instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool TokenExitsMath(const CompactHTMLToken& token) {
const String& tag_name = token.Data();
return ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::miTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::moTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::mnTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::msTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::mtextTag);
}
Commit Message: HTML parser: Fix "HTML integration point" implementation in HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator.
HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator assumed only <foreignObject> as an HTML
integration point. This CL adds <annotation-xml>, <desc>, and SVG
<title>.
Bug: 805924
Change-Id: I6793d9163d4c6bc8bf0790415baedddaac7a1fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/964038
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543634}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 17,560
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE4(send, int, fd, void __user *, buff, size_t, len,
unsigned int, flags)
{
return sys_sendto(fd, buff, len, flags, NULL, 0);
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,789
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderViewImpl* RenderViewImpl::FromRoutingID(int32_t routing_id) {
RoutingIDViewMap* views = g_routing_id_view_map.Pointer();
RoutingIDViewMap::iterator it = views->find(routing_id);
return it == views->end() ? NULL : it->second;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 9,083
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
struct blkcipher_alg *cipher = &tfm->__crt_alg->cra_blkcipher;
unsigned long alignmask = crypto_tfm_alg_alignmask(tfm);
int ret;
u8 *buffer, *alignbuffer;
unsigned long absize;
absize = keylen + alignmask;
buffer = kmalloc(absize, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
ret = cipher->setkey(tfm, alignbuffer, keylen);
memset(alignbuffer, 0, keylen);
kfree(buffer);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 23,482
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool readCryptoKey(v8::Handle<v8::Value>* value)
{
uint32_t rawKeyType;
if (!doReadUint32(&rawKeyType))
return false;
blink::WebCryptoKeyAlgorithm algorithm;
blink::WebCryptoKeyType type = blink::WebCryptoKeyTypeSecret;
switch (static_cast<CryptoKeySubTag>(rawKeyType)) {
case AesKeyTag:
if (!doReadAesKey(algorithm, type))
return false;
break;
case HmacKeyTag:
if (!doReadHmacKey(algorithm, type))
return false;
break;
case RsaHashedKeyTag:
if (!doReadRsaHashedKey(algorithm, type))
return false;
break;
default:
return false;
}
blink::WebCryptoKeyUsageMask usages;
bool extractable;
if (!doReadKeyUsages(usages, extractable))
return false;
uint32_t keyDataLength;
if (!doReadUint32(&keyDataLength))
return false;
if (m_position + keyDataLength > m_length)
return false;
const uint8_t* keyData = m_buffer + m_position;
m_position += keyDataLength;
blink::WebCryptoKey key = blink::WebCryptoKey::createNull();
if (!blink::Platform::current()->crypto()->deserializeKeyForClone(
algorithm, type, extractable, usages, keyData, keyDataLength, key)) {
return false;
}
*value = toV8(CryptoKey::create(key), m_scriptState->context()->Global(), isolate());
return true;
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 29,127
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __kvm_io_bus_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_io_bus *bus,
struct kvm_io_range *range, const void *val)
{
int idx;
idx = kvm_io_bus_get_first_dev(bus, range->addr, range->len);
if (idx < 0)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
while (idx < bus->dev_count &&
kvm_io_bus_cmp(range, &bus->range[idx]) == 0) {
if (!kvm_iodevice_write(vcpu, bus->range[idx].dev, range->addr,
range->len, val))
return idx;
idx++;
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 20,062
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::BoundFramebufferHasStencilAttachment() {
Framebuffer* framebuffer =
GetFramebufferInfoForTarget(GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT);
if (framebuffer) {
return framebuffer->HasStencilAttachment();
}
if (offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get()) {
return offscreen_target_stencil_format_ != 0 ||
offscreen_target_depth_format_ == GL_DEPTH24_STENCIL8;
}
return back_buffer_has_stencil_;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,386
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FolderHeaderView::FolderHeaderView(FolderHeaderViewDelegate* delegate)
: folder_item_(NULL),
back_button_(new views::ImageButton(this)),
folder_name_view_(new FolderNameView),
folder_name_placeholder_text_(
ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().GetLocalizedString(
IDS_APP_LIST_FOLDER_NAME_PLACEHOLDER)),
delegate_(delegate),
folder_name_visible_(true) {
ui::ResourceBundle& rb = ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
back_button_->SetImage(views::ImageButton::STATE_NORMAL,
rb.GetImageSkiaNamed(IDR_APP_LIST_FOLDER_BACK_NORMAL));
back_button_->SetImageAlignment(views::ImageButton::ALIGN_CENTER,
views::ImageButton::ALIGN_MIDDLE);
AddChildView(back_button_);
folder_name_view_->SetFontList(
rb.GetFontList(ui::ResourceBundle::MediumFont));
folder_name_view_->set_placeholder_text_color(kHintTextColor);
folder_name_view_->set_placeholder_text(folder_name_placeholder_text_);
folder_name_view_->SetBorder(views::Border::NullBorder());
folder_name_view_->SetBackgroundColor(kContentsBackgroundColor);
folder_name_view_->set_controller(this);
AddChildView(folder_name_view_);
}
Commit Message: Enforce the maximum length of the folder name in UI.
BUG=355797
R=xiyuan@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/203863005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260156 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 29,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptResource::ScriptResource(
const ResourceRequest& resource_request,
const ResourceLoaderOptions& options,
const TextResourceDecoderOptions& decoder_options)
: TextResource(resource_request, kScript, options, decoder_options) {}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 6,123
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int GetBlockForJpeg(void* param,
unsigned long pos,
unsigned char* buf,
unsigned long size) {
std::vector<uint8_t>* data_vector = static_cast<std::vector<uint8_t>*>(param);
if (pos + size < pos || pos + size > data_vector->size())
return 0;
memcpy(buf, data_vector->data() + pos, size);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 26,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GBool LZWStream::processNextCode() {
int code;
int nextLength;
int i, j;
if (eof) {
return gFalse;
}
start:
code = getCode();
if (code == EOF || code == 257) {
eof = gTrue;
return gFalse;
}
if (code == 256) {
clearTable();
goto start;
}
if (nextCode >= 4097) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
"Bad LZW stream - expected clear-table code");
clearTable();
}
nextLength = seqLength + 1;
if (code < 256) {
seqBuf[0] = code;
seqLength = 1;
} else if (code < nextCode) {
seqLength = table[code].length;
for (i = seqLength - 1, j = code; i > 0; --i) {
seqBuf[i] = table[j].tail;
j = table[j].head;
}
seqBuf[0] = j;
} else if (code == nextCode) {
seqBuf[seqLength] = newChar;
++seqLength;
} else {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(), "Bad LZW stream - unexpected code");
eof = gTrue;
return gFalse;
}
newChar = seqBuf[0];
if (first) {
first = gFalse;
} else {
table[nextCode].length = nextLength;
table[nextCode].head = prevCode;
table[nextCode].tail = newChar;
++nextCode;
if (nextCode + early == 512)
nextBits = 10;
else if (nextCode + early == 1024)
nextBits = 11;
else if (nextCode + early == 2048)
nextBits = 12;
}
prevCode = code;
seqIndex = 0;
return gTrue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,003
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string ProfileSyncService::QuerySyncStatusSummary() {
if (unrecoverable_error_detected_) {
return "Unrecoverable error detected";
} else if (!backend_.get()) {
return "Syncing not enabled";
} else if (backend_.get() && !HasSyncSetupCompleted()) {
return "First time sync setup incomplete";
} else if (backend_.get() && HasSyncSetupCompleted() &&
data_type_manager_.get() &&
data_type_manager_->state() != DataTypeManager::CONFIGURED) {
return "Datatypes not fully initialized";
} else if (ShouldPushChanges()) {
return "Sync service initialized";
} else {
return "Status unknown: Internal error?";
}
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 6,636
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabCloseableStateWatcher::OnBrowserAdded(const Browser* browser) {
waiting_for_browser_ = false;
if (browser->type() != Browser::TYPE_NORMAL)
return;
tabstrip_watchers_.push_back(new TabStripWatcher(this, browser));
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,086
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __x86_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, int id, gpa_t gpa, u32 size)
{
int i, r;
unsigned long hva;
struct kvm_memslots *slots = kvm_memslots(kvm);
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, old;
/* Called with kvm->slots_lock held. */
if (WARN_ON(id >= KVM_MEM_SLOTS_NUM))
return -EINVAL;
slot = id_to_memslot(slots, id);
if (size) {
if (WARN_ON(slot->npages))
return -EEXIST;
/*
* MAP_SHARED to prevent internal slot pages from being moved
* by fork()/COW.
*/
hva = vm_mmap(NULL, 0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0);
if (IS_ERR((void *)hva))
return PTR_ERR((void *)hva);
} else {
if (!slot->npages)
return 0;
hva = 0;
}
old = *slot;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++) {
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region m;
m.slot = id | (i << 16);
m.flags = 0;
m.guest_phys_addr = gpa;
m.userspace_addr = hva;
m.memory_size = size;
r = __kvm_set_memory_region(kvm, &m);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
if (!size) {
r = vm_munmap(old.userspace_addr, old.npages * PAGE_SIZE);
WARN_ON(r < 0);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,429
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadItemImpl::SetHashState(
std::unique_ptr<crypto::SecureHash> hash_state) {
hash_state_ = std::move(hash_state);
if (!hash_state_) {
destination_info_.hash.clear();
return;
}
std::unique_ptr<crypto::SecureHash> clone_of_hash_state(hash_state_->Clone());
std::vector<char> hash_value(clone_of_hash_state->GetHashLength());
clone_of_hash_state->Finish(&hash_value.front(), hash_value.size());
destination_info_.hash.assign(hash_value.begin(), hash_value.end());
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,038
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void omx_vdec::free_input_buffer_header()
{
input_use_buffer = false;
if (arbitrary_bytes) {
if (m_inp_heap_ptr) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Free input Heap Pointer");
free (m_inp_heap_ptr);
m_inp_heap_ptr = NULL;
}
if (m_phdr_pmem_ptr) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Free input pmem header Pointer");
free (m_phdr_pmem_ptr);
m_phdr_pmem_ptr = NULL;
}
}
if (m_inp_mem_ptr) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Free input pmem Pointer area");
free (m_inp_mem_ptr);
m_inp_mem_ptr = NULL;
}
/* We just freed all the buffer headers, every thing in m_input_free_q,
* m_input_pending_q, pdest_frame, and psource_frame is now invalid */
while (m_input_free_q.m_size) {
unsigned long address, p2, id;
m_input_free_q.pop_entry(&address, &p2, &id);
}
while (m_input_pending_q.m_size) {
unsigned long address, p2, id;
m_input_pending_q.pop_entry(&address, &p2, &id);
}
pdest_frame = NULL;
psource_frame = NULL;
if (drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Free Driver Context pointer");
free (drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer);
drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer = NULL;
}
#ifdef USE_ION
if (drv_ctx.ip_buf_ion_info) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Free ion context");
free(drv_ctx.ip_buf_ion_info);
drv_ctx.ip_buf_ion_info = NULL;
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,066
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Core::PassNodeControllerToIOThread(
std::unique_ptr<NodeController> node_controller) {
node_controller.release()->DestroyOnIOThreadShutdown();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 2,582
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHPAPI PHP_FUNCTION(feof)
{
zval *arg1;
php_stream *stream;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &arg1) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PHP_STREAM_TO_ZVAL(stream, &arg1);
if (php_stream_eof(stream)) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72114 - int/size_t confusion in fread
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 21,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parserep(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const struct sunrpc_msg *rp, register u_int length)
{
register const uint32_t *dp;
u_int len;
enum sunrpc_accept_stat astat;
/*
* Portability note:
* Here we find the address of the ar_verf credentials.
* Originally, this calculation was
* dp = (uint32_t *)&rp->rm_reply.rp_acpt.ar_verf
* On the wire, the rp_acpt field starts immediately after
* the (32 bit) rp_stat field. However, rp_acpt (which is a
* "struct accepted_reply") contains a "struct opaque_auth",
* whose internal representation contains a pointer, so on a
* 64-bit machine the compiler inserts 32 bits of padding
* before rp->rm_reply.rp_acpt.ar_verf. So, we cannot use
* the internal representation to parse the on-the-wire
* representation. Instead, we skip past the rp_stat field,
* which is an "enum" and so occupies one 32-bit word.
*/
dp = ((const uint32_t *)&rp->rm_reply) + 1;
ND_TCHECK(dp[1]);
len = EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[1]);
if (len >= length)
return (NULL);
/*
* skip past the ar_verf credentials.
*/
dp += (len + (2*sizeof(uint32_t) + 3)) / sizeof(uint32_t);
/*
* now we can check the ar_stat field
*/
ND_TCHECK(dp[0]);
astat = (enum sunrpc_accept_stat) EXTRACT_32BITS(dp);
if (astat != SUNRPC_SUCCESS) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", tok2str(sunrpc_str, "ar_stat %d", astat)));
nfserr = 1; /* suppress trunc string */
return (NULL);
}
/* successful return */
ND_TCHECK2(*dp, sizeof(astat));
return ((const uint32_t *) (sizeof(astat) + ((const char *)dp)));
trunc:
return (0);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13005/NFS: Add two bounds checks before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 26,434
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool forced_push(const struct tcp_sock *tp)
{
return after(tp->write_seq, tp->pushed_seq + (tp->max_window >> 1));
}
Commit Message: tcp: initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0
When tcp_disconnect() is called, inet_csk_delack_init() sets
icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss to 0.
This could potentially cause tcp_recvmsg() => tcp_cleanup_rbuf() =>
__tcp_select_window() call path to have division by 0 issue.
So this patch initializes rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 5,435
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AP_DECLARE(int) ap_is_initial_req(request_rec *r)
{
return (r->main == NULL) /* otherwise, this is a sub-request */
&& (r->prev == NULL); /* otherwise, this is an internal redirect */
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2015-3183 (cve.mitre.org)
Replacement of ap_some_auth_required (unusable in Apache httpd 2.4)
with new ap_some_authn_required and ap_force_authn hook.
