instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void cirrus_cursor_compute_yrange(CirrusVGAState *s)
{
const uint8_t *src;
uint32_t content;
int y, y_min, y_max;
src = s->vga.vram_ptr + s->real_vram_size - 16 * 1024;
if (s->vga.sr[0x12] & CIRRUS_CURSOR_LARGE) {
src += (s->vga.sr[0x13] & 0x3c) * 256;
y_min = 64;
y_max = -1;
for(y = 0; y < 64; y++) {
content = ((uint32_t *)src)[0] |
((uint32_t *)src)[1] |
((uint32_t *)src)[2] |
((uint32_t *)src)[3];
if (content) {
if (y < y_min)
y_min = y;
if (y > y_max)
y_max = y;
}
src += 16;
}
} else {
src += (s->vga.sr[0x13] & 0x3f) * 256;
y_min = 32;
y_max = -1;
for(y = 0; y < 32; y++) {
content = ((uint32_t *)src)[0] |
((uint32_t *)(src + 128))[0];
if (content) {
if (y < y_min)
y_min = y;
if (y > y_max)
y_max = y;
}
src += 4;
}
}
if (y_min > y_max) {
s->last_hw_cursor_y_start = 0;
s->last_hw_cursor_y_end = 0;
} else {
s->last_hw_cursor_y_start = y_min;
s->last_hw_cursor_y_end = y_max + 1;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,395 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void unmap_descbuffer(struct b43_dmaring *ring,
dma_addr_t addr, size_t len, int tx)
{
if (tx) {
dma_unmap_single(ring->dev->dev->dma_dev,
addr, len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
} else {
dma_unmap_single(ring->dev->dev->dma_dev,
addr, len, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
}
}
Commit Message: b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
{
return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
}
Commit Message: apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's
(interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always
a single page was violated.
The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write()
will reject anything larger, but for the sake of robustness we can keep
it in.
SMACK and SELinux look safe to me, but somebody else should probably
have a look just in case.
Based on original patch from Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
modified for the case that apparmor provides null termination.
Fixes: bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sm_looptest_min_isl_redundancy(p_fm_config_conx_hdlt hdl, fm_mgr_type_t mgr, int argc, char *argv[]) {
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res;
fm_msg_ret_code_t ret_code;
int plen=1;
uint8_t data[BUF_SZ];
if (argc > 1) {
printf("Error: only 1 argument expected\n");
return 0;
}
if (argc == 1) {
plen = atol(argv[0]);
}
*(int*)data = plen;
if((res = fm_mgr_simple_query(hdl, FM_ACT_GET, FM_DT_SM_LOOP_TEST_MIN_ISL_REDUNDANCY, mgr,
BUF_SZ, data, &ret_code)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "sm_looptest_path_min_isl_redundancy: Failed to retrieve data: \n"
"\tError:(%d) %s \n\tRet code:(%d) %s\n",
res, fm_mgr_get_error_str(res),ret_code,
fm_mgr_get_resp_error_str(ret_code));
} else {
printf("Successfully sent Loop Test Min ISL redundancy set to %d control to local SM instance\n", plen);
data[BUF_SZ-1]=0;
printf("%s", (char*) data);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 25,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pam_sm_close_session (pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags UNUSED,
int argc, const char **argv)
{
void *cookiefile;
int i, debug = 0;
const char* user;
struct passwd *tpwd = NULL;
uid_t unlinkuid, fsuid;
if (pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL) != PAM_SUCCESS)
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "error determining target user's name");
else {
tpwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, user);
if (!tpwd)
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "error determining target user's UID");
else
unlinkuid = tpwd->pw_uid;
}
/* Parse arguments. We don't understand many, so no sense in breaking
* this into a separate function. */
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
if (strcmp(argv[i], "debug") == 0) {
debug = 1;
continue;
}
if (strncmp(argv[i], "xauthpath=", 10) == 0) {
continue;
}
if (strncmp(argv[i], "systemuser=", 11) == 0) {
continue;
}
if (strncmp(argv[i], "targetuser=", 11) == 0) {
continue;
}
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING, "unrecognized option `%s'",
argv[i]);
}
/* Try to retrieve the name of a file we created when the session was
* opened. */
if (pam_get_data(pamh, DATANAME, (const void**) &cookiefile) == PAM_SUCCESS) {
/* We'll only try to remove the file once. */
if (strlen((char*)cookiefile) > 0) {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "removing `%s'",
(char*)cookiefile);
}
/* NFS with root_squash requires non-root user */
if (tpwd)
fsuid = setfsuid(unlinkuid);
unlink((char*)cookiefile);
if (tpwd)
setfsuid(fsuid);
*((char*)cookiefile) = '\0';
}
}
return PAM_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 1 | 20,439 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hns_roce_add_gid(struct ib_device *device, u8 port_num,
unsigned int index, const union ib_gid *gid,
const struct ib_gid_attr *attr, void **context)
{
struct hns_roce_dev *hr_dev = to_hr_dev(device);
u8 port = port_num - 1;
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
if (port >= hr_dev->caps.num_ports)
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&hr_dev->iboe.lock, flags);
ret = hr_dev->hw->set_gid(hr_dev, port, index, (union ib_gid *)gid,
attr);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hr_dev->iboe.lock, flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: RDMA/hns: Fix init resp when alloc ucontext
The data in resp will be copied from kernel to userspace, thus it needs to
be initialized to zeros to avoid copying uninited stack memory.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: e088a685eae9 ("RDMA/hns: Support rq record doorbell for the user space")
Signed-off-by: Yixian Liu <liuyixian@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-665 | 0 | 4,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_event_for_each_child(struct perf_event *event,
void (*func)(struct perf_event *))
{
struct perf_event *child;
WARN_ON_ONCE(event->ctx->parent_ctx);
mutex_lock(&event->child_mutex);
func(event);
list_for_each_entry(child, &event->child_list, child_list)
func(child);
mutex_unlock(&event->child_mutex);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 19,989 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DidRead(File::Error error,
const char* data,
int bytes_read) {
error_ = error;
buffer_.resize(bytes_read);
memcpy(&buffer_[0], data, bytes_read);
MessageLoop::current()->QuitWhenIdle();
}
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 5,890 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoftAACEncoder2::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
if (!mSentCodecSpecificData) {
if (outQueue.empty()) {
return;
}
if (AACENC_OK != aacEncEncode(mAACEncoder, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
ALOGE("Unable to initialize encoder for profile / sample-rate / bit-rate / channels");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
OMX_U32 actualBitRate = aacEncoder_GetParam(mAACEncoder, AACENC_BITRATE);
if (mBitRate != actualBitRate) {
ALOGW("Requested bitrate %u unsupported, using %u", mBitRate, actualBitRate);
}
AACENC_InfoStruct encInfo;
if (AACENC_OK != aacEncInfo(mAACEncoder, &encInfo)) {
ALOGE("Failed to get AAC encoder info");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nFilledLen = encInfo.confSize;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG;
uint8_t *out = outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset;
memcpy(out, encInfo.confBuf, encInfo.confSize);
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
mSentCodecSpecificData = true;
}
size_t numBytesPerInputFrame =
mNumChannels * kNumSamplesPerFrame * sizeof(int16_t);
if (mAACProfile == OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectELD && numBytesPerInputFrame > 512) {
numBytesPerInputFrame = 512;
}
for (;;) {
while (mInputSize < numBytesPerInputFrame) {
if (mSawInputEOS || inQueue.empty()) {
return;
}
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
const void *inData = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
size_t copy = numBytesPerInputFrame - mInputSize;
if (copy > inHeader->nFilledLen) {
copy = inHeader->nFilledLen;
}
if (mInputFrame == NULL) {
mInputFrame = new int16_t[numBytesPerInputFrame / sizeof(int16_t)];
}
if (mInputSize == 0) {
mInputTimeUs = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
}
memcpy((uint8_t *)mInputFrame + mInputSize, inData, copy);
mInputSize += copy;
inHeader->nOffset += copy;
inHeader->nFilledLen -= copy;
inHeader->nTimeStamp +=
(copy * 1000000ll / mSampleRate)
/ (mNumChannels * sizeof(int16_t));
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mSawInputEOS = true;
memset((uint8_t *)mInputFrame + mInputSize,
0,
numBytesPerInputFrame - mInputSize);
mInputSize = numBytesPerInputFrame;
}
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inData = NULL;
inHeader = NULL;
inInfo = NULL;
}
}
if (outQueue.empty()) {
return;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
uint8_t *outPtr = (uint8_t *)outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset;
size_t outAvailable = outHeader->nAllocLen - outHeader->nOffset;
AACENC_InArgs inargs;
AACENC_OutArgs outargs;
memset(&inargs, 0, sizeof(inargs));
memset(&outargs, 0, sizeof(outargs));
inargs.numInSamples = numBytesPerInputFrame / sizeof(int16_t);
void* inBuffer[] = { (unsigned char *)mInputFrame };
INT inBufferIds[] = { IN_AUDIO_DATA };
INT inBufferSize[] = { (INT)numBytesPerInputFrame };
INT inBufferElSize[] = { sizeof(int16_t) };
AACENC_BufDesc inBufDesc;
inBufDesc.numBufs = sizeof(inBuffer) / sizeof(void*);
inBufDesc.bufs = (void**)&inBuffer;
inBufDesc.bufferIdentifiers = inBufferIds;
inBufDesc.bufSizes = inBufferSize;
inBufDesc.bufElSizes = inBufferElSize;
void* outBuffer[] = { outPtr };
INT outBufferIds[] = { OUT_BITSTREAM_DATA };
INT outBufferSize[] = { 0 };
INT outBufferElSize[] = { sizeof(UCHAR) };
AACENC_BufDesc outBufDesc;
outBufDesc.numBufs = sizeof(outBuffer) / sizeof(void*);
outBufDesc.bufs = (void**)&outBuffer;
outBufDesc.bufferIdentifiers = outBufferIds;
outBufDesc.bufSizes = outBufferSize;
outBufDesc.bufElSizes = outBufferElSize;
AACENC_ERROR encoderErr = AACENC_OK;
size_t nOutputBytes = 0;
do {
memset(&outargs, 0, sizeof(outargs));
outBuffer[0] = outPtr;
outBufferSize[0] = outAvailable - nOutputBytes;
encoderErr = aacEncEncode(mAACEncoder,
&inBufDesc,
&outBufDesc,
&inargs,
&outargs);
if (encoderErr == AACENC_OK) {
outPtr += outargs.numOutBytes;
nOutputBytes += outargs.numOutBytes;
if (outargs.numInSamples > 0) {
int numRemainingSamples = inargs.numInSamples - outargs.numInSamples;
if (numRemainingSamples > 0) {
memmove(mInputFrame,
&mInputFrame[outargs.numInSamples],
sizeof(int16_t) * numRemainingSamples);
}
inargs.numInSamples -= outargs.numInSamples;
}
}
} while (encoderErr == AACENC_OK && inargs.numInSamples > 0);
outHeader->nFilledLen = nOutputBytes;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_ENDOFFRAME;
if (mSawInputEOS) {
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp = mInputTimeUs;
#if 0
ALOGI("sending %d bytes of data (time = %lld us, flags = 0x%08lx)",
nOutputBytes, mInputTimeUs, outHeader->nFlags);
hexdump(outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset, outHeader->nFilledLen);
#endif
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
outInfo = NULL;
mInputSize = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProfileImplIOData::AcquireMediaRequestContext() const {
DCHECK(media_request_context_);
return media_request_context_;
}
Commit Message: Give the media context an ftp job factory; prevent a browser crash.
BUG=112983
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121378 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int IsExtendedReportingCheckboxVisibleOnInterstitial() {
const std::string command = base::StringPrintf(
"var node = document.getElementById('extended-reporting-opt-in');"
"if (node) {"
" window.domAutomationController.send(node.offsetWidth > 0 || "
" node.offsetHeight > 0 ? %d : %d);"
"} else {"
" window.domAutomationController.send(%d);"
"}",
security_interstitials::CMD_TEXT_FOUND,
security_interstitials::CMD_TEXT_NOT_FOUND,
security_interstitials::CMD_ERROR);
content::WebContents* tab =
browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents();
WaitForInterstitial(tab);
int result = 0;
EXPECT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScriptAndExtractInt(
AreCommittedInterstitialsEnabled()
? tab->GetMainFrame()
: tab->GetInterstitialPage()->GetMainFrame(),
command, &result));
return result;
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,392 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ikev1_sig_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep _U_, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_SIG)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_SIG)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13689/IKEv1: Fix addr+subnet length check.
