fsop_bulkreq_t bulkreq;
int count; /* # of records returned */
xfs_ino_t inlast; /* last inode number */
int done;
int error;
/* done = 1 if there are more stats to get and if bulkstat */
/* should be called again (unused here, but used in dmapi) */
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(mp))
return -XFS_ERROR(EIO);
if (copy_from_user(&bulkreq, arg, sizeof(xfs_fsop_bulkreq_t)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
if (copy_from_user(&inlast, bulkreq.lastip, sizeof(__s64)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
if ((count = bulkreq.icount) <= 0)
return -XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
if (bulkreq.ubuffer == NULL)
return -XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
if (cmd == XFS_IOC_FSINUMBERS)
error = xfs_inumbers(mp, &inlast, &count,
bulkreq.ubuffer, xfs_inumbers_fmt);
else if (cmd == XFS_IOC_FSBULKSTAT_SINGLE)
error = xfs_bulkstat_single(mp, &inlast,
bulkreq.ubuffer, &done);
else /* XFS_IOC_FSBULKSTAT */
error = xfs_bulkstat(mp, &inlast, &count, xfs_bulkstat_one,
sizeof(xfs_bstat_t), bulkreq.ubuffer,
&done);
if (error)
return -error;
if (bulkreq.ocount != NULL) {
if (copy_to_user(bulkreq.lastip, &inlast,
sizeof(xfs_ino_t)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
if (copy_to_user(bulkreq.ocount, &count, sizeof(count)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 22,974
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int atif_ioctl(int cmd, void __user *arg)
{
static char aarp_mcast[6] = { 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF };
struct ifreq atreq;
struct atalk_netrange *nr;
struct sockaddr_at *sa;
struct net_device *dev;
struct atalk_iface *atif;
int ct;
int limit;
struct rtentry rtdef;
int add_route;
if (copy_from_user(&atreq, arg, sizeof(atreq)))
return -EFAULT;
dev = __dev_get_by_name(&init_net, atreq.ifr_name);
if (!dev)
return -ENODEV;
sa = (struct sockaddr_at *)&atreq.ifr_addr;
atif = atalk_find_dev(dev);
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCSIFADDR:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (sa->sat_family != AF_APPLETALK)
return -EINVAL;
if (dev->type != ARPHRD_ETHER &&
dev->type != ARPHRD_LOOPBACK &&
dev->type != ARPHRD_LOCALTLK &&
dev->type != ARPHRD_PPP)
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
nr = (struct atalk_netrange *)&sa->sat_zero[0];
add_route = 1;
/*
* if this is a point-to-point iface, and we already
* have an iface for this AppleTalk address, then we
* should not add a route
*/
if ((dev->flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT) &&
atalk_find_interface(sa->sat_addr.s_net,
sa->sat_addr.s_node)) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "AppleTalk: point-to-point "
"interface added with "
"existing address\n");
add_route = 0;
}
/*
* Phase 1 is fine on LocalTalk but we don't do
* EtherTalk phase 1. Anyone wanting to add it go ahead.
*/
if (dev->type == ARPHRD_ETHER && nr->nr_phase != 2)
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
if (sa->sat_addr.s_node == ATADDR_BCAST ||
sa->sat_addr.s_node == 254)
return -EINVAL;
if (atif) {
/* Already setting address */
if (atif->status & ATIF_PROBE)
return -EBUSY;
atif->address.s_net = sa->sat_addr.s_net;
atif->address.s_node = sa->sat_addr.s_node;
atrtr_device_down(dev); /* Flush old routes */
} else {
atif = atif_add_device(dev, &sa->sat_addr);
if (!atif)
return -ENOMEM;
}
atif->nets = *nr;
/*
* Check if the chosen address is used. If so we
* error and atalkd will try another.
