instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ActiveDOMObject* V8TestNamedConstructor::toActiveDOMObject(v8::Handle<v8::Object> object)
{
return toNative(object);
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int parse_sid(struct cifs_sid *psid, char *end_of_acl)
{
/* BB need to add parm so we can store the SID BB */
/* validate that we do not go past end of ACL - sid must be at least 8
bytes long (assuming no sub-auths - e.g. the null SID */
if (end_of_acl < (char *)psid + 8) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse SID %p\n", psid);
return -EINVAL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG2
if (psid->num_subauth) {
int i;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "SID revision %d num_auth %d\n",
psid->revision, psid->num_subauth);
for (i = 0; i < psid->num_subauth; i++) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "SID sub_auth[%d]: 0x%x\n",
i, le32_to_cpu(psid->sub_auth[i]));
}
/* BB add length check to make sure that we do not have huge
num auths and therefore go off the end */
cifs_dbg(FYI, "RID 0x%x\n",
le32_to_cpu(psid->sub_auth[psid->num_subauth-1]));
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 12,638 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ff_put_pixels_clamped_c(const int16_t *block, uint8_t *av_restrict pixels,
ptrdiff_t line_size)
{
int i;
/* read the pixels */
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
pixels[0] = av_clip_uint8(block[0]);
pixels[1] = av_clip_uint8(block[1]);
pixels[2] = av_clip_uint8(block[2]);
pixels[3] = av_clip_uint8(block[3]);
pixels[4] = av_clip_uint8(block[4]);
pixels[5] = av_clip_uint8(block[5]);
pixels[6] = av_clip_uint8(block[6]);
pixels[7] = av_clip_uint8(block[7]);
pixels += line_size;
block += 8;
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/idctdsp: Transmit studio_profile to init instead of using AVCodecContext profile
These 2 fields are not always the same, it is simpler to always use the same field
for detecting studio profile
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_3.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 3,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GfxState::shift(double dx, double dy) {
curX += dx;
curY += dy;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 18,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ExecuteMovePageUp(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
unsigned distance = VerticalScrollDistance(frame);
if (!distance)
return false;
return ModifySelectionyWithPageGranularity(
frame, SelectionModifyAlteration::kMove, distance,
SelectionModifyVerticalDirection::kUp);
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,769 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void VoidMethodSequenceLongArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "voidMethodSequenceLongArg");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
Vector<int32_t> long_sequence_arg;
long_sequence_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLSequence<IDLLong>>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->voidMethodSequenceLongArg(long_sequence_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,316 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void customSetterImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::customSetterImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 22,611 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int r_bin_dwarf_init_comp_unit(RBinDwarfCompUnit *cu) {
if (!cu) {
return -EINVAL;
}
cu->dies = calloc (sizeof (RBinDwarfDIE), COMP_UNIT_CAPACITY);
if (!cu->dies) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
cu->capacity = COMP_UNIT_CAPACITY;
cu->length = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8813 - segfault in dwarf parser
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 26,743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LoadFile(const base::FilePath& file) {
base::FilePath webui(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("webui"));
RunTest(ui_test_utils::GetTestUrl(webui, file));
}
Commit Message: WebUI: Include cr/ui/grid.js only on ChromeOS.
Not used in any other platform.
Bug: None
Change-Id: I13cb2550ee38a828d8d266aeea5a8aa04695b54e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1638915
Auto-Submit: Demetrios Papadopoulos <dpapad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Esmael El-Moslimany <aee@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Demetrios Papadopoulos <dpapad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#665766}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 28,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> unsignedLongLongAttrAttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.unsignedLongLongAttr._get");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
return v8::Number::New(static_cast<double>(imp->unsignedLongLongAttr()));
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DRM_ENUM_NAME_FN(drm_get_dirty_info_name,
drm_dirty_info_enum_list)
struct drm_conn_prop_enum_list {
int type;
char *name;
int count;
};
Commit Message: drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int handle_futex_death(u32 __user *uaddr, struct task_struct *curr, int pi)
{
u32 uval, uninitialized_var(nval), mval;
retry:
if (get_user(uval, uaddr))
return -1;
if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) == task_pid_vnr(curr)) {
/*
* Ok, this dying thread is truly holding a futex
* of interest. Set the OWNER_DIED bit atomically
* via cmpxchg, and if the value had FUTEX_WAITERS
* set, wake up a waiter (if any). (We have to do a
* futex_wake() even if OWNER_DIED is already set -
* to handle the rare but possible case of recursive
* thread-death.) The rest of the cleanup is done in
* userspace.
*/
mval = (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS) | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED;
/*
* We are not holding a lock here, but we want to have
* the pagefault_disable/enable() protection because
* we want to handle the fault gracefully. If the
* access fails we try to fault in the futex with R/W
* verification via get_user_pages. get_user() above
* does not guarantee R/W access. If that fails we
* give up and leave the futex locked.
*/
if (cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&nval, uaddr, uval, mval)) {
if (fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr))
return -1;
goto retry;
}
if (nval != uval)
goto retry;
/*
* Wake robust non-PI futexes here. The wakeup of
* PI futexes happens in exit_pi_state():
*/
if (!pi && (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS))
futex_wake(uaddr, 1, 1, FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.
This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")
[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
different depending on the mapping ]
Fixes CVE-2014-3153.
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 9,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ndis_set(USBNetState *s, uint32_t oid,
uint8_t *inbuf, unsigned int inlen)
{
switch (oid) {
case OID_GEN_CURRENT_PACKET_FILTER:
s->filter = le32_to_cpup((le32 *) inbuf);
if (s->filter) {
s->rndis_state = RNDIS_DATA_INITIALIZED;
} else {
s->rndis_state = RNDIS_INITIALIZED;
}
return 0;
case OID_802_3_MULTICAST_LIST:
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 5,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int nfs_revalidate_mapping(struct inode *inode, struct address_space *mapping)
{
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(inode);
int ret = 0;
if ((nfsi->cache_validity & NFS_INO_REVAL_PAGECACHE)
|| nfs_attribute_timeout(inode) || NFS_STALE(inode)) {
ret = __nfs_revalidate_inode(NFS_SERVER(inode), inode);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
}
if (nfsi->cache_validity & NFS_INO_INVALID_DATA)
ret = nfs_invalidate_mapping(inode, mapping);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 9,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int reset_config_defines(void *dummy)
{
ap_server_config_defines = saved_server_config_defines;
saved_server_config_defines = NULL;
server_config_defined_vars = NULL;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 7,764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
{
if (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
return 0;
return (s->s3->rrec.type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) ? s->s3->rrec.length : 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 8,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DummyPageHolder& GetDummyPageHolder() const { return *dummy_page_holder_; }
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API void ZEND_FASTCALL zend_hash_apply(HashTable *ht, apply_func_t apply_func)
{
uint32_t idx;
Bucket *p;
int result;
IS_CONSISTENT(ht);
HT_ASSERT(GC_REFCOUNT(ht) == 1);
HASH_PROTECT_RECURSION(ht);
for (idx = 0; idx < ht->nNumUsed; idx++) {
p = ht->arData + idx;
if (UNEXPECTED(Z_TYPE(p->val) == IS_UNDEF)) continue;
result = apply_func(&p->val);
if (result & ZEND_HASH_APPLY_REMOVE) {
_zend_hash_del_el(ht, HT_IDX_TO_HASH(idx), p);
}
if (result & ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP) {
break;
}
}
HASH_UNPROTECT_RECURSION(ht);
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 14,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionWithScriptExecutionContext(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
ScriptExecutionContext* scriptContext = jsCast<JSDOMGlobalObject*>(exec->lexicalGlobalObject())->scriptExecutionContext();
if (!scriptContext)
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->withScriptExecutionContext(scriptContext);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLint GLES2Implementation::GetProgramResourceLocationHelper(
GLuint program,
GLenum program_interface,
const char* name) {
typedef cmds::GetProgramResourceLocation::Result Result;