An IPv6 address plus subnet mask is 32 bytes, not 20 bytes.
16 bytes of IPv6 address, 16 bytes of subnet mask.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 13,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int show_stat(struct kmem_cache *s, char *buf, enum stat_item si)
{
unsigned long sum = 0;
int cpu;
int len;
int *data = kmalloc(nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
unsigned x = get_cpu_slab(s, cpu)->stat[si];
data[cpu] = x;
sum += x;
}
len = sprintf(buf, "%lu", sum);
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
if (data[cpu] && len < PAGE_SIZE - 20)
len += sprintf(buf + len, " C%d=%u", cpu, data[cpu]);
}
#endif
kfree(data);
return len + sprintf(buf + len, "\n");
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GBool ASCIIHexStream::isBinary(GBool last) {
return str->isBinary(gFalse);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int utf8_to_utf32(const u8 *s, int len, unicode_t *pu)
{
unsigned long l;
int c0, c, nc;
const struct utf8_table *t;
nc = 0;
c0 = *s;
l = c0;
for (t = utf8_table; t->cmask; t++) {
nc++;
if ((c0 & t->cmask) == t->cval) {
l &= t->lmask;
if (l < t->lval || l > UNICODE_MAX ||
(l & SURROGATE_MASK) == SURROGATE_PAIR)
return -1;
*pu = (unicode_t) l;
return nc;
}
if (len <= nc)
return -1;
s++;
c = (*s ^ 0x80) & 0xFF;
if (c & 0xC0)
return -1;
l = (l << 6) | c;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: NLS: improve UTF8 -> UTF16 string conversion routine
The utf8s_to_utf16s conversion routine needs to be improved. Unlike
its utf16s_to_utf8s sibling, it doesn't accept arguments specifying
the maximum length of the output buffer or the endianness of its
16-bit output.
This patch (as1501) adds the two missing arguments, and adjusts the
only two places in the kernel where the function is called. A
follow-on patch will add a third caller that does utilize the new
capabilities.
The two conversion routines are still annoyingly inconsistent in the
way they handle invalid byte combinations. But that's a subject for a
different patch.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
CC: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: test_one_file(const char *file_name, format_list *formats, png_uint_32 opts,
int stride_extra, int log_pass)
{
int result;
Image image;
newimage(&image);
initimage(&image, opts, file_name, stride_extra);
result = read_one_file(&image);
if (result)
result = testimage(&image, opts, formats);
freeimage(&image);
/* Ensure that stderr is flushed into any log file */
fflush(stderr);
if (log_pass)
{
if (result)
printf("PASS:");
else
printf("FAIL:");
# ifndef PNG_SIMPLIFIED_WRITE_SUPPORTED
printf(" (no write)");
# endif
print_opts(opts);
printf(" %s\n", file_name);
/* stdout may not be line-buffered if it is piped to a file, so: */
fflush(stdout);
}
else if (!result)
exit(1);
return result;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int query_qp_attr(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, struct mlx5_ib_qp *qp,
struct ib_qp_attr *qp_attr)
{
int outlen = MLX5_ST_SZ_BYTES(query_qp_out);
struct mlx5_qp_context *context;
int mlx5_state;
u32 *outb;
int err = 0;
outb = kzalloc(outlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!outb)
return -ENOMEM;
err = mlx5_core_qp_query(dev->mdev, &qp->trans_qp.base.mqp, outb,
outlen);
if (err)
goto out;
/* FIXME: use MLX5_GET rather than mlx5_qp_context manual struct */
context = (struct mlx5_qp_context *)MLX5_ADDR_OF(query_qp_out, outb, qpc);
mlx5_state = be32_to_cpu(context->flags) >> 28;
qp->state = to_ib_qp_state(mlx5_state);
qp_attr->path_mtu = context->mtu_msgmax >> 5;
qp_attr->path_mig_state =
to_ib_mig_state((be32_to_cpu(context->flags) >> 11) & 0x3);
qp_attr->qkey = be32_to_cpu(context->qkey);
qp_attr->rq_psn = be32_to_cpu(context->rnr_nextrecvpsn) & 0xffffff;
qp_attr->sq_psn = be32_to_cpu(context->next_send_psn) & 0xffffff;
qp_attr->dest_qp_num = be32_to_cpu(context->log_pg_sz_remote_qpn) & 0xffffff;
qp_attr->qp_access_flags =
to_ib_qp_access_flags(be32_to_cpu(context->params2));
if (qp->ibqp.qp_type == IB_QPT_RC || qp->ibqp.qp_type == IB_QPT_UC) {
to_rdma_ah_attr(dev, &qp_attr->ah_attr, &context->pri_path);
to_rdma_ah_attr(dev, &qp_attr->alt_ah_attr, &context->alt_path);
qp_attr->alt_pkey_index =
be16_to_cpu(context->alt_path.pkey_index);
qp_attr->alt_port_num =
rdma_ah_get_port_num(&qp_attr->alt_ah_attr);
}
qp_attr->pkey_index = be16_to_cpu(context->pri_path.pkey_index);
qp_attr->port_num = context->pri_path.port;
/* qp_attr->en_sqd_async_notify is only applicable in modify qp */
qp_attr->sq_draining = mlx5_state == MLX5_QP_STATE_SQ_DRAINING;
qp_attr->max_rd_atomic = 1 << ((be32_to_cpu(context->params1) >> 21) & 0x7);
qp_attr->max_dest_rd_atomic =
1 << ((be32_to_cpu(context->params2) >> 21) & 0x7);
qp_attr->min_rnr_timer =
(be32_to_cpu(context->rnr_nextrecvpsn) >> 24) & 0x1f;
qp_attr->timeout = context->pri_path.ackto_lt >> 3;
qp_attr->retry_cnt = (be32_to_cpu(context->params1) >> 16) & 0x7;
qp_attr->rnr_retry = (be32_to_cpu(context->params1) >> 13) & 0x7;
qp_attr->alt_timeout = context->alt_path.ackto_lt >> 3;
out:
kfree(outb);
return err;
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void d_walk(struct dentry *parent, void *data,
enum d_walk_ret (*enter)(void *, struct dentry *),
void (*finish)(void *))
{
struct dentry *this_parent;
struct list_head *next;
unsigned seq = 0;
enum d_walk_ret ret;
bool retry = true;
again:
read_seqbegin_or_lock(&rename_lock, &seq);
this_parent = parent;
spin_lock(&this_parent->d_lock);
ret = enter(data, this_parent);
switch (ret) {
case D_WALK_CONTINUE:
break;
case D_WALK_QUIT:
case D_WALK_SKIP:
goto out_unlock;
case D_WALK_NORETRY:
retry = false;
break;
}
repeat:
next = this_parent->d_subdirs.next;
resume:
while (next != &this_parent->d_subdirs) {
struct list_head *tmp = next;
struct dentry *dentry = list_entry(tmp, struct dentry, d_child);
next = tmp->next;
if (unlikely(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_DENTRY_CURSOR))
continue;
spin_lock_nested(&dentry->d_lock, DENTRY_D_LOCK_NESTED);
ret = enter(data, dentry);
switch (ret) {
case D_WALK_CONTINUE:
break;
case D_WALK_QUIT:
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
goto out_unlock;
case D_WALK_NORETRY:
retry = false;
break;
case D_WALK_SKIP:
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
continue;
}
if (!list_empty(&dentry->d_subdirs)) {
spin_unlock(&this_parent->d_lock);
spin_release(&dentry->d_lock.dep_map, 1, _RET_IP_);
this_parent = dentry;
spin_acquire(&this_parent->d_lock.dep_map, 0, 1, _RET_IP_);
goto repeat;
}
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
}
/*
* All done at this level ... ascend and resume the search.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
ascend:
if (this_parent != parent) {
struct dentry *child = this_parent;
this_parent = child->d_parent;
spin_unlock(&child->d_lock);
spin_lock(&this_parent->d_lock);
/* might go back up the wrong parent if we have had a rename. */
if (need_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq))
goto rename_retry;
/* go into the first sibling still alive */
do {
next = child->d_child.next;
if (next == &this_parent->d_subdirs)
goto ascend;
child = list_entry(next, struct dentry, d_child);
} while (unlikely(child->d_flags & DCACHE_DENTRY_KILLED));
rcu_read_unlock();
goto resume;
}
if (need_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq))
goto rename_retry;
rcu_read_unlock();
if (finish)
finish(data);
out_unlock:
spin_unlock(&this_parent->d_lock);
done_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq);
return;
rename_retry:
spin_unlock(&this_parent->d_lock);
rcu_read_unlock();
BUG_ON(seq & 1);
if (!retry)
return;
seq = 1;
goto again;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 7,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool mtrr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data)
{
int i;
if (!msr_mtrr_valid(msr))
return false;
if (msr == MSR_IA32_CR_PAT) {
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
if (!valid_pat_type((data >> (i * 8)) & 0xff))
return false;
return true;
} else if (msr == MSR_MTRRdefType) {
if (data & ~0xcff)
return false;
return valid_mtrr_type(data & 0xff);
} else if (msr >= MSR_MTRRfix64K_00000 && msr <= MSR_MTRRfix4K_F8000) {
for (i = 0; i < 8 ; i++)
if (!valid_mtrr_type((data >> (i * 8)) & 0xff))
return false;
return true;
}
/* variable MTRRs */
return valid_mtrr_type(data & 0xff);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GaiaOAuthClient::Core::RefreshToken(
const OAuthClientInfo& oauth_client_info,
const std::string& refresh_token,
GaiaOAuthClient::Delegate* delegate) {
DCHECK(!request_.get()) << "Tried to fetch two things at once!";
delegate_ = delegate;
access_token_.clear();
expires_in_seconds_ = 0;
std::string post_body =
"refresh_token=" + net::EscapeUrlEncodedData(refresh_token, true) +
"&client_id=" + net::EscapeUrlEncodedData(oauth_client_info.client_id,
true) +
"&client_secret=" +
net::EscapeUrlEncodedData(oauth_client_info.client_secret, true) +
"&grant_type=refresh_token";
request_.reset(new UrlFetcher(GURL(provider_info_.access_token_url),
UrlFetcher::POST));
request_->SetRequestContext(request_context_getter_);
request_->SetUploadData("application/x-www-form-urlencoded", post_body);
request_->Start(
base::Bind(&GaiaOAuthClient::Core::OnAuthTokenFetchComplete, this));
}
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 28,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoftAVC::initEncParams() {
mCodecCtx = NULL;
mMemRecords = NULL;
mNumMemRecords = DEFAULT_MEM_REC_CNT;
mHeaderGenerated = 0;
mNumCores = GetCPUCoreCount();
mArch = DEFAULT_ARCH;
mSliceMode = DEFAULT_SLICE_MODE;
mSliceParam = DEFAULT_SLICE_PARAM;
mHalfPelEnable = DEFAULT_HPEL;
mIInterval = DEFAULT_I_INTERVAL;
mIDRInterval = DEFAULT_IDR_INTERVAL;
mDisableDeblkLevel = DEFAULT_DISABLE_DEBLK_LEVEL;
mEnableFastSad = DEFAULT_ENABLE_FAST_SAD;
mEnableAltRef = DEFAULT_ENABLE_ALT_REF;
mEncSpeed = DEFAULT_ENC_SPEED;
mIntra4x4 = DEFAULT_INTRA4x4;
mAIRMode = DEFAULT_AIR;
mAIRRefreshPeriod = DEFAULT_AIR_REFRESH_PERIOD;
mPSNREnable = DEFAULT_PSNR_ENABLE;
mReconEnable = DEFAULT_RECON_ENABLE;
mEntropyMode = DEFAULT_ENTROPY_MODE;
mBframes = DEFAULT_B_FRAMES;
gettimeofday(&mTimeStart, NULL);
gettimeofday(&mTimeEnd, NULL);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBox::paintMaskImages(const PaintInfo& paintInfo, const LayoutRect& paintRect)
{
bool pushTransparencyLayer = false;
bool compositedMask = hasLayer() && layer()->hasCompositedMask();
bool flattenCompositingLayers = view()->frameView() && view()->frameView()->paintBehavior() & PaintBehaviorFlattenCompositingLayers;
CompositeOperator compositeOp = CompositeSourceOver;
bool allMaskImagesLoaded = true;
if (!compositedMask || flattenCompositingLayers) {
pushTransparencyLayer = true;
StyleImage* maskBoxImage = style()->maskBoxImage().image();
const FillLayer* maskLayers = style()->maskLayers();
if (maskBoxImage)
allMaskImagesLoaded &= maskBoxImage->isLoaded();
if (maskLayers)
allMaskImagesLoaded &= maskLayers->imagesAreLoaded();
paintInfo.context->setCompositeOperation(CompositeDestinationIn);
paintInfo.context->beginTransparencyLayer(1);
compositeOp = CompositeSourceOver;
}
if (allMaskImagesLoaded) {
paintFillLayers(paintInfo, Color::transparent, style()->maskLayers(), paintRect, BackgroundBleedNone, compositeOp);
paintNinePieceImage(paintInfo.context, paintRect, style(), style()->maskBoxImage(), compositeOp);
}
if (pushTransparencyLayer)
paintInfo.context->endLayer();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t CameraClient::setPreviewWindow(const sp<IBinder>& binder,
const sp<ANativeWindow>& window) {
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
status_t result = checkPidAndHardware();
if (result != NO_ERROR) return result;
if (binder == mSurface) {
return NO_ERROR;
}
if (window != 0) {
result = native_window_api_connect(window.get(), NATIVE_WINDOW_API_CAMERA);
if (result != NO_ERROR) {
ALOGE("native_window_api_connect failed: %s (%d)", strerror(-result),
result);
return result;
}
}
if (mHardware->previewEnabled()) {
if (window != 0) {
native_window_set_scaling_mode(window.get(),
NATIVE_WINDOW_SCALING_MODE_SCALE_TO_WINDOW);
native_window_set_buffers_transform(window.get(), mOrientation);
result = mHardware->setPreviewWindow(window);
}
}
if (result == NO_ERROR) {
disconnectWindow(mPreviewWindow);
mSurface = binder;
mPreviewWindow = window;
} else {
disconnectWindow(window);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 6,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PDFiumEngine::CheckPageAvailable(int index, std::vector<int>* pending) {
if (!doc_ || !form_)
return false;
const int num_pages = static_cast<int>(pages_.size());
if (index < num_pages && pages_[index]->available())
return true;
if (!FPDFAvail_IsPageAvail(fpdf_availability_, index, &download_hints_)) {
if (!base::ContainsValue(*pending, index))
pending->push_back(index);
return false;
}
if (index < num_pages)
pages_[index]->set_available(true);
if (default_page_size_.IsEmpty())
default_page_size_ = GetPageSize(index);
return true;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 11,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *enl_send_and_wait(char *msg)
{
char *reply = IPC_TIMEOUT;
sighandler_t old_alrm;
/*
* Shortcut this func and return IPC_FAKE
* If the IPC Window is the E17 fake
*/
if (e17_fake_ipc)
return IPC_FAKE;
if (ipc_win == None) {
/* The IPC window is missing. Wait for it to return or feh to be killed. */
/* Only called once in the E17 case */
for (; enl_ipc_get_win() == None;) {
if (e17_fake_ipc)
return IPC_FAKE;
else
sleep(1);
}
}
old_alrm = (sighandler_t) signal(SIGALRM, (sighandler_t) enl_ipc_timeout);
for (; reply == IPC_TIMEOUT;) {
timeout = 0;
enl_ipc_send(msg);
for (; !(reply = enl_ipc_get(enl_wait_for_reply())););
if (reply == IPC_TIMEOUT) {
/* We timed out. The IPC window must be AWOL. Reset and resend message. */
D(("IPC timed out. IPC window has gone. Clearing ipc_win.\n"));
XSelectInput(disp, ipc_win, None);
ipc_win = None;
}
}
signal(SIGALRM, old_alrm);
return(reply);
}
Commit Message: Fix double-free/OOB-write while receiving IPC data
If a malicious client pretends to be the E17 window manager, it is
possible to trigger an out of boundary heap write while receiving an
IPC message.