Submitted by: breser
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1684524 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,589
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cifs_get_tcon(struct cifsSesInfo *ses, struct smb_vol *volume_info)
{
int rc, xid;
struct cifsTconInfo *tcon;
tcon = cifs_find_tcon(ses, volume_info->UNC);
if (tcon) {
cFYI(1, "Found match on UNC path");
/* existing tcon already has a reference */
cifs_put_smb_ses(ses);
if (tcon->seal != volume_info->seal)
cERROR(1, "transport encryption setting "
"conflicts with existing tid");
return tcon;
}
tcon = tconInfoAlloc();
if (tcon == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_fail;
}
tcon->ses = ses;
if (volume_info->password) {
tcon->password = kstrdup(volume_info->password, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tcon->password) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_fail;
}
}
if (strchr(volume_info->UNC + 3, '\\') == NULL
&& strchr(volume_info->UNC + 3, '/') == NULL) {
cERROR(1, "Missing share name");
rc = -ENODEV;
goto out_fail;
}
/* BB Do we need to wrap session_mutex around
* this TCon call and Unix SetFS as
* we do on SessSetup and reconnect? */
xid = GetXid();
rc = CIFSTCon(xid, ses, volume_info->UNC, tcon, volume_info->local_nls);
FreeXid(xid);
cFYI(1, "CIFS Tcon rc = %d", rc);
if (rc)
goto out_fail;
if (volume_info->nodfs) {
tcon->Flags &= ~SMB_SHARE_IS_IN_DFS;
cFYI(1, "DFS disabled (%d)", tcon->Flags);
}
tcon->seal = volume_info->seal;
/* we can have only one retry value for a connection
to a share so for resources mounted more than once
to the same server share the last value passed in
for the retry flag is used */
tcon->retry = volume_info->retry;
tcon->nocase = volume_info->nocase;
tcon->local_lease = volume_info->local_lease;
spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
list_add(&tcon->tcon_list, &ses->tcon_list);
spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
cifs_fscache_get_super_cookie(tcon);
return tcon;
out_fail:
tconInfoFree(tcon);
return ERR_PTR(rc);
}
Commit Message: cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount
Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if
there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however
that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its
root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath,
so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit
a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for
the mount.
This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length
prefixpath. That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in
this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at
mount time instead.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: Yogesh Sharma <ysharma@cymer.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 16,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct dst_entry *ipv4_dst_check(struct dst_entry *dst, u32 cookie)
{
struct rtable *rt = (struct rtable *) dst;
/* All IPV4 dsts are created with ->obsolete set to the value
* DST_OBSOLETE_FORCE_CHK which forces validation calls down
* into this function always.
*
* When a PMTU/redirect information update invalidates a route,
* this is indicated by setting obsolete to DST_OBSOLETE_KILL or
* DST_OBSOLETE_DEAD.
*/
if (dst->obsolete != DST_OBSOLETE_FORCE_CHK || rt_is_expired(rt))
return NULL;
return dst;
}
Commit Message: inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.
It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 15,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Eina_Iterator* ewk_frame_children_iterator_new(Evas_Object* ewkFrame)
{
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(ewkFrame, smartData, 0);
Eina_Iterator_Ewk_Frame* iterator = static_cast<Eina_Iterator_Ewk_Frame*>
(calloc(1, sizeof(Eina_Iterator_Ewk_Frame)));
if (!iterator)
return 0;
EINA_MAGIC_SET(&iterator->base, EINA_MAGIC_ITERATOR);
iterator->base.next = FUNC_ITERATOR_NEXT(_ewk_frame_children_iterator_next);
iterator->base.get_container = FUNC_ITERATOR_GET_CONTAINER(_ewk_frame_children_iterator_get_container);
iterator->base.free = FUNC_ITERATOR_FREE(free);
iterator->object = ewkFrame;
iterator->currentIndex = 0;
return &iterator->base;
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 727
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static pte_t *lookup_pte(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address)
{
pgd_t *dir;
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
pte_t *pte;
pte_t entry;
dir = pgd_offset(mm, address);
if (pgd_none(*dir))
return NULL;
pud = pud_offset(dir, address);
if (pud_none(*pud))
return NULL;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
if (pmd_none(*pmd))
return NULL;
pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address);
entry = *pte;
if (pte_none(entry) || !pte_present(entry))
return NULL;
return pte;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 22,326
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void btm_sec_link_key_request (UINT8 *p_bda)
{
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec = btm_find_or_alloc_dev (p_bda);
BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("btm_sec_link_key_request() BDA: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x",
p_bda[0], p_bda[1], p_bda[2], p_bda[3], p_bda[4], p_bda[5]);
if( (btm_cb.pairing_state == BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_PIN_REQ) &&
(btm_cb.collision_start_time != 0) &&
(memcmp (btm_cb.p_collided_dev_rec->bd_addr, p_bda, BD_ADDR_LEN) == 0) )
{
BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("btm_sec_link_key_request() rejecting link key req "
"State: %d START_TIMEOUT : %d",
btm_cb.pairing_state, btm_cb.collision_start_time);
btsnd_hcic_link_key_neg_reply (p_bda);
return;
}
if (p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_KNOWN)
{
btsnd_hcic_link_key_req_reply (p_bda, p_dev_rec->link_key);
return;
}
/* Notify L2CAP to increase timeout */
l2c_pin_code_request (p_bda);
/* Only ask the host for a key if this guy is not already bonding */
if ( (btm_cb.pairing_state == BTM_PAIR_STATE_IDLE)
|| (memcmp (p_bda, btm_cb.pairing_bda, BD_ADDR_LEN) != 0) )
{
if (btm_cb.api.p_link_key_req_callback)
{
if ((*btm_cb.api.p_link_key_req_callback)(p_bda, p_dev_rec->link_key) == BTM_SUCCESS)
{
btsnd_hcic_link_key_req_reply (p_bda, p_dev_rec->link_key);
return;
}
}
}
/* The link key is not in the database and it is not known to the manager */
btsnd_hcic_link_key_neg_reply (p_bda);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 19,141
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int btrfs_prealloc_file_range(struct inode *inode, int mode,
u64 start, u64 num_bytes, u64 min_size,
loff_t actual_len, u64 *alloc_hint)
{
return __btrfs_prealloc_file_range(inode, mode, start, num_bytes,
min_size, actual_len, alloc_hint,
NULL);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 25,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ~AutoInstallCurrentThreadPlatformMock()
{
Platform::initialize(m_oldPlatform);
}
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 19,309
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SCTP_STATIC struct sock *sctp_accept(struct sock *sk, int flags, int *err)
{
struct sctp_sock *sp;
struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
struct sock *newsk = NULL;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
long timeo;
int error = 0;
sctp_lock_sock(sk);
sp = sctp_sk(sk);
ep = sp->ep;
if (!sctp_style(sk, TCP)) {
error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
if (!sctp_sstate(sk, LISTENING)) {
error = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & O_NONBLOCK);
error = sctp_wait_for_accept(sk, timeo);
if (error)
goto out;
/* We treat the list of associations on the endpoint as the accept
* queue and pick the first association on the list.
*/
asoc = list_entry(ep->asocs.next, struct sctp_association, asocs);
newsk = sp->pf->create_accept_sk(sk, asoc);
if (!newsk) {
error = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
/* Populate the fields of the newsk from the oldsk and migrate the
* asoc to the newsk.
*/
sctp_sock_migrate(sk, newsk, asoc, SCTP_SOCKET_TCP);
out:
sctp_release_sock(sk);
*err = error;
return newsk;
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,822
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebPluginDelegateProxy::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& msg) {
content::GetContentClient()->SetActiveURL(page_url_);
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(WebPluginDelegateProxy, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_SetWindow, OnSetWindow)
#if defined(OS_WIN)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_SetWindowlessPumpEvent,
OnSetWindowlessPumpEvent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_NotifyIMEStatus,
OnNotifyIMEStatus)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_CancelResource, OnCancelResource)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_InvalidateRect, OnInvalidateRect)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_GetWindowScriptNPObject,
OnGetWindowScriptNPObject)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_GetPluginElement,
OnGetPluginElement)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_ResolveProxy, OnResolveProxy)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_SetCookie, OnSetCookie)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_GetCookies, OnGetCookies)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_URLRequest, OnHandleURLRequest)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_CancelDocumentLoad, OnCancelDocumentLoad)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_InitiateHTTPRangeRequest,
OnInitiateHTTPRangeRequest)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_DeferResourceLoading,
OnDeferResourceLoading)
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_FocusChanged,
OnFocusChanged);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_StartIme,
OnStartIme);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_BindFakePluginWindowHandle,
OnBindFakePluginWindowHandle);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceSetIOSurface,
OnAcceleratedSurfaceSetIOSurface)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceSetTransportDIB,
OnAcceleratedSurfaceSetTransportDIB)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_AllocTransportDIB,
OnAcceleratedSurfaceAllocTransportDIB)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_FreeTransportDIB,
OnAcceleratedSurfaceFreeTransportDIB)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped,
OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_AcceleratedPluginEnabledRendering,
OnAcceleratedPluginEnabledRendering)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_AcceleratedPluginAllocatedIOSurface,
OnAcceleratedPluginAllocatedIOSurface)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_AcceleratedPluginSwappedIOSurface,
OnAcceleratedPluginSwappedIOSurface)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_URLRedirectResponse,
OnURLRedirectResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
DCHECK(handled);
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,687
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pkinit_init_dh_params(pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
plgctx->dh_1024 = DH_new();
if (plgctx->dh_1024 == NULL)
goto cleanup;
plgctx->dh_1024->p = BN_bin2bn(pkinit_1024_dhprime,
sizeof(pkinit_1024_dhprime), NULL);
if ((plgctx->dh_1024->g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(plgctx->dh_1024->q = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
BN_set_word(plgctx->dh_1024->g, DH_GENERATOR_2);
BN_rshift1(plgctx->dh_1024->q, plgctx->dh_1024->p);
plgctx->dh_2048 = DH_new();
if (plgctx->dh_2048 == NULL)
goto cleanup;
plgctx->dh_2048->p = BN_bin2bn(pkinit_2048_dhprime,
sizeof(pkinit_2048_dhprime), NULL);
if ((plgctx->dh_2048->g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(plgctx->dh_2048->q = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
BN_set_word(plgctx->dh_2048->g, DH_GENERATOR_2);
BN_rshift1(plgctx->dh_2048->q, plgctx->dh_2048->p);
plgctx->dh_4096 = DH_new();
if (plgctx->dh_4096 == NULL)
goto cleanup;
plgctx->dh_4096->p = BN_bin2bn(pkinit_4096_dhprime,
sizeof(pkinit_4096_dhprime), NULL);
if ((plgctx->dh_4096->g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(plgctx->dh_4096->q = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
BN_set_word(plgctx->dh_4096->g, DH_GENERATOR_2);
BN_rshift1(plgctx->dh_4096->q, plgctx->dh_4096->p);
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (retval)
pkinit_fini_dh_params(plgctx);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID:
| 0
| 13,042
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::UpdateSearchState(TabContents* contents) {
if (chrome::search::IsInstantExtendedAPIEnabled(profile_))
search_delegate_->OnTabActivated(contents->web_contents());
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u16 llcp_tlv_lto(u8 *tlv)
{
return llcp_tlv8(tlv, LLCP_TLV_LTO);
}
Commit Message: net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 21,398
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderFlexibleBox::isHorizontalFlow() const
{
if (isHorizontalWritingMode())
return !isColumnFlow();
return isColumnFlow();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataFileSystem::TransferFileFromLocalToRemoteAfterGetEntryInfo(
const FilePath& local_src_file_path,
const FilePath& remote_dest_file_path,
const FileOperationCallback& callback,
GDataFileError error,
scoped_ptr<GDataEntryProto> entry_proto) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
callback.Run(error);
return;
}
DCHECK(entry_proto.get());
if (!entry_proto->file_info().is_directory()) {
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_ERROR_NOT_A_DIRECTORY);
return;
}
std::string* resource_id = new std::string;
util::PostBlockingPoolSequencedTaskAndReply(
FROM_HERE,
blocking_task_runner_,
base::Bind(&GetDocumentResourceIdOnBlockingPool,
local_src_file_path,
resource_id),
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::TransferFileForResourceId,
ui_weak_ptr_,
local_src_file_path,
remote_dest_file_path,
callback,
base::Owned(resource_id)));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 5,218
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int iwbmp_read_bits(struct iwbmprcontext *rctx)
{
int retval = 0;
rctx->img->width = rctx->width;
rctx->img->height = rctx->height;
if(rctx->fileheader_size>0) {
size_t expected_offbits;
expected_offbits = rctx->fileheader_size + rctx->infoheader_size +
rctx->bitfields_nbytes + rctx->palette_nbytes;
if(rctx->bfOffBits==expected_offbits) {
;
}
else if(rctx->bfOffBits>expected_offbits && rctx->bfOffBits<1000000) {
if(!iwbmp_skip_bytes(rctx, rctx->bfOffBits - expected_offbits)) goto done;
}
else {
iw_set_error(rctx->ctx,"Invalid BMP bits offset");
goto done;
}
}
if(rctx->compression==IWBMP_BI_RGB) {
if(!bmpr_read_uncompressed(rctx)) goto done;
}
else if(rctx->compression==IWBMP_BI_RLE8 || rctx->compression==IWBMP_BI_RLE4) {
if(!bmpr_read_rle(rctx)) goto done;
}
else {
iw_set_errorf(rctx->ctx,"Unsupported BMP compression or image type (%d)",(int)rctx->compression);
goto done;
}
retval = 1;
done:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 20,930
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_read_guest(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa, void *data, unsigned long len)
{
gfn_t gfn = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
int seg;
int offset = offset_in_page(gpa);
int ret;
while ((seg = next_segment(len, offset)) != 0) {
ret = kvm_read_guest_page(kvm, gfn, data, offset, seg);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
offset = 0;
len -= seg;
data += seg;
++gfn;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 3,083
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void addColorBits(unsigned char* out, size_t index, unsigned bits, unsigned in)
{
unsigned m = bits == 1 ? 7 : bits == 2 ? 3 : 1; /*8 / bits - 1*/
/*p = the partial index in the byte, e.g. with 4 palettebits it is 0 for first half or 1 for second half*/
unsigned p = index & m;
in &= (1u << bits) - 1u; /*filter out any other bits of the input value*/
in = in << (bits * (m - p));
if(p == 0) out[index * bits / 8] = in;
else out[index * bits / 8] |= in;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 16,713
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum task_disposition sas_scsi_find_task(struct sas_task *task)
{
unsigned long flags;
int i, res;
struct sas_internal *si =
to_sas_internal(task->dev->port->ha->core.shost->transportt);
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
SAS_DPRINTK("%s: aborting task 0x%p\n", __func__, task);
res = si->dft->lldd_abort_task(task);
spin_lock_irqsave(&task->task_state_lock, flags);
if (task->task_state_flags & SAS_TASK_STATE_DONE) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&task->task_state_lock, flags);
SAS_DPRINTK("%s: task 0x%p is done\n", __func__,
task);
return TASK_IS_DONE;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&task->task_state_lock, flags);
if (res == TMF_RESP_FUNC_COMPLETE) {
SAS_DPRINTK("%s: task 0x%p is aborted\n",
__func__, task);
return TASK_IS_ABORTED;
} else if (si->dft->lldd_query_task) {
SAS_DPRINTK("%s: querying task 0x%p\n",
__func__, task);
res = si->dft->lldd_query_task(task);
switch (res) {
case TMF_RESP_FUNC_SUCC:
SAS_DPRINTK("%s: task 0x%p at LU\n",
__func__, task);
return TASK_IS_AT_LU;
case TMF_RESP_FUNC_COMPLETE:
SAS_DPRINTK("%s: task 0x%p not at LU\n",
__func__, task);
return TASK_IS_NOT_AT_LU;
case TMF_RESP_FUNC_FAILED:
SAS_DPRINTK("%s: task 0x%p failed to abort\n",
__func__, task);
return TASK_ABORT_FAILED;
}
}
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: defer ata device eh commands to libata
When ata device doing EH, some commands still attached with tasks are
not passed to libata when abort failed or recover failed, so libata did
not handle these commands. After these commands done, sas task is freed,
but ata qc is not freed. This will cause ata qc leak and trigger a
warning like below:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28512 at drivers/ata/libata-eh.c:4037
ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
CPU: 0 PID: 28512 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Tainted: G W OE 4.14.0#1
......