SetBucketAsCString(kResultBucketId, name);
auto result = GetResultAs<Result>();
if (!result) {
return -1;
}
*result = -1;
helper_->GetProgramResourceLocation(program, program_interface,
kResultBucketId, GetResultShmId(),
result.offset());
WaitForCmd();
helper_->SetBucketSize(kResultBucketId, 0);
return *result;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 23,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionFunctionDispatcher::ResetFunctions() {
ExtensionFunctionRegistry::GetInstance()->ResetFunctions();
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static HB_Error Load_Anchor( HB_Anchor* an,
HB_Stream stream )
{
HB_Error error;
HB_UInt cur_offset, new_offset, base_offset;
base_offset = FILE_Pos();
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 2L ) )
return error;
an->PosFormat = GET_UShort();
FORGET_Frame();
switch ( an->PosFormat )
{
case 1:
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 4L ) )
return error;
an->af.af1.XCoordinate = GET_Short();
an->af.af1.YCoordinate = GET_Short();
FORGET_Frame();
break;
case 2:
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 6L ) )
return error;
an->af.af2.XCoordinate = GET_Short();
an->af.af2.YCoordinate = GET_Short();
an->af.af2.AnchorPoint = GET_UShort();
FORGET_Frame();
break;
case 3:
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 6L ) )
return error;
an->af.af3.XCoordinate = GET_Short();
an->af.af3.YCoordinate = GET_Short();
new_offset = GET_UShort();
FORGET_Frame();
if ( new_offset )
{
if ( ALLOC_ARRAY( an->af.af3.DeviceTables, 2, HB_Device ) )
return error;
an->af.af3.DeviceTables[AF3_X_DEVICE_TABLE] = 0;
an->af.af3.DeviceTables[AF3_Y_DEVICE_TABLE] = 0;
new_offset += base_offset;
cur_offset = FILE_Pos();
if ( FILE_Seek( new_offset ) ||
( error = _HB_OPEN_Load_Device( &an->af.af3.DeviceTables[AF3_X_DEVICE_TABLE],
stream ) ) != HB_Err_Ok )
goto Fail2;
(void)FILE_Seek( cur_offset );
}
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 2L ) )
goto Fail;
new_offset = GET_UShort();
FORGET_Frame();
if ( new_offset )
{
if ( !an->af.af3.DeviceTables )
{
if ( ALLOC_ARRAY( an->af.af3.DeviceTables, 2, HB_Device ) )
return error;
an->af.af3.DeviceTables[AF3_X_DEVICE_TABLE] = 0;
an->af.af3.DeviceTables[AF3_Y_DEVICE_TABLE] = 0;
}
new_offset += base_offset;
cur_offset = FILE_Pos();
if ( FILE_Seek( new_offset ) ||
( error = _HB_OPEN_Load_Device( &an->af.af3.DeviceTables[AF3_Y_DEVICE_TABLE],
stream ) ) != HB_Err_Ok )
goto Fail;
(void)FILE_Seek( cur_offset );
}
break;
case 4:
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 4L ) )
return error;
#ifdef HB_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_MASTER
an->af.af4.XIdAnchor = GET_UShort();
an->af.af4.YIdAnchor = GET_UShort();
#else
(void) GET_UShort();
(void) GET_UShort();
#endif
FORGET_Frame();
break;
default:
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_SubTable_Format);
}
return HB_Err_Ok;
Fail:
if ( an->af.af3.DeviceTables )
_HB_OPEN_Free_Device( an->af.af3.DeviceTables[AF3_X_DEVICE_TABLE] );
Fail2:
FREE( an->af.af3.DeviceTables );
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,040 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cycle_packfile(void)
{
end_packfile();
start_packfile();
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,051 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void KeyboardOverlayHandler::GetInputMethodId(const ListValue* args) {
chromeos::input_method::InputMethodManager* manager =
chromeos::input_method::InputMethodManager::GetInstance();
const chromeos::input_method::InputMethodDescriptor& descriptor =
manager->current_input_method();
StringValue param(descriptor.id());
web_ui_->CallJavascriptFunction("initKeyboardOverlayId", param);
}
Commit Message: Add missing shortcut keys to the keyboard overlay.
This CL adds the following shortcuts to the keyboard overlay.
* Alt - 1, Alt - 2, .., Alt - 8: go to the window at the specified position
* Alt - 9: go to the last window open
* Ctrl - Forward: switches focus to the next keyboard-accessible pane
* Ctrl - Back: switches focus to the previous keyboard-accessible pane
* Ctrl - Right: move the text cursor to the end of the next word
* Ctrl - Left: move the text cursor to the start of the previous word
* Ctrl - Alt - Z: enable or disable accessibility features
* Ctrl - Shift - Maximize: take a screenshot of the selected region
* Ctrl - Shift - O: open the Bookmark Manager
I also deleted a duplicated entry of "Close window".
BUG=chromium-os:17152
TEST=Manually checked on chromebook
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7489040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93906 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 6,194 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebTransformationMatrix WebTransformOperations::apply() const
{
WebTransformationMatrix toReturn;
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_private->operations.size(); ++i)
toReturn.multiply(m_private->operations[i].matrix);
return toReturn;
}
Commit Message: [chromium] We should accelerate all transformations, except when we must blend matrices that cannot be decomposed.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95855
Reviewed by James Robinson.
Source/Platform:
WebTransformOperations are now able to report if they can successfully blend.
WebTransformationMatrix::blend now returns a bool if blending would fail.
* chromium/public/WebTransformOperations.h:
(WebTransformOperations):
* chromium/public/WebTransformationMatrix.h:
(WebTransformationMatrix):
Source/WebCore:
WebTransformOperations are now able to report if they can successfully blend.
WebTransformationMatrix::blend now returns a bool if blending would fail.
Unit tests:
AnimationTranslationUtilTest.createTransformAnimationWithNonDecomposableMatrix
AnimationTranslationUtilTest.createTransformAnimationWithNonInvertibleTransform
* platform/chromium/support/WebTransformOperations.cpp:
(WebKit::blendTransformOperations):
(WebKit::WebTransformOperations::blend):
(WebKit::WebTransformOperations::canBlendWith):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::WebTransformOperations::blendInternal):
* platform/chromium/support/WebTransformationMatrix.cpp:
(WebKit::WebTransformationMatrix::blend):
* platform/graphics/chromium/AnimationTranslationUtil.cpp:
(WebCore::WebTransformAnimationCurve):
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Added the following unit tests:
AnimationTranslationUtilTest.createTransformAnimationWithNonDecomposableMatrix
AnimationTranslationUtilTest.createTransformAnimationWithNonInvertibleTransform
* tests/AnimationTranslationUtilTest.cpp:
(WebKit::TEST):
(WebKit):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127868 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,906 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void qrio_wdmask(u8 bit, bool wden)
{
u16 wdmask;
void __iomem *qrio_base = (void *)CONFIG_SYS_QRIO_BASE;
wdmask = in_be16(qrio_base + WDMASK_OFF);
if (wden)
wdmask |= (1 << bit);
else
wdmask &= ~(1 << bit);
out_be16(qrio_base + WDMASK_OFF, wdmask);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 28,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GraphicsLayerFactory* ChromeClientImpl::graphicsLayerFactory() const
{
return m_webView->graphicsLayerFactory();
}
Commit Message: Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 11,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void free_descriptor_buffer(struct b43_dmaring *ring,
struct b43_dmadesc_meta *meta)
{
if (meta->skb) {
dev_kfree_skb_any(meta->skb);
meta->skb = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vhost_scsi_release_cmd(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
{
struct vhost_scsi_cmd *tv_cmd = container_of(se_cmd,
struct vhost_scsi_cmd, tvc_se_cmd);
struct se_session *se_sess = tv_cmd->tvc_nexus->tvn_se_sess;
int i;
if (tv_cmd->tvc_sgl_count) {
for (i = 0; i < tv_cmd->tvc_sgl_count; i++)
put_page(sg_page(&tv_cmd->tvc_sgl[i]));
}
if (tv_cmd->tvc_prot_sgl_count) {
for (i = 0; i < tv_cmd->tvc_prot_sgl_count; i++)
put_page(sg_page(&tv_cmd->tvc_prot_sgl[i]));
}
vhost_scsi_put_inflight(tv_cmd->inflight);
percpu_ida_free(&se_sess->sess_tag_pool, se_cmd->map_tag);
}
Commit Message: vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: restrict write access to dmesg_restrict
When dmesg_restrict is set to 1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to read the kernel
ring buffer. But a root user without CAP_SYS_ADMIN is able to reset
dmesg_restrict to 0.
This is an issue when e.g. LXC (Linux Containers) are used and complete
user space is running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A unprivileged and jailed
root user can bypass the dmesg_restrict protection.
With this patch writing to dmesg_restrict is only allowed when root has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPageSerializerImpl::buildContentForNode(Node* node,
SerializeDomParam* param)
{
switch (node->nodeType()) {
case Node::ELEMENT_NODE:
openTagToString(toElement(node), param);
for (Node *child = node->firstChild(); child; child = child->nextSibling())
buildContentForNode(child, param);
endTagToString(toElement(node), param);
break;
case Node::TEXT_NODE:
saveHTMLContentToBuffer(createMarkup(node), param);
break;
case Node::ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
case Node::DOCUMENT_NODE:
case Node::DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE:
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
break;
case Node::DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE:
param->haveSeenDocType = true;
default:
saveHTMLContentToBuffer(createMarkup(node), param);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Make WebPageSerializerImpl to escape URL attribute values in result.
This patch makes |WebPageSerializerImpl| to escape URL attribute values rather
than directly output URL attribute values into result.