The length of the already received message is stored in an unsigned
short, which overflows after receiving 64 KB of data. It's comparably
small amount of data and therefore achievable for an attacker.
When len overflows, realloc() will either be called with a small value
and therefore chars will be appended out of bounds, or len + 1 will be
exactly 0, in which case realloc() behaves like free(). This could be
abused for a later double-free attack as it's even possible to overwrite
the free information -- but this depends on the malloc implementation.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 8,150 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderBox* RenderBlock::createAnonymousBoxWithSameTypeAs(const RenderObject* parent) const
{
if (isAnonymousColumnsBlock())
return createAnonymousColumnsWithParentRenderer(parent);
if (isAnonymousColumnSpanBlock())
return createAnonymousColumnSpanWithParentRenderer(parent);
return createAnonymousWithParentRendererAndDisplay(parent, style()->display());
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int CursorShapeFromNative(gfx::NativeCursor native_cursor) {
switch (native_cursor.native_type()) {
case ui::kCursorNull:
return XC_left_ptr;
case ui::kCursorPointer:
return XC_left_ptr;
case ui::kCursorCross:
return XC_crosshair;
case ui::kCursorHand:
return XC_hand2;
case ui::kCursorIBeam:
return XC_xterm;
case ui::kCursorWait:
return XC_watch;
case ui::kCursorHelp:
return XC_question_arrow;
case ui::kCursorEastResize:
return XC_right_side;
case ui::kCursorNorthResize:
return XC_top_side;
case ui::kCursorNorthEastResize:
return XC_top_right_corner;
case ui::kCursorNorthWestResize:
return XC_top_left_corner;
case ui::kCursorSouthResize:
return XC_bottom_side;
case ui::kCursorSouthEastResize:
return XC_bottom_right_corner;
case ui::kCursorSouthWestResize:
return XC_bottom_left_corner;
case ui::kCursorWestResize:
return XC_left_side;
case ui::kCursorNorthSouthResize:
return XC_sb_v_double_arrow;
case ui::kCursorEastWestResize:
return XC_sb_h_double_arrow;
case ui::kCursorNorthEastSouthWestResize:
case ui::kCursorNorthWestSouthEastResize:
return XC_left_ptr;
case ui::kCursorColumnResize:
return XC_sb_h_double_arrow;
case ui::kCursorRowResize:
return XC_sb_v_double_arrow;
case ui::kCursorMiddlePanning:
return XC_fleur;
case ui::kCursorEastPanning:
return XC_sb_right_arrow;
case ui::kCursorNorthPanning:
return XC_sb_up_arrow;
case ui::kCursorNorthEastPanning:
return XC_top_right_corner;
case ui::kCursorNorthWestPanning:
return XC_top_left_corner;
case ui::kCursorSouthPanning:
return XC_sb_down_arrow;
case ui::kCursorSouthEastPanning:
return XC_bottom_right_corner;
case ui::kCursorSouthWestPanning:
return XC_bottom_left_corner;
case ui::kCursorWestPanning:
return XC_sb_left_arrow;
case ui::kCursorMove:
return XC_fleur;
case ui::kCursorVerticalText:
case ui::kCursorCell:
case ui::kCursorContextMenu:
case ui::kCursorAlias:
case ui::kCursorProgress:
case ui::kCursorNoDrop:
case ui::kCursorCopy:
case ui::kCursorNone:
case ui::kCursorNotAllowed:
case ui::kCursorZoomIn:
case ui::kCursorZoomOut:
case ui::kCursorGrab:
case ui::kCursorGrabbing:
return XC_left_ptr;
case ui::kCursorCustom:
NOTREACHED();
return XC_left_ptr;
}
NOTREACHED();
return XC_left_ptr;
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,461 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AP_DECLARE(const char *) ap_get_server_name_for_url(request_rec *r)
{
const char *plain_server_name = ap_get_server_name(r);
#if APR_HAVE_IPV6
if (ap_strchr_c(plain_server_name, ':')) { /* IPv6 literal? */
return apr_pstrcat(r->pool, "[", plain_server_name, "]", NULL);
}
#endif
return plain_server_name;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 1,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pdist(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int insn)
{
struct fpustate *f = FPUSTATE;
unsigned long rs1, rs2, *rd, rd_val;
unsigned long i;
rs1 = fpd_regval(f, RS1(insn));
rs2 = fpd_regval(f, RS2(insn));
rd = fpd_regaddr(f, RD(insn));
rd_val = *rd;
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
s16 s1, s2;
s1 = (rs1 >> (56 - (i * 8))) & 0xff;
s2 = (rs2 >> (56 - (i * 8))) & 0xff;
/* Absolute value of difference. */
s1 -= s2;
if (s1 < 0)
s1 = ~s1 + 1;
rd_val += s1;
}
*rd = rd_val;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 15,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void remove_from_net_schedule_list(struct xenvif *vif)
{
if (likely(__on_net_schedule_list(vif))) {
list_del_init(&vif->schedule_list);
xenvif_put(vif);
}
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8RecursionScope::didLeaveScriptContext()
{
Microtask::performCheckpoint();
V8PerIsolateData::from(m_isolate)->runEndOfScopeTasks();
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 1 | 25,166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __acquires(key_serial_lock)
{
key_serial_t pos = *_pos;
struct key *key;
spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
if (*_pos > INT_MAX)
return NULL;
key = find_ge_key(p, pos);
if (!key)
return NULL;
*_pos = key->serial;
return &key->serial_node;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 25,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cbc_aes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, long func,
struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
{
struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
int ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
unsigned int nbytes = walk->nbytes;
struct {
u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
u8 key[AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
} param;
if (!nbytes)
goto out;
memcpy(param.iv, walk->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
memcpy(param.key, sctx->key, sctx->key_len);
do {
/* only use complete blocks */
unsigned int n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
u8 *out = walk->dst.virt.addr;
u8 *in = walk->src.virt.addr;
ret = crypt_s390_kmc(func, ¶m, out, in, n);
if (ret < 0 || ret != n)
return -EIO;
nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes);
} while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes));
memcpy(walk->iv, param.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_snmp_object_free_storage(zend_object *object) /* {{{ */
{
php_snmp_object *intern = php_snmp_fetch_object(object);
if (!intern) {
return;
}
netsnmp_session_free(&(intern->session));
zend_object_std_dtor(&intern->zo);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 26,764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType(HTMLInputElement* element)
: BaseDateAndTimeInputType(element)
, m_dateTimeEditElement(0)
, m_spinButtonElement(0)
, m_clearButton(0)
, m_pickerIndicatorElement(0)
, m_pickerIndicatorIsVisible(false)
, m_pickerIndicatorIsAlwaysVisible(false)
{
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,733 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ap_bus_resume(struct device *dev)
{
struct ap_device *ap_dev = to_ap_dev(dev);
int rc;
if (ap_suspend_flag) {
ap_suspend_flag = 0;
if (ap_interrupts_available()) {
if (!ap_using_interrupts()) {
rc = register_adapter_interrupt(&ap_airq);
ap_airq_flag = (rc == 0);
}
} else {
if (ap_using_interrupts()) {
unregister_adapter_interrupt(&ap_airq);
ap_airq_flag = 0;
}
}
ap_query_configuration();
if (!user_set_domain) {
ap_domain_index = -1;
ap_select_domain();
}
init_timer(&ap_config_timer);
ap_config_timer.function = ap_config_timeout;
ap_config_timer.data = 0;
ap_config_timer.expires = jiffies + ap_config_time * HZ;
add_timer(&ap_config_timer);
ap_work_queue = create_singlethread_workqueue("kapwork");
if (!ap_work_queue)
return -ENOMEM;
tasklet_enable(&ap_tasklet);
if (!ap_using_interrupts())
ap_schedule_poll_timer();
else
tasklet_schedule(&ap_tasklet);
if (ap_thread_flag)
rc = ap_poll_thread_start();
else
rc = 0;
} else
rc = 0;
if (AP_QID_QUEUE(ap_dev->qid) != ap_domain_index) {
spin_lock_bh(&ap_dev->lock);
ap_dev->qid = AP_MKQID(AP_QID_DEVICE(ap_dev->qid),
ap_domain_index);
spin_unlock_bh(&ap_dev->lock);
}
queue_work(ap_work_queue, &ap_config_work);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 16,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void d_prune_aliases(struct inode *inode)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
restart:
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
hlist_for_each_entry(dentry, &inode->i_dentry, d_u.d_alias) {
spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
if (!dentry->d_lockref.count) {
struct dentry *parent = lock_parent(dentry);
if (likely(!dentry->d_lockref.count)) {
__dentry_kill(dentry);
dput(parent);
goto restart;
}
if (parent)
spin_unlock(&parent->d_lock);
}
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
}
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 25,311 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sm_get_counters(p_fm_config_conx_hdlt hdl, fm_mgr_type_t mgr, int argc, char *argv[]) {
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res;
fm_msg_ret_code_t ret_code;
uint8_t data[BUF_SZ];
time_t timeNow;
if((res = fm_mgr_simple_query(hdl, FM_ACT_GET, FM_DT_SM_GET_COUNTERS, mgr, BUF_SZ, data, &ret_code)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "sm_get_counters: Failed to retrieve data: \n"
"\tError:(%d) %s \n\tRet code:(%d) %s\n",
res, fm_mgr_get_error_str(res),ret_code,
fm_mgr_get_resp_error_str(ret_code));
} else {
time(&timeNow);
data[BUF_SZ-1]=0;
printf("%35s: %s%s", "SM Counters as of", ctime(&timeNow), (char*) data);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 4,629 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void jsP_warning(js_State *J, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
char buf[512];
char msg[256];
va_start(ap, fmt);
vsnprintf(msg, sizeof msg, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s:%d: warning: %s", J->filename, J->lexline, msg);
js_report(J, buf);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-674 | 0 | 27,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fetch_asn1_field(unsigned char *astream, unsigned int level,
unsigned int field, krb5_data *data)
{
unsigned char *estream; /* end of stream */
int classes; /* # classes seen so far this level */
unsigned int levels = 0; /* levels seen so far */
int lastlevel = 1000; /* last level seen */
int length; /* various lengths */
int tag; /* tag number */
unsigned char savelen; /* saved length of our field */
classes = -1;
/* we assume that the first identifier/length will tell us
how long the entire stream is. */
astream++;
estream = astream;
if ((length = asn1length(&astream)) < 0) {
return(-1);
}
estream += length;
/* search down the stream, checking identifiers. we process identifiers
until we hit the "level" we want, and then process that level for our
subfield, always making sure we don't go off the end of the stream. */
while (astream < estream) {
if (!asn1_id_constructed(*astream)) {
return(-1);
}
if (asn1_id_class(*astream) == ASN1_CLASS_CTX) {
if ((tag = (int)asn1_id_tag(*astream)) <= lastlevel) {
levels++;
classes = -1;
}
lastlevel = tag;
if (levels == level) {
/* in our context-dependent class, is this the one we're looking for ? */
if (tag == (int)field) {
/* return length and data */
astream++;
savelen = *astream;
if ((length = asn1length(&astream)) < 0) {
return(-1);
}
data->length = length;
/* if the field length is indefinite, we will have to subtract two
(terminating octets) from the length returned since we don't want
to pass any info from the "wrapper" back. asn1length will always return
the *total* length of the field, not just what's contained in it */
if ((savelen & 0xff) == 0x80) {
data->length -=2 ;
}
data->data = (char *)astream;
return(0);
} else if (tag <= classes) {
/* we've seen this class before, something must be wrong */
return(-1);
} else {
classes = tag;
}
}
}
/* if we're not on our level yet, process this value. otherwise skip over it */
astream++;
if ((length = asn1length(&astream)) < 0) {
return(-1);
}
if (levels == level) {
astream += length;
}
}
return(-1);
}
Commit Message: Fix S4U2Self KDC crash when anon is restricted
In validate_as_request(), when enforcing restrict_anonymous_to_tgt,
use client.princ instead of request->client; the latter is NULL when
validating S4U2Self requests.
