instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_setsockopt_initmsg(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sctp_initmsg sinit;
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
if (optlen != sizeof(struct sctp_initmsg))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&sinit, optval, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (sinit.sinit_num_ostreams)
sp->initmsg.sinit_num_ostreams = sinit.sinit_num_ostreams;
if (sinit.sinit_max_instreams)
sp->initmsg.sinit_max_instreams = sinit.sinit_max_instreams;
if (sinit.sinit_max_attempts)
sp->initmsg.sinit_max_attempts = sinit.sinit_max_attempts;
if (sinit.sinit_max_init_timeo)
sp->initmsg.sinit_max_init_timeo = sinit.sinit_max_init_timeo;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,248 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ShouldIgnoreFeatureUsageEvent() {
if (!writer_)
return true;
if (TabLoadTracker::Get()->GetLoadingState(web_contents()) !=
LoadingState::LOADED) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,298 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *Type_LUT8_Read(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, cmsUInt32Number* nItems, cmsUInt32Number SizeOfTag)
{
cmsUInt8Number InputChannels, OutputChannels, CLUTpoints;
cmsUInt8Number* Temp = NULL;
cmsPipeline* NewLUT = NULL;
cmsUInt32Number nTabSize, i;
cmsFloat64Number Matrix[3*3];
*nItems = 0;
if (!_cmsReadUInt8Number(io, &InputChannels)) goto Error;
if (!_cmsReadUInt8Number(io, &OutputChannels)) goto Error;
if (!_cmsReadUInt8Number(io, &CLUTpoints)) goto Error;
if (CLUTpoints == 1) goto Error; // Impossible value, 0 for no CLUT and then 2 at least
if (!_cmsReadUInt8Number(io, NULL)) goto Error;
if (InputChannels > cmsMAXCHANNELS) goto Error;
if (OutputChannels > cmsMAXCHANNELS) goto Error;
NewLUT = cmsPipelineAlloc(self ->ContextID, InputChannels, OutputChannels);
if (NewLUT == NULL) goto Error;
if (!_cmsRead15Fixed16Number(io, &Matrix[0])) goto Error;
if (!_cmsRead15Fixed16Number(io, &Matrix[1])) goto Error;
if (!_cmsRead15Fixed16Number(io, &Matrix[2])) goto Error;
if (!_cmsRead15Fixed16Number(io, &Matrix[3])) goto Error;
if (!_cmsRead15Fixed16Number(io, &Matrix[4])) goto Error;
if (!_cmsRead15Fixed16Number(io, &Matrix[5])) goto Error;
if (!_cmsRead15Fixed16Number(io, &Matrix[6])) goto Error;
if (!_cmsRead15Fixed16Number(io, &Matrix[7])) goto Error;
if (!_cmsRead15Fixed16Number(io, &Matrix[8])) goto Error;
if ((InputChannels == 3) && !_cmsMAT3isIdentity((cmsMAT3*) Matrix)) {
if (!cmsPipelineInsertStage(NewLUT, cmsAT_BEGIN, cmsStageAllocMatrix(self ->ContextID, 3, 3, Matrix, NULL)))
goto Error;
}
if (!Read8bitTables(self ->ContextID, io, NewLUT, InputChannels)) goto Error;
nTabSize = uipow(OutputChannels, CLUTpoints, InputChannels);
if (nTabSize == (cmsUInt32Number) -1) goto Error;
if (nTabSize > 0) {
cmsUInt16Number *PtrW, *T;
PtrW = T = (cmsUInt16Number*) _cmsCalloc(self ->ContextID, nTabSize, sizeof(cmsUInt16Number));
if (T == NULL) goto Error;
Temp = (cmsUInt8Number*) _cmsMalloc(self ->ContextID, nTabSize);
if (Temp == NULL) {
_cmsFree(self ->ContextID, T);
goto Error;
}
if (io ->Read(io, Temp, nTabSize, 1) != 1) {
_cmsFree(self ->ContextID, T);
_cmsFree(self ->ContextID, Temp);
goto Error;
}
for (i = 0; i < nTabSize; i++) {
*PtrW++ = FROM_8_TO_16(Temp[i]);
}
_cmsFree(self ->ContextID, Temp);
Temp = NULL;
if (!cmsPipelineInsertStage(NewLUT, cmsAT_END, cmsStageAllocCLut16bit(self ->ContextID, CLUTpoints, InputChannels, OutputChannels, T)))
goto Error;
_cmsFree(self ->ContextID, T);
}
if (!Read8bitTables(self ->ContextID, io, NewLUT, OutputChannels)) goto Error;
*nItems = 1;
return NewLUT;
Error:
if (NewLUT != NULL) cmsPipelineFree(NewLUT);
return NULL;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(SizeOfTag);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vips_foreign_load_gif_buffer_open( VipsForeignLoadGif *gif )
{
VipsForeignLoadGifBuffer *buffer = (VipsForeignLoadGifBuffer *) gif;
vips_foreign_load_gif_close( gif );
buffer->p = buffer->buf->data;
buffer->bytes_to_go = buffer->buf->length;
gif->read_func = vips_giflib_buffer_read;;
return( VIPS_FOREIGN_LOAD_GIF_CLASS(
vips_foreign_load_gif_file_parent_class )->open( gif ) );
}
Commit Message: fetch map after DGifGetImageDesc()
Earlier refactoring broke GIF map fetch.
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int php_stream_memory_set_option(php_stream *stream, int option, int value, void *ptrparam TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
php_stream_memory_data *ms = (php_stream_memory_data*)stream->abstract;
size_t newsize;
switch(option) {
case PHP_STREAM_OPTION_TRUNCATE_API:
switch (value) {
case PHP_STREAM_TRUNCATE_SUPPORTED:
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_OK;
case PHP_STREAM_TRUNCATE_SET_SIZE:
if (ms->mode & TEMP_STREAM_READONLY) {
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_ERR;
}
newsize = *(size_t*)ptrparam;
if (newsize <= ms->fsize) {
if (newsize < ms->fpos) {
ms->fpos = newsize;
}
} else {
ms->data = erealloc(ms->data, newsize);
memset(ms->data+ms->fsize, 0, newsize - ms->fsize);
ms->fsize = newsize;
}
ms->fsize = newsize;
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_OK;
}
default:
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_NOTIMPL;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 5,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void update_memslots(struct kvm_memslots *slots,
struct kvm_memory_slot *new)
{
int id = new->id;
int i = slots->id_to_index[id];
struct kvm_memory_slot *mslots = slots->memslots;
WARN_ON(mslots[i].id != id);
if (!new->npages) {
WARN_ON(!mslots[i].npages);
if (mslots[i].npages)
slots->used_slots--;
} else {
if (!mslots[i].npages)
slots->used_slots++;
}
while (i < KVM_MEM_SLOTS_NUM - 1 &&
new->base_gfn <= mslots[i + 1].base_gfn) {
if (!mslots[i + 1].npages)
break;
mslots[i] = mslots[i + 1];
slots->id_to_index[mslots[i].id] = i;
i++;
}
/*
* The ">=" is needed when creating a slot with base_gfn == 0,
* so that it moves before all those with base_gfn == npages == 0.
*
* On the other hand, if new->npages is zero, the above loop has
* already left i pointing to the beginning of the empty part of
* mslots, and the ">=" would move the hole backwards in this
* case---which is wrong. So skip the loop when deleting a slot.
*/
if (new->npages) {
while (i > 0 &&
new->base_gfn >= mslots[i - 1].base_gfn) {
mslots[i] = mslots[i - 1];
slots->id_to_index[mslots[i].id] = i;
i--;
}
} else
WARN_ON_ONCE(i != slots->used_slots);
mslots[i] = *new;
slots->id_to_index[mslots[i].id] = i;
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 4,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QQuickWebView::dropEvent(QDropEvent* event)
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
d->pageView->eventHandler()->handleDropEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 8,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline uint32_t ne2000_mem_readw(NE2000State *s, uint32_t addr)
{
addr &= ~1; /* XXX: check exact behaviour if not even */
if (addr < 32 ||
(addr >= NE2000_PMEM_START && addr < NE2000_MEM_SIZE)) {
return le16_to_cpu(*(uint16_t *)(s->mem + addr));
} else {
return 0xffff;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,185 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char* ContentSecurityPolicy::GetDirectiveName(const DirectiveType& type) {
switch (type) {
case DirectiveType::kBaseURI:
return "base-uri";
case DirectiveType::kBlockAllMixedContent:
return "block-all-mixed-content";
case DirectiveType::kChildSrc:
return "child-src";
case DirectiveType::kConnectSrc:
return "connect-src";
case DirectiveType::kDefaultSrc:
return "default-src";
case DirectiveType::kFrameAncestors:
return "frame-ancestors";
case DirectiveType::kFrameSrc:
return "frame-src";
case DirectiveType::kFontSrc:
return "font-src";
case DirectiveType::kFormAction:
return "form-action";
case DirectiveType::kImgSrc:
return "img-src";
case DirectiveType::kManifestSrc:
return "manifest-src";
case DirectiveType::kMediaSrc:
return "media-src";
case DirectiveType::kObjectSrc:
return "object-src";
case DirectiveType::kPrefetchSrc:
return "prefetch-src";
case DirectiveType::kPluginTypes:
return "plugin-types";
case DirectiveType::kReportURI:
return "report-uri";
case DirectiveType::kRequireSRIFor:
return "require-sri-for";
case DirectiveType::kTrustedTypes:
return "trusted-types";
case DirectiveType::kSandbox:
return "sandbox";
case DirectiveType::kScriptSrc:
return "script-src";
case DirectiveType::kScriptSrcAttr:
return "script-src-attr";
case DirectiveType::kScriptSrcElem:
return "script-src-elem";
case DirectiveType::kStyleSrc:
return "style-src";
case DirectiveType::kStyleSrcAttr:
return "style-src-attr";
case DirectiveType::kStyleSrcElem:
return "style-src-elem";
case DirectiveType::kTreatAsPublicAddress:
return "treat-as-public-address";
case DirectiveType::kUpgradeInsecureRequests:
return "upgrade-insecure-requests";
case DirectiveType::kWorkerSrc:
return "worker-src";
case DirectiveType::kReportTo:
return "report-to";
case DirectiveType::kNavigateTo:
return "navigate-to";
case DirectiveType::kUndefined:
NOTREACHED();
return "";
}
NOTREACHED();
return "";
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,326 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long data)
{
int ret = -EPERM;
void __user *datap = (void __user *) data;
switch (request) {
case PTRACE_PEEKTEXT: /* read word at location addr. */
case PTRACE_PEEKDATA:
ret = generic_ptrace_peekdata(child, addr, data);
break;
case PTRACE_PEEKUSR: /* read register specified by addr. */
ret = ptrace_peekusr(child, addr, datap);
break;
case PTRACE_POKETEXT: /* write the word at location addr. */
case PTRACE_POKEDATA:
ret = generic_ptrace_pokedata(child, addr, data);
break;
case PTRACE_POKEUSR: /* write register specified by addr. */
ret = ptrace_pokeusr(child, addr, data);
break;
case PTRACE_GETREGS:
ret = ptrace_getregs(child, datap);
break;
case PTRACE_SETREGS:
ret = ptrace_setregs(child, datap);
break;
case PTRACE_GETXTREGS:
ret = ptrace_getxregs(child, datap);
break;
case PTRACE_SETXTREGS:
ret = ptrace_setxregs(child, datap);
break;
default:
ret = ptrace_request(child, request, addr, data);
break;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: xtensa: prevent arbitrary read in ptrace
Prevent an arbitrary kernel read. Check the user pointer with access_ok()
before copying data in.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/EIO/EFAULT/]
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Christian Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx=NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
unsigned u=0;
unsigned long n;
int j;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A)
{
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p= &(d[4]);
pkey=s->cert->key->privatekey;
/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1())>0)
{
if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_sha1,
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
}
else
{
ERR_clear_error();
}
/* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature
* using agreed digest and cached handshake records.