BUG=542054
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.URLAttributeValues
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1398453005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#353712}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ebt_register_table(struct net *net, const struct ebt_table *input_table)
{
struct ebt_table_info *newinfo;
struct ebt_table *t, *table;
struct ebt_replace_kernel *repl;
int ret, i, countersize;
void *p;
if (input_table == NULL || (repl = input_table->table) == NULL ||
repl->entries == NULL || repl->entries_size == 0 ||
repl->counters != NULL || input_table->private != NULL) {
BUGPRINT("Bad table data for ebt_register_table!!!\n");
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
/* Don't add one table to multiple lists. */
table = kmemdup(input_table, sizeof(struct ebt_table), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!table) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
countersize = COUNTER_OFFSET(repl->nentries) * nr_cpu_ids;
newinfo = vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize);
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!newinfo)
goto free_table;
p = vmalloc(repl->entries_size);
if (!p)
goto free_newinfo;
memcpy(p, repl->entries, repl->entries_size);
newinfo->entries = p;
newinfo->entries_size = repl->entries_size;
newinfo->nentries = repl->nentries;
if (countersize)
memset(newinfo->counters, 0, countersize);
/* fill in newinfo and parse the entries */
newinfo->chainstack = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
if ((repl->valid_hooks & (1 << i)) == 0)
newinfo->hook_entry[i] = NULL;
else
newinfo->hook_entry[i] = p +
((char *)repl->hook_entry[i] - repl->entries);
}
ret = translate_table(net, repl->name, newinfo);
if (ret != 0) {
BUGPRINT("Translate_table failed\n");
goto free_chainstack;
}
if (table->check && table->check(newinfo, table->valid_hooks)) {
BUGPRINT("The table doesn't like its own initial data, lol\n");
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
table->private = newinfo;
rwlock_init(&table->lock);
ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&ebt_mutex);
if (ret != 0)
goto free_chainstack;
list_for_each_entry(t, &net->xt.tables[NFPROTO_BRIDGE], list) {
if (strcmp(t->name, table->name) == 0) {
ret = -EEXIST;
BUGPRINT("Table name already exists\n");
goto free_unlock;
}
}
/* Hold a reference count if the chains aren't empty */
if (newinfo->nentries && !try_module_get(table->me)) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto free_unlock;
}
list_add(&table->list, &net->xt.tables[NFPROTO_BRIDGE]);
mutex_unlock(&ebt_mutex);
return table;
free_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&ebt_mutex);
free_chainstack:
if (newinfo->chainstack) {
for_each_possible_cpu(i)
vfree(newinfo->chainstack[i]);
vfree(newinfo->chainstack);
}
vfree(newinfo->entries);
free_newinfo:
vfree(newinfo);
free_table:
kfree(table);
out:
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
Commit Message: bridge: netfilter: fix information leak
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,371 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __init int init_posix_cpu_timers(void)
{
struct k_clock process = {
.clock_getres = process_cpu_clock_getres,
.clock_get = process_cpu_clock_get,
.clock_set = do_posix_clock_nosettime,
.timer_create = process_cpu_timer_create,
.nsleep = process_cpu_nsleep,
.nsleep_restart = process_cpu_nsleep_restart,
};
struct k_clock thread = {
.clock_getres = thread_cpu_clock_getres,
.clock_get = thread_cpu_clock_get,
.clock_set = do_posix_clock_nosettime,
.timer_create = thread_cpu_timer_create,
.nsleep = thread_cpu_nsleep,
.nsleep_restart = thread_cpu_nsleep_restart,
};
register_posix_clock(CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID, &process);
register_posix_clock(CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID, &thread);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 10,978 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crc32c_sparc64_digest(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len, u8 *out)
{
return __crc32c_sparc64_finup(crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm), data, len,
out);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bta_av_signalling_timer(UNUSED_ATTR tBTA_AV_DATA* p_data) {
tBTA_AV_CB* p_cb = &bta_av_cb;
int xx;
uint8_t mask;
tBTA_AV_LCB* p_lcb = NULL;
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: conn_lcb=0x%x", __func__, p_cb->conn_lcb);
for (xx = 0; xx < BTA_AV_NUM_LINKS; xx++) {
p_lcb = &p_cb->lcb[xx];
mask = 1 << xx;
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG(
"%s: index=%d conn_lcb=0x%x peer=%s conn_mask=0x%x lidx=%d", __func__,
xx, p_cb->conn_lcb, p_lcb->addr.ToString().c_str(), p_lcb->conn_msk,
p_lcb->lidx);
if (mask & p_cb->conn_lcb) {
/* this entry is used. check if it is connected */
if (!p_lcb->conn_msk) {
bta_sys_start_timer(p_cb->link_signalling_timer,
BTA_AV_SIGNALLING_TIMEOUT_MS,
BTA_AV_SIGNALLING_TIMER_EVT, 0);
tBTA_AV_PEND pend;
pend.bd_addr = p_lcb->addr;
tBTA_AV bta_av_data;
bta_av_data.pend = pend;
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG(
"%s: BTA_AV_PENDING_EVT for %s index=%d conn_mask=0x%x lidx=%d",
__func__, pend.bd_addr.ToString().c_str(), xx, p_lcb->conn_msk,
p_lcb->lidx);
(*p_cb->p_cback)(BTA_AV_PENDING_EVT, &bta_av_data);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Check packet length in bta_av_proc_meta_cmd
Bug: 111893951
Test: manual - connect A2DP
Change-Id: Ibbf347863dfd29ea3385312e9dde1082bc90d2f3
(cherry picked from commit ed51887f921263219bcd2fbf6650ead5ec8d334e)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 12,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame* child_rwhv() { return child_rwhv_; }
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 16,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::WorkerCrashed() {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->WorkerCrashed(this);
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: template <typename T> static inline bool CheckIdType(T id, PPIdType type) {
if (!id)
return true;
const T mask = (static_cast<T>(1) << kPPIdTypeBits) - 1;
return (id & mask) == type;
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,114 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeWebUIControllerFactory::UseWebUIBindingsForURL(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context, const GURL& url) const {
return !NeedsExtensionWebUI(NULL,
Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context),
url) &&
UseWebUIForURL(browser_context, url);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void save_state_to_tss32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct tss_segment_32 *tss)
{
/* CR3 and ldt selector are not saved intentionally */
tss->eip = ctxt->_eip;
tss->eflags = ctxt->eflags;
tss->eax = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
tss->ecx = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX);
tss->edx = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX);
tss->ebx = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBX);
tss->esp = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP);
tss->ebp = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBP);
tss->esi = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSI);
tss->edi = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDI);
tss->es = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_ES);
tss->cs = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_CS);
tss->ss = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_SS);
tss->ds = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_DS);
tss->fs = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_FS);
tss->gs = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_GS);
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 16,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AppendEntry(const QuotaTableEntry& entry) {
entries_.push_back(entry);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,754 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::DidCallFocus() {
ForSecurityDropFullscreen();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 13,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void process_smi_save_state_64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *buf)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
struct desc_ptr dt;
struct kvm_segment seg;
unsigned long val;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
put_smstate(u64, buf, 0x7ff8 - i * 8, kvm_register_read(vcpu, i));
put_smstate(u64, buf, 0x7f78, kvm_rip_read(vcpu));
put_smstate(u32, buf, 0x7f70, kvm_get_rflags(vcpu));
kvm_get_dr(vcpu, 6, &val);
put_smstate(u64, buf, 0x7f68, val);
kvm_get_dr(vcpu, 7, &val);
put_smstate(u64, buf, 0x7f60, val);
put_smstate(u64, buf, 0x7f58, kvm_read_cr0(vcpu));
put_smstate(u64, buf, 0x7f50, kvm_read_cr3(vcpu));
put_smstate(u64, buf, 0x7f48, kvm_read_cr4(vcpu));
put_smstate(u32, buf, 0x7f00, vcpu->arch.smbase);
/* revision id */
put_smstate(u32, buf, 0x7efc, 0x00020064);
put_smstate(u64, buf, 0x7ed0, vcpu->arch.efer);
kvm_get_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_TR);
put_smstate(u16, buf, 0x7e90, seg.selector);
put_smstate(u16, buf, 0x7e92, process_smi_get_segment_flags(&seg) >> 8);
put_smstate(u32, buf, 0x7e94, seg.limit);
put_smstate(u64, buf, 0x7e98, seg.base);
kvm_x86_ops->get_idt(vcpu, &dt);
put_smstate(u32, buf, 0x7e84, dt.size);
put_smstate(u64, buf, 0x7e88, dt.address);
kvm_get_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
put_smstate(u16, buf, 0x7e70, seg.selector);
put_smstate(u16, buf, 0x7e72, process_smi_get_segment_flags(&seg) >> 8);
put_smstate(u32, buf, 0x7e74, seg.limit);
put_smstate(u64, buf, 0x7e78, seg.base);
kvm_x86_ops->get_gdt(vcpu, &dt);
put_smstate(u32, buf, 0x7e64, dt.size);
put_smstate(u64, buf, 0x7e68, dt.address);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
process_smi_save_seg_64(vcpu, buf, i);
#else
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
#endif
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: process_compressed_8x8_brush_data(uint8 * in, uint8 * out, int Bpp)
{
int x, y, pal_index, in_index, shift, do2, i;
uint8 *pal;
in_index = 0;
pal = in + 16;
/* read it bottom up */
for (y = 7; y >= 0; y--)
{
/* 2 bytes per row */
x = 0;
for (do2 = 0; do2 < 2; do2++)
{
/* 4 pixels per byte */
shift = 6;
while (shift >= 0)
{
pal_index = (in[in_index] >> shift) & 3;
/* size of palette entries depends on Bpp */
for (i = 0; i < Bpp; i++)
{
out[(y * 8 + x) * Bpp + i] = pal[pal_index * Bpp + i];
}
x++;
shift -= 2;
}
in_index++;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,125 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: isoclns_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const uint8_t *p, u_int length)
{
if (!ND_TTEST(*p)) { /* enough bytes on the wire ? */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "|OSI"));
return;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "OSI NLPID %s (0x%02x): ", tok2str(nlpid_values, "Unknown", *p), *p));
switch (*p) {
case NLPID_CLNP:
if (!clnp_print(ndo, p, length))
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", length);
break;
case NLPID_ESIS:
esis_print(ndo, p, length);
return;
case NLPID_ISIS:
if (!isis_print(ndo, p, length))
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", length);
break;
case NLPID_NULLNS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%slength: %u", ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ", length));
break;
case NLPID_Q933:
q933_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
break;
case NLPID_IP:
ip_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
break;
case NLPID_IP6:
ip6_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
break;
case NLPID_PPP:
ppp_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
break;
default:
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "OSI NLPID 0x%02x unknown", *p));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%slength: %u", ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ", length));
if (length > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", length);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13055/IS-IS: fix an Extended IS Reachability sub-TLV
In isis_print_is_reach_subtlv() one of the case blocks did not check that
the sub-TLV "V" is actually present and could over-read the input buffer.