CVE-2016-3120:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause krb5kdc
to dereference a null pointer if the restrict_anonymous_to_tgt option
is set to true, by making an S4U2Self request.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8458 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 11,659 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int path_has_submounts(const struct path *parent)
{
struct check_mount data = { .mnt = parent->mnt, .mounted = 0 };
read_seqlock_excl(&mount_lock);
d_walk(parent->dentry, &data, path_check_mount, NULL);
read_sequnlock_excl(&mount_lock);
return data.mounted;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,608 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string DownloadItemImpl::GetSuggestedFilename() const {
return request_info_.suggested_filename;
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int valid_irq_stack(unsigned long sp, struct task_struct *p,
unsigned long nbytes)
{
unsigned long stack_page;
unsigned long cpu = task_cpu(p);
/*
* Avoid crashing if the stack has overflowed and corrupted
* task_cpu(p), which is in the thread_info struct.
*/
if (cpu < NR_CPUS && cpu_possible(cpu)) {
stack_page = (unsigned long) hardirq_ctx[cpu];
if (sp >= stack_page + sizeof(struct thread_struct)
&& sp <= stack_page + THREAD_SIZE - nbytes)
return 1;
stack_page = (unsigned long) softirq_ctx[cpu];
if (sp >= stack_page + sizeof(struct thread_struct)
&& sp <= stack_page + THREAD_SIZE - nbytes)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void free_abs_cgroup(char *cgroup)
{
if (!cgroup)
return;
if (abs_cgroup_supported())
nih_free(cgroup);
else
free(cgroup);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 25,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DataReductionProxyIOData::SetProxyPrefs(bool enabled, bool at_startup) {
DCHECK(io_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
enabled_ = enabled;
config_->SetProxyConfig(enabled, at_startup);
if (config_client_) {
config_client_->SetEnabled(enabled);
if (enabled)
config_client_->RetrieveConfig();
}
if (!enabled) {
if (proxy_config_client_)
proxy_config_client_->ClearBadProxiesCache();
}
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 6,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool restart_stratum(struct pool *pool)
{
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Restarting stratum on pool %s", get_pool_name(pool));
if (pool->stratum_active)
suspend_stratum(pool);
if (!initiate_stratum(pool))
return false;
if (pool->extranonce_subscribe && !subscribe_extranonce(pool))
return false;
if (!auth_stratum(pool))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,653 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fixup_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_q *q, int locked)
{
int ret = 0;
if (locked) {
/*
* Got the lock. We might not be the anticipated owner if we
* did a lock-steal - fix up the PI-state in that case:
*
* Speculative pi_state->owner read (we don't hold wait_lock);
* since we own the lock pi_state->owner == current is the
* stable state, anything else needs more attention.
*/
if (q->pi_state->owner != current)
ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, current);
goto out;
}
/*
* If we didn't get the lock; check if anybody stole it from us. In
* that case, we need to fix up the uval to point to them instead of
* us, otherwise bad things happen. [10]
*
* Another speculative read; pi_state->owner == current is unstable
* but needs our attention.
*/
if (q->pi_state->owner == current) {
ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, NULL);
goto out;
}
/*
* Paranoia check. If we did not take the lock, then we should not be
* the owner of the rt_mutex.
*/
if (rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex) == current) {
printk(KERN_ERR "fixup_owner: ret = %d pi-mutex: %p "
"pi-state %p\n", ret,
q->pi_state->pi_mutex.owner,
q->pi_state->owner);
}
out:
return ret ? ret : locked;
}
Commit Message: futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
signed integer overflow:
0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.
Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 25,263 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void jsR_callscript(js_State *J, int n, js_Function *F, js_Environment *scope)
{
js_Value v;
if (scope)
jsR_savescope(J, scope);
js_pop(J, n);
jsR_run(J, F);
v = *stackidx(J, -1);
TOP = --BOT; /* clear stack */
js_pushvalue(J, v);
if (scope)
jsR_restorescope(J);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,788 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mk_vhost_fdt_worker_exit()
{
struct mk_list *head;
struct mk_list *tmp;
struct vhost_fdt_host *fdt;
if (config->fdt == MK_FALSE) {
return -1;
}
mk_list_foreach_safe(head, tmp, mk_vhost_fdt_key) {
fdt = mk_list_entry(head, struct vhost_fdt_host, _head);
mk_list_del(&fdt->_head);
mk_mem_free(fdt);
}
mk_mem_free(mk_vhost_fdt_key);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Request: new request session flag to mark those files opened by FDT
This patch aims to fix a potential DDoS problem that can be caused
in the server quering repetitive non-existent resources.
When serving a static file, the core use Vhost FDT mechanism, but if
it sends a static error page it does a direct open(2). When closing
the resources for the same request it was just calling mk_vhost_close()
which did not clear properly the file descriptor.
This patch adds a new field on the struct session_request called 'fd_is_fdt',
which contains MK_TRUE or MK_FALSE depending of how fd_file was opened.
Thanks to Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com> for report and troubleshoot this
problem.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Silva <eduardo@monkey.io>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vhost_scsi_free_evt(struct vhost_scsi *vs, struct vhost_scsi_evt *evt)
{
vs->vs_events_nr--;
kfree(evt);
}
Commit Message: vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gdImageScaleTwoPass(const gdImagePtr src, const unsigned int new_width,
const unsigned int new_height)
{
const unsigned int src_width = src->sx;
const unsigned int src_height = src->sy;
gdImagePtr tmp_im = NULL;
gdImagePtr dst = NULL;
int scale_pass_res;
assert(src != NULL);
/* First, handle the trivial case. */
if (src_width == new_width && src_height == new_height) {
return gdImageClone(src);
}/* if */
/* Convert to truecolor if it isn't; this code requires it. */
if (!src->trueColor) {
gdImagePaletteToTrueColor(src);
}/* if */
/* Scale horizontally unless sizes are the same. */
if (src_width == new_width) {
tmp_im = src;
} else {
tmp_im = gdImageCreateTrueColor(new_width, src_height);
if (tmp_im == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
gdImageSetInterpolationMethod(tmp_im, src->interpolation_id);
scale_pass_res = _gdScalePass(src, src_width, tmp_im, new_width, src_height, HORIZONTAL);
if (scale_pass_res != 1) {
gdImageDestroy(tmp_im);
return NULL;
}
}/* if .. else*/
/* If vertical sizes match, we're done. */
if (src_height == new_height) {
assert(tmp_im != src);
return tmp_im;
}/* if */
/* Otherwise, we need to scale vertically. */
dst = gdImageCreateTrueColor(new_width, new_height);
if (dst != NULL) {
gdImageSetInterpolationMethod(dst, src->interpolation_id);
scale_pass_res = _gdScalePass(tmp_im, src_height, dst, new_height, new_width, VERTICAL);
if (scale_pass_res != 1) {
gdImageDestroy(dst);
if (src != tmp_im) {
gdImageDestroy(tmp_im);
}
return NULL;
}
}/* if */
if (src != tmp_im) {
gdImageDestroy(tmp_im);
}/* if */
return dst;
}/* gdImageScaleTwoPass*/
Commit Message: Fix potential unsigned underflow
No need to decrease `u`, so we don't do it. While we're at it, we also factor
out the overflow check of the loop, what improves performance and readability.
This issue has been reported by Stefan Esser to security@libgd.org.