Call trace:
[<ffff0000088b7bd0>] ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
[<ffff0000088b8420>] ata_do_eh+0xc4/0xd8
[<ffff0000088b8478>] ata_std_error_handler+0x44/0x8c
[<ffff0000088b8068>] ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x480/0x694
[<ffff000008875fc4>] async_sas_ata_eh+0x4c/0x80
[<ffff0000080f6be8>] async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x170
[<ffff0000080ebd70>] process_one_work+0x144/0x390
[<ffff0000080ec100>] worker_thread+0x144/0x418
[<ffff0000080f2c98>] kthread+0x10c/0x138
[<ffff0000080855dc>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
If ata qc leaked too many, ata tag allocation will fail and io blocked
for ever.
As suggested by Dan Williams, defer ata device commands to libata and
merge sas_eh_finish_cmd() with sas_eh_defer_cmd(). libata will handle
ata qcs correctly after this.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 20,317
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cryptd_blkcipher_setkey(struct crypto_ablkcipher *parent,
const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
struct cryptd_blkcipher_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(parent);
struct crypto_blkcipher *child = ctx->child;
int err;
crypto_blkcipher_clear_flags(child, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
crypto_blkcipher_set_flags(child, crypto_ablkcipher_get_flags(parent) &
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(child, key, keylen);
crypto_ablkcipher_set_flags(parent, crypto_blkcipher_get_flags(child) &
CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 1,587
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: armv6pmu_read_counter(int counter)
{
unsigned long value = 0;
if (ARMV6_CYCLE_COUNTER == counter)
asm volatile("mrc p15, 0, %0, c15, c12, 1" : "=r"(value));
else if (ARMV6_COUNTER0 == counter)
asm volatile("mrc p15, 0, %0, c15, c12, 2" : "=r"(value));
else if (ARMV6_COUNTER1 == counter)
asm volatile("mrc p15, 0, %0, c15, c12, 3" : "=r"(value));
else
WARN_ONCE(1, "invalid counter number (%d)\n", counter);
return value;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::OnMediaStreamRemoved() {
DCHECK_GT(media_stream_count_, 0);
--media_stream_count_;
UpdateProcessPriority();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 4,010
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void build_ehash_secret(void)
{
u32 rnd;
do {
get_random_bytes(&rnd, sizeof(rnd));
} while (rnd == 0);
cmpxchg(&inet_ehash_secret, 0, rnd);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 28,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::WasUnOccluded() {
if (capturer_count_ == 0)
DoWasUnOccluded();
should_normally_be_occluded_ = false;
}
Commit Message: If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,434
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BassSetStrength(EffectContext *pContext, uint32_t strength){
pContext->pBundledContext->BassStrengthSaved = (int)strength;
LVM_ControlParams_t ActiveParams; /* Current control Parameters */
LVM_ReturnStatus_en LvmStatus=LVM_SUCCESS; /* Function call status */
/* Get the current settings */
LvmStatus = LVM_GetControlParameters(pContext->pBundledContext->hInstance,
&ActiveParams);
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVM_GetControlParameters", "BassSetStrength")
/* Bass Enhancement parameters */
ActiveParams.BE_EffectLevel = (LVM_INT16)((15*strength)/1000);
ActiveParams.BE_CentreFreq = LVM_BE_CENTRE_90Hz;
/* Activate the initial settings */
LvmStatus = LVM_SetControlParameters(pContext->pBundledContext->hInstance, &ActiveParams);
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVM_SetControlParameters", "BassSetStrength")
} /* end BassSetStrength */
Commit Message: fix possible overflow in effect wrappers.
Add checks on parameter size field in effect command handlers
to avoid overflow leading to invalid comparison with min allowed
size for command and reply buffers.
Bug: 26347509.
Change-Id: I20e6a9b6de8e5172b957caa1ac9410b9752efa4d
(cherry picked from commit ad1bd92a49d78df6bc6e75bee68c517c1326f3cf)
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 8,423
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *register_authz_provider(cmd_parms *cmd, void *_cfg,
const char *name, const char *file,
const char *function)
{
lua_authz_provider_spec *spec;
const char *err = ap_check_cmd_context(cmd, GLOBAL_ONLY);
if (err)
return err;
spec = apr_pcalloc(cmd->pool, sizeof(*spec));
spec->name = name;
spec->file_name = file;
spec->function_name = function;
apr_hash_set(lua_authz_providers, name, APR_HASH_KEY_STRING, spec);
ap_register_auth_provider(cmd->pool, AUTHZ_PROVIDER_GROUP, name,
AUTHZ_PROVIDER_VERSION,
&lua_authz_provider,
AP_AUTH_INTERNAL_PER_CONF);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 6,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::ProcessBaseElement() {
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kBaseElement);
const AtomicString* href = nullptr;
const AtomicString* target = nullptr;
for (HTMLBaseElement* base = Traversal<HTMLBaseElement>::FirstWithin(*this);
base && (!href || !target);
base = Traversal<HTMLBaseElement>::Next(*base)) {
if (!href) {
const AtomicString& value = base->FastGetAttribute(hrefAttr);
if (!value.IsNull())
href = &value;
}
if (!target) {
const AtomicString& value = base->FastGetAttribute(targetAttr);
if (!value.IsNull())
target = &value;
}
if (GetContentSecurityPolicy()->IsActive()) {
UseCounter::Count(*this,
WebFeature::kContentSecurityPolicyWithBaseElement);
}
}
KURL base_element_url;
if (href) {
String stripped_href = StripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(*href);
if (!stripped_href.IsEmpty())
base_element_url = KURL(FallbackBaseURL(), stripped_href);
}
if (!base_element_url.IsEmpty()) {
if (base_element_url.ProtocolIsData() ||
base_element_url.ProtocolIsJavaScript()) {
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kBaseWithDataHref);
AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kSecurityMessageSource, kErrorMessageLevel,
"'" + base_element_url.Protocol() +
"' URLs may not be used as base URLs for a document."));
}
if (!GetSecurityOrigin()->CanRequest(base_element_url))
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kBaseWithCrossOriginHref);
}
if (base_element_url != base_element_url_ &&
!base_element_url.ProtocolIsData() &&
!base_element_url.ProtocolIsJavaScript() &&
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->AllowBaseURI(base_element_url)) {
base_element_url_ = base_element_url;
UpdateBaseURL();
}
if (target) {
if (target->Contains('\n') || target->Contains('\r'))
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kBaseWithNewlinesInTarget);
if (target->Contains('<'))
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kBaseWithOpenBracketInTarget);
base_target_ = *target;
} else {
base_target_ = g_null_atom;
}
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 24,704
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t AudioFlinger::EffectModule::remove_effect_from_hal_l()
{
if ((mDescriptor.flags & EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_PRE_PROC ||
(mDescriptor.flags & EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_POST_PROC) {
sp<ThreadBase> thread = mThread.promote();
if (thread != 0) {
audio_stream_t *stream = thread->stream();
if (stream != NULL) {
stream->remove_audio_effect(stream, mEffectInterface);
}
}
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Check effect command reply size in AudioFlinger
Bug: 29251553
Change-Id: I1bcc1281f1f0542bb645f6358ce31631f2a8ffbf
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,704
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static GF_AVCConfig *AVC_DuplicateConfig(GF_AVCConfig *cfg)
{
u32 i, count;
GF_AVCConfigSlot *p1, *p2;
GF_AVCConfig *cfg_new = gf_odf_avc_cfg_new();
cfg_new->AVCLevelIndication = cfg->AVCLevelIndication;
cfg_new->AVCProfileIndication = cfg->AVCProfileIndication;
cfg_new->configurationVersion = cfg->configurationVersion;
cfg_new->nal_unit_size = cfg->nal_unit_size;
cfg_new->profile_compatibility = cfg->profile_compatibility;
cfg_new->complete_representation = cfg->complete_representation;
cfg_new->chroma_bit_depth = cfg->chroma_bit_depth;
cfg_new->luma_bit_depth = cfg->luma_bit_depth;
cfg_new->chroma_format = cfg->chroma_format;
count = gf_list_count(cfg->sequenceParameterSets);
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
p1 = (GF_AVCConfigSlot*)gf_list_get(cfg->sequenceParameterSets, i);
p2 = (GF_AVCConfigSlot*)gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_AVCConfigSlot));
p2->size = p1->size;
p2->id = p1->id;
p2->data = (char *)gf_malloc(sizeof(char)*p1->size);
memcpy(p2->data, p1->data, sizeof(char)*p1->size);
gf_list_add(cfg_new->sequenceParameterSets, p2);
}
count = gf_list_count(cfg->pictureParameterSets);
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
p1 = (GF_AVCConfigSlot*)gf_list_get(cfg->pictureParameterSets, i);
p2 = (GF_AVCConfigSlot*)gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_AVCConfigSlot));
p2->size = p1->size;
p2->id = p1->id;
p2->data = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char)*p1->size);
memcpy(p2->data, p1->data, sizeof(char)*p1->size);
gf_list_add(cfg_new->pictureParameterSets, p2);
}
if (cfg->sequenceParameterSetExtensions) {
cfg_new->sequenceParameterSetExtensions = gf_list_new();
count = gf_list_count(cfg->sequenceParameterSetExtensions);
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
p1 = (GF_AVCConfigSlot*)gf_list_get(cfg->sequenceParameterSetExtensions, i);
p2 = (GF_AVCConfigSlot*)gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_AVCConfigSlot));
p2->size = p1->size;
p2->id = p1->id;
p2->data = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char)*p1->size);
memcpy(p2->data, p1->data, sizeof(char)*p1->size);
gf_list_add(cfg_new->sequenceParameterSetExtensions, p2);
}
}
return cfg_new;
}
Commit Message: fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,824
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cupsdReadClient(cupsd_client_t *con) /* I - Client to read from */
{
char line[32768], /* Line from client... */
locale[64], /* Locale */
*ptr; /* Pointer into strings */
http_status_t status; /* Transfer status */
ipp_state_t ipp_state; /* State of IPP transfer */
int bytes; /* Number of bytes to POST */
char *filename; /* Name of file for GET/HEAD */
char buf[1024]; /* Buffer for real filename */
struct stat filestats; /* File information */
mime_type_t *type; /* MIME type of file */
cupsd_printer_t *p; /* Printer */
static unsigned request_id = 0; /* Request ID for temp files */
status = HTTP_STATUS_CONTINUE;
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "cupsdReadClient: error=%d, used=%d, state=%s, data_encoding=HTTP_ENCODING_%s, data_remaining=" CUPS_LLFMT ", request=%p(%s), file=%d", httpError(con->http), (int)httpGetReady(con->http), httpStateString(httpGetState(con->http)), httpIsChunked(con->http) ? "CHUNKED" : "LENGTH", CUPS_LLCAST httpGetRemaining(con->http), con->request, con->request ? ippStateString(ippGetState(con->request)) : "", con->file);
if (httpGetState(con->http) == HTTP_STATE_GET_SEND ||
httpGetState(con->http) == HTTP_STATE_POST_SEND ||
httpGetState(con->http) == HTTP_STATE_STATUS)
{
/*
* If we get called in the wrong state, then something went wrong with the
* connection and we need to shut it down...
*/
if (!httpGetReady(con->http) && recv(httpGetFd(con->http), buf, 1, MSG_PEEK) < 1)
{
/*
* Connection closed...
*/
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG, "Closing on EOF.");
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG, "Closing on unexpected HTTP read state %s.", httpStateString(httpGetState(con->http)));
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
if (con->auto_ssl)
{
/*
* Automatically check for a SSL/TLS handshake...
*/
con->auto_ssl = 0;
if (recv(httpGetFd(con->http), buf, 1, MSG_PEEK) == 1 &&
(!buf[0] || !strchr("DGHOPT", buf[0])))
{
/*
* Encrypt this connection...
*/
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "Saw first byte %02X, auto-negotiating SSL/TLS session.", buf[0] & 255);
if (cupsd_start_tls(con, HTTP_ENCRYPTION_ALWAYS))
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
switch (httpGetState(con->http))
{
case HTTP_STATE_WAITING :
/*
* See if we've received a request line...
*/
con->operation = httpReadRequest(con->http, con->uri, sizeof(con->uri));
if (con->operation == HTTP_STATE_ERROR ||
con->operation == HTTP_STATE_UNKNOWN_METHOD ||
con->operation == HTTP_STATE_UNKNOWN_VERSION)
{
if (httpError(con->http))
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG,
"HTTP_STATE_WAITING Closing for error %d (%s)",
httpError(con->http), strerror(httpError(con->http)));
else
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG,
"HTTP_STATE_WAITING Closing on error: %s",
cupsLastErrorString());
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
/*
* Ignore blank request lines...
*/
if (con->operation == HTTP_STATE_WAITING)
break;
/*
* Clear other state variables...