Add a length check to fix that and remove a useless boundary check from
a loop because the boundary is tested for the full length of "V" before
the switch block.
Update one of the prior test cases as it turns out it depended on this
previously incorrect code path to make it to its own malformed structure
further down the buffer, the bugfix has changed its output.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 119 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(unregister_tick_function)
{
zval *function;
user_tick_function_entry tick_fe;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "z/", &function) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!BG(user_tick_functions)) {
return;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(function) != IS_ARRAY && Z_TYPE_P(function) != IS_OBJECT) {
convert_to_string(function);
}
tick_fe.arguments = (zval **) emalloc(sizeof(zval *));
tick_fe.arguments[0] = function;
tick_fe.arg_count = 1;
zend_llist_del_element(BG(user_tick_functions), &tick_fe, (int (*)(void *, void *)) user_tick_function_compare);
efree(tick_fe.arguments);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 17,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iperf_get_test_get_server_output(struct iperf_test *ipt)
{
return ipt->get_server_output;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asmlinkage void do_reserved(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
/*
* Game over - no way to handle this if it ever occurs. Most probably
* caused by a new unknown cpu type or after another deadly
* hard/software error.
*/
show_regs(regs);
panic("Caught reserved exception %ld - should not happen.",
(regs->cp0_cause & 0x7f) >> 2);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void reply_outbuf(struct smb_request *req, uint8 num_words, uint32 num_bytes)
{
char *outbuf;
if (!create_outbuf(req, req, (char *)req->inbuf, &outbuf, num_words,
num_bytes)) {
smb_panic("could not allocate output buffer\n");
}
req->outbuf = (uint8_t *)outbuf;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: partition_modify_data_new (DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
Device *device,
Device *enclosing_device,
const char *type,
const char *label,
char **flags)
{
ModifyPartitionData *data;
data = g_new0 (ModifyPartitionData, 1);
data->context = context;
data->device = g_object_ref (device);
data->enclosing_device = g_object_ref (enclosing_device);
data->type = g_strdup (type);
data->label = g_strdup (label);
data->flags = g_strdupv (flags);
return data;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int set_dawr(struct arch_hw_breakpoint *brk)
{
unsigned long dawr, dawrx, mrd;
dawr = brk->address;
dawrx = (brk->type & (HW_BRK_TYPE_READ | HW_BRK_TYPE_WRITE)) \
<< (63 - 58); //* read/write bits */
dawrx |= ((brk->type & (HW_BRK_TYPE_TRANSLATE)) >> 2) \
<< (63 - 59); //* translate */
dawrx |= (brk->type & (HW_BRK_TYPE_PRIV_ALL)) \
>> 3; //* PRIM bits */
/* dawr length is stored in field MDR bits 48:53. Matches range in
doublewords (64 bits) baised by -1 eg. 0b000000=1DW and
0b111111=64DW.
brk->len is in bytes.
This aligns up to double word size, shifts and does the bias.
*/
mrd = ((brk->len + 7) >> 3) - 1;
dawrx |= (mrd & 0x3f) << (63 - 53);
if (ppc_md.set_dawr)
return ppc_md.set_dawr(dawr, dawrx);
mtspr(SPRN_DAWR, dawr);
mtspr(SPRN_DAWRX, dawrx);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline TCGMemOp mo_pushpop(DisasContext *s, TCGMemOp ot)
{
if (CODE64(s)) {
return ot == MO_16 ? MO_16 : MO_64;
} else {
return ot;
}
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-94 | 0 | 15,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutPoint RenderBlock::flipForWritingModeIncludingColumns(const LayoutPoint& point) const
{
ASSERT(hasColumns());
if (!hasColumns() || !style()->isFlippedBlocksWritingMode())
return point;
ColumnInfo* colInfo = columnInfo();
LayoutUnit columnLogicalHeight = colInfo->columnHeight();
LayoutUnit expandedLogicalHeight = borderBefore() + paddingBefore() + columnCount(colInfo) * columnLogicalHeight + borderAfter() + paddingAfter() + scrollbarLogicalHeight();
if (isHorizontalWritingMode())
return LayoutPoint(point.x(), expandedLogicalHeight - point.y());
return LayoutPoint(expandedLogicalHeight - point.x(), point.y());
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline size_t GetPSDRowSize(Image *image)
{
if (image->depth == 1)
return((image->columns+7)/8);
else
return(image->columns*GetPSDPacketSize(image));
}
Commit Message: Fixed head buffer overflow reported in: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/98
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 27,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void module_data_cleanup(pam_handle_t *pamh, void *data, int error_status)
{
struct module_data *module_data = data;
if (module_data) {
if (1 == module_data->module_loaded) {
PKCS11_release_all_slots(module_data->ctx, module_data->slots, module_data->nslots);
PKCS11_CTX_unload(module_data->ctx);
}
PKCS11_CTX_free(module_data->ctx);
EVP_cleanup();
ERR_free_strings();
free(module_data);
}
}
Commit Message: Use EVP_PKEY_size() to allocate correct size of signature buffer. (#18)
Do not use fixed buffer size for signature, EVP_SignFinal() requires
buffer for signature at least EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) bytes in size.
Fixes crash when using 4K RSA signatures (https://github.com/OpenSC/pam_p11/issues/16, https://github.com/OpenSC/pam_p11/issues/15)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(snmp, __construct)
{
php_snmp_object *snmp_object;
zval *object = getThis();
char *a1, *a2;
size_t a1_len, a2_len;
zend_long timeout = SNMP_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT;
zend_long retries = SNMP_DEFAULT_RETRIES;
zend_long version = SNMP_DEFAULT_VERSION;
int argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
snmp_object = Z_SNMP_P(object);
if (zend_parse_parameters_throw(argc, "lss|ll", &version, &a1, &a1_len, &a2, &a2_len, &timeout, &retries) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
switch (version) {
case SNMP_VERSION_1:
case SNMP_VERSION_2c:
case SNMP_VERSION_3:
break;
default:
zend_throw_exception(zend_ce_exception, "Unknown SNMP protocol version", 0);
return;
}
/* handle re-open of snmp session */
if (snmp_object->session) {
netsnmp_session_free(&(snmp_object->session));
}
if (netsnmp_session_init(&(snmp_object->session), version, a1, a2, timeout, retries)) {
return;
}
snmp_object->max_oids = 0;
snmp_object->valueretrieval = SNMP_G(valueretrieval);
snmp_object->enum_print = netsnmp_ds_get_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_PRINT_NUMERIC_ENUM);
snmp_object->oid_output_format = netsnmp_ds_get_int(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_OID_OUTPUT_FORMAT);
snmp_object->quick_print = netsnmp_ds_get_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_QUICK_PRINT);
snmp_object->oid_increasing_check = TRUE;
snmp_object->exceptions_enabled = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sigchld_handler(int s) {
int status;
int* i;
pid_t pid;
while((pid=waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0) {
if(WIFEXITED(status)) {
msg3(LOG_INFO, "Child exited with %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
}
i=g_hash_table_lookup(children, &pid);
if(!i) {
msg3(LOG_INFO, "SIGCHLD received for an unknown child with PID %ld", (long)pid);
} else {
DEBUG2("Removing %d from the list of children", pid);
g_hash_table_remove(children, &pid);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer size checking
Yes, this means we've re-introduced CVE-2005-3534. Sigh.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Extension::HasFullPermissions() const {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_data_lock_);
return runtime_data_.GetActivePermissions()->HasEffectiveFullAccess();
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,538 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: encode_CLONE(const struct ofpact_nest *clone,
enum ofp_version ofp_version, struct ofpbuf *out)
{
size_t len;
const size_t ofs = out->size;
struct ext_action_header *eah;
eah = put_NXAST_CLONE(out);
len = ofpacts_put_openflow_actions(clone->actions,
ofpact_nest_get_action_len(clone),
out, ofp_version);
len += sizeof *eah;
eah = ofpbuf_at(out, ofs, sizeof *eah);
eah->len = htons(len);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,754 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ProfilingProcessHost::BrowserChildProcessLaunchedAndConnected(
const content::ChildProcessData& data) {
DCHECK(content::BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(content::BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK_NE(data.process_type, content::ProcessType::PROCESS_TYPE_RENDERER);
if (!ShouldProfileProcessType(data.process_type)) {
return;
}
profiling::mojom::ProcessType process_type =
(data.process_type == content::ProcessType::PROCESS_TYPE_GPU)
? profiling::mojom::ProcessType::GPU
: profiling::mojom::ProcessType::OTHER;
content::BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(content::BrowserThread::IO)
->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&ProfilingProcessHost::StartProfilingNonRendererChild,
base::Unretained(this), data.id,
base::GetProcId(data.handle), process_type));
}
Commit Message: [Reland #1] Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
The original CL added a javatest and its dependencies to the apk_under_test.