CWE ID: CWE-191 | 0 | 12,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TraceEvent::AppendAsJSON(
std::string* out,
const ArgumentFilterPredicate& argument_filter_predicate) const {
int64 time_int64 = timestamp_.ToInternalValue();
int process_id = TraceLog::GetInstance()->process_id();
const char* category_group_name =
TraceLog::GetCategoryGroupName(category_group_enabled_);
DCHECK(!strchr(name_, '"'));
StringAppendF(out, "{\"pid\":%i,\"tid\":%i,\"ts\":%" PRId64
","
"\"ph\":\"%c\",\"cat\":\"%s\",\"name\":\"%s\",\"args\":",
process_id, thread_id_, time_int64, phase_, category_group_name,
name_);
bool strip_args = arg_names_[0] && !argument_filter_predicate.is_null() &&
!argument_filter_predicate.Run(category_group_name, name_);
if (strip_args) {
*out += "\"__stripped__\"";
} else {
*out += "{";
for (int i = 0; i < kTraceMaxNumArgs && arg_names_[i]; ++i) {
if (i > 0)
*out += ",";
*out += "\"";
*out += arg_names_[i];
*out += "\":";
if (arg_types_[i] == TRACE_VALUE_TYPE_CONVERTABLE)
convertable_values_[i]->AppendAsTraceFormat(out);
else
AppendValueAsJSON(arg_types_[i], arg_values_[i], out);
}
*out += "}";
}
if (phase_ == TRACE_EVENT_PHASE_COMPLETE) {
int64 duration = duration_.ToInternalValue();
if (duration != -1)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"dur\":%" PRId64, duration);
if (!thread_timestamp_.is_null()) {
int64 thread_duration = thread_duration_.ToInternalValue();
if (thread_duration != -1)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"tdur\":%" PRId64, thread_duration);
}
}
if (!thread_timestamp_.is_null()) {
int64 thread_time_int64 = thread_timestamp_.ToInternalValue();
StringAppendF(out, ",\"tts\":%" PRId64, thread_time_int64);
}
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_ASYNC_TTS) {
StringAppendF(out, ", \"use_async_tts\":1");
}
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_HAS_ID)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"id\":\"0x%" PRIx64 "\"", static_cast<uint64>(id_));
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_BIND_TO_ENCLOSING)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"bp\":\"e\"");
if ((flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_OUT) ||
(flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_IN)) {
StringAppendF(out, ",\"bind_id\":\"0x%" PRIx64 "\"",
static_cast<uint64>(bind_id_));
}
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_IN)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"flow_in\":true");
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_OUT)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"flow_out\":true");
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_HAS_CONTEXT_ID)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"cid\":\"0x%" PRIx64 "\"",
static_cast<uint64>(context_id_));
if (phase_ == TRACE_EVENT_PHASE_INSTANT) {
char scope = '?';
switch (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_SCOPE_MASK) {
case TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_GLOBAL:
scope = TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_NAME_GLOBAL;
break;
case TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_PROCESS:
scope = TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_NAME_PROCESS;
break;
case TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD:
scope = TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_NAME_THREAD;
break;
}
StringAppendF(out, ",\"s\":\"%c\"", scope);
}
*out += "}";
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 2,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit DeferredTaskSetPageVisibilityState(WebPagePrivate* webPagePrivate)
: DeferredTaskType(webPagePrivate)
{
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int ohci_read_hcca(OHCIState *ohci,
dma_addr_t addr, struct ohci_hcca *hcca)
{
return dma_memory_read(ohci->as, addr + ohci->localmem_base,
hcca, sizeof(*hcca));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 20,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BluetoothSocketSetPausedFunction::BluetoothSocketSetPausedFunction() {}
Commit Message: chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <tbarzic@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 18,214 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int modbus_read_registers(modbus_t *ctx, int addr, int nb, uint16_t *dest)
{
int status;
if (ctx == NULL) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
if (nb > MODBUS_MAX_READ_REGISTERS) {
if (ctx->debug) {
fprintf(stderr,
"ERROR Too many registers requested (%d > %d)\n",
nb, MODBUS_MAX_READ_REGISTERS);
}
errno = EMBMDATA;
return -1;
}
status = read_registers(ctx, MODBUS_FC_READ_HOLDING_REGISTERS,
addr, nb, dest);
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix VD-1301 and VD-1302 vulnerabilities
This patch was contributed by Maor Vermucht and Or Peles from
VDOO Connected Trust.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 28,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ehci_state_fetchentry(EHCIState *ehci, int async)
{
int again = 0;
uint32_t entry = ehci_get_fetch_addr(ehci, async);
if (NLPTR_TBIT(entry)) {
ehci_set_state(ehci, async, EST_ACTIVE);
goto out;
}
/* section 4.8, only QH in async schedule */
if (async && (NLPTR_TYPE_GET(entry) != NLPTR_TYPE_QH)) {
fprintf(stderr, "non queue head request in async schedule\n");
return -1;
}
switch (NLPTR_TYPE_GET(entry)) {
case NLPTR_TYPE_QH:
ehci_set_state(ehci, async, EST_FETCHQH);
again = 1;
break;
case NLPTR_TYPE_ITD:
ehci_set_state(ehci, async, EST_FETCHITD);
again = 1;
break;
case NLPTR_TYPE_STITD:
ehci_set_state(ehci, async, EST_FETCHSITD);
again = 1;
break;
default:
/* TODO: handle FSTN type */
fprintf(stderr, "FETCHENTRY: entry at %X is of type %d "
"which is not supported yet\n", entry, NLPTR_TYPE_GET(entry));
return -1;
}
out:
return again;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 28,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(struct completion *x,
unsigned long timeout)
{
return wait_for_common(x, timeout, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 20,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _PUBLIC_ size_t strlen_m_term(const char *s)
{
return strlen_m_ext_term(s, CH_UNIX, CH_UTF16LE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 8,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init crct10dif_mod_init(void)
{
int ret;
ret = crypto_register_shash(&alg);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 17,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u64 kvm_scale_tsc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 tsc)
{
u64 _tsc = tsc;
u64 ratio = vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio;
if (ratio != kvm_default_tsc_scaling_ratio)
_tsc = __scale_tsc(ratio, tsc);
return _tsc;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Function> firstArgAsFunction()
{
if (m_info.Length() < 1 || !m_info[0]->IsFunction())
return v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Function>();
return m_info[0].As<v8::Function>();
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 2,195 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsAllowed(const scoped_refptr<const Extension>& extension,
const GURL& url) {
return IsAllowed(extension, url, PERMITTED_BOTH, tab_id());
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int f2fs_map_blocks(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_map_blocks *map,
int create, int flag)
{
unsigned int maxblocks = map->m_len;
struct dnode_of_data dn;
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
int mode = create ? ALLOC_NODE : LOOKUP_NODE;
pgoff_t pgofs, end_offset, end;
int err = 0, ofs = 1;
unsigned int ofs_in_node, last_ofs_in_node;
blkcnt_t prealloc;
struct extent_info ei;
block_t blkaddr;
if (!maxblocks)
return 0;
map->m_len = 0;
map->m_flags = 0;
/* it only supports block size == page size */
pgofs = (pgoff_t)map->m_lblk;
end = pgofs + maxblocks;
if (!create && f2fs_lookup_extent_cache(inode, pgofs, &ei)) {
map->m_pblk = ei.blk + pgofs - ei.fofs;
map->m_len = min((pgoff_t)maxblocks, ei.fofs + ei.len - pgofs);
map->m_flags = F2FS_MAP_MAPPED;
goto out;
}
next_dnode:
if (create)
f2fs_lock_op(sbi);
/* When reading holes, we need its node page */
set_new_dnode(&dn, inode, NULL, NULL, 0);
err = get_dnode_of_data(&dn, pgofs, mode);
if (err) {
if (flag == F2FS_GET_BLOCK_BMAP)
map->m_pblk = 0;
if (err == -ENOENT) {
err = 0;
if (map->m_next_pgofs)
*map->m_next_pgofs =
get_next_page_offset(&dn, pgofs);
}
goto unlock_out;
}
prealloc = 0;
last_ofs_in_node = ofs_in_node = dn.ofs_in_node;
end_offset = ADDRS_PER_PAGE(dn.node_page, inode);
next_block:
blkaddr = datablock_addr(dn.node_page, dn.ofs_in_node);
if (blkaddr == NEW_ADDR || blkaddr == NULL_ADDR) {
if (create) {
if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) {
err = -EIO;
goto sync_out;
}
if (flag == F2FS_GET_BLOCK_PRE_AIO) {
if (blkaddr == NULL_ADDR) {
prealloc++;
last_ofs_in_node = dn.ofs_in_node;
}
} else {
err = __allocate_data_block(&dn);
if (!err)
set_inode_flag(inode, FI_APPEND_WRITE);
}
if (err)
goto sync_out;
map->m_flags = F2FS_MAP_NEW;
blkaddr = dn.data_blkaddr;
} else {
if (flag == F2FS_GET_BLOCK_BMAP) {
map->m_pblk = 0;
goto sync_out;
}
if (flag == F2FS_GET_BLOCK_FIEMAP &&
blkaddr == NULL_ADDR) {
if (map->m_next_pgofs)
*map->m_next_pgofs = pgofs + 1;
}
if (flag != F2FS_GET_BLOCK_FIEMAP ||
blkaddr != NEW_ADDR)
goto sync_out;
}
}
if (flag == F2FS_GET_BLOCK_PRE_AIO)
goto skip;
if (map->m_len == 0) {
/* preallocated unwritten block should be mapped for fiemap. */
if (blkaddr == NEW_ADDR)
map->m_flags |= F2FS_MAP_UNWRITTEN;
map->m_flags |= F2FS_MAP_MAPPED;
map->m_pblk = blkaddr;
map->m_len = 1;
} else if ((map->m_pblk != NEW_ADDR &&
blkaddr == (map->m_pblk + ofs)) ||
(map->m_pblk == NEW_ADDR && blkaddr == NEW_ADDR) ||
flag == F2FS_GET_BLOCK_PRE_DIO) {
ofs++;
map->m_len++;
} else {
goto sync_out;
}
skip:
dn.ofs_in_node++;
pgofs++;
/* preallocate blocks in batch for one dnode page */
if (flag == F2FS_GET_BLOCK_PRE_AIO &&
(pgofs == end || dn.ofs_in_node == end_offset)) {
dn.ofs_in_node = ofs_in_node;
err = reserve_new_blocks(&dn, prealloc);
if (err)
goto sync_out;
map->m_len += dn.ofs_in_node - ofs_in_node;
if (prealloc && dn.ofs_in_node != last_ofs_in_node + 1) {
err = -ENOSPC;
goto sync_out;
}
dn.ofs_in_node = end_offset;
}
if (pgofs >= end)
goto sync_out;
else if (dn.ofs_in_node < end_offset)
goto next_block;
f2fs_put_dnode(&dn);
if (create) {
f2fs_unlock_op(sbi);
f2fs_balance_fs(sbi, dn.node_changed);
}
goto next_dnode;
sync_out:
f2fs_put_dnode(&dn);
unlock_out:
if (create) {
f2fs_unlock_op(sbi);
f2fs_balance_fs(sbi, dn.node_changed);
}
out:
trace_f2fs_map_blocks(inode, map, err);
return err;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a dead loop in f2fs_fiemap()
A dead loop can be triggered in f2fs_fiemap() using the test case
as below:
...
fd = open();
fallocate(fd, 0, 0, 4294967296);
ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FIEMAP, fiemap_buf);
...
It's caused by an overflow in __get_data_block():
...
bh->b_size = map.m_len << inode->i_blkbits;
...
map.m_len is an unsigned int, and bh->b_size is a size_t which is 64 bits
on 64 bits archtecture, type conversion from an unsigned int to a size_t
will result in an overflow.
In the above-mentioned case, bh->b_size will be zero, and f2fs_fiemap()
will call get_data_block() at block 0 again an again.
Fix this by adding a force conversion before left shift.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 27,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SVGDocumentExtensions::startAnimations()
{
WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> > timeContainers;
timeContainers.appendRange(m_timeContainers.begin(), m_timeContainers.end());
WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> >::iterator end = timeContainers.end();
for (WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> >::iterator itr = timeContainers.begin(); itr != end; ++itr)
(*itr)->timeContainer()->begin();
}
Commit Message: SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 1 | 24,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void accumulate_steal_time(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u64 delta;
if (!(vcpu->arch.st.msr_val & KVM_MSR_ENABLED))
return;
delta = current->sched_info.run_delay - vcpu->arch.st.last_steal;
vcpu->arch.st.last_steal = current->sched_info.run_delay;
vcpu->arch.st.accum_steal = delta;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void drop_privs(int nogroups) {
EUID_ROOT();
gid_t gid = getgid();
if (gid == 0 || nogroups) {
if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
errExit("setgroups");
if (arg_debug)
printf("Username %s, no supplementary groups\n", cfg.username);
}
else {
assert(cfg.username);
gid_t groups[MAX_GROUPS];
int ngroups = MAX_GROUPS;
int rv = getgrouplist(cfg.username, gid, groups, &ngroups);
if (arg_debug && rv) {
printf("Username %s, groups ", cfg.username);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++)
printf("%u, ", groups[i]);
printf("\n");
}
if (rv == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: cannot extract supplementary group list, dropping them\n");
if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
errExit("setgroups");
}
else {
rv = setgroups(ngroups, groups);
if (rv) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: cannot set supplementary group list, dropping them\n");
if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
errExit("setgroups");
}
}
}
if (setgid(getgid()) < 0)
errExit("setgid/getgid");
if (setuid(getuid()) < 0)
errExit("setuid/getuid");
}
Commit Message: replace copy_file with copy_file_as_user
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 27,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AwMainDelegate::CreateContentRendererClient() {
content_renderer_client_.reset(new AwContentRendererClient());
return content_renderer_client_.get();
}
Commit Message: [Android WebView] Fix a couple of typos
Fix a couple of typos in variable names/commentary introduced in:
https://codereview.chromium.org/1315633003/
No functional effect.