*/
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
{
long hdatalen = 0;
void *hdata;
const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer,
&hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p += 2;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
|| !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(u,p);
n = u + 4;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto err;
}
else
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_md5,
&(data[0]));
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 )
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(u,p);
n=u+2;
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
{
if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.dsa))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(j,p);
n=j+2;
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
{
if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.ec))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(j,p);
n=j+2;
}
else
#endif
if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
{
unsigned char signbuf[64];
int i;
size_t sigsize=64;
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_id_GostR3411_94,
data);
if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
for (i=63,j=0; i>=0; j++, i--) {
p[2+j]=signbuf[i];
}
s2n(j,p);
n=j+2;
}
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
l2n3(n,d);
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
s->init_num=(int)n+4;
s->init_off=0;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return(-1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AddPageToHistory(const GURL& url,
const base::string16& title,
const history::RedirectList& redirects,
base::Time time) {
history_service()->AddPage(
url, time, reinterpret_cast<ContextID>(1), 0, GURL(),
redirects, ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED, history::SOURCE_BROWSED,
false);
history_service()->SetPageTitle(url, title);
}
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 8,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ClipboardMessageFilter::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message,
bool* message_was_ok) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_EX(ClipboardMessageFilter, message, *message_was_ok)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_WriteObjectsAsync, OnWriteObjectsAsync)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_WriteObjectsSync, OnWriteObjectsSync)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_GetSequenceNumber, OnGetSequenceNumber)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_IsFormatAvailable, OnIsFormatAvailable)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_Clear, OnClear)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_ReadAvailableTypes,
OnReadAvailableTypes)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_ReadText, OnReadText)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_ReadAsciiText, OnReadAsciiText)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_ReadHTML, OnReadHTML)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_ReadRTF, OnReadRTF)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ClipboardHostMsg_ReadImage, OnReadImage)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_ReadCustomData, OnReadCustomData)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_ReadData, OnReadData)
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_FindPboardWriteStringAsync,
OnFindPboardWriteString)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Refactor ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap sanitization in ClipboardMsgFilter.
BUG=352395
R=tony@chromium.org
TBR=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/200523004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@257164 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Document& Document::topDocument() const
{
Document* doc = const_cast<Document*>(this);
for (HTMLFrameOwnerElement* element = doc->ownerElement(); element; element = doc->ownerElement())
doc = &element->document();
ASSERT(doc);
return *doc;
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 5,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NPObjectAccessorWithIdentifier::NPObjectAccessorWithIdentifier(
NPObject* object,
NPIdentifier identifier,
bool allow_integer_identifier)
: object_(PluginObject::FromNPObject(object)),
identifier_(PP_MakeUndefined()) {
if (object_) {
identifier_ = Var::NPIdentifierToPPVar(object_->instance()->module(),
identifier);
if (identifier_.type == PP_VARTYPE_INT32 && !allow_integer_identifier)
identifier_.type = PP_VARTYPE_UNDEFINED; // Mark it invalid.
}
}
Commit Message: Fix invalid read in ppapi code
BUG=77493
TEST=attached test
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6883059
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@82172 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,253 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_CEILING( INS_ARG )
{
DO_CEILING
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void merge_all_config(GF_AVCConfig *avc_cfg, GF_HEVCConfig *hevc_cfg, GF_MediaBox *mdia)
{
u32 i;
GF_TrackReferenceTypeBox *scal = NULL;
Track_FindRef(mdia->mediaTrack, GF_ISOM_REF_SCAL, &scal);
if (!scal) return;
for (i=0; i<scal->trackIDCount; i++) {
GF_TrackBox *a_track = GetTrackbyID(mdia->mediaTrack->moov, scal->trackIDs[i]);
GF_MPEGVisualSampleEntryBox *an_entry = NULL;
if (a_track && a_track->Media && a_track->Media->information && a_track->Media->information->sampleTable && a_track->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription)
an_entry = (GF_MPEGVisualSampleEntryBox*)gf_list_get(a_track->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription->other_boxes, 0);
if (!an_entry) continue;
if (avc_cfg && an_entry->svc_config && an_entry->svc_config->config)
merge_avc_config(avc_cfg, an_entry->svc_config->config);
if (avc_cfg && an_entry->mvc_config && an_entry->mvc_config->config)
merge_avc_config(avc_cfg, an_entry->mvc_config->config);
if (avc_cfg && an_entry->avc_config && an_entry->avc_config->config)
merge_avc_config(avc_cfg, an_entry->avc_config->config);
if (hevc_cfg && an_entry->lhvc_config && an_entry->lhvc_config->config)
merge_hevc_config(hevc_cfg, an_entry->lhvc_config->config, GF_TRUE);
if (hevc_cfg && an_entry->hevc_config && an_entry->hevc_config->config)
merge_hevc_config(hevc_cfg, an_entry->hevc_config->config, GF_TRUE);
}
if (hevc_cfg) hevc_cfg->is_lhvc = GF_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vrend_destroy_streamout_object(struct vrend_streamout_object *obj)
{
int i;
list_del(&obj->head);
for (i = 0; i < obj->num_targets; i++)
vrend_so_target_reference(&obj->so_targets[i], NULL);
if (vrend_state.have_tf2)
glDeleteTransformFeedbacks(1, &obj->id);
FREE(obj);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 15,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DefaultWebClientState GetDefaultWebClientStateFromShellUtilDefaultState(
ShellUtil::DefaultState default_state) {
switch (default_state) {
case ShellUtil::UNKNOWN_DEFAULT:
return DefaultWebClientState::UNKNOWN_DEFAULT;
case ShellUtil::NOT_DEFAULT:
return DefaultWebClientState::NOT_DEFAULT;
case ShellUtil::IS_DEFAULT:
return DefaultWebClientState::IS_DEFAULT;
case ShellUtil::OTHER_MODE_IS_DEFAULT:
return DefaultWebClientState::OTHER_MODE_IS_DEFAULT;
}
NOTREACHED();
return DefaultWebClientState::UNKNOWN_DEFAULT;
}
Commit Message: Validate external protocols before launching on Windows
Bug: 889459
Change-Id: Id33ca6444bff1e6dd71b6000823cf6fec09746ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1256208
Reviewed-by: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597611}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int perf_event_task_disable(void)
{
struct perf_event *event;
mutex_lock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(event, ¤t->perf_event_list, owner_entry)
perf_event_for_each_child(event, perf_event_disable);
mutex_unlock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 13,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: deleteFiles()
{
Buffer *buf;
char *f;
for (CurrentTab = FirstTab; CurrentTab; CurrentTab = CurrentTab->nextTab) {
while (Firstbuf && Firstbuf != NO_BUFFER) {
buf = Firstbuf->nextBuffer;
discardBuffer(Firstbuf);
Firstbuf = buf;
}
}
while ((f = popText(fileToDelete)) != NULL) {
unlink(f);
if (enable_inline_image == 2 && strcmp(f+strlen(f)-4, ".gif") == 0) {
Str firstframe = Strnew_charp(f);
Strcat_charp(firstframe, "-1");
unlink(firstframe->ptr);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 1,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: isofile_add_data_file(struct iso9660 *iso9660, struct isofile *file)
{
file->datanext = NULL;
*iso9660->data_file_list.last = file;
iso9660->data_file_list.last = &(file->datanext);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 4,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderFlexibleBox::flowAwarePaddingAfter() const
{
switch (transformedWritingMode()) {
case TopToBottomWritingMode:
return paddingBottom();
case BottomToTopWritingMode:
return paddingTop();
case LeftToRightWritingMode:
return paddingRight();
case RightToLeftWritingMode:
return paddingLeft();
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return paddingTop();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,972 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fb_get_fscreeninfo(struct fb_info *info, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
mm_segment_t old_fs;
struct fb_fix_screeninfo fix;
struct fb_fix_screeninfo32 __user *fix32;
int err;
fix32 = compat_ptr(arg);
old_fs = get_fs();
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
err = do_fb_ioctl(info, cmd, (unsigned long) &fix);
set_fs(old_fs);
if (!err)
err = do_fscreeninfo_to_user(&fix, fix32);
return err;
}
Commit Message: vm: convert fb_mmap to vm_iomap_memory() helper
This is my example conversion of a few existing mmap users. The
fb_mmap() case is a good example because it is a bit more complicated
than some: fb_mmap() mmaps one of two different memory areas depending
on the page offset of the mmap (but happily there is never any mixing of
the two, so the helper function still works).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool nfsd4_session_too_many_ops(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_session *session)
{
struct nfsd4_compoundargs *args = rqstp->rq_argp;
return args->opcnt > session->se_fchannel.maxops;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 19,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int BN_ucmp(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
{
int i;
BN_ULONG t1,t2,*ap,*bp;
bn_check_top(a);
bn_check_top(b);
i=a->top-b->top;
if (i != 0) return(i);
ap=a->d;
bp=b->d;
for (i=a->top-1; i>=0; i--)
{
t1= ap[i];
t2= bp[i];
if (t1 != t2)
return((t1 > t2) ? 1 : -1);
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 26,191 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void TIFFSetProfiles(TIFF *tiff,Image *image)
{
const char
*name;
const StringInfo
*profile;
if (image->profiles == (void *) NULL)
return;
ResetImageProfileIterator(image);
for (name=GetNextImageProfile(image); name != (const char *) NULL; )
{
profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
if (GetStringInfoLength(profile) == 0)
{
name=GetNextImageProfile(image);
continue;
}
#if defined(TIFFTAG_XMLPACKET)
if (LocaleCompare(name,"xmp") == 0)
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_XMLPACKET,(uint32) GetStringInfoLength(
profile),GetStringInfoDatum(profile));
#endif
#if defined(TIFFTAG_ICCPROFILE)
if (LocaleCompare(name,"icc") == 0)
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ICCPROFILE,(uint32) GetStringInfoLength(
profile),GetStringInfoDatum(profile));
#endif
if (LocaleCompare(name,"iptc") == 0)
{
size_t
length;
StringInfo
*iptc_profile;
iptc_profile=CloneStringInfo(profile);
length=GetStringInfoLength(profile)+4-(GetStringInfoLength(profile) &
0x03);
SetStringInfoLength(iptc_profile,length);
if (TIFFIsByteSwapped(tiff))
TIFFSwabArrayOfLong((uint32 *) GetStringInfoDatum(iptc_profile),
(unsigned long) (length/4));
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_RICHTIFFIPTC,(uint32)