*/
if (!(dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) &&
!(dev->flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT) &&
atif_probe_device(atif) < 0) {
atif_drop_device(dev);
return -EADDRINUSE;
}
/* Hey it worked - add the direct routes */
sa = (struct sockaddr_at *)&rtdef.rt_gateway;
sa->sat_family = AF_APPLETALK;
sa->sat_addr.s_net = atif->address.s_net;
sa->sat_addr.s_node = atif->address.s_node;
sa = (struct sockaddr_at *)&rtdef.rt_dst;
rtdef.rt_flags = RTF_UP;
sa->sat_family = AF_APPLETALK;
sa->sat_addr.s_node = ATADDR_ANYNODE;
if (dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK ||
dev->flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT)
rtdef.rt_flags |= RTF_HOST;
/* Routerless initial state */
if (nr->nr_firstnet == htons(0) &&
nr->nr_lastnet == htons(0xFFFE)) {
sa->sat_addr.s_net = atif->address.s_net;
atrtr_create(&rtdef, dev);
atrtr_set_default(dev);
} else {
limit = ntohs(nr->nr_lastnet);
if (limit - ntohs(nr->nr_firstnet) > 4096) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "Too many routes/"
"iface.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (add_route)
for (ct = ntohs(nr->nr_firstnet);
ct <= limit; ct++) {
sa->sat_addr.s_net = htons(ct);
atrtr_create(&rtdef, dev);
}
}
dev_mc_add_global(dev, aarp_mcast);
return 0;
case SIOCGIFADDR:
if (!atif)
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
sa->sat_family = AF_APPLETALK;
sa->sat_addr = atif->address;
break;
case SIOCGIFBRDADDR:
if (!atif)
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
sa->sat_family = AF_APPLETALK;
sa->sat_addr.s_net = atif->address.s_net;
sa->sat_addr.s_node = ATADDR_BCAST;
break;
case SIOCATALKDIFADDR:
case SIOCDIFADDR:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (sa->sat_family != AF_APPLETALK)
return -EINVAL;
atalk_dev_down(dev);
break;
case SIOCSARP:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (sa->sat_family != AF_APPLETALK)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* for now, we only support proxy AARP on ELAP;
* we should be able to do it for LocalTalk, too.
*/
if (dev->type != ARPHRD_ETHER)
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
/*
* atif points to the current interface on this network;
* we aren't concerned about its current status (at
* least for now), but it has all the settings about
* the network we're going to probe. Consequently, it
* must exist.
*/
if (!atif)
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
nr = (struct atalk_netrange *)&(atif->nets);
/*
* Phase 1 is fine on Localtalk but we don't do
* Ethertalk phase 1. Anyone wanting to add it go ahead.
*/
if (dev->type == ARPHRD_ETHER && nr->nr_phase != 2)
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
if (sa->sat_addr.s_node == ATADDR_BCAST ||
sa->sat_addr.s_node == 254)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Check if the chosen address is used. If so we
* error and ATCP will try another.
*/
if (atif_proxy_probe_device(atif, &(sa->sat_addr)) < 0)
return -EADDRINUSE;
/*
* We now have an address on the local network, and
* the AARP code will defend it for us until we take it
* down. We don't set up any routes right now, because
* ATCP will install them manually via SIOCADDRT.
*/
break;
case SIOCDARP:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (sa->sat_family != AF_APPLETALK)
return -EINVAL;
if (!atif)
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
/* give to aarp module to remove proxy entry */
aarp_proxy_remove(atif->dev, &(sa->sat_addr));
return 0;
}
return copy_to_user(arg, &atreq, sizeof(atreq)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,928
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: update_string_node_case_fold(regex_t* reg, Node *node)
{
UChar *p, *end, buf[ONIGENC_MBC_CASE_FOLD_MAXLEN];
UChar *sbuf, *ebuf, *sp;
int r, i, len, sbuf_size;
StrNode* sn = STR_(node);
end = sn->end;
sbuf_size = (int )(end - sn->s) * 2;
sbuf = (UChar* )xmalloc(sbuf_size);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(sbuf);
ebuf = sbuf + sbuf_size;
sp = sbuf;
p = sn->s;
while (p < end) {
len = ONIGENC_MBC_CASE_FOLD(reg->enc, reg->case_fold_flag, &p, end, buf);
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (sp >= ebuf) {
sbuf = (UChar* )xrealloc(sbuf, sbuf_size * 2);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(sbuf);
sp = sbuf + sbuf_size;
sbuf_size *= 2;
ebuf = sbuf + sbuf_size;
}
*sp++ = buf[i];
}
}