*/
con->bytes = 0;
con->file = -1;
con->file_ready = 0;
con->pipe_pid = 0;
con->username[0] = '\0';
con->password[0] = '\0';
cupsdClearString(&con->command);
cupsdClearString(&con->options);
cupsdClearString(&con->query_string);
if (con->request)
{
ippDelete(con->request);
con->request = NULL;
}
if (con->response)
{
ippDelete(con->response);
con->response = NULL;
}
if (con->language)
{
cupsLangFree(con->language);
con->language = NULL;
}
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI
con->have_gss = 0;
con->gss_uid = 0;
#endif /* HAVE_GSSAPI */
/*
* Handle full URLs in the request line...
*/
if (strcmp(con->uri, "*"))
{
char scheme[HTTP_MAX_URI], /* Method/scheme */
userpass[HTTP_MAX_URI], /* Username:password */
hostname[HTTP_MAX_URI], /* Hostname */
resource[HTTP_MAX_URI]; /* Resource path */
int port; /* Port number */
/*
* Separate the URI into its components...
*/
if (httpSeparateURI(HTTP_URI_CODING_MOST, con->uri,
scheme, sizeof(scheme),
userpass, sizeof(userpass),
hostname, sizeof(hostname), &port,
resource, sizeof(resource)) < HTTP_URI_STATUS_OK)
{
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_ERROR, "Bad URI \"%s\" in request.",
con->uri);
cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE);
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
/*
* Only allow URIs with the servername, localhost, or an IP
* address...
*/
if (strcmp(scheme, "file") &&
_cups_strcasecmp(hostname, ServerName) &&
_cups_strcasecmp(hostname, "localhost") &&
!cupsArrayFind(ServerAlias, hostname) &&
!isdigit(hostname[0]) && hostname[0] != '[')
{
/*
* Nope, we don't do proxies...
*/
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_ERROR, "Bad URI \"%s\" in request.",
con->uri);
cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE);
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
/*
* Copy the resource portion back into the URI; both resource and
* con->uri are HTTP_MAX_URI bytes in size...
*/
strlcpy(con->uri, resource, sizeof(con->uri));
}
/*
* Process the request...
*/
gettimeofday(&(con->start), NULL);
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG, "%s %s HTTP/%d.%d",
httpStateString(con->operation) + 11, con->uri,
httpGetVersion(con->http) / 100,
httpGetVersion(con->http) % 100);
if (!cupsArrayFind(ActiveClients, con))
{
cupsArrayAdd(ActiveClients, con);
cupsdSetBusyState();
}
case HTTP_STATE_OPTIONS :
case HTTP_STATE_DELETE :
case HTTP_STATE_GET :
case HTTP_STATE_HEAD :
case HTTP_STATE_POST :
case HTTP_STATE_PUT :
case HTTP_STATE_TRACE :
/*
* Parse incoming parameters until the status changes...
*/
while ((status = httpUpdate(con->http)) == HTTP_STATUS_CONTINUE)
if (!httpGetReady(con->http))
break;
if (status != HTTP_STATUS_OK && status != HTTP_STATUS_CONTINUE)
{
if (httpError(con->http) && httpError(con->http) != EPIPE)
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG,
"Closing for error %d (%s) while reading headers.",
httpError(con->http), strerror(httpError(con->http)));
else
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG,
"Closing on EOF while reading headers.");
cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE);
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
break;
default :
if (!httpGetReady(con->http) && recv(httpGetFd(con->http), buf, 1, MSG_PEEK) < 1)
{
/*
* Connection closed...
*/
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG, "Closing on EOF.");
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
break; /* Anti-compiler-warning-code */
}
/*
* Handle new transfers...
*/
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG, "Read: status=%d", status);
if (status == HTTP_STATUS_OK)
{
if (httpGetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE)[0])
{
/*
* Figure out the locale from the Accept-Language and Content-Type
* fields...
*/
if ((ptr = strchr(httpGetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE),
',')) != NULL)
*ptr = '\0';
if ((ptr = strchr(httpGetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE),
';')) != NULL)
*ptr = '\0';
if ((ptr = strstr(httpGetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_CONTENT_TYPE),
"charset=")) != NULL)
{
/*
* Combine language and charset, and trim any extra params in the
* content-type.
*/
snprintf(locale, sizeof(locale), "%s.%s",
httpGetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE), ptr + 8);
if ((ptr = strchr(locale, ',')) != NULL)
*ptr = '\0';
}
else
snprintf(locale, sizeof(locale), "%s.UTF-8",
httpGetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE));
con->language = cupsLangGet(locale);
}
else
con->language = cupsLangGet(DefaultLocale);
cupsdAuthorize(con);
if (!_cups_strncasecmp(httpGetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_CONNECTION),
"Keep-Alive", 10) && KeepAlive)
httpSetKeepAlive(con->http, HTTP_KEEPALIVE_ON);
else if (!_cups_strncasecmp(httpGetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_CONNECTION),
"close", 5))
httpSetKeepAlive(con->http, HTTP_KEEPALIVE_OFF);
if (!httpGetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_HOST)[0] &&
httpGetVersion(con->http) >= HTTP_VERSION_1_1)
{
/*
* HTTP/1.1 and higher require the "Host:" field...
*/
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_ERROR, "Missing Host: field in request.");
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
else if (!valid_host(con))
{
/*
* Access to localhost must use "localhost" or the corresponding IPv4
* or IPv6 values in the Host: field.
*/
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Request from \"%s\" using invalid Host: field \"%s\".",
httpGetHostname(con->http, NULL, 0), httpGetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_HOST));
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
else if (con->operation == HTTP_STATE_OPTIONS)
{
/*
* Do OPTIONS command...
*/
if (con->best && con->best->type != CUPSD_AUTH_NONE)
{
httpClearFields(con->http);
if (!cupsdSendHeader(con, HTTP_STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED, NULL, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
if (!_cups_strcasecmp(httpGetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_CONNECTION), "Upgrade") && strstr(httpGetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_UPGRADE), "TLS/") != NULL && !httpIsEncrypted(con->http))
{
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
/*
* Do encryption stuff...
*/
httpClearFields(con->http);
if (!cupsdSendHeader(con, HTTP_STATUS_SWITCHING_PROTOCOLS, NULL, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
if (cupsd_start_tls(con, HTTP_ENCRYPTION_REQUIRED))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
#else
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
}
httpClearFields(con->http);
httpSetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_ALLOW,
"GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, POST, PUT");
httpSetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_CONTENT_LENGTH, "0");
if (!cupsdSendHeader(con, HTTP_STATUS_OK, NULL, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
else if (!is_path_absolute(con->uri))
{
/*
* Protect against malicious users!
*/
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Request for non-absolute resource \"%s\".", con->uri);
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_FORBIDDEN, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
else
{
if (!_cups_strcasecmp(httpGetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_CONNECTION),
"Upgrade") && !httpIsEncrypted(con->http))
{
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
/*
* Do encryption stuff...
*/
httpClearFields(con->http);
if (!cupsdSendHeader(con, HTTP_STATUS_SWITCHING_PROTOCOLS, NULL,
CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
if (cupsd_start_tls(con, HTTP_ENCRYPTION_REQUIRED))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
#else
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
}
if ((status = cupsdIsAuthorized(con, NULL)) != HTTP_STATUS_OK)
{
cupsdSendError(con, status, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE);
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
if (httpGetExpect(con->http) &&
(con->operation == HTTP_STATE_POST || con->operation == HTTP_STATE_PUT))
{
if (httpGetExpect(con->http) == HTTP_STATUS_CONTINUE)
{
/*
* Send 100-continue header...
*/
if (httpWriteResponse(con->http, HTTP_STATUS_CONTINUE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
else
{
/*
* Send 417-expectation-failed header...
*/
httpClearFields(con->http);
httpSetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_CONTENT_LENGTH, "0");
cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_EXPECTATION_FAILED, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE);
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
switch (httpGetState(con->http))
{
case HTTP_STATE_GET_SEND :
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG, "Processing GET %s", con->uri);
if ((!strncmp(con->uri, "/ppd/", 5) ||
!strncmp(con->uri, "/printers/", 10) ||
!strncmp(con->uri, "/classes/", 9)) &&
!strcmp(con->uri + strlen(con->uri) - 4, ".ppd"))
{
/*
* Send PPD file - get the real printer name since printer
* names are not case sensitive but filenames can be...
*/
con->uri[strlen(con->uri) - 4] = '\0'; /* Drop ".ppd" */
if (!strncmp(con->uri, "/ppd/", 5))
p = cupsdFindPrinter(con->uri + 5);
else if (!strncmp(con->uri, "/printers/", 10))
p = cupsdFindPrinter(con->uri + 10);
else
{
p = cupsdFindClass(con->uri + 9);
if (p)
{
int i; /* Looping var */
for (i = 0; i < p->num_printers; i ++)
{
if (!(p->printers[i]->type & CUPS_PRINTER_CLASS))
{
char ppdname[1024];/* PPD filename */
snprintf(ppdname, sizeof(ppdname), "%s/ppd/%s.ppd",
ServerRoot, p->printers[i]->name);
if (!access(ppdname, 0))
{
p = p->printers[i];
break;
}
}
}
if (i >= p->num_printers)
p = NULL;
}
}
if (p)
{
snprintf(con->uri, sizeof(con->uri), "/ppd/%s.ppd", p->name);
}
else
{
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_NOT_FOUND, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
break;
}
}
else if ((!strncmp(con->uri, "/icons/", 7) ||
!strncmp(con->uri, "/printers/", 10) ||
!strncmp(con->uri, "/classes/", 9)) &&
!strcmp(con->uri + strlen(con->uri) - 4, ".png"))
{
/*
* Send icon file - get the real queue name since queue names are
* not case sensitive but filenames can be...
*/
con->uri[strlen(con->uri) - 4] = '\0'; /* Drop ".png" */
if (!strncmp(con->uri, "/icons/", 7))
p = cupsdFindPrinter(con->uri + 7);
else if (!strncmp(con->uri, "/printers/", 10))
p = cupsdFindPrinter(con->uri + 10);
else
{
p = cupsdFindClass(con->uri + 9);
if (p)
{
int i; /* Looping var */
for (i = 0; i < p->num_printers; i ++)
{
if (!(p->printers[i]->type & CUPS_PRINTER_CLASS))
{
char ppdname[1024];/* PPD filename */
snprintf(ppdname, sizeof(ppdname), "%s/ppd/%s.ppd",
ServerRoot, p->printers[i]->name);
if (!access(ppdname, 0))
{
p = p->printers[i];
break;
}
}
}
if (i >= p->num_printers)
p = NULL;
}
}
if (p)
snprintf(con->uri, sizeof(con->uri), "/icons/%s.png", p->name);
else
{
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_NOT_FOUND, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
break;
}
}
if ((!strncmp(con->uri, "/admin", 6) && strcmp(con->uri, "/admin/conf/cupsd.conf") && strncmp(con->uri, "/admin/log/", 11)) ||
!strncmp(con->uri, "/printers", 9) ||
!strncmp(con->uri, "/classes", 8) ||
!strncmp(con->uri, "/help", 5) ||
!strncmp(con->uri, "/jobs", 5))
{
if (!WebInterface)
{
/*
* Web interface is disabled. Show an appropriate message...
*/
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_CUPS_WEBIF_DISABLED, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
break;
}
/*
* Send CGI output...
*/
if (!strncmp(con->uri, "/admin", 6))
{
cupsdSetStringf(&con->command, "%s/cgi-bin/admin.cgi",
ServerBin);
cupsdSetString(&con->options, strchr(con->uri + 6, '?'));
}
else if (!strncmp(con->uri, "/printers", 9))
{
cupsdSetStringf(&con->command, "%s/cgi-bin/printers.cgi",
ServerBin);
if (con->uri[9] && con->uri[10])
cupsdSetString(&con->options, con->uri + 9);
else
cupsdSetString(&con->options, NULL);
}
else if (!strncmp(con->uri, "/classes", 8))
{
cupsdSetStringf(&con->command, "%s/cgi-bin/classes.cgi",
ServerBin);
if (con->uri[8] && con->uri[9])
cupsdSetString(&con->options, con->uri + 8);
else
cupsdSetString(&con->options, NULL);
}
else if (!strncmp(con->uri, "/jobs", 5))
{
cupsdSetStringf(&con->command, "%s/cgi-bin/jobs.cgi",
ServerBin);
if (con->uri[5] && con->uri[6])
cupsdSetString(&con->options, con->uri + 5);
else
cupsdSetString(&con->options, NULL);
}
else
{
cupsdSetStringf(&con->command, "%s/cgi-bin/help.cgi",
ServerBin);
if (con->uri[5] && con->uri[6])
cupsdSetString(&con->options, con->uri + 5);
else
cupsdSetString(&con->options, NULL);
}
if (!cupsdSendCommand(con, con->command, con->options, 0))
{
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_NOT_FOUND, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
else
cupsdLogRequest(con, HTTP_STATUS_OK);
if (httpGetVersion(con->http) <= HTTP_VERSION_1_0)
httpSetKeepAlive(con->http, HTTP_KEEPALIVE_OFF);
}
else if (!strncmp(con->uri, "/admin/log/", 11) && (strchr(con->uri + 11, '/') || strlen(con->uri) == 11))
{
/*
* GET can only be done to configuration files directly under
* /admin/conf...
*/
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_ERROR, "Request for subdirectory \"%s\".", con->uri);
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_FORBIDDEN, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
break;
}
else
{
/*
* Serve a file...
*/
if ((filename = get_file(con, &filestats, buf,
sizeof(buf))) == NULL)
{
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_NOT_FOUND, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
break;
}
type = mimeFileType(MimeDatabase, filename, NULL, NULL);
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG, "filename=\"%s\", type=%s/%s", filename, type ? type->super : "", type ? type->type : "");
if (is_cgi(con, filename, &filestats, type))
{
/*
* Note: con->command and con->options were set by
* is_cgi()...
*/
if (!cupsdSendCommand(con, con->command, con->options, 0))
{
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_NOT_FOUND, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
else
cupsdLogRequest(con, HTTP_STATUS_OK);
if (httpGetVersion(con->http) <= HTTP_VERSION_1_0)
httpSetKeepAlive(con->http, HTTP_KEEPALIVE_OFF);
break;
}
if (!check_if_modified(con, &filestats))
{
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_NOT_MODIFIED, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
else
{
if (type == NULL)
strlcpy(line, "text/plain", sizeof(line));
else
snprintf(line, sizeof(line), "%s/%s", type->super, type->type);
if (!write_file(con, HTTP_STATUS_OK, filename, line, &filestats))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
}
break;
case HTTP_STATE_POST_RECV :
/*
* See if the POST request includes a Content-Length field, and if
* so check the length against any limits that are set...