GetStringInfoLength(iptc_profile)/4,GetStringInfoDatum(iptc_profile));
iptc_profile=DestroyStringInfo(iptc_profile);
}
#if defined(TIFFTAG_PHOTOSHOP)
if (LocaleCompare(name,"8bim") == 0)
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PHOTOSHOP,(uint32)
GetStringInfoLength(profile),GetStringInfoDatum(profile));
#endif
if (LocaleCompare(name,"tiff:37724") == 0)
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,37724,(uint32) GetStringInfoLength(profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(profile));
if (LocaleCompare(name,"tiff:34118") == 0)
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,34118,(uint32) GetStringInfoLength(profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(profile));
name=GetNextImageProfile(image);
}
}
Commit Message: https://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=31161
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8InjectedScriptHost::getInternalPropertiesCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (info.Length() < 1)
return;
v8::Local<v8::Array> properties;
if (unwrapInspector(info)->debugger()->internalProperties(info.GetIsolate()->GetCurrentContext(), info[0]).ToLocal(&properties))
info.GetReturnValue().Set(properties);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 16,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BlackBerry::Platform::String WebPage::selectedText() const
{
return d->m_selectionHandler->selectedText();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _tiffUnmapProc(thandle_t fd, void* base, toff_t size)
{
(void) fd;
(void) size;
UnmapViewOfFile(base);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 13,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __used unaligned_panic(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
die_if_kernel(str, regs);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,541 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThread::OnSetZoomLevelForCurrentURL(const GURL& url,
double zoom_level) {
RenderViewZoomer zoomer(url, zoom_level);
RenderView::ForEach(&zoomer);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Box *rssr_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_ReceivedSsrcBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_RSSR);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 23,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPluginAcceleratedSurfaceProxy::StartDrawing() {
if (!surface_)
return;
surface_->MakeCurrent();
surface_->Clear(gfx::Rect(surface_->GetSize()));
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContainerNode::appendChildCommon(Node& child)
{
child.setParentOrShadowHostNode(this);
if (m_lastChild) {
child.setPreviousSibling(m_lastChild);
m_lastChild->setNextSibling(&child);
} else {
setFirstChild(&child);
}
setLastChild(&child);
}
Commit Message: Fix an optimisation in ContainerNode::notifyNodeInsertedInternal
R=tkent@chromium.org
BUG=544020
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1420653003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#355240}
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err pasp_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_PixelAspectRatioBox *ptr = (GF_PixelAspectRatioBox *)s;
GF_Err e = gf_isom_box_write_header(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->hSpacing);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->vSpacing);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 25,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sdtp_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_SampleDependencyTypeBox *ptr = (GF_SampleDependencyTypeBox*)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
if (ptr->sample_info) gf_free(ptr->sample_info);
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 25,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct page *alloc_hugepage(int defrag)
{
return alloc_pages(alloc_hugepage_gfpmask(defrag, 0),
HPAGE_PMD_ORDER);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE and vm_flags cleanups
The huge_memory.c THP page fault was allowed to run if vm_ops was null
(which would succeed for /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE, as the f_op->mmap wouldn't
setup a special vma->vm_ops and it would fallback to regular anonymous
memory) but other THP logics weren't fully activated for vmas with vm_file
not NULL (/dev/zero has a not NULL vma->vm_file).
So this removes the vm_file checks so that /dev/zero also can safely use
THP (the other albeit safer approach to fix this bug would have been to
prevent the THP initial page fault to run if vm_file was set).
After removing the vm_file checks, this also makes huge_memory.c stricter
in khugepaged for the DEBUG_VM=y case. It doesn't replace the vm_file
check with a is_pfn_mapping check (but it keeps checking for VM_PFNMAP
under VM_BUG_ON) because for a is_cow_mapping() mapping VM_PFNMAP should
only be allowed to exist before the first page fault, and in turn when
vma->anon_vma is null (so preventing khugepaged registration). So I tend
to think the previous comment saying if vm_file was set, VM_PFNMAP might
have been set and we could still be registered in khugepaged (despite
anon_vma was not NULL to be registered in khugepaged) was too paranoid.
The is_linear_pfn_mapping check is also I think superfluous (as described
by comment) but under DEBUG_VM it is safe to stay.
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33682
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Caspar Zhang <bugs@casparzhang.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.38.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 11,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void imap_allow_reopen(struct Context *ctx)
{
struct ImapData *idata = NULL;
if (!ctx || !ctx->data || ctx->magic != MUTT_IMAP)
return;
idata = ctx->data;
if (idata->ctx == ctx)
idata->reopen |= IMAP_REOPEN_ALLOW;
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 10,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: json_lex(JsonLexContext *lex)
{
char *s;
int len;
/* Skip leading whitespace. */
s = lex->token_terminator;
len = s - lex->input;
while (len < lex->input_length &&
(*s == ' ' || *s == '\t' || *s == '\n' || *s == '\r'))
{
if (*s == '\n')
++lex->line_number;
++s;
++len;
}
lex->token_start = s;
/* Determine token type. */
if (len >= lex->input_length)
{
lex->token_start = NULL;
lex->prev_token_terminator = lex->token_terminator;
lex->token_terminator = s;
lex->token_type = JSON_TOKEN_END;
}
else
switch (*s)
{
/* Single-character token, some kind of punctuation mark. */
case '{':
lex->prev_token_terminator = lex->token_terminator;
lex->token_terminator = s + 1;
lex->token_type = JSON_TOKEN_OBJECT_START;
break;
case '}':
lex->prev_token_terminator = lex->token_terminator;
lex->token_terminator = s + 1;
lex->token_type = JSON_TOKEN_OBJECT_END;
break;
case '[':
lex->prev_token_terminator = lex->token_terminator;
lex->token_terminator = s + 1;
lex->token_type = JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_START;
break;
case ']':
lex->prev_token_terminator = lex->token_terminator;
lex->token_terminator = s + 1;
lex->token_type = JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_END;
break;
case ',':
lex->prev_token_terminator = lex->token_terminator;
lex->token_terminator = s + 1;
lex->token_type = JSON_TOKEN_COMMA;
break;
case ':':
lex->prev_token_terminator = lex->token_terminator;
lex->token_terminator = s + 1;
lex->token_type = JSON_TOKEN_COLON;
break;
case '"':
/* string */
json_lex_string(lex);
lex->token_type = JSON_TOKEN_STRING;
break;
case '-':
/* Negative number. */
json_lex_number(lex, s + 1, NULL);
lex->token_type = JSON_TOKEN_NUMBER;
break;
case '0':
case '1':
case '2':
case '3':
case '4':
case '5':
case '6':
case '7':
case '8':
case '9':
/* Positive number. */
json_lex_number(lex, s, NULL);
lex->token_type = JSON_TOKEN_NUMBER;
break;
default:
{
char *p;
/*
* We're not dealing with a string, number, legal
* punctuation mark, or end of string. The only legal
* tokens we might find here are true, false, and null,
* but for error reporting purposes we scan until we see a
* non-alphanumeric character. That way, we can report
* the whole word as an unexpected token, rather than just
* some unintuitive prefix thereof.
*/
for (p = s; p - s < lex->input_length - len && JSON_ALPHANUMERIC_CHAR(*p); p++)
/* skip */ ;
/*
* We got some sort of unexpected punctuation or an
* otherwise unexpected character, so just complain about
* that one character.
*/
if (p == s)
{
lex->prev_token_terminator = lex->token_terminator;
lex->token_terminator = s + 1;
report_invalid_token(lex);
}
/*
* We've got a real alphanumeric token here. If it
* happens to be true, false, or null, all is well. If
* not, error out.
*/
lex->prev_token_terminator = lex->token_terminator;
lex->token_terminator = p;
if (p - s == 4)
{
if (memcmp(s, "true", 4) == 0)
lex->token_type = JSON_TOKEN_TRUE;
else if (memcmp(s, "null", 4) == 0)
lex->token_type = JSON_TOKEN_NULL;
else
report_invalid_token(lex);
}
else if (p - s == 5 && memcmp(s, "false", 5) == 0)
lex->token_type = JSON_TOKEN_FALSE;
else
report_invalid_token(lex);
}
} /* end of switch */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init crypto_authenc_module_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_template(&crypto_authenc_tmpl);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,122 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static TEE_Result set_rmem_param(const struct optee_msg_param_rmem *rmem,
struct param_mem *mem)
{
uint64_t shm_ref = READ_ONCE(rmem->shm_ref);
mem->mobj = mobj_reg_shm_get_by_cookie(shm_ref);
if (!mem->mobj)
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
mem->offs = READ_ONCE(rmem->offs);
mem->size = READ_ONCE(rmem->size);
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: core: ensure that supplied range matches MOBJ
In set_rmem_param() if the MOBJ is found by the cookie it's verified to
represent non-secure shared memory. Prior to this patch the supplied
sub-range to be used of the MOBJ was not checked here and relied on
later checks further down the chain. Those checks seems to be enough
for user TAs, but not for pseudo TAs where the size isn't checked.
This patch adds a check for offset and size to see that they remain
inside the memory covered by the MOBJ.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0004: "Unchecked parameters are passed through from
REE".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 8,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void list_modules(GF_ModuleManager *modules)
{
u32 i;
fprintf(stderr, "\rAvailable modules:\n");
for (i=0; i<gf_modules_get_count(modules); i++) {
char *str = (char *) gf_modules_get_file_name(modules, i);
if (str) fprintf(stderr, "\t%s\n", str);
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
Commit Message: add some boundary checks on gf_text_get_utf8_line (#1188)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 3,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void stroke_terminate_srcip(private_stroke_socket_t *this,
stroke_msg_t *msg, FILE *out)
{
pop_string(msg, &msg->terminate_srcip.start);
pop_string(msg, &msg->terminate_srcip.end);
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "received stroke: terminate-srcip %s-%s",
msg->terminate_srcip.start, msg->terminate_srcip.end);
this->control->terminate_srcip(this->control, msg, out);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 11,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_icache_inode_is_allocated(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
struct xfs_trans *tp,
xfs_ino_t ino,
bool *inuse)
{
struct xfs_inode *ip;
int error;
error = xfs_iget(mp, tp, ino, XFS_IGET_INCORE, 0, &ip);
if (error)
return error;
*inuse = !!(VFS_I(ip)->i_mode);
IRELE(ip);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfs: validate cached inodes are free when allocated
A recent fuzzed filesystem image cached random dcache corruption
when the reproducer was run. This often showed up as panics in
lookup_slow() on a null inode->i_ops pointer when doing pathwalks.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
....