r = onig_node_str_set(node, sbuf, sp);
if (r != 0) {
xfree(sbuf);
return r;
}
xfree(sbuf);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 3,714
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Textfield::OnInputMethodChanged() {}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 24,501
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void read_settings(void)
{
int old_hide;
old_hide = hide_netsplit_quits;
hide_netsplit_quits = settings_get_bool("hide_netsplit_quits");
netjoin_max_nicks = settings_get_int("netjoin_max_nicks");
if (old_hide && !hide_netsplit_quits) {
signal_remove("message quit", (SIGNAL_FUNC) msg_quit);
signal_remove("message join", (SIGNAL_FUNC) msg_join);
signal_remove("message irc mode", (SIGNAL_FUNC) msg_mode);
} else if (!old_hide && hide_netsplit_quits) {
signal_add("message quit", (SIGNAL_FUNC) msg_quit);
signal_add("message join", (SIGNAL_FUNC) msg_join);
signal_add("message irc mode", (SIGNAL_FUNC) msg_mode);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'netjoin-timeout' into 'master'
fe-netjoin: remove irc servers on "server disconnected" signal
Closes #7
See merge request !10
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 5,884
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebContentsImpl::IsWebContentsOnlyAccessibilityModeForTesting() const {
return accessibility_mode_ == ui::kAXModeWebContentsOnly;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 14,769
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cmd_search(char *tag, int usinguid)
{
int c;
struct searchargs *searchargs;
clock_t start = clock();
char mytime[100];
int n;
if (backend_current) {
/* remote mailbox */
const char *cmd = usinguid ? "UID Search" : "Search";
prot_printf(backend_current->out, "%s %s ", tag, cmd);
if (!pipe_command(backend_current, 65536)) {
pipe_including_tag(backend_current, tag, 0);
}
return;
}
/* local mailbox */
searchargs = new_searchargs(tag, GETSEARCH_CHARSET_KEYWORD|GETSEARCH_RETURN,
&imapd_namespace, imapd_userid, imapd_authstate,
imapd_userisadmin || imapd_userisproxyadmin);
/* special case quirk for iPhones */
if (imapd_id.quirks & QUIRK_SEARCHFUZZY)
searchargs->fuzzy_depth++;
c = get_search_program(imapd_in, imapd_out, searchargs);
if (c == EOF) {
eatline(imapd_in, ' ');
freesearchargs(searchargs);
return;
}
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s BAD Unexpected extra arguments to Search\r\n", tag);
eatline(imapd_in, c);
freesearchargs(searchargs);
return;
}
if (searchargs->charset == CHARSET_UNKNOWN_CHARSET) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO %s\r\n", tag,
error_message(IMAP_UNRECOGNIZED_CHARSET));
}
else {
n = index_search(imapd_index, searchargs, usinguid);
snprintf(mytime, sizeof(mytime), "%2.3f",
(clock() - start) / (double) CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK %s (%d msgs in %s secs)\r\n", tag,
error_message(IMAP_OK_COMPLETED), n, mytime);
}
freesearchargs(searchargs);
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state2 *ps)
{
int r = 0, start = 0;
u32 prev_legacy, cur_legacy;
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
prev_legacy = kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags & KVM_PIT_FLAGS_HPET_LEGACY;
cur_legacy = ps->flags & KVM_PIT_FLAGS_HPET_LEGACY;
if (!prev_legacy && cur_legacy)
start = 1;
memcpy(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels, &ps->channels,
sizeof(kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels));
kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags = ps->flags;
kvm_pit_load_count(kvm, 0, kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels[0].count, start);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,924
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t write_iter_null(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from)
{
size_t count = iov_iter_count(from);
iov_iter_advance(from, count);
return count;
}
Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 20,159
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::inheritHtmlAndBodyElementStyles(StyleRecalcChange change)
{
ASSERT(inStyleRecalc());
ASSERT(documentElement());
bool didRecalcDocumentElement = false;
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> documentElementStyle = documentElement()->mutableComputedStyle();
if (change == Force)
documentElement()->clearAnimationStyleChange();
if (!documentElementStyle || documentElement()->needsStyleRecalc() || change == Force) {