*/
if (httpGetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_CONTENT_LENGTH)[0] &&
MaxRequestSize > 0 &&
httpGetLength2(con->http) > MaxRequestSize)
{
/*
* Request too large...
*/
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
break;
}
else if (httpGetLength2(con->http) < 0)
{
/*
* Negative content lengths are invalid!
*/
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
break;
}
/*
* See what kind of POST request this is; for IPP requests the
* content-type field will be "application/ipp"...
*/
if (!strcmp(httpGetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_CONTENT_TYPE),
"application/ipp"))
con->request = ippNew();
else if (!WebInterface)
{
/*
* Web interface is disabled. Show an appropriate message...
*/
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_CUPS_WEBIF_DISABLED, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
break;
}
else if ((!strncmp(con->uri, "/admin", 6) && strncmp(con->uri, "/admin/log/", 11)) ||
!strncmp(con->uri, "/printers", 9) ||
!strncmp(con->uri, "/classes", 8) ||
!strncmp(con->uri, "/help", 5) ||
!strncmp(con->uri, "/jobs", 5))
{
/*
* CGI request...
*/
if (!strncmp(con->uri, "/admin", 6))
{
cupsdSetStringf(&con->command, "%s/cgi-bin/admin.cgi",
ServerBin);
cupsdSetString(&con->options, strchr(con->uri + 6, '?'));
}
else if (!strncmp(con->uri, "/printers", 9))
{
cupsdSetStringf(&con->command, "%s/cgi-bin/printers.cgi",
ServerBin);
if (con->uri[9] && con->uri[10])
cupsdSetString(&con->options, con->uri + 9);
else
cupsdSetString(&con->options, NULL);
}
else if (!strncmp(con->uri, "/classes", 8))
{
cupsdSetStringf(&con->command, "%s/cgi-bin/classes.cgi",
ServerBin);
if (con->uri[8] && con->uri[9])
cupsdSetString(&con->options, con->uri + 8);
else
cupsdSetString(&con->options, NULL);
}
else if (!strncmp(con->uri, "/jobs", 5))
{
cupsdSetStringf(&con->command, "%s/cgi-bin/jobs.cgi",
ServerBin);
if (con->uri[5] && con->uri[6])
cupsdSetString(&con->options, con->uri + 5);
else
cupsdSetString(&con->options, NULL);
}
else
{
cupsdSetStringf(&con->command, "%s/cgi-bin/help.cgi",
ServerBin);
if (con->uri[5] && con->uri[6])
cupsdSetString(&con->options, con->uri + 5);
else
cupsdSetString(&con->options, NULL);
}
if (httpGetVersion(con->http) <= HTTP_VERSION_1_0)
httpSetKeepAlive(con->http, HTTP_KEEPALIVE_OFF);
}
else
{
/*
* POST to a file...
*/
if ((filename = get_file(con, &filestats, buf,
sizeof(buf))) == NULL)
{
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_NOT_FOUND, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
break;
}
type = mimeFileType(MimeDatabase, filename, NULL, NULL);
if (!is_cgi(con, filename, &filestats, type))
{
/*
* Only POST to CGI's...
*/
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
}
break;
case HTTP_STATE_PUT_RECV :
/*
* Validate the resource name...
*/
if (strcmp(con->uri, "/admin/conf/cupsd.conf"))
{
/*
* PUT can only be done to the cupsd.conf file...
*/
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Disallowed PUT request for \"%s\".", con->uri);
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_FORBIDDEN, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
break;
}
/*
* See if the PUT request includes a Content-Length field, and if
* so check the length against any limits that are set...
*/
if (httpGetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_CONTENT_LENGTH)[0] &&
MaxRequestSize > 0 &&
httpGetLength2(con->http) > MaxRequestSize)
{
/*
* Request too large...
*/
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
break;
}
else if (httpGetLength2(con->http) < 0)
{
/*
* Negative content lengths are invalid!
*/
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
break;
}
/*
* Open a temporary file to hold the request...
*/
cupsdSetStringf(&con->filename, "%s/%08x", RequestRoot,
request_id ++);
con->file = open(con->filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0640);
if (con->file < 0)
{
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Unable to create request file \"%s\": %s",
con->filename, strerror(errno));
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
fchmod(con->file, 0640);
fchown(con->file, RunUser, Group);
fcntl(con->file, F_SETFD, fcntl(con->file, F_GETFD) | FD_CLOEXEC);
break;
case HTTP_STATE_DELETE :
case HTTP_STATE_TRACE :
cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE);
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
case HTTP_STATE_HEAD :
if (!strncmp(con->uri, "/printers/", 10) &&
!strcmp(con->uri + strlen(con->uri) - 4, ".ppd"))
{
/*
* Send PPD file - get the real printer name since printer
* names are not case sensitive but filenames can be...
*/
con->uri[strlen(con->uri) - 4] = '\0'; /* Drop ".ppd" */
if ((p = cupsdFindPrinter(con->uri + 10)) != NULL)
snprintf(con->uri, sizeof(con->uri), "/ppd/%s.ppd", p->name);
else
{
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_NOT_FOUND, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
cupsdLogRequest(con, HTTP_STATUS_NOT_FOUND);
break;
}
}
else if (!strncmp(con->uri, "/printers/", 10) &&
!strcmp(con->uri + strlen(con->uri) - 4, ".png"))
{
/*
* Send PNG file - get the real printer name since printer
* names are not case sensitive but filenames can be...
*/
con->uri[strlen(con->uri) - 4] = '\0'; /* Drop ".ppd" */
if ((p = cupsdFindPrinter(con->uri + 10)) != NULL)
snprintf(con->uri, sizeof(con->uri), "/icons/%s.png", p->name);
else
{
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_NOT_FOUND, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
cupsdLogRequest(con, HTTP_STATUS_NOT_FOUND);
break;
}
}
else if (!WebInterface)
{
httpClearFields(con->http);
if (!cupsdSendHeader(con, HTTP_STATUS_OK, NULL, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
cupsdLogRequest(con, HTTP_STATUS_OK);
break;
}
if ((!strncmp(con->uri, "/admin", 6) && strcmp(con->uri, "/admin/conf/cupsd.conf") && strncmp(con->uri, "/admin/log/", 11)) ||
!strncmp(con->uri, "/printers", 9) ||
!strncmp(con->uri, "/classes", 8) ||
!strncmp(con->uri, "/help", 5) ||
!strncmp(con->uri, "/jobs", 5))
{
/*
* CGI output...
*/
httpClearFields(con->http);
if (!cupsdSendHeader(con, HTTP_STATUS_OK, "text/html", CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
cupsdLogRequest(con, HTTP_STATUS_OK);
}
else if (!strncmp(con->uri, "/admin/log/", 11) && (strchr(con->uri + 11, '/') || strlen(con->uri) == 11))
{
/*
* HEAD can only be done to configuration files under
* /admin/conf...
*/
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Request for subdirectory \"%s\".", con->uri);
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_FORBIDDEN, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
cupsdLogRequest(con, HTTP_STATUS_FORBIDDEN);
break;
}
else if ((filename = get_file(con, &filestats, buf,
sizeof(buf))) == NULL)
{
httpClearFields(con->http);
if (!cupsdSendHeader(con, HTTP_STATUS_NOT_FOUND, "text/html",
CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
cupsdLogRequest(con, HTTP_STATUS_NOT_FOUND);
}
else if (!check_if_modified(con, &filestats))
{
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_NOT_MODIFIED, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
cupsdLogRequest(con, HTTP_STATUS_NOT_MODIFIED);
}
else
{
/*
* Serve a file...
*/
type = mimeFileType(MimeDatabase, filename, NULL, NULL);
if (type == NULL)
strlcpy(line, "text/plain", sizeof(line));
else
snprintf(line, sizeof(line), "%s/%s", type->super, type->type);
httpClearFields(con->http);
httpSetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_LAST_MODIFIED,
httpGetDateString(filestats.st_mtime));
httpSetLength(con->http, (size_t)filestats.st_size);
if (!cupsdSendHeader(con, HTTP_STATUS_OK, line, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
cupsdLogRequest(con, HTTP_STATUS_OK);
}
break;
default :
break; /* Anti-compiler-warning-code */
}
}
}
/*
* Handle any incoming data...
*/
switch (httpGetState(con->http))
{
case HTTP_STATE_PUT_RECV :
do
{
if ((bytes = httpRead2(con->http, line, sizeof(line))) < 0)
{
if (httpError(con->http) && httpError(con->http) != EPIPE)
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG,
"HTTP_STATE_PUT_RECV Closing for error %d (%s)",
httpError(con->http), strerror(httpError(con->http)));
else
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG,
"HTTP_STATE_PUT_RECV Closing on EOF.");
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
else if (bytes > 0)
{
con->bytes += bytes;
if (MaxRequestSize > 0 && con->bytes > MaxRequestSize)
{
close(con->file);
con->file = -1;
unlink(con->filename);
cupsdClearString(&con->filename);
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
if (write(con->file, line, (size_t)bytes) < bytes)
{
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Unable to write %d bytes to \"%s\": %s", bytes,
con->filename, strerror(errno));
close(con->file);
con->file = -1;
unlink(con->filename);
cupsdClearString(&con->filename);
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
}
else if (httpGetState(con->http) == HTTP_STATE_PUT_RECV)
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
while (httpGetState(con->http) == HTTP_STATE_PUT_RECV && httpGetReady(con->http));
if (httpGetState(con->http) == HTTP_STATE_STATUS)
{
/*
* End of file, see how big it is...
*/
fstat(con->file, &filestats);
close(con->file);
con->file = -1;
if (filestats.st_size > MaxRequestSize &&
MaxRequestSize > 0)
{
/*
* Request is too big; remove it and send an error...
*/
unlink(con->filename);
cupsdClearString(&con->filename);
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
/*
* Install the configuration file...
*/
status = install_cupsd_conf(con);
/*
* Return the status to the client...
*/
if (!cupsdSendError(con, status, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
break;
case HTTP_STATE_POST_RECV :
do
{
if (con->request && con->file < 0)
{
/*
* Grab any request data from the connection...
*/
if (!httpWait(con->http, 0))
return;
if ((ipp_state = ippRead(con->http, con->request)) == IPP_STATE_ERROR)
{
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_ERROR, "IPP read error: %s",
cupsLastErrorString());
cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE);
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
else if (ipp_state != IPP_STATE_DATA)
{
if (httpGetState(con->http) == HTTP_STATE_POST_SEND)
{
cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE);
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
if (httpGetReady(con->http))
continue;
break;
}
else
{
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG, "%d.%d %s %d",
con->request->request.op.version[0],
con->request->request.op.version[1],
ippOpString(con->request->request.op.operation_id),
con->request->request.op.request_id);
con->bytes += (off_t)ippLength(con->request);
}
}
if (con->file < 0 && httpGetState(con->http) != HTTP_STATE_POST_SEND)
{
/*
* Create a file as needed for the request data...
*/
cupsdSetStringf(&con->filename, "%s/%08x", RequestRoot,
request_id ++);
con->file = open(con->filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0640);
if (con->file < 0)
{
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Unable to create request file \"%s\": %s",
con->filename, strerror(errno));
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
fchmod(con->file, 0640);
fchown(con->file, RunUser, Group);
fcntl(con->file, F_SETFD, fcntl(con->file, F_GETFD) | FD_CLOEXEC);
}
if (httpGetState(con->http) != HTTP_STATE_POST_SEND)
{
if (!httpWait(con->http, 0))
return;
else if ((bytes = httpRead2(con->http, line, sizeof(line))) < 0)
{
if (httpError(con->http) && httpError(con->http) != EPIPE)
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG,
"HTTP_STATE_POST_SEND Closing for error %d (%s)",
httpError(con->http), strerror(httpError(con->http)));
else
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG,
"HTTP_STATE_POST_SEND Closing on EOF.");
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
else if (bytes > 0)
{
con->bytes += bytes;
if (MaxRequestSize > 0 && con->bytes > MaxRequestSize)
{
close(con->file);
con->file = -1;
unlink(con->filename);
cupsdClearString(&con->filename);
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
if (write(con->file, line, (size_t)bytes) < bytes)
{
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Unable to write %d bytes to \"%s\": %s",
bytes, con->filename, strerror(errno));
close(con->file);
con->file = -1;
unlink(con->filename);
cupsdClearString(&con->filename);
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE,
CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
}
else if (httpGetState(con->http) == HTTP_STATE_POST_RECV)
return;
else if (httpGetState(con->http) != HTTP_STATE_POST_SEND)
{
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG,
"Closing on unexpected state %s.",
httpStateString(httpGetState(con->http)));
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
}
while (httpGetState(con->http) == HTTP_STATE_POST_RECV && httpGetReady(con->http));
if (httpGetState(con->http) == HTTP_STATE_POST_SEND)
{
if (con->file >= 0)
{
fstat(con->file, &filestats);
close(con->file);
con->file = -1;
if (filestats.st_size > MaxRequestSize &&
MaxRequestSize > 0)
{
/*
* Request is too big; remove it and send an error...
*/
unlink(con->filename);
cupsdClearString(&con->filename);
if (con->request)
{
/*
* Delete any IPP request data...
*/
ippDelete(con->request);
con->request = NULL;
}
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
else if (filestats.st_size == 0)
{
/*
* Don't allow empty file...
*/
unlink(con->filename);
cupsdClearString(&con->filename);
}
if (con->command)
{
if (!cupsdSendCommand(con, con->command, con->options, 0))
{
if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_NOT_FOUND, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
{
cupsdCloseClient(con);
return;
}
}
else
cupsdLogRequest(con, HTTP_STATUS_OK);
}
}
if (con->request)
{
cupsdProcessIPPRequest(con);
if (con->filename)
{
unlink(con->filename);
cupsdClearString(&con->filename);
}
return;
}
}
break;
default :
break; /* Anti-compiler-warning-code */
}
if (httpGetState(con->http) == HTTP_STATE_WAITING)
{
if (!httpGetKeepAlive(con->http))
{
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG,
"Closing because Keep-Alive is disabled.");
cupsdCloseClient(con);
}
else
{
cupsArrayRemove(ActiveClients, con);
cupsdSetBusyState();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Don't treat "localhost.localdomain" as an allowed replacement for localhost, since it isn't.