Call Trace:
lookup_slow+0x44/0x60
walk_component+0x3dd/0x9f0
link_path_walk+0x4a7/0x830
path_lookupat+0xc1/0x470
filename_lookup+0x129/0x270
user_path_at_empty+0x36/0x40
path_listxattr+0x98/0x110
SyS_listxattr+0x13/0x20
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
but had many different failure modes including deadlocks trying to
lock the inode that was just allocated or KASAN reports of
use-after-free violations.
The cause of the problem was a corrupt INOBT on a v4 fs where the
root inode was marked as free in the inobt record. Hence when we
allocated an inode, it chose the root inode to allocate, found it in
the cache and re-initialised it.
We recently fixed a similar inode allocation issue caused by inobt
record corruption problem in xfs_iget_cache_miss() in commit
ee457001ed6c ("xfs: catch inode allocation state mismatch
corruption"). This change adds similar checks to the cache-hit path
to catch it, and turns the reproducer into a corruption shutdown
situation.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: fix typos in comment]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 13,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t TracePath(PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info,const char *path)
{
char
token[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*p;
int
attribute,
last_attribute;
double
x,
y;
PointInfo
end = {0.0, 0.0},
points[4] = { {0.0,0.0}, {0.0,0.0}, {0.0,0.0}, {0.0,0.0} },
point = {0.0, 0.0},
start = {0.0, 0.0};
PrimitiveType
primitive_type;
register PrimitiveInfo
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
number_coordinates,
z_count;
attribute=0;
number_coordinates=0;
z_count=0;
primitive_type=primitive_info->primitive;
q=primitive_info;
for (p=path; *p != '\0'; )
{
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) *p)) != 0)
p++;
if (*p == '\0')
break;
last_attribute=attribute;
attribute=(int) (*p++);
switch (attribute)
{
case 'a':
case 'A':
{
MagickBooleanType
large_arc,
sweep;
double
angle;
PointInfo
arc;
/*
Compute arc points.
*/
do
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
arc.x=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
arc.y=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
angle=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
large_arc=StringToLong(token) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
sweep=StringToLong(token) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
x=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
y=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
end.x=(double) (attribute == (int) 'A' ? x : point.x+x);
end.y=(double) (attribute == (int) 'A' ? y : point.y+y);
TraceArcPath(q,point,end,arc,angle,large_arc,sweep);
q+=q->coordinates;
point=end;
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) *p)) != 0)
p++;
if (*p == ',')
p++;
} while (IsPoint(p) != MagickFalse);
break;
}
case 'c':
case 'C':
{
/*
Compute bezier points.
*/
do
{
points[0]=point;
for (i=1; i < 4; i++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
x=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
y=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
end.x=(double) (attribute == (int) 'C' ? x : point.x+x);
end.y=(double) (attribute == (int) 'C' ? y : point.y+y);
points[i]=end;
}
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
(q+i)->point=points[i];
TraceBezier(q,4);
q+=q->coordinates;
point=end;
} while (IsPoint(p) != MagickFalse);
break;
}
case 'H':
case 'h':
{
do
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
x=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
point.x=(double) (attribute == (int) 'H' ? x: point.x+x);
TracePoint(q,point);
q+=q->coordinates;
} while (IsPoint(p) != MagickFalse);
break;
}
case 'l':
case 'L':
{
do
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
x=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
y=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
point.x=(double) (attribute == (int) 'L' ? x : point.x+x);
point.y=(double) (attribute == (int) 'L' ? y : point.y+y);
TracePoint(q,point);
q+=q->coordinates;
} while (IsPoint(p) != MagickFalse);
break;
}
case 'M':
case 'm':
{
if (q != primitive_info)
{
primitive_info->coordinates=(size_t) (q-primitive_info);
number_coordinates+=primitive_info->coordinates;
primitive_info=q;
}
i=0;
do
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
x=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
y=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
point.x=(double) (attribute == (int) 'M' ? x : point.x+x);
point.y=(double) (attribute == (int) 'M' ? y : point.y+y);
if (i == 0)
start=point;
i++;
TracePoint(q,point);
q+=q->coordinates;
if ((i != 0) && (attribute == (int) 'M'))
{
TracePoint(q,point);
q+=q->coordinates;
}
} while (IsPoint(p) != MagickFalse);
break;
}
case 'q':
case 'Q':
{
/*
Compute bezier points.
*/
do
{
points[0]=point;
for (i=1; i < 3; i++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
x=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
y=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
if (*p == ',')
p++;
end.x=(double) (attribute == (int) 'Q' ? x : point.x+x);
end.y=(double) (attribute == (int) 'Q' ? y : point.y+y);
points[i]=end;
}
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
(q+i)->point=points[i];
TraceBezier(q,3);
q+=q->coordinates;
point=end;
} while (IsPoint(p) != MagickFalse);
break;
}
case 's':
case 'S':
{
/*
Compute bezier points.
*/
do
{
points[0]=points[3];
points[1].x=2.0*points[3].x-points[2].x;
points[1].y=2.0*points[3].y-points[2].y;
for (i=2; i < 4; i++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
x=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
y=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
if (*p == ',')
p++;
end.x=(double) (attribute == (int) 'S' ? x : point.x+x);
end.y=(double) (attribute == (int) 'S' ? y : point.y+y);
points[i]=end;
}
if (strchr("CcSs",last_attribute) == (char *) NULL)
{
points[0]=point;
points[1]=point;
}
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
(q+i)->point=points[i];
TraceBezier(q,4);
q+=q->coordinates;
point=end;
} while (IsPoint(p) != MagickFalse);
break;
}
case 't':
case 'T':
{
/*
Compute bezier points.
*/
do
{
points[0]=points[2];
points[1].x=2.0*points[2].x-points[1].x;
points[1].y=2.0*points[2].y-points[1].y;
for (i=2; i < 3; i++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
x=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
y=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
end.x=(double) (attribute == (int) 'T' ? x : point.x+x);
end.y=(double) (attribute == (int) 'T' ? y : point.y+y);
points[i]=end;
}
if (strchr("QqTt",last_attribute) == (char *) NULL)
{
points[0]=point;
points[1]=point;
}
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
(q+i)->point=points[i];
TraceBezier(q,3);
q+=q->coordinates;
point=end;
} while (IsPoint(p) != MagickFalse);
break;
}
case 'v':
case 'V':
{
do
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
y=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
point.y=(double) (attribute == (int) 'V' ? y : point.y+y);
TracePoint(q,point);
q+=q->coordinates;
} while (IsPoint(p) != MagickFalse);
break;
}
case 'z':
case 'Z':
{
point=start;
TracePoint(q,point);
q+=q->coordinates;
primitive_info->coordinates=(size_t) (q-primitive_info);
number_coordinates+=primitive_info->coordinates;
primitive_info=q;
z_count++;
break;
}
default:
{
if (isalpha((int) ((unsigned char) attribute)) != 0)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stderr,"attribute not recognized: %c\n",
attribute);
break;
}
}
}
primitive_info->coordinates=(size_t) (q-primitive_info);
number_coordinates+=primitive_info->coordinates;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_coordinates; i++)
{
q--;
q->primitive=primitive_type;
if (z_count > 1)
q->method=FillToBorderMethod;
}
q=primitive_info;
return(number_coordinates);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool InputHandler::PointIsWithinContents(gfx::PointF point) const {
gfx::Rect bounds = host_->GetView()->GetViewBounds();
bounds -= bounds.OffsetFromOrigin(); // Translate the bounds to (0,0).
return bounds.Contains(point.x(), point.y());
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteGROUP4Image(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
char
filename[MaxTextExtent];
FILE
*file;
Image
*huffman_image;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
int
unique_file;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count;
TIFF
*tiff;
toff_t
*byte_count,
strip_size;
unsigned char
*buffer;
/*
Write image as CCITT Group4 TIFF image to a temporary file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
huffman_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,&image->exception);
if (huffman_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
huffman_image->endian=MSBEndian;
file=(FILE *) NULL;
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if ((unique_file == -1) || (file == (FILE *) NULL))
{
ThrowFileException(&image->exception,FileOpenError,
"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile",filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(huffman_image->filename,MaxTextExtent,"tiff:%s",
filename);
(void) SetImageType(huffman_image,BilevelType);
write_info=CloneImageInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL);
SetImageInfoFile(write_info,file);
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType);
(void) SetImageDepth(image,1);
write_info->compression=Group4Compression;
write_info->type=BilevelType;
(void) SetImageOption(write_info,"quantum:polarity","min-is-white");
status=WriteTIFFImage(write_info,huffman_image);
(void) fflush(file);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(&image->exception,&huffman_image->exception);
huffman_image=DestroyImage(huffman_image);
(void) fclose(file);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
tiff=TIFFOpen(filename,"rb");
if (tiff == (TIFF *) NULL)
{
huffman_image=DestroyImage(huffman_image);
(void) fclose(file);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
ThrowFileException(&image->exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile",
image_info->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
/*
Allocate raw strip buffer.
*/
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_STRIPBYTECOUNTS,&byte_count) != 1)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
huffman_image=DestroyImage(huffman_image);
(void) fclose(file);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
strip_size=byte_count[0];
for (i=1; i < (ssize_t) TIFFNumberOfStrips(tiff); i++)
if (byte_count[i] > strip_size)
strip_size=byte_count[i];
buffer=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) strip_size,
sizeof(*buffer));
if (buffer == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
huffman_image=DestroyImage(huffman_image);
(void) fclose(file);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image_info->filename);
}
/*
Compress runlength encoded to 2D Huffman pixels.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) TIFFNumberOfStrips(tiff); i++)
{
count=(ssize_t) TIFFReadRawStrip(tiff,(uint32) i,buffer,strip_size);
if (WriteBlob(image,(size_t) count,buffer) != count)
status=MagickFalse;
}
buffer=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(buffer);
TIFFClose(tiff);
huffman_image=DestroyImage(huffman_image);
(void) fclose(file);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in SIXEL, PDB, MAP, and CALS coders (bug report from Donghai Zhu)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 28,381 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *rds_ib_wc_status_str(enum ib_wc_status status)
{
return rds_str_array(rds_ib_wc_status_strings,
ARRAY_SIZE(rds_ib_wc_status_strings), status);
}
Commit Message: rds: prevent BUG_ON triggering on congestion map updates
Recently had this bug halt reported to me:
kernel BUG at net/rds/send.c:329!