documentElementStyle = ensureStyleResolver().styleForElement(documentElement());
didRecalcDocumentElement = true;
}
WritingMode rootWritingMode = documentElementStyle->writingMode();
TextDirection rootDirection = documentElementStyle->direction();
HTMLElement* body = this->body();
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> bodyStyle;
if (body) {
bodyStyle = body->mutableComputedStyle();
if (didRecalcDocumentElement)
body->clearAnimationStyleChange();
if (!bodyStyle || body->needsStyleRecalc() || didRecalcDocumentElement)
bodyStyle = ensureStyleResolver().styleForElement(body, documentElementStyle.get());
rootWritingMode = bodyStyle->writingMode();
rootDirection = bodyStyle->direction();
}
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> overflowStyle;
if (Element* element = viewportDefiningElement(documentElementStyle.get())) {
if (element == body) {
overflowStyle = bodyStyle;
} else {
ASSERT(element == documentElement());
overflowStyle = documentElementStyle;
}
}
if (styleEngine().usesRemUnits() && (documentElement()->needsAttach() || documentElement()->ensureComputedStyle()->fontSize() != documentElementStyle->fontSize())) {
ensureStyleResolver().invalidateMatchedPropertiesCache();
documentElement()->setNeedsStyleRecalc(SubtreeStyleChange, StyleChangeReasonForTracing::create(StyleChangeReason::FontSizeChange));
}
EOverflow overflowX = OAUTO;
EOverflow overflowY = OAUTO;
float columnGap = 0;
if (overflowStyle) {
overflowX = overflowStyle->overflowX();
overflowY = overflowStyle->overflowY();
if (overflowX == OVISIBLE)
overflowX = OAUTO;
if (overflowY == OVISIBLE)
overflowY = OAUTO;
columnGap = overflowStyle->columnGap();
}
WebScrollBlocksOn scrollBlocksOn = documentElementStyle->scrollBlocksOn();
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> documentStyle = layoutView()->mutableStyle();
if (documentStyle->writingMode() != rootWritingMode
|| documentStyle->direction() != rootDirection
|| documentStyle->overflowX() != overflowX
|| documentStyle->overflowY() != overflowY
|| documentStyle->columnGap() != columnGap
|| documentStyle->scrollBlocksOn() != scrollBlocksOn) {
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> newStyle = ComputedStyle::clone(*documentStyle);
newStyle->setWritingMode(rootWritingMode);
newStyle->setDirection(rootDirection);
newStyle->setColumnGap(columnGap);
newStyle->setOverflowX(overflowX);
newStyle->setOverflowY(overflowY);
newStyle->setScrollBlocksOn(scrollBlocksOn);
layoutView()->setStyle(newStyle);
setupFontBuilder(*newStyle);
}
if (body) {
if (const ComputedStyle* style = body->computedStyle()) {
if (style->direction() != rootDirection || style->writingMode() != rootWritingMode)
body->setNeedsStyleRecalc(SubtreeStyleChange, StyleChangeReasonForTracing::create(StyleChangeReason::WritingModeChange));
}
}
if (const ComputedStyle* style = documentElement()->computedStyle()) {
if (style->direction() != rootDirection || style->writingMode() != rootWritingMode)
documentElement()->setNeedsStyleRecalc(SubtreeStyleChange, StyleChangeReasonForTracing::create(StyleChangeReason::WritingModeChange));
}
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 19,017
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool FeatureInfo::IsWebGL1OrES2Context() const {
return IsWebGL1OrES2ContextType(context_type_);
}
Commit Message: gpu: Disallow use of IOSurfaces for half-float format with swiftshader.
R=kbr@chromium.org
Bug: 998038
Change-Id: Ic31d28938ef205b36657fc7bd297fe8a63d08543
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1798052
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#695826}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 13,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ZEXPORT inflatePrime(strm, bits, value)
z_streamp strm;
int bits;
int value;
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
if (strm == Z_NULL || strm->state == Z_NULL) return Z_STREAM_ERROR;
state = (struct inflate_state FAR *)strm->state;
if (bits < 0) {
state->hold = 0;
state->bits = 0;
return Z_OK;
}
if (bits > 16 || state->bits + bits > 32) return Z_STREAM_ERROR;
value &= (1L << bits) - 1;
state->hold += value << state->bits;
state->bits += bits;
return Z_OK;
}
Commit Message: Avoid shifts of negative values inflateMark().
The C standard says that bit shifts of negative integers is
undefined. This casts to unsigned values to assure a known
result.