BUG=156062
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1331943002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#348175}
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport Cache ReferencePixelCache(Cache cache)
{
CacheInfo
*magick_restrict cache_info;
assert(cache != (Cache *) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature);
LockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->semaphore);
cache_info->reference_count++;
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->semaphore);
return(cache_info);
}
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=28946
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: devzvol_readdir(struct vnode *dvp, struct uio *uiop, struct cred *cred,
int *eofp, caller_context_t *ct_unused, int flags_unused)
{
struct sdev_node *sdvp = VTOSDEV(dvp);
char *ptr;
sdcmn_err13(("zv readdir of '%s' %s'", sdvp->sdev_path,
sdvp->sdev_name));
if (strcmp(sdvp->sdev_path, ZVOL_DIR) == 0) {
struct vnode *vp;
rw_exit(&sdvp->sdev_contents);
(void) devname_lookup_func(sdvp, "dsk", &vp, cred,
devzvol_create_dir, SDEV_VATTR);
VN_RELE(vp);
(void) devname_lookup_func(sdvp, "rdsk", &vp, cred,
devzvol_create_dir, SDEV_VATTR);
VN_RELE(vp);
rw_enter(&sdvp->sdev_contents, RW_READER);
return (devname_readdir_func(dvp, uiop, cred, eofp, 0));
}
if (uiop->uio_offset == 0)
devzvol_prunedir(sdvp);
ptr = sdvp->sdev_path + strlen(ZVOL_DIR);
if ((strcmp(ptr, "/dsk") == 0) || (strcmp(ptr, "/rdsk") == 0)) {
rw_exit(&sdvp->sdev_contents);
devzvol_create_pool_dirs(dvp);
rw_enter(&sdvp->sdev_contents, RW_READER);
return (devname_readdir_func(dvp, uiop, cred, eofp, 0));
}
ptr = strchr(ptr + 1, '/') + 1;
rw_exit(&sdvp->sdev_contents);
sdev_iter_datasets(dvp, ZFS_IOC_DATASET_LIST_NEXT, ptr);
rw_enter(&sdvp->sdev_contents, RW_READER);
return (devname_readdir_func(dvp, uiop, cred, eofp, 0));
}
Commit Message: 5421 devzvol_readdir() needs to be more careful with strchr
Reviewed by: Keith Wesolowski <keith.wesolowski@joyent.com>
Reviewed by: Jerry Jelinek <jerry.jelinek@joyent.com>
Approved by: Dan McDonald <danmcd@omniti.com>
CWE ID: | 1 | 20,013 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PassRefPtr<CSSValue> getDurationValue(const AnimationList* animList)
{
RefPtr<CSSValueList> list = CSSValueList::createCommaSeparated();
if (animList) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < animList->size(); ++i)
list->append(cssValuePool().createValue(animList->animation(i)->duration(), CSSPrimitiveValue::CSS_S));
} else {
list->append(cssValuePool().createValue(Animation::initialAnimationDuration(), CSSPrimitiveValue::CSS_S));
}
return list.release();
}
Commit Message: Rename isPositioned to isOutOfFlowPositioned for clarity
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89836
Reviewed by Antti Koivisto.
RenderObject and RenderStyle had an isPositioned() method that was
confusing, because it excluded relative positioning. Rename to
isOutOfFlowPositioned(), which makes it clearer that it only applies
to absolute and fixed positioning.
Simple rename; no behavior change.
Source/WebCore:
* css/CSSComputedStyleDeclaration.cpp:
(WebCore::getPositionOffsetValue):
* css/StyleResolver.cpp:
(WebCore::StyleResolver::collectMatchingRulesForList):
* dom/Text.cpp:
(WebCore::Text::rendererIsNeeded):
* editing/DeleteButtonController.cpp:
(WebCore::isDeletableElement):
* editing/TextIterator.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldEmitNewlinesBeforeAndAfterNode):
* rendering/AutoTableLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldScaleColumns):
* rendering/InlineFlowBox.cpp:
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::addToLine):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInInlineDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::requiresIdeographicBaseline):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::adjustMaxAscentAndDescent):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeLogicalBoxHeights):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::flipLinesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverflow):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverAnnotationAdjustment):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeUnderAnnotationAdjustment):
* rendering/InlineIterator.h:
(WebCore::isIteratorTarget):
* rendering/LayoutState.cpp:
(WebCore::LayoutState::LayoutState):
* rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::MarginInfo::MarginInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::containingColumnsBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::columnsBlockForSpanningElement):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildIgnoringAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::getInlineRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelfCollapsingBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addOverflowFromBlockChildren):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::expandsToEncloseOverhangingFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::handlePositionedChild):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::moveRunInUnderSiblingBlockIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::collapseMargins):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloatsIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::simplifiedNormalFlowLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelectionRoot):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::blockSelectionGaps):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markSiblingsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::isChildHitTestCandidate):
(WebCore::InlineMinMaxIterator::next):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::firstLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::lastLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::updateFirstLetter):
(WebCore::shouldCheckLines):
(WebCore::getHeightForLineCount):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustForBorderFit):
(WebCore::inNormalFlow):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustLinePositionForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustBlockChildForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderBlock.h:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::shouldSkipCreatingRunsForObject):
* rendering/RenderBlockLineLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::setMarginsForRubyRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeInlineDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutInlineChildren):
(WebCore::requiresLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipTrailingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipLeadingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::nextLineBreak):
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::removeFloatingOrPositionedChildFromBlockLists):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::updateBoxModelInfoFromStyle):
(WebCore::RenderBox::offsetFromContainer):
(WebCore::RenderBox::positionLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalWidthInRegion):
(WebCore::RenderBox::renderBoxRegionInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computePercentageLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalWidthUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::percentageLogicalHeightIsResolvable):
* rendering/RenderBox.h:
(WebCore::RenderBox::stretchesToViewport):
(WebCore::RenderBox::isDeprecatedFlexItem):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::adjustedPositionRelativeToOffsetParent):
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::mapAbsoluteToLocalPoint):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::requiresLayer):
* rendering/RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::childDoesNotAffectWidthOrFlexing):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutHorizontalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutVerticalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::renderName):
* rendering/RenderFieldset.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFieldset::findLegend):
* rendering/RenderFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computePreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::autoMarginOffsetInMainAxis):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::availableAlignmentSpaceForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeMainAxisPreferredSizes):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeNextFlexLine):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::resolveFlexibleLengths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::prepareChildForPositionedLayout):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutAndPlaceChildren):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutColumnReverse):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::adjustAlignmentForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::flipForRightToLeftColumn):
* rendering/RenderGrid.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderGrid::renderName):
* rendering/RenderImage.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderImage::computeIntrinsicRatioInformation):
* rendering/RenderInline.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildIgnoringContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::generateCulledLineBoxRects):
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineFirstLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineLastLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineVisualOverflowBoundingBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderInline::dirtyLineBoxes):
* rendering/RenderLayer.cpp:
(WebCore::checkContainingBlockChainForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::updateLayerPosition):
(WebCore::isPositionedContainer):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::calculateClipRects):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::shouldBeNormalFlowOnly):
* rendering/RenderLayerCompositor.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLayerCompositor::requiresCompositingForPosition):
* rendering/RenderLineBoxList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLineBoxList::dirtyLinesFromChangedChild):
* rendering/RenderListItem.cpp:
(WebCore::getParentOfFirstLineBox):
* rendering/RenderMultiColumnBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMultiColumnBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObject::markContainingBlocksForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderObject::setPreferredLogicalWidthsDirty):
(WebCore::RenderObject::invalidateContainerPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderObject::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderObject::offsetParent):
* rendering/RenderObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderObject::isOutOfFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isInFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::hasClip):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned):
* rendering/RenderObjectChildList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObjectChildList::removeChildNode):
* rendering/RenderReplaced.cpp:
(WebCore::hasAutoHeightOrContainingBlockWithAutoHeight):
* rendering/RenderRubyRun.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderRubyRun::rubyText):
* rendering/RenderTable.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderTable::addChild):
(WebCore::RenderTable::computeLogicalWidth):
(WebCore::RenderTable::layout):
* rendering/style/RenderStyle.h:
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isNonRenderViewFixedPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isFixedPositionedContainer):
Source/WebKit2:
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::updateOffsetFromViewportForSelf):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@121123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkService::StartSessionFromUserInteraction(
const gfx::Rect& rect) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
if (!InitiateUserInteraction(false /* is_toggle */))
return;
if (rect.IsEmpty()) {
mojom::VoiceInteractionFrameworkInstance* framework_instance =
ARC_GET_INSTANCE_FOR_METHOD(
arc_bridge_service_->voice_interaction_framework(),
StartVoiceInteractionSession);
DCHECK(framework_instance);
framework_instance->StartVoiceInteractionSession(IsHomescreenActive());
} else {
mojom::VoiceInteractionFrameworkInstance* framework_instance =
ARC_GET_INSTANCE_FOR_METHOD(
arc_bridge_service_->voice_interaction_framework(),
StartVoiceInteractionSessionForRegion);
DCHECK(framework_instance);
framework_instance->StartVoiceInteractionSessionForRegion(rect);
}
VLOG(1) << "Sent voice interaction request.";
}
Commit Message: arc: add test for blocking incognito windows in screenshot
BUG=778852
TEST=ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkServiceUnittest.
CapturingScreenshotBlocksIncognitoWindows
Change-Id: I0bfa5a486759783d7c8926a309c6b5da9b02dcc6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914983
Commit-Queue: Muyuan Li <muyuanli@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Hector Chavez <lhchavez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536438}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 26,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static XMLRPCCmd *createXMLCommand(const char *name, XMLRPCMethodFunc func)
{
XMLRPCCmd *xml = NULL;
xml = smalloc(sizeof(XMLRPCCmd));
xml->name = sstrdup(name);
xml->func = func;
xml->mod_name = NULL;
xml->core = 0;
xml->next = NULL;
return xml;
}
Commit Message: Do not copy more bytes than were allocated
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gboolean webkit_web_view_real_web_view_ready(WebKitWebView*)
{
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 5,202 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __must_check media_device_register_entity(struct media_device *mdev,
struct media_entity *entity)
{
/* Warn if we apparently re-register an entity */
WARN_ON(entity->parent != NULL);
entity->parent = mdev;
spin_lock(&mdev->lock);
if (entity->id == 0)
entity->id = mdev->entity_id++;
else
mdev->entity_id = max(entity->id + 1, mdev->entity_id);
list_add_tail(&entity->list, &mdev->entities);
spin_unlock(&mdev->lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] media-device: fix infoleak in ioctl media_enum_entities()
This fixes CVE-2014-1739.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speiro@ai2.upv.es>
Acked-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 14,166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DefaultTabHandler::DuplicateContentsAt(int index) {
delegate_->AsBrowser()->DuplicateContentsAt(index);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 26,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableExperimentalProductivityFeatures(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetExperimentalProductivityFeaturesEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 3,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::BlinkFeatureUsageReport(const std::set<int>& features) {
DCHECK(!features.empty());
for (int feature : features) {
UseCounter::Count(GetFrame(), static_cast<WebFeature>(feature));
}
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 8,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct dentry *proc_root_lookup(struct inode * dir, struct dentry * dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
if (!proc_lookup(dir, dentry, nd)) {
return NULL;
}
return proc_pid_lookup(dir, dentry, nd);
}
Commit Message: procfs: fix a vfsmount longterm reference leak
kern_mount() doesn't pair with plain mntput()...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::DecrementCapturerCount() {
--capturer_count_;
DVLOG(1) << "There are now " << capturer_count_
<< " capturing(s) of WebContentsImpl@" << this;
DCHECK_LE(0, capturer_count_);
if (is_being_destroyed_)
return;
if (!IsBeingCaptured()) {
const gfx::Size old_size = preferred_size_for_capture_;
preferred_size_for_capture_ = gfx::Size();
OnPreferredSizeChanged(old_size);
if (visibility_ == Visibility::HIDDEN) {
DVLOG(1) << "Executing delayed WasHidden().";
WasHidden();
} else if (visibility_ == Visibility::OCCLUDED) {
WasOccluded();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: eXosip_guess_localip (struct eXosip_t *excontext, int family, char *address, int size)
{
return _eXosip_guess_ip_for_via (excontext, family, address, size);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 25,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UiSceneCreator::CreateViewportAwareRoot() {
auto element = base::MakeUnique<ViewportAwareRoot>();
element->SetName(kWebVrViewportAwareRoot);
element->set_hit_testable(false);
scene_->AddUiElement(kWebVrRoot, std::move(element));
element = base::MakeUnique<ViewportAwareRoot>();
element->SetName(k2dBrowsingViewportAwareRoot);
element->set_hit_testable(false);
scene_->AddUiElement(k2dBrowsingRoot, std::move(element));
}
Commit Message: Fix wrapping behavior of description text in omnibox suggestion
This regression is introduced by
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/827033
The description text should not wrap.