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
SMP NR_CPUS=1024 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in: rds sunrpc ipv6 dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log ibmveth sg
ext4 jbd2 mbcache sd_mod crc_t10dif ibmvscsic scsi_transport_srp scsi_tgt
dm_mod [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan]
NIP: d000000003ca68f4 LR: d000000003ca67fc CTR: d000000003ca8770
REGS: c000000175cab980 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (2.6.32-118.el6.ppc64)
MSR: 8000000000029032 <EE,ME,CE,IR,DR> CR: 44000022 XER: 00000000
TASK = c00000017586ec90[1896] 'krdsd' THREAD: c000000175ca8000 CPU: 0
GPR00: 0000000000000150 c000000175cabc00 d000000003cb7340 0000000000002030
GPR04: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000030 0000000000000000 0000000000000030
GPR08: 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 c0000001756b1e30 0000000000010000
GPR12: d000000003caac90 c000000000fa2500 c0000001742b2858 c0000001742b2a00
GPR16: c0000001742b2a08 c0000001742b2820 0000000000000001 0000000000000001
GPR20: 0000000000000040 c0000001742b2814 c000000175cabc70 0800000000000000
GPR24: 0000000000000004 0200000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000001742b2860
GPR28: 0000000000000000 c0000001756b1c80 d000000003cb68e8 c0000001742b27b8
NIP [d000000003ca68f4] .rds_send_xmit+0x4c4/0x8a0 [rds]
LR [d000000003ca67fc] .rds_send_xmit+0x3cc/0x8a0 [rds]
Call Trace:
[c000000175cabc00] [d000000003ca67fc] .rds_send_xmit+0x3cc/0x8a0 [rds]
(unreliable)
[c000000175cabd30] [d000000003ca7e64] .rds_send_worker+0x54/0x100 [rds]
[c000000175cabdb0] [c0000000000b475c] .worker_thread+0x1dc/0x3c0
[c000000175cabed0] [c0000000000baa9c] .kthread+0xbc/0xd0
[c000000175cabf90] [c000000000032114] .kernel_thread+0x54/0x70
Instruction dump:
4bfffd50 60000000 60000000 39080001 935f004c f91f0040 41820024 813d017c
7d094a78 7d290074 7929d182 394a0020 <0b090000> 40e2ff68 4bffffa4 39200000
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Call Trace:
[c000000175cab560] [c000000000012e04] .show_stack+0x74/0x1c0 (unreliable)
[c000000175cab610] [c0000000005a365c] .panic+0x80/0x1b4
[c000000175cab6a0] [c00000000002fbcc] .die+0x21c/0x2a0
[c000000175cab750] [c000000000030000] ._exception+0x110/0x220
[c000000175cab910] [c000000000004b9c] program_check_common+0x11c/0x180
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 24,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dotraplinkage void do_coprocessor_error(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
enum ctx_state prev_state;
prev_state = exception_enter();
math_error(regs, error_code, X86_TRAP_MF);
exception_exit(prev_state);
}
Commit Message: x86_64, traps: Stop using IST for #SS
On a 32-bit kernel, this has no effect, since there are no IST stacks.
On a 64-bit kernel, #SS can only happen in user code, on a failed iret
to user space, a canonical violation on access via RSP or RBP, or a
genuine stack segment violation in 32-bit kernel code. The first two
cases don't need IST, and the latter two cases are unlikely fatal bugs,
and promoting them to double faults would be fine.
This fixes a bug in which the espfix64 code mishandles a stack segment
violation.
This saves 4k of memory per CPU and a tiny bit of code.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,441 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct hugepage_subpool *hugepage_new_subpool(struct hstate *h, long max_hpages,
long min_hpages)
{
struct hugepage_subpool *spool;
spool = kzalloc(sizeof(*spool), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!spool)
return NULL;
spin_lock_init(&spool->lock);
spool->count = 1;
spool->max_hpages = max_hpages;
spool->hstate = h;
spool->min_hpages = min_hpages;
if (min_hpages != -1 && hugetlb_acct_memory(h, min_hpages)) {
kfree(spool);
return NULL;
}
spool->rsv_hpages = min_hpages;
return spool;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SkColor WebContentsImpl::GetThemeColor() const {
return theme_color_;
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,253 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagecreatefromwebp)
{
_php_image_create_from(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_WEBP, "WEBP", gdImageCreateFromWebp, gdImageCreateFromWebpCtx);
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #66356 (Heap Overflow Vulnerability in imagecrop())
And also fixed the bug: arguments are altered after some calls
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 2,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Parcel::Blob::Blob() :
mMapped(false), mData(NULL), mSize(0) {
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int apply_to_pud_range(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
pte_fn_t fn, void *data)
{
pud_t *pud;
unsigned long next;
int err;
pud = pud_alloc(mm, pgd, addr);
if (!pud)
return -ENOMEM;
do {
next = pud_addr_end(addr, end);
err = apply_to_pmd_range(mm, pud, addr, next, fn, data);
if (err)
break;
} while (pud++, addr = next, addr != end);
return err;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rad_create_request(struct rad_handle *h, int code)
{
int i;
h->request[POS_CODE] = code;
h->request[POS_IDENT] = ++h->ident;
/* Create a random authenticator */
for (i = 0; i < LEN_AUTH; i += 2) {
long r;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
r = php_rand(TSRMLS_C);
h->request[POS_AUTH+i] = (unsigned char) r;
h->request[POS_AUTH+i+1] = (unsigned char) (r >> 8);
}
h->req_len = POS_ATTRS;
h->request_created = 1;
clear_password(h);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a security issue in radius_get_vendor_attr().
The underlying rad_get_vendor_attr() function assumed that it would always be
given valid VSA data. Indeed, the buffer length wasn't even passed in; the
assumption was that the length field within the VSA structure would be valid.
This could result in denial of service by providing a length that would be
beyond the memory limit, or potential arbitrary memory access by providing a
length greater than the actual data given.
rad_get_vendor_attr() has been changed to require the raw data length be
provided, and this is then used to check that the VSA is valid.
Conflicts:
radlib_vs.h
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int nfs4_proc_bind_conn_to_session(struct nfs_client *clp, struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
int status;
struct nfs41_bind_conn_to_session_args args = {
.client = clp,
.dir = NFS4_CDFC4_FORE_OR_BOTH,
};
struct nfs41_bind_conn_to_session_res res;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc =
&nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
.rpc_cred = cred,
};
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
nfs4_copy_sessionid(&args.sessionid, &clp->cl_session->sess_id);
if (!(clp->cl_session->flags & SESSION4_BACK_CHAN))
args.dir = NFS4_CDFC4_FORE;
status = rpc_call_sync(clp->cl_rpcclient, &msg, RPC_TASK_TIMEOUT);
trace_nfs4_bind_conn_to_session(clp, status);
if (status == 0) {
if (memcmp(res.sessionid.data,
clp->cl_session->sess_id.data, NFS4_MAX_SESSIONID_LEN)) {
dprintk("NFS: %s: Session ID mismatch\n", __func__);
status = -EIO;
goto out;
}
if ((res.dir & args.dir) != res.dir || res.dir == 0) {
dprintk("NFS: %s: Unexpected direction from server\n",
__func__);
status = -EIO;
goto out;
}
if (res.use_conn_in_rdma_mode != args.use_conn_in_rdma_mode) {
dprintk("NFS: %s: Server returned RDMA mode = true\n",
__func__);
status = -EIO;
goto out;
}
}
out:
dprintk("<-- %s status= %d\n", __func__, status);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int_unix_date(uint32_t dos_date)
{
struct tm t;
if (dos_date == 0)
return(0);
interpret_dos_date(dos_date, &t);
t.tm_wday = 1;
t.tm_yday = 1;
t.tm_isdst = 0;
return (mktime(&t));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12893/SMB/CIFS: Add a bounds check in name_len().
After we advance the pointer by the length value in the buffer, make
sure it points to something in the captured data.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 18,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker(ExecState* exec)
{
JSSharedWorkerConstructor* jsConstructor = jsCast<JSSharedWorkerConstructor*>(exec->callee());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
UString scriptURL = exec->argument(0).toString(exec)->value(exec);
UString name;
if (exec->argumentCount() > 1)
name = exec->argument(1).toString(exec)->value(exec);
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(JSValue());
DOMWindow* window = asJSDOMWindow(exec->lexicalGlobalObject())->impl();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
RefPtr<SharedWorker> worker = SharedWorker::create(window->document(), ustringToString(scriptURL), ustringToString(name), ec);
if (ec) {
setDOMException(exec, ec);
return JSValue::encode(JSValue());
}
return JSValue::encode(asObject(toJS(exec, jsConstructor->globalObject(), worker.release())));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 10,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int hid_parse_report(struct hid_device *hid, __u8 *start, unsigned size)
{
hid->dev_rdesc = kmemdup(start, size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!hid->dev_rdesc)
return -ENOMEM;
hid->dev_rsize = size;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings
Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of
out-of-bound readings.
The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do
not have enough fields to fit the incoming values.
Add checks and silence KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 17,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool EditorClientBlackBerry::isGrammarCheckingEnabled()
{
notImplemented();
return false;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Prevent text selection inside Colour and Date/Time input fields
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111733
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
PR 305194.
Prevent selection for popup input fields as they are buttons.
Informally Reviewed Gen Mak.
* WebCoreSupport/EditorClientBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145121 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _dbus_header_delete_field (DBusHeader *header,
int field)
{
DBusTypeReader reader;
DBusTypeReader realign_root;
if (_dbus_header_cache_known_nonexistent (header, field))
return TRUE; /* nothing to do */
/* Scan to the field we want, delete and realign, reappend
* padding. Field may turn out not to exist.