CWE ID: CWE-290
| 0
| 21,158
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: poppler_link_mapping_copy (PopplerLinkMapping *mapping)
{
PopplerLinkMapping *new_mapping;
new_mapping = poppler_link_mapping_new ();
*new_mapping = *mapping;
if (new_mapping->action)
new_mapping->action = poppler_action_copy (new_mapping->action);
return new_mapping;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 7,025
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::scheduleUseShadowTreeUpdate(SVGUseElement& element)
{
m_useElementsNeedingUpdate.add(&element);
scheduleLayoutTreeUpdateIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 1,640
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType UnregisterModule(const ModuleInfo *module_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
/*
Locate and execute UnregisterFORMATImage module.
*/
assert(module_info != (const ModuleInfo *) NULL);
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",module_info->tag);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
if (module_info->unregister_module == NULL)
return(MagickTrue);
module_info->unregister_module();
if (lt_dlclose((ModuleHandle) module_info->handle) != 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),ModuleWarning,
"UnableToCloseModule","`%s': %s",module_info->tag,lt_dlerror());
return(MagickFalse);
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 4,652
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ExtensionService::ExtensionBindingsAllowed(const GURL& url) {
if (GetExtensionByURL(url))
return true;
const Extension* extension = GetExtensionByWebExtent(url);
return (extension && extension->location() == Extension::COMPONENT);
}
Commit Message: Unrevert: Show the install dialog for the initial load of an unpacked extension
with plugins.
First landing broke some browser tests.
BUG=83273
TEST=in the extensions managmenet page, with developer mode enabled, Load an unpacked extension on an extension with NPAPI plugins. You should get an install dialog.
TBR=mihaip
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87738 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,937
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct ip_tunnel **__ipgre_bucket(struct ipgre_net *ign,
struct ip_tunnel_parm *parms)
{
__be32 remote = parms->iph.daddr;
__be32 local = parms->iph.saddr;
__be32 key = parms->i_key;
unsigned h = HASH(key);
int prio = 0;
if (local)
prio |= 1;
if (remote && !ipv4_is_multicast(remote)) {
prio |= 2;
h ^= HASH(remote);
}
return &ign->tunnels[prio][h];
}
Commit Message: gre: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().
This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,445
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OpenVideoDeviceAndWaitForFailure(int page_request_id,
const std::string& device_id) {
EXPECT_CALL(*host_, OnDeviceOpenSuccess()).Times(0);
base::RunLoop run_loop;
host_->OnOpenDevice(page_request_id, device_id, MEDIA_DEVICE_VIDEO_CAPTURE,
run_loop.QuitClosure());
run_loop.Run();
EXPECT_FALSE(DoesContainRawIds(host_->video_devices_));
EXPECT_FALSE(DoesEveryDeviceMapToRawId(host_->video_devices_, origin_));
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,737
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionSystemImpl::~ExtensionSystemImpl() {
if (rules_registry_service_.get())
rules_registry_service_->Shutdown();
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 15,922
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ipxcfg_set_auto_select(char val)
{
ipxcfg_auto_select_primary = val;
if (val && !ipx_primary_net)
ipx_primary_net = ipx_interfaces_head();
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 23,791
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t StreamingProcessor::togglePauseStream(bool pause) {
ATRACE_CALL();
status_t res;
sp<CameraDeviceBase> device = mDevice.promote();
if (device == 0) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Device does not exist", __FUNCTION__, mId);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
ALOGV("%s: Camera %d: toggling pause to %d", __FUNCTION__, mId, pause);
Mutex::Autolock m(mMutex);
if (mActiveRequest == NONE) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Can't toggle pause, streaming was not started",
__FUNCTION__, mId);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (mPaused == pause) {
return OK;
}
if (pause) {
res = device->clearStreamingRequest();
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Can't clear stream request: %s (%d)",
__FUNCTION__, mId, strerror(-res), res);
return res;
}
} else {
CameraMetadata &request =
(mActiveRequest == PREVIEW) ? mPreviewRequest
: mRecordingRequest;
res = device->setStreamingRequest(request);
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to set preview request to resume: "
"%s (%d)",
__FUNCTION__, mId, strerror(-res), res);
return res;
}
}
mPaused = pause;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: auth_etc_enlightenment_sysactions(char *a,
char *u,
char **g)
{
FILE *f;
char file[4096], buf[4096], id[4096], ugname[4096], perm[4096], act[4096];
char *p, *pp, *s, **gp;
int ok = 0;
size_t len, line = 0;
int allow = 0;
int deny = 0;
snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "/etc/enlightenment/sysactions.conf");
f = fopen(file, "r");
if (!f)
{
snprintf(file, sizeof(file), PACKAGE_SYSCONF_DIR "/enlightenment/sysactions.conf");
f = fopen(file, "r");
if (!f) return 0;
}
auth_etc_enlightenment_sysactions_perm(file);
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
{
line++;
len = strlen(buf);
if (len < 1) continue;
if (buf[len - 1] == '\n') buf[len - 1] = 0;
/* format:
*
* # comment
* user: username [allow:|deny:] halt reboot ...
* group: groupname [allow:|deny:] suspend ...
*/
if (buf[0] == '#') continue;
p = buf;
p = get_word(p, id);
p = get_word(p, ugname);
pp = p;
p = get_word(p, perm);
allow = 0;
deny = 0;
if (!strcmp(id, "user:"))
{
if (!fnmatch(ugname, u, 0))
{
if (!strcmp(perm, "allow:")) allow = 1;
else if (!strcmp(perm, "deny:"))
deny = 1;
else
goto malformed;
}
else
continue;
}
else if (!strcmp(id, "group:"))
{
Eina_Bool matched = EINA_FALSE;
for (gp = g; *gp; gp++)
{
if (!fnmatch(ugname, *gp, 0))
{
matched = EINA_TRUE;
if (!strcmp(perm, "allow:")) allow = 1;
else if (!strcmp(perm, "deny:"))
deny = 1;
else
goto malformed;
}
}
if (!matched) continue;
}
else if (!strcmp(id, "action:"))
{
while ((*pp) && (isspace(*pp)))
pp++;
s = eina_hash_find(actions, ugname);
if (s) eina_hash_del(actions, ugname, s);
if (!actions) actions = eina_hash_string_superfast_new(free);
eina_hash_add(actions, ugname, strdup(pp));
continue;
}
else if (id[0] == 0)
continue;
else
goto malformed;
for (;; )
{
p = get_word(p, act);
if (act[0] == 0) break;
if (!fnmatch(act, a, 0))
{
if (allow) ok = 1;
else if (deny)
ok = -1;
goto done;
}
}
continue;
malformed:
printf("WARNING: %s:%zu\n"
"LINE: '%s'\n"
"MALFORMED LINE. SKIPPED.\n",
file, line, buf);
}
done:
fclose(f);
return ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,056
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ib_uverbs_free_hw_resources(struct ib_uverbs_device *uverbs_dev,
struct ib_device *ib_dev)
{
struct ib_uverbs_file *file;
struct ib_uverbs_event_file *event_file;
struct ib_event event;
/* Pending running commands to terminate */
synchronize_srcu(&uverbs_dev->disassociate_srcu);
event.event = IB_EVENT_DEVICE_FATAL;
event.element.port_num = 0;
event.device = ib_dev;
mutex_lock(&uverbs_dev->lists_mutex);
while (!list_empty(&uverbs_dev->uverbs_file_list)) {
struct ib_ucontext *ucontext;
file = list_first_entry(&uverbs_dev->uverbs_file_list,
struct ib_uverbs_file, list);
file->is_closed = 1;
ucontext = file->ucontext;
list_del(&file->list);
file->ucontext = NULL;
kref_get(&file->ref);
mutex_unlock(&uverbs_dev->lists_mutex);
/* We must release the mutex before going ahead and calling
* disassociate_ucontext. disassociate_ucontext might end up
* indirectly calling uverbs_close, for example due to freeing
* the resources (e.g mmput).
*/
ib_uverbs_event_handler(&file->event_handler, &event);
if (ucontext) {
ib_dev->disassociate_ucontext(ucontext);
ib_uverbs_cleanup_ucontext(file, ucontext);
}
mutex_lock(&uverbs_dev->lists_mutex);
kref_put(&file->ref, ib_uverbs_release_file);
}
while (!list_empty(&uverbs_dev->uverbs_events_file_list)) {
event_file = list_first_entry(&uverbs_dev->
uverbs_events_file_list,
struct ib_uverbs_event_file,
list);
spin_lock_irq(&event_file->lock);
event_file->is_closed = 1;
spin_unlock_irq(&event_file->lock);
list_del(&event_file->list);
if (event_file->is_async) {
ib_unregister_event_handler(&event_file->uverbs_file->
event_handler);
event_file->uverbs_file->event_handler.device = NULL;
}
wake_up_interruptible(&event_file->poll_wait);
kill_fasync(&event_file->async_queue, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
}
mutex_unlock(&uverbs_dev->lists_mutex);
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,046
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pch_end (void)
{
return p_end;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 15,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void pcnet_set_link_status(NetClientState *nc)
{
PCNetState *d = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
d->lnkst = nc->link_down ? 0 : 0x40;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,655
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned long group_faults(struct task_struct *p, int nid)
{
if (!p->numa_group)
return 0;
return p->numa_group->faults[task_faults_idx(NUMA_MEM, nid, 0)] +
p->numa_group->faults[task_faults_idx(NUMA_MEM, nid, 1)];
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 11,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: help(void)
{
(void)fputs(
"Usage: file [OPTION...] [FILE...]\n"
"Determine type of FILEs.\n"
"\n", stdout);
#define OPT(shortname, longname, opt, doc) \
fprintf(stdout, " -%c, --" longname, shortname), \
docprint(doc);
#define OPT_LONGONLY(longname, opt, doc) \
fprintf(stdout, " --" longname), \
docprint(doc);
#include "file_opts.h"
#undef OPT
#undef OPT_LONGONLY
fprintf(stdout, "\nReport bugs to http://bugs.gw.com/\n");
exit(0);
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 28,174
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void console_unblank(void)
{
struct console *c;
/*
* console_unblank can no longer be called in interrupt context unless
* oops_in_progress is set to 1..
*/
if (oops_in_progress) {
if (down_trylock(&console_sem) != 0)
return;
} else
console_lock();
console_locked = 1;
console_may_schedule = 0;
for_each_console(c)
if ((c->flags & CON_ENABLED) && c->unblank)
c->unblank();
console_unlock();
}
Commit Message: printk: fix buffer overflow when calling log_prefix function from call_console_drivers
This patch corrects a buffer overflow in kernels from 3.0 to 3.4 when calling
log_prefix() function from call_console_drivers().
This bug existed in previous releases but has been revealed with commit
162a7e7500f9664636e649ba59defe541b7c2c60 (2.6.39 => 3.0) that made changes
about how to allocate memory for early printk buffer (use of memblock_alloc).
It disappears with commit 7ff9554bb578ba02166071d2d487b7fc7d860d62 (3.4 => 3.5)
that does a refactoring of printk buffer management.
In log_prefix(), the access to "p[0]", "p[1]", "p[2]" or
"simple_strtoul(&p[1], &endp, 10)" may cause a buffer overflow as this
function is called from call_console_drivers by passing "&LOG_BUF(cur_index)"
where the index must be masked to do not exceed the buffer's boundary.
The trick is to prepare in call_console_drivers() a buffer with the necessary
data (PRI field of syslog message) to be safely evaluated in log_prefix().
This patch can be applied to stable kernel branches 3.0.y, 3.2.y and 3.4.y.
Without this patch, one can freeze a server running this loop from shell :
$ export DUMMY=`cat /dev/urandom | tr -dc '12345AZERTYUIOPQSDFGHJKLMWXCVBNazertyuiopqsdfghjklmwxcvbn' | head -c255`
$ while true do ; echo $DUMMY > /dev/kmsg ; done
The "server freeze" depends on where memblock_alloc does allocate printk buffer :
if the buffer overflow is inside another kernel allocation the problem may not
be revealed, else the server may hangs up.