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 5,051
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport QuantizeInfo *CloneQuantizeInfo(const QuantizeInfo *quantize_info)
{
QuantizeInfo
*clone_info;
clone_info=(QuantizeInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*clone_info));
if (clone_info == (QuantizeInfo *) NULL)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
GetQuantizeInfo(clone_info);
if (quantize_info == (QuantizeInfo *) NULL)
return(clone_info);
clone_info->number_colors=quantize_info->number_colors;
clone_info->tree_depth=quantize_info->tree_depth;
clone_info->dither=quantize_info->dither;
clone_info->dither_method=quantize_info->dither_method;
clone_info->colorspace=quantize_info->colorspace;
clone_info->measure_error=quantize_info->measure_error;
return(clone_info);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/574
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 23,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cma_listen_handler(struct rdma_cm_id *id,
struct rdma_cm_event *event)
{
struct rdma_id_private *id_priv = id->context;
id->context = id_priv->id.context;
id->event_handler = id_priv->id.event_handler;
return id_priv->id.event_handler(id, event);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,542
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_exif_tag_int_value(struct iw_exif_state *e, unsigned int tag_pos,
unsigned int *pv)
{
unsigned int field_type;
unsigned int value_count;
field_type = iw_get_ui16_e(&e->d[tag_pos+2],e->endian);
value_count = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[tag_pos+4],e->endian);
if(value_count!=1) return 0;
if(field_type==3) { // SHORT (uint16)
*pv = iw_get_ui16_e(&e->d[tag_pos+8],e->endian);
return 1;
}
else if(field_type==4) { // LONG (uint32)
*pv = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[tag_pos+8],e->endian);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed invalid memory access bugs when decoding JPEG Exif data
Fixes issues #22, #23, #24, #25
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 20,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameFetchContext::ProvideDocumentToContext(FetchContext& context,
Document* document) {
DCHECK(document);
CHECK(context.IsFrameFetchContext());
static_cast<FrameFetchContext&>(context).document_ = document;
static_cast<FrameFetchContext&>(context).fetch_client_settings_object_ =
new FetchClientSettingsObjectImpl(*document);
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,343
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int virtqueue_num_heads(VirtQueue *vq, unsigned int idx)
{
uint16_t num_heads = vring_avail_idx(vq) - idx;
/* Check it isn't doing very strange things with descriptor numbers. */
if (num_heads > vq->vring.num) {
error_report("Guest moved used index from %u to %u",
idx, vring_avail_idx(vq));
exit(1);
}
/* On success, callers read a descriptor at vq->last_avail_idx.
* Make sure descriptor read does not bypass avail index read. */
if (num_heads) {
smp_rmb();
}
return num_heads;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 481
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init crypto_pcbc_module_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_template(&crypto_pcbc_tmpl);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 13,913
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long hung_up_tty_compat_ioctl(struct file *file,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
return cmd == TIOCSPGRP ? -ENOTTY : -EIO;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 24,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sock_spd_release(struct splice_pipe_desc *spd, unsigned int i)
{
put_page(spd->pages[i]);
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,034
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GetClientID(const ClientServiceMap<ClientType, ServiceType>* map,
ResultType service_id,
ResultType* result) {
ClientType client_id = 0;
if (!map->GetClientID(static_cast<ServiceType>(service_id), &client_id)) {
return false;
}
*result = static_cast<ResultType>(client_id);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 20,952
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned int ReadPropertyUnsignedLong(const EndianType endian,
const unsigned char *buffer)
{
unsigned int
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned int) ((buffer[3] << 24) | (buffer[2] << 16) |
(buffer[1] << 8 ) | (buffer[0]));