*/
if (!find_field_for_modification (header, field,
&reader, &realign_root))
return TRUE; /* nothing to do */
if (!reserve_header_padding (header))
return FALSE;
if (!_dbus_type_reader_delete (&reader,
&realign_root))
return FALSE;
correct_header_padding (header);
_dbus_header_cache_invalidate_all (header);
_dbus_assert (!_dbus_header_cache_check (header, field)); /* Expensive assertion ... */
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType ClipImage(Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
return(ClipImagePath(image,"#1",MagickTrue,exception));
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,319 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int f2fs_submit_page_mbio(struct f2fs_io_info *fio)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = fio->sbi;
enum page_type btype = PAGE_TYPE_OF_BIO(fio->type);
struct f2fs_bio_info *io;
bool is_read = is_read_io(fio->op);
struct page *bio_page;
int err = 0;
io = is_read ? &sbi->read_io : &sbi->write_io[btype];
if (fio->old_blkaddr != NEW_ADDR)
verify_block_addr(sbi, fio->old_blkaddr);
verify_block_addr(sbi, fio->new_blkaddr);
bio_page = fio->encrypted_page ? fio->encrypted_page : fio->page;
if (!is_read)
inc_page_count(sbi, WB_DATA_TYPE(bio_page));
down_write(&io->io_rwsem);
if (io->bio && (io->last_block_in_bio != fio->new_blkaddr - 1 ||
(io->fio.op != fio->op || io->fio.op_flags != fio->op_flags) ||
!__same_bdev(sbi, fio->new_blkaddr, io->bio)))
__submit_merged_bio(io);
alloc_new:
if (io->bio == NULL) {
if ((fio->type == DATA || fio->type == NODE) &&
fio->new_blkaddr & F2FS_IO_SIZE_MASK(sbi)) {
err = -EAGAIN;
dec_page_count(sbi, WB_DATA_TYPE(bio_page));
goto out_fail;
}
io->bio = __bio_alloc(sbi, fio->new_blkaddr,
BIO_MAX_PAGES, is_read);
io->fio = *fio;
}
if (bio_add_page(io->bio, bio_page, PAGE_SIZE, 0) <
PAGE_SIZE) {
__submit_merged_bio(io);
goto alloc_new;
}
io->last_block_in_bio = fio->new_blkaddr;
f2fs_trace_ios(fio, 0);
out_fail:
up_write(&io->io_rwsem);
trace_f2fs_submit_page_mbio(fio->page, fio);
return err;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a dead loop in f2fs_fiemap()
A dead loop can be triggered in f2fs_fiemap() using the test case
as below:
...
fd = open();
fallocate(fd, 0, 0, 4294967296);
ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FIEMAP, fiemap_buf);
...
It's caused by an overflow in __get_data_block():
...
bh->b_size = map.m_len << inode->i_blkbits;
...
map.m_len is an unsigned int, and bh->b_size is a size_t which is 64 bits
on 64 bits archtecture, type conversion from an unsigned int to a size_t
will result in an overflow.
In the above-mentioned case, bh->b_size will be zero, and f2fs_fiemap()
will call get_data_block() at block 0 again an again.
Fix this by adding a force conversion before left shift.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 17,805 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::prepareForDestruction()
{
disconnectDescendantFrames();
if (DOMWindow* window = this->domWindow())
window->willDetachDocumentFromFrame();
detach();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: process_colcache(STREAM s)
{
COLOURENTRY *entry;
COLOURMAP map;
RD_HCOLOURMAP hmap;
uint8 cache_id;
int i;
in_uint8(s, cache_id);
in_uint16_le(s, map.ncolours);
map.colours = (COLOURENTRY *) xmalloc(sizeof(COLOURENTRY) * map.ncolours);
for (i = 0; i < map.ncolours; i++)
{
entry = &map.colours[i];
in_uint8(s, entry->blue);
in_uint8(s, entry->green);
in_uint8(s, entry->red);
in_uint8s(s, 1); /* pad */
}
logger(Graphics, Debug, "process_colcache(), id=%d, n=%d", cache_id, map.ncolours);
hmap = ui_create_colourmap(&map);
if (cache_id)
ui_set_colourmap(hmap);
xfree(map.colours);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_link_name (const char *name,
int count,
int max_length)
{
const char *format;
char *result;
int unshortened_length;
gboolean use_count;
g_assert (name != NULL);
if (count < 0)
{
g_warning ("bad count in get_link_name");
count = 0;
}
if (count <= 2)
{
/* Handle special cases for low numbers.
* Perhaps for some locales we will need to add more.
*/
switch (count)
{
default:
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
/* fall through */
}
case 0:
{
/* duplicate original file name */
format = "%s";
}
break;
case 1:
{
/* appended to new link file */
format = _("Link to %s");
}
break;
case 2:
{
/* appended to new link file */
format = _("Another link to %s");
}
break;
}
use_count = FALSE;
}
else
{
/* Handle special cases for the first few numbers of each ten.
* For locales where getting this exactly right is difficult,
* these can just be made all the same as the general case below.
*/
switch (count % 10)
{
case 1:
{
/* Localizers: Feel free to leave out the "st" suffix
* if there's no way to do that nicely for a
* particular language.
*/
format = _("%'dst link to %s");
}
break;
case 2:
{
/* appended to new link file */
format = _("%'dnd link to %s");
}
break;
case 3:
{
/* appended to new link file */
format = _("%'drd link to %s");
}
break;
default:
{
/* appended to new link file */
format = _("%'dth link to %s");
}
break;
}
use_count = TRUE;
}
#pragma GCC diagnostic push
#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wformat-nonliteral"
if (use_count)
{
result = g_strdup_printf (format, count, name);
}
else
{
result = g_strdup_printf (format, name);
}
if (max_length > 0 && (unshortened_length = strlen (result)) > max_length)
{
char *new_name;
new_name = shorten_utf8_string (name, unshortened_length - max_length);
if (new_name)
{
g_free (result);
if (use_count)
{
result = g_strdup_printf (format, count, new_name);
}
else
{
result = g_strdup_printf (format, new_name);
}
g_assert (strlen (result) <= max_length);
g_free (new_name);
}
}
#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
return result;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cm_init_qp_rts_attr(struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv,
struct ib_qp_attr *qp_attr,
int *qp_attr_mask)
{
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
spin_lock_irqsave(&cm_id_priv->lock, flags);
switch (cm_id_priv->id.state) {
/* Allow transition to RTS before sending REP */
case IB_CM_REQ_RCVD:
case IB_CM_MRA_REQ_SENT:
case IB_CM_REP_RCVD:
case IB_CM_MRA_REP_SENT:
case IB_CM_REP_SENT:
case IB_CM_MRA_REP_RCVD:
case IB_CM_ESTABLISHED:
if (cm_id_priv->id.lap_state == IB_CM_LAP_UNINIT) {
*qp_attr_mask = IB_QP_STATE | IB_QP_SQ_PSN;
qp_attr->sq_psn = be32_to_cpu(cm_id_priv->sq_psn);
switch (cm_id_priv->qp_type) {
case IB_QPT_RC:
case IB_QPT_XRC_INI:
*qp_attr_mask |= IB_QP_RETRY_CNT | IB_QP_RNR_RETRY |
IB_QP_MAX_QP_RD_ATOMIC;
qp_attr->retry_cnt = cm_id_priv->retry_count;
qp_attr->rnr_retry = cm_id_priv->rnr_retry_count;
qp_attr->max_rd_atomic = cm_id_priv->initiator_depth;
/* fall through */
case IB_QPT_XRC_TGT:
*qp_attr_mask |= IB_QP_TIMEOUT;
qp_attr->timeout = cm_id_priv->av.timeout;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (cm_id_priv->alt_av.ah_attr.dlid) {
*qp_attr_mask |= IB_QP_PATH_MIG_STATE;
qp_attr->path_mig_state = IB_MIG_REARM;
}
} else {
*qp_attr_mask = IB_QP_ALT_PATH | IB_QP_PATH_MIG_STATE;
qp_attr->alt_port_num = cm_id_priv->alt_av.port->port_num;
qp_attr->alt_pkey_index = cm_id_priv->alt_av.pkey_index;
qp_attr->alt_timeout = cm_id_priv->alt_av.timeout;
qp_attr->alt_ah_attr = cm_id_priv->alt_av.ah_attr;
qp_attr->path_mig_state = IB_MIG_REARM;
}
ret = 0;
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cm_id_priv->lock, flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void xts_round(struct sinfo *s, void *dst, const void *src)
{
be128_xor(dst, s->t, src); /* PP <- T xor P */
s->fn(s->tfm, dst, dst); /* CC <- E(Key1,PP) */
be128_xor(dst, dst, s->t); /* C <- T xor CC */
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int compat_get_timeval(struct timeval *tv, const void __user *utv)
{
if (COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME)
return copy_from_user(tv, utv, sizeof(*tv)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
else
return __compat_get_timeval(tv, utv);
}
Commit Message: compat: fix 4-byte infoleak via uninitialized struct field
Commit 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to
native counterparts") removed the memset() in compat_get_timex(). Since
then, the compat adjtimex syscall can invoke do_adjtimex() with an
uninitialized ->tai.
If do_adjtimex() doesn't write to ->tai (e.g. because the arguments are
invalid), compat_put_timex() then copies the uninitialized ->tai field
to userspace.
Fix it by adding the memset() back.
Fixes: 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to native counterparts")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 21,366 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::WebContentsTreeNode::OnFrameTreeNodeDestroyed(
FrameTreeNode* node) {
DCHECK_EQ(outer_contents_frame_tree_node_id_, node->frame_tree_node_id())
<< "WebContentsTreeNode should only receive notifications for the "
"FrameTreeNode in its outer WebContents that hosts it.";
delete current_web_contents_; // deletes |this| too.
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tsize_t t2p_write_pdf_catalog(T2P* t2p, TIFF* output)
{
tsize_t written = 0;
char buffer[32];
int buflen = 0;
written += t2pWriteFile(output,
(tdata_t)"<< \n/Type /Catalog \n/Pages ",
27);
buflen = snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%lu", (unsigned long)t2p->pdf_pages);
check_snprintf_ret(t2p, buflen, buffer);
written += t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer,
TIFFmin((size_t)buflen, sizeof(buffer) - 1));
written += t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) " 0 R \n", 6);
if(t2p->pdf_fitwindow){
written += t2pWriteFile(output,
(tdata_t) "/ViewerPreferences <</FitWindow true>>\n",
39);
}
written += t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t)">>\n", 3);
return(written);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 5,834 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ip6_frag_queue(struct frag_queue *fq, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct frag_hdr *fhdr, int nhoff)
{
struct sk_buff *prev, *next;
struct net_device *dev;
int offset, end;
struct net *net = dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev);
if (fq->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_COMPLETE)
goto err;
offset = ntohs(fhdr->frag_off) & ~0x7;
end = offset + (ntohs(ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len) -
((u8 *)(fhdr + 1) - (u8 *)(ipv6_hdr(skb) + 1)));
if ((unsigned int)end > IPV6_MAXPLEN) {
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS);
icmpv6_param_prob(skb, ICMPV6_HDR_FIELD,
((u8 *)&fhdr->frag_off -
skb_network_header(skb)));
return -1;
}
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE) {
const unsigned char *nh = skb_network_header(skb);
skb->csum = csum_sub(skb->csum,
csum_partial(nh, (u8 *)(fhdr + 1) - nh,
0));
}
/* Is this the final fragment? */
if (!(fhdr->frag_off & htons(IP6_MF))) {
/* If we already have some bits beyond end
* or have different end, the segment is corrupted.
*/
if (end < fq->q.len ||
((fq->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_LAST_IN) && end != fq->q.len))
goto err;
fq->q.last_in |= INET_FRAG_LAST_IN;
fq->q.len = end;
} else {
/* Check if the fragment is rounded to 8 bytes.