Signed-off-by: Alexandre SIMON <Alexandre.Simon@univ-lorraine.fr>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *ShaveImage(const Image *image,
const RectangleInfo *shave_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*shave_image;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (((2*shave_info->width) >= image->columns) ||
((2*shave_info->height) >= image->rows))
ThrowImageException(OptionWarning,"GeometryDoesNotContainImage");
SetGeometry(image,&geometry);
geometry.width-=2*shave_info->width;
geometry.height-=2*shave_info->height;
geometry.x=(ssize_t) shave_info->width+image->page.x;
geometry.y=(ssize_t) shave_info->height+image->page.y;
shave_image=CropImage(image,&geometry,exception);
if (shave_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
shave_image->page.width-=2*shave_info->width;
shave_image->page.height-=2*shave_info->height;
shave_image->page.x-=(ssize_t) shave_info->width;
shave_image->page.y-=(ssize_t) shave_info->height;
return(shave_image);
}
Commit Message: Fixed out of bounds error in SpliceImage.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 22,192
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs_set_open_stateid_locked(struct nfs4_state *state, nfs4_stateid *stateid, fmode_t fmode)
{
if (test_bit(NFS_DELEGATED_STATE, &state->flags) == 0)
nfs4_stateid_copy(&state->stateid, stateid);
nfs4_stateid_copy(&state->open_stateid, stateid);
switch (fmode) {
case FMODE_READ:
set_bit(NFS_O_RDONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
break;
case FMODE_WRITE:
set_bit(NFS_O_WRONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
break;
case FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE:
set_bit(NFS_O_RDWR_STATE, &state->flags);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 14,571
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetActiveUniformBlockiv(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
if (!feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context())
return error::kUnknownCommand;
const volatile gles2::cmds::GetActiveUniformBlockiv& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::GetActiveUniformBlockiv*>(
cmd_data);
GLuint program_id = c.program;
GLuint index = static_cast<GLuint>(c.index);
GLenum pname = static_cast<GLenum>(c.pname);
Program* program = GetProgramInfoNotShader(
program_id, "glGetActiveUniformBlockiv");
if (!program) {
return error::kNoError;
}
GLuint service_id = program->service_id();
GLint link_status = GL_FALSE;
api()->glGetProgramivFn(service_id, GL_LINK_STATUS, &link_status);
if (link_status != GL_TRUE) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glGetActiveActiveUniformBlockiv", "program not linked");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (index >= program->uniform_block_size_info().size()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glGetActiveUniformBlockiv",
"uniformBlockIndex >= active uniform blocks");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLsizei num_values = 1;
if (pname == GL_UNIFORM_BLOCK_ACTIVE_UNIFORM_INDICES) {
GLint num = 0;
api()->glGetActiveUniformBlockivFn(service_id, index,
GL_UNIFORM_BLOCK_ACTIVE_UNIFORMS, &num);
GLenum error = api()->glGetErrorFn();
if (error != GL_NO_ERROR) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(error, "GetActiveUniformBlockiv", "");
return error::kNoError;
}
num_values = static_cast<GLsizei>(num);
}
typedef cmds::GetActiveUniformBlockiv::Result Result;
uint32_t checked_size = 0;
if (!Result::ComputeSize(num_values).AssignIfValid(&checked_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
Result* result = GetSharedMemoryAs<Result*>(
c.params_shm_id, c.params_shm_offset, checked_size);
GLint* params = result ? result->GetData() : nullptr;
if (params == nullptr) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (result->size != 0) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
api()->glGetActiveUniformBlockivFn(service_id, index, pname, params);
result->SetNumResults(num_values);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 24,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: enum AVPixelFormat ff_thread_get_format(AVCodecContext *avctx, const enum AVPixelFormat *fmt)
{
return ff_get_format(avctx, fmt);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 29,152
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOrange(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->banana();
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,889
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::NeedsCopyTextureImageWorkaround(
GLenum internal_format,
int32_t channels_exist,
GLuint* source_texture_service_id,
GLenum* source_texture_target) {
if (!workarounds().use_intermediary_for_copy_texture_image)
return false;
if (internal_format == GL_RGB || internal_format == GL_RGBA)
return false;
Framebuffer* framebuffer = GetBoundReadFramebuffer();
if (!framebuffer)
return false;
const Framebuffer::Attachment* attachment =
framebuffer->GetReadBufferAttachment();
if (!attachment)
return false;
if (!attachment->IsTextureAttachment())
return false;
TextureRef* texture =
texture_manager()->GetTexture(attachment->object_name());
if (!texture->texture()->HasImages())
return false;
if (channels_exist != GLES2Util::kRGBA && channels_exist != GLES2Util::kRGB)
return false;
*source_texture_target = texture->texture()->target();
*source_texture_service_id = texture->service_id();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,238
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XML_SetCommentHandler(XML_Parser parser,
XML_CommentHandler handler)
{
if (parser != NULL)
parser->m_commentHandler = handler;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 18,389
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MPEG4Source::~MPEG4Source() {
if (mStarted) {
stop();
}
free(mCurrentSampleInfoSizes);
free(mCurrentSampleInfoOffsets);
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor.cpp: handle chunk_size > SIZE_MAX
chunk_size is a uint64_t, so it can legitimately be bigger
than SIZE_MAX, which would cause the subtraction to underflow.
https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=182251
Bug: 23034759
Change-Id: Ic1637fb26bf6edb0feb1bcf2876fd370db1ed547
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 15,955
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static JSValueRef leapForwardCallback(JSContextRef context, JSObjectRef function, JSObjectRef thisObject, size_t argumentCount, const JSValueRef arguments[], JSValueRef* exception)
{
notImplemented();
return JSValueMakeUndefined(context);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,892
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tg3_stop_block(struct tg3 *tp, unsigned long ofs, u32 enable_bit, int silent)
{
unsigned int i;
u32 val;
if (tg3_flag(tp, 5705_PLUS)) {
switch (ofs) {
case RCVLSC_MODE:
case DMAC_MODE:
case MBFREE_MODE:
case BUFMGR_MODE:
case MEMARB_MODE:
/* We can't enable/disable these bits of the
* 5705/5750, just say success.
*/
return 0;
default:
break;
}
}
val = tr32(ofs);
val &= ~enable_bit;
tw32_f(ofs, val);
for (i = 0; i < MAX_WAIT_CNT; i++) {
udelay(100);
val = tr32(ofs);
if ((val & enable_bit) == 0)
break;
}
if (i == MAX_WAIT_CNT && !silent) {
dev_err(&tp->pdev->dev,
"tg3_stop_block timed out, ofs=%lx enable_bit=%x\n",
ofs, enable_bit);
return -ENODEV;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,673
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pimv2_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, register u_int len, const u_char *bp2)
{
register const u_char *ep;
register const struct pim *pim = (const struct pim *)bp;
int advance;
enum checksum_status cksum_status;
ep = (const u_char *)ndo->ndo_snapend;
if (bp >= ep)
return;
if (ep > bp + len)
ep = bp + len;
ND_TCHECK(pim->pim_rsv);
pimv2_addr_len = pim->pim_rsv;
if (pimv2_addr_len != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RFC2117-encoding"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", cksum 0x%04x ", EXTRACT_16BITS(&pim->pim_cksum)));
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(&pim->pim_cksum) == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(unverified)"));
} else {
if (PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever) == PIMV2_TYPE_REGISTER) {
/*
* The checksum only covers the packet header,
* not the encapsulated packet.
*/
cksum_status = pimv2_check_checksum(ndo, bp, bp2, 8);
if (cksum_status == INCORRECT) {
/*
* To quote RFC 4601, "For interoperability
* reasons, a message carrying a checksum
* calculated over the entire PIM Register
* message should also be accepted."
*/
cksum_status = pimv2_check_checksum(ndo, bp, bp2, len);
}
} else {
/*
* The checksum covers the entire packet.
*/
cksum_status = pimv2_check_checksum(ndo, bp, bp2, len);
}
switch (cksum_status) {
case CORRECT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(correct)"));
break;
case INCORRECT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(incorrect)"));
break;
case UNVERIFIED:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(unverified)"));
break;
}
}
switch (PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever)) {
case PIMV2_TYPE_HELLO:
{
uint16_t otype, olen;
bp += 4;
while (bp < ep) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
otype = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[0]);
olen = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]);
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4 + olen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (%u), length %u, Value: ",
tok2str(pimv2_hello_option_values, "Unknown", otype),
otype,
olen));
bp += 4;
switch (otype) {
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_HOLDTIME:
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(bp));
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_LANPRUNEDELAY:
if (olen != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ERROR: Option Length != 4 Bytes (%u)", olen));
} else {
char t_bit;
uint16_t lan_delay, override_interval;
lan_delay = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
override_interval = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp+2);
t_bit = (lan_delay & 0x8000)? 1 : 0;
lan_delay &= ~0x8000;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t T-bit=%d, LAN delay %dms, Override interval %dms",
t_bit, lan_delay, override_interval));
}
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_DR_PRIORITY_OLD:
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_DR_PRIORITY:
switch (olen) {
case 0:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Bi-Directional Capability (Old)"));
break;
case 4:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(bp)));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ERROR: Option Length != 4 Bytes (%u)", olen));
break;
}
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_GENID:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(bp)));
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_REFRESH_CAP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "v%d", *bp));
if (*(bp+1) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", interval "));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, *(bp+1));
}
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(bp+2) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?0x%04x?", EXTRACT_16BITS(bp+2)));
}
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_BIDIR_CAP:
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_ADDRESS_LIST_OLD:
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_ADDRESS_LIST:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
const u_char *ptr = bp;
while (ptr < (bp+olen)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t "));
advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, ptr, pimv2_unicast, 0);
if (advance < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
ptr += advance;
}
}
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, bp, "\n\t ", olen);
break;
}
/* do we want to see an additionally hexdump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag> 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, bp, "\n\t ", olen);
bp += olen;
}
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_REGISTER:
{
const struct ip *ip;
ND_TCHECK2(*(bp + 4), PIMV2_REGISTER_FLAG_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [ %s ]\n\t",
tok2str(pimv2_register_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(bp+4))));
bp += 8; len -= 8;
/* encapsulated multicast packet */
ip = (const struct ip *)bp;
switch (IP_V(ip)) {
case 0: /* Null header */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IP-Null-header %s > %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_src),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_dst)));
break;
case 4: /* IPv4 */
ip_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
case 6: /* IPv6 */
ip6_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IP ver %d", IP_V(ip)));
break;
}
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_REGISTER_STOP:
bp += 4; len -= 4;
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " group="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " source="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
break;
case PIMV2_TYPE_JOIN_PRUNE:
case PIMV2_TYPE_GRAFT:
case PIMV2_TYPE_GRAFT_ACK:
/*
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* |PIM Ver| Type | Addr length | Checksum |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Unicast-Upstream Neighbor Address |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Reserved | Num groups | Holdtime |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Multicast Group Address-1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Number of Joined Sources | Number of Pruned Sources |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Joined Source Address-1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | . |
* | . |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Joined Source Address-n |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Pruned Source Address-1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | . |
* | . |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Pruned Source Address-n |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | . |
* | . |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Multicast Group Address-n |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*/
{
uint8_t ngroup;
uint16_t holdtime;
uint16_t njoin;
uint16_t nprune;
int i, j;
bp += 4; len -= 4;
if (PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever) != 7) { /*not for Graft-ACK*/
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", upstream-neighbor: "));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
}
if (bp + 4 > ep)
break;
ngroup = bp[1];
holdtime = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %u group(s)", ngroup));
if (PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever) != 7) { /*not for Graft-ACK*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", holdtime: "));
if (holdtime == 0xffff)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "infinite"));
else
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, holdtime);
}
bp += 4; len -= 4;
for (i = 0; i < ngroup; i++) {
if (bp >= ep)
goto jp_done;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t group #%u: ", i+1));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto jp_done;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
if (bp + 4 > ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto jp_done;
}
njoin = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[0]);
nprune = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", joined sources: %u, pruned sources: %u", njoin, nprune));
bp += 4; len -= 4;
for (j = 0; j < njoin; j++) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t joined source #%u: ", j+1));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_source, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto jp_done;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
}
for (j = 0; j < nprune; j++) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t pruned source #%u: ", j+1));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_source, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto jp_done;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
}
}
jp_done:
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_BOOTSTRAP:
{
int i, j, frpcnt;
bp += 4;
/* Fragment Tag, Hash Mask len, and BSR-priority */
if (bp + sizeof(uint16_t) >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tag=%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(bp)));
bp += sizeof(uint16_t);
if (bp >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " hashmlen=%d", bp[0]));
if (bp + 1 >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BSRprio=%d", bp[1]));
bp += 2;
/* Encoded-Unicast-BSR-Address */
if (bp >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BSR="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
for (i = 0; bp < ep; i++) {
/* Encoded-Group Address */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (group%d: ", i));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0))
< 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
bp += advance;
/* RP-Count, Frag RP-Cnt, and rsvd */
if (bp >= ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RPcnt=%d", bp[0]));
if (bp + 1 >= ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " FRPcnt=%d", frpcnt = bp[1]));
bp += 4;
for (j = 0; j < frpcnt && bp < ep; j++) {
/* each RP info */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RP%d=", j));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp,
pimv2_unicast,
0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
bp += advance;
if (bp + 1 >= ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ",holdtime="));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(bp));
if (bp + 2 >= ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ",prio=%d", bp[2]));
bp += 4;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
}
bs_done:
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_ASSERT:
bp += 4; len -= 4;
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " group="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " src="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
if (bp + 8 > ep)
break;
if (bp[0] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RPT"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " pref=%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[0]) & 0x7fffffff));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " metric=%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[4])));
break;
case PIMV2_TYPE_CANDIDATE_RP:
{
int i, pfxcnt;
bp += 4;
/* Prefix-Cnt, Priority, and Holdtime */
if (bp >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " prefix-cnt=%d", bp[0]));
pfxcnt = bp[0];
if (bp + 1 >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " prio=%d", bp[1]));
if (bp + 3 >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " holdtime="));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]));
bp += 4;
/* Encoded-Unicast-RP-Address */
if (bp >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RP="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
/* Encoded-Group Addresses */
for (i = 0; i < pfxcnt && bp < ep; i++) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " Group%d=", i));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0))
< 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
}
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_PRUNE_REFRESH:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " src="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " grp="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " forwarder="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " TUNR "));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(bp));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [type %d]", PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever)));
break;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|pim]"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12996/PIMv2: Make sure PIM TLVs have the right length.
We do bounds checks based on the TLV length, so if the TLV's length is
too short, and we don't check for that, we could end up fetching data
past the end of the TLV - including past the length of the captured data
in the packet.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 5,034
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltAddStackElemList(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xsltStackElemPtr elems)
{
return(xsltAddStackElem(ctxt, elems));
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,230
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PageInfo::OnChangePasswordButtonPressed(
content::WebContents* web_contents) {
#if defined(FULL_SAFE_BROWSING)
DCHECK(password_protection_service_);
DCHECK(safe_browsing_status_ == SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_SIGN_IN_PASSWORD_REUSE ||
safe_browsing_status_ ==
SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_ENTERPRISE_PASSWORD_REUSE);
password_protection_service_->OnUserAction(
web_contents,
safe_browsing_status_ == SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_SIGN_IN_PASSWORD_REUSE
? PasswordReuseEvent::SIGN_IN_PASSWORD
: PasswordReuseEvent::ENTERPRISE_PASSWORD,
safe_browsing::WarningUIType::PAGE_INFO,
safe_browsing::WarningAction::CHANGE_PASSWORD);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 1
| 2,650
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderProcessHostImpl::FastShutdownIfPossible() {
if (run_renderer_in_process())
return false; // Single process mode never shuts down the renderer.
if (!child_process_launcher_.get() || child_process_launcher_->IsStarting() ||
!GetHandle())
return false; // Render process hasn't started or is probably crashed.
if (!SuddenTerminationAllowed())
return false;
if (GetWorkerRefCount() != 0) {
if (survive_for_worker_start_time_.is_null())
survive_for_worker_start_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
return false;
}
fast_shutdown_started_ = true;
ProcessDied(false /* already_dead */, nullptr);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,678
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::RequestToLockMouse(bool user_gesture,
bool last_unlocked_by_target) {
GotResponseToLockMouseRequest(false);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,663
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FileTransfer::DeterminePluginMethods( CondorError &e, const char* path )
{
FILE* fp;
const char *args[] = { path, "-classad", NULL};
char buf[1024];
fp = my_popenv( args, "r", FALSE );
if( ! fp ) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "FILETRANSFER: Failed to execute %s, ignoring\n", path );
e.pushf("FILETRANSFER", 1, "Failed to execute %s, ignoring", path );
return "";
}
ClassAd* ad = new ClassAd;
bool read_something = false;
while( fgets(buf, 1024, fp) ) {
read_something = true;
if( ! ad->Insert(buf) ) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "FILETRANSFER: Failed to insert \"%s\" into ClassAd, "
"ignoring invalid plugin\n", buf );
delete( ad );
pclose( fp );
e.pushf("FILETRANSFER", 1, "Received invalid input '%s', ignoring", buf );
return "";
}
}
my_pclose( fp );
if( ! read_something ) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS,
"FILETRANSFER: \"%s -classad\" did not produce any output, ignoring\n",
path );
delete( ad );
e.pushf("FILETRANSFER", 1, "\"%s -classad\" did not produce any output, ignoring", path );
return "";
}
char* methods = NULL;
if (ad->LookupString( "SupportedMethods", &methods)) {
MyString m = methods;
free(methods);
delete( ad );
return m;
}
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "FILETRANSFER output of \"%s -classad\" does not contain SupportedMethods, ignoring plugin\n", path );
e.pushf("FILETRANSFER", 1, "\"%s -classad\" does not support any methods, ignoring", path );
delete( ad );
return "";
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 22,791
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PrintViewManager::OnMessageReceived(
const IPC::Message& message,
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_WITH_PARAM(PrintViewManager, message, render_frame_host)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintHostMsg_DidShowPrintDialog, OnDidShowPrintDialog)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_WITH_PARAM_DELAY_REPLY(
PrintHostMsg_SetupScriptedPrintPreview, OnSetupScriptedPrintPreview)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintHostMsg_ShowScriptedPrintPreview,
OnShowScriptedPrintPreview)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled ||
PrintViewManagerBase::OnMessageReceived(message, render_frame_host);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,777
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RunTransactionTestWithResponseInfo(net::HttpCache* cache,
const MockTransaction& trans_info,
net::HttpResponseInfo* response) {
RunTransactionTestWithRequest(
cache, trans_info, MockHttpRequest(trans_info), response);
}
Commit Message: Http cache: Test deleting an entry with a pending_entry when
adding the truncated flag.