return((unsigned int) (value & 0xffffffff));
}
value=(unsigned int) ((buffer[0] << 24) | (buffer[1] << 16) |
(buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[3]);
return((unsigned int) (value & 0xffffffff));
}
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 11,335
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sp<MetaData> OggExtractor::getTrackMetaData(
size_t index, uint32_t /* flags */) {
if (index >= 1) {
return NULL;
}
return mImpl->getFormat();
}
Commit Message: Fix memory leak in OggExtractor
Test: added a temporal log and run poc
Bug: 63581671
Change-Id: I436a08e54d5e831f9fbdb33c26d15397ce1fbeba
(cherry picked from commit 63079e7c8e12cda4eb124fbe565213d30b9ea34c)
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 14,248
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FT_Stream_ReadLongLE( FT_Stream stream,
FT_Error* error )
{
FT_Byte reads[4];
FT_Byte* p = 0;
FT_Long result = 0;
FT_ASSERT( stream );
*error = FT_Err_Ok;
if ( stream->pos + 3 < stream->size )
{
if ( stream->read )
{
if ( stream->read( stream, stream->pos, reads, 4L ) != 4L )
goto Fail;
p = reads;
}
else
{
p = stream->base + stream->pos;
}
if ( p )
result = FT_NEXT_LONG_LE( p );
}
else
goto Fail;
stream->pos += 4;
return result;
Fail:
*error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_ReadLongLE:"
" invalid i/o; pos = 0x%lx, size = 0x%lx\n",
stream->pos, stream->size ));
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 26,468
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void SerializedScriptValueAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValue(info, V8Deserialize(info.GetIsolate(), WTF::GetPtr(impl->serializedScriptValueAttribute()).get()));
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 8,397
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool ExecuteMoveDown(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
return frame.Selection().Modify(
SelectionModifyAlteration::kMove, SelectionModifyDirection::kForward,
TextGranularity::kLine, SetSelectionBy::kUser);
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,118
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CL_Frame( int msec ) {
if ( !com_cl_running->integer ) {
return;
}
#ifdef USE_CURL
if(clc.downloadCURLM) {
CL_cURL_PerformDownload();
if(clc.cURLDisconnected) {
cls.realFrametime = msec;
cls.frametime = msec;
cls.realtime += cls.frametime;
SCR_UpdateScreen();
S_Update();
Con_RunConsole();
cls.framecount++;
return;
}
}
#endif
if ( cls.cddialog ) {
cls.cddialog = qfalse;
VM_Call( uivm, UI_SET_ACTIVE_MENU, UIMENU_NEED_CD );
} else if ( cls.endgamemenu ) {
cls.endgamemenu = qfalse;
VM_Call( uivm, UI_SET_ACTIVE_MENU, UIMENU_ENDGAME );
} else if ( clc.state == CA_DISCONNECTED && !( Key_GetCatcher( ) & KEYCATCH_UI )
&& !com_sv_running->integer && uivm ) {
S_StopAllSounds();
VM_Call( uivm, UI_SET_ACTIVE_MENU, UIMENU_MAIN );
}
if ( ( CL_VideoRecording( ) && cl_aviFrameRate->integer && msec ) || ( cl_avidemo->integer && msec ) ) {
if ( clc.state == CA_ACTIVE || cl_forceavidemo->integer ) {
if ( cl_avidemo->integer ) { // Legacy (screenshot) method
Cbuf_ExecuteText( EXEC_NOW, "screenshot silent\n" );
msec = ( 1000 / cl_avidemo->integer ) * com_timescale->value;
if ( msec == 0 ) {
msec = 1;
}
} else { // ioquake3 method
float fps = MIN(cl_aviFrameRate->value * com_timescale->value, 1000.0f);
float frameDuration = MAX(1000.0f / fps, 1.0f) + clc.aviVideoFrameRemainder;
CL_TakeVideoFrame( );
msec = (int)frameDuration;
clc.aviVideoFrameRemainder = frameDuration - msec;
}
}
}
if( cl_autoRecordDemo->integer ) {
if( clc.state == CA_ACTIVE && !clc.demorecording && !clc.demoplaying ) {
qtime_t now;
char *nowString;
char *p;
char mapName[ MAX_QPATH ];
char serverName[ MAX_OSPATH ];
Com_RealTime( &now );
nowString = va( "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d",
1900 + now.tm_year,
1 + now.tm_mon,
now.tm_mday,
now.tm_hour,
now.tm_min,
now.tm_sec );
Q_strncpyz( serverName, clc.servername, MAX_OSPATH );
p = strstr( serverName, ":" );
if( p ) {
*p = '.';
}
Q_strncpyz( mapName, COM_SkipPath( cl.mapname ), sizeof( cl.mapname ) );
COM_StripExtension(mapName, mapName, sizeof(mapName));
Cbuf_ExecuteText( EXEC_NOW,
va( "record %s-%s-%s", nowString, serverName, mapName ) );
}
else if( clc.state != CA_ACTIVE && clc.demorecording ) {
CL_StopRecord_f( );
}
}
cls.realFrametime = msec;
cls.frametime = msec;
cls.realtime += cls.frametime;
if ( cl_timegraph->integer ) {
SCR_DebugGraph ( cls.realFrametime * 0.25 );
}