* Required by the RFC.
*/
if (end & 0x7) {
/* RFC2460 says always send parameter problem in
* this case. -DaveM
*/
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS);
icmpv6_param_prob(skb, ICMPV6_HDR_FIELD,
offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, payload_len));
return -1;
}
if (end > fq->q.len) {
/* Some bits beyond end -> corruption. */
if (fq->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_LAST_IN)
goto err;
fq->q.len = end;
}
}
if (end == offset)
goto err;
/* Point into the IP datagram 'data' part. */
if (!pskb_pull(skb, (u8 *) (fhdr + 1) - skb->data))
goto err;
if (pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, end - offset))
goto err;
/* Find out which fragments are in front and at the back of us
* in the chain of fragments so far. We must know where to put
* this fragment, right?
*/
prev = fq->q.fragments_tail;
if (!prev || FRAG6_CB(prev)->offset < offset) {
next = NULL;
goto found;
}
prev = NULL;
for(next = fq->q.fragments; next != NULL; next = next->next) {
if (FRAG6_CB(next)->offset >= offset)
break; /* bingo! */
prev = next;
}
found:
/* We found where to put this one. Check for overlap with
* preceding fragment, and, if needed, align things so that
* any overlaps are eliminated.
*/
if (prev) {
int i = (FRAG6_CB(prev)->offset + prev->len) - offset;
if (i > 0) {
offset += i;
if (end <= offset)
goto err;
if (!pskb_pull(skb, i))
goto err;
if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY)
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
}
}
/* Look for overlap with succeeding segments.
* If we can merge fragments, do it.
*/
while (next && FRAG6_CB(next)->offset < end) {
int i = end - FRAG6_CB(next)->offset; /* overlap is 'i' bytes */
if (i < next->len) {
/* Eat head of the next overlapped fragment
* and leave the loop. The next ones cannot overlap.
*/
if (!pskb_pull(next, i))
goto err;
FRAG6_CB(next)->offset += i; /* next fragment */
fq->q.meat -= i;
if (next->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY)
next->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
break;
} else {
struct sk_buff *free_it = next;
/* Old fragment is completely overridden with
* new one drop it.
*/
next = next->next;
if (prev)
prev->next = next;
else
fq->q.fragments = next;
fq->q.meat -= free_it->len;
frag_kfree_skb(fq->q.net, free_it);
}
}
FRAG6_CB(skb)->offset = offset;
/* Insert this fragment in the chain of fragments. */
skb->next = next;
if (!next)
fq->q.fragments_tail = skb;
if (prev)
prev->next = skb;
else
fq->q.fragments = skb;
dev = skb->dev;
if (dev) {
fq->iif = dev->ifindex;
skb->dev = NULL;
}
fq->q.stamp = skb->tstamp;
fq->q.meat += skb->len;
atomic_add(skb->truesize, &fq->q.net->mem);
/* The first fragment.
* nhoffset is obtained from the first fragment, of course.
*/
if (offset == 0) {
fq->nhoffset = nhoff;
fq->q.last_in |= INET_FRAG_FIRST_IN;
}
if (fq->q.last_in == (INET_FRAG_FIRST_IN | INET_FRAG_LAST_IN) &&
fq->q.meat == fq->q.len)
return ip6_frag_reasm(fq, prev, dev);
write_lock(&ip6_frags.lock);
list_move_tail(&fq->q.lru_list, &fq->q.net->lru_list);
write_unlock(&ip6_frags.lock);
return -1;
err:
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_REASMFAILS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: discard overlapping fragment
RFC5722 prohibits reassembling fragments when some data overlaps.
Bug spotted by Zhang Zuotao <zuotao.zhang@6wind.com>.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 1 | 22,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cac_match_card(sc_card_t *card)
{
int r;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
/* Since we send an APDU, the card's logout function may be called...
* however it may be in dirty memory */
card->ops->logout = NULL;
r = cac_find_and_initialize(card, 0);
return (r == SC_SUCCESS); /* never match */
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 11,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsUninitializedMemory(void* object_pointer, size_t object_size) {
Address* object_fields = reinterpret_cast<Address*>(object_pointer);
for (size_t i = 0; i < object_size / sizeof(Address); ++i) {
if (object_fields[i])
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 9,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void print_ls(int mode, const unsigned char *sha1, const char *path)
{
static struct strbuf line = STRBUF_INIT;
/* See show_tree(). */
const char *type =
S_ISGITLINK(mode) ? commit_type :
S_ISDIR(mode) ? tree_type :
blob_type;
if (!mode) {
/* missing SP path LF */
strbuf_reset(&line);
strbuf_addstr(&line, "missing ");
quote_c_style(path, &line, NULL, 0);
strbuf_addch(&line, '\n');
} else {
/* mode SP type SP object_name TAB path LF */
strbuf_reset(&line);
strbuf_addf(&line, "%06o %s %s\t",
mode & ~NO_DELTA, type, sha1_to_hex(sha1));
quote_c_style(path, &line, NULL, 0);
strbuf_addch(&line, '\n');
}
cat_blob_write(line.buf, line.len);
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CreateTextFile(const FilePath& filename,
const std::wstring& contents) {
std::wofstream file;
file.open(filename.value().c_str());
ASSERT_TRUE(file.is_open());
file << contents;
file.close();
}
Commit Message: Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 20,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: entry_guard_has_higher_priority(entry_guard_t *a, entry_guard_t *b)
{
tor_assert(a && b);
if (a == b)
return 0;
/* Confirmed is always better than unconfirmed; lower index better
than higher */
if (a->confirmed_idx < 0) {
if (b->confirmed_idx >= 0)
return 0;
} else {
if (b->confirmed_idx < 0)
return 1;
/* Lower confirmed_idx is better than higher. */
return (a->confirmed_idx < b->confirmed_idx);
}
/* If we reach this point, both are unconfirmed. If one is pending, it
* has higher priority. */
if (a->is_pending) {
if (! b->is_pending)
return 1;
/* Both are pending: earlier last_tried_connect wins. */
return a->last_tried_to_connect < b->last_tried_to_connect;
} else {
if (b->is_pending)
return 0;
/* Neither is pending: priorities are equal. */
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 25,485 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long macvtap_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
return macvtap_ioctl(file, cmd, (unsigned long)compat_ptr(arg));
}
Commit Message: macvtap: zerocopy: validate vectors before building skb
There're several reasons that the vectors need to be validated:
- Return error when caller provides vectors whose num is greater than UIO_MAXIOV.
- Linearize part of skb when userspace provides vectors grater than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
- Return error when userspace provides vectors whose total length may exceed
- MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,664 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::close()
{
if (!scriptableDocumentParser() || !scriptableDocumentParser()->wasCreatedByScript() || !scriptableDocumentParser()->isParsing())
return;
explicitClose();
}
Commit Message: Don't change Document load progress in any page dismissal events.
This can confuse the logic for blocking modal dialogs.
BUG=536652
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1373113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351419}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hfsplus_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
{
return hfsplus_mknod(dir, dentry, mode | S_IFDIR, 0);
}
Commit Message: hfsplus: Fix potential buffer overflows
Commit ec81aecb2966 ("hfs: fix a potential buffer overflow") fixed a few
potential buffer overflows in the hfs filesystem. But as Timo Warns
pointed out, these changes also need to be made on the hfsplus
filesystem as well.
Reported-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Acked-by: WANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Cc: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Anderson <anderson@redhat.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int v9fs_xattr_fid_clunk(V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsFidState *fidp)
{
int retval = 0;
if (fidp->fs.xattr.copied_len == -1) {
/* getxattr/listxattr fid */
goto free_value;
}
/*
* if this is fid for setxattr. clunk should
* result in setxattr localcall
*/
if (fidp->fs.xattr.len != fidp->fs.xattr.copied_len) {
/* clunk after partial write */
retval = -EINVAL;
goto free_out;
}
if (fidp->fs.xattr.len) {
retval = v9fs_co_lsetxattr(pdu, &fidp->path, &fidp->fs.xattr.name,
fidp->fs.xattr.value,
fidp->fs.xattr.len,
fidp->fs.xattr.flags);
} else {
retval = v9fs_co_lremovexattr(pdu, &fidp->path, &fidp->fs.xattr.name);
}
free_out:
v9fs_string_free(&fidp->fs.xattr.name);
free_value:
g_free(fidp->fs.xattr.value);
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t utf8_to_utf32_length(const char *src, size_t src_len)
{
if (src == NULL || src_len == 0) {
return 0;
}
size_t ret = 0;
const char* cur;
const char* end;
size_t num_to_skip;
for (cur = src, end = src + src_len, num_to_skip = 1;
cur < end;
cur += num_to_skip, ret++) {
const char first_char = *cur;
num_to_skip = 1;
if ((first_char & 0x80) == 0) { // ASCII
continue;
}
int32_t mask;
for (mask = 0x40; (first_char & mask); num_to_skip++, mask >>= 1) {
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t CameraService::removeListener(
const sp<ICameraServiceListener>& listener) {
ALOGV("%s: Remove listener %p", __FUNCTION__, listener.get());
if (listener == 0) {
ALOGE("%s: Listener must not be null", __FUNCTION__);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock lock(mServiceLock);
Vector<sp<ICameraServiceListener> >::iterator it;
for (it = mListenerList.begin(); it != mListenerList.end(); ++it) {
if ((*it)->asBinder() == listener->asBinder()) {
mListenerList.erase(it);
return OK;
}
}
ALOGW("%s: Tried to remove a listener %p which was not subscribed",
__FUNCTION__, listener.get());
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 5,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: main (int argc, char *argv[])
{
Object info;
GBool ok;
int exitCode;
exitCode = 99;
ok = parseArgs (argDesc, &argc, argv);
if (!ok || argc != 3 || printVersion || printHelp)
{
fprintf (stderr, "pdfseparate version %s\n", PACKAGE_VERSION);
fprintf (stderr, "%s\n", popplerCopyright);
fprintf (stderr, "%s\n", xpdfCopyright);
if (!printVersion)
{
printUsage ("pdfseparate", "<PDF-sourcefile> <PDF-pattern-destfile>",
argDesc);
}
if (printVersion || printHelp)
exitCode = 0;
goto err0;
}
globalParams = new GlobalParams();
ok = extractPages (argv[1], argv[2]);
if (ok) {
exitCode = 0;
}
delete globalParams;
err0:
return exitCode;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Downmix_foldGeneric(
uint32_t mask, int16_t *pSrc, int16_t*pDst, size_t numFrames, bool accumulate) {
if (mask & kUnsupported) {
ALOGE("Unsupported channels (top or front left/right of center)");
return false;
}
if ((mask & AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_STEREO) != AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_STEREO) {
ALOGE("Front channels must be present");
return false;
}
bool hasSides = false;
if ((mask & kSides) != 0) {
if ((mask & kSides) != kSides) {
ALOGE("Side channels must be used as a pair");
return false;
}
hasSides = true;
}
bool hasBacks = false;
if ((mask & kBacks) != 0) {
if ((mask & kBacks) != kBacks) {
ALOGE("Back channels must be used as a pair");
return false;