This causes the dependencies to be stripped from the instrumentation_apk, which
causes issue. This CL updates the build configuration so that the javatest and
its dependencies are only added to the instrumentation_apk.
This is a reland of e0b4355f0651adb1ebc2c513dc4410471af712f5
Original change's description:
> Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
>
> This CL has three components:
> 1) The bulk of the logic in OOP HP was refactored into ProfilingTestDriver.
> 2) Adds a java instrumentation test, along with a JNI shim that forwards into
> ProfilingTestDriver.
> 3) Creates a new apk: chrome_public_apk_for_test that contains the same
> content as chrome_public_apk, as well as native files needed for (2).
> chrome_public_apk_test now targets chrome_public_apk_for_test instead of
> chrome_public_apk.
>
> Other ideas, discarded:
> * Originally, I attempted to make the browser_tests target runnable on
> Android. The primary problem is that native test harness cannot fork
> or spawn processes. This is difficult to solve.
>
> More details on each of the components:
> (1) ProfilingTestDriver
> * The TracingController test was migrated to use ProfilingTestDriver, but the
> write-to-file test was left as-is. The latter behavior will likely be phased
> out, but I'll clean that up in a future CL.
> * gtest isn't supported for Android instrumentation tests. ProfilingTestDriver
> has a single function RunTest that returns a 'bool' indicating success. On
> failure, the class uses LOG(ERROR) to print the nature of the error. This will
> cause the error to be printed out on browser_test error. On instrumentation
> test failure, the error will be forwarded to logcat, which is available on all
> infra bot test runs.
> (2) Instrumentation test
> * For now, I only added a single test for the "browser" mode. Furthermore, I'm
> only testing the start with command-line path.
> (3) New apk
> * libchromefortest is a new shared library that contains all content from
> libchrome, but also contains native sources for the JNI shim.
> * chrome_public_apk_for_test is a new apk that contains all content from
> chrome_public_apk, but uses a single shared library libchromefortest rather
> than libchrome. This also contains java sources for the JNI shim.
> * There is no way to just add a second shared library to chrome_public_apk
> that just contains the native sources from the JNI shim without causing ODR
> issues.
> * chrome_public_test_apk now has apk_under_test = chrome_public_apk_for_test.
> * There is no way to add native JNI sources as a shared library to
> chrome_public_test_apk without causing ODR issues.
>
> Finally, this CL drastically increases the timeout to wait for native
> initialization. The previous timeout was 2 *
> CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL, which flakily failed for this test.
> This suggests that this step/timeout is generally flaky. I increased the timeout
> to 20 * CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL.
>
> Bug: 753218
> Change-Id: Ic224b7314fff57f1770a4048aa5753f54e040b55
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/770148
> Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Brett Wilson <brettw@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517541}
Bug: 753218
TBR: brettw@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ic6aafb34c2467253f75cc85da48200d19f3bc9af
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/777697
Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517850}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 29,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentLoader::ResponseReceived(
Resource* resource,
const ResourceResponse& response,
std::unique_ptr<WebDataConsumerHandle> handle) {
DCHECK_EQ(GetResource(), resource);
DCHECK(!handle);
DCHECK(frame_);
application_cache_host_->DidReceiveResponseForMainResource(response);
if (response.AppCacheID())
GetMemoryCache()->Remove(resource);
content_security_policy_ = ContentSecurityPolicy::Create();
content_security_policy_->SetOverrideURLForSelf(response.Url());
if (!frame_->GetSettings()->BypassCSP()) {
content_security_policy_->DidReceiveHeaders(
ContentSecurityPolicyResponseHeaders(response));
if (!content_security_policy_->HasPolicyFromSource(
kContentSecurityPolicyHeaderSourceOriginPolicy)) {
std::unique_ptr<OriginPolicy> origin_policy = OriginPolicy::From(
StringUTF8Adaptor(request_.GetOriginPolicy()).AsStringPiece());
if (origin_policy) {
for (auto csp : origin_policy->GetContentSecurityPolicies()) {
content_security_policy_->DidReceiveHeader(
WTF::String::FromUTF8(csp.policy.data(), csp.policy.length()),
csp.report_only ? kContentSecurityPolicyHeaderTypeReport
: kContentSecurityPolicyHeaderTypeEnforce,
kContentSecurityPolicyHeaderSourceOriginPolicy);
}
}
}
}
if (!content_security_policy_->AllowAncestors(frame_, response.Url())) {
CancelLoadAfterCSPDenied(response);
return;
}
if (!frame_->GetSettings()->BypassCSP() &&
!GetFrameLoader().RequiredCSP().IsEmpty()) {
const SecurityOrigin* parent_security_origin =
frame_->Tree().Parent()->GetSecurityContext()->GetSecurityOrigin();
if (ContentSecurityPolicy::ShouldEnforceEmbeddersPolicy(
response, parent_security_origin)) {
content_security_policy_->AddPolicyFromHeaderValue(
GetFrameLoader().RequiredCSP(),
kContentSecurityPolicyHeaderTypeEnforce,
kContentSecurityPolicyHeaderSourceHTTP);
} else {
ContentSecurityPolicy* required_csp = ContentSecurityPolicy::Create();
required_csp->AddPolicyFromHeaderValue(
GetFrameLoader().RequiredCSP(),
kContentSecurityPolicyHeaderTypeEnforce,
kContentSecurityPolicyHeaderSourceHTTP);
if (!required_csp->Subsumes(*content_security_policy_)) {
String message = "Refused to display '" +
response.Url().ElidedString() +
"' because it has not opted-into the following policy "
"required by its embedder: '" +
GetFrameLoader().RequiredCSP() + "'.";
ConsoleMessage* console_message = ConsoleMessage::CreateForRequest(
kSecurityMessageSource, kErrorMessageLevel, message, response.Url(),
this, MainResourceIdentifier());
frame_->GetDocument()->AddConsoleMessage(console_message);
CancelLoadAfterCSPDenied(response);
return;
}
}
}
DCHECK(!frame_->GetPage()->Paused());
if (response.DidServiceWorkerNavigationPreload())
UseCounter::Count(this, WebFeature::kServiceWorkerNavigationPreload);
response_ = response;
if (IsArchiveMIMEType(response_.MimeType()) &&
resource->GetDataBufferingPolicy() != kBufferData)
resource->SetDataBufferingPolicy(kBufferData);
if (!ShouldContinueForResponse()) {
probe::didReceiveResourceResponse(frame_->GetDocument(),
resource->Identifier(), this, response_,
resource);
fetcher_->StopFetching();
return;
}
if (frame_->Owner() && response_.IsHTTP() &&
!CORS::IsOkStatus(response_.HttpStatusCode()))
frame_->Owner()->RenderFallbackContent();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDrawArrays(uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile cmds::DrawArrays& c =
*static_cast<const volatile cmds::DrawArrays*>(cmd_data);
return DoDrawArrays("glDrawArrays",
false,
static_cast<GLenum>(c.mode),
static_cast<GLint>(c.first),
static_cast<GLsizei>(c.count),
1);
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PushMessagingServiceImpl::Shutdown() {
GetGCMDriver()->RemoveAppHandler(kPushMessagingAppIdentifierPrefix);
HostContentSettingsMapFactory::GetForProfile(profile_)->RemoveObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Remove some senseless indirection from the Push API code
Four files to call one Java function. Let's just call it directly.