CL_CheckUserinfo();
CL_CheckTimeout();
CL_SendCmd();
CL_CheckForResend();
CL_SetCGameTime();
SCR_UpdateScreen();
S_Update();
#ifdef USE_VOIP
CL_CaptureVoip();
#endif
#ifdef USE_MUMBLE
CL_UpdateMumble();
#endif
SCR_RunCinematic();
Con_RunConsole();
cls.framecount++;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 14,138
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::DataReceived(Resource* resource,
const char* data,
size_t length) {
DCHECK(data);
DCHECK(length);
DCHECK_EQ(resource, GetResource());
DCHECK(!response_.IsNull());
DCHECK(!frame_->GetPage()->Paused());
if (in_data_received_) {
data_buffer_->Append(data, length);
return;
}
base::AutoReset<bool> reentrancy_protector(&in_data_received_, true);
ProcessData(data, length);
ProcessDataBuffer();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,498
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnDidStartProvisionalLoad(
const GURL& url,
const std::vector<GURL>& redirect_chain,
const base::TimeTicks& navigation_start) {
if (!is_active())
return;
TRACE_EVENT2("navigation", "RenderFrameHostImpl::OnDidStartProvisionalLoad",
"frame_tree_node", frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id(), "url",
url.possibly_invalid_spec());
frame_tree_node_->navigator()->DidStartProvisionalLoad(
this, url, redirect_chain, navigation_start);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 24,693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InputMethodController::SetCompositionFromExistingText(
const Vector<CompositionUnderline>& underlines,
unsigned composition_start,
unsigned composition_end) {
Element* editable = GetFrame()
.Selection()
.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated()
.RootEditableElement();
if (!editable)
return;
DCHECK(!GetDocument().NeedsLayoutTreeUpdate());
const EphemeralRange range =
PlainTextRange(composition_start, composition_end).CreateRange(*editable);
if (range.IsNull())
return;
const Position start = range.StartPosition();
if (RootEditableElementOf(start) != editable)
return;
const Position end = range.EndPosition();
if (RootEditableElementOf(end) != editable)
return;
Clear();
AddCompositionUnderlines(underlines, editable, composition_start);
has_composition_ = true;
if (!composition_range_)
composition_range_ = Range::Create(GetDocument());
composition_range_->setStart(range.StartPosition());
composition_range_->setEnd(range.EndPosition());
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,242
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BluetoothChooserDesktop::BluetoothChooserDesktop(
BluetoothChooserController* bluetooth_chooser_controller)
: bluetooth_chooser_controller_(bluetooth_chooser_controller) {
DCHECK(bluetooth_chooser_controller_);
}
Commit Message: Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <msw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 11,560
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct dentry *lookup_one_len_unlocked(const char *name,
struct dentry *base, int len)
{
struct qstr this;
unsigned int c;
int err;
struct dentry *ret;
this.name = name;
this.len = len;
this.hash = full_name_hash(name, len);
if (!len)
return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
if (unlikely(name[0] == '.')) {
if (len < 2 || (len == 2 && name[1] == '.'))
return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
}
while (len--) {
c = *(const unsigned char *)name++;
if (c == '/' || c == '\0')
return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
}
/*
* See if the low-level filesystem might want
* to use its own hash..
*/
if (base->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_HASH) {
int err = base->d_op->d_hash(base, &this);
if (err < 0)
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
err = inode_permission(base->d_inode, MAY_EXEC);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
ret = lookup_dcache(&this, base, 0);
if (!ret)
ret = lookup_slow(&this, base, 0);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: vfs: rename: check backing inode being equal
If a file is renamed to a hardlink of itself POSIX specifies that rename(2)
should do nothing and return success.
This condition is checked in vfs_rename(). However it won't detect hard
links on overlayfs where these are given separate inodes on the overlayfs
layer.
Overlayfs itself detects this condition and returns success without doing
anything, but then vfs_rename() will proceed as if this was a successful
rename (detach_mounts(), d_move()).