}
hasBacks = true;
}
const int numChan = audio_channel_count_from_out_mask(mask);
const bool hasFC = ((mask & AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_FRONT_CENTER) == AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_FRONT_CENTER);
const bool hasLFE =
((mask & AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_LOW_FREQUENCY) == AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_LOW_FREQUENCY);
const bool hasBC = ((mask & AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_BACK_CENTER) == AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_BACK_CENTER);
const int indexFC = hasFC ? 2 : 1; // front center
const int indexLFE = hasLFE ? indexFC + 1 : indexFC; // low frequency
const int indexBL = hasBacks ? indexLFE + 1 : indexLFE; // back left
const int indexBR = hasBacks ? indexBL + 1 : indexBL; // back right
const int indexBC = hasBC ? indexBR + 1 : indexBR; // back center
const int indexSL = hasSides ? indexBC + 1 : indexBC; // side left
const int indexSR = hasSides ? indexSL + 1 : indexSL; // side right
int32_t lt, rt, centersLfeContrib; // samples in Q19.12 format
if (accumulate) {
while (numFrames) {
centersLfeContrib = 0;
if (hasFC) { centersLfeContrib += pSrc[indexFC]; }
if (hasLFE) { centersLfeContrib += pSrc[indexLFE]; }
if (hasBC) { centersLfeContrib += pSrc[indexBC]; }
centersLfeContrib *= MINUS_3_DB_IN_Q19_12;
lt = (pSrc[0] << 12);
rt = (pSrc[1] << 12);
if (hasSides) {
lt += pSrc[indexSL] << 12;
rt += pSrc[indexSR] << 12;
}
if (hasBacks) {
lt += pSrc[indexBL] << 12;
rt += pSrc[indexBR] << 12;
}
lt += centersLfeContrib;
rt += centersLfeContrib;
pDst[0] = clamp16(pDst[0] + (lt >> 13));
pDst[1] = clamp16(pDst[1] + (rt >> 13));
pSrc += numChan;
pDst += 2;
numFrames--;
}
} else {
while (numFrames) {
centersLfeContrib = 0;
if (hasFC) { centersLfeContrib += pSrc[indexFC]; }
if (hasLFE) { centersLfeContrib += pSrc[indexLFE]; }
if (hasBC) { centersLfeContrib += pSrc[indexBC]; }
centersLfeContrib *= MINUS_3_DB_IN_Q19_12;
lt = (pSrc[0] << 12);
rt = (pSrc[1] << 12);
if (hasSides) {
lt += pSrc[indexSL] << 12;
rt += pSrc[indexSR] << 12;
}
if (hasBacks) {
lt += pSrc[indexBL] << 12;
rt += pSrc[indexBR] << 12;
}
lt += centersLfeContrib;
rt += centersLfeContrib;
pDst[0] = clamp16(lt >> 13); // differs from when accumulate is true above
pDst[1] = clamp16(rt >> 13); // differs from when accumulate is true above
pSrc += numChan;
pDst += 2;
numFrames--;
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: process_mux_close_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
{
struct Forward fwd, *found_fwd;
char *fwd_desc = NULL;
const char *error_reason = NULL;
char *listen_addr = NULL, *connect_addr = NULL;
u_int ftype;
int i, ret = 0;
u_int lport, cport;
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ftype, m) != 0 ||
(listen_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
buffer_get_int_ret(&lport, m) != 0 ||
(connect_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
buffer_get_int_ret(&cport, m) != 0 ||
(lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) ||
(cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) {
error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
if (*listen_addr == '\0') {
free(listen_addr);
listen_addr = NULL;
}
if (*connect_addr == '\0') {
free(connect_addr);
connect_addr = NULL;
}
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
fwd.listen_port = lport;
if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.listen_path = listen_addr;
else
fwd.listen_host = listen_addr;
fwd.connect_port = cport;
if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.connect_path = connect_addr;
else
fwd.connect_host = connect_addr;
debug2("%s: channel %d: request cancel %s", __func__, c->self,
(fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd)));
/* make sure this has been requested */
found_fwd = NULL;
switch (ftype) {
case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
if (compare_forward(&fwd,
options.local_forwards + i)) {
found_fwd = options.local_forwards + i;
break;
}
}
break;
case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
if (compare_forward(&fwd,
options.remote_forwards + i)) {
found_fwd = options.remote_forwards + i;
break;
}
}
break;
}
if (found_fwd == NULL)
error_reason = "port not forwarded";
else if (ftype == MUX_FWD_REMOTE) {
/*
* This shouldn't fail unless we confused the host/port
* between options.remote_forwards and permitted_opens.
* However, for dynamic allocated listen ports we need
* to use the actual listen port.
*/
if (channel_request_rforward_cancel(found_fwd) == -1)
error_reason = "port not in permitted opens";
} else { /* local and dynamic forwards */
/* Ditto */
if (channel_cancel_lport_listener(&fwd, fwd.connect_port,
&options.fwd_opts) == -1)
error_reason = "port not found";
}
if (error_reason == NULL) {
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK);
buffer_put_int(r, rid);
free(found_fwd->listen_host);
free(found_fwd->listen_path);
free(found_fwd->connect_host);
free(found_fwd->connect_path);
found_fwd->listen_host = found_fwd->connect_host = NULL;
found_fwd->listen_path = found_fwd->connect_path = NULL;
found_fwd->listen_port = found_fwd->connect_port = 0;
} else {
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
buffer_put_int(r, rid);
buffer_put_cstring(r, error_reason);
}
out:
free(fwd_desc);
free(listen_addr);
free(connect_addr);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 23,805 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf_array_push_drop(fz_context *ctx, pdf_obj *obj, pdf_obj *item)
{
RESOLVE(obj);
if (obj >= PDF_OBJ__LIMIT)
{
fz_try(ctx)
pdf_array_push(ctx, obj, item);
fz_always(ctx)
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, item);
fz_catch(ctx)
fz_rethrow(ctx);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 27,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RelayEnsureFileExists(
scoped_refptr<base::MessageLoopProxy> message_loop_proxy,
const FilePath& file_path,
base::FileUtilProxy::EnsureFileExistsCallback* callback)
: message_loop_proxy_(message_loop_proxy),
file_path_(file_path),
callback_(callback),
created_(false) {
DCHECK(callback);
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,184 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const ExtensionList* ExtensionService::disabled_extensions() const {
return &disabled_extensions_;
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 3,138 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2Implementation::GetProgramResourceivHelper(GLuint program,
GLenum program_interface,
GLuint index,
GLsizei prop_count,
const GLenum* props,
GLsizei bufsize,
GLsizei* length,
GLint* params) {
DCHECK_LE(0, prop_count);
DCHECK_LE(0, bufsize);
base::CheckedNumeric<uint32_t> bytes = prop_count;
bytes *= sizeof(GLenum);
if (!bytes.IsValid()) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glGetProgramResourceiv", "count overflow");
return false;
}
SetBucketContents(kResultBucketId, props, bytes.ValueOrDefault(0));
typedef cmds::GetProgramResourceiv::Result Result;
auto result = GetResultAs<Result>();
if (!result) {
return false;
}
result->SetNumResults(0);
helper_->GetProgramResourceiv(program, program_interface, index,
kResultBucketId, GetResultShmId(),
result.offset());
WaitForCmd();
if (length) {
*length = result->GetNumResults();
}
if (result->GetNumResults() > 0) {
if (params) {
result->CopyResult(params);
}
GPU_CLIENT_LOG_CODE_BLOCK({
for (int32_t i = 0; i < result->GetNumResults(); ++i) {
GPU_CLIENT_LOG(" " << i << ": " << result->GetData()[i]);
}
});
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 14,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: flatpak_proxy_add_wildcarded_policy (FlatpakProxy *proxy,
const char *name,
FlatpakPolicy policy)
{
g_hash_table_replace (proxy->wildcard_policy, g_strdup (name), GINT_TO_POINTER (policy));
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436 | 0 | 624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr TIFFReadDirEntryCheckedSrational(TIFF* tif, TIFFDirEntry* direntry, double* value)
{
UInt64Aligned_t m;
assert(sizeof(double)==8);
assert(sizeof(uint64)==8);
assert(sizeof(int32)==4);
assert(sizeof(uint32)==4);
if (!(tif->tif_flags&TIFF_BIGTIFF))
{
enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr err;
uint32 offset = direntry->tdir_offset.toff_long;
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabLong(&offset);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryData(tif,offset,8,m.i);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
return(err);
}
else
m.l=direntry->tdir_offset.toff_long8;
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabArrayOfLong(m.i,2);
if ((int32)m.i[0]==0)
*value=0.0;
else
*value=(double)((int32)m.i[0])/(double)m.i[1];
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XML_SetStartElementHandler(XML_Parser parser,
XML_StartElementHandler start) {
if (parser != NULL)
parser->m_startElementHandler = start;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 29,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Instance::IsOverlayScrollbar() {
return GetScrollbarReservedThickness() == 0;
}
Commit Message: Let PDFium handle event when there is not yet a visible page.
Speculative fix for 415307. CF will confirm.
The stack trace for that bug indicates an attempt to index by -1, which is consistent with no visible page.
BUG=415307
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/560133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#295421}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int i2d_ECParameters(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out)
{
if (a == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
return i2d_ECPKParameters(a->group, out);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::ExtendSelectionAndDelete(
size_t before, size_t after) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,337 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniform4uiv(
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
const FlexibleUint32ArrayView& v,
GLuint src_offset,
GLuint src_length) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateUniformParameters<WTF::Uint32Array>("uniform4uiv", location, v,
4, src_offset, src_length))
return;
ContextGL()->Uniform4uiv(
location->Location(),
(src_length ? src_length : (v.length() - src_offset)) >> 2,
v.DataMaybeOnStack() + src_offset);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d;
pitem *item = NULL;
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
pqueue *unprocessed_rcds;
pqueue *processed_rcds;
pqueue *buffered_app_data;
d = rl->d;
while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) {
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
unprocessed_rcds = d->unprocessed_rcds.q;
processed_rcds = d->processed_rcds.q;
buffered_app_data = d->buffered_app_data.q;
memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d));
d->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds;
d->processed_rcds.q = processed_rcds;
d->buffered_app_data.q = buffered_app_data;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 21,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: align_by_4 (guint32 offset)
{
return (offset + 4 - 1) & ~(4 - 1);
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436 | 0 | 17,330 |
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