BUG=
Change-Id: I6e988e9a000051dd7e3dd2b517a33a09afc2fff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/749147
Reviewed-by: Anita Woodruff <awdf@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Beverloo <peter@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513464}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileSystemOperationRunner::DidCreateSnapshot(
const OperationID id,
SnapshotFileCallback callback,
base::File::Error rv,
const base::File::Info& file_info,
const base::FilePath& platform_path,
scoped_refptr<storage::ShareableFileReference> file_ref) {
if (is_beginning_operation_) {
finished_operations_.insert(id);
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&FileSystemOperationRunner::DidCreateSnapshot, weak_ptr_,
id, std::move(callback), rv, file_info, platform_path,
std::move(file_ref)));
return;
}
std::move(callback).Run(rv, file_info, platform_path, std::move(file_ref));
FinishOperation(id);
}
Commit Message: [FileSystem] Harden against overflows of OperationID a bit better.
Rather than having a UAF when OperationID overflows instead overwrite
the old operation with the new one. Can still cause weirdness, but at
least won't result in UAF. Also update OperationID to uint64_t to
make sure we don't overflow to begin with.
Bug: 925864
Change-Id: Ifdf3fa0935ab5ea8802d91bba39601f02b0dbdc9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1441498
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#627115}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 6,078 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EntrySync::EntrySync(DOMFileSystemBase* fileSystem, const String& fullPath)
: EntryBase(fileSystem, fullPath)
{
ScriptWrappable::init(this);
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ftp_chmod(ftpbuf_t *ftp, const int mode, const char *filename, const int filename_len)
{
char *buffer;
if (ftp == NULL || filename_len <= 0) {
return 0;
}
spprintf(&buffer, 0, "CHMOD %o %s", mode, filename);
if (!ftp_putcmd(ftp, "SITE", buffer)) {
efree(buffer);
return 0;
}
efree(buffer);
if (!ftp_getresp(ftp) || ftp->resp != 200) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void withScriptStateAttributeRaisesAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(TestObject*, cppValue, V8TestObject::toNativeWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), jsValue));
imp->setWithScriptStateAttributeRaises(WTF::getPtr(cppValue));
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 16,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static js_Function *newfun(js_State *J, js_Ast *name, js_Ast *params, js_Ast *body, int script)
{
js_Function *F = js_malloc(J, sizeof *F);
memset(F, 0, sizeof *F);
F->gcmark = 0;
F->gcnext = J->gcfun;
J->gcfun = F;
++J->gccounter;
F->filename = js_intern(J, J->filename);
F->line = name ? name->line : params ? params->line : body ? body->line : 1;
F->script = script;
F->name = name ? name->string : "";
cfunbody(J, F, name, params, body);
return F;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 7,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HeadlessPrintManager::OnScriptedPrint(
const PrintHostMsg_ScriptedPrint_Params& params,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
PageRangeStatus status =
PageRangeTextToPages(page_ranges_text_, ignore_invalid_page_ranges_,
params.expected_pages_count, &print_params_->pages);
switch (status) {
case SYNTAX_ERROR:
printing_rfh_->Send(reply_msg);
ReleaseJob(PAGE_RANGE_SYNTAX_ERROR);
return;
case LIMIT_ERROR:
printing_rfh_->Send(reply_msg);
ReleaseJob(PAGE_COUNT_EXCEEDED);
return;
case PRINT_NO_ERROR:
PrintHostMsg_ScriptedPrint::WriteReplyParams(reply_msg, *print_params_);
printing_rfh_->Send(reply_msg);
return;
default:
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <jzfeng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~SyncMessageStatusReceiver() {}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: views::View* AutofillDialogViews::CreateInputsContainer(DialogSection section) {
views::View* info_view = new views::View();
info_view->SetLayoutManager(
new views::BoxLayout(views::BoxLayout::kVertical, 0, 0, 0));
DetailsGroup* group = GroupForSection(section);
group->manual_input = new views::View();
InitInputsView(section);
info_view->AddChildView(group->manual_input);
group->suggested_info = new SuggestionView(this);
info_view->AddChildView(group->suggested_info);
group->suggested_button = new SuggestedButton(this);
return info_view;
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,813 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hci_sock_release(struct socket *sock)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct hci_dev *hdev;
BT_DBG("sock %p sk %p", sock, sk);
if (!sk)
return 0;
hdev = hci_pi(sk)->hdev;
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel == HCI_CHANNEL_MONITOR)
atomic_dec(&monitor_promisc);
bt_sock_unlink(&hci_sk_list, sk);
if (hdev) {
atomic_dec(&hdev->promisc);
hci_dev_put(hdev);
}
sock_orphan(sk);
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_write_queue);
sock_put(sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: HCI - Fix info leak in getsockopt(HCI_FILTER)
The HCI code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
hci_ufilter before copying it to userland -- that for leaking two
bytes kernel stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the
structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 12,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API RConfigNode* r_config_set(RConfig *cfg, const char *name, const char *value) {
RConfigNode *node = NULL;
char *ov = NULL;
ut64 oi;
if (!cfg || STRNULL (name)) {
return NULL;
}
node = r_config_node_get (cfg, name);
if (node) {
if (node->flags & CN_RO) {
eprintf ("(error: '%s' config key is read only)\n", name);
return node;
}
oi = node->i_value;
if (node->value) {
ov = strdup (node->value);
if (!ov) {
goto beach;
}
} else {
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup ("");
}
if (node->flags & CN_BOOL) {
bool b = is_true (value);
node->i_value = (ut64) b? 1: 0;
char *value = strdup (r_str_bool (b));
if (value) {
free (node->value);
node->value = value;
}
} else {
if (!value) {
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup ("");
node->i_value = 0;
} else {
if (node->value == value) {
goto beach;
}
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup (value);
if (IS_DIGIT (*value)) {
if (strchr (value, '/')) {
node->i_value = r_num_get (cfg->num, value);
} else {
node->i_value = r_num_math (cfg->num, value);
}
} else {
node->i_value = 0;
}
node->flags |= CN_INT;
}
}
} else { // Create a new RConfigNode
oi = UT64_MAX;
if (!cfg->lock) {
node = r_config_node_new (name, value);
if (node) {
if (value && is_bool (value)) {
node->flags |= CN_BOOL;
node->i_value = is_true (value)? 1: 0;
}
if (cfg->ht) {
ht_insert (cfg->ht, node->name, node);
r_list_append (cfg->nodes, node);
cfg->n_nodes++;
}
} else {
eprintf ("r_config_set: unable to create a new RConfigNode\n");
}
} else {
eprintf ("r_config_set: variable '%s' not found\n", name);
}
}
if (node && node->setter) {
int ret = node->setter (cfg->user, node);
if (ret == false) {
if (oi != UT64_MAX) {
node->i_value = oi;
}
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup (ov? ov: "");
}
}
beach:
free (ov);
return node;
}
Commit Message: Fix #7698 - UAF in r_config_set when loading a dex
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 26,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ShellWindowGeometryCache* ExtensionSystemImpl::shell_window_geometry_cache() {
return shared_->shell_window_geometry_cache();
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,150 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int LocalDOMWindow::orientation() const {
DCHECK(RuntimeEnabledFeatures::OrientationEventEnabled());
if (!GetFrame() || !GetFrame()->GetPage())
return 0;
int orientation = GetFrame()
->GetPage()
->GetChromeClient()
.GetScreenInfo()
.orientation_angle;
if (orientation == 270)
return -90;
return orientation;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::PopulateDocumentStateFromPending(
DocumentState* document_state) {
document_state->set_request_time(
pending_navigation_params_->request_params.request_time);
InternalDocumentStateData* internal_data =
InternalDocumentStateData::FromDocumentState(document_state);
if (!pending_navigation_params_->common_params.url.SchemeIs(
url::kJavaScriptScheme) &&
pending_navigation_params_->common_params.navigation_type ==
FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::RESTORE) {
internal_data->set_cache_policy_override(
WebURLRequest::UseProtocolCachePolicy);
}
if (IsReload(pending_navigation_params_->common_params.navigation_type))
document_state->set_load_type(DocumentState::RELOAD);
else if (pending_navigation_params_->request_params.page_state.IsValid())
document_state->set_load_type(DocumentState::HISTORY_LOAD);
else
document_state->set_load_type(DocumentState::NORMAL_LOAD);
internal_data->set_is_overriding_user_agent(
pending_navigation_params_->request_params.is_overriding_user_agent);
internal_data->set_must_reset_scroll_and_scale_state(
pending_navigation_params_->common_params.navigation_type ==
FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD_ORIGINAL_REQUEST_URL);
document_state->set_can_load_local_resources(
pending_navigation_params_->request_params.can_load_local_resources);
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 16,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: interpt_sl(LSEG *lseg, LINE *line)
{
LINE tmp;
Point *p;
line_construct_pts(&tmp, &lseg->p[0], &lseg->p[1]);
p = line_interpt_internal(&tmp, line);
#ifdef GEODEBUG
printf("interpt_sl- segment is (%.*g %.*g) (%.*g %.*g)\n",
DBL_DIG, lseg->p[0].x, DBL_DIG, lseg->p[0].y, DBL_DIG, lseg->p[1].x, DBL_DIG, lseg->p[1].y);
printf("interpt_sl- segment becomes line A=%.*g B=%.*g C=%.*g\n",