Bug: NONE
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Iaac5e6176e1730853406602835d61fe1e80ec0d0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/839960
Reviewed-by: Christopher Grant <cjgrant@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525806}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 24,195 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xml_create_patchset_v1(xmlNode *source, xmlNode *target, bool config, bool with_digest)
{
xmlNode *patchset = diff_xml_object(source, target, !with_digest);
if(patchset) {
CRM_LOG_ASSERT(xml_document_dirty(target));
xml_repair_v1_diff(source, target, patchset, config);
crm_xml_add(patchset, "format", "1");
}
return patchset;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 16,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int btrfs_prealloc_file_range_trans(struct inode *inode,
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, int mode,
u64 start, u64 num_bytes, u64 min_size,
loff_t actual_len, u64 *alloc_hint)
{
return __btrfs_prealloc_file_range(inode, mode, start, num_bytes,
min_size, actual_len, alloc_hint, trans);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 2,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeShortSlong8(int64 value)
{
if ((value<0)||(value>0xFFFF))
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrRange);
else
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int phar_parse_tarfile(php_stream* fp, char *fname, int fname_len, char *alias, int alias_len, phar_archive_data** pphar, int is_data, php_uint32 compression, char **error TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char buf[512], *actual_alias = NULL, *p;
phar_entry_info entry = {0};
size_t pos = 0, read, totalsize;
tar_header *hdr;
php_uint32 sum1, sum2, size, old;
phar_archive_data *myphar, **actual;
int last_was_longlink = 0;
if (error) {
*error = NULL;
}
php_stream_seek(fp, 0, SEEK_END);
totalsize = php_stream_tell(fp);
php_stream_seek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (read != sizeof(buf)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is not a tar file or is truncated", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
return FAILURE;
}
hdr = (tar_header*)buf;
old = (memcmp(hdr->magic, "ustar", sizeof("ustar")-1) != 0);
myphar = (phar_archive_data *) pecalloc(1, sizeof(phar_archive_data), PHAR_G(persist));
myphar->is_persistent = PHAR_G(persist);
/* estimate number of entries, can't be certain with tar files */
zend_hash_init(&myphar->manifest, 2 + (totalsize >> 12),
zend_get_hash_value, destroy_phar_manifest_entry, (zend_bool)myphar->is_persistent);
zend_hash_init(&myphar->mounted_dirs, 5,
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, (zend_bool)myphar->is_persistent);
zend_hash_init(&myphar->virtual_dirs, 4 + (totalsize >> 11),
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, (zend_bool)myphar->is_persistent);
myphar->is_tar = 1;
/* remember whether this entire phar was compressed with gz/bzip2 */
myphar->flags = compression;
entry.is_tar = 1;
entry.is_crc_checked = 1;
entry.phar = myphar;
pos += sizeof(buf);
do {
phar_entry_info *newentry;
pos = php_stream_tell(fp);
hdr = (tar_header*) buf;
sum1 = phar_tar_number(hdr->checksum, sizeof(hdr->checksum));
if (sum1 == 0 && phar_tar_checksum(buf, sizeof(buf)) == 0) {
break;
}
memset(hdr->checksum, ' ', sizeof(hdr->checksum));
sum2 = phar_tar_checksum(buf, old?sizeof(old_tar_header):sizeof(tar_header));
size = entry.uncompressed_filesize = entry.compressed_filesize =
phar_tar_number(hdr->size, sizeof(hdr->size));
if (((!old && hdr->prefix[0] == 0) || old) && strlen(hdr->name) == sizeof(".phar/signature.bin")-1 && !strncmp(hdr->name, ".phar/signature.bin", sizeof(".phar/signature.bin")-1)) {
off_t curloc;
if (size > 511) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: tar-based phar \"%s\" has signature that is larger than 511 bytes, cannot process", fname);
}
bail:
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
curloc = php_stream_tell(fp);
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, size);
if (read != size) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: tar-based phar \"%s\" signature cannot be read", fname);
}
goto bail;
}
#ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
# define PHAR_GET_32(buffer) \
(((((unsigned char*)(buffer))[3]) << 24) \
| ((((unsigned char*)(buffer))[2]) << 16) \
| ((((unsigned char*)(buffer))[1]) << 8) \
| (((unsigned char*)(buffer))[0]))
#else
# define PHAR_GET_32(buffer) (php_uint32) *(buffer)
#endif
myphar->sig_flags = PHAR_GET_32(buf);
if (FAILURE == phar_verify_signature(fp, php_stream_tell(fp) - size - 512, myphar->sig_flags, buf + 8, size - 8, fname, &myphar->signature, &myphar->sig_len, error TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (error) {
char *save = *error;
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: tar-based phar \"%s\" signature cannot be verified: %s", fname, save);
efree(save);
}
goto bail;
}
php_stream_seek(fp, curloc + 512, SEEK_SET);
/* signature checked out, let's ensure this is the last file in the phar */
if (((hdr->typeflag == '\0') || (hdr->typeflag == TAR_FILE)) && size > 0) {
/* this is not good enough - seek succeeds even on truncated tars */
php_stream_seek(fp, 512, SEEK_CUR);
if ((uint)php_stream_tell(fp) > totalsize) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
}
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (read != sizeof(buf)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
hdr = (tar_header*) buf;
sum1 = phar_tar_number(hdr->checksum, sizeof(hdr->checksum));
if (sum1 == 0 && phar_tar_checksum(buf, sizeof(buf)) == 0) {
break;
}
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" has entries after signature, invalid phar", fname);
}
goto bail;
}
if (!last_was_longlink && hdr->typeflag == 'L') {
last_was_longlink = 1;
/* support the ././@LongLink system for storing long filenames */
entry.filename_len = entry.uncompressed_filesize;
/* Check for overflow - bug 61065 */
if (entry.filename_len == UINT_MAX) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (invalid entry size)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
entry.filename = pemalloc(entry.filename_len+1, myphar->is_persistent);
read = php_stream_read(fp, entry.filename, entry.filename_len);
if (read != entry.filename_len) {
efree(entry.filename);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
entry.filename[entry.filename_len] = '\0';
/* skip blank stuff */
size = ((size+511)&~511) - size;
/* this is not good enough - seek succeeds even on truncated tars */
php_stream_seek(fp, size, SEEK_CUR);
if ((uint)php_stream_tell(fp) > totalsize) {
efree(entry.filename);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (read != sizeof(buf)) {
efree(entry.filename);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
continue;
} else if (!last_was_longlink && !old && hdr->prefix[0] != 0) {
char name[256];
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < 155; i++) {
name[i] = hdr->prefix[i];
if (name[i] == '\0') {
break;
}
}
name[i++] = '/';
for (j = 0; j < 100; j++) {
name[i+j] = hdr->name[j];
if (name[i+j] == '\0') {
break;
}
}
entry.filename_len = i+j;
if (name[entry.filename_len - 1] == '/') {
/* some tar programs store directories with trailing slash */
entry.filename_len--;
}
entry.filename = pestrndup(name, entry.filename_len, myphar->is_persistent);
} else if (!last_was_longlink) {
int i;
/* calculate strlen, which can be no longer than 100 */
for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
if (hdr->name[i] == '\0') {
break;
}
}
entry.filename_len = i;
entry.filename = pestrndup(hdr->name, i, myphar->is_persistent);
if (entry.filename[entry.filename_len - 1] == '/') {
/* some tar programs store directories with trailing slash */
entry.filename[entry.filename_len - 1] = '\0';
entry.filename_len--;
}
}
last_was_longlink = 0;
phar_add_virtual_dirs(myphar, entry.filename, entry.filename_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (sum1 != sum2) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (checksum mismatch of file \"%s\")", fname, entry.filename);
}
pefree(entry.filename, myphar->is_persistent);
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
entry.tar_type = ((old & (hdr->typeflag == '\0')) ? TAR_FILE : hdr->typeflag);
entry.offset = entry.offset_abs = pos; /* header_offset unused in tar */
entry.fp_type = PHAR_FP;
entry.flags = phar_tar_number(hdr->mode, sizeof(hdr->mode)) & PHAR_ENT_PERM_MASK;
entry.timestamp = phar_tar_number(hdr->mtime, sizeof(hdr->mtime));
entry.is_persistent = myphar->is_persistent;
#ifndef S_ISDIR
#define S_ISDIR(mode) (((mode)&S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
#endif
if (old && entry.tar_type == TAR_FILE && S_ISDIR(entry.flags)) {
entry.tar_type = TAR_DIR;
}
if (entry.tar_type == TAR_DIR) {
entry.is_dir = 1;
} else {
entry.is_dir = 0;
}
entry.link = NULL;
if (entry.tar_type == TAR_LINK) {
if (!zend_hash_exists(&myphar->manifest, hdr->linkname, strlen(hdr->linkname))) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file - hard link to non-existent file \"%s\"", fname, hdr->linkname);
}
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
entry.link = estrdup(hdr->linkname);
} else if (entry.tar_type == TAR_SYMLINK) {
entry.link = estrdup(hdr->linkname);
}
phar_set_inode(&entry TSRMLS_CC);
zend_hash_add(&myphar->manifest, entry.filename, entry.filename_len, (void*)&entry, sizeof(phar_entry_info), (void **) &newentry);
if (entry.is_persistent) {
++entry.manifest_pos;
}
if (entry.filename_len >= sizeof(".phar/.metadata")-1 && !memcmp(entry.filename, ".phar/.metadata", sizeof(".phar/.metadata")-1)) {
if (FAILURE == phar_tar_process_metadata(newentry, fp TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: tar-based phar \"%s\" has invalid metadata in magic file \"%s\"", fname, entry.filename);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
}
if (!actual_alias && entry.filename_len == sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1 && !strncmp(entry.filename, ".phar/alias.txt", sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1)) {
/* found explicit alias */
if (size > 511) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: tar-based phar \"%s\" has alias that is larger than 511 bytes, cannot process", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, size);
if (read == size) {
buf[size] = '\0';
if (!phar_validate_alias(buf, size)) {
if (size > 50) {
buf[50] = '.';
buf[51] = '.';
buf[52] = '.';
buf[53] = '\0';
}
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: invalid alias \"%s\" in tar-based phar \"%s\"", buf, fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
actual_alias = pestrndup(buf, size, myphar->is_persistent);
myphar->alias = actual_alias;
myphar->alias_len = size;
php_stream_seek(fp, pos, SEEK_SET);
} else {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: Unable to read alias from tar-based phar \"%s\"", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
}
size = (size+511)&~511;
if (((hdr->typeflag == '\0') || (hdr->typeflag == TAR_FILE)) && size > 0) {
/* this is not good enough - seek succeeds even on truncated tars */
php_stream_seek(fp, size, SEEK_CUR);
if ((uint)php_stream_tell(fp) > totalsize) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
}
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (read != sizeof(buf)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
} while (read != 0);
if (zend_hash_exists(&(myphar->manifest), ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1)) {
myphar->is_data = 0;
} else {
myphar->is_data = 1;
}
/* ensure signature set */
if (!myphar->is_data && PHAR_G(require_hash) && !myphar->signature) {
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "tar-based phar \"%s\" does not have a signature", fname);
}
return FAILURE;
}
myphar->fname = pestrndup(fname, fname_len, myphar->is_persistent);
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
phar_unixify_path_separators(myphar->fname, fname_len);
#endif
myphar->fname_len = fname_len;
myphar->fp = fp;
p = strrchr(myphar->fname, '/');
if (p) {
myphar->ext = memchr(p, '.', (myphar->fname + fname_len) - p);
if (myphar->ext == p) {
myphar->ext = memchr(p + 1, '.', (myphar->fname + fname_len) - p - 1);
}
if (myphar->ext) {
myphar->ext_len = (myphar->fname + fname_len) - myphar->ext;
}
}
phar_request_initialize(TSRMLS_C);
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_add(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), myphar->fname, fname_len, (void*)&myphar, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), (void **)&actual)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: Unable to add tar-based phar \"%s\" to phar registry", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
myphar = *actual;
if (actual_alias) {
phar_archive_data **fd_ptr;
myphar->is_temporary_alias = 0;
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), actual_alias, myphar->alias_len, (void **)&fd_ptr)) {
if (SUCCESS != phar_free_alias(*fd_ptr, actual_alias, myphar->alias_len TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: Unable to add tar-based phar \"%s\", alias is already in use", fname);
}
zend_hash_del(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), myphar->fname, fname_len);
return FAILURE;
}
}
zend_hash_add(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), actual_alias, myphar->alias_len, (void*)&myphar, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), NULL);
} else {
phar_archive_data **fd_ptr;
if (alias_len) {
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), alias, alias_len, (void **)&fd_ptr)) {
if (SUCCESS != phar_free_alias(*fd_ptr, alias, alias_len TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: Unable to add tar-based phar \"%s\", alias is already in use", fname);
}
zend_hash_del(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), myphar->fname, fname_len);
return FAILURE;
}
}
zend_hash_add(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), alias, alias_len, (void*)&myphar, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), NULL);
myphar->alias = pestrndup(alias, alias_len, myphar->is_persistent);
myphar->alias_len = alias_len;
} else {
myphar->alias = pestrndup(myphar->fname, fname_len, myphar->is_persistent);
myphar->alias_len = fname_len;
}