The correct thing to do is to detect this condition before even calling
into overlayfs. This patch does this by calling vfs_select_inode() to get
the underlying inodes.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 23,433
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static CPU_CONST *const_by_name(CPU_MODEL *cpu, int type, char *c) {
CPU_CONST **clist, *citem;
for (clist = cpu->consts; *clist; clist++) {
for (citem = *clist; citem->key; citem++) {
if (!strcmp (c, citem->key)
&& (type == CPU_CONST_NONE || type == citem->type)) {
return citem;
}
}
}
if (cpu->inherit_cpu_p)
return const_by_name (cpu->inherit_cpu_p, type, c);
eprintf ("ERROR: CONSTANT key[%s] NOT FOUND.\n", c);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9943 - Invalid free on RAnal.avr
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 29,672
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int netsnmp_session_gen_auth_key(struct snmp_session *s, char *pass TSRMLS_DC)
{
int snmp_errno;
s->securityAuthKeyLen = USM_AUTH_KU_LEN;
if ((snmp_errno = generate_Ku(s->securityAuthProto, s->securityAuthProtoLen,
(u_char *) pass, strlen(pass),
s->securityAuthKey, &(s->securityAuthKeyLen)))) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error generating a key for authentication pass phrase '%s': %s", pass, snmp_api_errstring(snmp_errno));
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 19,133
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FLAC_API FLAC__bool FLAC__stream_decoder_set_metadata_respond(FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder, FLAC__MetadataType type)
{
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder);
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder->private_);
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder->protected_);
FLAC__ASSERT((unsigned)type <= FLAC__MAX_METADATA_TYPE_CODE);
/* double protection */
if((unsigned)type > FLAC__MAX_METADATA_TYPE_CODE)
return false;
if(decoder->protected_->state != FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_UNINITIALIZED)
return false;
decoder->private_->metadata_filter[type] = true;
if(type == FLAC__METADATA_TYPE_APPLICATION)
decoder->private_->metadata_filter_ids_count = 0;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Avoid free-before-initialize vulnerability in heap
Bug: 27211885
Change-Id: Ib9c93bd9ffdde2a5f8d31a86f06e267dc9c152db
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,581
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void jsB_RegExp(js_State *J)
{
if (js_isregexp(J, 1))
return;
jsB_new_RegExp(J);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 3,425
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rxfilter_notify(NetClientState *nc)
{
QObject *event_data;
VirtIONet *n = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
if (nc->rxfilter_notify_enabled) {
gchar *path = object_get_canonical_path(OBJECT(n->qdev));
if (n->netclient_name) {
event_data = qobject_from_jsonf("{ 'name': %s, 'path': %s }",
n->netclient_name, path);
} else {
event_data = qobject_from_jsonf("{ 'path': %s }", path);
}
monitor_protocol_event(QEVENT_NIC_RX_FILTER_CHANGED, event_data);
qobject_decref(event_data);
g_free(path);
/* disable event notification to avoid events flooding */
nc->rxfilter_notify_enabled = 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,273
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void g_tv_details_checkbox_toggled(
GtkCellRendererToggle *cell_renderer_UNUSED,
gchar *tree_path,
gpointer user_data_UNUSED)
{
GtkTreeIter iter;
if (!gtk_tree_model_get_iter_from_string(GTK_TREE_MODEL(g_ls_details), &iter, tree_path))
return;
gchar *item_name = NULL;
gtk_tree_model_get(GTK_TREE_MODEL(g_ls_details), &iter,
DETAIL_COLUMN_NAME, &item_name,
-1);
if (!item_name) /* paranoia, should never happen */
return;
struct problem_item *item = problem_data_get_item_or_NULL(g_cd, item_name);
g_free(item_name);
if (!item) /* paranoia */
return;
int cur_value;
if (item->selected_by_user == 0)
cur_value = item->default_by_reporter;
else
cur_value = !!(item->selected_by_user + 1); /* map -1,1 to 0,1 */
if (item->allowed_by_reporter && !item->required_by_reporter)
{
cur_value = !cur_value;
item->selected_by_user = cur_value * 2 - 1; /* map 0,1 to -1,1 */
gtk_list_store_set(g_ls_details, &iter,
DETAIL_COLUMN_CHECKBOX, cur_value,
-1);
}
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 25,616
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int disable_output_path_l(struct stream_out *out)
{
struct audio_device *adev = out->dev;
struct audio_usecase *uc_info;
uc_info = get_usecase_from_id(adev, out->usecase);
if (uc_info == NULL) {
ALOGE("%s: Could not find the usecase (%d) in the list",
__func__, out->usecase);
return -EINVAL;
}
disable_snd_device(adev, uc_info, uc_info->out_snd_device, true);
uc_release_pcm_devices(uc_info);
list_remove(&uc_info->adev_list_node);
free(uc_info);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 11,590
|
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