DBL_DIG, tmp.A, DBL_DIG, tmp.B, DBL_DIG, tmp.C);
#endif
if (PointerIsValid(p))
{
#ifdef GEODEBUG
printf("interpt_sl- intersection point is (%.*g %.*g)\n", DBL_DIG, p->x, DBL_DIG, p->y);
#endif
if (on_ps_internal(p, lseg))
{
#ifdef GEODEBUG
printf("interpt_sl- intersection point is on segment\n");
#endif
}
else
p = NULL;
}
return p;
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const std::string& WebContentsImpl::GetEncoding() const {
return encoding_;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int MagickDLLCall PostscriptDelegateMessage(void *handle,
const char *message,int length)
{
char
**messages;
ssize_t
offset;
offset=0;
messages=(char **) handle;
if (*messages == (char *) NULL)
*messages=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+1,sizeof(char *));
else
{
offset=strlen(*messages);
*messages=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(*messages,offset+length+1,
sizeof(char *));
}
(void) memcpy(*messages+offset,message,length);
(*messages)[length+offset] ='\0';
return(length);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/715
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 9,834 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hugetlbfs_mknod(struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
{
struct inode *inode;
int error = -ENOSPC;
inode = hugetlbfs_get_inode(dir->i_sb, dir, mode, dev);
if (inode) {
dir->i_ctime = dir->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
dget(dentry); /* Extra count - pin the dentry in core */
error = 0;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <abarry@cray.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int md4_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len)
{
struct md4_ctx *mctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
const u32 avail = sizeof(mctx->block) - (mctx->byte_count & 0x3f);
mctx->byte_count += len;
if (avail > len) {
memcpy((char *)mctx->block + (sizeof(mctx->block) - avail),
data, len);
return 0;
}
memcpy((char *)mctx->block + (sizeof(mctx->block) - avail),
data, avail);
md4_transform_helper(mctx);
data += avail;
len -= avail;
while (len >= sizeof(mctx->block)) {
memcpy(mctx->block, data, sizeof(mctx->block));
md4_transform_helper(mctx);
data += sizeof(mctx->block);
len -= sizeof(mctx->block);
}
memcpy(mctx->block, data, len);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::CompressedTexSubImage2D(GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLenum format,
GLsizei image_size,
const void* data) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG(
"[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glCompressedTexSubImage2D("
<< GLES2Util::GetStringTextureTarget(target) << ", " << level << ", "
<< xoffset << ", " << yoffset << ", " << width << ", " << height
<< ", " << GLES2Util::GetStringCompressedTextureFormat(format) << ", "
<< image_size << ", " << static_cast<const void*>(data) << ")");
if (width < 0 || height < 0 || level < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glCompressedTexSubImage2D", "dimension < 0");
return;
}
if (bound_pixel_unpack_transfer_buffer_id_) {
GLuint offset = ToGLuint(data);
BufferTracker::Buffer* buffer = GetBoundPixelTransferBufferIfValid(
bound_pixel_unpack_transfer_buffer_id_, "glCompressedTexSubImage2D",
offset, image_size);
if (buffer && buffer->shm_id() != -1) {
helper_->CompressedTexSubImage2D(
target, level, xoffset, yoffset, width, height, format, image_size,
buffer->shm_id(), buffer->shm_offset() + offset);
buffer->set_last_usage_token(helper_->InsertToken());
CheckGLError();
}
return;
}
if (bound_pixel_unpack_buffer_) {
helper_->CompressedTexSubImage2D(target, level, xoffset, yoffset, width,
height, format, image_size, 0,
ToGLuint(data));
} else if (data) {
SetBucketContents(kResultBucketId, data, image_size);
helper_->CompressedTexSubImage2DBucket(target, level, xoffset, yoffset,
width, height, format,
kResultBucketId);
helper_->SetBucketSize(kResultBucketId, 0);
} else {
helper_->CompressedTexSubImage2D(target, level, xoffset, yoffset, width,
height, format, image_size, 0, 0);
}
CheckGLError();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 28,885 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableRenderingPipelineThrottling(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetRenderingPipelineThrottlingEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 20,914 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssize_t splice_to_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
struct splice_pipe_desc *spd)
{
unsigned int spd_pages = spd->nr_pages;
int ret = 0, page_nr = 0;
if (!spd_pages)
return 0;
if (unlikely(!pipe->readers)) {
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
ret = -EPIPE;
goto out;
}
while (pipe->nrbufs < pipe->buffers) {
int newbuf = (pipe->curbuf + pipe->nrbufs) & (pipe->buffers - 1);
struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + newbuf;
buf->page = spd->pages[page_nr];
buf->offset = spd->partial[page_nr].offset;
buf->len = spd->partial[page_nr].len;
buf->private = spd->partial[page_nr].private;
buf->ops = spd->ops;
buf->flags = 0;
pipe->nrbufs++;
page_nr++;
ret += buf->len;
if (!--spd->nr_pages)
break;
}
if (!ret)
ret = -EAGAIN;
out:
while (page_nr < spd_pages)
spd->spd_release(spd, page_nr++);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 26,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void smbXcli_negprot_invalid_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
{
struct tevent_req *req =
tevent_req_callback_data(subreq,
struct tevent_req);
NTSTATUS status;
/*
* we just want the low level error
*/
status = tevent_req_simple_recv_ntstatus(subreq);
TALLOC_FREE(subreq);
if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) {
return;
}
/* this should never happen */
tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,875 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline RenderObject* rendererForScrollbar(RenderObject& renderer)
{
if (Node* node = renderer.node()) {
if (ShadowRoot* shadowRoot = node->containingShadowRoot()) {
if (shadowRoot->type() == ShadowRoot::UserAgentShadowRoot)
return shadowRoot->host()->renderer();
}
}
return &renderer;
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 8,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int udp_proc_register(struct net *net, struct udp_seq_afinfo *afinfo)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *p;
int rc = 0;
afinfo->seq_fops.open = udp_seq_open;
afinfo->seq_fops.read = seq_read;
afinfo->seq_fops.llseek = seq_lseek;
afinfo->seq_fops.release = seq_release_net;
afinfo->seq_ops.start = udp_seq_start;
afinfo->seq_ops.next = udp_seq_next;
afinfo->seq_ops.stop = udp_seq_stop;
p = proc_create_data(afinfo->name, S_IRUGO, net->proc_net,
&afinfo->seq_fops, afinfo);
if (!p)
rc = -ENOMEM;
return rc;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 28,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_poc_getparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_poc_t *poc = &ms->parms.poc;
jpc_pocpchg_t *pchg;
int pchgno;
uint_fast8_t tmp;
poc->numpchgs = (cstate->numcomps > 256) ? (ms->len / 9) :
(ms->len / 7);
if (!(poc->pchgs = jas_alloc2(poc->numpchgs, sizeof(jpc_pocpchg_t)))) {
goto error;
}
for (pchgno = 0, pchg = poc->pchgs; pchgno < poc->numpchgs; ++pchgno,
++pchg) {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &pchg->rlvlnostart)) {
goto error;
}
if (cstate->numcomps > 256) {
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &pchg->compnostart)) {
goto error;
}
} else {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp)) {
goto error;
};
pchg->compnostart = tmp;
}
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &pchg->lyrnoend) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &pchg->rlvlnoend)) {
goto error;
}
if (cstate->numcomps > 256) {
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &pchg->compnoend)) {
goto error;
}
} else {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp)) {
goto error;
}
pchg->compnoend = tmp;
}
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &pchg->prgord)) {
goto error;
}
if (pchg->rlvlnostart > pchg->rlvlnoend ||
pchg->compnostart > pchg->compnoend) {
goto error;
}
}
return 0;
error:
jpc_poc_destroyparms(ms);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 11,102 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofpact_put(struct ofpbuf *ofpacts, enum ofpact_type type, size_t len)
{
struct ofpact *ofpact;
ofpacts->header = ofpbuf_put_uninit(ofpacts, len);
ofpact = ofpacts->header;
ofpact_init(ofpact, type, len);
return ofpact;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TraceEventTestFixture::FindNonMatchingValue(const char* key,
const char* value) {
JsonKeyValue key_values[] = {
{key, value, IS_NOT_EQUAL},
{0, 0, IS_EQUAL}
};
return FindMatchingTraceEntry(key_values);
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 15,601 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void put_links(struct ctl_table_header *header)
{
struct ctl_table_set *root_set = &sysctl_table_root.default_set;
struct ctl_table_root *root = header->root;
struct ctl_dir *parent = header->parent;
struct ctl_dir *core_parent;
struct ctl_table *entry;
if (header->set == root_set)
return;
core_parent = xlate_dir(root_set, parent);
if (IS_ERR(core_parent))
return;
for (entry = header->ctl_table; entry->procname; entry++) {
struct ctl_table_header *link_head;
struct ctl_table *link;
const char *name = entry->procname;
link = find_entry(&link_head, core_parent, name, strlen(name));
if (link &&
((S_ISDIR(link->mode) && S_ISDIR(entry->mode)) ||
(S_ISLNK(link->mode) && (link->data == root)))) {
drop_sysctl_table(link_head);
}
else {
pr_err("sysctl link missing during unregister: ");
sysctl_print_dir(parent);
pr_cont("/%s\n", name);
}
}
}
Commit Message: sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir
Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.