myphar->is_temporary_alias = 1;
}
if (pphar) {
*pphar = myphar;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 7,968 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetUniformfv(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::GetUniformfv& c) {
GLuint program = c.program;
GLint fake_location = c.location;
GLuint service_id;
GLint real_location = -1;
Error error;
typedef cmds::GetUniformfv::Result Result;
Result* result;
GLenum result_type;
if (GetUniformSetup(
program, fake_location, c.params_shm_id, c.params_shm_offset,
&error, &real_location, &service_id,
reinterpret_cast<void**>(&result), &result_type)) {
if (result_type == GL_BOOL || result_type == GL_BOOL_VEC2 ||
result_type == GL_BOOL_VEC3 || result_type == GL_BOOL_VEC4) {
GLsizei num_values = result->GetNumResults();
scoped_ptr<GLint[]> temp(new GLint[num_values]);
glGetUniformiv(service_id, real_location, temp.get());
GLfloat* dst = result->GetData();
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < num_values; ++ii) {
dst[ii] = (temp[ii] != 0);
}
} else {
glGetUniformfv(service_id, real_location, result->GetData());
}
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,805 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XMLRPC_SERVER XMLRPC_GetGlobalServer() {
static XMLRPC_SERVER xsServer = 0;
if(!xsServer) {
xsServer = XMLRPC_ServerCreate();
}
return xsServer;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,244 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScopedFrameBufferBinder::~ScopedFrameBufferBinder() {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(decoder_);
decoder_->RestoreCurrentFramebufferBindings();
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::free_input_buffer(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *bufferHdr)
{
unsigned int index = 0;
OMX_U8 *temp_buff ;
if (bufferHdr == NULL || m_inp_mem_ptr == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: free_input: Invalid bufferHdr[%p] or m_inp_mem_ptr[%p]",
bufferHdr, m_inp_mem_ptr);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
index = bufferHdr - ((!meta_mode_enable)?m_inp_mem_ptr:meta_buffer_hdr);
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
if (meta_mode_enable) {
if (index < m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual) {
memset(&meta_buffer_hdr[index], 0, sizeof(meta_buffer_hdr[index]));
memset(&meta_buffers[index], 0, sizeof(meta_buffers[index]));
}
if (!mUseProxyColorFormat)
return OMX_ErrorNone;
else {
c2d_conv.close();
opaque_buffer_hdr[index] = NULL;
}
}
#endif
if (index < m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual && !mUseProxyColorFormat &&
dev_free_buf(&m_pInput_pmem[index],PORT_INDEX_IN) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ERROR: dev_free_buf() Failed for i/p buf");
}
if (index < m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual && m_pInput_pmem) {
if (m_pInput_pmem[index].fd > 0 && input_use_buffer == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("FreeBuffer:: i/p AllocateBuffer case");
if(!secure_session) {
munmap (m_pInput_pmem[index].buffer,m_pInput_pmem[index].size);
} else {
free(m_pInput_pmem[index].buffer);
}
close (m_pInput_pmem[index].fd);
#ifdef USE_ION
free_ion_memory(&m_pInput_ion[index]);
#endif
m_pInput_pmem[index].fd = -1;
} else if (m_pInput_pmem[index].fd > 0 && (input_use_buffer == true &&
m_use_input_pmem == OMX_FALSE)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("FreeBuffer:: i/p Heap UseBuffer case");
if (dev_free_buf(&m_pInput_pmem[index],PORT_INDEX_IN) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: dev_free_buf() Failed for i/p buf");
}
if(!secure_session) {
munmap (m_pInput_pmem[index].buffer,m_pInput_pmem[index].size);
}
close (m_pInput_pmem[index].fd);
#ifdef USE_ION
free_ion_memory(&m_pInput_ion[index]);
#endif
m_pInput_pmem[index].fd = -1;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("FreeBuffer:: fd is invalid or i/p PMEM UseBuffer case");
}
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27903498
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVenc problem #3)
CRs-Fixed: 1010088
Change-Id: I898b42034c0add621d4f9d8e02ca0ed4403d4fd3
CWE ID: | 1 | 20,316 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::ReplaceMisspelling(const base::string16& word) {
RenderFrameHost* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->Send(new InputMsg_ReplaceMisspelling(
focused_frame->GetRoutingID(), word));
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init setup_transparent_hugepage(char *str)
{
int ret = 0;
if (!str)
goto out;
if (!strcmp(str, "always")) {
set_bit(TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_FLAG,
&transparent_hugepage_flags);
clear_bit(TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_REQ_MADV_FLAG,
&transparent_hugepage_flags);
ret = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(str, "madvise")) {
clear_bit(TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_FLAG,
&transparent_hugepage_flags);
set_bit(TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_REQ_MADV_FLAG,
&transparent_hugepage_flags);
ret = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(str, "never")) {
clear_bit(TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_FLAG,
&transparent_hugepage_flags);
clear_bit(TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_REQ_MADV_FLAG,
&transparent_hugepage_flags);
ret = 1;
}
out:
if (!ret)
printk(KERN_WARNING
"transparent_hugepage= cannot parse, ignored\n");
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE and vm_flags cleanups
The huge_memory.c THP page fault was allowed to run if vm_ops was null
(which would succeed for /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE, as the f_op->mmap wouldn't
setup a special vma->vm_ops and it would fallback to regular anonymous
memory) but other THP logics weren't fully activated for vmas with vm_file
not NULL (/dev/zero has a not NULL vma->vm_file).
So this removes the vm_file checks so that /dev/zero also can safely use
THP (the other albeit safer approach to fix this bug would have been to
prevent the THP initial page fault to run if vm_file was set).
After removing the vm_file checks, this also makes huge_memory.c stricter
in khugepaged for the DEBUG_VM=y case. It doesn't replace the vm_file
check with a is_pfn_mapping check (but it keeps checking for VM_PFNMAP
under VM_BUG_ON) because for a is_cow_mapping() mapping VM_PFNMAP should
only be allowed to exist before the first page fault, and in turn when
vma->anon_vma is null (so preventing khugepaged registration). So I tend
to think the previous comment saying if vm_file was set, VM_PFNMAP might
have been set and we could still be registered in khugepaged (despite
anon_vma was not NULL to be registered in khugepaged) was too paranoid.
The is_linear_pfn_mapping check is also I think superfluous (as described
by comment) but under DEBUG_VM it is safe to stay.
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33682
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Caspar Zhang <bugs@casparzhang.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.38.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(sigsuspend, int, unused1, int, unused2, old_sigset_t, mask)
{
sigset_t blocked;
siginitset(&blocked, mask);
return sigsuspend(&blocked);
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CardUnmaskPromptViews::FadeOutView::PaintChildren(
const PaintContext& context) {
if (opacity_ > 0.99)
return views::View::PaintChildren(context);
gfx::Canvas* canvas = context.canvas();
canvas->SaveLayerAlpha(0xff * opacity_);
views::View::PaintChildren(context);
canvas->Restore();
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SerializeNotificationDatabaseData(const NotificationDatabaseData& input,
std::string* output) {
DCHECK(output);
scoped_ptr<NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData> payload(
new NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData());
const PlatformNotificationData& notification_data = input.notification_data;
payload->set_title(base::UTF16ToUTF8(notification_data.title));
switch (notification_data.direction) {
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_LEFT_TO_RIGHT:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::LEFT_TO_RIGHT);
break;
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_RIGHT_TO_LEFT:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::RIGHT_TO_LEFT);
break;
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_AUTO:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::AUTO);
break;
}
payload->set_lang(notification_data.lang);
payload->set_body(base::UTF16ToUTF8(notification_data.body));
payload->set_tag(notification_data.tag);
payload->set_icon(notification_data.icon.spec());
for (size_t i = 0; i < notification_data.vibration_pattern.size(); ++i)
payload->add_vibration_pattern(notification_data.vibration_pattern[i]);
payload->set_timestamp(notification_data.timestamp.ToInternalValue());
payload->set_silent(notification_data.silent);
payload->set_require_interaction(notification_data.require_interaction);
if (notification_data.data.size()) {
payload->set_data(¬ification_data.data.front(),
notification_data.data.size());
}
for (const PlatformNotificationAction& action : notification_data.actions) {
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationAction* payload_action =
payload->add_actions();
payload_action->set_action(action.action);
payload_action->set_title(base::UTF16ToUTF8(action.title));
}
NotificationDatabaseDataProto message;
message.set_notification_id(input.notification_id);
message.set_origin(input.origin.spec());
message.set_service_worker_registration_id(
input.service_worker_registration_id);
message.set_allocated_notification_data(payload.release());
return message.SerializeToString(output);
}
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
CWE ID: | 1 | 17,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void handle_rc_passthrough_rsp ( tBTA_AV_REMOTE_RSP *p_remote_rsp)
{
#if (AVRC_CTLR_INCLUDED == TRUE)
const char *status;
if (btif_rc_cb.rc_features & BTA_AV_FEAT_RCTG)
{
int key_state;
if (p_remote_rsp->key_state == AVRC_STATE_RELEASE)
{
status = "released";
key_state = 1;
}
else
{
status = "pressed";
key_state = 0;
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: rc_id=%d status=%s", __FUNCTION__, p_remote_rsp->rc_id, status);
release_transaction(p_remote_rsp->label);
if (bt_rc_ctrl_callbacks != NULL) {
HAL_CBACK(bt_rc_ctrl_callbacks, passthrough_rsp_cb, p_remote_rsp->rc_id, key_state);
}
}
else
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s DUT does not support AVRCP controller role", __FUNCTION__);
}
#else
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s AVRCP controller role is not enabled", __FUNCTION__);
#endif
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 25,461 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct sock *dccp_v4_request_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct sock *newsk;
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))
goto exit_overflow;
newsk = dccp_create_openreq_child(sk, req, skb);
if (newsk == NULL)
goto exit_nonewsk;
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
ireq = inet_rsk(req);
newinet->inet_daddr = ireq->rmt_addr;
newinet->inet_rcv_saddr = ireq->loc_addr;
newinet->inet_saddr = ireq->loc_addr;
newinet->inet_opt = ireq->opt;
ireq->opt = NULL;
newinet->mc_index = inet_iif(skb);
newinet->mc_ttl = ip_hdr(skb)->ttl;
newinet->inet_id = jiffies;
if (dst == NULL && (dst = inet_csk_route_child_sock(sk, newsk, req)) == NULL)
goto put_and_exit;
sk_setup_caps(newsk, dst);
dccp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
if (__inet_inherit_port(sk, newsk) < 0)
goto put_and_exit;
__inet_hash_nolisten(newsk, NULL);
return newsk;
exit_overflow:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
exit_nonewsk:
dst_release(dst);
exit:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENDROPS);
return NULL;
put_and_exit:
sock_put(newsk);
goto exit;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *ovl_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, void **cookie)
{
struct dentry *realdentry;
struct inode *realinode;
struct ovl_link_data *data = NULL;
const char *ret;
realdentry = ovl_dentry_real(dentry);
realinode = realdentry->d_inode;
if (WARN_ON(!realinode->i_op->follow_link))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
if (realinode->i_op->put_link) {
data = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ovl_link_data), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
data->realdentry = realdentry;
}
ret = realinode->i_op->follow_link(realdentry, cookie);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(ret)) {
kfree(data);
return ret;
}
if (data)
data->cookie = *cookie;
*cookie = data;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ovl: fix permission checking for setattr
[Al Viro] The bug is in being too enthusiastic about optimizing ->setattr()
away - instead of "copy verbatim with metadata" + "chmod/chown/utimes"
(with the former being always safe and the latter failing in case of
insufficient permissions) it tries to combine these two. Note that copyup
itself will have to do ->setattr() anyway; _that_ is where the elevated
capabilities are right. Having these two ->setattr() (one to set verbatim
copy of metadata, another to do what overlayfs ->setattr() had been asked
to do in the first place) combined is where it breaks.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 29,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: logger_buffer_renamed_signal_cb (const void *pointer, void *data,
const char *signal,
const char *type_data, void *signal_data)
{
/* make C compiler happy */
(void) pointer;
(void) data;
(void) signal;
(void) type_data;
logger_stop (logger_buffer_search_buffer (signal_data), 1);
logger_start_buffer (signal_data, 1);
return WEECHAT_RC_OK;
}
Commit Message: logger: call strftime before replacing buffer local variables
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabsCaptureVisibleTabFunction::RegisterProfilePrefs(
user_prefs::PrefRegistrySyncable* registry) {
registry->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kDisableScreenshots, false);
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,935 |
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