BUG=125159
TEST=net_unittests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10356113
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139331 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 11,054
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sctp_do_ecn_cwr_work(struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u32 lowest_tsn)
{
/* Turn off ECNE getting auto-prepended to every outgoing
* packet
*/
asoc->need_ecne = 0;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Prevent soft lockup when sctp_accept() is called during a timeout event
A case can occur when sctp_accept() is called by the user during
a heartbeat timeout event after the 4-way handshake. Since
sctp_assoc_migrate() changes both assoc->base.sk and assoc->ep, the
bh_sock_lock in sctp_generate_heartbeat_event() will be taken with
the listening socket but released with the new association socket.
The result is a deadlock on any future attempts to take the listening
socket lock.
Note that this race can occur with other SCTP timeouts that take
the bh_lock_sock() in the event sctp_accept() is called.
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 67s! [swapper:0]
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8152d48e>] [<ffffffff8152d48e>] _spin_lock+0x1e/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffff880028323b20 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff880028323b20 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880028323be0 RDI: ffff8804632c4b48
RBP: ffffffff8100bb93 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880610662280 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff880028323aa0
R13: ffff8804383c3880 R14: ffff880028323a90 R15: ffffffff81534225
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028320000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000006df528 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff880616b70000, task ffff880616b6cab0)
Stack:
ffff880028323c40 ffffffffa01c2582 ffff880614cfb020 0000000000000000
<d> 0100000000000000 00000014383a6c44 ffff8804383c3880 ffff880614e93c00
<d> ffff880614e93c00 0000000000000000 ffff8804632c4b00 ffff8804383c38b8
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01c2582>] ? sctp_rcv+0x492/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8148c559>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148c716>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8149757d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497808>] ? ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff81496ccd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81497255>] ? ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145cfeb>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
...
With lockdep debugging:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
CslRx/12087 is trying to release lock (slock-AF_INET) at:
[<ffffffffa01bcae0>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x40/0xe0 [sctp]
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by CslRx/12087:
#0: (&asoc->timers[i]){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8108ce1f>] run_timer_softirq+0x16f/0x3e0
#1: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa01bcac3>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x23/0xe0 [sctp]
Ensure the socket taken is also the same one that is released by
saving a copy of the socket before entering the timeout event
critical section.
Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 6,595
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t CameraClient::setPreviewCallbackTarget(
const sp<IGraphicBufferProducer>& callbackProducer) {
(void)callbackProducer;
ALOGE("%s: Unimplemented!", __FUNCTION__);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 11,570
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inf_gtk_certificate_manager_response_cb(GtkDialog* dialog,
int response_id,
gpointer user_data)
{
InfGtkCertificateManagerQuery* query;
InfGtkCertificateManagerPrivate* priv;
InfXmppConnection* connection;
gchar* hostname;
gnutls_x509_crt_t cert;
gnutls_x509_crt_t known_cert;
GError* error;
gboolean cert_equal;
query = (InfGtkCertificateManagerQuery*)user_data;
priv = INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_MANAGER_PRIVATE(query->manager);
connection = query->connection;
g_object_ref(connection);
switch(response_id)
{
case GTK_RESPONSE_ACCEPT:
g_object_get(
G_OBJECT(query->connection),
"remote-hostname", &hostname,
NULL
);
/* Add the certificate to the known hosts file, but only if it is not
* already, to avoid unnecessary disk I/O. */
cert =
inf_certificate_chain_get_own_certificate(query->certificate_chain);
known_cert = g_hash_table_lookup(query->known_hosts, hostname);
error = NULL;
cert_equal = FALSE;
if(known_cert != NULL)
{
cert_equal = inf_gtk_certificate_manager_compare_fingerprint(
cert,
known_cert,
&error
);
}
if(error != NULL)
{
g_warning(
_("Failed to add certificate to list of known hosts: %s"),
error->message
);
}
else if(!cert_equal)
{
cert = inf_cert_util_copy_certificate(cert, &error);
g_hash_table_insert(query->known_hosts, hostname, cert);
inf_gtk_certificate_manager_write_known_hosts_with_warning(
query->manager,
query->known_hosts
);
}
else
{
g_free(hostname);
}
priv->queries = g_slist_remove(priv->queries, query);
inf_gtk_certificate_manager_query_free(query);
inf_xmpp_connection_certificate_verify_continue(connection);
break;
case GTK_RESPONSE_REJECT:
case GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT:
priv->queries = g_slist_remove(priv->queries, query);
inf_gtk_certificate_manager_query_free(query);
inf_xmpp_connection_certificate_verify_cancel(connection, NULL);
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
break;
}
g_object_unref(connection);
}
Commit Message: Fix expired certificate validation (gobby #61)
CWE ID: CWE-295
| 0
| 10,167
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CommandBufferProxyImpl::DiscardBackbuffer() {
if (last_state_.error != gpu::error::kNoError)
return false;
return Send(new GpuCommandBufferMsg_DiscardBackbuffer(route_id_));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 9,019
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int AutoFillManager::GUIDToID(const std::string& guid) {
static int last_id = 1;
if (!guid::IsValidGUID(guid))
return 0;
std::map<std::string, int>::const_iterator iter = guid_id_map_.find(guid);
if (iter == guid_id_map_.end()) {
guid_id_map_[guid] = last_id;
id_guid_map_[last_id] = guid;
return last_id++;
} else {
return iter->second;
}
}
Commit Message: Add support for autofill server experiments
BUG=none
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutoFillMetricsTest.QualityMetricsWithExperimentId:AutoFillQueryXmlParserTest.ParseExperimentId
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6260027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 12,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct dst_entry *inet_csk_route_child_sock(const struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
const struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
struct net *net = read_pnet(&ireq->ireq_net);
struct inet_sock *newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
struct ip_options_rcu *opt;
struct flowi4 *fl4;
struct rtable *rt;
fl4 = &newinet->cork.fl.u.ip4;
rcu_read_lock();
opt = rcu_dereference(newinet->inet_opt);
flowi4_init_output(fl4, ireq->ir_iif, ireq->ir_mark,
RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE,
sk->sk_protocol, inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk),
(opt && opt->opt.srr) ? opt->opt.faddr : ireq->ir_rmt_addr,
ireq->ir_loc_addr, ireq->ir_rmt_port,
htons(ireq->ir_num), sk->sk_uid);
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi4_to_flowi(fl4));
rt = ip_route_output_flow(net, fl4, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
goto no_route;
if (opt && opt->opt.is_strictroute && rt->rt_uses_gateway)
goto route_err;
rcu_read_unlock();
return &rt->dst;
route_err:
ip_rt_put(rt);
no_route:
rcu_read_unlock();
__IP_INC_STATS(net, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: dccp/tcp: do not inherit mc_list from parent
syzkaller found a way to trigger double frees from ip_mc_drop_socket()
It turns out that leave a copy of parent mc_list at accept() time,
which is very bad.
Very similar to commit 8b485ce69876 ("tcp: do not inherit
fastopen_req from parent")
Initial report from Pray3r, completed by Andrey one.
Thanks a lot to them !
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Pray3r <pray3r.z@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 8,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int gfs2_lock(struct file *file, int cmd, struct file_lock *fl)
{
struct gfs2_inode *ip = GFS2_I(file->f_mapping->host);
struct gfs2_sbd *sdp = GFS2_SB(file->f_mapping->host);
struct lm_lockstruct *ls = &sdp->sd_lockstruct;
if (!(fl->fl_flags & FL_POSIX))
return -ENOLCK;
if (__mandatory_lock(&ip->i_inode) && fl->fl_type != F_UNLCK)
return -ENOLCK;
if (cmd == F_CANCELLK) {
/* Hack: */
cmd = F_SETLK;
fl->fl_type = F_UNLCK;
}
if (unlikely(test_bit(SDF_SHUTDOWN, &sdp->sd_flags))) {
if (fl->fl_type == F_UNLCK)
posix_lock_file_wait(file, fl);
return -EIO;
}
if (IS_GETLK(cmd))
return dlm_posix_get(ls->ls_dlm, ip->i_no_addr, file, fl);
else if (fl->fl_type == F_UNLCK)
return dlm_posix_unlock(ls->ls_dlm, ip->i_no_addr, file, fl);
else
return dlm_posix_lock(ls->ls_dlm, ip->i_no_addr, file, cmd, fl);
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHost::DidCompletePageScaleAnimation() {
did_complete_scale_animation_ = true;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 12,968
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::ConvertContentsToApplication(TabContents* contents) {
const GURL& url = contents->controller().GetActiveEntry()->url();
std::string app_name = web_app::GenerateApplicationNameFromURL(url);
DetachContents(contents);
Browser* app_browser = Browser::CreateForApp(
TYPE_POPUP, app_name, gfx::Rect(), profile_);
TabContentsWrapper* wrapper =
TabContentsWrapper::GetCurrentWrapperForContents(contents);
if (!wrapper)
wrapper = new TabContentsWrapper(contents);
app_browser->tabstrip_model()->AppendTabContents(wrapper, true);
contents->GetMutableRendererPrefs()->can_accept_load_drops = false;
contents->render_view_host()->SyncRendererPrefs();
app_browser->window()->Show();
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,251
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: selftest_fips_192 (int extended, selftest_report_func_t report)
{
const char *what;
const char *errtxt;
(void)extended; /* No extended tests available. */
what = "low-level";
errtxt = selftest_basic_192 ();
if (errtxt)
goto failed;
return 0; /* Succeeded. */
failed:
if (report)
report ("cipher", GCRY_CIPHER_AES192, what, errtxt);
return GPG_ERR_SELFTEST_FAILED;
}
Commit Message: AES: move look-up tables to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/rijndael-internal.h (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
* cipher/rijndael-tables.h (encT): Move to 'enc_tables' structure.
(enc_tables): New structure for encryption table with counters before
and after.
(encT): New macro.
(dec_tables): Add counters before and after encryption table; Move
from .rodata to .data section.
(do_encrypt): Change 'encT' to 'enc_tables.T'.
(do_decrypt): Change '&dec_tables' to 'dec_tables.T'.
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (prefetch_table): Make inline; Handle input
with length not multiple of 256.
(prefetch_enc, prefetch_dec): Modify pre- and post-table counters
to unshare look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 22,888
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void compute_samples(int mask, short *output, int num_c, float **data, int d_offset, int len)
{
#define BUFFER_SIZE 32
float buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];
int i,j,o,n = BUFFER_SIZE;
check_endianness();
for (o = 0; o < len; o += BUFFER_SIZE) {
memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
if (o + n > len) n = len - o;
for (j=0; j < num_c; ++j) {
if (channel_position[num_c][j] & mask) {
for (i=0; i < n; ++i)
buffer[i] += data[j][d_offset+o+i];
}
}
for (i=0; i < n; ++i) {
FASTDEF(temp);
int v = FAST_SCALED_FLOAT_TO_INT(temp,buffer[i],15);
if ((unsigned int) (v + 32768) > 65535)
v = v < 0 ? -32768 : 32767;
output[o+i] = v;
}
}
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,703
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameView::scheduleOrPerformPostLayoutTasks()
{
if (m_postLayoutTasksTimer.isActive())
return;
if (!m_inSynchronousPostLayout) {
m_inSynchronousPostLayout = true;
performPostLayoutTasks();
m_inSynchronousPostLayout = false;
}
if (!m_postLayoutTasksTimer.isActive() && (needsLayout() || m_inSynchronousPostLayout)) {
m_postLayoutTasksTimer.startOneShot(0, FROM_HERE);
if (needsLayout())
layout();
}
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 23,059
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CreateResource() {
ui_resources_[num_ui_resources_++] =
FakeScopedUIResource::Create(layer_tree_host()->GetUIResourceManager());
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 19,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void qemu_spice_destroy_update(SimpleSpiceDisplay *sdpy, SimpleSpiceUpdate *update)
{
g_free(update->bitmap);
g_free(update);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 27,248
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_field_prtlen)
{
php_pgsql_data_info(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, PHP_PG_DATA_LENGTH);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 13,562
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe_oldest(struct fnhe_hash_bucket *hash)
{
struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe, *oldest;
oldest = rcu_dereference(hash->chain);
for (fnhe = rcu_dereference(oldest->fnhe_next); fnhe;
fnhe = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_next)) {
if (time_before(fnhe->fnhe_stamp, oldest->fnhe_stamp))
oldest = fnhe;
}
fnhe_flush_routes(oldest);
return oldest;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 10,339
|
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