The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:
[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265] [<ffffffff817cdaaf>] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817] [<ffffffff817d33fb>] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346] [<ffffffff817cf055>] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256] [<ffffffff817cf0d3>] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972] [<ffffffff810d1fd0>] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804] [<ffffffff8130de64>] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227] [<ffffffff8130de17>] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648] [<ffffffff8130decd>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654] [<ffffffff8130deff>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657] [<ffffffff810f57f5>] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344] [<ffffffff810d7704>] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447] [<ffffffff817d0761>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844] [<ffffffff81167684>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336] [<ffffffff8116789d>] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186] [<ffffffff81167acb>] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899] [<ffffffff810fce3d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234] [<ffffffff8115a9f5>] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049] [<ffffffff81167ae5>] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571] [<ffffffff8115aa2c>] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207] [<ffffffff810bc83f>] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736] [<ffffffff810bc7c0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461] [<ffffffff810bce9b>] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697] [<ffffffff810bcd70>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426] [<ffffffff810c3f7e>] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991] [<ffffffff817d4baf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041] [<ffffffff810c3e80>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230
One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex. The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.
See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13
Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Yang Shukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ciebasecolor(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *space, int base, int *stage, int *cont, int *stack_depth)
{
os_ptr op;
ref *spacename, nref;
int i, components=1, code;
/* If the spaece is an array, the first element is always the name */
if (r_is_array(space))
spacename = space->value.refs;
else
spacename = space;
/* Check that it really is a name */
if (!r_has_type(spacename, t_name))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
/* Find the relevant color space object */
for (i=0;i<4;i++) {
code = names_ref(imemory->gs_lib_ctx->gs_name_table, (const byte *)CIESpaces[i], strlen(CIESpaces[i]), &nref, 0);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (name_eq(spacename, &nref)) {
break;
}
}
/* Find out how many values are on the stack, which depends
* on what kind of CIEBased space this is.
*/
switch(i){
case 0:
components = 1;
break;
case 1:
case 2:
components = 3;
break;
case 3:
components = 4;
break;
}
/* Remove teh requisite number of values */
pop(components);
op = osp;
/* Find out how many values we need to return, which
* depends on the requested space.
*/
switch(base) {
case 0:
components = 1;
break;
case 1:
case 2:
components = 3;
break;
case 3:
components = 4;
break;
}
push(components);
/* The PLRM says that all the components should be returned as 0.0 */
op -= components-1;
for (i=0;i<components;i++) {
make_real(op, (float)0);
op++;
}
/* However, Adobe implementations actually return 1.0 for the black
* channel of CMYK...
*/
if (components == 4) {
op--;
make_real(op, (float)1);
}
*stage = 0;
*cont = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 19,493 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Texture::Destroy() {
if (id_ != 0) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(decoder_);
glDeleteTextures(1, &id_);
id_ = 0;
estimated_size_ = 0;
decoder_->UpdateBackbufferMemoryAccounting();
}
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnCryptohomeNeedsDircryptoMigrationCallback(
const AccountId& account_id,
base::Optional<bool> needs_migration) {
if (!needs_migration.has_value()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to call cryptohome NeedsDircryptoMigration.";
UpdateUI(account_id, false);
return;
}
needs_dircrypto_migration_cache_[account_id] = needs_migration.value();
UpdateUI(account_id, needs_migration.value());
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SMB2_logoff(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses)
{
struct smb_rqst rqst;
struct smb2_logoff_req *req; /* response is also trivial struct */
int rc = 0;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server;
int flags = 0;
unsigned int total_len;
struct kvec iov[1];
struct kvec rsp_iov;
int resp_buf_type;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "disconnect session %p\n", ses);
if (ses && (ses->server))
server = ses->server;
else
return -EIO;
/* no need to send SMB logoff if uid already closed due to reconnect */
if (ses->need_reconnect)
goto smb2_session_already_dead;
rc = smb2_plain_req_init(SMB2_LOGOFF, NULL, (void **) &req, &total_len);
if (rc)
return rc;
/* since no tcon, smb2_init can not do this, so do here */
req->sync_hdr.SessionId = ses->Suid;
if (ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA)
flags |= CIFS_TRANSFORM_REQ;
else if (server->sign)
req->sync_hdr.Flags |= SMB2_FLAGS_SIGNED;
flags |= CIFS_NO_RESP;
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
iov[0].iov_len = total_len;
memset(&rqst, 0, sizeof(struct smb_rqst));
rqst.rq_iov = iov;
rqst.rq_nvec = 1;
rc = cifs_send_recv(xid, ses, &rqst, &resp_buf_type, flags, &rsp_iov);
cifs_small_buf_release(req);
/*
* No tcon so can't do
* cifs_stats_inc(&tcon->stats.smb2_stats.smb2_com_fail[SMB2...]);
*/
smb2_session_already_dead:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 4,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int log_write(void __user *log_base,
u64 write_address, u64 write_length)
{
u64 write_page = write_address / VHOST_PAGE_SIZE;
int r;
if (!write_length)
return 0;
write_length += write_address % VHOST_PAGE_SIZE;
for (;;) {
u64 base = (u64)(unsigned long)log_base;
u64 log = base + write_page / 8;
int bit = write_page % 8;
if ((u64)(unsigned long)log != log)
return -EFAULT;
r = set_bit_to_user(bit, (void __user *)(unsigned long)log);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (write_length <= VHOST_PAGE_SIZE)
break;
write_length -= VHOST_PAGE_SIZE;
write_page += 1;
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: vhost: fix length for cross region descriptor
If a single descriptor crosses a region, the
second chunk length should be decremented
by size translated so far, instead it includes
the full descriptor length.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 20,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static zend_object_value spl_filesystem_object_new_check(zend_class_entry *class_type TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_object_value ret = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(class_type, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
ret.handlers = &spl_filesystem_object_check_handlers;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 23,989 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh, const unsigned char *data, int datalen)
{
/* Log raw data, if we're in that mode. */
if (ssh->logctx)
log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, -1, NULL, data, datalen,
0, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
crBegin(ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate);
/*
* To begin with, feed the characters one by one to the
* protocol initialisation / selection function do_ssh_init().
* When that returns 0, we're done with the initial greeting
* exchange and can move on to packet discipline.
*/
while (1) {
int ret; /* need not be kept across crReturn */
if (datalen == 0)
crReturnV; /* more data please */
ret = ssh->do_ssh_init(ssh, *data);
data++;
datalen--;
if (ret == 0)
break;
}
/*
* We emerge from that loop when the initial negotiation is
* over and we have selected an s_rdpkt function. Now pass
* everything to s_rdpkt, and then pass the resulting packets
* to the proper protocol handler.
*/
while (1) {
while (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0 || datalen > 0) {
if (ssh->frozen) {
ssh_queue_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
/* This uses up all data and cannot cause anything interesting
* to happen; indeed, for anything to happen at all, we must
* return, so break out. */
break;
} else if (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0) {
/* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
* session. */
ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
} else {
/* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
* session. */
ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
}
/* FIXME this is probably EBW. */
if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
return;
}
/* We're out of data. Go and get some more. */
crReturnV;
}
crFinishV;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHPAPI int php_copy_file(char *src, char *dest TSRMLS_DC)
{
return php_copy_file_ctx(src, dest, 0, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72114 - int/size_t confusion in fread
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 24,838 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int midi_setup_smpteoffset(struct _mdi *mdi, uint32_t setting) {
MIDI_EVENT_DEBUG(__FUNCTION__,0, setting);
_WM_CheckEventMemoryPool(mdi);
mdi->events[mdi->event_count].do_event = *_WM_do_meta_smpteoffset;
mdi->events[mdi->event_count].event_data.channel = 0;
mdi->events[mdi->event_count].event_data.data.value = setting;
mdi->events[mdi->event_count].samples_to_next = 0;
mdi->event_count++;
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 958 |
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